S/PV.9334 Security Council

In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Ukraine to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I give the floor to Mr. Grossi. Mr. Grossi: I thank you, Mr. President, and the members of the Security Council for allowing me the opportunity today to update the Council on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) activities concerning safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine. Your own personal conviction, Sir, in supporting me and the work of the IAEA has been remarkable. I thank you very much. I also thank the Council for its continuing support for the IAEA’s efforts. I will also lay out basic principles needed to prevent a nuclear accident. I have addressed the Council on the situation in Ukraine four times before, on 4 March (see S/PV.8986), 11 August (see S/PV.9109), 6 September (see S/PV.9124) and 27 October 2022 (see S/PV.9172). However, I see today’s meeting as the most important one, and I will explain why. But first I want to briefly update members on what the Agency has been doing in Ukraine. It is now over 15 months since the beginning of the war. May I remind the Council that this is the first time in history that a war is being fought amid the facilities of a major nuclear power programme. That includes several of Ukraine’s five nuclear power plants, and other facilities have come under direct shelling. All of those plants have lost off-site power at some point. Furthermore, one of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants  — the Zaporizhzhya plant  — has come under Russian military and operational control. The IAEA has been closely monitoring the situation and assisting Ukraine every single day since the start of the war. That assistance has involved the continuous engagement of the IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Centre. There have been 12 expert missions to Ukraine; I personally led seven of them, including two to the Zaporizhzhya plant. In addition, since 1 September 2022, we have had an IAEA Support and Assistance Mission stationed at the Zaporizhzhya plant, which is literally on the front lines of this war. And we are on the eighth rotation of our dedicated and courageous staff, who have had to cross that front line to undertake that vital work many times. Twenty-three of our staff have been part of those teams. And, since January of this year, we have had other dedicated IAEA experts stationed at every other major Ukrainian nuclear site  — the Rivne, South Ukraine, Khmelnytskyi and Chornobyl nuclear power plants. Their presence allows us to provide the international community with reliable information on the safety and security situation at each of those sites as well. Another 58 of our staff have been part of those teams, totalling more than 2,350 person-days of our staff in Ukraine. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security and the Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support once again for their help in making that happen. Moreover, we have facilitated an international assistance package totalling more than €5 million, with 17 deliveries of vital equipment to Ukraine. I thank Member States for their contributions in that regard. We are putting in place a comprehensive programme of health-care assistance, including through equipment and psychological support for all Ukrainian nuclear workers. In addition to our work on nuclear safety and security, we are also continuing our vital safeguards verification activities across Ukraine, ensuring that there is no diversion of nuclear material for military purposes. We are also keeping the world informed of the situation at Ukraine’s nuclear sites in more than 160 web statements, updates, reports and briefings, including to the General Assembly and members here at the Security Council. The nuclear safety and security situation at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant in particular continues to be extremely fragile and dangerous. Military activities continue in the region and may well increase very considerably in the near future. The plant has been operating with a significantly reduced staff, which, despite being in temporary shut-down, is not sustainable. There have been seven occasions when the site lost all off-site power and had to rely on emergency diesel generators, which, as everyone knows, is the last line of defence against a nuclear accident, in order to provide essential cooling of the reactor and spent fuel. The most recent one — the seventh — occurred just one week ago. We are fortunate that a nuclear accident has not yet happened. As I said to the IAEA Board of Governors in March, we are rolling the dice, and, if this continues, then one day our luck will run. We therefore must all do everything in our power to minimize the chance that it does. As the Council knows, since returning from my first of two missions to the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant in September 2022, I have been urging all parties to preserve the nuclear safety and security of the plant. That has involved numerous meetings, intensive consultations and exchanges, including at the highest levels in Ukraine and the Russian Federation. As the Council will recall, only a year ago I elaborated on the seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict. They are as follows: first, the physical integrity of facilities  — whether it be the reactors, fuel ponds or radioactive waste stores  — must be maintained; second, all safety and security systems and equipment must be fully functional at all times; third, the operating staff must be able to fulfil their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure; fourth, there must be a secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites; fifth, there must be uninterrupted logistical supply chains and transportation to and from the sites; sixth, there must be effective on-site and off-site radiation monitoring systems and emergency preparedness and response measures; and, seventh, there much be reliable communication with the regulator and others. Those common-sense rules derive from a vast body of IAEA documents, guidelines and experience. They have been universally cited and supported. That is very encouraging. A nuclear or radiological accident during the ongoing conflict could have disastrous consequences for the people of Ukraine, the people of Russia, neighbouring States and beyond. The time has come to be more specific as to what is required. We must prevent the dangerous release of radioactive material. To that end, and mindful of the seven indispensable pillars, which I just cited, I have been working intensively, and in consultation, with the leadership of Ukraine and the Russian Federation. As a result of the intensive consultations, I have identified the following concrete principles to help ensure nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant in order to prevent a nuclear accident and ensure the integrity of the plant. I see the commitments as essential to avoiding the danger of a catastrophic incident. First, there should be no attack of any kind from or against the plant, in particular targeting the reactors, spent fuel storage, other critical infrastructure or personnel. Secondly, the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant should not be used as storage or a base for heavy weapons  — for example, multiple-rocket launchers, artillery systems and munitions and tanks, or military personnel that could be used for an attack from the plant. Thirdly, off-site power to the plant should not be put at risk. To that effect, all efforts should be made to ensure that off-site power remains available and secure at all times. Fourthly, all structures, systems and components essential to the safe and secure operation of the plant should be protected from attacks or acts of sabotage. Fifthly, no action should be taken that undermine these principles. The IAEA experts onsite, namely, the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya, will report to the IAEA Director General on the observance of the principles. The Director General will report publicly on any violations of the principles. I respectfully and solemnly ask both sides to observe the principles. I request the members of the Security Council to unambiguously support them. Let me say something very clearly: the principles are to no one’s detriment; they to everyone’s benefit. Avoiding a nuclear accident is possible. Abiding by the IAEA’s five principles is the way to start. The IAEA’s five principles to avoid a nuclear accident are hereby established. The IAEA intends to start monitoring the principles through its on-site mission.

