S/PV.903 Security Council

In accordance withthe decisions taken at previous meetings on this question, I shall, with the consent of the Council, invite the representa- tives ofYugoslavia, Indonesia, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco and Belgium to take seats at the Council table. Sur l'invitation du President, M. de Thier(Belgique), M. Quaison-Sackey (Ghana), M. Caba (Guinee), M. Wirjopranoto (Indonesie), M. Aboud(Maroc) etM. Vidi6 (Yougoslavie) prennent place ala table du Conseil. At the invitation of the President, Mr. de Thier (Belgium), Mr. Quaison-Sackey (Ghana), Mr. Caba (Guinea), Mr. Wirjopranoto (Indonesia), Mr. Aboud (Morocco) and Mr. Vidi6 (Yugoslavia); took places at the Security Council table. President: M. E. ORTONA (Italie). Adoption de I'ordre du jour 3. When, in tl\ose first critical moments, the Council met, on 13 July [873rd meeting], to considerthe acute crisis that had arisen, it was said thatthat crisia was the result of the vacuum created by the sudden un- planned transition from a colonialist government, which has failed to prepare the Territory for inde- pendence, to self-government without the stable ele- ments required to exercise responsibility for the maintenance of internal order and the protection of national security. It was to fill this vacuum, the con- tinued existence of which might have given rise to an international armed conflict, that the Security Council authorized the sending of the United Nations Force. 4. At earlier meetings of the Council at which this matter has been discussed, we have taken the oppor- tunity to speak of the successful work performed by the Force in evacuating the Belgiantroops, inprevent- ing the conflict from spreading and inotherways. To- day we are faced with the hard fact that, owing to negative political, human and economic factors, com- plicated by equally negative international influences, the Republic of the Congo has not even been able to make use of United Nations assistance in order to fill the disastrous vacU'.ml which led to the critical situa- tion of two months ago. 5. The political vacuum still exists. The struggle for power between opposing forces has produced a real vacuum of authority. And it would not be too much to say that there is also a certain constitutional vacuum. Economic, fiscal and administrative problems have so impaired the operation of the Congolese "Force publi- que" that the vacuumthere continues in Its worst form. The economic crisis, which grows worse from day to day, is a sad part of the existing vacuum. As is to be expected in such a situation, leading to disintegration, the psychological atmosphere is not conducive to the production of any constructive solutions. 6. I have seen fit to draw attention to these negative aspects, which the Secretary-General has described so vividly in his fourth report and in his statement [896th meeting], because I think the Council should not make the mistake of discussing the case as if it were dealing with abstract problems of political and administrative science. We must consider the case as it is, namely as one of painful human problems, hard to understand and to unravel. 7. The actionwhichthe Commandofthe UnitedNations Force has taken in the matter of the airports and the radio station should be understood in the light of these facts. Thefact that the Secretary-Generalhas notbeen able to hold periodic consultations with the organs of the Central Government must be regarded as an in- evitable result of this vacuum. At the moment the Security Council itself is in the same situation. Only 3. Quand le Consell s 'est r6uni d~s les premiers troubles, le 13 juillet [873~e s6ance), pour examiner la crise aigne qui existait alors, on a dit que celle-ci r6sultait du vide dd au passage subit et non organis6 d'un r6gime colonialiste, qui a omis de pr6parer le territoire h 1'ind6pendance, h un rllgime d'ind6pen- dance d6pourvu des 616ments stables qu'exige 1'exer- cice des responsabllit6s qu'imposent le maintien de 1'ordre interne et la protection de la s6curit6 extll- rieure. C'est pour remplir ce vide, dont la prolonga- tion aurait pu provoquer un conflitarme international, que le Consell de s6curit6 a autoris6 1'envoi de la Force des Nations Unies. 4. Lors des dunions antllrieures du Consell pendant lesquelles nous avons examine cette question, nous avons d6jh eu 1'occasion de souligner le succ~s de 1'oeuvre accomplie par la Force en ce qui concerne 1'llvacuation des troupes beIges, la prllvention d'un conflit plus 6tendu, et h d'autres llgards encore. AUjourd'hui, nous sommes plac6s devant la dure r6alit6: en raison de facteurs politiques, humains et 6conomiques dllfavorables, aggrav6s par des in- fluences internationales 6galement dllfavorables, la R6publique du Congo n'a pu encore profiter de l'aide de 1'Organisation des Nations Unies pour combler le vide d6plorable qui est h l'origine de la situation cri- tique apparue II y a deux mois. 5. En effet, le vide politique subsiste. Laluttepour le pouvoir entre fO:re13B antagonistes a caus6 undel vide d'autorit6. n ne serait pas exag6r6 d'affirmer qu'll ;axiste m~me un certain vide constitutionnel. Des prG- bl~mes 6conomiques, fiscaux et administratifs ont h tel point d6natur6 le role de la force publique congo- laise que le vide persiste, dans ce domaine, sous sa forme la plus aigue. La crise 6conomique, qui s'ag- grave de jour en jour, est un 6lllment dramatique du vide existant. nest €lvident que dans une situation comme celle-ci, qui s 'oriente vers la d€lsint6gration, le climat psychologique n'est pas favorable h des solutions constructives. 6. J'ai cru devoir souligner ces aspects n6gatifs, d6crits si clairementdansle quatri~merapportetdans 1'expos6 du Secr6taire g6n6ral [896~me s6ance), car j'estime que le Consell dolt 6viter 1'6cuell qui consis- terait h discuter de cette affaire comme s'll s 'agissait de questions abstraites de science politique et ad- o ministrative. n faut au contraire 1'examiner te11e qu'elle se pr6sente dans sa r€lalft6, humaine, difficlle, complexe, impAn6trable et douloureuse. 7. C'est en tenant compte de cette r6alit6 qu'll faut interpr6ter les mesures prises parle Commandement de la Force des Nations Unies en ce qui concerne les a6rodromes et lastation de radio. L'impossibllit6 daDS laquelle s'est trouv6le Secr6taire g6n6ral de consulter p6riodiquement les organes du gouvemement central doit Btre consid6r6e comme le r6sultat intwitable du vide dont j'ai par16. Le Consell de s6curit6lui-m&ne 8. This is not the first time that important decisions have had to be taken in which the greater or lesser importance of apparently conflictingprinciples has had to be measured on political grounds. In the incidents I have mentioned the protection of peace, of life itself and of the authority of the United Nations, the repre- sentative of the international community, may have appeared to conflict with formalistic considerations arising from exceptional circumstances. I wonder whether anyone would have placed those formalistic considerations above theurgentnecessityofwithdraw- ing the Belgian troops. 9. We have carefully analysed the Council's resolu- tions, the spirit of its discussions, the Secretary- General's reports and other information from various sources. We find that the Secretary-General and his agents have acted correctly and wisely and that, in extraordinarily difficult circumstances, they havefol- lowed an impartial line of conduct in the internal con- flicts, as required in the various resolutions of the Security Council. 10. Looking towards the future, we feel that there is no denying that in view of the gravity of the situation in the Congo the presence and authority of the inter- national community will have to be strengthened. The Republic of the Congo needs international co-operation in order to start on the right lines as an independent State. As has so wisely been said here, the circum- !>tances are such that, if this external aidis to streng- then the independence of ~he Congo and not make it dependent upon those who provide the assistance, it must be channelled through the United Nations. 11. In normal, healthy relations between States there should clearly be a free exchange of co-operation at the international, regional and bilateral level. In the present circumstances, however,. the interest of the Congolese people will be better served if external aid is sent through the United Nations. The alternative is at present encouraging the forces of dissensionwithin ·the Congo, thus endangering the unity of the country, intensifying the disagreements between the Congolese and hamperingthe work ofthe international community. 12. No one can deny that foreign aid prOvided outside the United Nations operation tends to swaythebalance in the constitutional and political struggle inthe Congo and therefore constitutes an illegal interference inthe internal affairs of the Congo. In our opinion, both the support given to a certain group which is striving to gain control of tl.d CentralGovernment andthe support given to the Katanga authorities by another country constitute an unpardonable interference inthe internal affairs of the Congo. 13. The Belgian Government is closely involvedinthe events that led to the lamentable situationinthe Congo. This is yet another reasonwhywe may hope that every 13. Le Gouvernement beIge est intimement mele aux faits qui sont ~ 1'origine de la situation deplorable qui existe au Congo. C'est III une raison de plus d'esperer 9. Nous avons analys6 avec soin les r6solutions du ConseU, 1'esprit de ses d€lliberations, les rapports du Secr6taire glln€lral et les donn.€les compl€lmentaires r8Ques de diverses sources. Nous sommes parvenus II la conclusion que le Secr€ltaire g€ln€lral et ses colla- borateurs ont agi de fac;onloyale etavis€le et que, dans des circonstances extraordinairement difficUes, Us ont reussi II suivre une ligne de conduite impartiale au milieu des conflits internes, ainsi quele ConseU de securit6 1'a 6tabli dans ses diff6rentes resolutions. 10. Si l'on consid~rel'avenir, il ne fait pas de doute, selon nous, qu'en raison meme de la gravite de la situation au Congo, la presence de la communaute internationale doive etre renforcee et son autorite affermie. La R6publique du Congo a besoin de la collaboration internationale pour s'engager surlavoie de l'independance et, comme on l'a dit si justement dans cette salle, les circonstances sonttelles que, pour que cette aide exterieure affermisse1'independance du Congo et ne le rende pas dependant des donateurs, elle doit etre fournie par. 1'intermediaire de1'Organi- sation des Nations Unies. 