S/PV.9218 Security Council

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by the outgoing Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council: Ambassador Fergal Mythen, Permanent Representative of Ireland, Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992); Ambassador Mona Juul, Permanent Representative of Norway, Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict; myself, Permanent Representative of India and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011); Ambassador Michael Kiboino, Deputy Permanent Representative of Kenya, on behalf of the Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa; Ambassador Juan Ramón de la Fuente Ramírez, Permanent Representative of Mexico, Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017); and Ambassador Trine Heimerback, Deputy Permanent Representative of Norway and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). I now give the floor to Ambassador Mythen.

I have the privilege of chairing the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992), concerning Al-Shabaab. I want to begin my remarks by acknowledging the effective skill and leadership shown by my predecessor as Chair, Ambassador Geraldine Byrne Nason. It has been an honour to exercise this important role, and I am very grateful for the opportunity to share my reflections and observations, particularly for the benefit of the incoming elected members of the Security Council. Before remarking on the specifics of the bodies, I would like to thank the staff of the Security Council Affairs Division and its Subsidiary Organs Branch for their invaluable advice and enduring courtesy over the past two years. They were instrumental in supporting me and my team and their tireless work in managing the daily tasks of both bodies. That ensured that their mandates were implemented proficiently. As Chair of the Somalia, and now the Al-Shabaab, Sanctions Committee, Ireland has tried to be as innovative as possible in the role, including by broadening the scope of Committee discussions. We looked for new voices to brief the Committee. To take one example, we invited the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sexual Violence in Conflict, Ms. Pramila Patten, to provide her perspective. That was the first time that the Special Representative on that important and relevant topic had briefed the Committee. There has been a dramatic increase in conflict-related sexual violence violations in Somalia, mostly affecting women and girls. The Committee has the tools at its disposal to deliver on justice and accountability measures, and the Special Representative called on us to use them. The relationship between gender rights and sanctions is one that should be considered in other United Nations sanctions regimes. Similarly, we were the first to invite the Secretary- General’s Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, Mrs. Virginia Gamba de Potgieter, to brief the Committee. Grave violations against children have been consistently highlighted in Somalia, and there is a clear link to the work of the Committee. In that meeting, Special Representative Gamba de Potgieter said that the level of violations against children had been high and alarming and, like Special Representative Patten, she called on the Committee to use the tools at its disposal to provide accountability. We believe that that is a briefing that should take place more regularly in the future in the Committee. Another innovation during Ireland’s tenure as Chair was a joint meeting with the Yemen Sanctions Committee. The meeting came at the recommendation of the Yemen Panel of Experts and was a successful example of coordination between different, but linked, regimes. For example, it was clear that there are links in terms of illicit smuggling routes and that the respective Panel of Experts should continue to coordinate and share information. Again, that type of collaboration, and the building upon synergies, should be considered by future Chairs. Sanctions must be a dynamic tool. Dialogue and engagement with key stakeholders is critical if regimes are to remain effective and evolve in line with changes on the ground. We commend the United Kingdom for its work during the most recent mandate renewal to reinforce the focus on engaging with Somalia to support its capacity to tackle key challenges, including degrading Al-Shabaab. During our time as Chair, four senior Al-Shabaab members were listed under targeted sanctions. That shows the utility of the regime and the fact that it can be used as an accountability tool in Somalia. Unfortunately, we did not manage to visit to Somalia during our time as Chair, due in part to restrictions imposed as a result of the coronavirus disease pandemic. I recommend that the visit should take place as a priority in 2023. The preservation of the humanitarian space has been an overarching priority for Ireland for sanctions regimes. In that regard, we recognized the immense value of the Somalia humanitarian carveout. We were therefore very proud to build on that by acting as co-penholder with the United States to introduce a draft resolution bringing forward a carveout across all United Nations sanctions regimes (resolution 2664 (2022)). I would like to commend the outgoing Somalia Panel of Experts and sincerely thank them for their invaluable work and investigations. Ireland strongly supports the work of the sanctions-monitoring experts, and we sincerely appreciated their thoughtful meetings and engagement with us. Finally, speaking as Chair of the Committee overseeing sanctions on Somalia, my predecessor and I have enjoyed very good relations with the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations. I would like to commend the commitment shown by the Federal Government of Somalia in its dialogue with the Committee and the Panel during our