S/PV.879 Security Council

We heard last nightveryim- portant statements by the Ministerfor ForeignAffairs of Belgium and by the representative ofthe Republic of the Congo which helped to enlighten all of us on the developments in the Congo, and they constituteanelo- quent confirmation of the great wisdom with whichthe Council has acted in adopting the resolution of14 July [S/4387] which made it possible to dispatch a United Nations force to that territory so quickly. 3. First of all, I would like to commend with the highest expressions of praise, gratefulness and ap- preciation the way in which theSecretary-Generalhas been carryinF; out the task entrusted to him. It is Pr6sident: M. Jos6 A. CORREA (Equateur). Pr6sents: Les repr6sentants des Etats suivants: Argentine, Ceylan, Chine, Equateur, Etats-Unis d'Am6rique, France, Italie, Pologne, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Tunisie, Union des R6publiques socialistes sovi6tiques. Ordre du jour provisoire (SIAgenda/879) 1. Adoption de 1'ordre du jour. 2. Lettre, en date du 13 juillet 1960, adressee par le Secretaire general au President du Conseil de secu- rite (S/4381). Adoption de I'ordre du jour L'ordre du jour est adopte. Lettre, en date du 13 juillet 1960,< adressee par le Secretaire general au President du Conseil de securite (S/4381) 1. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'espagnol): Conform6- ment !l la d~cision prise par le Conseil de s6curit6 [873~me s~ance], j'invite les repr6sentants de laBel- gique et de la R6publique du Congo A- prendre place A- la table du Conseil. Sur l'invitation du President, oM: Pierre Wigny, l:epresentant de la Belgique, prend place a la table du Conseil. Sur l'invitation du President, M. Thomas Kanza, representant de la Republique du Congo, prend place ala table du Conseil. nest donne lecture de l'interpretation, en anglais et en fran()ais, de la declaration faite par M. Amadeo (Argentine) ala 878eme seance. 2. M. ORTONA (ItaUe) [traduit de l'anglais]: Nous avons entendu hier soir des d6clarations tr~s impor- tantes du Ministre des affaires 6tran~resde Belgique et du repr6sentant de la R6publique du Congoqui nous ont apport6 des 6claircissements sur 1'6volution de la situation au Congo et qui nous confirment avec 610- quence que le Conseil a fait preuve d'une grande sagesse en adoptant, le 14 juillet, la r6so1ution [S/4387] qui a permis d'envoyer si rapidement une force des Nations Unies dans ce territoire. 3. Tout d'abord, je ne saurais trop louer le 8ecr6- taire g6n6ral de la mani~re dont 11 s'est acquitt6 de la mission qui lui a 6t6 confi6e, et je voudrais lui expri- mer toute notre reconnaissance et notre admiration. 4. Now, I think that what we have to do here today is to take stock of the accomplishments so far achieved, to examine what more must be done, and to spare no efforts to facilitate the task undertaken by the Secre- tary-General. I think that no exception can be taken to anything done so far. Our responsibility now is to facilitate a smooth, effective and rapid increase of activities by the United Nations so that the resolution adopted on 14 July can have the maximum effect in the shortest possible time. 5. Last night we heard arehashingoffamiliarthemes by the representative of the Soviet Union. He pro- nounced words which do not seem to take any account of the realities and particularly the sufferings which unfortunately have been and are being borneby scores of unfortunate Europeans of many nations-not by a bunch of monopolistic, capitalistic exploiters as they were described yesterday in this room, butbyworkers who have worthily contributed to the welfare of the Congo for decades, workers engaged in building and road construction, in mining, in engineering, in electrical power-planned activities, in transportation enterprises and so on, workers whose activities have been praised by Mr. Kanza, the Congolese representa- tive, workers whose exodus we should wish to stop as it is already dealing a fatal blowtothe economy of that very territory which we want to help. The words he used seem to indicate that the Soviet Union is more interested in aggravating the situation than correcting it, and seem to prove an intention of furthering con- fusion in that country instead of co-operating for the establishment of a new prosperous order. All this at a moment, let me add, whenit shouldbe the duty of all well-meaning countries, without distinction ofpolitical ideologies, totryto remedy controversial situations, ~o curb dangerous hatreds, and especiallyto helpthe pop- ulations concerned, regardless oftheir race or colour, towards peaceful and constructive progress. 6. I think that it would be pertinent for me at this point to restate very clearly the position of my Gov- ernment on the matter. This position remains the same as I described it in my explanation of vote on 14 July [873rd meeting] and it is centred around the following proposition: the necessity of gearing the withdrawal of the Belgiantroops which haveintervened for the necessary protection of lives in the Congo to the re-establishment of order and security there through the intervention of the United Nations troops. 7. My delegation feels that there is still need of pro- tection of the European communities in the Congo. including the Italian which-Iwouldlike to emphasize- 5. Hier soir, le reprllsentant de l'Union sovilltique nous a fait entendre une repetition de themes qui nous sont familiers. n a prononcll des paroles qui semblent ne tenir aucun compte des faits, en particulier des souffrances qu'ont endurlles et qu'endurent encore des dizaines et des dizaines de malheureux Europllens originaires de nombreux pays. n ne s'agit pas d'une bande d'exploiteurs capitalistes et monopolisateurs comme on nOus l'a dit hier ici m~me, mais de tra- vailleurs qui, depuis des dizaines d'annlles, contribuent de faC$on mllritoire au bien~tre du Congo, de tra- vailleurs employlls dans le ba.timent, dans les cons- tructions de routes, dans les mines, dans les industries mllcaniques, dans les centrales lllectriques, dans les entreprises de transport et dans bien d'autres secteurs encore, de travailleurs dont M. Kanza, reprllsentant du CongO, a loulll'activitll, de travailleursdontnousvou- drions voir cesser l'exode, car cet exode a dlljll portll un coup fatal 11 l'llconomie du territoire auquel nous voulons venir en aide. n semble, 11 en juger par les paroles de son reprllsentant, que l'Union sovietique se prlloccupe plus d'aggraver la situation que d'ypor- ter rem~de et qu'elle ait l'intention de maintenir la confusion au Congo plutOt que de coopllrer Il l'instau- ration d'un ordre nouveau qui retablira la prosperite. Et cela, permettez-moi de le rappeler, au moment OU tous les pays de bonne volontll, sans distinction d'idllologie politique, devraient se faire un devoir d'apaiser les controverses, de rllprimer des h3.ines dangereuses et surtout d'aider les populations intll- resslles, quelle que soit leur race ou letir couleur, Il rllaliser des progr~s pacifiques et constructifs. 6. Le moment me semble venu de dMinir it nouveau l'attitude du Gouvernement italien enlamati~re.Cette attitude reste celle que j'ai exposlle le 14 juillet r873~me sllance] dans mes explications de vote et elle se fonde sur le principe suivant: il faut faire dllpendre le retrait des troupes beIges qui sont inter- venues pour assurer la protection des vies humaines au Congo du rlltablissement de l'ordre et de la sllcuritll par les troupes des Nations Unies. 7. En fait, ma dlllllgation estime qu'il est encore nllcessaire d'assu.rer la protection des communautes europeennes, parmt lesquelles une communautll ita- 8. I do not want to dwell unduly onthe origin of these unfortunate events or on the reasons for them, neither do I want to indulge in recriminations for occurrences which we all hope to be of a temporary nature. And I wish to reaffirm here that these clouds, however serious, should be viewed as a transient phenomenon, as pains of growth, as a difficult test that the young Republic will in due course of time overcome. But it is a fact that our workers, and the Europeans in general, have suffered and are suffering deeply from the situation which has developed in the last few days in the Congo. We are at pains to rescue our people, our planes are trying to fly ,them to Italy, ships are being diverted from their routes to Luanda and Dar es Salaam. In Brazzaville, long lines ofrefugees fromthe Congo are waiting to leave. In Rome alone there are already hundreds of refugees who have just arrived from the territory of the Congo. This is, I think, un- fortunately a sadly eloquent and, I hope, persuasive answer to the remarks made by the representative of the Soviet Union, according to which some people "are seeking to create the impression that the lives and property of Europeans ••• are in danger" [877thmeet- ing, para. 162]. The representative of the Soviet Union can rest assured that if this were only an impression, hundreds of people would not line up at harbours and airports waiting to escape, abandoning their posses- sions, leaving behind a past of industrious and con- structive work-and we, just the Italians, can count such people by the hundreds. 9. I know, because I was touched by the sincere tone in which he expressed himself, thatthe representative of the Republic of the Congo and his Government are the first to regret such occurrences, and I know that. they are as preoccupied as we are thatthey should not be repeated or multiply. Moreover, we have heardfrom the representative of the Republic of the Congo that 8. Je ne veux pas m'attarder outre mesure sur l'ori- gine ni sur les raisons de ces tristes €lvenements et je ne ve\U~ pas non plus me lancer dans des recrimi- nations il. l'occasion d'incidents qui, nous l'esperons tous, ont un caract~retemporaire. Et je veux redire ici que ces nuages, si sombres soient-ils, doivent ~tre consid€lres comme un phenom~ne passager, comme une douleur de croissance, comme une epreuve difficile que la jeune republique surmontera en temps voulu. n n'en demeure pas moins que nostravailIeurs, et les Europeens en ~n€lral, ont souffert et souffrent encore profondement de l'etat de choses qui r~gne depuis quelques jours au Congo. Nous nous efforgons de secourir nos compatriotes, nos avions essayent de les rapatrier, des bateaux sont d€ltournes pour toucher Luanda et Dar-es-Salam. A BrazzavilIe, de longues files de refugies du Congo attendent leur depart. On compte deja, rien qu'il. Rome, des centaines de refugies en provenance du Congo. crest l:l, malheu- reusement me semble-t-il, une reponse d'une triste eloquence, une reponse que j 'espere convaincante aux observations du r~pr€lsentant de 1'Union sovi€ltique selon lequel "on cherche :l donner 1'impression que la vie et les biens des Europeens ••. seraient menaces" [877~me seance, par. 162]. Le representantdel'Union sovietique peut ~tre certain que, s'il s'agissait seule- ment d'impression, on ne verrait pas des centaines de personnes faire la queue dans les ports et sur les aerodromes, attendant de s'enfuir, abandonnant leurs biens et laissant derri~re elIes un passe de travail industrieux et constructif, et je rappelIerai que, dans le seul cas des Italiens, ces personnes peuvent se compter par centaines. 9. La sincerite avec laquelIe le representant de la Republique du Congo s'est exprime m'a toucM et je sais que lui-m~me et spn gouvernement sont les pre- miers it deplorer de tels €lvenements et qu'ns sont aussi desireux que nous de ne pas voir ces €lvene- ments se rep§ter ni se multiplier. En outre, le repre- sentant de la Republique du Congo nous a assure que 10. Everybody, including" Belgium, agrees that the preseuce of the Belgian troops is only a temporary measure and that the Belgi:m troops called in to ensure order have to be withdrawn. May I add, in that respect, that I do not tltink that the statement made on tltis problem by the representative of the Soviet Union yesterday is accurate, when he said: "the question whether or not an imminent danger exists is one which the Belgian authorities themselves intend to settle at their own discretion" [877th meeting, para. 150]. 11. In fact, I should like to quote what the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium told us last night: "We have already begun to get out of Leopold- ville •.. We shall be only too happy to get out of the other places as soon as the United Nations tells us that security and tranquillity have been restored and that people can again go about their business-to which the representative of the Congo referred-in peace." [S77th meeting, para. 141.] 12. We can trust the Belgians when they say that they intervened only for humanitarian reasons and for an emergency mission, because their purpose is not to reinstate control of the Congo, which they voluntarily relinquished. It is for the United Nations to assess the needs of order and security, so that the Belgian troops can withdraw. The withdrawal will take place as soon as possible. Mr. Wigny, the Foreign Minister of Bel- gium, gave us last night the assurance that the with- drawal, already begun, will continue as the United Nations establishes control of the situation. On the other side, Mr. Kanza, a Congolese Minister, has re- affirmed that his Government is only anxious to see its country grow inpeace and independence and resume its friendship with Belgium. 13. All this, through the great effort of the United Nations and with the help of the United Nations, can be achieved, and quickly. There is only one condition: that no outside interventions take place. 14. The meaning of this important operation of the United Nations is that the only way of protecting and guaranteeing the independence and future of the Congo is to keep this young State from becoming a battle- ground for the contrasting interests of outside parties. Nor is any useful purpose, for the international com- munity or for the Congo itself, served by certain ut- tera..ces, certain incitements of ultimate character like the ones we have heard in these recent days. We believe that they do not strengthen the authority of the United Nations but that, on the contrary, they defy it. I wonder also whether all this talk of "goingit alone" in the Congo if the Belgian troops do not withdraw is in keeping with the spirit of the resolution we adopted on 14 July, which in fact means that the independence of 10. Tout le monde, y eompris la Belgique, reconnaft que la pr~senee des troupes beIges ne constitue qu'une mesure temporaire et qu'll faut procllder au retralt de ces troupes, qui ont lItll appel€les pour assurer I 'ordre. A cc sujet, puis-je ajouter qu'a mOll avis le repre- sentant de I'Union sovilltlque n'lItnit pas dans le v1'lli lorsqu'll d~elarait hier que "qunnt ~ savoir si illl danger imminent existe, les autoritlls beIges "ou- draient pouvoir en juger ~ leur guise" [877eme st!iance, par. 150). 11. En falt, je voudrais citer les paroles prononcees hier soil' par le Ministre des affaires €lt1'llngeres de Belgique,. "Nous avons d€lja d€leroch€l a LlIopoldville ••. Nous ne demandons qu'd (;(-crocher dans les autres loca- Utt!is ou nous sommes, d~s que 1'ONU nous dira que la s~curitt!i, la t1'llnquiIlit€l sont r~tablies et que le travail (auquel le repr€lsentant du Congo a fait allusion) peut Nre repris." [877eme s€lance, par. 141.] 12. Nous pouvons faire confiance nux BeIges lorsqu'ils disent qu'lls sont intervenus uniquement pour des rai- sons humanitaires et afin d'accomplir une mission ayant un caract~re d'urgence, car leur objectif n'est pas de reprendre au Congo une autorit€l !l laquelle lls ont volontairement renonc€l. n appartient!ll'Organisa- tion des Nations Unies de dt!iterminer les conditions !l rempUr pour r€ltablir 1'ordre et la st!icurit€l de fa<;on que les troupes beIges puissent se retirer, ce qui sera fait aussitOt que possible; M. Wigny, ministre des affaires t!itrangeres de Belgique, nous a donnt!i hier soil' l'assurance que le retrait, dt!ij!l commenc€l, se poursuivra il. mesure que les Nations Unies de- viendront maftresses de la situation. Par ailleurs, M. Kanza, membre du Gouvernement congolais, a rt!iaffirm€l que ce dernier ne souhaite qu'une chose: voir son pays se dt!ivelopper dans la paix et 1'indt!ipendance et renouer ses liens d'amitit!i avec la Belgique. 13. Tout cela, gdce il. l'effort consid€lrable d~ploy~ par les Nations Unies et avec l'aide des Nations Unies peut se r~aliser, et se r~aliserrapidement. Aune con- dition seulement: qu'll n'y ait aucune intervention de I 'ext~rieur. 14. Cette importante op~ration des Nations Unies signifie que la seule mani~re de prot~ger et de ga- rantir l'ind~pendance et l'avenir du Congo est d'em- p~cher ce jeune Etat de devenir un champ de bataille 011 s'affronteraient les int~r~ts oppos~s de tierces puissances. n n'est non plus d'aucune utllit~ il. la collectivit~ internationale ni au Congo lui-m~me que soient faites certaines d~clarations, certaines inci- tations il. caractere d'ultimatum telles que nous en avons entendu ces jours derniers. Nous estimons que l'autorit~ de 1'0rganisation des Nations Unies s'en trouve non pas raffermie, mais au contraire mise en question. Je me demande aussi si ces menaces d'intervention unilat~rale au Congo, au cas 011 les troupes beIges ne se retireraient pas, sont conformes 15. We do believe that any attempt to transfer the "cold war" to the arena of Africa will be damaging to the interests not only of peace but of the Africans themselves. 1G. There is no need to fear that the Congo will be left defenceless. Its best defence is in the United Nations Force, in the alertness ofthe Security Council to all the problems confronting the new Republic, in the responsibility of all ofus today for peace and order in that area-and it is inthe authority of our Organiza- tion, which has brought about such an exemplary rally of all the Member States around the proposal of the Secretary-General. This awareness on the part of the international community is indeed significant. Itis the basis from which we should look ahead to the future, because it is from the support and interest of the United Nations and its lmowledge of the needs which will face the Congo that the new State can derive its hope for a successful resumption of life. Let us not forg'et that the tragedy of these days is not only the struggle which has ensued between Europeans and Africans, who were for years associated in a pros- perous co-operation, but also the fact that Europeans are leaving the territory and are leaving by the thousands: behind them there is desolation and eco- nomic chaos. 