11. nest 6vident qu'en temps normal, U estd'usage, il est salutaire que la cooperation se fasse librement entre Etats, sur les plans mondial, regional et bila- t6ral, mais, etant donne les conditions qui existent au Congo, les int6rets du peuple congolais seront mieux servis si l-'aide exterieure est fournie par 1'interm(,- diaire de 1'Organisation des Nations Unies. Sinoll, on encouragera les forces de dissension III'interieur du Congo, lesquelles mettent en danger l'unite du pays, aggravent les d6saccords entre Congolais et rendent plus difficile la tache dela communaut6 internationale. 12. n ne fait pas de doute que 1'aide extllrieure ap- port6e en marge de l'operation des Nations Unies tend II faire pencher la balance dans la lutte constitution- nelle et politique qui se deroule lll'interieur du pays et constitue par cons6quent une interventionil16gitime dans les affaires int6rieures du Congo. Tant 1'appui donn6 II un groupe dlltermin6 qui lutte pour s'assurer le contrl:l1e du gouvernement central quel'appuifourni par un autre pays aux autorites du Katangs, consti- tuent, ~ notre avis, une intervention reprehenSible dans les affaires int6rieures du Congo. 14. On the other hand, it seems paradoxlcal that one of the great Powers, which is interfering illegally in the internal affairs of the country by supporting one group in the fight for control of the Central Govern- ment, presumes to question the impartiality of the Secretary-General, his agents, andthe Commandofthe United Nations Force in dealing with situations con- nected with political problems in the Congo. This destructive campaign is not in conformity with the truth and is creatinga psychologicalatmospherewhich is not conducive to a solution of the Congo problem. 15. I think it can truly be said that if foreign aid outside the United Nations were to cease and this unjustified anddangerOllS psychologicalcampaignwere to be brought to an end, it would be a tremendous step towards improving the situation in the Congo and solving its constitutional and pOlitical problems. 16. For this reason, we consider that the Security Council should make another appeal to all States to a~stainfrom any act which might impede the restora- tion of law and order or which, in the circumstances, might hamper the peaceful settlement of the internal conflicts in the Congo. Inparticular,the Council should appeal to States to send all military aid through the United Nations. My delegationtherefore fully endorses paragraph 4 of the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the United States of America [S/4516], as also the draft resolution as a whole. 17. In his faurth report, the Secretary-General pro- poses that a United Nations fund for the Congo should be set up, financed by voluntary contributions from Member States [S/4482, para. 6]. There seems to be an urgent need for 'this arid we are sure that an appeal to Member States by the Security Council will meet with a generous and imaginative response. The mainte- nance of peace c;:Llls for sacrifices and we ~ay be confident that those States which are able to make voluntary contributions will respond to the Security Council's appeal as promptly as did those from which the Secretary-General requested military forces and other assistance. 18. I thought it best to limit my remarks to these basic points. This does not meanthatIam overlooking the vital importance of the Katanga problem and the constitutional and political problems, all closely re-- lated, but, as has been said many times, these are matters within the exclusive competence ofthe Congo- lese people. 19. The co-operation of the CongoleseGovernmentis essential if the United Nations is to succeedin carry- 15. On peut sans crainte affirmer que, sil'aide exttl- rieure fournie en margo de I'Organisationdes Nations Unies prenait fin, de m~me que la campagne psycho- logique, d'autant plus nuisible qu'elle est injustifiee, qui eat menee actuellement, un grand pas serait fait dans la voie du retablissementdelasituationau Congo et de'la solution de ses probl~mes constitutionnels et politiques. 16. En cons6quence, nous estimons que le Consell de s6curittl doit adresser un nouvel appel rt tous les Etats pour leur demander de s'abstenir de toute action qui risquerait d'empeeher le r6tablissement de 1'ordl-e public et qui, dans lea circonstances actuelles, met- trait obstacle a la solution pacifique des conflits in- ternes. En particulier, le Consell devrait adresser un appel aux Etats pour que toute aide mllitaire soit fournie par 1'interm€ldiaire de 1'Organisation des Nations Unies. C'est dans cet esprit quemad€llegation juge parfaitement acceptable le paragraphe4duprojet de resolution present€l par la d61egation des Etate- Unis d'Amerique [8/4516], projet qui nous paraft d'allleurs egalement acceptable dans son ensemble. 17. J e voudrais, Il. cet egard, rappeler que le Secrb- taire general propose, dans son quatri~me rapport, la creation d'un fonds des Nations Unies pour le Congo qui serait alimente par les conti"ibutions volontaires des Etats Membres [S/4482, par. 6]. La necessite de cette mesure semble imperieuse et nous sommes certains qu'un appel adresse parleConsell de securit6 aux Etats Membree serait accuellU avec gllnerositll et clatrvoyance. Le maintien de la paix exige des sacrifices et nous pouvons compter que les Etats qui sont enmesure de fournir des contributions volontaires r6pondront Il. 1'appel du Consell de securitll avec la meme promptitude qu'ont montree ceux auxquels le Secr6taire general a demand6 des contingents mili- -taires et d'autres formes d'assistance. 18. J'ai cru devoir limiter mes observations 11. ces aspects fondamentaux de la question. Cela ne veut pas dire que je m€lconnaisse 1'importance capitale que presente la solution du probl~me du Katanga et des probl~me8 constitutionnel et politique - qui sont tous intimement li6s - mais ces probl~mes, je1'ai d6jll dit 11. plusieurs reprises, rel~ventdelacompetence exclu- sive du peuple congolais. 19. La collaboration du Gouvernement congolais est indispensable au succ~s de 1'muvre Il. long terme que 20. Permettez-omoi, pour conclure cette intervention, de souligner une foie de plus 1'importance que pr6- sente, pour les int6dts sup6rieurs de la paix et pour l'avenir de notre organisation, le succ~sde Pop6ration des Nations Unies an Congo. Les pays africains. en premier lieu, et les pays des autres continents anssi continueront d'avoir besoin, de temps h autre, del'Or- ganisation des Nations Unies pour d6fendre leur int6- grit6 et lutter contre l'agression, et detrouver en elle un instrument diplomatique pour la solution de leurs conflits, un centre promoteur des grands pXincipes de la Charte. et un centre ob s'harmonisent les efforts concertlls dllploylls par la communaute internationale pour relever les niveaux de vie. Si nous tolerons aujourd'hui que l'autorit6 et le prestige de l'Organisa.. tion soient affaiblis. que son Secretaire gllneral soit 1'objet d'attaques injustifi6es de la part de certains Etats sans que les autres1'appuient, sinous admettons que les Etats Membres qui fournissent des contribu- tions glln6reuses et consentent des sacrifices voient leurs intentions et leurs mobiles deformes, demain, lorsque 1'intervention de notre organisation sera ne-- cessaire dans d'autres regions d'Afrique ou dumonde, nous decouvrirons peut-etre que, malheureusement, elIe a perdu toute vigueur et toute efficacite. Nous ne saurions le permettre; or, en l'etat actuel des choses, la seule fa~on d'eviter cela est de mener une actionsolidaire qui, en assurant aUjourd"uuile succ~s de l'ONU au Congo, preservera son autorite, son prestige et son efficacite dans 1'avenir. 20. In concluding, I should like to stress once again the importance of the success of the United Nations action in the Congo, in the higher interests of peace. and for the future of the Organization. The African countries, first andforemost, andthe countries ofother continents will continuetoneedthe UnitedNations from time to time for the defence of their integrity in their struggle against aggression, as a diplomatic instru-. ment for the settlement of conflicts, and as a centre for furthering the great principles of the Charter and for organizing international c~operationwith a view to raising standards of living. If today we allow the authol'ity and reputation of the United Nations to be weakened, the Secretary-General tobe madethe object of an unjust and unopposed campaign, the motives and intentions of Member Stateswhichmake generous con.. tributions and sacrifices tobewilfullymisinterpreted, tomorrow, When, the work of the United Nations is needed in other parts of Africa and of the world. we may unhappily find that the Organization has lost its strength and its effectiveness. We cannot allow this to happen but the only way to avoid it at this stage is by united action, which by ensuring here and now the success of the United Nations in the Congo, will pre- serve its authority, its reputation and its efficiency in the future.•

Before calling on the next speaker, I wish to inform the Council that I have just received a letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic [S/4518], who asks to be seated at the Council table. The letter states that Mr. Rafik Asha, Deputy Permanent Representative, has been designated for the purpose. 21. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Avant de donner la parole ~ l'orateur suivant, je voudrais in- former le Conseil que je viens de recevoir du repr6- sentant permanent de'la Republique arabe unie aupr~s de 1'Organisation des Nations Unies unelettre [S/4518] dans laquelle i1 demande que son pays soit autorise h prendre place ~ la table du Conseil. n ajoute que M. Rafik Ashl:!-, representant permanent adjoint, a ete deSigne ~ cette fin. 22. In accordance with rule ~;'; ,ifth.I'; provisionalrules of procedure of the Council, ·Wi~h the consent of the members of the Council, I invite the representative of the United Arab Republic totake a seat at the Coun- .cil table• 22. Conformement h l'article 37 du r~glement int6- rieur provisoire du Conseil de securite, et avec 1'as.. sentiment des membres du Conseil, j'invite le repr6- sentant de la Republique arabe unie ~ prendre place ~ la table du Conseil• At the invitation of the President, Mr. Asha (United Arab Republic) took a place at the Council table.