I thank Mr. Grossi for his briefing. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as Federal Councillor and Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland. Switzerland welcomes the continued commitment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Director General to ensuring the protection of civilian nuclear installations in Ukraine. Switzerland has often recalled in the Security Council its position on the Russian military aggression against Ukraine. We reiterate our call on the Russian Federation to withdraw its troops from Ukrainian territory and condemn any attack perpetrated against civilian infrastructure. For our country, respect for international law in general, and international humanitarian law in particular, is the foundation of international security. The seven pillars determined by the IAEA perfectly encapsulate what must be done to ensure nuclear safety in all armed conflicts. Today we have an opportunity to support five concrete principles to protect the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. There are five principles for implementing the seven pillars in this particular case; five principles to prevent a nuclear disaster, with all its consequences for the population and the environment beyond a generation; five principles, in effect, to ensure the protection of civilians. Switzerland welcomes the Agency’s efforts and fully supports those proposals. We are talking about a pragmatic and targeted approach. I am convinced that it is an important contribution in this crisis situation. Switzerland calls on all Council members to support the seven pillars and five principles proposed by the Agency. In particular, we call on the Russian Federation and Ukraine to fully implement the five principles and commit to protecting the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. Respect for international humanitarian law is a priority of Swiss foreign policy. The Geneva Conventions and the Protocols Additional thereto bestow a clear and major responsibility upon us. No civilian infrastructure must be attacked during armed conflicts and, secondly, civilians must be protected against the consequences of war, especially in occupied territories. The rules for ensuring such protection exist, but their implementation is lacking. The military situation is very tense. The danger surrounding the nuclear power plant remains. We are all aware of the risks to civilians when a nuclear power plant becomes the focus of an armed conflict. It is our duty to prevent those risks. Switzerland is pleased to be able to discuss issues relating to the safety and security of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant within the Council. We are committed to protecting civilians. That was the spirit in which we assumed the presidency of the Council. I resume my functions as President of the Council. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

As we approach the end of the month, I take this opportunity, Mr. President, to acknowledge the impeccable work of your country and your delegation in presiding over the Security Council in May. I also appreciate the convening of today’s meeting, as requested by France and Ecuador. And I welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of Ukraine in today’s meeting. I would like to express my deepest appreciation to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Rafael Mariano Grossi, not only for the clarity of his briefing on a sensitive issue but also for his work at the helm of the IAEA and his efforts regarding nuclear safety and security in Ukraine. The courage and professionalism of his team on the ground and his own leadership, reflected in his on-site visits in 2022 and 2023 to the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, enhance the work of the United Nations nuclear security agency and the role of the Organization. I therefore reiterate that safe, unhindered and unrestricted access for the IAEA at all levels, at any nuclear facility, and in this case in Zaporizhzhya, must be guaranteed at all times. I also reiterate the obligation of the parties to provide the IAEA with access to the information necessary to assess physical and technical safety and security. I also recognize the sacrifice and dedication of Ukrainian civilian technical personnel in ensuring the operation of nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes. We also reiterate the need to preserve them and facilitate the provision of health services, including mental health care. Furthermore, Russia must cease its military aggression, as ordered by the International Court of Justice, and restore full control over the territory, infrastructure and facilities belonging to the people of Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhya power plant. The world remains on edge in the face of the danger of a nuclear catastrophe, whether from the risk of an accident at a plant used for peaceful purposes or from the threat posed by nuclear weapons, given their catastrophic humanitarian consequences and the devastation it can cause to human existence and the environment. We call for the cessation of harmful narratives and actions in order to prevent misinterpretation or miscalculation, as well as the avoidance of any actions that pose a threat to nuclear facilities. The parties must comply with the assurances provided by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In that regard, we deplore the fact that, at the most critical time for the objectives of the Treaty and when it most needed to be strengthened, the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, held here at Headquarters in August 2022, was prevented from adopting its final recommendations. We also deplore the fact that the establishment of a nuclear safety zone has thus far, not been possible. The Council must a fortiori demand respect for the Statute of the IAEA, the Charter of the United Nations, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment and international humanitarian law. Ecuador further reiterates the need for compliance with the seven pillars of nuclear security and confirms its full support for the five principles promoted by the Director General of the IAEA. We encourage the parties to agree on, and commit to, their implementation. While they are minimum principles, they are also vital elements on compliance, on which IAEA experts in the field should have the full capacity to report. I should underscore that the various proposals and frameworks to achieve peace, whether we are talking about President Zelenskyy’s 10-point plan, or the 12-point peace plan proposed by China, all include nuclear security in their key components. Moreover, General Assembly resolution ES/11-6, on the principles of the Charter underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine, adopted on 23 February by the Assembly at its eleventh emergency session, urges all Member States to cooperate in a spirit of solidarity to address the global impact of the war on nuclear security. Reaching an agreement that guarantees nuclear safety and security is vital to lowering the risks and easing the tensions in this area and to preserving human life, health, the environment and the energy resources of the Ukrainian people, which in this case are represented by the largest nuclear power plant in Europe.

I thank the Director General for his briefing and welcome him to this meeting. Only a week ago, the electrical supply to the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant was once again cut off for several hours for the seventh time since Russia’s aggression began. For the seventh time, we have come close to a nuclear accident at Europe’s largest nuclear power plant, which Russia has cut off from its emergency power supply lines. France is extremely concerned about the threat to the safety and security of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities. The deterioration in the conditions for gaining access to them, which has prevented the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from rotating its team of experts scheduled to visit this weekend, is extremely worrisome. Russia is solely responsible for the situation. And as we know, it was Russia that forcibly seized the plant and massed its armed forces and military equipment at its site. Mining the surrounding area and consolidating military positions at the site of the power plant are unacceptable. We must act to avoid an accident, which would have irreparable consequences. First, France continues to urge Russia to return full control of all nuclear facilities to Ukraine and stop pressuring and threatening their personnel, which increases the risk of human error. Above all, Russia must stop using the Zaporizhzhya plant as a military base. Secondly, France would like to emphasize that while the demilitarization of the plant remains a priority, in the meantime we are fully committed to reducing the risk of a nuclear accident at the plant as much as possible. To that end, we welcome and fully support the efforts of the IAEA Director General. The principles that the Director General has just outlined for us are likely to ensure the safety and security of nuclear installations. We support them and will continue to support the Agency in its efforts to advance the plan, which respects Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thirdly, it is imperative that IAEA experts continue to have access to all Ukraine’s nuclear infrastructure. They must be able to communicate directly, without interference, with the Ukrainian personnel in charge of operating the facilities. France will continue to support Ukraine. That is why we signed an agreement on 5 May with the IAEA and Ukraine’s atomic energy agency, which will guarantee the operation of emergency generators at the South Ukraine nuclear power plant. Our position is clear. The Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant must be safely returned to Ukraine, and Russia must withdraw its troops and stop playing with fire.

