S/PV.9814 Security Council

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by the outgoing Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, according to the year of adoption of the related Council decisions: Ambassador Kazuyuki Yamazaki, Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, Chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and other Procedural Questions, Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011), concerning Libya, and Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023), concerning Al-Shabaab; Ms. Francesca Gatt, Deputy Permanent Representative of Malta to the United Nations, Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict; Ambassador Pedro Comissário Afonso, Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the United Nations and Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa; Ambassador Andrés Efren Montalvo Sosa, Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the United Nations, Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011); and Ambassador Pascale Baeriswyl, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006). I now give the floor to Ambassador Yamazaki. Mr. Yamazaki: During our term on the Security Council, I have had the privilege to chair three subsidiary bodies. Along with my predecessor, Ambassador Kimihiro Ishikane, I chaired the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011), concerning Libya, and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023), concerning Al-Shabaab. This year, I also chaired the Informal Working Group on Documentation and other Procedural Questions. I express my sincere appreciation to the former Chairs of those subsidiary bodies, namely, India, Ireland and Albania, for their advice and close cooperation with my team. Allow me to share some of my thoughts and observations on the activities I have conducted as Chair of those bodies. Let me start with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011), concerning Libya. I believe that is one of the most work-intensive sanctions committees, with written notes going out almost every working day and the Chair briefing the Council every two months. The vibrant Committee activities reflect the politically complex environment in Libya and within the Committee, as well as the dynamic relations of Member States with Libya. As Chair, I strived to steer the Committee’s dealings in a fair and transparent manner, while listening attentively to the perspectives of Committee members and the Member States concerned, including Libya. During Japan’s chairship, we held two informal Committee meetings with the Libyan Investment Authority in order for them to present their views and concerns to the Committee. That was reflected in resolution 2701 (2023) and the final report of the Panel of Experts on Libya (see S/2023/673), which I welcome. Sanctions measures on Libya are unique in the sense that, especially with regard to the assets freeze, they are implemented for the future benefit of the people of Libya. In the Committee, we have continuously worked to ensure the appropriate application of the assets freeze exemptions. We were able to issue Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7, on humanitarian exemptions, pursuant to resolution 2664 (2022), in a timely manner. We also lifted the travel ban on two family members of the former leader of the country after careful consideration. That does not mean that the sanctions measures and the work of the Committee are perfect. The report by the Panel shows that in the areas of arms embargoes, travel bans, asset freezes and illicit petroleum exports we are far from it. All Member States must fulfil and implement their obligations under the relevant Council resolutions, and the Committee must continue its efforts to rigorously implement the measures decided by the Council. I now turn to the Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) regarding Al-Shabaab. During the past two years, the Al-Shabaab sanctions regime evolved significantly to assist the State-building efforts of Somalia. Japan closely coordinated with Somalia and the United Kingdom, the penholder, in that regard. One of the most significant changes was the lifting of the arms embargo on the Federal Government of Somalia through the adoption of resolution 2713 (2023). The Council rightly acknowledged the Federal Government’s efforts to improve arms and ammunition control and management. Japan hopes that the regional governments will also join that effort, as the Panel of Experts expects. In spite of that improvement, it is regrettable that the Committee has continued to receive constant reports of flows of weapons and ammunition to Al-Shabaab, in violation of the arms embargo. I also regret that I was unable to convene a joint meeting between the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014), on Yemen, and the 2713 Committee, owing to a lack of consensus among Committee members. Given that part of the Arabian peninsula is considered a regional hub for smuggling weapons and ammunition, I hope for further cooperation between the Panels of the two Committees and that a joint meeting will be held as soon as possible. Holding a Committee meeting with Member States of the region would also be helpful in enhancing regional cooperation in that regard. Although Ireland, our predecessor, encouraged Japan to lead a Chair’s visit to Somalia during our term, we have so far been unable to realize such a visit, owing to the security situation and the