I shall not attempt to conceal from the Council the deep impression whichthe statementwe heardfrom the Secretary-General on 9 September [896th meeting] made on my delegation. 23. M. MILLET (Fral"k.::e): Je ne cacherai pas au Con- seil la vive impression qu'a produite sur ma delega" tion 1'expose que nous avons entendu le 9 septembre du Secretaire general [896~me seance].. 24. He is not a man to use strong language lightly. The threat of bankruptcy, a complete or almost com- plete absence of any effort to counteract it, frequent failure to honour commitments, incompetence and irresponsibility: that is thepicturedrawn ofa situation in the Congo which my delegation earnestly hopes will be purely transitory, for my country has great sym- pathy for the Congolese as for all African peoples. 24. Celui-ci n'est pas homme ~ employer vainement de grands mats. Menace de banqueroute, absence, ou peu s'en faut, de tout effort pouryremedier, manque- merits frequents aux engagements pris, incompetence et irresponsabilite, tel est le tableau qui nous a ete dresse d'une situation au Congo que, du fond du coour, ma delllgation soubaite passagbre en raison de la sym.- pathie profonde que porte monpays aupeuple congolais comme ~ tous les peuples africains. 26. In addition. we now have a constitutional crisisto which the statement drew our attention. We have been told how on 5 September President Kasavubu revoked the mandate he had given the Prime Minister, Mr. Lumumba, and how Mr. Lumumba, with no constitu- tional provision to support his action, retorted by claiming to dismiss the Chief of State. Since then we have received messages emanating from two different government authorities. 27. Yesterday we learned through the press agencies that one of the heads ofthe CongoleseArmy had seized power. This morning, this was apparently no longer the case. This evening. however. the report would appear to have been confirmed. 28. In thr circumstances, it is the view ofmy delega- tion that the Council acted wisely in deciding not to hear the Congolese representatives forthetimebeing. 29. My delegation has been deeply disturbed by the report confirmed by the Secretary-General, on the basis of absolutely reliable evidence,thattroops ofthe Congolese National Army had carried out outrageous massacres of the defenceless civilianpopulation,par- ticularly in the Bakwanga region. This report re- minded me of the account we heard in this Council about the violence to which units ofthat same National Army had resorted earlier. It proved-if proof were necessary-that the presence of Belgian troops could not be regarded as the cause of such excesses. 30. In view of that unfortunate situation-and I do not wish to dwell further upon it, although there are still many aspectswhich couldbe emphasized-what attitude should the Council adopt? What decisions are likelyto correct the existing state ofaffairs andhelpthe Congo- lese people to weather this crisis, and, primarily, to prevent the situationfrom deteriorating stillfUrther and the danger of civil war and international tension from growing? 31. Along with the reasons for anxiety, we are con- vinced that there are also reasons for hope -in the Congo. In the news reaching us daily, there are some items which give promise of an easing ofthe situation. A cease-fire appears to havebeenagreeduponbetween the opposingmilitaryforces. Various groups aretrying to combine in order to work towards the marshalling of all the forces for agreement, conciliation and res- toration in the country and to unite all men of good will. Let us hope that this trend will develop further and that all the political leaders in the Congo who are genuinely conscious of their responsibilities will come together in a useful endeavour. 32. The Secretary-General has told us what tempo- rary measures his representatives found it necessary to take on the spot and which he himself endorsed. They thought it imperativeto preventthe national radio from being used to broadcast reprehensible incite- .ments which would have promoted further clashes and disturbances. They also considered it necessary to 26. n sly joint aujourd'hui unecriseconstitutionnelle sur laquelle cet expose a attirenotre attention.n nous a ete rapporte comment, le 5 septembre, le pr6sident Kasavubu avait revoqu6 le mandat donne par lui au Premier Ministre. M. Lumumba, et comment, en r6- ponse et sans pouvoir s'appuyer sur aucune disposi- tion constitutionneUe. ce dernier avait pretendurevo- quer le chef de 1'Etat. Depuis lors, nous avons reQu des messages emanant de deux autorit6s gouverne- mentales differentes. 27. Nous apprenions hier, par les agencesdepresse, qu'un des chefs de 1'armee congolaise avait pris le pouvoir. Ce matin, semble-t-il, ce n'etait plus le cas. Ce soir, en revanche, II parait que la nouvelle est confirm~e. 28. Dans ces conditions, ma delegation consid~reque le Consell a fait preuve de sagesselorsqu'll a renonce, pour le moment, rt entendre les representants congo- lais. 29. Ma delegation est enfin profondement emue de la confirmation quele Secr~taireg~neralnous a apportee, rt 1'aide de temoignages indubitables, des nouvelh~s suivant lesqueUes des forces de 1'armee nationak congolaise se seraient livrees, en particulier dans la region de Bakwanga, h de revoltants massacres de populations civiles sans defense. Ce recitm'arappele celui que nous avions entendu rt cette table des vio- lences dej1l. commises par des unites de cette meme arm6e nationale. n nous a apporte la preuve, s'll en etait besoin, que la presence de troupes beIges ne pouvait etre consid~r~ecomme la cause de tels exc~s. 30. TeUe ~tant la triste situation sur laquelle je ne veux pas m '~tendre et dontbiendes aspects pourraient encore etre mis en relief, queUe attitude dolt adopter le Consell? QueUes d~cisions, de sa part, serontsus- ceptibles de remedier 1l. cet etat de choses et d'aider le peuple congolais 1l. sortir de cette crise, et d'em- pecher que cette situation ne se d6teriore encore et que ne s'accroissent le danger de guerre civile et la tension internationale? 31. A cote des motifs d'inqui6tude, il y a aussi au Congo, nous en sommes persuades, des raisons d'es- perer. Parmiles nouvelles qui nous parviennentchaque jour, il en est qui laissent entrevoir des perspectives d'apaisementj un cessez-le-feu serait intervenu entre les unites militaires qui s'opposent; divers elements s 'efforceraient de se grouper dans la volonte de tra- valller au rassemblement de toutes les forces d'en- tente, de conciliation et de restauration du pays, de .rlmnir tous les hommes de bonne volonte. Souhaitons que cette tendance s'accentue et que s'unissent pour oouvrer utilement tous les hommes politiques du Congo veritablement conscients de leurs responsabllites. 32. Le Secretaire general nous a rapporte les me- sures temporaires qu'avaient juge necessaire de prendre sur place ses represe!J.tants et que lui-meme a avalisees. n a paru indispensable 1l. ces represen- tants d'empecher que, par la radio nationale congo- laise, ne soient diffusees des incitations condamnables qui auraient encourage de nouveaux heurts et de nou- 33. That is why my delegation cannot accept Mr. Zorin's version of the recent events in the Congo. By deliberately distorting the facts, he has seen fit to attribute to Mr. Hammarskjold motives and calcula- tions which are patently implausible. I amnotthe only one at this table to express the disgustwe feel at such allegations. He also attacked Belgium and its NATO allies, the traditional target of Soviet invective. I have too much respect for my colleagues in this Council to deem it necessary to make a serious reply to such slogans and such nonsense. 34. I would remind the representative of the Soviet Union that, in Africa as elsewhere, France lives ac- cording to the ways of the twentieth century and not to those of the age ofconspiracy. InAfrica, France has only one monopoly and it is proud ofit: it can boast of having helped the greatest number of States to attain independence. 35. May I remindMr. Zorin, who spoke ofthe "French Congo" for purposes of his argument, thattheRepublic of the Congo which has its capital at Brazzaville is an independent State today andthattheSecurityCouncil has unanimously recommended its admission to the United Nations. The Government ofMr. FulbertYoulou exercises its sovereign rights in full independence, whether it be in respect of radio broadcasts or its relations with its neighbours. 36. In his fourth report, the Secretary-General appeals to all parties concerned in the Congo to put an end to their internal quarrels and their domestic strife and to work together to remedy what is today a disastrous situation leading the Congo to ruin and humiliation. That appeal deserves our warmest sup- port. The same applies to the renewed appeals to all third-party States to refrain from any interference, intervention or initiative which might tend to compli- cate the situation and hamper the efforts ofthis Coun- cil and the United Nations. Our Secretary-GeneralIs recent exchanges of letters demonstrate the urgent necessity of repeating and emphasizing those appeals. Moreover, any state which the United Nations has ,honoured by asking it to contribute a military contin- gent to restore order and security in the country would be failing in its mostsolemnobligationstowards the United Nations and in the responsibilities it as- sumed when it joined the Organization if it were to use that contingent, or any other, in the Congo outside the scope of operation of the United Nations Force. 36. Dans sonquatri~merapport,le Secretaireg€lneral adresse h toutes les parties intllress€les h l'intllrieur du Congo un appal en vue de rnettre fiu h leurs que- renes et leurs luttes intestines pour travailler ensemble h rem6dier h une situation aujourd'hui catastrophique, qui conduit le Congo h la. mine et h 1'humiliation. Cet appel m€lrite de recevoir notre plus chaleureux appui. n en est de mame des appals renouveles h tous les Etats tiers, de s 'abstenir de toute ing€lrence, de toute intervention et de toute ini- tiative qui' risqueraient de compliquer la situation et qui vienqraient h 1'encontre de 1'effort poursuivi par le Conseil et notre organisation. Les recentes corres- pondances du Secr€ltaire general montrent 1'urgence de repeter et de souligner ces appels. Enfin, tout Etat h qui l'Organisation des Nations Unies afaitl'honneur de sladresser pour lui demander de llaider par la fourniture de contingents militaires h restaurer dans le pays 1'ordre et la a€lcurite faillirait h ses obligations les plus solennelles envers les Nations Unies et aux engagements qulil a souscrits en adherant h notre organisation slil utilisait, au Congo, ce contingent ou tout autre contingent en dehors du cadre de la force d'intervention. 37. I should now like briefly to express my delega- tion's views on the financial asp~cts of the problem. 37. Je voudrais maintenant exposer bri~vementles vues de ma delegation sur les aspects financiers du probl~me. 38. The needs brought to our attention are of two kinds: funds to maintain the United Nations Force and funds to assist the Congolese State. 38. Les besoins qui nous sont indiques sont de deux sOrtes: des fonds pour llentretien de la force dlinter- vention et, d'autre part, des fonds de secours et d'aide h 1'Etat congolais. 33. Crest pourquoi ma d€ll€lgation jugeinacceptablela version qu'a donn€le M. Zorine des recents€lvenements du Congo. n a notamment, en d€lformant d€llib€lrement les faits, cru devoir attribuer h M. Hammarskjold des intentions et des calculs dont 1'invraisemblance est manifeste. Je ne suis pas le seulll cette table 11 exprimer la r€lprobation que de telles all€lgations nous inspirent. n s 'en est pris llgalement h la Belgique et h ses allies de 1'OTAN, cible traditionnelle des invec- tives sovilltiques. J'ai trop d'estime pour mes coi- l~gues du Conseil pour juger necessaire de repondre serieusement h de telles rengaines et billevesees. 34. La France, Monsieur le representant de 1'Union sovietique, vit en Afrique, comme dans toutes les autres parties du monde, h 1'heure du ~me si~cle et non pas h celle des complots.EnAfrique, mon pays ne poss~de qu'un monopole, dont il s 'honore, celui du plus grand nombre d'Etats qu'il a aides h acceder h 1'independance. 35. Je crois pouvoir rappeler 11 M. Zorine qui, pour les besoins de son argumentation, a parle du "Congo fran9ais", que la Republique du Congo, dontlacapitale est Brazzaville, est aujourd'hui independante etquele Conseil de sllcurit€l a recommand€l unanimement son admission h 1'Organisation des Nations Unies. Le gouvernement de M. Fulbert Youlou exerce en pleine ind€lpendance ses droits souveraine, qu'il s 'agisse des €lmissions de radio ou de ses relations avec ses voi- sins. 40. In requesting additional funds, the Secretary- General has pointed out that the money to finance the basic services for which the Congolese Government is responsible will be a sheer waste ifnothing is done to restore law aildorderthroughoutthe nation. Firstly, therefore, the internal problems should be settled through the genuine and effectiveefforts ofthe respon- sible Governments. 41. Lastly, my Government considers that the prob- lem before us should be examined in detail by the ap- propriate organs ofthe General Assembly, whichisto meet in a few days and which is, we feel, the body qualified to take decisions of such nature and scope. It also feels that we should ensure that the United Nations does not, without recourse to the usual pro. cedure, assume the burden of government expenses which should normally be borne by the Congolese au- thorities. 'Indeed, my delegation doubtsthe advisability -even in the present circumstances-of an interna- tional organization taking over the basic prerogatives and responsibilities of national authorities. 42. Those are the concerns and the considerations by which my delegation will be guided at the close of our discussion.