mandate. This continued spirit of partnership will be very important as Somalia moves toward peace and stability. I will now conclude with a few brief remarks on my role as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) on Iran. Building on the excellent work of previous Facilitators, and with the support of the Secretariat, Ireland has done its utmost during the past two years to support and improve the implementation of the resolution. Our work included facilitating dialogue, promoting the procurement channel and effectively engaging with all Member States in support of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). I would like to thank all Council members for placing their trust in us. Despite sometimes difficult challenges, Ireland sought throughout to maintain its role as an honest broker. I urge everyone to continue to support all efforts to restore the JCPOA. I hope that the sides can reach agreement to ensure that the JCPOA can achieve its goals for the benefit of all. Finally, I would like to extend my sincere thanks to the staff of my own Mission, whose skill, professionalism and dedication have been crucial in supporting me in my role. I wish every success to my successors.

I thank Ambassador Mythen for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Juul.

Over the past two years, I have had the honour of serving as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and as Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. First and foremost, let me thank the Secretariat and my team at the Mission for their crucial work and support. I would also like to thank the Committee and Working Group members for their cooperation during the last two years. Turning first to my role as Chair of the 1718 Committee, there has been a deeply troubling increase in the number of ballistic-missile tests by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. These launches are unprecedented in frequency, diversity and scale, and the nuclear rhetoric of the Democratic People’s Republic’s State media is cause for grave concern. Against this backdrop, the sanctions regime remains an important instrument to curb the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s ability to fund its illegal programme to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their means of delivery. As Chair, I have worked to put the effective implementation of the sanctions regime front and centre and to maintain and push forward consensus in the Committee. This has admittedly not always been easy, but some progress has been made: My predecessor, Ambassador Heusgen of Germany, stressed the importance of the Committee reaching agreement on a conversion rate for the consideration of the restrictions on the delivery of refined petroleum products — the so-called oil cap. I am pleased to note that the Committee was able to find consensus on this issue. Yet there are still many steps the Committee could take to ensure more effective implementation of the sanctions regime. A starting point would be to update the weapons control lists, and particularly, the WMD ballistic-missile dual-use lists, which the Committee is mandated to update annually. In my view, it would also be beneficial for the Committee to seek further designations of vessels and individuals who obviously contribute to sanctions evasions by the Democratic People’s Republic. The humanitarian situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has also been a constant focus for the 1718 Committee. As Chair, I have been committed to the expedient processing of humanitarian exemptions aimed at facilitating important humanitarian assistance to the North Korean people. All Committee members have also shown a strong commitment to granting exemptions expeditiously. However, there is an unfortunate contrast between the many exemptions granted and the reports of only a small amount of humanitarian assistance reaching the Democratic People’s Republic because of the border closures imposed by the country’s Government. In general, I believe it is important to separate the issue of humanitarian impacts of sanctions from other political considerations. Sanctions should not be portrayed wrongfully as an explanation for serious problems that are caused by other factors. The responsibility for the humanitarian situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea remains with the country’s regime. Let me also highlight the importance of the work of the Panel of Experts to the 1718 Committee. The Panel’s reporting provides relevant information about sanctions evasion by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its weapons programmes. It is therefore important that all Member States cooperate with the Panel and that the Panel be able to work in an unhindered manner. In my view, the Committee would benefit from even closer cooperation with the Panel, including through receiving briefings or reports when developments require it, or when requested by Member States. Finally, I hope the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will reverse its path and reply positively to the many attempts for dialogue. I strongly believe that diplomacy is the right and only way forward for sustained peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Let me now turn to my time as Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict: In this context, I would like to especially thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General Virginia Gamba and her Office for their engagement and excellent leadership. I would also like to thank UNICEF, the Department of Peace Operations and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for their close collaboration and tireless work. Children are among the most vulnerable in war and armed conflict, and the Working Group is evidence of the Security Council’s shared commitment to protecting