Council’s tight scheduling. I hope that the next Chair will lead such a visit and that it will serve as an opportunity for the Federal Government of Somalia to directly explain its efforts to the Committee. I also call on the Federal Government of Somalia to allow and facilitate the Panel of Experts’ smooth and unhindered work so that it can serve the Committee effectively. That will also help to expedite the ongoing one-off disposal of the charcoal stockpile by selling it. Finally, I would like to share my thoughts on the activities of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, whose chairship we assumed in January 2024. It is the fourth time that Japan has chaired the Working Group since 2006, and this time we focused on the work of revising the note by the President S/2017/507. During 2023, Japan worked closely with Albania, as Chair of the Group for 2022–2023, as a Vice-Chair. In June 2023, in collaboration with Albania and the two previous Chairs — Kuwait and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines — we launched the online Interactive Handbook of the Working Methods of the Security Council. I believe that joint work contributed to building on the legacy of the Informal Working Group. Today, just an hour ago, the Informal Working Group successfully agreed on an updated note 507 after intensive discussions throughout the year. I believe that there are two important aspects to that. The first is incorporation and streamlining. The work of incorporating all the presidential notes concerning the Security Council’s working methods into one document is a notable initiative that Japan began in 2006. It was subsequently further updated in 2010 and 2017 under Japan’s chairship of the Informal Working Group. We are committed to building on that important tradition. Having a single streamlined document should make for easier reference and implementation for Council members and beyond, thereby improving transparency and efficiency in the Council. Once the new note 507 is issued, the digital version of the Handbook, which is available through the Interactive Handbook website, will also be updated accordingly by the Secretariat. Japan is also preparing to issue hard copies of the Handbook in due course. Those are signature practical contributions by Japan to improving the working methods of the Security Council. Another important aspect of the project is the collective effort towards codification. In January, at the first meeting of the Informal Working Group, we encouraged the codification of good practices that will contribute to the implementation of the working methods of the Council. We also announced that we are open to adding new provisions, should there be a consensus on them. We attach high importance to an inclusive approach and we therefore listened carefully and proactively to the views not only of Council members but also of the wider United Nations membership during the open debate in March (see S/PV.9571), which was arranged under our Security Council presidency. I would now like to introduce some of the achievements regarding codification in the new note 507. The new note includes a reference to the value of hearing the perspectives of a variety of briefers, as well as the importance of mitigating the risk and threat of reprisals to ensure the full, safe and meaningful participation of briefers. Regarding access to documentation, the elected members proposed to address the current unequal access to the legacy documents of the Security Council between the permanent and the elected members. The Group spent a substantial amount of time discussing that matter at informal occasions. As a result, the acknowledgement of the principle of full access to relevant documents by all members of the Security Council and the necessary procedure regarding requests for access has been codified. With regard to the call for improving the Security Council’s collaboration with other organs, the new note refers in particular to the importance of strengthening collaboration with the Peacebuilding Commission, including through making use of the Commission’s timely advice. Regarding the annual report of the Security Council, the new note successfully codifies the inclusion of special reports on the use of the veto in the contents of the first part of the report. The success in codifying those elements in the new note is a truly collective achievement, and I thank all members of the Informal Working Group for their constructive engagement in the discussions throughout the year. We should stress that the efforts to improve the Council’s working methods will not end with the adoption of the revised version of note 507. It is an open- ended, ongoing process and a collective endeavour, and what is most important is its implementation in the actual practice of the Security Council. In conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude to the members of the Security Council and the wider United Nations membership for their cooperation with us as the Chair of the 1970 and 2713 Committees and the Informal Working Group over the past two years. I am confident that the incoming Chairs will bring their enthusiasm and ideas to further that work. I also want to extend our appreciation to the two Panels of Experts for their contributions and to the Secretariat, especially the Subsidiary Organs Branch, for their invaluable assistance and depth of knowledge. I wish them all the best and assure them of Japan’s full cooperation from outside the Council.