lshouldlike, first, to explain the main considerations which govern the attitude of the UnitedKingdom Governmenttowards the present situation in the Congo and towards the responsibilities of the United Nations in the light of that situation. 44. The basic fact of thepresent positioninthe Congo is that there are many factions throughout the country which hold strong and different views on how the country should best be governed and what form of constitution is best sulted to the population. These different views are strongly supported, withthe result that there has been for sometime almost a fotal para- lysis of government in the country and .no Congolese authorities have been able to exercise any effective control for any length of time except purely locally. Nor have they been able to carry on any of.the normal processes of administration, with the result that ~oday the economic life of the Congo is at a standstill. There is virtually no money inthe exchequer, the responsible Congolese units are hardly capable of protecting the population and the administration of justice, in the ordinary sense of the term, has almost ceased. 45. In such a situation it is not surprising that, as the Secretary-General has informed the Council in his fourth report and inthe grave andconvincing statement which he made to it on 9 September, ancient tribal 40. En demandant de nouveaux cr€ldits, le Secr€ltaire gen6ral a marqu6 que l'argent pourlefinancement des services 616mentaires dontle Gouvernementcongolais est responsable sera manife3tement fourni en pure perte si rien n'est fait pour restaurerlaloi et 1'ordre dans la vie nationale. Les probl~mesint6rieurs doivent donc etre pr€lalablement r€lsolus par les efforts sin- c~res et efficaces des gouvernements responsables. 41. Enfin, mon gouvernement estime quele probl~me qui nous est soumis devrait faire l'objet d'une €ltude d6taill€le par les organes appropri~s de 1'Assemblee g6n6rale qui se .r€lunit dans quelques jours et qui est qualifiee, .semble-t-il, pour prendre des d6cisions de cette nature et de cette ampleur. n estime, en outre, que nous devons veiller ~ ce que notre organisation n'assume pas, sans recours aux proc6dures habi- tue11es, la charge des d6penses gouvernementales qui incombent normalement aux autorit6s congolaises. Ma d€llegation a en effet des doutes sur 1'opportunite - meme dans les circonstances actue11es -- de voir une instance internationale se substituer aux autorites nationales dans leurs pr€lrogatives et responsabilites fondamentales. 42. Te11es sont les preoccupations et les considera- tions qui guideront ma d6legation lors dela conclusion de nos debats. 43. Sir Patrick DEAN (Royaume-Uni) [traduit de 1'anglais]: Permettez-moi tout d'abord d'expliquerles principales considerations qui determinent 1'attitude du Gouvernement du Royaume-Unl en ce qui concerne la situation actue11e au Congo et lea responsabilites qui incombent ~ 1'Organisation des Nations Unies du fait de cette situation. 44. Le fait essentiel en ce rnoment est 1'existence dans 1'ensemble du Congo d'uil grand nombre de fac- tions qui ont des opinions bien arretees, mais diver- gentes, sur la faQon la meilleure de gouvernerle pays et sur la forme de constitution qui convient le mieux ~ sa population. Ces opinions divergentes sont sou- tenues avec une te11e vigueur que, depuis un certain temps d6j~, le gouvernement du pays est presque totalement paralys6 et que, sauf sur le plan purement local, aucune autoriM congolaise n'est en mesure d'exercer un pouvoir efficace pour unedur6equelcon- que. Les autoriMs congolaises ne peuventexercer non ·plus aucune des attributions normales de I'administra- tion, si bien qu'aujourd'hui la vie 6'conomique du Congo est arret6e; les caisses de 1'Etat sont pratiquement vides; crest ~ peine si les unites congolaises respon- sables peuvent prot6ger lapopulation, etl'administra- tion de la justice, au sens ordinaire de cette expres- sion, a pour ainsi dire cesse. 45. Dans ces circonstances, il n'est pas surprenant que, comme le Secr6taire general en a inform6 le Conseil dans son quatribme rapport et dans lad6clara- tion, si grave et si convaincante, qu'il a faite devant 46. Since the Council began its present series of meetings on 9 September, the news from the Congo has been frequent and various, and I am bound to say, at times conflicting. There have been reports of pro- nouncements by different political leaders suspending each other's authority, of votes in the Congolese Parliament annulling these pronouncements, of war- rants issued for arrest, of imprisonment andrelease, that military leaders have declared that the armywlll assume control, and so on. 47. All these developments strongly supportthebelief of my Government that at the moment there is no authority in the Congo capable of canying onthe nor- mal business of government and of assuring the well- being of the population. 48. The problem in our view is primarily apractical one; we consider that in the present very difficult and delicate circumstances the United Nations and only the United Nations can createthe necessaryconditions in which the Congolese people can go forward to re- solve their differences and build up their country. It is for this reason that my Government approves and supports all the efforts whichthe United Nationsforces have made throughout the country to maintain law and order, to safeguard the civilian population, and to prevent fighting between the forces of the different factions. 49. We are, moreover, convinced that at this time no attempt should be made by other Powers to influence the course of events in the Congo by actions outside the United Nations. We believe that such attempts, in whatever guise they are made, must be dangerous not only for the peace and stability of the Congo but for international peace and security, which must al- ways remain the overriding cOncern of this Council. Such attempts are also contrary to the spirit of the .Security Council resolutions on the Congo. contradictoir~s. On a rapporte les dllclarations de differents chefs politiques revoquant mutuellement leurs pouvoirs; on a parle de votes du Parlement congolais annulant ces declarations, de mandats d'ar- rat, d'emprisonnements et de remises en liberte; ana dit que les chefs militaires avaient declare que1'armee allait prendre la situation enmain, que sais-je encore. 47. Toutes ces nouvelles font que man gouvernement est absolument convaincu qu'll n'existe ~ l'heure ae- tuelle au Congo aucune autorite capable d'assurer le fonctionnement normal du gouvernement et le bien- atre de la population. 48. A notre avis, le probl~meest d'ordre pratique; nous estimons que, dans les circonstances actuelles qui sont extremement difficiles et delicates, 1'Organi- sation des Nations Unies peut creer les conditions voulues pour que les Congolais puissent regler leurs differends et mettre leur pays en valeur. C'est pour cette raison que mon gouvernementapprouve etappuie tous les efforts que les forces des Nations Unies ont accomplis dans l'ensemble du pays pour maintenir l'ordre public, proteger la population civile et em- p@cher les combats entre les forces des diff6rentes factions. 49. En outre, nous sommes convaincus queles autres puissances ne doivent rien tenter pour influencer le cours des evenements au Congo enintervenanthors du cadre de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Nous sommes persuades que des tentatives de ce genre, quelque forme qu'elles puissent prendre, ne peuvent etre que dangereuses, non seulement pour la paix et pour la stabilite du Congo, mais encore pour la paix et la Securite internationales, qui doivent demeurerla preoccupation principale du Conseil. En outre, ces tentatives seraient contraires ~ 1'esprit des resolu.. tions que le Conseil de sllcurite a adoptees au sujet du Congo. 50. The Government of the United Kingdom must therefore feel serious concern at any continuance by' outside Powers of activities in the Congo independent of the United Nations effort, such as the supply of material or personnel to any of the conflictingparties in the Congo. 50. Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni ne pourrait quteprouver de graves inquietudes si des puissances exterieures poursuivaient des activites au Congo inde- pendamment des efforts entrepris par 1'Organisation des Nations Unies, en fournissant par exemple du matllriel et du personnel ~ 1'une quelconque des par- ties qui s 'affrontent au Congo. 5!. Mais il ne suffit pas d'empecher la situation de s'aggraver encore, si urgenteet si difficile que cette 51. But it is not enough to prevent the situation from deteriorating any further, urgent and difficult though this may be. The truth is that the United Nations through the Security Council has undertaken the re- sponsibility and the task of helping the Congolese people to escape from the destructive course ofevents which has overtaken them, and to proceed with the ~che puisse etre. La verite, crest que l'Organisation des Nations Unies a assume, par l'intermediaire du consen de securite, la responsabilite et la tache d'aider les Congolais ~ echapper ~ la tragedie qui s'est abattue sur eux et ~ poursuivre1'edificationd'un 53. The Secretary-General's report also pointed out that efforts to re-establish normal life on thebasis of the financial assistance which he has proposed would be nullified unless the internal conflicts inthe country can be resolved. He proposed that the Council should urge the parties concerned within the Congo to seek by peaceful means a solutiontotheir internalproblems in a ws.y which would preserve the unity and integrity of the country. The Secretary-General proposed fur- ther that the Council should reaffirm its request to Member States to refrain from any action likely to impede the restoration of law and order or make a peaceful solution of the internal conflicts more diffi- cult. He has asked that it should clarify the mandate of the United Nations Force in a way which would enable it to act as necessaryto protectthe lives of the civilian population. 54. The Government of the United Kingdom fully supports these proposals by the Secretary-General as an integrated whole. They are convinced that if, and only if, they are all put into effect can the dangerous situation in the Congo be brought under control. 55. Her Majesty's Government in the UnitedKingdom certainly supports the proposal for an emergencyfund and will contribute to it, in the expectation that all Members of the United Nations will co-operate fully in putting into effect all the proposals outlined in the Secretary-General's fourth report, towhich Ihave just referred. 56. In this respect we lay particular emphasis onthe importance of an early effortbythe various conflicting parties concerned within the Congo to find bypeaceful means a solution to their internal difficulties. We be- lieve that if a serious attempt to do so were made in good faith, a settlement could be found whichwould be responsive to the particular needs of the Congolese people as a whole, and would preserve the territorial and economic unity of the Congo, to which Her Majes- ty's Government attaches the greatest importance. 