them. To this end, I have built on the work of my predecessor, Ambassador Kridelka of Belgium, and of his country, by creating an ambitious work plan. During the past two years, the Working Group has successfully adopted conclusions on a number of country situations, with the constructive engagement of all Council members. It has been important to me as Chair to consistently strive for conclusions that are fit for purpose, practical and instruments for real action. Please be assured that we will continue to work right up until our Chairpersonship is finished at the end of this month. To stay alert of recent developments, we have also received and reviewed regular global horizontal notes, and we have had briefings on situations of concern, including on Ukraine. Furthermore, together with the Niger, Norway proposed the first ever stand-alone resolution on the protection of education in armed conflict. Resolution 2601 (2021) was unanimously adopted (see S/PV.8889), and the importance of the subject has been demonstrated again and again over the last year. We have seen how political instability and regime change in several country situations on the Children and Armed Conflict agenda — as well as the war in Ukraine — have affected the dynamics of the Working Group. Against this difficult backdrop, my goal as Chair has been to ensure that the Working Group stays active. The potential impact of the Working Group cannot be overstated. Its contact with the country task forces and the Governments of the countries concerned should get even more attention. Norway works actively through its Embassies and the Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict to promote the implementation of the conclusions. Norway has also worked in its national capacity within the Security Council to strengthen the protection of children in mandate renewals and all other relevant Council products. The Security Council must continue to mainstream child protection throughout its work, ensuring adequate and dedicated capacity in United Nations missions as well as sufficient funding. This work is too important for the Council not to do so.

I thank Ambassador Juul for her briefing. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of India. Please allow me to share a few reflections from my side as Chair of three subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, namely, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism; the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya; and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011). Although I only became the Chair of those three Committees in August, for my reflections today I will also draw on the assessments and experience of the previous Chair and my predecessor, Ambassador Tirumurti. Let me start with the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). We have chaired that important committee since January of this year. The Committee draws its mandate from resolution 1373 (2001) and more than 20 subsequent counter-terrorism related resolutions of the Council, aimed at ensuring the implementation of those resolutions by Member States, facilitating technical assistance to them and organizing regional and thematic briefings on emergent counter-terrorism issues. The Committee remained active throughout the year and has organized 28 meetings that have included open and closed briefings, plenary meetings, a special meeting and a press conference. During the year, 10 assessment visits were conducted in Africa, the Americas, Central Asia, Europe, the Middle East, the Pacific and South-East Asia, and presentations of the reports and on the visits were made to the Committee. The Committee is also planning to organize an open briefing on 20 December and a plenary and a closed meeting on 21 December 2022. Besides that, the Chair of the Committee participated in nine meetings on behalf of the Committee. A record 510 communications in the form of internal notes and outgoing correspondence were issued during the year. The Committee issued 154 notices of preparation for concept notes, background notes, draft agendas and invites, reports, country assessments and stocktaking documents for the consideration of the Committee and a subsequent adoption. From our perspective, the highlight for the CTC was the special meeting of the Committee in Mumbai and New Delhi on 28 and 29 October. The Committee paid homage to the victims of the 26 November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai at a solemn wreath-laying ceremony at the site of the attacks. It also adopted the Delhi declaration, on countering the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes, following the special meeting. We have worked out recommendations mentioned in the declaration and have circulated them for consideration by Committee members. Throughout the year we tried to promote coherence between the various United Nations agencies through a One United Nations approach, encouraging the participation of civil-society organizations, women, young people and other private stakeholders in the CTC’s counter-terrorism discourse. The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya had an equally hectic period. A few facts related to its functioning show how much work was transacted in the last two years. There were seven meetings; 575 written notes, averaging more than one every single working day; 26 exemption requests, which were dealt with, and 70 mandated reports, which were considered by the Committee. The Chair briefed the Council seven times, and I am slated to brief it again one last time, this coming Friday. The work transacted in the Libya Sanctions Committee is partly a demonstration of a fervent desire among Committee members to ensure that the Committee supports the overall political objective of securing peace and stability in Libya. The enormous number