I thank Ambassador Yamazaki for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ms. Gatt. Ms. Gatt: I would like to share Malta’s experiences and suggestions across the subsidiary bodies we chaired. First, regarding the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, over the past two years the Committee added three individuals and one entity to the sanctions list. Three individuals were delisted on the recommendation of the Ombudsperson. The relevance of the 1267 Committee remains high. The Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team’s valuable reporting shows the heightened risk assessment that many Member States are facing. However, one of the core tasks of the Committee — adopting new designations — has seen limited progress. While Malta believes in the proactive use of 1267 Committee sanctions, our experience shows both hesitation to use the sanctions regime and, at times, disagreement over which persons or entities may qualify for designation under the regime. After our two years as Chair, we find ourselves looking back to resolution 1566 (2004), which, at that time, established a working group of the Security Council, inter alia, to submit recommendations to the Council on practical measures to be imposed on individuals, groups or entities involved or associated with terrorist activities, other than those designated by the Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee, and the possibility of establishing an international fund to compensate the victims of terrorist acts and their families. The Monitoring Team’s engagement with the international community and its reports are useful, particularly as regards threat assessment. Perhaps an additional focus on sanctions implementation would be beneficial in order to emphasize the relevance of the reporting to the 1267 Committee and its sanctions mandate. If an investigative mandate is deemed necessary for that, it could be considered by Committee members. Malta believes that there is constructive work that can still be done in terms of countering terrorism through sanctions at the Security Council. Secondly, as Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, we have worked tirelessly, in close collaboration with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mrs. Virginia Gamba de Potgieter, and her Office. I extend my heartfelt thanks to them for their exceptional support over the past two years. I also express our gratitude to UNICEF, the Department of Peace Operations and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for their steadfast partnership and invaluable contributions. Grave violations against children in armed conflict have reached unprecedented levels. The escalating crises worldwide have shown a blatant disregard for children’s rights, including the fundamental right to life. The evolving nature, complexity and intensification of armed conflicts, combined with acute humanitarian crises and a persistent disregard for international law, have contributed to alarming increases in those violations. Against that sobering backdrop, Ambassador Frazier continued to build on the work of her predecessor, Ambassador Juul of Norway, with a focus on fostering unity and consensus within the Working Group. Since assuming the Chair in 2023, we have convened 18 formal meetings and numerous informal consultations to address a wide array of country-specific situations. Over the past two years, the Working Group has successfully adopted conclusions on 11 country files. Those accomplishments were made possible through the collective efforts and cooperation of all Council members. Our priority has been to build bridges and deliver strong, consensus-driven conclusions that can meaningfully improve the lives of the children affected by armed conflict. To enhance our engagement, we organized two field visits  — to Nigeria in July 2023 and Colombia in December 2024. In addition, we hosted round-table discussions with non-governmental organizations active in the children and armed conflict space and also facilitated informal meetings at our Mission to explore related issues. We are currently advancing the negotiation of a draft resolution on ensuring sustainable child- protection capacity, including during United Nations peace operation transitions. That initiative seeks to strengthen the children and armed conflict framework, address critical child-protection gaps, particularly in transitional contexts, and reinforce the Security Council’s commitment to upholding international peace and security. We remain unwavering in our dedication to that critical work and will continue to advance those efforts until the end of our term. I would like to conclude with some words on our role as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) on Iran. I sincerely thank the previous Facilitators for their outstanding work and the Secretariat for its constant and expert support. Malta has worked to the best of its abilities to facilitate dialogue aimed at supporting and improving the implementation of the resolution, including through meaningful engagement with all members and ensuring smooth proceedings regarding the procurement channel. In a challenging environment that is subject to complex regional dynamics, we have tried to maintain a neutral position over the past two years. We thank all Council members for their trust. We are mindful of the challenges that lie ahead in the coming year and wish the next Facilitator every success in the role. To that end, we call on all parties to make every effort to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and sincerely hope that an agreement can be found among the parties that successfully negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015.