57. It must surely be clear by now that nOhB of the rival Congolese factions in the Congo can or should impose itself upon the other, and. that negotIation is essential if the country is not to be further torn by internal political strife or driven further into e~orlomic disorder. 58. If outside help is necessaryinpromoUngapeace- ful solution of the Congo's internal problems, we be- lieve that the experience of the United Nations in conciliatory procedures could contribute directly to arranging a conference of all concerned to this end. We also trust that those nations in Africa which na- turally have the greatest knowledge of the Congo and 53. Le Secretaire general souligne egalement daDs son rapport que les efforts visant h retablir une vie normale grtce h 1'aide financi~re qu'll a proposee seraient r6duits h neant s'n n'etait pas mis fin aux luttes intestines dans le pays. n propose que le Con- seil demande instamment aux parties interessees, h 1'interieur du Congo, de rechercher par des moyens pacifiques une solution h leurs probl~mesinternes de faQon h preserver 1'unite et 1'integrite du pays. Le Secrlltaire general propose en outre que le Consen de securite, r6affirmant sa demande anterieure, prie les Etats Membres de s'abstenir de toute action de nature h empecher le retablissement de1'ordre public ou h compliquer la solution pacifique des conflits internes. n demande que le Conseil eclaircisse le mandat de la Force des Nations Unies de faQon h permettre 11 cette derni~re de prendre' les mesures necessaires pour protllgerlavie dela population civile. 54. Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uniappuiepleine- men! les propositions du Secretaire generalqu'ilcon- sid~re comme un ensemble indissoluble. 11 estime quIon ne pourra venir about de la situation dangereuse existant au Congo qu'en appliquant toutes ces proposi- tions. 55. Le Gouvernement de SaMajeste dans le Royaume- Uni approuve notamment lapropositiontendantacreer un fonds d'urgence; il entend y contribuer et esp~re que tous les Membres de I'Organisation des Nations Unies yont cooperer pleinement a la mise en applica- tion de toutes les propositions que le Secretaire ge- neral a formulees dans son quatri~me rapport et que je viens de mentionner. 56. A cet egard, nous voudrions souligner combienn est important que les diverses parties qui sont en lutte au Congo s'efforcent sans delai de trouver des moyens pacifiques de regler leurs difficultes internee. A notre avis, si une tentative serieuse et de bonne foi etait faite dans ce sens, il serait possible de parvenir Aun r~glement qui repondrait auxbesoins particuliers de l'ensemble du peuple congolais et preserverait 1'unite territoriale et economique du Congo, Alaquelle le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste attache la plus grande importance. 57. 11 doit apparartre clairementdesormais qu'aucune des factions congolaises rivales ne peut ou ne doit .s'imposer al'autre et qu'une negociation est indispen- sable si 1'0n veut enter que le pays continue a ~tre dechire par des luttes politiques internes ou s 'enfonce plus avant dans le desordre economique. 58. S'il est necessaire de faire appel 1\ une aide exterieure pour trouver une solution pacifique aux probl~mes internes du Congo, nous estimons que, grace 11 l'experience qu'elle a acquise en mati~re de proce- dures de conciliation, 1'Organisationdes Nations Unies pourra contribuer directement a organiser une confe- rence qui r~unirait 11 cette fin tous les int~ress~s. 59. The Council now has before it a resolution pro- posed by the representative of the United states [8/4516]. This resolution covers the essential points which I have just described as constituting the neces- sary elements for a constructive andprogressive pro- gramme to deal with the present situationinthe Congo in the true interests of the Congolese people. 60. I therefore support the draft resolution put for- ward by my United states colleague, andlhope that on its merits it will commend itself to all my colleagues round this table. 61. Avant de conclure mon intervention, j'aile regret de devoir dire quelques mots sur ladeclarationque le representant de 1'Union sovietique a faite hier soir et qui rev~le une attitude toute differente. Cette declara- tion m'a malheureusementfait 1'effet d'avoir un carac- 61. Before I finish speaking I must regretfully say something briefly about the statement made last night by the representative of thE.~ Soviet Union, which indi- cated quite a different approach. This statement regrettably seemed to me to be a thoroughly old- fashioned doctrinaire statement of the kind withwhich the Council inyears gonebyhadbeenonly too familiar. The representative of the Soviet Union showed no disposition to insulate the affairs of Africa from the language of the cold war, and all the familiar slogans were paraded: the aggressive designs of NATO; the sinister machinations of the capitalistic monopolists, especially on Wall street; and the determination ofthe imperialist colonialist Powers to resist the liberation movement of the African peoples. He also added a new bogy; he accused the United Nations Command in the Congo and the Secretary-General personally of sup- porting "those forces which, piaying into the hands of the colonial Powers, oppose a policy for strengthening the independence of the Republic of the Congo, en- courage divisions in the nationalfreedom movement of the African peoples and help the imperialist Powers in their fight against this movement" [901st meeting, para. 35]. culi~rement de Wall Street, volonM bien arr~t~e des puissances colonialo-imperialistes de s'opposer au mouvement de liberation des peuples d'Afrique. n a egalement brandi un autre epouvantail en accusant le Commandement des forces des Nations Unies auCongo et le Secretaire general en personne de soutenir "les forces qui, faisant le jeu des puissances coloniales, combattent la politique visant i\ renforcer 1'indepen- dance de la Republique du Congo, favorisent la divi- sion du mouvement de liberation nationale des peuples africains et aident les puissances imperialistes dans leur lutte contre ce mouvementll [901~me seance, par. 35]. 62. On pourrait croire que ces accusations sont par trop rebattues pour qu'il soit besoin d'y repondre, mais, vu lapersonnalitedeleurauteur,j'estimene pas pouvoir les laisser passer. Je ne puis croire par exemple qu'H y ait un seul membre du Conseil de securite pour s'emouvoir de 1'accusationselonlaquelle la presence de moins de 300 Canadiens et Norvegiens charges de fonctions techniques specialisees sur un effectif total de 18.000 hommes environ ferait de la Force des Nations Unies un instrument des visees imperialistes des puissances de 1'OTAN en Afrique. Je crois plut6t que, lorsque les Etats africains se souviendront de 1'attitude honorable qui a toujours ete celle du Canada et de la Norv~ge i\ 1'egard des pro- 62. It might be thought that these accusations are too patently trite to require an answer, but as they come from so distinguished a source I feel I cannot let them pass. For example, I cannot believe that any member ofthis Council will be impressedbythe charge that the inclusion in a United Nations Force totalling .some 18,000 of personnel from Canada and Norway of a total of less than 300 men performing specialized technical functions, constitutes an instrument of im- perialist designs by the NATO Powers in Africa. I believe rather that when the African states recall .the honourable and consistent attitude of Canada and Nor- way towards African problems they will prefer to draw other conclusions. bl~mes africains, Hs prefereront tirer d'autres con- clusions. 63. Je crois egalement que ces m~mes Etats afri- cains auront ete troubles par la fa<;on dont 1'Union sovietique a insiste sur son droit d'envoyer au Congo des fournituretl de toute esp~ce sans passer par 1'en- tremise de 1'Organisation des Nations Unies. Je auis certain qu'ils esp~rent comme nous que l'Union sovie-' tique cessera d'agir de la sorte et qu'elle tiendra compte des appels du Conseil de securite qui a de- 63. I believe too that these African states will have been disturbed by the emphasis which the Soviet Union has placed on its right to send supplies of any kind to the Congo outside the framework of the UnltedNations effort. I am sure that they share' our hope that the Soviet Union will cease to act in this way and respond to the appeals of the Security Council to do nothing to aggravate the present very difficult situation. t~re doctrinaire absolument depasse, d'un genre quine rappelle que trop celles que le Conseil avait coutume d'entendre il y a quelques annees. Le representant de l'Union sovietique n'a pas cherche i\ parler des af- faires d'Afrique en des termes autres que ceux de la guerre froide et tous les slogans familiers ont ete ressortis: desseins agressifs de 1'0TAN, sinistres machinations des monopoles capitalistes et plus plL:-i;i- 65. The United Kingdom, for its part, has no doubt that in all his decisions with regard to the United Nations operations inthe Congo, the Secretary-General has been guided by his mandate, and within this man- date by a determination to prevent the total collapse of law and order, which would constitute a threat to international peace and security, and by a desire to place the resources of the United Nations at the dis- posal of a people strugglingto establisha constitutional and economic framework for its independent life. 66. The United Kingdom is satisfied that the emer- gency decisions taken by the Secretary-General and his representatives on the spot have been taken with these ends in view. We believe these decisions were fully justified. I therefore wish to associate myself with the tribute which hasbeenpaidtothe devotion and energy of the Secretary-General and which was par- ticularly paid to the Secretary-General by the repre- sentative of Tunisia last night andbyother representa- tives who have spoken before me today. 67. One last word. I have been deeply impressed in the speeches which we have heard today from the representatives of Argentina and Ecuador by-the his- torical perspective in which they placed the role of the United Nations in the Congo. We round this table must indeed consider the lasting consequences of the decisions which we are nOw going to take. To the extent that we support the United Nations inthe Congo today, we are ensuring that the Organization will be available now and hereafter to meet the needs of Member States, or indeed of non-member States, and ofthe world community in future emergencies. Byour action now we can contribute to the aspirations and the security not only of the Congolese people but of all peoples.

