A/1/PV.61 General Assembly

The first item on our agenda is the continuation of the discussion on the report of the First Committee on the application of Articles 27 and 109 of the Charter (annex 71). I call upon Mr. Romulo, representative of the Philippine Republic. . Mr. ROMULO (Philippine Republic): I listened intently this morning to the speeches made here . by the distinguished representatives of Cuba, the Sdviet Union,and the United States, and I rub my eyes, and wonder where I am. I listen) and yet cannot believe my ears. We who are gathered here, seeking to create conditions of everlasting peace, are working, prennent en consideration ees nombreuses propositions constructives dans l'etablissement de leurs methodes et de leurs procedures. . Pour tenniner, nous estimons que cette resolution est moderee et qu'elle exprime au mieux les vues d'une majorite ecrasante des Membres des Nations Unies. Nous esperons qu'elle sera approuvee par l'AssembIee. Nous souhaitons qu'elle sait appuyee par tous les Membres des Nations Unies, dans l'esprit dans lequel dIe nous est presentee, c.est-a.-dire comme etant une contribution eminente et veritable ala cause de I la paix internationale. La seance est levee a'14 h. 10. SOIXANTE ET UNIEME SEANCE PLENIERE .Tenue le vendredi 13 decembre 1946, t a16 heures. TAllLE DES MATIERES Pagel 172. Application de l'Article 27 de la Charte concernant .la procedure de vote au Conseil de scecurite. Convocation d'une conference generale des Membres des· Nations Unies, conformement a l'Article 109. Rapport de la Premiere Commission. Resolution (suite de la discussion) 1247 173. A. Approbation des accords de tutelle. B. EtabHssement du Conseil de tutelle; Rapport de la Quatrieme Commission. 1264 President: M. P.-H. SPAAK (Belgique). , 72~ Application de I'Article 27 de la Charte concernant Ja procedure de vote au Conseil de securite. Convocation d'une conference generaJe des Membres des Nations Unies, conformement Cl I'Article 109. Rapport de la Premiere Commission. ResoJution (document A/235) (suite de la discussion) Le PRESIDENT: Uordre du' jour appelle la suite de la discussion sur le rapport de la Premiere Commission relatif a l'application des Articles 27 et 109 de la Charte (annexe 71). Je donne la parole aM. Romulo, representant de la R:epubliqu~ des Philippines. M. ROMULO (Republique des Philippines) (traduit de l'anglais): C'est avec une attention soutenue que j'ai ecout,e, ce matin, les discours des. distingues representants de Cuba, de l'Union sovietique et des Etats-Unis. Je me frottms les yeux, en me demandant ou je pouvais . bien me trouver; j'ecoutais, et je ne pouvais en croire mes oreilles. Nous qui sommes l'cunis id pour chercher a etablir les conditions d'une paix pennanente, "We do not propose to tolerate a veto", said Senator Connally in the disarmament debate. He warned against subjecting the conduct of disarmament to the Security Council because that would mean, to quote his words, "the enthronement of the Security Council, where resides a very dangerous modem weapon, the veto, apt to explode on contact". Said the able Senator Connally: "How many p'eople would be in jail if they had the right of veto over the sheriffor the judge?" Yet, and this confuses and confounds the delegation from the youngest Republic of the world, the United States, while thus denouncing the veto, voted against all efforts to amend the Charter to do away with it. The United States was not content, in the Political Committee with merely voting against the Cuban proposal ~hich sought immediate revision of the Charter by calling a general conference under Article 109. The United States even voted against the mild Cuban proposal, seeking eventual revision of the Charter, by establishing a committee to study the Charter and to recommend amendments designed to make the United Nations amore effective instmment to maintain world peace and security. Senator Warren R. A!lstin, head of the United States .delegation, for wh?se ability and statesmanshIp I also have the highest admiration and whose poise and moderation have saved us ~any "11 n'est pas clans nos intentions de toUrer un droit de veto" a declare le senateur Connally, au cours du debat sur le desarmement. n a mis en garde contre le danger qu'il y aurait a confier la direction du desarmement au Conseil de securite parce que, seIon ses propres paroles, "ce serait donner des pGuvoirs souverains au ConseiI. de securite, organe dans lequel existe une arme moderne tres dangereuse, le veto, qui est susceptible d'exploser par simple contact';. Le scnatcur Connally, en homme averti, a ajoutc: "Combien de gens seraient en prison s'ils pouvaient exercer un droit de veto a l'egard du "sheriff" ou du juge?" Cependant, et ced me trouble et me deroute absolument, moi qui represente la plus jeune des Republiques du monde: tout en denon9ant le veto, les Etats-Unis repoussent par leur vote tous les efforts tentes pour modifier la Chatte de fac;on a supprimer celui-ci. Les Etats-Unis ne se sont pas contentes, au sein de la Commission des questions politiques, de voter contre la proposition cubaine tendant ala revision immediate de la Charte au moyen de la convocation d'une conference generale par application de l'Article 109. Les Etats-Unis ant illeme vote contre la proposition de caractere modcre presentee par la delegation cubaine qui tendait a une revision eventuelle de la.Charte, grace a la constitution d'une commission chargee d'ctudier la Charte et de recommander les amendements propres a faire de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en instrument plus efficace pour le maintien de la . paix et de la securite mondiales. Le senateur Warren R. Austin, chef de la delegation des Etats-Unis, dont j'adrnire aussi beaucoup la competence et les qualitcs d'homme d'Etat, et dont I'esprit d'equilibre et la modera- . I cannot understand this. How can the United States denollilce the veto one day, and defend the veto the next day? Cela, je ne peux pas le comprendre. Comment les Etats-Unis peuvent-ils denoncer le droit de veto un jour et le defendre le lendemain? 'Meanwhile, the United Kingdom, too, has made very plain its strong conviction that atomic bombs and other major weapons of mass destruction, together with the whole matt~r of disarmament, must be dealt with by an authority which is not hamstrung by the veto. There still rings in my ears the carefully calculated, forceful statement of Sir Hartley Shawcross, that famed lawyer of Great Britain, of the British delegation, who told us not many days ago that any plan for disarmament based in any way upon the veto privilege would be a "fraud, a delusiori, and a snare". At one point, let me remind you, a halt was called in the veto debate at the very wise suggestion of Mr. Parodi of France, a great statesman, and the Big Five met, in secret conclave, in the Waldorf-Astoria, to see if they could reach an agreement among themselves at least to be more moderate in the use of the veto in the Security Council. They failed. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who honours us with his presence today, emerged from that meeting to declare that the failure made it impossible for him to let the British people think that the Security Council can be the cornerstone of their future security. , Qu::tnt au Royaume-Uni il a, lui aussi, affirrne tres nettement sa ferme conviction que la question des bombes atomiques et des autres principaux engins de destruction massive, ainsi que tout le probleme du desarmement, doivent etre traites par une autorite qui n'ait pas les mains " liees par le veto. l'entends encore la declaration si mesuree et forrnuIee en des termes si convaincants de Sir Hartley Shawcross, cet i1lustre avocat, membre de la delegation britannique, qui nous a dit, il y a queIques jours a peine, que tout plaIl ,de desarmeIhent qui reposerait, de quelque fat;;on que ce flit, sur le droit de veto serait "un dol, une tromperie et un piege". Rappelez-vous qu'a un certain moment, les deliberations sur la question du veto ant ete suspendues, sur le conseil tres sage du grand homme d'Etat qu'est M. Parodi, ,representant de la France, et les representants des cinq grandes Puissances se sont reunis en seance secrete a I'Hotel Waldorf Astoria afin de chercher a se mettre d'accord pour exercer le droit de veto avec plus de moderation au Conseil de securite. Ils n'y' ont pas ,reussi. M. Ernest Bevin, Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres du Royaume-Dni, qui nous honore de sa presence aujourd'hui, a declare a l'issue de cette reunion qu'apres cet echec le peuple britannique ne pourrait plus croire que le Conseil de securite puisse etre la pierre angulaire de sa securite future. , Yet, and again this confuses and confounds me, the :United Kingdom, at the very same time, voted against all efforts to amend the Charter so as to eliminate the veto. The United Kingdom even voted against the Cuban proposal for the establishment of a committee to study the Charter. Mr. Noel-Baker an,d Sir Hartley Shawcross have joined in telling us that they think the Charter must remain unchanged, the same Charter that Mr. Bevin says cannot keep the peace. Cependant, et, cela aussi me trouble et me c1eroute, le Royaume-Uni a vote au meme moment contre toutes les propositions tendant a modifier la Charte en vue de supprimer le droit de veto. Le Royaume-Uni a meme vote contre la proposition de Cuba visant a creer un comite charge d'etudier la Charte. M. Noel-Baker et Sir Hartley Shawcross sont venus l'un et l'autre nous affirmer leur conviction que la Charte doit rester inchangee, cette meme Charte qui, de l'avis de M. Bevin, ne saurait assurer le maintien de la paix. Je n'arrive pas a comprendre cette attitude. Comment le Royaume-Uni peut-il, un Jour, denoncer le droit de veto et le defendre le lendemain? Le Royaume-Uni desire-t-ilune Charte capable de maintenir la paix DU tine Charte qui ne peut pas la maintenir? Ouant a rUnion sovietique, eUe a ega1ement affi7me tres nettement que seuls les organismes qui ne sont pas susceptibles d'etre paralyses par l'exercice du droit de veto, peuvent assurer d'une fat;;on efficace l'inspection et le controle de l'energie atomique, supprimer tous les principaux , I cannot understand this. How can the United Kingdom denounce the veto one day, and defend it the next day? Does the United Kingdom want a Charter that can keep the peace, or a Charter that cannot keep the peace? Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, too, has made plain its agreement that only agencies not hamstrung, by the veto can effectively carry on inspection and control of atomic energy, eliminate all major weapons. of mass destruction, and conduct disarmament. It is not yet entirely clear I Political Committee during the disarmament debate. In carefully measured words which the world will long remember, Mr. Molotov made it plain that the agency charged with disarmament should operate without the veto principle. He declared, "The control commissions are not the Security Council, and, therefore, there are no grounds whatsoever for saying that any Power making use of the right of veto will be in a position to obstruct the course of control." , Thus, Mr. Molotov joined Senator Connally and Sir Hartley Shawcross in admitting that the veto can be used to "obstruct". Mr. Molotov proceeded to work with Senator Connally, Sir Hartley Shawcross, and other members of the Disarmament Sub-Committee in the preparation of a resolution on the control of atomic energy, the elimination of major weapons of mass destruction, and general disarmament. Mr. Molotov joined in voting that this disarm:ament resolution should bar the veto from the control commissions to be established for these purposes. y ~t I am once more confused and confounded by the fact that the Soviet Union, too, at the very same time, voted against all efforts to amend the Charter to do away with the veto. The Soviet Union even voted against the Cuban proposal for the establishment of a committee to :;tudy the Charter. We have all heard the stem remarks of Mr. Molotov, Mr. Vyshinsky and Mr: .Gromyko concerning all suggestions for reVISIon of the Charter. I cannot understand all this. Why this incon- . sistency? Why these contradictions? There can be but one explanation, and that explanation must be the following: the Americans and the British, yes, and the Russians too, are beginning to see that the veto is a "Frankenstein." They are beginning to understand that it prevents all practical results in the United Nations, that it therefore endangers the fate of all mankind. They are being driven, despite themselves, to the realization that, in such life-and-death matters as the control of our modern weapons, there can be no veto. . How, then, can the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Umon oppose all qu'il ne devrait pas y avoir de droit de.veto qui puisse soustraire aux sanctions les coupables qui seraient pris en flagrant delit de contravention volontaire aux regles du desarmement. Toutefois, le fait que rUnion sovietique est pleinement consciente des dangers que presente le droit de veto est .apparu nettement lorsque son eminent Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, M. Molotov, a fait sa declaration historique a la