17. Looking ahead, we can only say that what the United Nations is doing today, in maldng respect pre- vail so that harmony may be re-established in the Congo, is really a prerequisite to what it might be called upon to do tomorrow. The role of the United Nations, in this area of ex-pectations whichis Africa, is being andwillbe enhancedby the result of what is being done in these days in the Congo. Today the United Nations is worldng towards the goal of preventingthis territory from becoming a battleground of countries and of races. Tomorrow, as a result, the United Nations might have to develop new responsibilities, to work along new avenues. This is why my delegationdeems it essential that the operation should meet with success and should not be dis~.lrbedby local recurrences or by outside initiatives. We are strengthened in our hope by the words of friendship which were exchanged last night between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium and the representative of the Republic of the Congo. We feel that our expectations are well founded also because we were impressed by the statements which were pronouncedwithwarmthbythe representa- tive of the Congowithregardtothedesire and the need for future co-operation in constructive activities and joint efforts in building the new Congo. In this spirit, I trust, the Council will interpret the attitude of my Government to the problem. 18. As for the draft resolutions before us, !think that my remarks indicate to you that my delegation would not be able to vote for the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union [S/4402] and that the draft resolu- tion submitted by CeylonandTunisia'[S/4404] is in line 15. Nous sommes convaincus que toute tentative vi- sant II faire passer la "guerre froide" sur la sc~ne africaine serait pr~judiciablenon seulement a. la paix, mais aux Africains eux-m~mes. 16. n n'y a aucune raison de craindre que le Congo soit laisse sans defense. Sa meilleure defense c'est la Force des Nations Unies, cleat la vigilance du Conseil de s~curit~ face A. tous les probl~mes qui se posent II la nouvelle r~publique, c'est le fait que nous sommes tous responsables aujourd'hui du main- tien de la paix et de l'ordre dans cette r~gion. Et c'est aussi l'autorit~ de notre organisation, qui a permis un ralliement exemplaire de tous les Etats Membres a. 1'initiative du Secr~taire ~n~ral. Cette conscience de la collectivit~ internationale est signi- ficll,tive. C'est en nous appuyant sur elle que noUs devrions envisager l'avenir, car c'estgrace ausoutien des Nations Unies, d. l'int~r~t qu'elles manifestent et d. leur compr~hension des besoins futurs du Congo que le nouvel Etat peut esp~rer parvenir a. reprendre une existence normale. N'oublions pas que la tra~die de ces derniers jours pe r~side pas seulement dans la lutte qui a oppos~ Europ~ens et Africains, associ~s depuis des ann~es dans une coo~ration fructueuse, mais aussi dans le fait que les Euro~ens quittent le territoire et le quittent par mUliers: derri~re eux apparaissent la d~solationet le chaos ~conomique. 17. En nous tournant vel'S l'avenir, nous pouvons dire seulement que ce que font aujourd'hui l'Organi- sation des Nations Unies, en faisant pr~valoir le respect pour que 1'harmonie puisse ~tre r~tablie au Congo, n'est en r~alit~ que la condition pr~alable de ce qu'elle pourra ~tre appel~e a. faire demain. Le rOle des Nations Unies, dans cette terre d'espoirs qu'est 1'Afrique, est et sera rehauss~ par les r~sul­ tats de l'action entreprise au Congo. Aujourd'hui, les Nations Unies se proposent d'emp~cherce terri- toire de devenir un champ de batail!e entre pays et entre races. Demain, les Nations Unies seront peut- ~tre appel~es de ce fait d. assumer de nouvelles res- ponsabilit~s, d. ouvrir de nouvelles voies. C'est pour- quoi ma d~l~gation juge indispensable que 1'o~ration soit couronn~e de succ~s et ne soit entrav~e ni par des incidents locaux ni par des initiatives venues de 1'ext~rieur. Notre espoir se trouve affermi par les paroles d'amiti~ qu'ont ~chang~es bier soil' le Mi- nistre des affaires ~tran~res de Belgique et le re- pr~sentant de la R~publique du Congo. Nous avons le sentiment que nos esp~rances reposent sur une base solide parce que nous avons ~M frap~s par les d~clarations chaleureuses du repr~sentant du Congo lorsqu'il a parle du desir et de la necessite d'une coo~ration future dans des activ1t~s constructives et des efforts communs en vue d'~difier le nouveau Congo. C'est dans cet esprit, j'en suis convaincu, que le ConseU interpr~tera l'attitude de mon gouverne- ment 1l1'6gard de ce probl~me. 18. En ce qui concerne les projets de r6s01ution dont nous sommes saisis, comme mes observations l'auront d6jll montr6, je pense, ma d616gation n'est pas en mesure de voter en faveur du projet de r~solution pr6sent6 par la d~16gation de 1'Union sovi~tique 20. Not only are many of the arguments advanced by the Soviet Union representative in his speech last night unintelligible on any other hypothesis than this, some of them are hardto understand on any hypothesis. For instance, his conception of the policy of the Bel- gian Government appears to be based on the view that if you have something which you strongly desire to keep the best way of ensuring this is to give it to somebody else and then try to take it back again. I must confess that I am unable to penetrate this argu- ment. fa~on de proc~derest de donner cette chose 11 quelqu'un d'autre et ensuite d'essayer de la reprendre. Je dois avouer que je suis incapable de suivre ce raisonnement. 21. M@me si l'on pent d6montrer leur absurdiM en les analysant, des interpr~tationserron6es de ce genre ont n6anmoins pour r6sultat - et ce, 11 dessein, . j'imagine - de cr~er une atmosph~re de m6fiance quant aux intentions du Gouvernement beIge. C'est III agir d'une mani~re qui, 11 moins de se fonder sur des t6moignages beaucoup plus probants que ceux que M. Kouznetsov a pu apporter, a des cons6quences nMastes dans une situation qui exige avant tout que les parties interess6es se fassent davantage confiance. L'une des tAches essentielles de I'Organisation des Nations Unies est d'aider 11 6tablir la confiance mutuelle. D'une part, les communaut~s ~tran~res qui vivent au Congo doivent recevoir l'assurance que, si elles d6sirent y rester et apporter leur contribution 11 la vie 6cono- mique du nouvel Etat, elles ne risqueront pas de subir de mauvais traitements et se verront pleinementpro- 21. Misrepresentations such as this, however absurd they can be shown to be on analysis, do nevertheless have the effect-and I can only suppose are intended to have the effect-of creating an atmosphere of distrust concerning the intentions of the Belgian Government. This, unless based on far better evidence than Mr. Kuznetsov was able to produce, is a mischievous ac- tivity in a situation in which one of the overriding necessities is an increase of confidence between all the parties involved. One of the essential tasks of the United Nations is to contribute to the building up of mutual confidence. On the one hand the foreign com- munities living in the Congo need the assurance that if they desire to stay and contribute towards the eco- nomic life of the new State, they will be free from molestation and given the full protection ofthe law. On the other hand, the leaders ofthe Republic of the Congo need to be convinced that the Belgian Government will respect the freedom and independence which it has so recently granted. I believe that the attitudes and in- terests of the two parties are suchthat it is within the power of the United Nations to create this atmosphere of trust, andby so doingto set limits both 'of complexity and of duration to the responsibilities of the United hypoth~se autre que celle que j'ai avanc~e, mais certains d'entre eux sont dlfficiles 11 comprendre queUe que soit l'hypoth~se qu'on adopte. C'est ainsi que la conception que le repr6sentant de I'Union so- vi6tique se fait de la politique du Gouvernement beIge semble se fonder sur I'opinion que, sil'onposs~de une chose qu'on d6sire vivement garder, la meilleure " l t6~es par la 101. D'autre part, les dirigeants de la R~publique du Congo doivent pouvoir ~tre stU-s que le Gouvernement beIge respectera la libert6 etl'ind6- pendance qu'il vient de leur accorder. Je crois que les attitudes et les int~r@ts des deux parties sont tels qu'U est du pouvoir des Nations Unies de cr6er une atmosph~re de confiance et, par la m~me, de limiter 22. But Belgium does not stand alone in the accusa- tions made by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Poland. Belgium, they say, is the instrument of a conspiracy by the colonial Powers. So far as the Gov- ernment of the United Kingdom is concerned, I cannot do better, as a comment on this allegation, than to read to the Council apassagefromtheletter which the Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, has recently ad- dressed to Mr. Khrushchev. After discussing other matters, he writes as follows: "Then there comes the question of the Congo. I have read the statement which you have distributed which accuses Great Britain, in concert with the United States, France, Belgium and West Germany, of organizing a conspiracy to destroy the indepen- dent State of Congo. "I must ~;sk you, Mr. Khrushchev, whether you really believe such a conspiracy is likely in view of the policies which BritishGovernments of allparties have followed not only since the last war but for many generations. "For more than a century it has been our purpose to guide our dependent territories toward freedom and independence. Apart from th", older independent countries of the Commonwealth, since the Second World War India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana and Malaya, comprising over 510 million people, have, with our help, reached the goal of independent life and strength. We have aided this process bothby our technical assistance and by generous financial con- tributions. All these States are completely indepen- dent members of our free Commonwealth associa- tion. "Nor is this movement at an end. In October this year Nigeria, with its 35 million people, will be another great independent country.Sierra Leonewill become independent in April 1961. The West Indies Federation is moving rapidly in the same direction. And so the process goes on. "I ask you, Sir, can you really believe that a Gov- ernment and a people who have pursued these poli- cies so consistently and so honourably are engaged in a conspiracy' to destroy the new independent State of Congo?" 23. I am sure that I do not need to labour this point further. It is of more interest toturnto the future and conSider the operation in which the United Nations is engaged in the Congo, an operationwhichwas described by Mr. WaIter Lippman this morning as the most ad- 23. Je suis sOr que je n'ai pas besoin d'insister da- vantage. Mieux vaut nous tourner vers l'avenir et examiner 1'operation entreprise par 1'Organisationdes Nations Unies au Congo, operation dont M. Waiter Lippman ecrivait ce matinqu'elleetait1'e~riencede "We have good cause to be grateful for the speedy and efficient manner inwhichMr. Hammarskjoldand his staff have begun discharging the difficult duties laid upon them by the Security Council." 24. My Government is also warmly appreciative of the readiness with which so many African and non- African Governments have responded to the appealfor troops. For its part, the United Kingdom Government has met the requests made by the Secretary-General for logistic help and foodstuffs, and will continue to make its appropriate contribution to the common effort: the success of this operation can be of in- calculable importance for the prestige of the United Nations and for the peace of the world. 25. Since the .question of Katanga has been raised by a number ofspeakers inthe Council,Iwould say a word about that. We recall that the former Belgianauthori- ties in the Congo, during the months which preceded independence, worked hard, in circumstances which were sometimes adverse, to preserve a united Congo. Thanks to their skill and to that of the Congolese leaders this aim ~as achieved. Today we regard the Republic of the Congo as a single Statepossessing the same national boundaries as those of the former Belgian Congo. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has received a request for recognition from the authorities of Katanga but has not replied to it. We consider that the relationship between the pro- vince of Katanga and the other provinces of the Congo is a matter to be settled bythe Congolese themselves. It is a domestic problem which cannot satisfactorily be resolved either by the intervention ofoutsideStates or by this Organization. In this connexion, we remem- ber the words of the Secretary-General before the Council on 13 July [873rd meeting] whichhe reiterated yesterday at the 877th meeting. We agree withhim that the United Nations Force cannot be a party to any in- ternal conflict nor can the United Nations Force inter- vene in a domestic conflict. 26. I now turn to the draft resolution introduced last night by the representative of the Soviet Union [Si 4402]. I am afraid that I cannot regard that draft resolution as a serious attempt to serve the interests either of the Republic of the Congo or of the United Nations. It seems indeed to have a contrary purpose. I pass over the peculiar description of the Secretary- General's report in the preambl.l;3 of the draft and turn to operative paragraph 1, Whl0i1 calls for "the im- mediate cessation of armed intervention against the Republic of the Congo and the withdrawal from its territory of all troops of the aggressor within a period of three daysll. This proposal really does not fit in with the factswhichhavebeenpresentedtothe Council. donn~ effet 11 la r~solution adopt~e par le Conseil le 14 juillet. Comme l'a dit hier 11 la Chambre des communes le Secr~taire aux affaires ~tran~res, M. Selwyn Lloyd: "Nous avons de bonnes raisons dl~tre reconnais- sants it M. Hammarskjold et it sonpersonnel d'avoir commenc~, avec rapidit~ et efficacit~, it slacquitter des t~ches difficiles que leur a confi~es le Conseil de securite." 24. En outre, mon gouvernement appr~cie vivement aussi l'empressement avec lequel un si grandnombre de gouvernements africains et non africains ont accept~ d'envoyer les troupes qu'on leur demandait. Pour sa part, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a fourni au Secr~taire ~n~ral I'aide que celui-ci lui demandait en mati~re de logistique et d1envoi de vivres et il conti- nuera it apporter la participation voulue it l'effort commun. Le succ~s de cette op~rationpeut avoir une importance incalculable pour le prestige de 1'Organi- sation des Nations Unies et pour la paix du monde. 25. Plusieurs membres du Conseil ayant soulev~ la question du Katanga, j'aimerais en dire un mot. Rappelons qu'au cours des mois qui ont pr~c~d~ l'ind~pendance, les anciennes autorit~s beIges au Congo ont travai1l6 sans reHl.che, dans des oonditions parfois dMavorables, pour maintenir un Congo un!. Gdce 11 leur habilet~, gr~ce aussi it celle des diri- geants congolais, ce but a~t~atteint. Nous consi~rons aUjourd'hui la R~publique du Congo comme un seul et unique Etat dont les front1~res sont les m~mes que celles de l'ancien Congo beIge. Les autoriMs du Ka- tanga ont adress~ une demande de reconnaissance au Gouvernement de Sa Majest~ dans le Roys.ume-Uni, mais celui-ci n'y a pas donn~ suite. Nous estimons qu'il apparl:ient aux Congolais eux-m~mes de r~gler la question des relations entre la province duKatanga et les autres provinces du Congo. n s'agit d'un pro- bl~me int~rieur qui ne peut ~tre r~solude fa~on satis- faisante ni par l'intervention d'Etats ~trangers ni par l'Organisation des Nations Unies. A cet ~gard,je vou- drais rappeler les paroles que le Secr~taire ~n~ral pronon9ait devant le Conseil le 13 juillet [873~me s~ance] et qu'il a r~p~t~es hier ilIa 877~me s~ance. Nous sommes, comme lui, d'avis que la Force des Nations Unies ne saurait ~tre partie 11 aucun conflit interne et ne saurait non plus intervenir dans un CG:ll- flit int~rieur. 26. J'aborderai maintenant le projet de r~solution que la d~l~gation de l'Union sovi~tique a pr~sent~ hier soir [S/4402]. Je dois dire qu'llmesyeux ce pro- jet de r~solut1on ne vise pas s~rieusement11 servir les int~rets de la R~publ1que du Congo ou de 1'Orga- nisation des Nations Unies. Bien aucontraire, il semble avoir un objectif oppos~. Je passerai sous silence l'expression ~trange que le pr~ambule de ce projetde r~solutionemploie pour qualifier le rapport du Secr~­ taire ~n~ral et je passerai au paragraphe 1du dispo- sitif, qui insiste "pour que cesse imm~diatementl'in­ tervention arm~e contre la R~publ1que du Congo et pour que toutes les troupes de l'a~esseur soient retir~es du territoire congolais dans un d~lai de trois "The Belgian authorities will co-operate in the military action undertaken by the United Nations. "Belgium will withdraw its intervening troops as soon as, and to the extent that, the United Nations effectively ensures the maip.tenance of order andthe safety of persons. This principle has already begun to be carriedout, particularlyin Leopoldville, andwe hope that the situation will soon be the same else- where." [877th meeting, para. 142.] We have corroboration ofthese Belgianintentions from the representative of the United Nations on the spot, who, as reported by the Secretary-General [S/4389/ Add.1], states that it has been agreed that Belgian forces should complete their withdrawal, called for in the Council's resolution of 14 July, from the area of Leopoldville by the evening of Saturday next, 23 July. 27. The Government of the Congo, theSecurityCoun- cil and the Belgian Government itselfare in agreement on the principle that Belgiantroops shouldwithdraw as soon as possible. The best way of ensuring that this withdrawal is carried out smoothly and rapidly is to ensure that the development of the United Nations operation itself is also smooth and rapid. The Council will best serve the interests of the Republic of the Congo and the United Nations if it concentrates on this interlocking process of building up the United Nations operation and arranging for the withdrawal of the Belgian forces, and refuses to be divertedby demands such as are made inthe USSR draft resolution for with- drawal to be completed within an impracticable time limit and without reference to the deployment of the United Nations Force. 28. This afternoon we were presentedwitha new draft resolution sponsored by Ceylon and Tunisia [S/4404]. This draft is of an altogether different character. It clearly represents a serious and well-thought-out attempt by those two delegations to cometo grips with the realities of the situation and to enable the United Nations to continue and develop its operation. The United Kingdom delegation is carefully considering the text of this latest draft resolution, andI would like to reserve my right to speak on it again should cir- cumstances make that necessary.

