S/PV.8809 Security Council

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them document S/2021/610, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by France. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2021/519, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, and document S/2021/520, which contains the text of a letter dated 1 June 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

The draft resolution received 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 2584 (2021). I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

I have the honour to deliver this explanation of vote on behalf of the African members of the Security Council, namely, Kenya, the Niger and Tunisia, as well as Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (A3+1). We thank the penholder for its efforts in preparing resolution 2584 (2021), renewing for an additional year the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). We also commend the other members of the Security Council for their spirit of consensus and their constructive engagement during the negotiations. We agreed to join the consensus by voting in favour of resolution 2584 (2021) with the conviction that the support of the United Nations and bilateral, regional and multilateral partners is essential to find a lasting solution to the crisis. However, as the stabilization of Mali continues to elude us, despite the multiple interventions, it is now clear that we will need to adjust our efforts. We would have wanted the resolution to enable MINUSMA to help Mali in coordination with other partners, including the African Union, to harmonize and streamline its political, security, social and humanitarian efforts to make them more consistent and effective and enable them to serve the interests of the people of Mali, who have been bled dry for far too long. With regard to operational and logistical support from MINUSMA to the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel — while important — it is clear that it falls significantly short of what is needed to eradicate the scourge of terrorism. The longer we wait to understand that, the more serious the problem will become. The A3+1 therefore reiterates the urgency of replacing it with a lasting solution, such as establishing a United Nations support office.

The United States would also like to thank Security Council members for their collaborative negotiation. And we are grateful for France’s collegiality in developing resolution 2584 (2021) and in conducting negotiations. As I begin this explanation of vote, I know all our thoughts are with the 13 German peacekeepers wounded in the improvised explosive device attack on 25 June while serving in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The United States condemns that attack in the strongest terms. In the light of MINUSMA’s immense tasks, my delegation reiterates that a clear line must be maintained between counter-terrorism-mandated operations and peacekeeping missions in order to protect the United Nations impartiality, its personnel and its effectiveness. The Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel) Governments  — not the Security Council  — direct the Joint Force, which is a coalition of domestic forces conducting offensive counter-terrorism operations within their own countries. To that end, we must work together to find options to relieve MINUSMA of its reimbursable support through the United Nations- European Union-G-5 Sahel technical agreement to the G-5 Sahel Joint Force. We also recall that MINUSMA and other United Nations support to regional actors must be conditioned on strict compliance with the human rights due diligence policy and must be supported by credible and robust verification mechanisms. With regard to the new mandate requesting the Secretary-General to report on options to increase support to the Joint Force, we reiterate that Chapter VII authorization is not appropriate for the Joint Force. Furthermore, the United States does not support using any source of United Nations funding to establish a United Nations support office for the Joint Force. We encourage the Secretary-General to explore the full spectrum of bilateral and multilateral options outside of MINUSMA and the United Nations more generally. We agree that the G-5 Sahel is a crucial part of a sustainable solution for stability and prosperity in the Sahel. The United States is a committed partner to the G-5 Sahel, and we have obligated more than $588 million to provide security assistance and other countering- violent extremism support to the G-5 countries since fiscal year 2017. For the people of the Sahel, the United States Government has provided more than $2 billion in health and development, security and humanitarian assistance. We will continue to support the Sahel through appropriate mechanisms. Moving to climate change, we were dismayed that the Council failed to take the needed steps to increase United Nations information gathering in order to increase the Council’s understanding of how climate-related security risks affect Mali. As we know, the impacts of climate change can exacerbate underlying political, social and economic conditions  — possibly leading to new or renewed conflict, food and water scarcity and mass migration  — that threatens to undermine peace and stability. The impacts of climate change can also undermine our ability to successfully execute peacekeeping operations and other shared security priorities. Finally, let me end with a note about the ongoing transition in Mali. It is critical that the February 2022 elections be free and fair and result in a transition to democratic governance by April 2022, which will support conditions for stability and address social grievances. We strongly support the Economic Community of West African States parameter that the Head of State and the Prime Minister are not under any circumstances to be candidates in the presidential election. We also reiterate our call for the immediate and unconditional release and humane treatment of those still being held in detention and under house arrest following the events of 24 May.