Commission des questions politiques au cours du debat sur le desarmement. En termes soigneusement mesures que le monde n'oubliera pas, M. Molotov a affirme que l'organisme qui serait charge de veiller au desarmement devrait Jonctionner sans que le droit de veto s'exerce. Il a declare: "Les Commissions de controle ne sont pas le Conseil de securite; il n'y a donc aucune raison de dire que toute Puissance exerc;ant son droit de veto aurait la possibilite de faire de l'obstruction aux mesures de contrale." C'est ainsi que M. Molotov s'est associe au senateur Connally et a Sir Hartley Shawcross pour reconnaitre que le veto peut ~tre utilise pour "faire de l'obstruction". M. Molotov a entrepris, de concert avec le senateur ConnaUy, Sir Hardey Shawcross et d'autres membres de la Sous-Conunission du desarmement, de prepareI' une resolution concernant le contr61e de l'energie atomique, la suppression des principaux ' engins de destruction m;lSSive et le desarmement general. M. Molotov, a marque par son vote que cette resolution relative au desarmement devrait exclme l'exercice du droit de veto dans les commissions de controle qui devront etre creees aces fins. . Cependant, je suis de nouveau trouble et deroute par le fait que l'Union sovi~tique a vote, au meme moment, contre tous les efforts tendant amodifier la Charte dans le aens d'une suppression du droit de veto. L'Union sovietique a meme vote contre la proposition de Cuba visant a creel' un comite charge d'etudier la Charte. Nous avons tous entendu les observations 'severes de M. Molotov,. de M. Vychinsky et deMo Gromyko concernant toutes les propositions relatives a une revision de la Charte. Je ne comprends rien a tout cela. Pourquoi cet illogisme, pourquoi ces contradictions? nne saurait y avoir qu'une seule explication, et cette explication est la suivante: les Americains, les Britanniques, et les Russes eux-m~mes corn· mencent a comprendre que le droit de veto est un monstre, un "Frankenstein". Ils commen· cent a comprendre que ce privilege ernpecher.a les Nations Unies d'arriver a un resultat pratique quekonque, et que ce privilege, par con~e. quent, met en danger le sort du genre hummn. lIs sont amenes, malgn~ eux, ase rendre compte que, dans des questions vitales comme lecontrole des armes modernes, il ne saurait y avoir de droit· de veto. Comment done expliquer que les Etats-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et rUnion sov.ietique s'opposent I assert that we who assail the veto are the, realists. I assert that, whatever the reason, whatever the motive, the present policy of the Big Five in opposing efforts to eliminate the veto amounts to a refusal to admit a vast mistake while at the same time, it seeks to avoid the consequences of that mistake, that cardinal sin. Is this' fair to the United' Nations? Is this fair to the people of the ~orld? The Soviet Union proposals are not yet entirely clear, but it is now plain that th: American and the British are, in effect, proposmg that, for the control of atomic energy and for the endorsement. of disarmament, we establish, by separate treaties and covenants, new organs more or less independent ofthe United Nations as we now know it. They thus propose the creation of new organs to deal with problems they deem too important to be dealt with by the United Nations as now constructed. If we adopt this policy, we shall be doing our United Nations to death. If we do this, we shall leave only a shell, a shell to deal with mere trivia. This shell will bear a marked resemblance to the League of Nations, famed for its achievements in such matters as the prevention of international narcotic smuggling, and notorious for its failure to prevent world war. . Is this to be the fate of the great effort of the people of the world, who sent their representatives to San Francisco with a mandate to create a body capable of keeping the peace for all time? Why do we not admit the plain fact,. a fact now known to the peoples of the. wodd, but a fact which we who are gathered here nonetheless seem so anxious' to conceal, the fact that the United Nations, as now constructed, is incapable of freeing mankind from the scourge of war? Why do we not admit the plain fact that the Soviet Union, h10st steadfast of all in its opposition to efforts to eliminate the veto in the Security Council, has a valid reason for that opposition? We all know that the Soviet Union is in a hopeless minority in the United Nations as presently constructed, a minority out of all proportion to the real power and influence of the Soviet Union in the modern world. 'We all Les propositions de l'Union sovietique ne sont pas encore entierement precisees; mais il est desormais evident que les Americains et les Britanniques proposent en fait que, pour le controle de l'energie atomique et pour la realisation du desarmement, nous etablissons, au 'moyen de traites et d'accords separes, des organes nouveaux et plus ou moins independants de l'Organisation des Nations Unies telle qu'elle existe actuellement. !ls proposent ainsi la creation de nouveaux organismes pour traiter des probU:mes qu'ils jugent trap importants pour etre traites par l'Organisation des Nations Unies sous sa forme actueIle. Si nous adoptons cette politique, nous porterons un coup mortel a cette Organisation. ' Si nous faisons cela, il ne reetera de notre Organisation qu'une coquille vide, une coquille que ne servira plus que pour les taches insignifiantes. Oette coquille ressemblera beaucoup a la Societe des Nations, cette institution qui est renommee pour les resultats qu'elle a obtenus en des domaines comme celui de la repression de la contrebande internationale des stupefiants, et qui est non moins celebre pour son incapacite a empech~r la guerre mondiale. Est-ce a ce1a que doit aboutir le grand effort des peuples du monde qui ont envoye a San- Francisco leurs representants en leur donnant le mandat de creer un organisme capable de maintenir la paix pour toujours? Pourql1oi n'admettons-nous pas un fait evident, un fait que les peuples du'monde connaissent, mais qu'ici pourtant nous paraissons soucieux de cacher: le fait que les Nations Unies telles qu'eBes sont actuellement organisees sont incapables de liberer l'humanite du £leau de la guerre? Pourquoi, malgre l'evidence, n'admettonsnous pas que l'Union sovietique, la nation la plus opiniatrement opposee aux efforts faits pour supprimer le veto au Conseil de securite, a un motif valable d'adopter une telle attitude? Nous savons tous que, dans l'Organisation des Nations Unies, teBe qu'elle est actuellement constituee, l'Union sovietique fait partie de la minorite, sans espoir cl'en