The world has watched the recent events in the Republic of the Congo with deep concern-at moments, even with alarm. The report of the Secretary-General has been eagerly awaited. The President has very wisely called us together to con- sider the subject once more, although it is only one "Les autorit6s beIges apporteront leur concours ~ l'actioll militaire entreprise par l'ONU. nLa Belgique proc6dera au retrait de ses troupes d'intervention aussitOt que, et dans la mesure oll, les Nations Unies assureront effectivementle main- tien de 1'0rdre et la s6curit6 des personnes. Ce principe a dej~ reQu un commencement d'execution, notamment a. Ikopoldville, et nous souhaitons ••. pouvoir constater bientOt la m~me situation ail- leurs." [877~me s6ance, par. 142.] Les intentions exprim6es par la Belgique se trouvent corrobor6es par le repr6sentant des Nations Unies au Congo qui a fait savoir, comme le signale le Secr6- taire ~n6ral [S/4389/Add.1], qu'il a 6t6 convenu que le retrait des forces beIges, demand6par lar6solution du Conseil en date du 14 juillet, serait achev6 dans la r6gion de Ikopoldville d'ici samedi soir. 27. Le Gouvernement congolais, le Conseil de s6cu- riM et le Gouvernement beIge lui-m~mesont d'accord sur le principe d'un retrait aussi rapide que possible des troupes beIges. Le meilleur moyen pour que cette op6ration ait lieu rapidement et sans heurts est de faire en sorte que 1'0p6ration des Nations Unies soit elle-m~me men6e ~ bien rapidement et sans heurts. Le Conseil servira au mieux les int6r~ts de la R6pu- blique du Congo et de 1'Organisation des Nations Unies en insistant sur ce processus simultan6 d'ex6- cution de 1'op6ration des Nations Unies et du retrait des forces beIges et en refusant de s'en laisser d6- tourner par des exigences comme celles que 1'Union sovi6tique formule dans son projet de r6so1ution lorsqu'elle demande que ce retrait s'effectue dans un d6lai impossible a. respecter et s'abstientdemention- ner le d6ploiement de la Force des Nations Unies. 28. Cet apr~s"midi, nous avons 6t6 saisis d'un nou- veau projet de r6solution, pr6sent6 par Ceylan et la Tunisie [S/4404]. Ce projet de r6solution a un carac- t~re tout diff6rent. n est manifeste que ces deux d6l6- gations ont s6rieusement et m6thodiquement essay6 de faire face aux r6alit6s de la situation et de donner aux Nations Unies la possibilit6 de poursuivre et d'6tendre leur op6ration. La d6l6gation du Royaume- Uni examine attentivement le texte de ce dernier pro- jet de r6solution et je voudrais me r6server le droit de reprendre la parole 11 ce sujet, le cas 6cMant. 29. M. TSIANG (Chine) [traduit de Panglais]: Le monde a suivi avec une profonde inqui6tude, parfois m~me avec angoisse, les 6v6nements qui viennent de se produire dans la R6publique d1.l Congo. Le rap- port du Secr6taire ~n6ra16taitimpatiemment attendu. Avee beaucoup de sagesse, le Pr6sident nous ainvit6s 31. Last night, the Foreign Minister of Belgium and the representative of the Republic of the Congo spoke to us at some length. I listened carefully to both of them. Their views differed on severalimportantpoints, both in relation to fact and in relation to evaluation of motives. I am not in a position to pass judgement on some of these differences, and I have no desire to do so, except in relation to one point, that of aggression. I do not believe that Belgium, in sending troops to the Congo, was guided by any design ofaggression against the Republic of the Congo. 32. I am by nature an optimist. It appears to me that the United Nations programme of action, as laid down in the Council's resolution of 14 July and as adminis- tered by the Secretary-General, will proceed as ex- peditiously in the coming weeks and months as during the past week. At least, I know ofno reason to believe the contrary. In time, I hope, the differences between Belgium and the Congo will appear less important than they appear today, and perhaps some of these differ- ences will appear very academic. 33. Much emphasis has been laid, by practically all the speakers who have taken part inthis debate, on the problem of the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo. In connection with this issue, I note three el~ mentary facts: first, the resolution of 14 July estab- lished the principlethat the Belgiantroops inthe Congo should be withdrawn; second, the Belgian Government has solemnly assured the world, through its Foreign Minister, speaking before this Council last night, as well as on other occasions, that Belgian troops will be withdrawn as UnitedNations forces succeed in main- taining peace and order in the Congo; third, Belgium welcomes the United Nations Force in the Congo and has already begun to co-operate with United Nations representatives in Leopoldville. 34. Under the circumstances, it appears to me that the Security Council, while upholding the principle of the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo, should leave the time-table of such withdrawal in the capable hands of the Secretary-General in consultation with the Belgiatl representatives in the Congo. 35. We from China have only good will towards the Republic of the Congo. My delegation gladly voted for 10 d~terminer la composition de la Force des Nations Unies au Congo et dMinir la nature et l'ampleur de ses ttlches. 31. Hier soir, le Ministre des affaires ~tran~resde Belgique et le repr6sentant de la R~publiqueduCongo ont pris assez longuement la parole. Je les ai ~cout~s attentivement tous les deux. Leurs vues divergent sur plusieurs points importants, tant en ce qui concerne les faits que les motifs suppos~s. Je ne suis pas en mesure de me prononcer sur certaines de ces diver- gences, et je n'en ai d'ailleurs pas le d~sir, sauf sur un point toutefois: la question de l'agression. Je ne crois pas qu'en envoyant des troupes au Congo la Belgique ait eu le dessein de commettre une agression contre la R~publique du Congo. 32. Je suis optimiste par nature. n me semble que le programme d'action de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, tel qu'il a ~M dMini par la r~solutiondu Con- seil en date du 14 juillet et tel qu'il est mis en oouvre par le Secr~taire ~n6ral, sera appliqu~ au cours des semaines et des mois 11 venir avec autant de diligence qu'au cours de la semaine ~coul~e. Du moins, je ne vois aucune raison pour qu'il n'en soit pas ainsi. Avec le temps, je l'esp~re, les d~saccordsentre la Belgique et le Congo apparaltront moins importants qu'aujourd'hui et peut~tre certains d'entre eux sem- bleront-ils tout 11 fait tMoriques. 33. La quasi-totalit~ des orateurs qui ont particip~ d ce d~bat ont beaucoup insist6 sur le probl~me du retrait des troupes beIges du Congo. A ce propos, je rel~verai trois faits essentiels: tout d'abQrd, la r~solution que nous avons adopMe le 14 juillet a pos~ le principe du retrait des troupes beIges du Congo; ensuite, le Gouvernement beIge a donn~ solennellement l'assurance au monde, par l'interm~diaire de son ministre des affaires ~tran~res, qui a pris la parole hier soir devant ce conseil, ainsi qu'en d'autres occasions, que les troupes beIges seront retir~es d mesure que les forces des Nations Unies r~ussiront 11 maintenir la paix et l'ordre au Congo; enfin, la Belgique se f~licite de voir la Force des Nations Unies au Congo et a d~jll. commenc~ ll. coo~rer avec les repr~sentantsde l'Organisation des Nations Uni6s ll. Uopoldville. 34. Dans ces conditions, il me semble que, tout en r~affirmant le principe du retrait des troupes beIges du Congo, le Conseil de s~cu.riM devrait laisser au Secr6taire g6n~ral le soin de fixer les phases de ce retrait, en consultation avec les repr6sentants du Gouvernement beIge au Congo. 35. Nous n'avons, pour notre part, que du bon vou- loir envers la R~publique du Congo. Ma d~l~gation 36. We hope that the presentperiod oftrouble is but a passing phase, and that the Republic of the Congo will soon be able to devote all its energies to peaceful development and nation building, and that BeIgiumand the Congo will be warm friends again. My delegation will support the draft resolution submitted by Ceylon and Tunisia.