I thank the Deputy Permanent Representative of Malta for her briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Afonso. Mr. Afonso: We are happy to note that Mozambique’s term as Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Security Council on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa is concluding under the highly successful presidency of the United States. We wish to pay tribute to Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield and her team for the attention and positive engagement that they have devoted to Africa and African issues. We extend our heartfelt gratitude to the Security Council Affairs Division and its Subsidiary Organs Branch for their unwavering support, expertise and collegiality throughout our term. In the two years during which we have chaired the Ad Hoc Working Group, Mozambique has sought to use that unique platform to strengthen the partnership between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. We have done so by amplifying Africa’s voice, fostering innovation, broadening the thematic scope of our discussions and deepening institutional relationships with our counterparts in the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. We have anchored our work in the precept of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and in the African Union Constitutive Act. The cornerstone principle of “African solutions for African challenges” was always present in our work. In doing so, we have followed in the footsteps of the other nations that have chaired the Africa-dedicated body of the Council. In that connection, I would like to acknowledge and pay tribute to the effective skill and pan-African zeal shown by my predecessor as Chair, Ambassador Kimani of Kenya, with whom we enjoyed and continue to enjoy an excellent relationship, including the exchange of advice. The Ad Hoc Working Group’s functionality hinges on cooperation among its members. We are deeply grateful for the exemplary collaboration we received from all members of the Security Council, both permanent and non-permanent. With the agreement of all members, the Ad Hoc Working Group expanded thematic discussions to address emerging challenges, such as climate, peace and security, youth, peace and security, and the future of peacekeeping on the continent. Those discussions highlighted the Ad Hoc Working Group’s responsiveness to Africa’s evolving peace and security landscape. Another strategic highlight of our chairship was our relentless focus on ensuring predictable, sustainable and flexible financing for African Union peace support operations, as a matter of high priority for the continent. As one of the remaining original penholders of resolution 2719 (2023), we have dedicated multiple meetings to the issue, including during our joint annual consultative meetings in Addis Ababa and New York in October 2023 and October 2024. By facilitating pre- and post-adoption discussions on resolution 2719 (2023), including with the wider membership, we hope to have played our part in shaping this critical instrument in both Councils’ toolboxes. We sincerely hope that those discussions will continue to inform the current and ongoing negotiations towards implementing the resolution’s first test case and that future Chairs of the Ad Hoc Working Group will remain seized of the matter. I would particularly like to highlight the convening of the seventeenth and eighteenth annual joint consultative meetings in Addis Ababa and New York. Early preparatory work and a clear definition of roles were critical to the success of those meetings, underscoring the importance of coordination in fostering unity. The adoption of joint communiqués during both meetings demonstrated that despite the differences in their mandates, the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council are capable of establishing a common language and shared strategic priorities. The communiqués not only articulated joint understandings but also served as reference instruments and agreed language for reinforcing a unified approach to tackling conflicts in Africa. At this stage, I would also like to commend the presidencies of the Council under which the consultative meetings were held in 2023 and 2024, Brazil and Switzerland, for their exemplary leadership and commitment to fostering collaboration. I want to highlight a few elements introduced during our chairmanship. For the first time in 2023, and subsequently in 2024, expert-level discussions between the two Councils were convened ahead of the annual joint consultative meetings. The meetings exemplify our efforts to deepen this critical partnership by creating space for dialogue and informed decision-making. Moreover, in 2024, under Switzerland’s presidency, an interactive format was introduced for the joint informal seminar, conducted as a retreat. That format permitted frank and in-depth discussions aimed at deepening the necessary trust and mutual understanding between the two Councils. Another example was the joint session of the Ad Hoc Working Group and the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, chaired by the Republic of Korea. That allowed us to break the silos that tend to characterize the work of subsidiary bodies. Such innovations ought to be further encouraged. As the Ad Hoc Working Group transitions to a new leadership under another African nation and new membership, we humbly offer suggestions on a few areas to be considered for improvement. First, informal mechanisms should be established to monitor the implementation of joint communiqués. Secondly, the implementation of resolution 2719 (2023) should be consolidated and engagement with the joint United Nations-AU task force should be continued. Thirdly, ambassadorial-level inter-Council engagements should be increased to build trust and deepen cooperation. Fourthly, innovative practices such as expert-level engagements, retreats and field visits should be included in the Ad Hoc Working Group’s standard operating procedures. Fifthly, the Ad Hoc Working Group’s programme of work should be focused on concrete efforts in the areas of conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution in Africa. Sixthly, the Ad Hoc Working Group section of the Security Council’s website should be improved to better serve member States and stakeholders. In conclusion, Mozambique would like to express its profound gratitude to all Council members, the United Nations, the African Union and its Permanent Observer Mission in New York, and the wider membership, for their collaboration and contributions, which were important to our work. Lastly, I thank my dedicated team, whose hard work and commitment have been the backbone of Mozambique’s efforts.

I thank Ambassador Afonso for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Montalvo Sosa.