of documents and exemption requests processed during that time also reflects the Committee’s determination to ensure that Libyan wealth remains in Libyan hands. The Sanctions Committee cooperated closely with the Libyan Permanent Mission in New York. It also provided opportunities for the Libyan Investment Authority to present its point of view to the Committee. In my assessment, the work would not have been possible without the excellent cooperation with the Chair extended by all the members of the Committee, including those who served on it in 2021. Turning to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), as Council members know, the main task of the Committee is to administer asset freezes, travel bans and arms embargo measures against individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan. The implementation of sanctions was faced with a major political shift after the Taliban took power in August last year. While the political situation in Afghanistan has changed, the work of the Committee remained as important as ever. India held the presidency of the Security Council in the month of August 2021. Under our presidency, the Council met three times to discuss the evolving situation in Afghanistan, resulting in four outcome documents. They included three press statements and a landmark resolution  — resolution 2593 (2021), adopted by the Council on 30 August 2021 (see S/PV.8848)  — which comprehensively addressed the key pending issues relating to Afghanistan. The resolution is aimed at ensuring that Afghan territory is not used to threaten or attack any country, to shelter or train terrorists or to plan or finance terrorist acts, pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). In November 2021, we organized a briefing by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to Committee members to discuss issues related to the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan and how to overcome those difficulties. Subsequently, the Security Council adopted resolution 2615 (2021) (see S/PV.8941), which clarified that the provision of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan does not constitute a violation of paragraph 1(a) of resolution 2255 (2015) and permitted the processing of payments of funds, other financial assets and economic resources and the provision of goods and services needed to support humanitarian aid delivery. We are happy to note that the humanitarian carve-out provided by that resolution is being utilized by humanitarian service providers. Under our chairship, we organized a subsequent briefing by OCHA in April to enable Committee members to get an overview of the working of the resolution. On the other hand, a travel ban exemption granted in April 2019 to a group of listed Taliban members, with a view to enabling them to engage in peace and stability discussions in a range of countries, expired in August of this year. There were concerns expressed by Committee members about the situation of human rights in Afghanistan. Subsequently, the travel ban exemption was not extended, as the Committee was unable to reach a consensus on it. However, the Committee did stand ready to grant exemptions on a case-by-case basis and we, as Chair, sought to facilitate that. In the final analysis, it is well known that as a contiguous neighbour and a friend of the people of India, Afghanistan is close to our hearts. At the same time, we tried to steer the affairs of the Sanctions Committee with impartiality, objectivity and neutrality. I would like to present the following broad takeaways from our time as Chair of those Sanctions Committees: First, when incoming Security Council members express a preference for taking on the responsibility of chairing a particular subsidiary body, and if there is a consensus on it among the other incoming members, it is important that the five permanent members of the Council respect the consensus of the 10 elected members and take their preferences seriously. Secondly, the function or dysfunction of a subsidiary body depends on the cooperation of its members. We have been fortunate enough to have received excellent cooperation from everyone during our tenure. Thirdly, we need to work out a solution for bringing predictability to the scheduling of Committee meetings. Throughout the year, the subsidiary bodies had to reschedule meetings on several occasions, mainly due to clashes with the work of the Council and the resultant unavailability of interpretation, which caused great inconvenience to visiting participants and speakers. A more workable solution, such as the confirmed availability of a second team once a week on a given day, could be made a practice. Fourthly, the functioning of the Committees is still not transparent. They are shrouded in mystery, especially to non-Council members. It is important to enhance the transparency of the Council’s functioning if its credibility is to be maintained. Fifthly, the credibility of a Committee also depends on how objective and fair its decisions are perceived to be. Any impression that decisions are being taken based on a political preference rather than objective, evidence-based reasoning will damage a Committee’s credibility. Sixthly and finally, our work as Chair would not have run as smoothly if it were not for the assistance and cooperation provided by the Secretariat. I would therefore like to acknowledge in particular the cooperation extended to us by the secretariats of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the 1970 Sanctions Committee on Libya and the 1988 Sanctions Committee, as well as the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate My grateful thanks also go to the Monitoring Team of the 1988 Committee and the Panel of Experts on Libya. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I give the floor to Ambassador Kiboino.