The Security Council has met to consider the first steps taken by the Secretary-General in the Congo on behalf the United Nations. 38. When the Council was suddenly convened last Wednesday, at the Secretary-General's request, to examine the situation which the mutiny of the "force publique" had caused in the Congo, my delegation did not hide its grave concern aboutwhatwas happening in this newly independent country. Many representatives around this table had expressed the same feeling. The news which has reached us us since then has shown painfu11y, and attimes dramatically, thatwewere right. 39. The situation in the Congo caused great anxietyto African States, to the white and Congolese population of the country and indeed to the community of States Members of the United Nations. 40. I can understandwhy, facedwiththe recent events, certain African States should have been afraid,3s- pecially those which have recentlybecome independent and which are particularly concerned about anything they think might threaten their sovereignty. 41. Their extreme sensitiveness may have ledthemto think that the steps the Belgian Government had taken to safeguard its nationals were the first signs of the re-establishment of an obsolete political status. But there is no foundation for thesefears, andwe should all try to dispel them. 42. On 11 July the Belgian Prime Minister told the Parliament that the independence of the Congo was an established fact and would be respected by Belgium. His representative, Mr. Loridan, communicated this solemn declaration to us here on13July. At this table, Mr. Wigny, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, re- affirmed the Belgian Government's firm resolve. 43. No one has the right to doubt Belgium'sword. Its whole history shows that it has always honoured its commitments. France can bear witness to this, for it has twice found Belgium at its side in dramatic cir- cumstances, when human rights and freedom were 43. Personne n'est en droit de douter de laparole de la Belgique. Toute son histoire illustre sa fidelit~aux engagements souscrits. La France peut en temoigner qui, par deuxfois, dans des circonstances dramatiques, l'a trouvee it ses cOtes lorsque les droits de l'homme 11 amiti~ pour le peuple congolais et pour rem~dier en partie it la p~nurie de denr~es alimentaires dans la r~publique. 36. Nous esp~rons que les troubles actuels n'ont qu'un caract~re passager, que la Republique duCongo sera bientOt it m~me de consacrer toute son ~nergie au d~veloppement pacifique et it la construction du pays et que la Belgique et le Congo renoueront leurs liens d'amiti~. Ma d~l~gation appuiera le projet de r~solution pr~sente par Ceylan et la Tunisie. 37. M. BERARD (France): Le Conseil de s~curite est r6uni pour examiner les premi~res mesures d'interventlon qU'it sa demande a prises au Congo le Secretaire g~neral des Nations Unies au nom de notre organisation. 38. Lorsque, mercredi dernier, le Conseil a ete soudainement convoque it la requ~te du secr~taire general afin d'~tudier la situation creee au Congo par la mutinerie de la force publique, ma d~l~gation n'a pas cache les graves inqui~tudes qu'etaient de nature it susciter les evenements qui se derou- laient dans ce nouveau pays ind~pendant. De nom- breux representants autour de cette table avaient exprime lea m~mes sentiments. Les nouvelles qui nous sont parvenues depuis lors ont confirme de fac;on douloureuse et parfois dramatique le bien-fonde de nos preoccupations. 39. La situation au Congo provoquait de graves inquietudes, d'une part, awe Etats africains, de l'autre, it la population non seulementblanche, mais egalement congolaise, enfin it la communaut~des Etats Membres de 1'Organisation des Nations Unies. 40. Jladmets la crainte qui, en presence des recents evenements, a pu s'emparer de certains Etats afri- cains, notamment de ceux qui ont accede recemment it 1!ind~pendance et qui sont s~cialement attentifs it tout ce qui, it leurs yeux, menacerait de mettre en cause leur souverainet~. 41. Une sensibiliM particuli~rement vive a pu les inciter it voir, dans les mesures de sauvegarde prises par le Gouvernement beIge en faveur de ses ressortissants, les signes avant-eoureurs du reta- blissement d'un statut politique revolu. Hien ne vient pourtant justifier ces craintes que nous avons tous ici le devoir de contribuer it dissiper. 42. Le Premier Ministre beIge a declare le 11 juillet dernier, devant le Parlement, que l'independance du Congo etait un fait acquiset qu'elle serarespect~epar la Belgique. Cette declaration solennelleaeterappor- tee par SOn representant, M. Loridan, ici m~me, le 13 juillet dernier. Le Ministre des affaires etran~res, M. Wigny, a repete itcettetable laferme determination du Gouvernement beIge sur ce point. 45. My country is gladtodo allit can to help to dispel these fears. Need I remind you that, over the last few months, France has presented to the United Nations, one after another, requests for the admission of Cameroun, Togo, Mali and the Malagasy Republic? Soon it intends to present those ofthe Ivory Coast, the Republic of the Upper Volta, Dahomey,the Niger, Chad, the Central African Republic, Gabon and the Republic of the Congo headed by President Fulbert Youlou. Present events will not change in any way this policy of the French Government andits determinationto help these countries to attain independence in thebestpos- sible circumstances. Our African friends need not worry. Nothing can interfere witha developmentwhich France is the first to applaud and to promote. 46. I have justspoken ofthefears whichMrican States have felt. I have shown that thesefears are unfounded. But I must also speak of the alarm and terror of cer- tain communities in the Congo, which have suddenly found themselves surrounded, attacked andthreatened, and where death has sometimes struck. 47. The various minorities-Belgians, Greeks, Toga- lese, Portuguese, Italians, Nigerians and French- thought that they could rely on the support of the Congolese administration when it took over from the Belgian authorities, and thattheywouldbe protectedby the police as in any other country. Recently, however, officials have completely lost their authority andthose who were supposed to keep the peace have often been the first to break it. 48. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs has mentioned all too many cases of. abominable cruelty, which have stirred the conscience ofmen and affronted their dignity. It makes a sad page inthe history of the Congo. Indeed, not a day has gone by since 1 July without bringing news ofsome appallingtragedy. These incidents have been so many and so frequent that the Council is justified in taking the strongest action to stop them. The United Nations cannot atthe same time give the Congo military, technical and financial as- sistance and allow such actions to continue. 49. Indeed, we cannot forget that the United Nations is responsible for defending human rights and thatthe Congolese Government, by its first acts, has allowed these inviolable rights to be trampled underfoot. 50. Si je rappeUe ces faits, ce n'est pas que je veuiUe avant tout en porter grief au jeune gouverne- ment congolais. Nous sommes ici moins pour juger que pour comprendre et, ayant compris, pour tllcher de tirer les conclusions les plus sages surles mesures 12 50. If I recall these facts, Iamnotdoing so simply to complain of thr young Government of the Congo. We are not here to judgebut rather tounderstand, and then to try to decide wisely on the steps we should take. If anyone is to be blamed, and blamed severely, it is not 45. Mon pays est heureux d'apporter sur ce point sa contribution a. I'apaisement des esprits. Est-il besoin de rappeler que depuis quelques mois la France a successivement pr6sent6 a. notre organisation lea demandes d'admission du Cameroun, du Togo, duMali et de la R6publique malgache? Elle se propose de lui pr6senter prochainement celles de la COte-d'Ivoire, de la Republique de Haute-Volta, du Dahomey, du Niger, du Tchad, de la Republique centrafricaine, du Gabon et de la Republique du Congo que dirige le prcSsident Fulbert Youlou. Rien dans les-6v6nements actuels ne modifiera cette politique du Gouvernement fran9ais, ni sa d6termination d'aider ces pays a.acc6- der II l'ind6pendance dans les conditions les plus favorables. Nos amis africains peuvent @tre tran- quiUes, rien ne viendra a. l'encontre d'une 6volution dont la France est la premi~re a. se r6jouir et a. se faire l'artisan. 46. Si je viens de parler des craintes qu'avaient ressenties, sans motif serieux, comme jel'aimontre, les Etats africains, que dire de 1'emotion et de l'an- goisse de certaines communautes du Congo, qui se sont trouv6es brusquement encercl6es, brutalis6es, menaccSes, parfois, h6las! frapp6es de mort. 47. Qu'il s'agisse des BeIges, des Grecs, des Togo- lais, des Portugais, des Italiens, des Nig6riensoudes Fran9ais, ces minoritcSs croyaient pouvoir compter sur l'appui de I'administrationcongolaise prenant la rel~ve des autorit6s beIges et @tre assurcSes, comme dans tous les pays, de la protection de la force publique. Or crest un fait qu'aucours de ces rcScents 6vcSnements le fonctionnaire a perdutoute autorit6 et que le gardien de l'ordre a souvent cStcS le premier a. le troubler. 48. Le Ministre des affaires cStran~resde Belgique nous a cit6 quelques exemples, d6ja. trop nombreux, de scSvices abominables, qui 6meuvent la conscience des hommes et blessent leur dignitcS. Crest une triste page dans l'histoire du Congo. n n'est point de jour en effet, depuis le 1er juiUet qui ne nous ait appris quelque drame sanglant. L'ampleur de ces incidents, leur rcSpcStition justifient, de la part du Conseil, l'ac- tion la plus 6nergique pour y mettre un terme. Les Nations Unies ne peuvent tout II la fois donner au Congo une aide militaire, technique et financi~re, et tol6rer que de teUes actions puissent se poursuivre. 49. Nous ne pouvons llla vcSritcS oublierquel'Organi- sation des Nations Unies est chargcSe d'assurer la dcSfense des droits de l'homme et que le Gouverne- ment congolais, dans ses premiers pas, a laisscS picStiner ces droits imprescriptibles. 51. However, I should also like to draw attention to the hidden danger in the Congolese representative's reference tothe numerical superiority ofthe Congolese over the Belgian population. This reference, together with the imperative demands which the Congolese Government has made on our Organization, is not what the Council expects from Stateswhichhaveundertaken the obligations of the Charter. 52. The Leopoldville Government has notbeenableto fulfil its elementary duty to protect minorities living in its territory and the officials and technicians who are essential to the country's stability. It has not been able to ensure the safety of the women and children entrusted to it. 53. Confronted with a task beyond its capacity au-'= means, it was unable to cope with it. How can we help it? What sort of assistance cantheUnitedNations give for this purpose? That is what our concern should be. 54. But could any of us have remained indifferent to such outrages? Could we have remained idlewhile our nationals were being surrounded, attacked and raped? 55. The Soviet Union Government is always ready to raise its voice, evenwhenits interests are not directly involved; but would it have allowedtens ofthousands of its nationals to be threatened and maltreated? The representative of the Congo has said at this table that he hoped for a relaxation of tension and for a renewal of fruitful co-operation between the Congolese au- thorities and people on the one hand and the Belgian authorities and people on the other. All ofus share his hopes, and I sincerely congratulate him on them, but I must ask him whether a mere telegram or telephone call would really have sufficed toward offthe frightful dangers which were threatening these communities. That was the only reasonfor the sending of the Belgian forces to compensatetemporarilyfor the governmental and administrativefailure ofthe Congolese authorities. It is quite obvious that the Belgian Government was forced to use its troops to defend the lives and honour of its nationals, until the United Nations Force was ready to do so. 56. There can be no doubt that this intervention is pnly temporary, since the Belgianrepresentative him- self asked the Secretary-General, before the Security Council meeting of 13/14 July, for the rapid dispatch of a United Nations force. Onbehalfofhis Government, Mr. Loridan confirmed this request to us on 14 July. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs has just solemnly reaffirmed it. There can be no doubt at all that the Belgian Government hopes that the United Nations will take effective action soon. The Belgians have already kept their" promise towithdrawwhenever the United Nations Command thought it advisable. 51. Cependant, je voudrais aussi faire observer le danger latent que constitue l'allusion du repr6sentant du Congo A. la sup6riorit6 num~rique de la population congolaise sur la population beIge. Cette allusion, jointe aux mises en demeure adress~es 11 notre organisation par le Gouvernement congolais, ne r~pond pas !lce que le Conseil attenddes Etats qui ont souscrit aux obligations de la Charte. 52. Le Gouvernement de Uopoldville n'a pas ~t~ capable de remplir son devoir ~l~mentairedeprotec- tion des minorit~s vivant sur son territoire, ainsique des cadres et des techniciens indispensables aumain- tien de l'~quilibre du p~ys. n n'a pas ~t6 capable d'assurer la sQret6 des femmes et des enfants qui lui avaient 6t~ confi~s. 53. Confront6 par une tl1che au-dessus de ses capa- cit6s ou de sesmoyens, iln'apas6t6 11 m~me d'y faire face. Comment pouvons-nous 1'y aider? Comment 1'Organisation des Nations Unies peut-elle, dans ce dessein, lui donner son assistance? Telle doit ~tre notre pr60ccupation. 54. Mais qui de nous serait resM insensible A. de tels exc~s et inactif 11 la nouvelle que ses ressortis- sants ~taient encercl6s, attaqu6s, violent6s? 55. Le Gouvernement sovi6tique, qui61~vevolontiers la voix, m~me quand ses int6r~ts ne sont pas directe- ment en jeu, aurait-il laiss6 menacer et brutaliser des dizaines de milliers de ses ressortissants? Et, m'adressant 11 M. le repr6sentant du Congo, qui a manifest6 !l cette table des espoirs que nous parta- geons tous et dont je le f6licite sinc~rement, des espoirs de d6tente et de reprise d'une coop6ration f6conde entre autorit6s et peuple congolais d'une part, autoriMs et peuple beIge de 1'autre, je deman- derai: suffisait-il vraiment d'un petit t616gramme, d'un petit coup de t616phone pour conjurer les affreux dangers que couraient ces communauMs? Tel a 6t6 le seul motif de 1'intervention des forces beIges venues provisoirement suppl6er !l la d6ficience, 11 la carence gouvernementale et administrative des allto- rit6s congolaises. Qui ne peut comprendre qut> le Gouvernement beIge se soit trouv~ devant la n6cessit6 de faire d6fendre par ses troupes la vie et 1'honneur de ses ressortissants, en attendant que la Force des Nations Unies ftlt !l m~me de le faire? 56. Que cette intervention n'ait qu'un caract~re pro- visoire, personne n'en peut douter, puisque le repr6- se -~ant de la Belgique a lui-m~me demand~ au Se- cre'Laire g6n6ral, avant la r6union du Conseil de s6- curit6 des 13 et 14 juillet, l'intervention rapide d'une force des Nations Unies. Mieux encore, au nom de son gouvernement, M. Loridan nous l'a confirm6 le 14 juillet. Le Ministre des affaires 6tran~res de Belgique vient de renouveler solennellement cette assurance. Non, nul ne mettra en doute le souhait du Gouvernement beIge de voir aboutir promptement l'action des Nations Unies. Ces engagements ont d6jll 6t6 r6alis6s chaque fois que le Commandement des Nations Unies a jug6 la chose possible. 58. This should finally put an end to the ridiculous charge of aggression which has been implicitly or explicitly made here and elsewhere. 59. Anyone who expects us to believe thatthe Belgian authorities, which granted independence to the Congo and sponsored its admission to the United Nations, would have left women and children, thousands of experts and their families at the mercy ofa Congolese mob which was free to do as it liked with them, if it has had the slightest aggressive intentionstowards the new State, must take us for utterfools. It is too absurd for words. 60. No one who is aware of the responsibility which the United Nations has accepted can possible demand the withdrawal of the Belgian troops, which have stepped in to protect human lives, until these troops are replaced by forces which are well able to keep law and order. 61. I turn now to the increase ininternationaltension which these events have caused and which my delega- tion considers to be the third cause of concern. 62. As I £laid, the independence ofthe Congois not in question. The government and administration of the country, when the administering Power suddenly dis- appeared, has beentoo great a burden for the Congo- lese Government to bear, and we should judgeits first actions as leniently as possible: but the situation still calls for quick and effective action by the United Nations. 63. To the USSR representative, these arebut secon- dary consideratIons and thepresence ofBelgiantroops is the only reason for the collapse ofCongolese insti- tutions. If the troops go all will be well, he says. 64. The USSR representative put his views in much stronger words than did the Congolese representative. He spoke ofimperialistplots, colonialist conspiracies, and so on. Just as, the day before, our colleague from the Soviet Union seemed almost more Cuban than Mr. Roa, yesterday the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed more Congolese than Mr. Kanza. 65. This is not the first time that the Soviet Union has tried to take advantage of a State's misfortunes, making it still harder to find a workable solution. Now that we have all met, not to pass judgement but to decide on measures to restore the Congolese Govern- ment's authority, the Soviet Union does not hesitateto make new difficulties and to resort to direct or in- direct threats. France cannot accept such an attitude or such threats. France itself abstains from allinter- colI~gue de l'Union sovi6tique s'6tait montr6 presque plus cubain que M. Roa, le Premier Ministre adjoint des affaires 6tran~res s'est montr6 bier plus congo- lais que M. Kanza. 65. Ce n'est pas la premi~refois que 1'Union sovi6- tique saisit l'occasion des malheurs d'un Etat pour essayer d'en tirer profit, rendant plusdifficile encore la recherche d'une solution viable; alors que nous sommes tous r6unis, moins pourporter des jugements que pour 6laborer des mesures susceptibles de dta- blir 1'autorit6 du Gouvernement congolais, l'Union sovi6tique n'Msite pas a. cr6er des complications nouvelIes et a. recourir directement ou indirectement 66. In the midst of these serious difficulties and in response to the concern of the United Nations com- munity, the Secretary-General has acted with com- mendable speed. The report he has submitted to us contains a declaration of the principles governing the United Nations Force and a description of the various contingents which have arrived in the Congo underthe command of Major-General Carl von Horn. 67. I should like to congratulate allthe UnitedNations officials who are taking part in this work and, in par- ticular, the Secretary-General, who has once again shown his exceptional qualities of intelligence and action. 68. The French delegation approves ofthe mainpoints of the report he has submitted to us and considers particularly important his repeated assurance to the Council that the Force is necessarily under the ex- clusive command of the United Nations and cannot, in any circumstances, become a pa,rty to any internal dispute or be used toputthrough anypolitical solution. 69. The United Nations action is under way. It should make possible the progressive replacement of the Belgian troops which were forced to intervene. Mean- while we must reaffirm our confidence in the Secre- tary-General. Nothing must stand in the way of his efforts in the cause of peace, justice and mankind. 70. I reserve the right to speak on the draft resolu- tions if necessary.