I take the floor to explain India’s position on resolution 2584 (2021), just adopted. Mali is currently facing serious political and security challenges. This delicate phase requires the renewed commitment of all stakeholders in Mali to the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and its implementation as well as ownership of the transition road map. The continued support of bilateral and international partners to Mali  — including the United Nations, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States — is much-needed in these challenging times. India remains committed to supporting Mali to overcome the present political and security crisis. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has been playing an important role in stabilizing the security situation in Mali through its support to the peace process. We commend the efforts of MINUSMA peacekeepers, who are functioning under complex and extremely challenging circumstances. The contribution of MINUSMA to peace and security in Mali needs to be recognized unequivocally. I would also like to underline that the primary responsibility to fight terrorists and extremist armed groups lies with the Malian Defence and Security Forces. MINUSMA peacekeepers are there to support the Malian Defence and Security Forces to implement the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and its provisions. The effective implementation of peacekeeping mandates is the responsibility of all stakeholders, not just the troop-contributing countries (TCCs). However, paragraph 46 of the resolution singles out TCCs and puts the onus on them for what is mentioned in the resolution: “shared responsibility for effective mandate implementation”. This paragraph gives the impression that the TCCs in Mali have not performed in a professional manner. Such a conclusion has not been drawn in any of the reports as such. In fact, the contrary is true, since the TCCs have been performing courageously in the extremely challenging environment in Mali. We have already agreed that the evaluation of performance should not be limited to TCCs but include all components of the Mission— that is, uniformed, civilian and Mission leadership. That is reflected in the Integrated Performance Policy Framework, including the Comprehensive Planning Performance Assessment System. The insertion of any language to the contrary will undermine the framework we have painstakingly put together as well as absolve the civilian leadership of the Mission from any misdemeanour. We therefore continue to call for the implementation of Integrated Performance Policy Framework to hold all civilian and uniformed peacekeepers accountable for effective performance under common parameters while addressing performance shortfalls.

The United Kingdom thanks France as penholder for its efforts and welcomes the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) for a further 12 months. We remain a strong supporter of the Mission, which plays a crucial role in promoting peace and stability in Mali. Our military deployment is testament to that support. The United Kingdom welcomes the re-emphasis of MINUSMA’s two strategic priorities: to support the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and the protection of civilians in the centre of the country. Both are fundamental to peace and stability in Mali and depend upon full respect for human rights. The transitional authorities must uphold their commitment to tackling impunity for violations and abuses of human rights. Furthermore, it is critical that MINUSMA’s support be coordinated across civilian and military pillars and with security, development and humanitarian actors beyond the Mission. MINUSMA must be able to focus on its priority peacekeeping tasks and act in strict compliance with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. This negotiation demonstrated that there is no Council-wide consensus on United Nations support for the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel. While an effective Force is an important part of the solution, we note again that its long-term impact will be limited without a sustained focus on governance. The United Kingdom does not support the idea of a United Nations support office. We have continued concerns regarding human rights accountability. And we have a fundamental concern regarding United Nations involvement in offensive national counter-terrorism operations. It is important that we protect the United Nations impartiality and the safety and security of its personnel. We believe that any further discussions regarding support for the Force should consider a wide range of options for support, particularly those provided by bodies other than the United Nations. They should establish how the Force complements a broader strategy to address the underlying drivers of conflict in the Sahel. And they should ensure compliance with international human rights standards. We look forward to engaging in frank discussions with Security Council members and the region on ways forward in the months ahead. Finally, we share Council members’ concerns about the trajectory of violence and suffering in Mali and stand firmly behind MINUSMA as it delivers its mandate in challenging circumstances. All Malians deserve to be free of insecurity and to reap the dividends of a lasting peace.

China attaches great importance to peace and stability in Africa, including the situation in Mali, supports the peace process and political transition in Mali and supports the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in playing a positive and constructive role in improving the situation in Mali, in accordance with the relevant resolutions. It is in this spirit that China voted in favour of resolution 2584 (2021), on the renewal of the MINUSMA mandate. Paragraph 19 of the resolution requests the Secretary-General to provide a report on relevant issues no later than 15 July, including the force levels and the ceiling of uniformed personnel of the Mission. In fact, when the Secretary-General submitted his report (S/2021/519) to the Council on 1 June, he already recommended that the ceiling of the Mission’s uniformed personnel be maintained. In China’s view, the set recommendation contained in Secretary- General’s report is in line with the current situation in Mali and the needs of the Mission in performing its mandate. We would like to express our full support for that. China questions the need for the resolution to request the Secretary-General to submit another report on the same issue after merely a month or so. I would also like to point out that the peacekeepers of MINUSMA have made important contributions and enormous sacrifices in the process of mandate implementation, which should be fully acknowledged by the Security Council. However, paragraph 46 of the resolution is drafted in a way that lends itself to misunderstanding. China has concerns about the text of this paragraph and would ask the Secretariat to place on record.