In connexion with the dis- cussion which took place yesterday and today, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to make a number of remarks onpoints ofprinciple andto submit Us own proposals. 69. In the first place, the representative ofthe United states was unable in his remarks today to refute the facts we presented in our statement yesterday, the reason being that these facts are, unfortunately, real. The Secretary-General likewise did not refute the substance of these facts in his statementofyesterday. 12 65. Le Royaume-Uni ne doute pas pour sa part que, dans toutes les decisions relatives aux operations des Nations Unies au Congo. le Secretaire general s'est laisse guider par son mandat et, dans le cadre de ce mandat, par la resolution bien arr~tee d'emp~cherun effonclrement totalde-liordre public qui constituerait une menace pour la paix et lasecuriteinternationales, ainsi que par le desir de mettretoutes les ressOllrces de 1'Organisation des Nations Unies h la disposition d'un peuple qui lutte pour creer le cadre constitu- tionnel et economique de son independance. 66. Le Royaume-Uni a la certitude que les decisions d'urgence prises par le Secretaire general et par ses represontants sur place ont ete prises dans ces inten- tions. Nous sommes convaincus que ces decisions etaient pleinement justifiees. Je tiens donc h m'asso- cier h 1'hommage qui a ete rendu audevouement et h l'{mergie du Secretaire general et notamment aux paroles prononcees par le representant de la Tunisie bier soir et par les orateurs qui m'ont precede ce matin. 67. J'ai ete profondement frappe enfin. en entendant aujourd'hui les representants de l'Argentine et de 1'Equateur, par la perspectivebistoriquedans laquelle Hs ont place le r81e de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo. Nous devons tous ici eneffet conside- rer les consequences h long terme des decisions que nous sommes sur le point de prendre. Dans la mesure oft nous soutiendrons aUjouid'hui Paction des Nations Unies au Congo. nous donnerons h I'Organisation, m"aintenant et dans d'autres cas d'urgence quipourront se presenter hi'avenir, la possibilite de repondre aux besoins d'Etats Membres, ou m~me d'Etatsnonmem- bres, et A ceux de la communaute mondiale. Par les decisions que nous allons prendre, nOlls pouvons oon- tribuer h realiser les aspirations et A assurer la securite non seulement du peuple congolais, mais de tous lea peuples. 68. M. ZORINE (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) [traduit du russel: 'La delegation sovie- tique estime indispensable, h propos de la discussion qui s'est deroulee bier et aUjourd'hui, de formuler une serie d'observations de principe et de presenter ses propositions. 69. En premier lieu, le representant des Etats-Unis. dans soninterventiond'aujOllrd'hui,n'apudementir lea faits que nous anons mentionnes bier, car ces faits sont malheureusement exacts. Le Secretaire general, dans son intervention d'bier. n'a pas non plus dementi ces faits quant au fond. n a simplement voulu en 70. Secondly, the statement made by the representa- tive of the United States was so framed as to give the impression that somebody-the reference was to the Soviet Union-wishes to undermine the United Nations and its action in the Congo, and that the United States opposes this and wants the tasks of the United Nations to be carried out in the spirit of the Charter, so that the acute problems now facing the Congo may be re- solved. 71. The Soviet delegation is constrained to state that the attempts to represent our position in this light are completely futile. From the very outset of the debate on the Congo question, the Soviet Union has taken an active part in formulating the Council's de... cisions and has voted in favour of the resolutions that were adopted. It continues to stand by these resolu- tions and inl:08nds to ensure that they are strictly en- forced. 72. Further, ina public statement made very recently, on 13 September, Mr. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, stated that the Soviet Government is in favour of strengthen- ing the United Nations in every way because it is the paramount international body inwhichStatesbelonging to both systems are represented. 73. Our consistent policy is to increase the authority and importance of the United Nations, and the great significance which the Soviet Government attaches to this international Organization is demonstrated bythe fact that the Soviet delegation to the forthcoming session of the General Assemblyis tobe headed by '/;he Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Unfortunately, not all those who are speaking now of the lofty au- thority of the United Nations take this same position. The question under discussion is not, moreover, whether the United Nations is or is not carrying out the measures provided for in the Security Council resolutions on the Congo, or whether action is being ,taken outside the United Nations. It is rather that the resolutions on the Congo adopted by the Security Council are being violated and that they are being violated, unfortunately, by the Secretary-General and the United Nations Command, as has been shown by detailed facts which have not been refuted. 74. The question is also that attempts arebeingmade to use the United Nations for the attainment of ob- jectives in the Congo which have nothing to do with the purposes of the United Nations and which are in fact leading to a re-enslavement of the Congo under the United Nations nag. The Soviet Union has voiced its opposition to this and will continue to do so, be- cause in its view this is the very sort of action that undermines the authority of the .United Nations in Africa and throughout the world. Preciselybecause we value the authority of the United Nations, we take the stand that these violations of the Security Council's decisions must cease, that further violations must not 70. En second lieu, l'interventiondurepresentantdes Etats-Unis visait ! faire croire que quelqu'un, et l'on a cit6 I'Union sovietique,vent saper l'Organisationdes Nations Unies et compromettre les mesures qu'elle prend au Congo, et que les Etats-Unis sly opposent et veulent que les t!ches soient executees par 1'ONUdans l'esprit de la Charte pour resoudre les graves pro- bl~mes qui se posent aujourd'hui au Congo. 71. La delegation sovietique estime indispensable de declarer que cettetentative de presenternotre position sous un tel jour est denuee detoutfondement. L'Union sovietique, d~s le debut de l'examen de la question du Congo, a pris une part active! l'61aboration des de- cisions du Conseil de securite et a vote pour les resolutions qu'il a adoptees. AUjourd'hui encore, elle se fonde sur ces resolutions et son intention est d'obtenir qu'elles soient scrupuleusement executees. 72. En outre, le President du Conseil des ministres de 1'Union .sovi~tique, M. Khrouchtchev, a, tr~s r~­ cemment, le 13 septembre, d~clar~publiquementque le Gouvernement sovietique ~st favorable ! unrenforce- ment de l'Organisation des Nations Unies sur unebase universelle parce qu'il s'agit del'organeinternational le plus important, oil sont representes des Etats appartenant ! l'un et l'autre syst~me. 73. Nous suivons fid~lement une politique visant ! renforcer l'autorite et l'importance de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, et le fait m~me que la delegation sovietique ! la presente session de I'Assemblee ge- nerale est dirigee par le President du Conseil des ministres indique toute 1'importance que le Gouverne- ment sovietique accorde ~ cette organisation interna~ tionale. Telle n'est pas malheureusement la position de tous ceux qui parlent aUjourd'hui du grandprestige de l'Organisation. n ne s'agit nullement de savoir si l'Organisation des Nations Unies doit ou non executer au Congo les mes.ures prevues dans les resolutions du Conseil de securite, ou s'il faut agir hors de l'Or- ganisation. Voici ce dont il s'agit: les resolutions adoptees par le Conseil de securite sur le Congo sont enfreintes, malheureusement, par le Secretaire ge- neral et le Commandement des Nations UnieSj sur ce point, on a cite des faits precis qui n'ont pas ete dementis. 74. n s'agit en outre de ceci: on a tente d'utiliser l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour executer au Congo des taches qui n'ont aucunrapport avec les buts de l'Organisation et qui, enfait, conduisent~unnouvel asservissement du Congo sous le couvert du drapeau de l'ONU. L'Union sovietique s'est opposee ets'oppo- sera! ces tentatives, car elle estime que de tels agissements, pr~cis~ment,compromettent le prestige de l'Organisation des Nations Unies dans le monde entier et en Afrique. crest justement parce que nous attachons du prix au prestige de I'Organisation des Nations Unies que nous sommes partisans de mettre fin ! ces violations des decisions du Conseil de se- 77. In opentive paragraph 1, the Secretary-General is urged "to continue to give vigorous effect to the resolutions of the Council". This, unfortunately, is a pious wish, for the resolution says nothing about the erroneous action which is in fact leading to violations of the resolutions and which must be rectified. 78. In operative paragraph 2, the States Members of the United Na!ions are called upon to make "voluntary financial contributions to a United Nations fundforthe Congo, to be used under United Nations control as determined by the Secretary-General, for the finan- cing of the necessary governmental expenditures not covered by governmental revenue•••". What does this mean? It means that we would give the Secretary- General a mandate to finance the governmental expen- ditures of an independent State, the Congo, as he sees fit. This iscalled strengtheninga country's sovereignty and enhancing the authority of the United Nations in the eyes of the African States. We do not think that such a mandate can be given, especially since the Secretary-General has unfortunately carried out the last mandate he receivedinthe distortedanderroneous fashion to which we have referred. 