I should like to make the following statement as repre- sentative of ECUADOR. 72. The Security Council has before ittheSecretary- General's report [S/4389 and Add.1-3] on the imple- mentation of the resolution of 14July 1960. The report is adocument of the highest importance and has wide implications. Having studied it carefully, I feel that it is true to say that it expresses a new conception, a modern conception, of the role ofthe UnitedNations in the maintenance of international peace and security. 73. The United Nations operation in the Congo, which is being undertaken under the direction of the Secre- tary-General in the exercise of his general con- stitutional powers under the Cb..arter and the General Assembly's resolutions on technical assistance andof the specific powers conferred upon him by the Se- curity Council in its resolution of 14 July, is the first thoroughly concerted effort to clear up a situation which might endangerinternationalpeace and security, not only by removing its immediate and external causes but also by dealing with its deeper causes. The object of this immense effort is to reduce tensions and to solve immediate problems, and also to create condi- tions of political, economic, social and administrative stability, thus filling the gaps which resulted in the present state of affairs. probl~mes imm~diats, mais egalement pour etablir 15 consid~re comme particuli~rementimportante 1'assu- rance qui est 11 nouveau donn~e au Conseil que la Force se tl'ouve n~cessairement sous le commande- ment exclusif de 1'Organisation des Nations Unieset ne saurait, en aucune circonstance, devenir partie II un conflit int~rieur ni €!tre utilis~e pour faire pr~­ valoir une solution politique donnee. 69. L'action des Nations Unies est en cours; elle doit permettre une rel~ve progressive des troupes beIges qui se sont trouv~es dans I'obligation d'inter- venir. Dans cette action, il importe que notre con- fiance continue d'@tre marqu~e au Secr~tairegen~ral, et que rien ne vienne g@ner ses efforts au service de la paix, de la justice et de I'humanit~. 70. Je me r~serve le droit de reprendre la parole sur les projets de r~solution si le besoin s'en fait sentir. 71. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'espagnol): Je feral maintenant la declaration suivante en qualite de repre- sentant de l'EQUATEUR. 72. Le Conseil de s~curit~ est saisi du rapport du Secr~taire ~n~ral sur la mise en application de la resolution du 14 juillet 1960 [S/4389 et Add.1 a. 3]; il s'agit d'un document d'une importance capitale et d'une vaste portee. Une analyse attentive de ce rapport permet de conclure qu'il correspond 11 une conception nouvelle - une conception moderne - du rOle de 1'01'- ganisation des Nations Unies dans le maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales. 73. L'operation des Nations UniesauCongo,ex~cut~e sous la direction du Secretaire ~neralen vertu, d'une part, des pouvoirs ~n~raux que lui conf~re la Charte et des pouvoirs qu'il tient des resolutions de l'Assem- blee ~nerale sur l'assistance technique, et, d'autre part, des pouvoirs speciaux que lui a conferes le Con- seil de securite par sa resolution du 14 juillet, cons- titue la premi~re tentative enti~rement coordonnee qui ait jamais ete faite pour mettre fin 11 une situation de nature a. compromettre la paix et la securite inter- nationales, non seulement en supprimant les causes immediates et externes de cette situation, mais aussi en s'attaquant !l ses causes profondes. n s'agit d'un effort, en quelque sorte gigantesque, accompli non seulement pour assainir l'atmosph~reet resoudre les 75. I should like, on behalf of the Government of Ecuador, to pay tribute to the Secretary-General for his far-sighted and timely action in bringing the case of the Republic of the Congo beforethe Security Coun- cil, for the administrative efficiency,politicalwisdom and undeniable couragewithwhichhe has organized as- sistance to the Republic of the Congo and for the re- markable contribution he has made to the cause of international peace and security through the various plans for assistance to the Republic of the Congo. Al- though these will place a hea'ry burden on Member States, they are an immense effort which is urgently necessary to meetthe equallyimmense dangertowhich Mr. Hammarskjold drew our attention in the closing words of his impressive speech yesterday [877th meeting]. 76. We may be proud that the Security Council has answered the appeal of the Republic of the Congo with exemplary speed and in a way which showed its deep sense of responsibility, as well as the moral stature and generosity which led its Members to take the es- sential action the situationcalledfor withoutpausingto weigh the burden which in various ways willbe placed on each and every Member of the Organization. 77. ThaIiks to the prompt action of the Council as the body primarily responsible for the ;maintenance of international peace and security, thanks to the ex- cellent work of the Secretary-General ~md his assist- ants in planning and giving aid to the Hepublic of the Congo, thanks to the timely presence there of Mr. Ralph Bunche and tothe immediate response ofvarious Member States which made it possible to send United Nations forces to the Congo, the international com- munity has accepted the responsibility of helping the Congolese Government to maintain law and order, which are essential to the maintenance ofpeace, and of making it psychologically and practically possible for the Congolese Government to look to the future with optimism, in the knowledge that it will be feasible in the more or less immediate future tofill the immense gaps which have made its initiation into independence so hard. 78. This is the background, created by the events of the last two weeks, against which we must see the debate that was resumed yesterday. The debate, despite the unhappy story of human suffering which it has brought to light, has been encouraging since it has shown that, however serious the situation in the Congo may be, at least the gapbetweenthe two parties directly concerned can be bridged at some important points. 78. Telle est, II notre sens, la perspective. r6suItat direct des 6v6nements des deux derni~res semaines. dans laquelle nous devons placer le debat qui a repris hier; ce debat en depit de ses aspects penibles - il nous a en effet revl1He de dures realites humaines qui nOus emeuvent - a eu un caract~re positifparce qu'il a montre que, si la situation dans la Republique du Congo est d'une extreme gravite, du moins sur cer- tains points importants. 1'ecart qUi separe les deux 16 76. Nous pouvons @tre fiers que, repondant lll'appel de la R6publique du Congo, le Conseil de s6curit6 ait agi avec une promptitude exemplaire et d'une mani~re qui a r6v6l6 un sens profond de ses responsabilit6s; se pla~ant sur un plan moral 61ev6 et anim6 d'un esprit g6n6reux, les membres du Conseil ont pris les mesures fondamentales qu'exigeait la situation sans se preoccuper des charges que les mesures II prendre impliqueraient, II divers 6gards, pour chacun des Etats Membres de l'Organisation. 77. Gdce II la compr6hension dont a fait pret,lve 1'organe principal charg6 du maintien de la paix et de la securit6 internationales, gra.ce auxefforts deploy6s avec· bonheur par le Secr6taire g6n6ral et par ses collaborateurs pour mettre au point et executer le plan d'assistance II la R6publique du Congo, gra.cellla pr6- sence opportune de M. Ralph Bunche dans ce pays, gra.ce enfin II la r6action immediate de divers Etats Membres qui a rendu possible 1'envoi au Congo de forces des Nations Unies, la communaute inter- nationale a pu se charger d'aider le Gouvernement congolais II maintenir 1'ordrepublic, 6l6ment essentiel du maintien de la paix, et aussi mettre le Gouverne- ment congolais en mesure, tant psychologiquementque maMriellement, d'envisager l'avenir avec optimisme en sachant quIll pourra dans un avenir plus ou moins proche combler les vides terribles qui ont rendu si difficiles ses d6buts d'Etat ind6pendant. 80. It is therefore unnecessary to examine the rea- sons the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs has given to justify the sending of troops fromthe point of view of international law. But we cannot judge these events properly unless we see them as part of an un- controlled transition from colonialismto independence which, unfortunately, was not properly planned in ad- vance. On behalf of my Government, I should like to reaffirm the principle that foreigntroops shouldnotbe in a State's territory without the active consent of that State's Government. In the light of the Security Coun- cil's resolution of 14 July andofits implementation by the Secretary-General and inthe light ofthe statements made in the Councilyesterdaybybothparties, it seems reasonable to hope thatthe withdrawal oftroops will be effected in the near future. r~solutiondu Conseil de s6curit~ du 14 juilIetet de sa mise en application par le Secr~taire g6n~ral, ainsi que des d~clarations formul~es hier au Conseilpar les parties int6ress~es, 1'6vacuation des troupes sera .bientOt un fait acquis. 81. Turning to another aspect of the situation, Iwould be failing in my duty as the representative of Ecuador if I did not saythatwe shareBelgium's deep sorrow at the suffering and loss of life caused by reprehensible acts any repetition of which, we are sure, will be pre- vented by the authority of the Congolese Government with the help of the United Nations. The Republic of the Congo has also suffered grievously, and I must express our regret to its representative. 82. In the absence of more complete information, it is hard to make a detailed analysis ofthe present situation in the Congo. I should like, however, to stress three things. 83. It is, no doubt, one of the paradoxes of life that Belgium, at the moment ofits highest andmost realis- tic generosity'; 'Jwards the Congo, should be in such a position, but experience shows us that it is hard to escape the consequences of one's own mistakes. Al- though it did much humanitarian work in the Congo, Belgium neglected its duty to lIcongolizelt-ifImayuse the expression-the public administrationandtechnical services while there was still time. Iwouldrecall that frequent remarks on its failure to do so have been cons~quences de ses propres erreurs o~ n6gligences, et la Belgique, en d~pit des aspects humanitaires de son reuvre au Congo, a oubli~ qu'elle avaitl'obligation de "congoliser", si je puis utiliser cette expression, en temps voulu, I'administration publique et les 17 ~tran~res de Belgique a d~clar~ que sonpays retire- rait ses troupes d'intervention d~s que l'Organisation des Nations Unies assurerait le maintien de 1'ordre et la s~curit6 des personnes, le repr~sentantde la R6pu- blique du Congo a adopt6lui aussiune attitude mod6r~e et souple qui prouve sa maturit~ politique. Si, d'autre part, le Ministre des affaires ~tran~res de Belgique paratt dispos~, comme permet de le penser sa d6cla- ration, it accepter la d6cision de l'Organisation des Nations Unies concernant le moment 0111'ordre et la s6curit6 des personnes seront assur~s par la Force des Nations Unies, 11 se peut que, du point de vue pratique, le probl~me de 1'6vacuation des troupes soit bien pr~s d'etre r~solu. Nous sommes persuad~s que le Secr~taire g6n~ral, usant des pouvoirs qui lui seront conf~r~s aUjourd'hui par le Conseil, exercera, 11 cet effet, son influence d~cisive avec la coo~ration du Gouvernement beIge. 80. n n'y a donc pas lieu d'examiner, dupoint de vue du droit international, les raisons invoqu~es par le Ministre des affaires 6tran~res de Belgique pour justifier 1'envoi de troupes beIges. Nous tenons compte pour juger des evenements du fait qu'ils se sont pro- duits au cours d'un passage incontrOl~du colonialisme it l'ind~pendance, passage qui, malheureusement, n'a pas ~t6 pr~par~ de faC}on m~thodique. Je me bornerai it r~affirmer, au nom de mon gouvernement, laposition de principe selon laquelIe des troupes 6tran~res ne peuvent se trouver sur le territoire d'un Etat sans le consentement r~el du gouvernement de cet Etat. n nous paratt raisonnable d'esp6rer que, compte tenu de la 81. Je parlerai maintenant d'un autre aspect de la situation. Je manquerais it mandevoir de repr6sentant de l'Equateur si je ne disais pastout de suite que nous partageons la douleur qu'~prouve la Belgique devant les souffrances et les morts caus~s par des actes inadmissibles dont la r6~tition sera, nous en sommes certains, ~vit~e par le Gouvernement congolais, exer- C}ant son autorit~ avec I'assistance de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. La R~publique du Congo a ~M tr~s 6prouwe elIe aussi et je tiens 11 exprimer toute notre sympathie it son repr~sentant. 82. En ce qUi concerne la situation actuelIe dans la R~publique du Congo, il est difficile de procMer it une analyse exhaustive, car nous ne sommes pas enposses- sion de tous les ~l~ments d'appr~ciation voulus. Je me permettrai cependant d'insister sur trois points. 83. n est sans doute paradoxal que la Belgique, au moment 011 ene fait preuve, it I'6gard du Congo, de la g6n6rosit~la plus grande et laplus r~aliste,se trouve dans la situation que nous avons ~voqu6e; mais l'ex- ~rience montre qu'il eSt difficile d'6chapper aux 84. Yesterday I listened with sincere sympathytothe Congolese representative's statement. I listened with the admiration for his people and the solidarity with the cause of AfricanindependencewhichI expressed on 7 July [872nd meeting], when we were considering his country's application for admission to the United Nations. It is good to hear the freshness and sincerity of the voices of new states. In once again welcoming the Republic of the Congo on behalf ofthe Government of Ecuador, I should liketo express my confidence that the contact of the Congolese Government with the United Nations and its Members from all over the world will soon make the Government of the Congo feel-as other new African States have felt-that by gaining independence it enters an international com- munity in which it will find hands stretchedtowards it in friendship from every continent and minds longing for peace, mutual co-operation, tolerance and har- mony. With this well-founded conviction, the Govern- ment of the pongo will find that the Charter of the United Nations will always be its best defence. 85. There is a third point. For the last two weeks, through all the media of information,we have heard so much about events in the Congo that we must some- times havebeenconfused. We shouldthereforebe care- ful not to drawdefinite conclusions. However, there are signs that the tensions -'between the great Powers may be reflected in intensified form in the life of the Re- public of the Congo. Let us hope these signs will dis- appear, since any attempt to make a newly independent State a battlefield in the coldwar would do irreparable damage to an Africanpeoplewhichneeds peaceto fulfil its fundamental task of building its political and eco- nomic institutions. To carry the cold war into Africa would be disastrous for the future of the African peoples. 86. Finally, I should like to refer tothedraft resolu- tion introduced by the distinguished representatives of Ceylon and Tunisia. Once again, Sir Claude Coreaand Ambassador Slim have made a valuable contributionto the work of the Council, which will enable it to make a decision which is both legal and morally right. The delegation of Ecuador supports itwithoutreservations and takes this opportunity to pay tribute to the illus- trious representative of Tunisia-the worthy repre-. sentative of an African State in the Council-whose 18 ana~ogue 11 celle qui existe actuellement au Congo. 84. J'ai 6couM hier avec une sinc~re sympathie la d6claration du repr6sentant de la R6publique du Congo. Je l'ai 6cout6e avec des sentiments d'admirationpour le peuple congolais et de solidariM avec la cause de l'ind6pendance de l'Afrique que j'avais d6jll exprim6s le 7 juillet [872~me s6ance], lorsque nous avons examin6 la demande d'admission de la R6publique du Congo ! 1'Organisation des Nations Unies. n est r6confortant d'entendre les paroles directes et sin- c~res des repr6sentants -des nouveaux Etats. En souhaitant 11 nouveau ici, au nom du Gouvernement 6quatorien, la bienvenue au Gouvernement congolais, je tiens ! dire que je suis persuad6 qu'en prenant contact avec les Nations Unies en tant qu'Organisa- tion, et avec ses membres, qui repr6sentent toutes les r6gions .du monde, ce gouvernement sentira bientOt, comme je sais que 1'ont senti les gouverne- ments d'autres Etats africains, qu'en acc6dant d 1'ind6pendance le Congo entre dans une communaut6 internationale oll il trouvera des amiti6s dans tous les continents, ainsi que des esprits qui souhaitent la paix, la coop6ration mutuelle, la tol6rance et la bonne entente. S'il est fermement convaincu de ce qui pr6clMe, le Gouvernement congolais constatera que crest la Charte des Nations Unies qui lui four- nira toujours l'appui le plus sth'. 85. nest une troisi~me observation que je voudrais faire. Au cours des deux derni~res semaines, gra.ce 11 tous les moyens d'information dont nous disposons, nous avons re~u une telle somme de renseignements sur les 6v6nements intervenus au Congo qu'il ne pouvait manquer de se produire parfois, dans nos esprits, une certaine confusion. crest pourquoi il convient de faire preuve de prudence et d'6viter de formuler des conclusions d6finitives. n n'en reste pas moins que certains indices nous permettent de craindre que les tensions qui existent entre les grandes puissances aient une influence marqu6e sur la vie de la R6publique du Congo. Nous souhaitons que ces indices disparaissent car toute tentative visant 11 ce qu'un Etat qui fait ses premiers pas dans 1'ind6pendance devienne un instrument de la guerre froide causerait un tort irr~parable d un peuple d'Afrique qui a absolument besoin de paix pour mener 11 bien l'ceuvre essentielle, consistant d consolider ses institutions politiques et 6conomiques. L'intro- duction de la guerre froide en Afrique aurait des cons6quences fatales pour 1'avenir des peuples de ce continent. 86. Je voudrais, avant de terminer, dire quelques mots du projet de r6s01ution d6pos6 par les repr6- sentants de Ceylan et de la Tunisie. Une fois de plus, sir Claude Coreaet 1'ambassadeur de Tunisie, M. Slim, par le concours extr@mement pr6cieux qu'ils four- nissent au Conseil, lui permettront de prendre une d6cision en se fondant sur la position qui convient parce qu'elle est juste et conforme au droit. La d616- gation 6quatorienne appuie sans r6serve ce projet et tient 11 saisir cette occasion pour rendre hommage