We thank Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his briefing. Ensuring the nuclear and physical safety of nuclear facilities has always been and always will be an unequivocal priority for our country. From the very beginning, with the support of the Agency’s leadership, Russia has made every possible effort to prevent the threats to the security of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant created by the Zelenskyy regime and its Western backers. The Director General’s initiative establishing a nuclear safety and security protection zone at the Zaporizhzhya plant, announced following his visit there on 1 September 2022, included a number of important elements whose implementation would have helped to prevent Ukraine’s attacks on the plant and any emergency situations or human-made disasters with unpredictable consequences. The Director General and the Agency’s secretariat worked very hard on that, but thanks to Kyiv’s reluctance to reach an agreement and its unwillingness to accept its obligation to refrain from shelling the plant, the initiative did not succeed. We share the Director General’s apprehension about the continuing threats to the safety of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. Ukraine’s shelling of the plant is absolutely unacceptable. Mr. Grossi’s proposals for ensuring its safety correspond to the measures that we have long been implementing in our national capacity in accordance with decisions taken at the national level. In that regard, no attacks have been launched from the plant’s site and no heavy weapons or ammunition have been deployed there. There are no military personnel stationed at the plant who could be used to launch an attack from the site. We have taken concrete steps to protect the plant’s most sensitive structures, systems and components from attacks or sabotage. In the current circumstances, Russia intends to take every possible measure to strengthen the plant’s nuclear safety and security in accordance with its national legislation and obligations under the relevant international legal instruments to which our country is party. In the light of the nuclear safety and security principles outlined by the Director General, we will continue to protect the plant to ensure that there is no chance that Kyiv and the collective West can grossly and irresponsibly violate them. Russia will respond with extreme measures to any attacks by Ukraine on the plant or its critical infrastructure, including its power supply lines, or on Enerhodar, the town where the plant’s personnel and their families live. We hope that in taking into account Mr. Grossi’s statement, the IAEA secretariat, for its part, will also display the Agency’s impartiality and impartiality and openly condemn the actions of Ukraine, which has already repeatedly brought the world to the brink of a nuclear incident that would affect not only the territory around the plant but lands far beyond its borders, including in Europe. That would be a nuclear disaster.

We are delighted to see you, Mr. President, back in New York for the final stretch of your country’s very successful first-ever presidency of the Security Council. I thank Mr. Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his important briefing, and I acknowledge the presence of the Permanent Representative of Ukraine at this meeting. This year the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists set its Doomsday Clock at 90 seconds to midnight, which is the closest to midnight that it has been since it was established in 1947 to illustrate global existential threats at the dawn of the nuclear-weapon age. That sense of urgency is echoed by the IAEA in its publication entitled Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine: February 2022–February 2023, which states, “Since the start of the armed conflict, the events that have arisen have either partially or fully compromised the IAEA’s seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict for almost all nuclear facilities and many activities involving radioactive sources in Ukraine.” This conflict has reminded the world that a potential escalation into a nuclear conflagration  — whether by accident, intention or miscalculation  — is a real possibility. The conflict has already put the nuclear reactor sites at Chornobyl and in Zaporizhzhya in the middle of a war zone, risking the possibility of a widespread release of radioactive material. To add to the sense of urgency, nuclear doctrinal postures are being revived and non-proliferation agreements suspended. While deterrence theory has traditionally dominated nuclear doctrines, we are witnessing shifts towards doctrines emphasizing the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons as a possible response to the use of similar weapons by an adversary. Those changes increase the risk of misunderstandings, miscalculations and unintended escalation, all of which undermine our efforts to achieve a nuclear-safe world. Mozambique supports any measure aimed at protecting and preventing any nuclear incident or accident, including those put forward by the Director General of the IAEA. As we heard, the Agency emphasizes the importance of a stringent, globally coordinated approach to nuclear safety. An African perspective on the issue advocates for reinforced collective responsibilities in which a nuclear threat anywhere is a threat to all humankind, as our Pelindaba Treaty states. It is therefore our collective responsibility to avoid a scenario with a repeat of a nuclear incident or accident in Ukraine and in an already fragile geopolitical context. In conclusion, we must commit to a cooperative global effort to enhance nuclear safety and security in Ukraine and indeed the world. We must heed the IAEA’s advice and support the talks for an agreement on the urgent establishment of a nuclear safety and security protection zone. As we have repeatedly stated, ending the conflict is the most viable and sustainable solution if we are to ensure nuclear safety and security and save lives — indeed, save humankind. The conflict has gone too far and has brought us to a febrile and dangerously destabilizing place of imminent nuclear confrontation. In that regard, we reiterate our call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a return to direct negotiations between the parties as a matter for urgent action by the Security Council.