sortir, situation qui ne correspond We speak here of realism. We are expected to think, to plan, to act here in a realis~ic w?,y. Is it realistic to believe that, at any tune m the foreseeable future, the Soviet Union will be willing to grant real power to a veto-free Security Council? The Soviet Union cannot do so as long as we proceed on the absurd, anachronistic, undemocratic "one-vote-per-nation" rule. Actually, none of the Big Five will be willing to grant authority to any international body upon which all nations are represented as long as the vote of the greatest nation is no more important and powerful than that of the smallest nation. The idea of giving all nations an equal vote sounds decent and democratic, but it is not. It gives the 125,000 people of one Iilf the newest Members of the United Nations, Iceland, for example, equal representationwith 140,000,000 Americans and with 450,000,000 Chinese. It gives each citizen of Iceland. a voting power equal to 1,120 American citizens and to 3,600 Chinese citizens. Under this incredible system, it is of course necessary for the great nations to have a veto. The veto simply empowers them to overrule any decision reached on the basis of this utterly absurd system of representation. It seems to be the general opinion that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a Communist nation, the United Kingdom is now a socialist nation ~nd the United States of America . a capitalist nation. Yet I am led to wonder about the differences between these three greatest nations of the world when, facing the greatest problem of our time, I see all three united in resisting change, all three united in the conservative position that the United Nations Charter is not to be touched, not to be modified, not to be amended. .,. . . I only represent a very young 'country but it IS a couJ;1try that has been devastated by war' it has been a victim of terrorism and atrocities: May I ~ppeal especially to the representatives of the Umted States and the United Kingdom' h~w. is it possible for you to oppose efforts t~ elimmate the veto from the Charter and at t~e same time to advocate plans de;igned to CIrcumvent the Security Council because you know . ~at the. veto throttles the Security Council. How IS it possible for you to advoca,te these plans, plans which are virtually certal~ to hur~ the prestige and authority of the Umted NatIOns, while at the ~ame time profa~on realiste. Est-ce faire preuve de realisme que de croire qu'a. un moment quelconque de 1'avenir previsible, 1'Union sovietique acceptera de conferer une autorite reelle a un Conseil de securite depourvu du droit de veto? L'Union sovietique ne peut pas le faire aussi longtemps que nous maintiendrons la regIe absurde, anachronique et antidemocratique selon' laque11e chacune des nations ne dispose que d'une voix. En fait, aucune des cinq grandes Puissanccs ne sera disposee :\ accorder des pouvoirs :\ un organisme international quelconque dans lequel tous les pays sont representes, tant que le vote du pays le plus grand n'a pas plus de poids ni plus d'effet que celui du pays le plus petit. Le principe selon lequel tous les pays ont un vote egal semble convenable et democratique, mais i1 ne rest pas. Ce principe donne, par exemple, aux 125.000 habitants de run des plus recents Membres des Nations Unies, l'Islande, une representation egale :\ celle dont jouissent 140 millions d'Americains ou a celle de 450 millions de Chinois. I1 donne a chaque citoyen de l'Islande une puissance en matiere de vote egale acelle de 1.120 Amcricains ou de 3.600 Chinois. Avec ce systeme incroyable, il faut evidemment que 1(:s grandes Puissances possedent un droit de veto. Ce veto leuT donne simplement le pouvoir de passer outre :\ toute decision prise selon ce systeme de representation completement absurde. On ~dmet generalement, semble-t-il, que l'Union sovietique est une nation communiste, que le Royaume-Uni est maintenant une nation socialiste et que les Etats-Unis sont une nation capitaliste. Et cependant, j'en arrive a me demander quelles sont au juste les differences entre ces trois plus grandes nations du monde, Iquand, en face du plus grand probleme de notre temps, je les vois toutes les trois unies pour s'opposer a un changement, unies toutes les trois dans la position conservatrice qui consiste asoutenir que 1'on ne doit pas toucher a la Charte des Nations Unies, et qu'elle ne doit etre ni modifiee ni amendee. ~e represente un pays encore tres jeunc; mais qUl. a 6te devastc par la guerre, qui a 6te en prOle au terrorisme et aux atrocites. Puis-je poser, particuIierement aux representants des Etats-Unis et du Royaumc-Uni cettc question: comment pouvez-vous vqus opposer aux efforts deployes pour supprimer le droit de veto de la Cha.rte, ~t en mcme temps preconiser des projcts destmes a agir en dehors du Conseil de securite parce .que vous Savez que le veto bloque cc Co~sel1? ~omment -pouvez-vous preconiser ces proJets qUI. ne peuvent manquer de compromettre vutuellement le prestige et 1'autorite de 1'Organisation des Nations Unies et) en meme However, we are convinced that the Assembly should have adopted the Cuban proposal for the revision of the Charter. And now, fellow representatives, I implore you to heed the cry of the people of the world for lasting peace. I beg you to face the facts endangering the life of our United Nations and all Our hopes for peace and human dignity. I beg you at least to launch a study for the purpose of detennining how the Charter can be strengthened. Certainly the mankind capable of producing the atom bomb is capable of devising a voting fonnula giving to each nation of the world a power and influence, within the United Nations, proportionate to its power and influence outside the United Nations. Once such voting power has been devised, the way will be open for endowing the United Nations with powers sufficient to prevent war: powers transfonning the United Nations into something that can maintain and establish peace for us. Once we have done this, we shall be able to use the United Nations Charter itself as the great instrument to achieve disarmament and security instead of by-passing the Charter and creating new organs and commissions independent of the United Nations. One more sentence: I implore you, my fellow representatives, let us take this Australia~ resolution as only the first step towards the study of the Charter; let .us take this first great step along the road to everlasting peace, the road leading to amending the Charter, constantly by-passed, before the United Nations becomes a hollow shell and the peace of the world an empty dream.