As an elected member of the Security Council, Ecuador has had the privilege of chairing the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. During those two years, the 1988 Committee held meetings to discuss various issues, including the annual reports of the Monitoring Team, the situation in Afghanistan and the status of the arms situation in that country. The Committee plans to hold one more meeting on 23 December. Jointly with the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, in 2023 and 2024 we organized briefings open to the entire membership on the Committee’s activities and the sanctions regime imposed by resolution 1988 (2011). One of the Committee’s main tasks has been to deal with requests for exemptions to the travel ban for members of the Taliban on the sanctions list, which has not been amended. The Committee approved all the requests on the grounds that they contributed to peace and stability in Afghanistan, or on humanitarian grounds. However, unauthorized travel and late or incomplete requests are of concern, highlighting the importance of Member States adhering to the sanctions regime and following the Committee’s guidelines. I would also like to highlight the unanimous adoption of resolution 2763 (2024) this morning, which extended the mandate of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team for 14 months. Three years after the Taliban seized power, the situation in Afghanistan remains complex. In that context, it is vital that the sanctions regime continue to serve as an appropriate tool to counter threats and contribute to stability in Afghanistan. For that reason, I would like to present for the Council’s consideration some thoughts on the sanctions regime that could improve the effectiveness thereof. First, the political change that took place in Afghanistan has meant that elements of the relevant resolutions and the Committee’s guidelines may no longer be applicable. That state of affairs could undermine the implementation of the sanctions regime and affect its credibility. Secondly, it is likely that the reported violations of the travel ban are at least partially due to the fact that the requirements set out in the guidelines are difficult to meet. Furthermore, the lack of consensus among members on the periodic review of violations of the ban on a strictly factual basis hinders the Committee’s analysis and, consequently, the possibility of taking action. Thirdly, the Monitoring Team should devote more time and resources to monitoring the implementation of sanctions and reporting to the Committee on potential violators. In that regard, consideration could be given to reviewing the mandate of the Monitoring Team to provide it with strong authority to investigate violations of the sanctions regime, instead of simply collecting and collating information. Ecuador assumed the chairpersonship of the 1540 Committee following a complex process, which was marked by the coronavirus disease pandemic, in the context of the negotiation and adoption of the comprehensive review and resolution 2663 (2022). I acknowledge the work of the previous Chair of the Committee, whose efforts led to those two achievements that established the road map until 2032, which we have strengthened and promoted in these two years under the Ecuadorian mandate. Under the chairpersonship of Ecuador, several actions have been taken to strengthen the work of the Committee by promoting cooperation and dialogue with Member States and the implementation of the activities set forth in the programmes of work adopted for Ecuador’s two-year mandate. I emphasize that, prior to the adoption of the programme of work for 2023, the previous programme of work had been adopted in February 2020. With regard to progress and future challenges, I would like to highlight the organization of the Committee’s first open briefing on 9 October and of an informal interactive dialogue with Member States and international and regional organizations on 10 October. The Committee should convene open briefings in the coming years as part of its regular schedule of activities. It is recommended that those events continue to be held in October of each year. It is also very important that the training courses for the 1540 points of contact be reactivated. In 2024, two workshops were held, one for Africa and one for the Asia-Pacific region. Ecuador recommends that the Committee continue to co-organize those courses in other regions and/or formats, with the participation of all Committee members, and to discuss other alternatives to make full use of the network of points of contact, whose database was updated over the past two years. After more than a year of discussions and negotiations, the new model for the assistance mechanism was adopted. I thank all the members and the Group of Experts for their dedication to the review of that document, which was one of the priorities of the Ecuadorian chairpersonship. That mechanism is essential to ensure that the Committee is able to provide assistance to Member States in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in an efficient and effective manner. It is an evolving document and should be updated as necessary. I also underscore that the Committee discussed the first technical guidelines for voluntary use and a pilot project on possible activities related to paragraph 12 of resolution 2663 (2022) to support the implementation by all Member States of resolution 1540 (2004). I look forward to constructive discussions within the Committee and hope that those documents will be adopted soon. During its mandate, Ecuador has carried out three selection processes for candidates for the Group of Experts. That process took up a considerable amount of the Chair’s time. That should not be the case. With respect to the final process of electing candidates for three available vacancies, despite the efforts of this chairpersonship, it has not been possible to reach consensus thus far. Other instances of progress promoted by Ecuador can be found in the Committee’s annual reports. My delegation has worked actively and tirelessly with determination to guide the Committee, always striving to advance the effective implementation of this historic resolution. As I conclude this chairpersonship, I wish to assure the Council of Ecuador’s ongoing commitment to resolution 1540 (2004) and its readiness to continue contributing to a world in which weapons of mass destruction are kept out of the hands of non-State actors. As evidence of that, I am pleased to report that today my country, Ecuador, submitted to the Committee its first voluntary national action plan for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In conclusion, I would like to thank the members of the Committees for their active cooperation in the work of these two subsidiary bodies and for the professional and committed support provided by the respective secretariats. I also extend my deep appreciation to the 1988 Committee Monitoring Team, the 1540 Committee Group of Experts and the Office for Disarmament Affairs. Naturally, my main thanks go to the reduced number of diplomatic officials that make up the Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the United Nations for their professionalism.