I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, who is away. I thank members of the Security Council for the honour, privilege and confidence bestowed on Kenya in chairing the Ad Hoc Working Group for the past two years. As set out in presidential statement S/PRST/2002/2, the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa is both advisory and analytical in supporting the work of the Security Council on issues pertaining to peace and security in Africa. A significant portion of the agenda of the Security Council focuses on African countries and issues. At the start of our chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Working Group, we resolved to be sensitive to the perspectives and opinions of those countries most affected by instability and insecurity. In that regard, as our guiding principle for the identification of topics and the conduct of the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group, we adopted the theme “Listening better to African country perspectives and learning lessons from successes in conflict prevention, resolution and transition”. As a first step, we asked ourselves several questions, including the following. What needs to be understood better and taken into account by the Security Council according to African countries on its agenda? What lessons can we learn from countries and regions that have successfully managed to transition from protracted conflict situations into political stability and peace? And how can the Security Council effectively take those lessons into account as it shapes peace operation mandates and engages with country and regional political processes and dynamics? Guided by those questions, Kenya first embarked on bilateral consultations with African countries that are at different stages of the peace-conflict continuum. The aim of the listening exercise was for the Ad Hoc Working Group to identify, proactively engage and provide nationally and regionally owned recommendations that would enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the Security Council in responding to the challenges of peace and security in Africa. In order to enrich our discussions, Kenya invited the countries concerned to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group and share their experiences and perspectives on the topics under consideration. We also ensured that key cross-cutting issues — including, but not limited to, women and peace and security; young people peace and security; peacebuilding; children in situations of armed conflict; and the protection of civilians — were part of the discussions and were contextualized and reinforced through a call for national ownership and leadership in addressing their related challenges. Kenya also endeavoured to strengthen the partnership between the Security Council and the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council, in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of complementarity and respect for African ownership and leadership in seeking solutions to the challenges of peace and security on the continent. During the past two years, we were able to convene nine meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group. Two meetings were dedicated to the respective annual programmes of work; three meetings were dedicated to the preparations for the fifteenth and sixteenth annual joint consultative meetings between the members of the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council; and four meetings were dedicated to discussions on the following thematic issues. The first meeting was dedicated to better disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) — or DDR+. The objective of the meeting was to identify the issues, trends and challenges relating to DDR in Africa. We evaluated emerging lessons related to DDR design and implementation when dealing with militant and terrorist organizations, whose arsenal includes the ideological conditioning of fighters. Members made recommendations on how to better deploy and support DDR, with the “+” allowing space for consideration of what is further needed for the evolving security landscape in Africa. The second meeting was dedicated to the implementation of the Secretary-General’s reports on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa  — the peace-security-development nexus. Its objective was to consider the nexus between conflict and underdevelopment, using as a starting point the Secretary-General’s reports on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. Kenya partnered with the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa and the Peacebuilding Commission to comprehensively identify key trends and opportunities for the Security Council’s constructive intervention in hotspots where such linkages between conflict and development are most pressing. The third meeting was dedicated to addressing national conflict situations involving terrorist groups and illegal armed groups with a transnational character. That meeting assessed the threat, scope and destabilizing power of transnational illegal armed groups and terrorist groups; the existing and possible measures that the Security Council could