I thank Director General Grossi for briefing the Council on a pressing issue. I would also like to welcome the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to this meeting. The United States appreciates the focus and leadership that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has demonstrated in its efforts to help prevent a nuclear calamity in Ukraine, particularly at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. I also extend my heartfelt thanks to the IAEA and Ukrainian staff at the plant, who have laboured under unimaginable pressure to prevent a catastrophic incident. We appreciate the concrete principles that Mr. Grossi has presented to us today. We urge everyone in this Chamber to support those important principles, just as we urge everyone to support all efforts to avoid a nuclear incident at Zaporizhzhya — an incident that could have a disastrous impact on both Ukraine and the surrounding region. The principles laid out today should foster an ongoing discussion about the steps we must take to ensure nuclear safety and security at Zaporizhzhya. I will also note that those principles build on the seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety and security that the Director General introduced last spring. We know that one country — a permanent member of the Council  — continues to demonstrate flagrant disregard for those principles. Since March of last year, when Russia illegally seized the Zaporizhzhya plant, the international community has held its breath each time the facility has been hit by shells, each time it has lost external power and each time Russian forces have detained essential staff. An image released in April by the United Kingdom that showed Russian military emplacements atop reactors at the plant only heightened our concerns about the facility’s nuclear safety. To make matters worse, recent news reports indicate that Moscow has disconnected Zaporizhzhya’s vital radiation-monitoring sensors, which means that the plant’s data is now being sent to the Russian nuclear regulator. That is a clear escalation of Russia’s efforts to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and authority over the Zaporizhzhya plant and undermines our ability to have confidence in the level of nuclear safety at the plant. Let me be clear. The Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant belongs to Ukraine and its data should go to Ukraine, not Russia. Russia’s reckless actions stand in stark contrast to Ukraine’s responsible behaviour. Throughout the conflict, Director General Grossi has made it clear that Ukraine has fully cooperated in implementing safeguards at all of its nuclear facilities and that the IAEA has not found any indication of proliferation concerns in Ukraine. The IAEA’s independent assessments have been essential in verifying the lack of diversion of nuclear material in Ukraine, and the presence of the Agency’s technical experts has helped support safe and secure operations at all of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. Those of us who sit on the Council are entrusted with a sacred responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. There can be no doubt that Russia’s actions are an attack on the safety and security of the region and the world, and we must stand together and demand that President Putin end this madness. If Russia wants to show that it is serious about reducing nuclear risk at Zaporizhzhya, it can take steps to remove its weapons and civil military personnel from the plant; maintain an uninterrupted power supply to the plant from the territory under Ukraine’s control; provide a humanitarian corridor so that Ukrainian personnel can be rotated at the plant to reconnect the plant’s radiation monitoring systems; and return full control of the plant to the competent Ukrainian authorities. If Russia wants to show that it is serious about reducing nuclear risk more broadly, it must cease its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and stop undermining the arms-control regime. The United States is also deeply concerned about Russia’s stated intent to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus  — as we all should be. It is entirely within Moscow’s control to avert a nuclear catastrophe and end its war of aggression against Ukraine, a war that has caused so much pain, destruction and death. The United States will continue to stand with the Ukrainian people and support Ukraine for as long as it takes.

I would like to thank Director General Rafael Grossi for the information he has just shared with the Council on the volatile situation around the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. The fact that the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant was again disconnected from the national grid for several hours last week is very alarming. Cut off completely from its external power supply, the plant’s cooling system had to rely on emergency generators. The situation is clearly far from being under control, as the risk of overheating leading to a nuclear accident continues to be plausible. I would like to add my voice to the words of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and say that this situation cannot continue. Such a grave risk must be avoided at all costs. I commend the tireless commitment of Rafael Grossi and his teams of experts on the ground, who are intensifying their efforts to contain the situation and avert a potential catastrophe. To that end, my country supports the five principles proposed by the IAEA to secure the nuclear power plant. In that regard, I would like to make the following additional observations. First, my country condemns any manipulation or attempt at bargaining using the nuclear threat. The potential consequences of a nuclear accident are known to all, and no one has the right to put the world at such risk. Secondly, we reject any attempt to politicize the issue and emphasize the central and exclusive role that the IAEA must continue to play in nuclear safety and security. Thirdly, nuclear power plants are elements of civil infrastructure protected by international humanitarian law and, more specifically, by a number of instruments, such as the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. The parties to the conflict must comply with them. Fourthly, I urge the parties to cooperate in full transparency with the IAEA to implement its five security principles in order to reduce the risk of an accident and restore compliance with the seven security pillars guaranteeing the normal functioning of the plant. We reiterate our call for de-escalation. The bombing of the nuclear power plant must stop. My country is also opposed to any action by the parties that would increase the risk of a nuclear escalation of the conflict. The tendency to trivialize a nuclear escalation of the conflict is extremely regrettable. Yet recent history speaks for itself on the extent of the damage caused to populations and the environment by a nuclear disaster. The parties must commit to dialogue to put an end to the war. It is the only viable way out of this conflict. We continue to support initiatives aimed at bringing the parties to the negotiating table. We remain convinced that that is possible, if the parties build on the model of the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Finally, the channels of diplomacy must supersede this dangerous gamble of brute force, and peaceful coexistence must prevail over the logic of confrontation. Dame Barbara Woodward (United Kingdom): I thank Director General Grossi for his briefing. Since the start of its full-scale invasion, Russia’s reckless actions at nuclear facilities across Ukraine have threatened the safety of Ukrainians and the international community. Let me be clear, Russia’s control of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant is illegal and continues to pose a serious threat to the facility’s safe and secure functioning. The February report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed the continued presence of military personnel and activity across the site and described a situation that is “dangerous, precarious and challenging”. Unauthorized military vehicles and stores sit in turbine halls. Landmines in the vicinity of the plant endanger Ukrainian operating staff and delay maintenance work. Supply chains and associated logistics continue to be severely affected by the conflict, and off-site power supplies remain vulnerable. New imagery shows that Russian forces have established sandbag fighting positions on the roofs of several of the six reactor buildings. That indicates that they have integrated the actual reactor buildings of Europe’s largest nuclear power plant into tactical defence planning. Russia’s actions have violated all of Director General Grossi’s seven pillars of nuclear safety and security. We have always been clear that as long as Russia’s illegal control of the plant continues, its safe and secure operation cannot be ensured. As the Director General said, the situation simply cannot go on. I thank him and his colleagues at the IAEA for their bravery and ceaseless efforts to support nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, together with the Ukrainian Government. We continue to support the IAEA’s work in Ukraine and its efforts to ensure the safe and secure use of nuclear technology around the world. We recognize Director General Grossi’s efforts to maintain safety at the Zaporizhzhya plant, including through his five principles, as part of a solution that respects Ukraine’s sovereignty. I also pay tribute to the bravery, professionalism and resilience of Ukrainian staff at the plant, who continue to work tirelessly under duress. The situation at Zaporizhzhya is entirely of Russia’s making. Russia can resolve this situation at any time. It should withdraw its troops from the plant and from all of Ukraine.