79. This paragraph is not in keeping with the resolu- tions already adopted by the Security Council, for in all the resolutions adopted by the Council itwas stated that the Secretary-General should act in consultation with the Government of the Congo in respect of all questions, including economic and administrative questions. In this paragraph, consultation with the Government is no longer -mentioned. All financial re- sources are now placed at the disposal of the Secre- tary-General-and this does not involve a smallfigure but some hundred million dollars which are to be spent as the Secretary-General sees fit. 80. This can only be called the establishment of a trusteeship over an independent State, the Congo. Life is moving towards the end of colonial possession, the end of trusteeship, but under this new draft resolution of the United States, we wouid restore trusteeship over an independent State which has only recently freed itself from colonial domination. 81. Operative paragraph 3 reads: "Urges all parties to the internal conflicts within the Republic of the Congo, in the interest of its unity 76. En troisi~me lieu, les Etats-Unis, dans leur projet de resolution [S/4516], s'ecartent des resolu- tions adoptees par le Consell de securite, en faveur desquelles Us ont eux-m~mes vote, et cela aux fins d'une politique contraire aux objectifs de l'Organisa- tion des Nations Unies. C'est ce que jeme permettrai de demontrer en analysant le projet qui noUB est soumis. 77. Au paragraphe 1 du dispositif de ce projet de resolution, le Secretalre general est instamment prie "de continuer A. donner vigoureusementeffetauxreso- lutions du Consell". Mais cen'estlA.malheureusement qu'un souha:it gratuit, car Fon ne parle pas dans ce texte des actions fautives qui equivalent pratiquement A. une violation des resolutions et qu'll convient de rectifier. 78. Au paragraphe 2, les Gouvernements des Etats Membres sont invites "A. yerser des contributions yolontaires A. un Fonds des Nations Unies pour le Congo" et le texte poursuit: "qui sera utilise sous le contr8le de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, dans les conditions fixees par le 8ecretalre general, pour cou- vrir les depenses publiques necessaires qui [...] ne peuvent etre couvertes par des recettes publiques". Qu'est-ce que cela signifie? Nous donnons le mandat au 8ecretalre general de financer A. sa discretion les depenses publiques de l'Etat independant du Congo selon ce qu'll jugera necessaire. Et c'est lA. ce qu'on appelle renforcer la'souverainete d'unEtat," renforcer le prestige de l'Organisation des Nations Unies aux yeux des Etats africains". Nons estimons impossible de donner un mandat de cette nature,d'autantplus que le Secretaire general s'est malheureusement acquitte du mandat que nous lui avons precedemment confie en le deformant et en commettant les erreurs que nous avons signalees. 79. Ce paragraphe n'estpasconformeauxresolutions dejA. adoptees par le Consell de securite, car aux termes de tOlltes ces resolutions leSecretaire general devait· agir en consultation avec le Gouvernement congolais dans tous les domalnes, et notamment dans les domaines economique, administratif, etc. Dans ce paragraphe, II n'est plus question de consultation avec le gouvernement. Le Secretaire general se voit dejA confier toutes les ressources financi~res - et II ne s'agit pas de sommes insignifiantespuisqu'onparlede 109 millions de dollars - ! depenser comme ille jugera bono 80. Cela revient pratiquement A. imposer ULne tutelle A. 1'Etat independant du Congo. La vie evolue vers la suppression des possessions coloniales, vers la sup- pression du r~gime de tutelle, et nous voudrions, par le nouveau projet de resolution des Etats-Unis., imposer una nouvelle Melle A. un Etat independant qui vient de se liberer de la domination coloniale. 81. Le paragraphe 3 est ainsi redige: "Prie instamment toutes les parties aux conflits internes dans la Republique duCongo de rechercher, 82. What does this mean? In the first place, IIparties to the internal conflictsll now make their appearance. But where did the lawful Government of the Congo disappear to? Why is there not a single word about it, even though precedingresolutions spoke ofthe Govern- ment to which the Secretary-General was to give assistance in the solution of its many difficult prob- lems. Why has reference to the Government now dis- appeared? Very simply because the United states wants to set- up a different Government and wants to do so through the Secretary-General, who, under operative paragraph 3, is indeed entrusted with pro- viding such assistance as maybe required. 'PUs means that we would give the Secretary-General a mandateto set up in the Congo any Government he wished. We cannot give such a mandate, because that would mean not only the establishment of an outright trtlBteeship . over the Congo but alsothe attainmentofthe objectives sought by certain Governments, objectives which are certainly not those of the United Nations. 83. This is what operative paragraph 3really means, and if it means something else, we shouldlike to know why the draft resolution is worded as it is. 84. Operative paragraph 4 reads: IIReaffirms its re- que~t to all states to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoratlon of law and or- der•••". At first glance this would appeartobe a well- meaning proposal and one which apparently reiterates what was stated in the Security Council resolution of 22 July [S/4405]. However, anyone who reads the two resolutions attentively wiU see that there is a small difference between them. The resolution of 22 July says: IIReguests all states to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise. by the Government of Congo of its authority••. 11. Why has the Government of the Congo disappeared from the new text? Whydowe have only 1I1aw and order11 , which to the mind of the repr,e- sentative of the United states would mean the so- caUed protection of human rights? 85. The representatives of France and the United Kingdom have spoken just nowoflawlessness, breaches of law and order, violations ofthe rights of individuals, violence done to citizens, and so forth. We know how the United Kingdom and France establishlaw andorder in their colonies, and we know wbat lawlessness and legality mean to them. I shall not pursue this theme further, as I fear that the representatives of France and the United Kingdom will reproach mefor indulging in propaganda, but everyone present understands full well what is meant. We are against the establishment of law and order of the colonial type. We believe, moreover, that law and order should be establishedby the lawful Government and not by some outside Power, even if this is done under the United Nations flag. 86. It is no coincidence that reference tothe Govern- ment of the Congo has disappeared from the United states draft resolution. The resolution of 22 July goes on, moreover, to say: 11 ••• and alsoto refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo". 83. Voil! ce que signifie le paragraphe 3. Et s'il slgnifie autre chose, quton m'explique pourquoi il a et€. ainsi redige. 84. Le paragraphe 4 dit ceci: IfPrie! nouveau taus les Etats de s'abstenir de toute action qui pourrait tendre ! emp~cher le r6tablissement de l'ordre pu- blic•••". n semble, a premi~re vue, qu'il s'agisse l! d'une bonne initiative, dtune proposition qui rep~te ce qutavait affirme le Conseil desecurite dans saresolu- tion du 22 juillet[S/4405]. Mais quiconquelit attentive- ment les textes trouvera en les comparant une leg~re difference. La resolution .du 22 juillet priait "taus les Etats de s 'abstenir de toute action qui pourraittendre ! empecher le retablissement de l'ordre public et 1'exercice de son autorite par leGouvernement congo- lais•••". Pourquoi n'est-il plus question du Gouverne- 'ment du Congo? Pourquoi parle-t-on seulement de l'ordre public qui, dans l'esprit du representant des Etats-Unis, signifierait une pretendue defense des droits de 1'homme? 85. Le representant de la France et celui duRoyaume- Uni nQus ont ! l'instant parle d'actes i11egaux, de violations de l'ordre et des droits de l'homme., de violences faites ! des particuliers, etc. Or nous savons comment le Royaume-Uni et la France etablissent l'ordre dans leurs colonies, et nous saTons ce qutils entendent par illegalite et legalite. J e ne voudrais pas entrer dans les details, car je crains que le repr6- sentant de la France et celui du Royaume-Uni ne m'accusent de faire de la propagande, mais tout le monde ici comprend parfaitement ce dont il s'agit. Nous sommes opposes! l'etablissement d'un ordre public du type colonial. Nous pensons que l'ordre public doit ~tre etabli par le gouvernement legitime et non point par une autorite venue de l'exterieur, fllt-ce sous le couvert du drapeau de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. 86. Ce n'est pas un hasard si,dansleprojet de reso- lution des Etats-Unis, mention du Gouvernement du Congo a disparu. Qui plus est, la resolution du 22 juillet continuait ainsl: "... et aussi de s'abstenir de toute action qui pourrait saper 1tintegrite territoriale et l'independance politique de laRepublique du Congolt. In other words, a mandate is given to the United En d'autres termes, on donne au Commandement de Nations Command to go about and establishthe kind of la Force des Nations Unies le mandat de retablir law and order it thinks desirable. comme ill'entend un ordre qui sera celui pour lequel il jugera bon d'intervenir. 89. Again, reference to the Government has disap- 89. LA encore toute mention du gouvernement a dis- peared. The United Nations Command, it would seem, paru. C'est donc le Commandement de la Force des is to establish law and order in an independent coun- Nations Unies qui ~tabliral'ordre public 'dans unpays try. What is this if not the restorationof colonial con- independant. Qu'est-ce l!,sinonleretablissementd'un ditions in a State which has just freed itself from regime colonial dans un pays qui vient de se llberer colonial oppression? de l'oppression coloniale? 