I requested the floor in order to exercise my right of reply. Since, in the speeches of certain members oftheSecurity Coun- cil, the Soviet Union's attitude has been misrepre- sented, and attempts have also beenmadeto embellish the position of those who are developing and carrying out aggression, I thoughtitnecessarytomake, shortly, a few supplementary observations. 88. To hear the representatives of the States mem- bers of the NorthAtlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO), one would imagine that the aggressor is notBelgium- the country which launched aggression in the Congo- together with its supporters, but, almost, the Soviet Union. It would appear, from the speeches of those representatives, that the Soviet Union is also respon- sible for the placing of the Congolese people in such tragic and intolerable circumstances, and almost for the presence of Belgian troops in the Congo and for the aggressive policy there pursued by them; but that the other NATO countries who are supporting and inspiring Belgium are entirely unconnected with that aggression. 89. It is of course easy to see how thin and remote from reality all these arguments are. For instance, how can one take seriously the statement ofthe United Kingdom representative that "there has been no ag- gression against the Congo", when yesterday the representative of the Congo itself expressed, clearly enough, his view that aggression was beingcommitted against his country? Nor was he alone in that, since certain other delegates representing Councilmembers also said, equally clearly and definitely,thatthere was aggression against the Congo. How can the two views be reconciled? My taskherebecomes somewhat easier because the representatives of the States members of NATO are acting more or less in unison and confirm- ing yet again how rightthe SovietGovernment has been in its assessment and analy,sis of their position. They are defending aggression b",,c;:':i'J$0 they arethemselves involved in it. Aggression idthere for everyoneto see. 90. The Soviet Union's position was set forth in suf- ficient detail at the 873rd meeting, when the problem of the Congo was discussed for the first time. At that meeting our representative read Clutastatementbythe Soviet Government from which it can be seen that the attitude of the Soviet Union and ofthe Soviet people has always been, and continues to be, one of support for national liberation movements and of sympathyfor the efforts and struggles of peoples to secure their in- dependence, to strengthentheir sovereignty andtobuild and consolidate a new existence in which all natural resources and fruits of labour would gotoincrease the people's welfare. 91. I shall not deal in detail with the statements of each member of the Security Council. I shouldmerely like to point out thatthose who are trying to convey the impression that the Soviet Unionis obstructing certain measures, or is standing inthe way ofthe achievement by the Congolese people at long last of their freedom from colonial dependence, grossly distortthe position. 88. En ~coutant les repr~sentantsdes Etats membres de 1'Organisation du Traite de l'Atlantique nord (OTAN), on a l'impression que l'agresseur n'est pas du tout le pays qui en fait a commis l'agression au Congo; ce nlest pas la Belgique, ce ne sont pas ceux qui appuient la Belgique, mais ce serait 1'Union sovi~tique! A en juger par les d~clarations de ces repr~sentants, l'Union sovi~tique serait responsable des conditions intol~rables et p6nibles dans lesquelIes se trouve le peuple·congolaisj c'est tout juste si elIe n'est pas responsable de la pr~sence des troupes beIges sur le territoire congolais et de leur politique d'agression; quant aux membres de l'OTAN, qui appuient et inspirent la Belgique, Hs n'auraient abso- lument rien 11 voir avec cette agression. 89. n n'est pas difficile de voir que tout cela est, bien entendu, cousu de fil blanc et fort ~loign~ de la r~alit~. Comment peut-on prendre au s~rieux. par exemple,_ le repr~sentant du Royaume-Uni lorsqu'il dit quI "il n'y a pas d'agression contre le Congo", alors qu'hier le repr~sentant du Congo lui-m~me a expos~ assez nettement son opinion et dit qu'ily avait agression. En outre, d'autres membres du Conseil ont d~clar~ dans leurs interventions en des termes aussi clairs et nets qu'il y avait agression au Conge. Comment concilier ces d~clarationscontradictoires? Ma tft.che est quelque peu faciliMe du fait que les repr~sentants des pays membres de l'OTAN pr~­ sentent un front plus ou moins uni et confirment une fois de plus la description et l'analyse que l'Union sovi~tique a faite de leur position. ns d6fendent l'agression parce qu'ils y participent. n y a bien agression. "- 90. La position de l'Union sovi~tique a ~t~ expos~e assez en d~tail lorsque la question du Congo est venue en discussion pour la premi~re fois 11 la 873~me s~ance. A ce moment-Ill, notre repr~sentanta donn~ lecture d'une d~claration du Gouvernement sovi~tiaue dont 11 ressort que la position de 1'Union sovi~tique et de son peuple est et a toujours ~t~ de soutenir' le mouvement de lib~ration nationale, de sympathiser avec ce mouvement et avec la lutte des peuples pour obtenir leur ind~pendance, raffermir leur souverai- net~ et ~difierune vie nouvelIe 011toutes les ressources naturelIes et tous les fruits du labeur iraient accroflre le bien-etre du peuple. 91. Je n'entrerai pas dans le d~tail des d~clarations faites par chacun des membres du Conseil de s~curit~; mais je voudrais seulement relever que ceux qui pr~tendent que 1'Union sovi~tique emp~ched'appliquer des mesures, qu'elIe emp~che le peuple congolais de se lib~rer enfin de la d~pendancecoloniale, d6forment grossi~rement la position sovi~tique. Les faits nous 92. I should also like to deal briefly with the state- ment made by the United States representative, or rather to single out one particular aspect which re- ceived especially wide coverage in today's Press. The United States representative declared that his country would not permit-if I may use such a picturesque expression-that any State should help the Congowith- out the consent of the United Nations. Since a particu- lar group of States is dominant in the United Nations, that means: without the knowledge and the consent of the United States. Is not tIns goingmuchtoo far? If the United States representative thinks that byspeakingin this way he can influence the Soviet Union's attitude, or possibly intimidate the Soviet Union, he is very gravely mistaken. 93. In thi:" context I should like to explainthe attitude of the Soviet Union. The USSR responds to all appeals when it is a question of helping peoples who are strug5ling for their liberation. 94. The President of the Republic of the Congo and Mr. Lumumba, the Congolese Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence, sent to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on 14 July a letter which I will now read out-incidentally,thisbrief letter vividly demonstrates whether there is or is not aggression against the Congo: "Faced with the threat to the neutrality of the Republic of the Congo emanating from Belgium and certain Western Stateswhichsupportthe Belgianplot against our independence, we request you to give hourly attention to developments in the Congo. It is possible that we shall be forced to requestthe Soviet Union's intervention, if the Western camp does not stop its aggression against the sovereignty of the Republic of the Congo. At the present time, Congo- lese state territory is being occupied by Belgian troops and the lives of the President ofthe Republic and of the Prime Minister are in danger." 95. According to the principle whichthe UnitedStates representative tried to establish yesterday, we should perhaps have first asked the United Stateswhetherthe Soviet Union should send any answer to that letter. I repeat that the United States representative is, maybe, talting too much upon himself. 96. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR sent to that letter a reply, of which I shall now read, not the whole, but merely a few excerpts: "The Soviet Union has already raised its voice in resolute condemnation ofthe imperialistintervention in regard to the Republic of the Congo. It has ex- pressed itself in favour of the United Nations taking measures to stop the aggression and restore, to the full, the sovereign rights ofthe independentRepublic of the Congo. If the States directly committing im-. perialist aggression against. the Republic of the Congo, and those spurring them on to such action, continue their criminal activity, theSoviet Unionwill not refrain from taking resolute measures to put an 20 92. J'aimerais m'arrater aussi bri~vement sur la d~claration du repr~sentantdes Etats-Unis, ou plutOt relever un aspect de cette d~claration sur lequel la presse a particuli~rement insist~ aujourd'hui. Le re- pr~sentant des Etats-Unis a d~clar~ que son pays ne tol~rerait pas - si l'on peut s'exprimerainsi- qu'un Etat ~tranger aide le Congo sans l'assentiment de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Mais comme un certain groupe d'Etats domine d 1'0rganisation des Nations Unies, cela revient d dire "d l'insu et sans l'assentiment des Etats-Unis". N'est-ee pas III aller trop loin? Si le repr~sentant des Etats-Unis pense, en disant cela, modifier la position de IfUnion sovi~­ tique, s'iI pense peut-atre effrayerl'Unionsovi~tique, iI se trompe lourdement, tr~s 10urdement. 93. J'aimerais II ce propos pr~ciser la position sovi~tique: l'URSS r~pond d tout appellorsqu'iI s'agit d'aider les peuples qui luttent pour leur liMration. 94. Le Pr~sident de la R~publique du Congo et M. Lumumba, premier ministre et ministre de lad6fense nationale, ont adress~ le 14 juillet au Pr~sident du ConseiI des ministres de l'URSS la lettre suivante - et d'ailleurs cette courte lettre montre clairement s'iI y a ou non agression au Congo: "Devant la menace que font peser sur la neutralit~ de la R~publique du Congo la Belgique et certains pays occidentaux qui appuient la conspiration beIge contre notre ind~pendance, nous vous demandons de suivre, heure par heure, l'~volutionde la situation au Congo. n est possible que nous soyons obli~s de demander l'intervention de l'Union sovi~tique si le camp occidental ne cesse pas son agression contre la souveraineM de la R~publique du Congo. Al'heure actuelle, le territoire souverain duCongoestoccu~ par les troupes beIges et les vies du Pr6sident de la R6publique et du Premier Ministre sont endanger." 95. S'iI nOus fallait agir conform6ment llladgleque le repr6sentant des Etats-Unis a chercM d nous im- poser ici hier, nous devrions commencer par deman- der peut-@tre auX Etats-Unis si l'Union sovi6tlque a le droit de r6pondre II cette lettre. Le repr6sentant des Etats-Unis, je le r6p~te, s'arroge, semble-t-il, des droits excessifs. 96. Je ne lirai pas en entler la r6ponse faite Acette lettre par le Pr6sident du Conseil des ministres de l'URSS, mais en voici quelques extraits: "L'Union sovi6tlque a d6jA 61e\'6 la voix pour condamner resolument l'interTention imperialiste contre la R6pubUque du Congo. Elle a pr6conis6 l'adoption par l'Organisation des Nations Unies de niesures visant il faire cesser l'agression et II 1'6- tabUr pleinement la R6publique ind6pendante du Congo dans ses droits souverains. Siles Etats qui se livrent IIune agression imp6rialiste dlrecte contre la R6pubUque du Congo, et ceux qui les y incitent, continuent leur activiM criminelle, l'Union sovi6- tique n'Msitera pas II prendre des mesures d6cisives 97. This letter reflects the feelings of the entire Soviet people, and the Soviet Union, in the matter of help for the Congo, is consistently following this line. The Soviet Union took the initiative with a view to the Security Council considering this matter. The Soviet Union supported the resolution of 14 July to the effect that Belgian troops should be withdrawn from the Congo. It supported the proposal that aid should be given to the Congo, and agreed to the formation of a United Nations Force. 98. Just over a week has elapsed since then; but the situation in the Congo has not improved. On the con- trary, to judge from what we have heardhere from the Congolese representative, unless urgent measures are taken the situation inthe Congomaybecome even more tragic and even more bloodshed may occur. 99. For that reason it appears absolutely necessary that the Security Council, which under the Charter is called upon to maintain international peace andsecur- ity, should take more decisive steps. Such a step- which would be the main and fundamental step, and OD this all who have spoken here are in essence agreed- would be the immediate withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Congo. 100. The Soviet Union will c.onsistently pursue its policy of extending effective help to the struggling people of the Congo. In followingthatpolicy, the Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that it is in line not only with the interests of the Congolese people and of the USSR, but also with the vital and fundamental interests of every people-with the maintenance and strengthening of peace.

Let me simply read what I said yesterday as I said it, not as Mr. Kuznetsov said that!saidit. I quote paragraph 193 of th". official verbatim record of the 877thmeeting of the Council held on 20/21 July 1960: "There have been reports that the Soviet Union might intervene in the Congo directly with troops, and before I yield the floor I would just like to say a word about that. The position of the United States Government on this point is unequivocallyclear, both for itself and for others. For,asIhave Said, despite an official request from the Government ofthe Congo some days ago for United State.s troops we insisted that all American help should be sent through the United Nations. The United Nations .effort, we think, offers the best way of restoring order and making possible the speedy Withdrawal, by stages, ofBelgian forces. Obviously, notroops shouldbe introducedinto the Congo other than those requested by the Secre- tary-General pursuant to the Security Council's resolution of 14 July. The UnitedStates can, accord- ingly, be counted on to continue its vigorous support sovi~tique s'en tient II cette ligne deconduite. L'Union sovi~tique a pris 1'initiative de faire examiner cette question par le Conseil de s~curiM. Elle a vot~ en faveur de la r~solution, adopt~e le 14 juillet, relative au retr,:it des troupes beIges du Congo. Elle a appuy~ la proposition tendant II aider le Congo et a accept~ la cr~ation d'une Force des Nations Unies. 98. n s'est ~coul~ un peu plus d'une semaine. La situation au Congo ne s'est pas am~lior~e. Bien au contraire, d'apr~s ce que vient de nous dire le repr~­ sentant du Congo, si des mesures d'urgence ne sont pas prises, la situation risque d'empirer encore et des evenements bien plus sanglants peuvent se pro- duire. 99. Dans ces conditions, il est absolument indispen- sable que le Conseil de s~curit~, char~par la Charte du maintien de lapaixet de la s~curit~ internationales, prenne des mesures plus d~cisives.Laplus importante a cet ~gard, la mesure essentielle - et tous ceux qui sont intervenus lci sont en substance d'accord sur ce point - serait le retrait imm6diat des troupes beIges du Congo. 100. L'Union sovi~tique continuera II s'en tenir II cette r~gle de conduite, afin d'aider efficacement le peuple congolais dans salutte. L'Unionsovi~tiquecon­ sid~re en effet que cette politlque r~pondnon seulement aux int6r~ts du peuple congolais, non seulement aux int6r~ts de 1'Union sovietique, mais anssi aux int6r~ts vitaux, aux inter~ts fondamentaux de tous les peuples, car il s'agit du maintienet du renforcement de la paix. 101. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Am6rique) [traduit de l'anglais]: Permettez-moi simplement de vous donner lecture de ce que j'ai dit hier, dece que j'ai dit exac- tement et non des paroles que m'attribue M. Kouznet- soy. Je lis le paragraphe 193 du compte rendu steno- graphique official de la 877~me s6ance du Conseil, tenue les 20 et 21 juillet 1960: "Selon certaines nouvelles, 1'Union sovi6tique pourrait intervenir directement au Congo en y envoyant des troupes; avant determiner,jevoudrals dire quelques mots sur cette question. La position du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Am6rique a. cet 6gard est absolument claire, tant pour lui-mame que pour d'autres pays. Je 1'ai dit, bien que le Gouver- nement congolais nous a.1t officiellement demand6 il y a quelques jours de lui envoyer des troupes am6- ricaines, nous avons insist6 pour que toute aide que les Etats-Unls pourralent fournir le soltpar l'inter- mediaire des Nations Unles. L'action des Nations Unies est, II notre avis, le meilleur moyen de r6ta- blir 1'ordre et de permettre le retralt progresslf et rapide des forces beIges. De toute 6vidence, 11 ne faut introduire au Congo d'autres troupes que celles qui ont 6t6 demand6es par le Secr6taire ~n6ral en That is the end of the quotation of what I said last night. That statement stands, andMr.Kuznetsovmight as well realize it.

Ifno other member of the Council wishes to speak, we shall take a vote. 103. I call on the representative of Ceylon on a point of order concerning the voting.

I shouldliketo make one comment onthe draft resolution [S/4404] submitted by the Tunisian delegation and my delegation. I refer to operative paragraph 3, which reads: "Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to continue to take such action as may be necessary under the authority given to him by the Security Council on 14 July 1960 and by this resolution." It is clear that the resolution of 14 July 1960 contains such authority; and by the present draft resolution, in operative paragraph 1, special authorityis giventothe Secretary-General. It is clear, accordingly, that operative paragraph 3 is redundant, and, therefore, if there is no objectionfrom the CouncilIbeg permission to delete it before the draft resolution is put to the vote. The representative of Tunisia agrees with this proposal•.

The Chair has taken note of what the representative of Ceylon has said, and willputthe draft resolution to the vote without operative paragraph 3.

According to t.he rules of procedure, it is clear that, when there are two draft resolutions beforethe Council,they are put to the vote in the order of their submission. However, if the Council has no objection, I would propose that the resolution submitted by Ceylon and Tunisia have priority. 107. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The USSR dele- gation has no objectiontothe draft resolution submitted by Tunisia and Ceylon being given priority, 108. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The Council will now vote on the draft resolutionsubmitted by Ceylon and Tunisia [S/4404], without paragraph 3. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Argentina, Ceylon, China, Ecuador, France, Italy, Poland, Tunisia, Union ofSovietSocial- ist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. d~claration, n'en d~plaise 11 M. Kouznetsov. 102. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de 1'espagnol): Si aucun autre membre du Conseil ne desire prendre laparole, nouS passerons au vote. 103. Je donne la parole au repr~sentant de Ceylan pour une motion d'ordre concernant le vote. 104. Sir Claude COREA (Ceylan) [traduitdel'anglais]: Je voudrais faire une observation 11 propos du projet de resolution presen16 par la d~legationtunisienne et ma propre d~legation [S/4404]. Je voudrais parler du paragraphe 3 du dispositif dont le texte est le suivant: "Decide d'autoriser le Secretaire g6nerall1conti- nuer-aemener l'action qui pourra @tre n~cessaire, en vertu de l'autorite a lui comeree par le Conseil de securite le 14 juillet 1960 et par la pr~sente resolution." n est evident que la resolution du 14 juillet 1960 donne dejl1 cette autorisation au Secretaire g6neralet lepre- sent projet de r~solution, au paragraphe 1 de· son dispositif, conf~re des pouvoirs precis au Secretaire g6neral. Le paragraphe 3 du dispositiffait donc double emploi et je voudrais par consequent, sile Conseil n'y voit pas d'objection, le supprimer dutexte duprojet de resolution avant que celui-ei ne soit mis aux voix. Le representant de la Tunisie approuv~ cette proposition. 105. Le PRESIDENT (traduitde l'espagnol):Jeprends note de ce que vient de dire le representant de Ceylan et je mettrai aux voix le projet de resolution sans le paragraphe 3 du dispositif. 106. Sir Claude COREA (Ceylan) [traduit de 1'anglais]: Conformement au r~glement interieur, lorsque le Conseil est saisi de deux projets de resolution, ceux- ci sont mis auxvoixdansl'ordreollils ont e16 presen- tes. Toutefois, si le Conseil n'y voitpas d'inconvenient, je propose qu'on donne la priorite au projet de reso- lution presente par Ceylan et la Tunisie. 107. M•.KOUZNETSOV (Union des Republiques socia- listes sovietiques) [traduit du russe]: La delegation sovietique ne s'oppose pas 11 ce que le projet de la Tunisie et de Ceylan ait la priorite. 108. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de 1'espagnol): Dans ces conditions, le Conseil votera sur le projet de reso- lution de Ceylan et de la Tunisie [S/4404], le para- graphe 3 du dispositif etant supprime. n est precede au vote amain levee! Votent pour: Argentine, Ceylan, Chine, Equateur, France, Italie, Pologne, Tunisie, Union des Repu- bliques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Amerique.