Allow me to begin my statement by expressing our sincere appreciation to Director General Grossi for his insightful briefing on the latest developments on the ground. We reaffirm our support for the seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety and security and highlight the importance of ensuring and promoting the safety and security of nuclear facilities under any circumstances. We once again express our gravest concern about Russia’s grossly irresponsible seizure and militarization of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. That poses a serious threat to the nuclear safety and security of not only Ukraine but also Europe and the entire world. As the Director General said just now, the situation of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant and its Ukrainian operating staff remains dangerous and precarious, with the seven pillars outlined by him being compromised constantly. We condemn in the strongest terms Russia’s manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, its aggression against Ukraine and its continued control over the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. Japan strongly urges the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw its forces and personnel from the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. We also condemn the signing by the defence ministers of Russia and Belarus of an agreement establishing procedures for the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, which further increases tensions, while Russia continues its aggression against Ukraine. Japan can never accept Russia’s nuclear threats, let alone its use of nuclear weapons, under any circumstances. Other Member States should also refrain from supporting such actions directly or indirectly. Japan reiterates its deep appreciation to Director General Grossi and the secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and continues to support their efforts to strengthen the nuclear safety and security of nuclear material and facilities in Ukraine and applying safeguards to them. We salute the continued presence of the IAEA experts and their focus on ensuring nuclear safety and security at the site during this very difficult time. In that regard, we also commend the ongoing work by the Director General to ensure the nuclear safety and security of the facilities. In particular, the role of the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya is essential to acquiring a first-hand, objective and impartial observation of the situation regarding the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. Japan has contributed financially to enabling the secretariat to facilitate missions, including support for procuring special vehicles for the periodic rotation system for IAEA staff, bringing our total contribution to the IAEA’s activities to approximately €12 million. Japan continues to support Mr. Grossi’s efforts in a manner that respects Ukrainian sovereignty over its internationally recognized territory.

I thank Director General Grossi for his briefing and his new proposal. Albania appreciates the professionalism, objectivity and impartiality of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and considers the role of the Agency central to the non-proliferation regime. We support its continued efforts to secure the protection of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant in Ukraine. Since Russia invaded Ukraine and occupied Zaporizhzhya, we have asked some very basic yet fundamental questions. Under what rights and rules has Russia occupied and taken ownership of a key piece of the power generation infrastructure of another country? By what logic has Russia militarized the biggest nuclear power plant in Europe? Like other questions related to the war of choice in Ukraine, those have so far remained unanswered except through propaganda and a distorted narrative for domestic use. We know that since the facility’s occupation began its normal activity has been severely disrupted, and in no fewer than seven cases it has lost all external power for several hours, creating an extremely precarious nuclear safety and security situation for a major disaster. Professionals have long warned that on-site diesel generators cannot cool each of the six reactors in the long term. And as long as the current situation continues, the risk of major escalation is real — a clear and present danger. Albania strongly condemns Russia’s illegal seizure and militarization of Ukrainian nuclear power plants by Russia. The intentional weaponization of a nuclear plant is wrong and dangerous. There is no other case in history — I repeat, none — when a nuclear plant has been used as a shield to protect military troops and hardware, as Russia is doing. The absurd and dangerous situation highlights the need for urgent international regulation governing nuclear power plants in our time, and we hope the IAEA will tackle the issue. In the meantime, we call on Russia to implement the resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors without delay so that the competent Ukrainian authorities can regain full control of all nuclear facilities located within the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. Ukrainian personnel operating at the plant under Russian occupation must be able to perform their important duties without restrictions, threats or pressure, and supply networks must be restored to ensure the stability of the plant’s six reactors. As Director General Grossi said earlier, the general situation in the area near the Zaporizhzhya plant remains unpredictable and potentially dangerous, undermining the seven essential pillars of nuclear safety and security, as defined by the IAEA. It is therefore imperative to protect the plant to prevent the risk of a serious nuclear accident, with catastrophic consequences for the population and the environment. The proposals presented today by Director General Grossi could be a good basis for ensuring the protection and safety of nuclear facilities in Ukraine, and specifically the Zaporizhzhya power plant, and we have full confidence in the IAEA’s ability to facilitate their implementation. But the root of the problem will remain unresolved until Russia withdraws its troops from Ukraine’s nuclear facilities and transfers their control to the legitimate Ukrainian authorities. That alone will offer the best guarantee for the protection and safety of nuclear power plants in Ukraine. Russia’s military has no business at Ukraine’s power plants. It has no business in Ukraine. That is why we reiterate our call on Russia to end the war, withdraw its troops from the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine and start sincere talks for a peaceful solution. Any initiative aimed at reaching just and sustainable peace must show full respect for international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the General Assembly. We do not need to wait and hope for a roll of the dice to bring luck. We need to ask, insist, work and expect Russia to see reason.