utilize in addressing such situations; and the key strategy, policy and technical elements of cross-border coordination that are required to address the challenges posed by transnational terrorist groups and illegal armed groups. The fourth meeting was dedicated to peace processes and peace agreements and policies, strategies and approaches to conflict resolution in Africa. The objective was for members to exchange views and assessments of the achievements and challenges of the agreements and strategies that the United Nations has used in peace processes in Africa. The outcome included proposals on how and when peace processes may be advanced through better utilization of existing regional initiatives and the role of peers. The Ad Hoc Working Group also facilitated the successful hosting and consensual adoption of two substantive communiqués during the sixth informal joint seminar and the fifteenth annual joint consultative meeting between the members of the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council, held from 16 to 17 December 2021, and the seventh informal joint seminar and the sixteenth annual joint consultative meeting between the members of the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council, held from 13 to 14 October. Kenya is particularly pleased that the two Councils were able to discuss and agree on the way forward with regard to several issues, including the strengthening of working methods and having a common vision for Africa; the promotion of peacebuilding for sustaining peace in Africa; the strengthening of AU and United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa, including an exchange of views on predictable and sustainable financing for AU-led peace support operations through United Nations-assessed contributions, which needs follow-up and finalization; combating terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism in Africa; and the issue of imposing sanctions in conflict situations in Africa The activities just mentioned include many firsts that we strongly urge the Security Council to remain seized of. The causes of conflicts, as well as strategies that could be deployed for their prevention and resolution, are multifaceted. The Working Group serves as an important forum for discussion and reflection on the emerging systemic threats that affect the continent. Today efforts to prevent violent conflicts from breaking out or escalating and preventing resolved situations from relapsing must involve an array of institutions, actors and strategies. In particular, collaboration and coordination between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations is critical. Kenya therefore ensured the participation of representatives of regional and subregional organizations, civil society, academia, women, young people and national actors from Africa in the interactive meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which is critical for ensuring that the Ad Hoc Working Group serves as a forum for relevant stakeholders to discuss strategies for enhancing coordination and coherence in their activities. We are pleased that together we have managed to reinvigorate and strengthen the partnership between the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council. However, much more remains to be done. Moving forward, I would encourage the incoming Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group, with the support of Council members, to work on modalities through which the discussions and recommendations of the Working Group can be followed up on to add immediate value to the work of the Council. The discussions would benefit from more active engagement at the ambassadorial level as well. The Working Group is a good platform through which the Council and the AU Peace and Security Council can hold more regular meetings and maintain close dialogue on emerging issues to supplement the discussions held during the annual joint consultative meetings. It could also be utilized for horizon-scanning briefings on emerging global issues that impinge on peace and security in Africa. To enrich its deliberations, the Working Group should consider utilizing field visits, which could involve synchronizing joint field visits, including conducting them with other committees. We recommend that the Chair of the Working Group consider making an annual trip to Addis Ababa to gain an enhanced understanding of the AU’s work on the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. In conclusion, I want to express Kenya’s deep gratitude to all Council members for their cooperation and support. I thank the experts who brought much value to our discussions with their experience, concrete proposals and recommendations during our meetings. We are also grateful to our colleagues at the Department of Peacebuilding and Political Affairs and the Security Council Affairs Division, as well as the United Nations and AU officials, briefers and resource persons and all the States Members of the United Nations, for their contribution, support, time and cooperation.

I thank Ambassador Kiboino for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador De la Fuente Ramírez.