I thank Ambassador Montalvo Sosa for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Baeriswyl.

During Switzerland’s term on the Security Council, I had the honour of chairing the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In that capacity, I had the pleasure of chairing more than 15 meetings in various formats, circulating 466 notes, signing 242 letters and approving, on behalf of the Committee, 48 requests for humanitarian exemptions to the sanctions measures. In that work, I have received exemplary support from the Secretariat team, to whom I would like to convey my warmest thanks through its Director, Ms. Claudia Banz. I would also like to thank the members of the Committee for their cooperation over the past two years. In addition, I would like to thank my team, hidden behind me now, for its sterling performance. Statistics such as those can bring some comfort to our assessment, and it seems clear that the most complex sanctions measures in force go hand in hand with a particularly delicate and heavy workload. At the same time, these figures should not mislead us about the growing global threat posed by the nuclear and ballistic weapons programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, global tensions and their deleterious impact not only on the smooth running of the Committee, but on the entire disarmament and arms control architecture. I would like to discuss three major challenges that the Committee has had to face and will have to overcome in the future if it is to fulfil the mandate conferred on it by the Council. The first concerns the inadequate implementation of sanctions measures and the contradictions that prevent the Committee from fulfilling one of its central functions, which is monitoring the situation. The veto of the renewal of the mandate of the 1718 Committee’s Panel of Experts (see S/PV.9591) is merely the clearest demonstration of that, as we have been unable to agree even on purely technical issues. If we truly want to maintain sanctions measures as an effective tool of the Council for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation, a wake-up call is needed. The continued unravelling of a system that has restricted access to the deadliest weapon ever developed for more than half a century is a serious dereliction of our duty to maintain international peace and security. Our ability to fulfil our responsibility to all Member States is at stake. Secondly, with the end of the Panel of Experts, which for 15 years supported the Committee in its work, we have lost a critical information and communication tool. Not only did the Panel’s expertise contribute constructively to our deliberations within the Committee, its reports also informed Member States and the public about the implementation of sanctions measures, their impact and the scope for adapting them to changing circumstances. While we have begun the task of tapping new sources of information with the support of Committee members, we are far from being able to make up for that loss. It seems clear to me that the most desirable solution is for the Council to invest the Panel of Experts with a new mandate, and indeed that is the only solution that can effectively support the implementation of the Committee’s mandate. In the meantime, the Committee will continue to depend on information provided by Member States and various organizations, individually or as part of groups, that will submit reports on violations of sanctions measures, as in the past. Stripped of their own Panel of Experts, the members of the Committee will have to analyse the reports received themselves. Thirdly, while the sanctions targeting the nuclear- weapons programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are the most comprehensive of the Council’s sanctions regimes, so too is the humanitarian exemption process. As the Council demonstrated again last week with its adoption of resolution 2761 (2024), Council sanctions are not adopted for use against civilian populations and are not intended to have a humanitarian impact. The 1718 Committee has accordingly never lost sight of the situation of the people of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. All requests for humanitarian exemptions submitted during our term of office have been approved under the fast-track procedures established by our predecessors. We also welcome the fact that the 1718 Committee was the first to update its procedures following the adoption of resolution 2664 (2022). Despite that, the extreme restrictions related to the pandemic put in place in the past few years by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have been a major obstacle to the delivery of international humanitarian assistance. While we welcome the opening of borders, that must go hand in hand with rapid, safe and unhindered access for humanitarian aid. To that end, permitting the entry of international personnel into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is vital. Disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation have always been a priority for the United Nations and the Security Council, and as part of the Pact for the Future, we have all committed to strengthening them and preventing any erosion of existing international norms. We must not fail in that effort. However, despite our own efforts and the support of many Committee members, efforts to relativize the situation have been particularly visible within the 1718 Committee, and I regret that we are leaving my successor a challenging legacy. I reaffirm, however, that my successor will not be alone in carrying out that task, as there is a clear will  — not only within the Council but also among Member States  — to find a political solution to the issue of the nuclear and ballistic-missile programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. To that end, however, the Council will have to break its silence on the issue. If it decides to do so, I firmly believe that the Council will find within the 1718 Committee the right place to achieve the goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula at peace. We must turn hope into concrete action.

I thank Ambassador Baeriswyl for her briefing. On behalf of the Security Council, I would like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to the outgoing Chairs for the manner in which they have discharged their important responsibilities on behalf of the Council.