Let me start by congratulating Switzerland on its impeccable presidency of the Security Council during the month of May. I would also like to underline the excellent cooperation between the delegations of Brazil and Switzerland during this period when we have coincided as elected members of the Security Council. And I want to thank Director General Grossi for his detailed and very important briefing. Brazil is a strong supporter of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We have been especially appreciative of the Agency’s recent efforts to enhance transparency and trust and ensure the safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities in challenging dossiers. We believe the Agency has played and should continue to play a key role in ensuring the safety and security of nuclear facilities in a way that is depoliticized and open to dialogue with all stakeholders. As Director General Grossi has said in the Council on previous occasions, nuclear accidents do not recognize borders. We are encouraged by the fact that the IAEA has been able to keep a permanent presence at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, providing both technical support for operations through its experts, as well as timely updates on the plant’s functioning through its public- facing communications. We strongly support the IAEA’s seven pillars of nuclear safety and security in armed conflict, and we welcome the reports that the plant continues to have sufficient staff for the safe operation of the plant. We are nevertheless concerned about repeated disruptions to the plant’s only existing external power line, which was temporarily disconnected last week for the seventh time. Each of those disruptions raises the risk of a nuclear accident, and the repeated disruptions to plant operations also make the system less safe. Upholding the seven pillars requires preserving secure off-site power at all times. Brazil welcomes the proposal presented today by the Director General on the five principles for addressing the situation at the Zaporizhzhya power plant. Those principles represent an adequate solution to the political pitfalls that have so far prevented the full implementation of the seven pillars of nuclear safety and security at the plant. We call on both the parties to the conflict to individually confirm to the IAEA their intention to adhere to those principles, which represent the best way to avoid a nuclear catastrophe until a complete cessation of hostilities can be achieved. We hope that future reports by the Director General on the situation at the Zaporizhzhya power plant will include information on the implementation of the five principles. Brazil cannot stress enough the critical importance of safe and secure nuclear facilities. The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) is a success story with potential lessons. As recognized by General Assembly resolution 76/52, which was adopted by consensus in December 2021, the Agency has been an effective bilateral confidence-building mechanism with positive effects for peace and security at subregional and regional levels. We are fully aware that we cannot draw a direct parallel to the current situation in Ukraine and that the objectives of ABACC are not related to safety and nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, that experience in our region may inspire us to think about how to explore cooperation on technical issues as an effective confidence-building measure. Cooperation at the technical level can in fact be a driver for dialogue in other areas, contributing to a positive cycle, as Brazil and Argentina have now sustained for over three decades. We hope to tap into that experience and the contribution of regional mechanisms for cooperation and peace and security during our presidency in October. Despite the divergent perspectives on how the conflict in Ukraine should be resolved, there is a consensus on the need to prevent a nuclear disaster from taking place in Zaporizhzhya. A radius of protection of the plant must be ensured, and that should be seen as an opportunity to establish confidence-building measures among all the different parties involved. The Agency and other partners could help facilitate that process, but it requires political will from all actors directly involved.

I welcome you, Mr. President, as you preside over the important meeting this afternoon. I congratulate Switzerland on its successful completion of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of May. I thank Director General Grossi for his briefing. At present, the crisis in Ukraine continues to drag on and the situation remains serious. China has always been on the side of peace and dialogue and insists on promoting peace talks and a political settlement. We look forward to and support the resumption of peace talks between Russia and Ukraine as soon as possible. That requires the joint efforts of the international community and, more importantly, the parties concerned to create conditions to that end by starting with themselves and accumulating mutual trust. The ongoing crisis in Ukraine poses a grave challenge to the safety and security of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities. China has repeatedly stated its position in previous Security Council deliberations, and on 24 February, China’s position on the political settlement of the crisis in Ukraine was issued, which specifically calls for keeping nuclear power plants safe and opposes armed attacks against nuclear power plants or other peaceful nuclear facilities. It is disconcerting that, despite repeated warnings and appeals from the international community, including China, military operations have continued to take place at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant and the surrounding area. Off-site power supplies have been interrupted several times, related facilities have been damaged on several occasions and the military risks in the area have continued unabated. China is deeply concerned about that. The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has focused on the common concerns of all parties and put forward a safe initiative for the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, which includes the five principles, and is actively exercising his good offices in that regard. China appreciates the Director General’s efforts and supports him and the IAEA in playing a constructive role in promoting the safety and security of nuclear facilities. We call upon the parties concerned to adhere to the spirit of humanity, science, common sense, com­ munication and cooperation; strictly abide by the Con­ vention on Nuclear Safety and other relevant interna­ tional law; avoid any action that endangers nuclear facilities and make every effort to avoid any accident. The issue of safety and security at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant is only one aspect of the crisis in Ukraine, and its resolution ultimately depends on the prospects for a political settlement to the crisis in Ukraine. All parties should focus on the overall picture of peace and common security and meet each other halfway, so as to create favourable conditions for the resumption of dialogue and an appropriate solution of the related issues, including the safety and security of nuclear power plants. Moreover, the country with significant influence should play a responsible and constructive role rather than adding fuel to the fire. China will continue to work to promote peace talks and play a constructive role in advancing a political settlement of the crisis in Ukraine.

I warmly welcome your presence, Mr. President, at this meeting, as we once again seek convergence to address the critical concerns of nuclear safety and security arising from the Russian Federation’s sustained aggression against Ukraine. I thank Ecuador and France for their initiative in calling for today’s meeting and also thank Mr. Rafael Grossi, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his briefing, which highlighted efforts to rein in those actions that undermine the physical and operational integrity of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, Europe’s largest nuclear plant. My delegation continues to share the concerns expressed in today’s briefing and more fully espoused in the IAEA report issued in February and in the subsequent situational reports on Ukraine. Ghana considers it extremely important for nuclear facilities anywhere to be operated with the highest standards of safety and security. It is in that context that we fully support the seven pillars of nuclear safety, first outlined in March 2022, to address the issues relating to the physical integrity of the facilities, the functionality of equipment and security systems, the safety and independence of operating staff, secure off-site power supply, uninterrupted logistical supply chains and transportation, effective radiation monitoring systems, emergency preparedness and response measures and reliable communications with the regulator and other stakeholders. In the precarious context of the ongoing violent conflict in Ukraine, where the associated risks to human lives and their environment are elevated, we affirm that those pillars are important in themselves and need to be implemented as a collective to realize the full gamut of protection that they can afford Ukraine and the world at large. We urge the cooperation of the parties on all necessary measures, including the commitments just outlined by Director General Grossi, to ensure nuclear safety and security, beginning with the demarcation of a demilitarized zone in and around the power plant and its facilities. All efforts must also be made to restore the civilian character of the power plant at the earliest possible date. We encourage continuous monitoring, as is being done during the various mechanisms of the IAEA, including the expert missions to Ukraine, and the establishment of the presence of technical experts at the facility and also welcome further engagements with the Security Council on the implementation of the outlined pillars and commitments. Today’s meeting offers an opportunity to remind ourselves of the historical, ethical and normative underpinnings of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and, in doing so, to collectively renew our commitment in support of a world without nuclear weapons. We encourage restraint in rhetoric and actions that carry the potential to further escalate and protract the war. Our view is that ending the war in Ukraine is the best way to reduce the chances of accidental risk and avoid a catastrophic incident of global magnitude. Our concerns on the humanitarian aspect of the war remain unresolved, as we continue to witness the persistent targeting of civilian-populated areas, contrary to the stipulations of international humanitarian law. In this month of May, the city of Kyiv has experienced more than 15 episodes of drone and missile attacks, with reported incidents of civilian casualties. We are compelled to reiterate the obligations of warring parties to respect and uphold the rules of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law. In the context of today’s discussions, we also underline article 56 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention, which specifically prohibits attacks against works or installations, including nuclear electrical generating facilities, if such attacks “may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population”. Ghana remains resolute in the call for peace in Ukraine. On that basis, we reiterate the urgent need for the cessation of hostilities in order to curtail the loss, suffering and destruction, which, unfortunately, has not let up since the commencement of the war in February, last year. We reaffirm our support for political settlement through the channels of dialogue and diplomacy and maintain the viewpoint that all peace efforts must respect and uphold international law and the core principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Lastly, I reaffirm Ghana’s unwavering commitment to the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine and call on the Russian Federation to end the war by the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of its troops from the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine.