I will now provide a brief overview of Mexico’s chairmanship of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali. Our chairmanship of the 1540 Committee took place at one of the most interesting periods in the Committee’s work — amid the second comprehensive review on the status of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). It must be acknowledged that it was a very complex process. The Security Council approved two technical extensions of the Committee’s mandate to enable it to continue its work and conclude the comprehensive review, while acknowledging the long-term impact created by the coronavirus disease pandemic. The pandemic resulted in decreased participation in outreach events — and when that failed, meetings that were entirely virtual — and limited even the possibility of holding in-person Committee meetings. As a matter of fact, the very first in-person meeting of a subsidiary body once that work resumed following the pandemic was held by the 1540 Committee. Along with the activities of the comprehensive review, the Committee continued its work of coordinating and providing assistance to States. There are currently 20 requests for assistance from 18 Member States. In addition to providing technical assistance, the Committee participated in several workshops to provide follow-up on various offers. The Group of Experts participated in numerous outreach events in every region of the world, which helped to strengthen the Committee’s cooperation with Member States, international and regional organizations, academic institutions, industry forums and others. From 31 May to 2 June, the Committee was able to hold open consultations here in New York with the entire membership, as well as with international and regional organizations and civil-society and industry members. That was one of the core components of the comprehensive review — ensuring that the Committee’s deliberations and decisions were aligned with countries’ general approaches and concerns, beyond those of the 15 members of the Security Council. In addition to conducting a thorough analysis of the measures undertaken by States in line with their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004), the Committee undertook a review of the lessons learned over the past five years and formulated proposals for its future mandate, while bearing in mind various challenges and emerging threats that would have been difficult to imagine in 2004, when resolution 1540 (2004) was adopted. The long comprehensive review process culminated in November with the adoption of a final report, which contains a wealth of analytical and statistical information, as well as conclusions and recommendations that reflect positions expressed not only by the members of the Committee but by the general membership of the United Nations. It should be acknowledged that the support of the Group of Experts was key in the drafting of that document. Less than two weeks ago, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2663 (2022), extending the mandate of the Committee and the Group of Experts for 10 years. In addition to reflecting the priorities identified in the comprehensive review, the extension will further strengthen the assistance that States need to meet their obligations. And for the first time, the Security Council encouraged the Committee to pay due attention to the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all its activities. I again thank all members of the Council for their flexibility and the constructive spirit that made it possible to reach a consensus. It will be up to whoever is at the helm of the Committee to implement the new measures contained in the resolution, as well as in the corresponding comprehensive reviews, in order to maintain the 1540 Committee’s relevance. We believe that the Committee should pay particular attention to developments in the areas of science and technology. As we conclude our term of office at the helm of the 1540 Committee, Mexico is satisfied that the subsidiary body will continue to support Member States in their efforts to prevent non-State actors from having access to weapons of mass destruction. With regard to the 2374 Committee concerning Mali, I want to begin by noting that in the past two years, the situation in Mali has been affected by the coups d’état that took place in 2020 and 2021. In that context, and despite the pandemic-related challenges, the Sanctions Committee continued to meet regularly to monitor the implementation of the sanctions regime established at the request of the Malian authorities through resolution 2374 (2017). The Committee’s work focused on two issues. First, the Committee members held informal consultations to discuss the progress and final reports of the Group of Experts concerning Mali. The reports provided valuable insights into the challenges associated with the implementation of the targeted sanctions imposed by the Committee. Furthermore, while the Security Council’s attention at meetings on Mali was focused on assessing the deteriorating security situation and the effects of the suspension of constitutional order in the country, the work of the Group of Experts enabled the Committee to provide timely follow-up on the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, which is a key tool for stabilizing the country. Secondly, the Committee held meetings with representatives of Mali and other countries and organizations in the region with the aim of promoting better coordination, which is necessary for the implementation of the sanctions regime. Those meetings enabled us to identify areas of opportunity for enforcing the ban on international travel, to which the eight individuals on the current sanctions list are subject. We noted that greater support is needed from the Committee and the Secretariat in order to ensure that the countries of the region have the technical tools to fully implement those sanctions. Mexico also prioritized dialogue with the Malian authorities throughout its chairmanship of the Committee. In that context, and in response to the concern expressed by the Government of Mali, the Committee provided the Permanent Mission of Mali to the United Nations in New York with access to the final reports of the Group of Experts prior to their publication. In my capacity as Chair, I also transmitted to all the members of the Committee Mali’s comments on the final drafts of those reports. Similarly, as the co-penholder with France on resolution 2649 (2022), which renewed the sanctions regime concerning Mali, Mexico worked to promote better coordination with the Malian authorities through a focal point in Bamako. In the light of what I have mentioned, we encourage the incoming Chair to continue working to support the countries of the region in systematically building the capacity to implement sanctions. We call on Mali’s authorities and the countries of the region to facilitate the work of the Group of Experts that assists the Committee. The visits by experts to Mali and the region are key to the Committee’s ability to receive objective and reliable information. In addition, direct dialogue between the authorities and the Group of Experts is essential for ensuring that the points of view of the Governments of Mali and the neighbouring countries are taken into account in the preparation of the reports. I am confident that, with the support of Member States, the 2374 Committee will continue to contribute in accordance with the peacekeeping mandate in Mali. In conclusion, I would like to thank the experts and the Secretariat staff, as well as my colleagues in the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations, for their professional work throughout the past two years in support of the proper conduct of both Committees.