I call upon Mr. Slavik, representative of Czechoslovakia. Mr. SLAVIK (Czechoslovakia): The Czechoslovak delegation has clearly stated in the Committee its conviction on the question of the socalled veto and has opposed all the proposals the aim of which was to weaken or eliminate, . directly or indirectly, the principle of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council. . . The arguments of the honourable' representative of Australia in this discussion have not caused me to change my opinion; in particular, Le PRESIDENT: Je donne la parole a M. Slavik, representant de la TcMcoslovaquie. M. SLAVIK (Tchecosl~vaquie) (traduit de l'anglais): La delegation tchecoslovaque a c1airement exprime son opinion au sein de la Premiere Commission sur la question du veto; elle s'est opposee a toutes les propositions tendant a affaiblir ou a ecarter directement ou indirectement le principe de l'unanimite des membres permanents du Conseil de securite. Les arguments presentes par l'honorable representant de l'A1;lstralie au cours ~~ la discussion n'ont pas faIt changeI' ma poSItIon. En The very convincing speech of Mr. Vyshinsky before this Assembly, and especially the first general and historical part of his arguments should be studieci very intently indeed, and should be met with understanding. Mr. Vyshinsky convinced me, and I hope all the present members of this Assembly, that unanimity can and should be reached by the United Nations on aB importa.nt problems. That is sometimes, I agree, not very easy, but we have had in this very Assembly some experiences and examples which prove that patience and goodwill can lead to great results. The principle of unanimity means, I am sincerely convinced, an optimistic outlook towards the future complete success of our Organization i it can eliminate mistrust and suspicion in the Organization of the United Nations, and, last but not least, only the unanimity principle can strengthen the authority and power of the United Nations Organization and of the Security Council, in order to help them to achieve the great task which the democratic and peaceloving world opinion expects of them. The declaration of the Chairman of the United States delegation was a clearly fonnulated support of the'principle of unanimity. As to the analysis by Senator Austin, .. whom I respect very sincerely, of the proposed resolution, I would remark only that we are not opposed to the wording of the resolution, but rather to the background, to the tendencies and expectations behind the harmless sentences, which expectations and tendencies were demonstrated so clearly in the vigorous and colourful speech of the Philippine representative who spoke just before me. I am not confused, as the Chairman of the Philippine delegation declared himself to be. r am representing a small nation, as my prede- ~essor on the rostrum, but I realize very clearly mdeed that our security and our very independence depend on a unanimol1s understanding and sincere collaboration on the part of our cesseur a cette tribune, le representant des Philippines, a revelees de fa90n lumineuse. Dans mon esprit, il n'y a pas cette cpnfusion que l'honorable president de la delegation des Philippines a declare eprouver. Comme lui, je represente un petit pays, mais je me rends compte tres nettement que l'entente parfaite et la collaboration sincere de nos grands et puissants allies sont la condition merne de notre Pour ces raisons, la delegation tchecoslovaque ne peut voter en faveurde la resolution proposee par la delegation australienne et qui a ete approuvee par la majorite des membres de la Premiere Commission. Nous estimons que l'As- The Czechoslovak delegation cannot vote, therefore, for the resolution proposed by Australia and approved by the majority of the First Committee. It is of the opinion that the Assembly should have been in a position to vote on the Chinese proposal, which could and should be agreed upon by all the permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council, and by all the members of this Assembly. semblee allrait du pouvoir voter sur la proposition chinoise, laquelle aurait pu et aurait du recevoir l'accord de tous les membres, permanents ou non, du Conseil de securite, ainsi que l'accord de tous les representants reunis dans cette salle. Je regrette que la proposition chinoise n'ait pas ete presentee a l'Assemblee generale car je suis convaincu que seule une decision dans ce sens, prise a l'unanimite par l'Assemblee, serait capable d'attenuer les difficultes qui se produisent dans l'application de l'Article 27 et d'assurer un fonctionnement rapide et efficace du Conseil de securite. I regret that the Chinese proposal was not moved in the plenary meeting, because I am conyinced that only such a unanimous decision of the General Assembly could reduce the difficulties in the application of Article 27, and ensure the prompt and effective exercise by the . Security Council of its functions. Le PRESIDENT: Je donne la parole a" M. Martin, representant du Canada.