In my earlier statement I think I stressed sufficiently my Government's feelings about the continuingthreats and outrages against certainethnic groups inthe Congo, and I need not repeat myself. My delegation wishes to explain clearly why it votedfor thetext just adopted by the Council. s~vices dont ont 6t~ et sont encore l'objet certains 61~ments ethniques, au Congo, pour n'avoirpasbesoin d'y revenir. Ma d~l~gation tient il6tablir clairement leG motifs de sonvote enfaveur dutexte que le Conseil vient d'adopter. 111. L'action du Secr6taire g6n~ral, exerc~e dans un esprit it la fois r6aliste et humanitaire, nous a donn~ tous apaisements et doit, en cons~quence, recevoir le soutien le plUS large. La r~solution ne saurait, d'autre part, ~tre interpr~t6e - et s~cialementilIa suite des explications donn6es par le Ministre des affaires 6tran~resde laBelgique - comme impliquant la moindre critique :l I'~gard du Gouvernement beIge. 112. Enfin, je prends acte du lien salutaire qui a 6t6 111. The Secretary-General has acted in a realistic and humanitarian spirit: he has fully met our wishes and deserves the widest possible support. The resolu- tion cannot, moreover, be interpreted to imply the slightest criticism of the Belgian Government, es- pecially after the statement ofthe BelgianMinisterfor Foreign Affairs. 112. Lastly, I note that one of the sponsors of the draft resolution established a very necessary relation between the withdrawal of Belgian troops andpersonal safety. 113. These are the three reasons why my delegation voted in favour of the resolution which has just been adopted. ~tabli par I 'un des auteurs duprojet de r6solution, dans son intervention, entre le retrait des troupes beIges et la s6curiM des personnes. 113. Tels sont les trois ordres de consid6rationpour lesquels ma d616gation a vot6 enfaveur de la r6solution qui vient d'~tre adopt6e. 114. M. KOUZNETSOV (Uniondes R~publiquessocia- listes sovi~tiques) [traduit du russe]: Nous avons voM en faveur du projet de r6solution de la Tunisie et de Ceylan, bien que nous le jUgions insuffisant quant aux d6lais d'~vacuation des troupes beIges du Congo. La r6solution serait sans aucun doute plus efficace sielle fixait un d6lai pr6cis pour le retrait des troupes, comme le pr~voyait le projet de r6solution sovi~tique.

My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Tunisia and Ceylon, even though we think that it does not go far enoughwithregardtothetime-limits for the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Congo. There is no doubt that the resolution would have been more effective if it had set a definite deadline for the with- drawal of those forces, as was proposed in the draft resolution submitted by the USSR. 115. Etant donn6 la situation critique au Congo, les troupes beIges d'occupation doivent ~tre retir6es immMiatement. Presque tous les representants qui ont comment~ le rapport du Secr6taire g6n6ral sont parvenus il cette conclusion. Nous comptons donc que le Secr6taire g6n6ral tiendra compte de leur vceu et prendra toutes les mesures voulues pour que les troupes beIges se retirent sans tarder en quelques jours. 115. In view of the critical situation inthe Congo, the Belgian occupation forces should be withdrawn im- mediately. That was the conclusion reached by almost every member of the Council who spoke onthe Secre- tary-General's report. We therefore expectthe Secre- tary-General to heed the general wish and to take all necessary steps to ensurethewithdrawal ofthe Belgian troops without delay-within a few days. 116. En outre, au paragraphe 2 du dispositif de la r6s01ution qui vient d'~tre adopt~e, le Conseil prie tous les Etats de s'abstenir de toute action qui pour- rait tendre il emp~cher le r6tablissement de 1'ordre public au Congo. n va de soi que le Gouvernement central de la R6publique, et lui seul, r6tablira1'ordre public dans le pays. La R6publique du Congo est un Etat souverain et ind6pendant, et c 'est pourquoi le 116. Operative paragraph 2 of the resolution which the Council has just adopted requests all States to refrain from any action whichmighttendto impede the restoration of law and order in the Congo. Needless to say, the restoration of law and order in that country will be effected by the Central Government of the Re- public of the Congo, and by no one else. The Republic of the Congo being an independent sovereign State,the settlement of all issues concerning the Republic falls Within the exclusive province of its Government. r~glement de toutes les questions int6ressant le Congo est la pr6rogative exclusive du Gouvernement de la R6publique. 117. I have one more comment to make. Inconnexion with the Secretary-General's report, I should like to explain our conception of the tasks that must be en- trusted to the United Nations Force in the Congo. The 117. Une remarque encore. Au sUjet du rapport du Secr6taire g6n6ral, je voudrais expliquer comment nouS comprenons lea tllches qui doivent ~tre confi6es il la Force des Nations Unies au Congo. L'Union 118. Because of the specific nature ofthat resolution, and of the situation in the Republic of the Congo with which the Security Council was confronted, itwould, in our view, beprudent not to regardthe resolution other- wise than as a decision adopted under exceptionalcir- cumstances. 119. The resolution of 14 July and that adopted today should not; therefore, be consideredas aprecedentfor the future. 120. We feel unable to subscribe to certainaspects of the interpretation given by the Secretary-General to the Security Council resolution of 14 July. We cannot regard that resolution, and the ensuing action for its implementation, as endowing the United Nations with the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of a State and to assume responsibility for a country's domestic laws and regulations. That is not, nor canit be, part of the functions of the United Nations as defined in its Charter. The fundamental purpose of the resolutionis to be found in its demand for the withdrawal of the Belgian forces, which have no right to remain in the Republic of the Congo or be sent inside its frontiers without the consent, and a fortiori against the wishes, of the Republic's Government. It is precisely that demand which is the crux of the resolution of 14 July. 121. The United Nations Force must also be en- trusted with the task of safeguarding the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo. 122. In our opinion, no other interpretation of the resolution of 14 July can be correct or consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. 123. The USSR delegation has deemed itnecessaryto make these explanations.

Ifno other member ofthe Councilwishes to explainhis vote, I shall call on the representative ofthe Republic of the Congo.

I must thank all the members of the Council most warmly for the vote which it has just taken on the draft resolution submitted by Ceylon and Tunisia. If it is notthefirst time, it is certainly one of the few times thatthe SecurityCouncilhas unanimously adopted a resolution of this kind. I extend my sincere thanks to the members of the Council. 126. I believe that the decision just taken will allow peace and tranquillity tobe re-establishedintheterri- tory of the Republic of the Congo. I have not prepared a speech and I shall take up briefly and extempore the four points which I dealt with yesterday andwhich are included in the resolution just adopted. 127. There are some matters which I did not mention 127. n y a des d~tails que je n'ai pas signal~s hier, yesterday but which the Council must be informed of mais que le Conseil ne doit pas ignorer, parce qu'ils because they are extremelyimportant. Since yesterday sont d'une tr~s grande importance. Depuis hier soir, evening our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Justin notre ministre des affaires ~tran~res, M. Justin Bomboko, has been under arrest at Elisabethville. Bomboko, est arr~t~ it Elisabethville. Depuis avant- 24 118. Etant donn~ le caract~re s~c1fique de la r~so­ lution en question et la situation devant laquelle le Con"seil de s~curit~ s'est trouv~ dans le cas de la Republique du Congo, il seraitraisonnable, selonnous, de ne VC?ir dans cette r~solutionqu'une d~cision prise dans des circonstances exceptionnelles. 119. C'est pourquoi la r~solution du 14 juillet et la resolution adopt~e aujourd'hui ne doivent pas consti- tuer des pr~cMents. 120. Nous ne pouvons souscrire it certains aspects de 1'interpr~tation que le Secr~taire ~n~ral a donn~e de la r~solution adopt~e le 14 juillet par le Conseil de s~curit~. Nous ne saur.ions consid~rer que cette r~solution et les mesures d'application prises ult~­ rieurement conf~rent it 1'Organisation des Nations Unies le droit de s'immiscer dans les affaires inM- rieures des Etats et d'assumer la responsabilit~de l'ordre public dans un pays. Cette missionn'entrepas et ne peut entrer dans les attributions de 1'Organisation des Nations Unies selon la Charte. L'objectif fonda- mental de la r~solution est d'exiger le retrait des troupes beiges, qui n'ontpas le droit de se trouver dans la R~publique du Congo ni d'y p~n~trersans le consen- tement, et it plus forte raison contre le VCBU du Gou- vernement de la R~publique. C'est pr~cis~ment III 1'essentiel de la r~solutiondu 14 juillet. 121. En m~me temps, la Force des Nations Unies doit ~tre char~e d'assurer 1'int~griM territoriale de la R~publique du Congo. 122. A notre avis, aucune autre interpr~tationde la r~solution du 14 juillet n'est exacte ni conforme aux dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies. 123. La d~l~gation sovi~tique a ju~ n~cessaire de donner ces pr~cisions. 124. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'espagnol): Siaucun autre membre du Conseil ne d~sire expliquer son vote, je donnerai la parole au repr~sentantde la R~publique du Congo. 125. M. KANZA (R~publique du Congo): C'est avec ~motion que je dois remercier tout les membres du Coneeil de s~curiM pour le vote qui vient d'intervenir sur le projet de resolution expose par les represen- tants de Ceylan et de la Tunisie. Si ce n'est pas la premi~re fois, c'est certainement l'une des rares fois que le Conseil de s~curit~ adopte it 1'unanimit~ une r~solution de ce genre. Je remercie sinc~rement les repr~sentantsdes pays membres du Conseil. 126. Je crois que la d~cision qui vient d'intervenir permettra le r~tablissementde la paix et de la tran- quillit~ sur le territoire de la R~publique du Congo. Je n'ai pas pr~par~ de discours et me livrerai it une courte improvisation pour reprendre les quatre points que j'avais expos~s hier et qui figurent dans la r~so­ lution qui vient d'~tre adopt~e. 129. The Secretary-General has stated [877th meet- ing] that in present circumstances Africa may well mean the world, and this is a fact which must be stressed. The representative ofArgentina saidearlier that the situation in the Congowas ablaze which might become a general conflagration. For the Congolese Government and people, each Belgian soldier is a match likely to cause a fire. If this danger is to be removed, Belgian troops must leave our territory as quickly as possible. As I said before, tomorrowwould be acceptable but today would be better still. 130. I now pass to operative paragraph 2 ofthe reso- lution just adopted, which reads: "Requests all States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration oflaw and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integ- rity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo". Our interpretation of this paragraph is as follows: "Requests all States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority in restoring law and order", the rest remaining unchanged. Indeed, as we see it, the Congolese Government is the only body responsible for maintaining law and order in Congolese territory. It has been prevented for some days from restoring and maintaining law and order and, since it is the Government of a sovereign and independent State, it can only endorse what the representative of Ecuador just said, namely, thatthe presence offoreigntroops in any territory requires the consent of that territory's national authorities. 131. As I pointed out yesterday, Belgiantroops are in the national territory of the Congo without the consent of the Congolese Government. Incidents which have occurred in our territory have been provoked by the presence of these troops. 132. I do not wish to repeat certain details, but I believe that two small events, whichI am going to bring to the Council's attention, are of primary importance to international relations. Our Head of State and our Prime Minister, who are in our nationalterritory, have several times been subjected to insults, mockery and 133. For the moment, the Congo is in a tragic situa- tion. The psychology of the Congolese is difficult to understand for those who do not wish tounderstand it. The Western peoples, the Eastern peoples, all the peoples of the world, all those who have suffered humiliation and have experienced mental anguish will understand that, now that the Congo has beenindepen- dent for a few brief days, all Congolese are proud of their Government and oftheir HeadofState and merely want him, their Prime Minister and their Government to be respected andto enjoy allthe esteem and honours due to them so thattheymay dischargewith dignity the heavy responsibilities whichrest upontheir shoulders. 134. According to the Secretary-General's report [S/4389], by 18 July 3,500 troops had arrived in Leopoldville, consisting of 460 troops from Ethiopia, 770 from Ghana, 1,250 from Morocco and 1,020 from Tunisia. In addition, some 700 men have just left from Guinea. At the moment there are about 4,000 United Nations troops in.Congoleseterritory.ldonotknow the exact number of Belgian troops but I challenge anyone to state it is greater than 4,000. Thus the presence of these Belgian troops has long become superfluous, for' at the moment there are in Congolese national terri- tory about 4,000 United Nations troops which are certainly comptetent and able to help the Congolese National Army and the Congolese Governmentto main- tain order and safeguard territorial integrity. 135. The Government and people ofthe Republic ofthe Congo intend to defend the territorialintegrity oftheir country at all costs and by every means. Attempts to create division will not succeed in the Congo. We are even convinced that they will no longer succeed in Africa. Africa, once divided, intends to unite again in order to become a force for peace and progress in the world. If we did not knowtlie unspeakable and unspoken motives of those who seek to derive a base advantage from these machinations, we would find it surprising, to say the least, that the Congo at this very moment should want to break up. The Republic of the Congo refuses to submit to such machinations. I make a solemn appeal here to all who have in mind the future , of the Congo and the peace of the world to help us put out the blaze set off by these attempts to dismember our country. 136. I cannot conclude my statement without paying a 136. Je ne p~is terminer mon expos~ sans rendre tribute to the perseverance and eminent qualities of hommage 11 la t~nacit~ et 11 la haute· personnalit~ du 26 ~prouver quelque difficult~ que ce soit pour atterrir, ou qu'ils puissent ~tre insulMs ou injuri~s par des ~trangers. 133. Pour le moment, le Congo se trouve dans une situation tragique. La psychologie du Congolais est difficile ~ comprendre pour ceux qui ne veulent pas la comprendre. Les peuples occidentaux comme les peuples de l'Est, les peuples du monde entier, tous ceux qui ont subi des humiliations, tous ceux qui connaissent les souffrances psychologiques, compren- dront que, depuis quelques jours que le Congo est devenu ind~pendant, tous les Congolais sont fiers de leur gouvernement et de leur chef d'Etat, tous les Congolais souhaitent simplement que le chef d'Etat, le Premier Ministre et le Gouvernement congolais soient respecMs et b~nMicient de tout le respect, de tous les honneurs, et assument de la faC;on la plus respectable, la plus digue, les lourdes responsabilit~s qui p~sent sur leurs ~paules. 134. n. y avait, le 18 juillet, d'apr~s le rapport du Secr~taire ~n~ral [S/4389], aumoins3.500militaires de la Force des Nations Unies ~ Uopoldville, soit 460 Ethiopiens, 770 Ghan~ens, 1.250 Marocains, 1.020 Tunisiens. En plUS, 700 Guin~ens viennent de partir pour L~opoldville. A I'heure actuelle, il y a approxi- mativement 4.000 militaires de la Force des Nations Unies sur le territoire congolais. J'ignore le chiffre exact des troupes beIges, mais je dMie quiconque de dire que ce chiffre serait sup~rieur II 4.000. Aussi la pr~sence de ces troupes beIges est-elle devenue inutile depuis tr~s longtemps, car il y a pour le mo- ment, sur le territoire national congolais, environ 4.000 militaires de la Force des Nations Unies, qUi sont certainement com~tents et capables d'aider I'arm~e nationale congolaise et le Gouvernement con- golais II maintenir l'ordre et l'int~grit~territoriale. 135. Le gouvernement et le peuple de la R~publique du Congo entendent dMendre II tout prix, par tous les moyens, I'inMgrit~ territoriale de leur pays. Les manreuvres de division ne r~ussiront pas au Congo. Nous sommes m~mes convaincus qu'elles ne r~us­ siront pas au Congo. Nous semmes m~mesconvaincus qu'elles ne r~ussiront plus en Afrique. L'Afrique na- gu~re divis~e entend s'unir II nouveau pour constituer une force depaixetdeprogr~sdanslemonde. n serait pour le moins surprenant, si I'on ne savait les raisons inavouables et inavou~es de ceux qui comptenttirer un avantage malsain de ces manreuvres, quIll ce moment pr~cis le Congo cherche ~ se disloquer. La R~publique du Congo refuse de se soumettre ~ de telles ma- nreuvres. Je lance ici un appel solennel pour que tous ceux qui pensent II l'avenir du Congo et ~ la paix du monde nous aident efficacement 11 ~teindre le foyer attis~ par les tentatives tendant II disloquer notre pa- trie. 137. I wish to express my gratitude again to the representatives of States members of the Security Council. I have asked for a telephone call to be put through to Leopoldville. It will be for me a great pleasure-although a somewhat mitigated one-to in- form our Prime Minister, who will certainly announce it himself on the Leopoldville radio, of the resolution which has just been adopted by the Security Council. I say that my pleasure will be somewhat mitigated be- cause, I repeat, the psychology ofthe Congolese for the moment can be understood only by those who wish to understand it. That psychology is very easy to under- stand; the Congolese have suffered one of the greatest insults that canbeinflicted on a youngpeople which has just achieved independence. Rather, it has won its independence because, whatever they say, it was not handed to the Congo on a silver platter. The Congo actually won its independence. Some of our people lost their lives in this process. 138. My pleasurewillbe mitigatedbecausethe Congo- lese have become mistrustful. They continue, however, to put their faith in the United Nations because they hope that the word "speedily" in the resolutionwill be understood in theway inwhichI have explained and that in a few days' time, whenthe Secretary-General of the United Nations lands at the Leopoldville airport, the Congolese Government will be in a position to receive him worthily, with all due honours beingpaidto him by the Congolese National Army. If time allows, the Secretary-General will be able to travel across the Congo, be received by the Congolese, and see the Congo, this young country which is, Ibelieve,the hope of Africa and which certainly for some days has at- tracted the attention of the whole world. 139. I believe that when he returns to United Nations Headquarters the Secretary-Generalwillbe able to say that Belgium has respected the Council's resolutions and that he has found a Congo restored to health, a country good to live in. 140. I wish againto express mythanks tothe members of the Council. In September 1960 the Congo will be very proud to be counted among the Member States of the United Nations.