I thank Ambassador De la Fuente Ramírez for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Heimerback.

I thank you, Madam President, for this opportunity to share some reflections on my experience over the past two years as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. It has been a privilege, and I thank my team and the Norwegian Mission for their support and constructive work. During the past two years, the Committee has added four individuals and two entities to the sanctions list. It has also delisted three entities and 14 individuals, mainly as part of the annual review or upon the recommendation of the Ombudsperson. Let me offer a few personal reflections on that work. The unity of the Council on countering the threats posed by Al-Qaida and ISIL (Da’esh) affiliates remains high, and the 1267 Sanctions Committee, with the support of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, remains a well-functioning and effective tool for combating ISIL and Al-Qaida. However, maintaining that unity requires the continuous efforts of all the members of the Council, both elected and permanent. It is therefore important to keep the work of the Committee focused on its core tasks. For example, I believe the sanctions regime would have benefited further if the Committee had been able to agree on more of the designation proposals it had under consideration. Using the sanctions regime as a tool to promote other agendas will only harm its effectiveness and legitimacy. I also regret that the focus on core tasks has yet to lead to the Committee agreeing to an update of its guidelines. In my view, the Committee would also have benefited from expanding its view to assess and discuss the sexual and gender-based violence committed by ISIL and Al-Qaida and its affiliates. Turning to the role of the Ombudsperson, I am very pleased that the Committee was able to agree on the proposed appointment of the current Ombudsperson, Mr. Malanjum, without the undue delays that were experienced in the past. I would like to commend the Secretariat and the Committee itself for their efforts to support a timely and transparent process for his appointment. As Chair, I witnessed the Ombudsperson’s instrumental role in safeguarding due process, and thereby ensuring both the effectiveness and legitimacy of the sanctions regime. Based on that experience, it is my firm view that expanding the mandate of the Ombudsperson or introducing similar procedural guarantees in the context of all United Nations sanctions regimes would benefit the overall effectiveness and legitimacy of those regimes. I am therefore very pleased that the Council, by its recent adoption of resolution 2653 (2022), concerning the situation in Haiti, made clear its intention to consider authorizing the Ombudsperson to ensure due process beyond the 1267 regime. Let me also use this opportunity to welcome the adoption last week of resolution 2664 (2022), on humanitarian carveouts. Avoiding unintended negative consequences of Security Council sanctions, including for humanitarian action, is crucial. I find it particularly important that the exemption also applies to the 1267 sanctions regime. Finally, let me extend a warm thank you to my colleagues, the Committee members, the Secretariat, the Ombudsperson and the Monitoring Team. During this period, all of them in their respective capacities contributed to the important work of the Committee and the United Nations counter-terrorism architecture. It has indeed been a pleasure to work with everyone, and I thank them for their cooperation.

I thank Ambassador Heimerback for her briefing. On behalf of the Security Council, I take this opportunity to express appreciation to the outgoing Chairs for the manner in which they have discharged their important responsibilities on behalf of the Council.