I call upon Mr. Martin, representative of Canada. M. MARTIN (Canada) (traduit de l'anglair) : La delegation du Canada appuie sans reserve la resolution concernant la procedure de vote au sein du Conseil de securite, qui est soumise a l'AssembIee. Cette resolution coincide entierement avec les vues que la delegation du Canada a exposees depuis le· debut de la presente session de l'Assemblee. Au cours de la seance d'ouverture, le 29 octobre, mon collegue, le president de la delegation canadienne, a declare: Mr. MARTIN (Canada): The Canadian delegation gives its full support to the resolution before the Assembly on voting procedure in the Security Council. This resolution is in entire accord with the views which the Canadian delegation has put forward from the very beginning of this Assembly. In the opening debate, on 29 October, my colleague, the Chairman of the Canadian delegation, said.: "We agree that now is not the time to try to amend the Charter. But we also say that now is the time for the Assembly to make practical recommendations on how, within the framework of the Charter as it is, the Security Council can more effectively discharge the vital functions so confidently entrusted to it by the Members of the United Nations". "Nous convenons que ce n'est pas maintenant le moment de tenter d'amender la Charte. Mais nous pensons cgalement que le moment est venu pour l'Assemblee de faire des propositions pratiques sur la maniere dont le Conseil de securite, dans le cadre de la Charte teIle qu'eIle est, pourra s'acquitter d'une fa<;on plus efficace des fonctions essentielIes qui lui ont cte devolues .avec tant de confiance par tous les Membres des Nations Unies." Le 16 novembre, a la Premiere Commission, le representant du Canada a expose nos vues au sujet des reformes que le Conseil de securite pourrait introduire dans ses methodes et sa procedure en matiere de reglement pacifique des differends. 11 ne l'a pas fait dans l'intention de ranimer les controverses passees concernant In the First Committee, on 16 November, the Canadian representative set forth our views on the reforms which the Security 'Council might adopt in its practices and procedures on pacific settlement. He did so not with any desire to :,ake over coals of past controversy about the veto or about the operations of the Security In the unsettled state of the world, which is the inevitable aftermath of the war, situations or disputes may be expected to arise where it would be important that the Security Council should be capable of taking prompt and effective. action for the maintenance of peace and secunty. In such circumstances we would all like to feel that the Council would be ready and able to take effective action promptly and not after a dispute or a source of friction had been fanned into a conflagration; that it would not have to wait until it became necessary to resort to force, or until men, desperate from the frustration of waiting for a decision, had taken whatever action they thought apt to serve their own interests. In order that the. views expressed by the Canadian delegation in its statement of 16 November to the First Committee should be embodied in the permanent records of this Assembly, our delegation, on 30 November, put in the form of a memoranduml the views which it had expressed on the steps which the Security Council might take to improve its practices and procedures on pacific settlement.. I am glad to note that this memorandum is referred to specifically in the Rapporteur's report.2 I shall not now, at this late stage in our work, take up the time of this Assembly by attempting even to summarize Canada's eight-point programme for .dealing with this problem. All I shall do now is to express the earnest hope of the Canadian delegation that the Security Council will, in the very near future, give serious consideration to this eight-point programme which, I am convinced, expresses the views of almost all the Members of the United Nations. By Article 24: of the Charter the Members of the United Nations solemnly conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. They agreed that, in carrying out this responsibility, the Security Council acts on their behalf. In conferring this responsibility on the Security Council, the Members of the United Nations which are not members of the Council undertook heavy obligations. We stand ready to fulfil those obligations. We ask that the Security Council demonstrate. to us that it in its turn, is, ready to carry out the obligation~ to all 1 Document A/C.l/91. • See page '" circonstances, le Conseil de securite sera pret a agir et qu'il sera capable de le faire rapidement et efficacement, avant que le differend ou l~ situation pouvant eI1trainer un desaccord alt degenere en un~ conflagration; autrex:rent di~, nous voudrions ctre surs que le Consetl ne SOlt .pas oblige d'attendre jusqu'a ce qu'il devienne necessaire de recourir a la force ou que, las d'attendre une decision, les hornmes entrepr~ nent telle action qui leur semble de nature a servir leurs propres interets. Afin que I'opinion exprimee par la delegation canadienne, dans sa declaration du 16 novembre ala Premiere Commission, figure dans lcs documents officiels de la presente session de I"AssembIee, notre deJegation a presente, le 30 novembre, sous forme d'une memorandum1 ses VUe! sur les mesures que le Conseil de securite pourrait prendre pour ameliorer ses methodes et sa procedure en matiere de reglement padfique des differends. Je suis heureux de constater que le rapport 2 du Rapporteur fait etat de ce memorandum. Pour epargner le temps de l'Assernbtee, je n'essaierai pas, ace stade avanee de nos travaux, de resumer meme brievement les huit points du programme propose par la delegation cana~ dienne pour traiter ce probleme. Je me contentetai d'exprimer le fenne espoir de la delegation canadienne que le Conseil de secunte pourra, dans un avenir tres rapprocM, examiner serieusement cc programme en huit points qui exprime, fen suis persuade, les vues de la presque totalite des Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Par l'Article 24: de la Charte, les Membres des Nations Unies ont solennellement conIere au Co~s~l de securite.la responsabilite pnncipale du matntIen de la palX et de la securite internationales.. ~ls ant reconnu qu'en s'acquittant de cette lll1SS10n le Conseil de securite agirait en leur nom. E~ c~nferant cette responsabilite au Conseil de secunte, les Membres des Nations Unies qui ne font pas partie de ce conseil ant assume de lour~es obligations. Nous sommes prets a nous acquItter -de ces obligations. Toutefois, DOUS demandons que le Conseil de securite nous demontre qu'il est dispose a son tour a remplir , , , :Do~ument A/C.1/91. VOIr page... These obligations to all the Members of the United Nations rest on the Security Council as a whole and on its members individually. The Charter has imposed on each individual member of the Security Council, pennanent and nonpermanent, the obligation to exercise its rights and responsibilities as a member of the Council, not in defence of its own special national interests, but in defence of th'e interests of the United Nations as a whole. This applies to the votes which a member casts in the Security Council as well as to its other actions in the Council. The special voting position in the Security Council of its permanent members imposes on China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America special responsibilities, since failure by ap.y one of them to agree with certain decisions supported by the requiSite num· ber of the Council can prevent the Council from exercising its functions as the supreme agency of international conciliation. In view of these special responsibilities, each one of the pennanent members is under an obligation to all the other Members bf the United Nations not to use its special voting position to obstruct, the work of the Council. The· resolution before us is couched in the traditional diplomatic language of understatement. It clearly means, however, that we, the members of this Assembly, believe that the Security Council has yet to demonstrate that it is capable of doing the job the United Nations has a right to expect of it, and which, I believe, is expected of it by the people of the world.