I would like to thank Director General Grossi for his valuable briefing today. I extend my gratitude to him and his team at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for their efforts since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. The United Arab Emirates welcomes their ongoing engagement with all relevant actors to ensure the safety and security of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. Today’s report follows months of careful assessment and visits to the site by the IAEA, and we appreciate the technical approach of the team of experts, which emphasizes nuclear safety and security on the ground. We urge all relevant parties to cooperate with the IAEA. The situation surrounding the Zaporizhzhya plant remains alarming. The fact that Chornobyl and Fukushima have been invoked in the Chamber and elsewhere demonstrates that the world has not forgotten how grave the consequences of a nuclear misstep could be. It also reminds us that when it comes to nuclear safety, our security is intertwined. A nuclear accident would have catastrophic consequences for Ukraine, the wider region and the world. We remain concerned by the disconnections of the power plant from the Ukrainian electrical grid, which have resulted in interruptions of energy supplies, thus further threatening the safety and lives of Ukrainians already living in a severe humanitarian situation. De-escalation is critically important in order to guarantee the plant’s normal functioning and to prevent a nuclear disaster from becoming an unintended consequence of this war. Ensuring the safety of nuclear facilities is of the utmost importance for the United Arab Emirates. We recall the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law of necessity, proportionality and distinction and the special protections that nuclear facilities are afforded under international humanitarian law, including the Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as well as the obligation to take care to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage. Those obligations must be respected. In recent weeks we have seen positive developments emerge — the Black Sea Grain Initiative will continue for another 60 days. Those efforts are proof of what can be achieved when there is political will. The Initiative should be taken seriously, and by opening the door to political discussions, the Initiative’s potential as a confidence-building measure could lay the groundwork for further talks aimed at a resolution to this conflict. As we have said many times before, the cessation of hostilities throughout Ukraine is the only way to guarantee the prevention of a nuclear miscalculation. We reiterate our call for de-escalation and dialogue to bring this conflict to a peaceful, sustainable solution in line with the Charter of the United Nations. I would like to conclude by congratulating Switzerland for its outstanding presidency of the Council this month.

I thank the representative of the United Arab Emirates for her expression of gratitude.

I too thank Director General Grossi for his briefing. As we just heard, the situation regarding nuclear safety and security in Ukraine continues to be of great concern. Since February 2022, the world has watched with worry as Russia has occupied Zaporizhzhya, Europe’s largest nuclear power plant, as part of its aggression against Ukraine. Let us not forget that the root of the problem is the illegal presence of Russian military personnel at the site. We stress the fact that without their presence, the situation we are discussing today would not exist. With that in mind, it is deeply regrettable that military activities in and around the facility, as a result of Russia’s actions, have placed the nuclear safety and security of the entire continent in jeopardy. As stated by Director General Grossi, the situation is becoming increasingly unpredictable and, consequently, more dangerous. Such risks are completely unacceptable. While it remains occupied, the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant has been operating with significantly reduced staffing numbers. It has been reported that the Ukrainian staff who are still there are working in extremely challenging conditions, faced with intimidation, interrogation and even abduction, in some instances. A humanitarian corridor for the rotation of the management, operational and repair staff of the power plant is an idea that should be given serious consideration to make sure that the station continues to function in a safe way. We also note that in recent weeks there have been reports of evacuations from the town of Enerhodar, where most staff and their families live. That creates further uncertainty about the staffing situation. We welcome the presence of staff from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) deployed to Zaporizhzhya and other Ukrainian power plants, but emphasize that this does not amount to a solution. Even in a shut-down State, the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant requires adequate maintenance and other work. Since Russia’s illegal invasion and occupation of the region last February, the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant and its surrounding area have been exposed to dangerous military activity. The power lines, essential to the operation and maintenance of safety of the plant, have been damaged on a number of occasions. Malta deeply regrets that, despite assurances, Rosatom has not granted the IAEA access to the Zaporizhzhya thermal power plant, which has provided back-up power for the nuclear power plant in the past. It is urgent that the IAEA be granted access. While we welcome the delivery of 200 portable-power systems to Ukraine to compensate for frequent power losses, as well as the agreement reached earlier this month between the IAEA, France and Energoatom for the delivery of necessary spare parts for emergency diesel generators of the South Ukraine nuclear power plant, we also underline the need for guarantees of uninterrupted power supply to the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant from the territory under the control of the Government of Ukraine. Malta also welcomes the General Assembly’s recent adoption by consensus of the resolution entitled “Persistent legacy of the Chernobyl disaster” (General Assembly resolution 77/288), which is indicative of the importance placed by the international community on nuclear safety and security in Ukraine and the significance of the serious long-term consequences of nuclear disasters. The risks currently posed to nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, endangering the entire world, are a direct consequence of Russia’s illegal, unjustified and unprovoked war against Ukraine. Once again, Malta reiterates its call on the Russian Federation to immediately cease its war of aggression and withdraw all its forces and military equipment from Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders. We also remain supportive of the IAEA’s continued efforts aimed at finding a permanent solution for the safety and integrity of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. In this regard, Malta welcomes the principles outlined today that constitute an important foundation to continue to build and guide future discussions. The return of full legitimate control over the facility to the competent Ukrainian authorities, including the demilitarization and de-occupation of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, is a first priority. This is a key prerequisite for restoring not only nuclear safety and security but also respect for international law. We thank the Director General for his tireless efforts and the experts that form part of the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya for their valuable work.