90. I believe that this cursory analysis of the United 90. n me semble que cette analyse rapide du projet states draft resolution is sufficientto showthat it goes de resolutionsuffitAmontrer qu'il est enopposition, en counter and is in flagrant contradiction to the resolu- contradiction flagrante avec les resolutions adoptees tions on the Congo which have thus far been adopted jusqu'ici sur le Congo et pour lesquelles ont vote les and for which the United states has voted. The United Etats-Unis. Les Etats-Unis veulent aUjourd'hui, par States now wishes, with its new draft resolution, to ce nouveau texte, s'ecarter en fait des resolutions , depart from the earlier resolutions and give the Secre- anciennes; Us veulent donner au Secretaire generalle tary-General a mandate to persevere in and to aggra- mandat de poursuivre et d'aggraver les erreurs, la vate the errors and the erroneous course of action politique erronee, dont la consequence a ete un grave which have caused serious dissatisfaction among the mecontentement de la,population du Congo et la chute Congolese people and a loss of prestige by the United du prestige de I 'Organisation des Nations Unies dans Nations in the eyes of all Mrican states. tous les Etats africains. 91. We are in favour of strengthening the authority 91. Nous voulonsreleverleprestigedel'Organisation of the United Nations, but in order to do this we must des Nations Unies. n faut pour cela rectifier les rectify the flagrant errors which havebeencommitted grossi~res erreurs que lIon a tolerees et dont nous and which we have discussed, and we must secure avons parle, et obtenir que les resolutions que nous strict compliance with the resolutions we have already avons dejA adoptees soient strictement appliquees. adopted. 92. It is for this reason that the Soviet Union delega- 92. VoilA pourquoi la delegation de l'Unionsovietique tion emphatically rejectsthis draft resolution, whichis rejette resolument ce projet qui vise i1 saper les aimert at underminingthe Council's earlier resolutions resolutions precedemment adoptees par le Conseil de and aggravating the gross errors which have been securite et Aaggraver les grossi~res erreurs qu'ona committed in carrying out the mandate given to the laisse commettre dans l'execution dumandatconfieau Secretary-General under the Security Council's pre- Secretaire general par les decisions anterieures du vious decisions. Conseil de securite. 93. The Soviet delegation therefore submits the fol- 93. La delegation sovietique soumet A l'examen du lowing draft resolution [S/4519] for the consideration Conseille projet de resolution ci-apr~s [S/4519]: of the Council: "The Security Council, "Le Conseil de securite, "Recalling its resolutions of 14 and 22 July and "Rappelant ses resolutions des 14 et 22 juillet et 9 August 1960, and in particular the clause of the du 9 aoat 1960, et notamment la disposition de la resolution of 9 August which provides that 'the resolution du 9 aoat qui prevoit que ilIa Force des United Nations Force in the Congowill notbe a party Nations Unies au Congo ne sera partie Aaucun con- to or in any way intervene in orbe used to influence flit interne, constitutionnel ou autre,qu'ellen'inter- the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional viendra en aucune faQon dans un tel conflit ou ne or otherwise', sera pas utilisee pour en influencer l'issue", "Noting the serious state of the economy of the "Constatant la situation difficile de l'economie de Republic of the Congo resulting from prolonged la Republique du Congo, qui resulte de la longue 16 "2. Instructs the secretary-General to remove the present Command ofthe United Nations Force, whose actions constitute flagrant violation of the security C~cU's decisions on the question of the Congo; "3. Calls upon all states Members of the United Nations to provide the Republ1c of the Congo with speedy financial and other economic assistance through voluntary contributions, It being understood that such assistance will be placed' d1rect~y at the disposal of the Government of the Republ1c of the Congo."

I call upon the representative of France, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

(should like to exerciseniy:rtghtofreply With respect" to the inadmissible remarks the'representative of the Soviet Union has seen fit to make about my country. 96. I shall be very brief but, contrary to what Mr. Zorin said yesterday about some of my colleagues and about myself, it seems that it sometimes requires more courage in this Council to speak brieflythan not to speak at all. 97. I too could make some unpleasant remarks, which would at least have the merit of being true, as to the establ1sbment of law and order by the Soviet Union. 98. With regard to the conduct of France and the difference between its conduct and that of the Soviet Union, I shall merely say, to borrow the words the Soviet representative has just used: everyone present understands full well what is meant.

I caU on the representative of the United Kingdom, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

I toowould like to reply to some remarks whichthe representative of the Soviet Union saw fit to make in his last inter- vention about the United Kingdom Government's atti- tude towards the maintenance of law and order in the dependent territories for which it is still responsible. 101. He said, if I heard aright, that "we all know what the Governments of the United Kingdom and France mean by·the enforcement of law and order in their colonial territories", or some such words. 1t2. Prie le Secretaire general de r6voquer le commandement actuel delaForce des Nations Um~s, dont les actions constituent une violation flagrante des decisions du Conseil de securite relatives 'A. la qtlestion du Congo; "3. Fait appel il. tous les Etats Membres de l'Or- ganisation des Nations Unies pour qu'ils prMent d'urgence, par des contributians volontaires, une assistance f:in3.nci~re et economique h.laRepublique du Congo, etant entendu que cette assistance sera mis.e dlrectement lla disposition du Gouvernement de la Republique du Congo.1t 94. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Jedonnela parole au representant de la France qui desire user de; son droit de reponse. 95. M.> MILLET (France): Jedesireuserdemondroit de reponse en ce qui concerne les remarques inad- missibles que le representant de l'Union sovietique a cru bon de faire au sujet de mon pays. 96. Je serai tr~s bref mais, il. la difference de ca que M. Zorine disait bier de certains de mes coil~gues et de moi-m~me, 11 semble qu'11 faiile parfois, dans cette enceinte, plus de couragepourparler bri~ement que pour ne pas parler du tout. 97. J e pourrais moi aussi faire des remarqlles d&- sagreables, mats qui auraient au moins le me-rite d'~re vraies, sur le retablissement de l'ordre par ltUnion aovietique. 98. En ce qui concerne le comportementde laFrance et la difference de comportement entre l'Unionsovie- tique et mon pays, jedirai simplement,pour reprendre l'expression que vient d'employer le representant sovietique: tout le monde sait ce dont il s'agit. 99. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais): Je donne la parole au representant du Royaume-Uni, qtiidesire user de son droit de reponse. 100. Sir Patrick DEAN (Royaume-Uni) [traduit de I'anglais] : Je voudrais,.mo:!. a~ssi, r~pondre dcertaines remarques que le representant de l'Union sovietique a juge ben de faire dans sa derni~re intervention au sujet de l'attitude prise par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni en ce quiconcerne1emaintiendel'ordre public dans lesterritoires dependants dont11 est encore responsable. 101. n a dit, si j'ai blen compris, que Itnous savons tous ce que les GOUV6.l'nements du Royaume-Uni et de la France entendent par le maintien de Itordre public dans leurs territoires coloniaux", ou quelque chose dtapprochant. ~. ~use him of speaking for propaganda purposes. 103. On the first point he is entirely right, and I do feel bound to reply. On the second point, however, I feel he is wrong and I cannot believe that he himself believes that his remarks will bring him any propa- ganda advantage. I certainly do not. On the contrary, I believe that the majority of representatives around this table, among whom are representatives of more than one sovereign state for whose development to independent status the United Kingdom Government has had some responsibntty, will in general agree that the policy of the United Kingdom Government toward the territories for which it is still responsible is to assist them toward independence ·as rapidly as is possible and wise.

I have no further members of the Council inscribed on my 11st, and would therefore propose that we adjourn the meeting and that we meet tomorrow promptly at 10.30 a.m. The Council will hear four meinbers of the Council and then we shall proceed to hearthe representatives ofthe non-member countries who have been waiting very patiently to be heard. The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m. Litho in U.N. 18 103. Sur le premier point, il a parfaitement raison, et j'estime effectivement devoir lui repondre. Mais, sur le second point, je crols qu'il se trompe et je ne puis croire qu'il pense lui-m~meque ses remarques lu! vaudront un avantage quelconque sur le plan de la propagande. Pour ma part, je n'en crois rien.Au con- traire, je suis persuade que la majorite des repre- sentants iei presents, parmi lesquels se trouvent les representants de plus d'un Etat souverain dont 1'evo- lution vera 1'independance n'a pas ~e sans dependre du Gouyernement du Royaume-Uni, reeonna1'ti.-ont en general que la poUtiquedu GouvernementduRoyaume- Uni ft. l'egard des territoires dontilest encore respon- sable est de les aider ft. progresser vers 1'indepen- dance aussi rapidement qu'il est possible et qu'il est raisonnable. 104. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je n'ai plus d'orateurs inscrits sur ma liste. Jeproposedonc cie lever la ~eance et de convoquer le Conseil demain ~ 10 h 30 pr6cises. LeConseilentendrad'abord quatre de ses membres, puis .les representants d'Etats non membres qui ont trlls patiemment attendu leur tour de prendre la parole. La seance est levee a18 hIS.