I call upon Mr. Wellington Koo, representative of China, Mr. Wellington Koo (China): I am not going to make a long speech, but I wish to state briefly the attitude of the Chinese delegation toward the report and the draft resolution on the application of Article 27 of the Charter. You will recall, I am sure, that in the statement which I made in this Assembly, I explained the general attitude of China toward the unanimity rule. My Government does not feel itself wedded inalterably to the unanimity rule. We made it clear that if a formula could be found which.would be generally acceptable, we would be willing to waive that rule. But, evidently,. that moment has not yet come cord peut empecher le Conseil d'exerc,er ses fonctions d'organe supr~e de conciliation internationale. En raison de ccs responsabilites particulieres, chacun des membres pennanents du Conseil est, vis-a.-vis des autres Membres des Nations Unies, dans l'obligation de ne pas faire usage de ses droits speciaux en matiere de vote pour entraver les travaux du Conseil. La resolution soumise a l'Assemblee est con~ue dans le langage attenue, qui est de tradition dans la diplomatie. Elle signifie cependant tres c1airement que les Membres de l'Assemblee sont convaincus que le Conseil de securite a encore a donner la p.reuve qu'il est capable d'executer la tache dont les Nations Unies et, j'en suis persuade, taus les peuples du monde comptent qu'il doit s'acquitter. Le llREsIDENT: Je donne la parole a M. Koo, representant de la Chine. , M. Koo (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): Je n'ai pas l'intention de prononcer un long discours; je veux seulement faire une breve declaration sur l'attitude de la delegation chinoise a l'egard du rapport et du projet de 'resolution relatifs a. l'application de l'Article 27 de la Charte. Les Membres de l'Assemblee n'ont certainement pas oublie la/declaration dans laquelle j'ai . expose queTIe etait, d'une maniere generale, l'attitude de la Chine en ce qui concerne la regIe de l'unanimite. Le Gouvernement chinois n'est pas irnmuablement attache acette regIe. Nous avons clairement indique que, s'U etait possible de trouver une forrnule acceptable d'une maniere generale, nollS serions prets arenoncer al'appli- So, the question before us is one of the. application of the voting procedure, the apphcatIOn of Article 27. That is really the issue which we now face. In the First Committee, when the debate took place on this question, we made it clear that the smooth functioning of the Security Council depended a great deal upon the voting procedure and that in the light of past experience, and in the general desire to improve the future functioning of the Security Council, every effort should be made to bring about improvement. We also made it clear that there was room for improvement as regards the voting procedure in the Security Council. More than that, we brought forward certain concrete suggestions, not only in the First Committee, but also in the consultations which took place amongst the permanent members, and which were held at the initiative of the United Kingdom delegation. Unfortunately, those consultations were fruitless. When the question was taken up in the First Committee, several resolutions were proposed, including one by the Australian delegation and one by the Soviet delegation. So far as their substance was concerned, they appeared to us ' to differ only in degree. It seemed to us that the underlying intention was much the same. The Australian proposal was much more concrete and explicit; the Soviet Union proposal was more implicit. Those proposals were later referred to a sub-committee with a view to conciliating them. A prolonged debate took place, but the two points of view could not be brought closer together. And so, the Chinese delegation tried to bring about a compromise proposal. The method of approach of the Chinese delegation was to take both proposals, the Australian and the Soviet proposals, and try to combine them into one on the basis of agreed points. Thus the Australian text said that. there should be ar:. early adoption of the practices and procedures in order to reduce, ~ifficu1ties .in the .working o~ the Security Council, the SOVIet UnIOn resolution said that we. sho~ld take into account the experience ?,amed ill the working of the Security Council ill the pa:t few months. But it Was found difficult to brIng the two points of view into agreement. We suggested a compromise proposal in the hope of striking a middle ground between the ~wo proposals, incorporating, for example, the fIrst paragraph of the Soviet Union proposal and the ess~nce of the third and the fourth of the Australian proposal in the hope that that would be found acceptable to both delega'ti'ons. Lorsque la question a ete abordee a. la Premiere Commission, plusieurs propositions avaient cte pr.esentees, dont une par la delegation aus~ra.henne, et une autre par la delegation sov.letIque. I1 nous a semble que, pour ce qui etalt du fond de ces propositions, les differences qu'elles presentaient ne portaient que Sur des nuances; l'intention qui etait a leur base paraissait la.meme; ~a proposition de la dc%~gation austrahenne etalt plus concrete et plus explicite; celle de la delegatIon de l'Union sovietique avait un caractere plus implicite. Ces propositions ont ete renvoyees ulterieurement a une souscommission, qui etait chargee de les eoneilier. ~ette sous-commission les a longuement discutees, sans pourtant reussir a les rapprocher davantage. La delegati?n chinoise a done essaye de trouver une solutIOn transactionnelle. Sa methode a consiste a prendre la proposition australienne et la proposition sovietique et a s'efforcer de les fondr~ en un texte unique ayant comme base l~ ~oillts sur lesquels l'accord avait ete realise. ~nsI, .la proposition australienne preconisait I adoptIon, abref delai, de methodes et de regles de procedure propres a reduire les difficultes auxqu,elles se heurte le fonctionnement du CO?S~I1 de securitc; la proposition de l'Union s,ovIe~19ue portait. qu'il fallait tenir compte de I expenen,ce acqUlse quant au fonctionnement du Co.nsel~ ~u <;o~r:s de ces derniers rnois. Cependant, il a ete dlfflcI1e de concilier les deux points de vue.. Nous a:rons presente une proposition tran~actIOnne1le Vlsant a offrir un moyen terme conslstant a joindre, par exemple, le premier paragrap~e du texte sovietique a la substance des deUXleme, troisieme et quatrieme paragraphes du texte australien, dans l'espoir que cette f?rmule serait acceptable pour les deux delegatIOns. Since our efforts have failed, we have no intention of moving the Chinese resolution again, although if it is moved by some other delegation we are, of course, prepared to support it. But we ourselves do not wish to put it forward again since it has been rejected in the First Committee, and we feel that the role of the conciliator, after all, is not an easy one. But let me say a word as to why we tried to make that effort. We believe that, in trying to bring about some concrete result on this question, three steps are necessary: (1) We must have a