I now give the floor to the representative of Ukraine.

I recognize the representative of Putin’s regime in the permanent seat of the Soviet Union. We express our appreciation for the professionalism and commitment of the experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mission to the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, which is being temporarily and illegally occupied by Russia. They continue to work under extremely precarious conditions caused by regular dangerous provocations by Russian troops. We praise the bravery of the Ukrainian personnel working in inhumane conditions of constant intimidation and threats of detention and torture by the Russian military. Russian forces have mined the perimeter and shelled the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant site and adjacent areas. These actions have led to the violation of the physical integrity of the power plant and serious damage to the station and its facilities, thereby posing a direct threat to the lives and health of the operating personnel. The shelling seriously undermines the nuclear safety of the plant and could lead to a nuclear incident or accident, in clear violation of the first pillar of the IAEA Director General’s seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety and security, which envisages that the physical integrity of nuclear installations, be it the reactors, the fuel ponds or the radioactive-waste stores, be properly maintained. Russian military activities regularly lead to the loss of off-site power. Since the beginning of Russia’s illegal occupation there have been seven emergency cases where the plant was in blackout, running only on diesel generators. The most recent blackout occurred a week ago, on 22 May, after the Russian missile attack resulted in the disconnection of the last high-voltage transmission line running, notably the Dniprovska line, which supplied power for the inhouse needs of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. Thanks to the work of Ukrainian power engineers, the operation of the transmission line was restored at noon on the same day, and the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant was reconnected to power from the Ukrainian power system. Russia continues to actively use the nuclear plant for military purposes, deploying approximately 500 military personnel and 50 units of heavy weaponry on the site. Equipment, munition and explosives are located in the turbine buildings of units 1, 2 and 4 of the plant. The threat of a dangerous accident as a result of these irresponsible and criminal actions hangs over us. Accordingly, we support the IAEA Director General’s commitment to addressing this inappropriate situation and restoring nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant in line with aforementioned seven indispensable pillars. We also take note of the Director General’s principles to help ensure nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. They are partially based on the seven indispensable principles, which are applicable to any nuclear facility across the globe. In the case of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, however, due to the uniqueness of the situation  — the illegal occupation of the station by another State  — these principles must be complemented with the demand of the full demilitarization and de-occupation of the station. We reiterate that by illegally occupying the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant and making it an element of its military strategy, Russia has violated all key international principles of nuclear safety and security and the vast majority of its obligations under international treaties. One can hardly consider Russia to be a reliable partner capable of upholding commitments it has undertaken. For its part, the Ukrainian side confirms that we have never resorted and will never resort to any action that could lead to a nuclear incident at the Ukrainian nuclear power plant. We realize the catastrophic consequences of such an incident both for Ukraine and neighbouring States, which is why our position on the fundamental principle of ensuring nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant remains clear and consistent. To ultimately remove the nuclear threats stemming from the illegal Russian presence at the plant, the troops and weaponry must be withdrawn, and the station must be de-occupied and returned to the legitimate full control of Ukraine. I would like to remind the Council that a clear call upon Russia to immediately cease all actions against and at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant so that the competent Ukrainian authorities may regain full control over the facility is also enshrined in relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors. In this regard, the principles to ensure nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant should also include the following elements: first, the withdrawal of troops and all other Russian personnel illegally present at the station; secondly, guarantees of uninterrupted power supply to the power plant from the territory under the control of the Government of Ukraine; and thirdly, a humanitarian corridor to ensure the rotation of management, operational and repair personnel of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant in order to maintain it in safe condition. We also deem it necessary to include these elements and the reference to the need to fully implement the aforementioned resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors on the situation in Ukraine in a new draft resolution of the Board of Governors, if such a document is proposed for adoption at its next session. Ukraine consistently adheres to the approaches designed to prevent a nuclear accident at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, which are reflected in the General Assembly resolution ES-11/6 entitled “Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine”, as well as in the peace formula of the President of Ukraine. I wish to recall that radiation and nuclear safety is the first point under the peace formula presented by the President of Ukraine, and it is vitally important to further consolidate efforts around this initiative, the implementation of which will ensure a just and lasting peace in Ukraine and prevent the recurrence of similar crimes in future, including in a nuclear area.

I now give the floor once again to Mr. Grossi for him to make concluding remarks. Mr. Grossi: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, and the members of the Council, as well as the representative of Ukraine for the important elements they have brought to the discussion today. Their words undoubtedly constitute an expression of support for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since the beginning of the war. We take note of the different nuances and aspects raised by all around this table. As my Brazilian colleague was saying, there may be differences, but there is consensus in the Chamber around the idea that there should never be a nuclear accident. To that end, the work of the IAEA is truly indispensable. In the midst of these complex and concerning circumstances in which we have been living over the past year and a half, today constitutes a step in the right direction when it comes to the safety and security of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. We are encouraged by the expressions of support for our work, including on the seven indispensable pillars and the five principles that I have established today. We commit to continue working to consolidate them and to be even more effective in protecting this facility. I also express our readiness, as indicated on various occasions, to continue keeping the Council abreast and informed about the situation, including the implementation and observance of the five principles that I enumerated today. I will say that our work continues. The IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya continues to be present there. We will continue and reinforce our presence to avoid what must be avoided at all costs — that on top of the situation that we are living in this conflict, we would add the unspeakable tragedy of a nuclear accident. That should never happen, and the IAEA will spare no effort to make sure that it does not happen.

I thank Mr. Grossi for the clarifications he has provided and for his conclusions. There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. As this is the last scheduled meeting of the Council for the month of May, I would like to express the sincere appreciation of the delegation of Switzerland to the members of the Council and the Council’s secretariat for their support. At the end of a busy month, we are pleased that we rallied to arrive at consensus on several important issues within our purview. We could not have done it alone and without the hard work, support and positive contributions of every delegation and the representatives of the Secretariat, including the technical support team and the conference service officers, interpreters, translators, verbatim reporters and security staff. As we end our presidency, I know I speak on behalf of the Council in wishing the delegation of the United Arab Emirates good luck in its presidency in the month of June.