I could make a good many comments on the final remarks of the representative of the Congo. I shall, however, confine myself to two or three observations. 142. The representative of the Congo based his re- marks on certain facts which are on the sensational side. I presume he has gathered his information from news agencies. But I went a bit further than that. esp~rons que la Belgique respectera les d~cisions du Conseil de s~curit~ - que le Congo ne devienne pas un champ de bataille, ne devienne pasl'occasiond'une troisieme guerre mondiale. 137. Je redis ma gratitude aux repr~sentantsdes pays membres du Conseil de s~curit~.Je viens de demander Uopoldville au Ml~phone. Ce sera pour moi une tres grande joie, encore que joie miti~e, tout a. l'heure, d'annoncer a. notre premier ministre - qui certaine- ment l'annoncera lui-m~me a. la radio de Uopold- ville - la r~solution qui vient d'~tre adopt~e par le Conseil de s~curit~. Je dis que ma joie sera quelque peu miti~e,parce que, jetiens llle r~~ter, la psycho- logie du Congolais, pour le moment, ne peut ~tre com- prise que de ceux qui veulent la comprendre. La psychologie du Congolais esttresfacile !comprendre; les Congolais auront subi 1'un des plus grands affronts que peut subir un jeune peuple qui vient d'accMer ! 1'ind~pendance, qui vient de conqu~rir son ind~pen­ dance parce que, quoiqu'ondise, leCongon'a pas reQu l'ind~pendance sur un plateau d'argent. Son ind~pen­ dance, le Congo l'a conquise. Nous avons d~plor~ des morts avant d'y acc6der. 138. Ma joie sera miti~e,car le Congolais est devenu m6fiant. Le Congolais continue quand m~me ! faire confiance aux Nations Unies parce quIll espere que le mot "rapidement" qui figure dans la r~solution,sera compris de la faQon que je vous ai expliqu6e et que d'ici quelques jours, quandil atterrira sur l'a~rodrome de Leopoldville, ~e Secr6taire ~n~ralpourra~trereQu dignement par le Gouvernement congolais, les hon- neurs lui 6tant rendus par l'arm~e nationale congo- laise. Le Secr~taire ~n6ral pourra, s'il dispose du temps n~cessaire, se d~placer!travers le Congo, ~tre reQu par les Congolais, voir le Congo, ce jeune pays, qui est, je crois, l'espoir de l'Afrique, etqui a certai- nement, depuis quelques jours, attir6 l'attention du monde entier. 139. Je crois que le Secr6taire ~n6ral pourra, lorsqu'il sera de retour au Siege des Nations Unies, dire que la Belgique a respect~ les r~solutions du Conseil de s~curit~ et qU'il a trouv~ un Congo assaini, un Congo od II fait bon vivre. 140. Monsieur le Pr~sident, Messieurs, je tiens encore d vaus r~it6rer mes remerciements et, en septembre 1960, le Congo sera tres fier d'~tre compt~ parmi les Etats Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. 141. M. WIGNY (Belgique): Les remarques finales du repr~sentant du Congo appelleraient de ma part de nombreux commentaires. Je prMere me borner d deux ou trois rMlexions. 142. Le repr~sentantdu Congo s'estbas~ sur certains faits qui, !l vrai dire, sont assez sensationnels. Je suppose quIll tient ses informations des agences de presse. J'ai ~t6 un peu plus loin. 144. As regards Mr. Bomboko, I suppose that the representative of the Congo has taken his information from a Reuters dispatch. He will learnintime that one must not rely too heavily on news agency releases. I have made a little inquiry into this matter, too. Mr. Bomboko was never arrested at Elisabethville. Ac- cording to a cable from our Ambassador, itwould ap- pear that Mr. Lumumba intends to have Mr. Bomboko accompany him on his journey to New York. 145. As to the respect due to the Head of State, I should have liked the representative of the Congo to recall that the Belgian troops, in scrupulous respect for this important personage, paid him allthe honours due to a Head of State whenever he left and re-entered Leopoldville. 146. With regard to Mr. Lumumba, the Prime Minis- ter, the representative ofthe Congo oughtto have made it clear that, while he may at times have been greeted with rather unfriendly words-which, incidentally, I regret because this never solves anything-this hap- pened when he found himself in the midst of refugees waiting to depart. Quite naturally, those who had ex- perienced or had heard of the sufferings aboutwhich I spoke yesterday were not in a mood to add their ac- clamations to the military honours paid to Mr. Lumumba. 147. So much for the facts cited just now by the representative of the Congo. But apart from this question I should like to set out several general con- siderations, and I shall be very brief. 148. Belgium was not only disappointed in its hopes and painfully wounded, it was outrageously slandered by those who, always ready to take liberties with facts and logic, accused it of aggression against apeople to whom it had granted independence in conditions offull agreement and friendship four days earlier. These are the very terms of the declaration signed on 30 June 1960 by the two Prime Ministers andthe two Ministers of Foreign Affairs. All the members of the Security Council, with the exception of the two Communist members, have wisely condemned this slander, and I thank them for it. 149. Secondly, our intervention was motivated by purely humanitarian considerations. It arose neither from article 6 of the treaty of friendship!! nor cer- tainly from any design to take over all the duties and obligations of the faltering Congolese authority. Itwas strictly limited to protecting our nationals, who were no longer protected by the faltering Congolese auth- ority, and thus had no protection, andwho had been the victims of atrocities. The most convincing evidence of this situation is that we sent to Leopoldville, with its JJ General Treaty of Friendship,AsslstanceandCo-operationbetween Belgium and the Republic of theCongo. signed at Leopoldville on 29 June 1960. 28 145. En ce qui concerne le respect dtl au chef de l'Etat, j'aurais voulu que le representant du Congo rappela.t que, poussant jusqu'auscrupule le respect que nous devons pour cette haute personnali16, les troupes mllitaires beIges lui ont rendu les honneurs dus II un chef d'Etat chaque fois quIll quittait Leopoldville et quIll y revenait. 146. En ce qui concerne le Premier Ministre, M. Lumumba, le representant du Congo aurait dtl preciser que, si, II certains moments, II a e16 re9u avec des paroles peu aimables, que je regrette d'ailleurs - car cela ne corrige jamais rien - c'est parce qu'il se trouvait au milieu de tous ces refugies qui attendaient le moment du depart. Naturellement, tous ceux qui avaient souffert ou entendu parler des souffrances que je vous ai racontees hier n'etaient pas d'humeur II m~ler leurs acclamations aux honneurs militaires rendus II M. Lumumba. 147. Voilll pour les faits qui viennent d'~tre rappe16s par le representant du Congo. Mais laissons cette question. Je voudrais developper quelques conside- rations generales; je serai tr~s bref. 148. La Belgique, dec;ue dans ses esperances etdou- loureusement blessee, a ete outrageusement calomniee par ceux qui, toujours II lIaise avec la reali16 et la logique, 1'ont accusee d'agression envers un peuple qui, quatre jours plus tOt, accedait II l'independance en plein accord et amiti6 avec la Belgique. Tels sont les termes exprlls de la declaration signee le 30 juin 1960 par les deux Premiers Ministres et les deux Ministre~ des affaires etrang~res. Avec sagesse, tous les membres du Conseil de securite, lll'exception de deux membres C'l)mmunistes, ont condamne cette ca- lomnie; je les en remercie. 149. Deuxi~mement, notre intervention fut justifiee par des raisons strictement humanitaires; elle ne se fondait ni sur l'article6 dutraited'amitie.!l,ni surtout sur la pretention de se substituer II l'ensemble des devoirs de I 'autorite congolaise dMaillante; elle etait strictement limitee II la protection de nos ressor- tissants qui n'etaient plus pro16g6s parl'autori16con- golaise dMaillante, c'est-ll-dire par personne, et qui etaient victimes de graves sevices. La meilleure preuve de cette realite est quIll Leopoldville, qui lJ Traitl! general d'amitil!, d'assistance et de coopl!ration entre la Belgique et la Rl!publique du Congo, signeaLl!opoldv,i1le le 29 juin 1960. .. 151. Fourthly, we have brought troops to the Congo against our wishes, forced by necessity. I solemnly reiterate the will of the Belgian Government, which I stated yesterday: these troops are to be withdrawn as quickly as possible, that is, as soon as the United Nations Command is in a position to ensure order and security, and possibly also when the Congolese Gov- ernment is capable, not only in words-and this is my very candid hope-of restoring order in its own coun- try. This decision to leave as quickly as pOSSible, which concurs with your wish, would involve no delay, since its implementation is bound to be regional and hence progressive. At Leopoldville, where the foreign troops of which Mr. Kanza spoke have already arrived, the withdrawal is in progress and shouldbe completed rapidly. We do not intend to press arbitrarily for the acceptance of our own views. We have faith in the wisdom and political tact of the Secretary-General, perhaps more faith than in the discrimination of the Congolese Government, which we shall judge by its actions. 152. Fifthly, where Congolese unity is concerned, may I recall that this unity is Belgium's doing. Before we came to Africa there was no Congo. Congolese unity was enshrined in the "loi fondamentale" adoptedbythe Belgian Parliament this year, in agreeIll;ent with, and on behalf of, an independent Congo. It will be remem- bered also that the first Congolese Government was assisted in every way in its efforts to enlarge its territorial representation. But since 30 June the Congo has been independent and we are no longer entitled to intervene. We eschew all interference inits internal life. We are fulfilling our commitments regarding technical and financial assistance wherever it has been requested, provided that we are giventhebasic guaran- tees that are to be expected from any civilized State. For the rest, it is for the Congolese themselves to decide their fate. Neither the Belgian Government nor any other State, nor even the United Nations has the right to do it for them. 153. I should like, finally, to take note ofthe words of 153. J'enregistre enfin les paroles d'espoir qui ont hope we have heard around this table regarding the t!ite prononct!ies autour de cette table quant III'avenir Congo's future. Despite the fact thatwe havebeen dis- du Congo. Encore que nous ayons t!itt!i dt!i«.tus et que appointed and that the last remarks, based on rumours, les derni~res paroles, fondees sur des rumeurs, soient are obviously unfortunate, and although we continueto evidemment malheureuses, encore que nous conti- suffer, the Belgian Government associates itself with nuions de souffrir, le Gouvernement beIge s'associe this hope. Its. wish for the independent Congo is that 11 cette espt!irance. A ce Congo indt!ipendant, il souhaite 29 d~clare franchement: Anotre connaissance et Acelle du Commandement de 1'ONU,le Congo n'est pas encore pacifi~; les appels au secours continuent A se faire entendre tragiquement de partout; nous en informons le Secretaire ~neral; il doit d'ailleurs le sayoir directement. 151. Quatri~mement, nous avons amene des troupes au Congo, contre notre d~sir, forces par lan~cessite. Je rep~te solennellement la volont~ du Gouvernement beIge que j'ai dejA exprimee hier: ces troupes seront retir~es aussi vite que possible, c'est-A-dire aussi vite que le Commandement des Nations Unies sera en ~tat d'assurer l'ordre et la securit~, et peut~tre aussi dans la mesure OU, au-delA des paroles, le Gouvernement congolais sera capable - et je le souhaite bien franchement - de retablir la discipline dans son propre pays. Cette d~cision de partir aussi vite que possible, comme vous le souhaitez, n'implique aucun retard, puisque son application doit ~tre r~gio­ nale, et par cons~quentprogressive. A Uopoldville, ou se trouvent d~jll les effectifs ~trangersdont parlait M. Kanza, le d~crochageest en cours et dolt se ter- miner rapidement. Nous ne pr~tendons pas faire pr~­ valoir arbitrairement des appreciations unilaMrales. Nous avons confiance en la sagesse et en la prudence politique du Secr~taire ~n~ral, plus peut~tre- dans le temps pr~sent - que dans I' appr~ciationdu Gou- vernement congolais. Nous le jugerons Ases actes. 152. Cinqui~mement, en ce qui concerne l'uniM du Congo, puis-je rappeler que celle-ei est le fait de la politique beIge. Avant que nous arrivions en Mrique, il n'y avait pas de Congo. L'unite du Congo a ~te con- sacr~e par la loi fondamentale vot~epar les Chambres beIges au cours de cette ann~e, enaccordavec et pour le Congo ind~pendant. Vous savez que le premier gou- vernement congolais a ~t~ assiste de toutes les ma- ni~res dans son effort pour ~largir sa repr~sentation territoriale. Mais aujourd'hui, et depuis le 30 juin, le Congo est ind~pendantet nous n'avons plus 11 inter- venir. Nous nous abstenons de toute in~rence dans sa vie inMrieure. Nous tenons notre promesse d'as- sistance technique et financi~re III ou elle nous est demandt!ie et, en m~me temps, lA ou nous sont donnt!ies les garanties fondamentales que I'on est en droit d'attendre de tout Etat civilist!i. Pour le surplus, il appartient aux Congolais eux-mames de dt!icider de leur sort. Ce droit n'appartient ni au Gouvernement beIge, ni 11 un autre Etat, ni mame aux Nations Unies.

Mr. President, the generous words which you have just addressed to me are infact addressedto allthosewho in the service of the United Nations have worked for its aim in as- sistance to the Congo. The spirit and hope which have inspired us during the past week will not fail. They have been strengthened by the unanimitythat has given this effort its special weight and power. The meeting rose on Friday, 22 July, at 1 a.m. Price: $U.S. 0.50; 3/6 stg.; Sw. fr. 2.00 (or equivalent in other currencies) Litho in U.N. qualit~ de mandataire du Conseil, ceuvre qui a ~t~ appuy~e et approuv~e par tousaucoursdud~batd'hier et d'aujourd'hui. Je tiens ~galement 11 exprimer le souhait que son prochain s~jour dans la R~publiquedu Congo contribue d'une mani~re' nettement positive - et nous sommes persuad~squ'il en sera ainsi - 11 assainlr la situation et 11faire respecter lesbuts et les principes de la Charte des NationsUnies dans la R~pu­ blique du Congo. 155. Le SECRETAffiE GENERAL (traduit de l'an- glais): Monsieur le Pr~sident, les paroles g6n~reuses que vous venez de prononcer llmon~gards'adressent, en fait, 11 tous ceux qui, au service de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, ont tra'vaill~ 11 fournir une assis- tance au Congo. La volont~ et I'espoir qui nous ont anim~s au cours de cette derni~re semaine ne seront pas mis en ~chec. ns sont renforc~s par I'unanimiM qui donne 11 notre effort sa port~e et son ampleur exceptionnelles. La seance est levee le vendredi 22 juillet, a1 heure. 25210-November 1960-1,775