full, frank and comprehensive debate expressing our views as to the working of the Security Council in the past and in what way the function of the Security Council could be improved upon in the future. We have had this debate both here in the Assembly, and also in the First Committee as well as in the Sub-Committee. (2) The second step is for the General Assembly to consider what resolution to adopt. (3) The third step is, after the adoption of a resolution, for the Security Council to take action with a view to implementing the resolution of the General Assembly by examining the question of the Council's functioning, to determine the ways in which the working of the Security Council, with special reference to its voting practice, could be improved upon. Those are the three steps which we must take in order that our efforts in the debate on this question may bring about some concr~te results. Now we are faced with the second step; in other words, that of trying to pass a resolution. It seems to the Chinese delegation that what matters most in our resolution is not that we should insist upon any particular point, but·that we should adopt a resolution which would be acceptable generally, and especially to all the members of the Security Council, because you will. recall that, while under Article 10 of the Charter, the General Assembly has the right to tique, polonaise, fran~aise et hindoue qui avaient toutes presente des amendements ont retire !eurs propositions ou amendements, en faveur de la proposition chinoise. Toutefois, nous n'avons pu convaincre les autres delegations et, lorsque le moment est venu de mettre au:){ voix les propositions australienne et chinoise, la proposition chinoise a ete ecartee, tant a la Sous-Commission qu'a la Premiere Commission; notre proposition a ete repoussee par vingtquatre voix contre treize a la Premiere Commission. Nos efforts ayant ecboue, nous n'avons pas l'intention de presenter de nouveau le projet de resolution de la delegation chinoise; toutefois, si quelque autre delegation reprenait ce projet pour son compte, nous serions prets al'appuyer; mais nous ne voulons pas le presenter de nouveau nous-memes puisqu'il a ete repousse par la Premiere Commission et que nous n'avons pas trouve, en fin de compte, que le role de conciliateur soit facile. Qu'il me soit cependant permis de dire pourquoi nous avons fait cette tentative. Nous estimons que pour aboutir a un resultat positif en cette matiere, it est necessaire de proceder en trois etapes: 1) Vne discussion franche, complete, embrassant tous les aspects de la question, au cours de laquelle noUB fenons connaitre nos vues relativement al'activite passee du Conseil de securite et ala maniere dont nous estimons que son fonctionnement pourrait etre ame- Hore a I'avenir. Cette discussion, nous l'avons eue ici, aI'Assemblce; nous l'avons eue egalement ala Premiere Commission et ala Sous- Commission. 2) Le choix, par I'Assernblee generale, de la resolution qu'eIle adoptera. 3) Apres l'adoption de la resolution par l'Assemblee, le Conseil de securite prendrait des mesures pour mettre cette resolution a execution en exarninant la question du fonctionnement de ce ConseiI en vue de determiner comment on pourrait .ameliorer ce fonctionnement, .en particulier la methode de vote. Telles sont les trois etapes qu'il faut franchir pour que, des efforts que nous deployons dans la discussion de la question, puisse sortir quelque chose de positif. Nons abordons maintenant la deuxieme etape: autrement dit, il faut nous efforcer d'adopter une resolution. Il semble ala delegation chinoise que ce qui irnporte le plus, dans cette resolution, ce n'est pas tant d'insister sur tel ou tel point en particulier, que d'adopter un texte acceptable pour I'ensemble des delegations, et surtout pour les membres du Conseil de securite. En effet, comme vous vous en souvenez, si aux tennes de l'Article 10 de la Charte, l'AssembIee gene- Now, since we are notputqng forward the Chinese proposal again, I would like to say a word about our attitude toward the Australian proposal, which after modification and amendment has now become the proposed resolution of the First Committee since it was adopted by a .majority in that Committee. As regards the d~aft resolution now before us, I must say very frankly that it contains several points which we of the Chinese delegation suggested. So far as the intention of the original Atj.stralian proposal and also a great deal of its substance are concerned, we find ourselves in agreement. But we are not going to vote for the draft resolution, because we feel that it is not in a desirable form or appropriately worded. It is really a great pity that, although we are all I agreed upon the intention and although we find a great deal of the substance acceptable, the form in which it is put and the wording of certain parts of the text are such that they have raised objections on the part of several delegations, not only in the First Committee but also in the Assembly. If that is the case, as it appears clearly to be, I am afraid that the resolution based upon the Australian proposal would most likely defeat the very purpose we all have in mind, namely, to bring about an improvement in the functioning of the Security Council by improving the voting practice in that organ. For this reason we feel that we cannot vote for the text before us, but we are not going to vote against it either. We feel there is a great deal in it which has our support, but we shall abstain because we do not think that, as several delegations-including those of members of the Security Council-have raised objections to it, it would accomplish the purpose which it is intended to accomplish. Therefore, we of the Chinese delegation will abstain when a vote is taken. on this draft resolution now before the Assembly. . l'aura mise en reuvre. Si la resolution adoptee par nous n'a pas l'approbation de tous les membres du Conseil de securite, sa mise en application integrale devient problematique, pour ne pas dire plus. Nous attachons donc une grande importance a ce que notre resolution soit telle qu'elle puisse recueillir le plus grand nombre possible de voix a l'Assemblee, et recevoir l'approbation de tous les membres du Conseil de securite. C'est pourquoi p.ous nous sommes efforces de concilier les deux points de vue opposes et d'arriver a une solution de compromis. Je voudrais maintenant - puisque nous ne presentons pas de nouveau notre propositiondire quelques mots de la proposition australienne qui, apres avoir ete modifiee et amendee, est devenue la resolution proposee par la Premiere Commission qui l'a adoptee a la majorite. Je dois declarer tres franchement que le projet de resolution dont nous sommes actuelIement saisis contient plusieurs points que la delegation chinoise avait elle-meme suggeres. Nous sommes donc d'accord avec la delegation australienne sur I'idee qui inspirait sa proposition initiale et nous le sornmes ausi, en grande partie, sur le fond de cette proposition. Cependant, nous ne voterons pas pour le projet de resolution, car nous estimons que la forme n'en est pas heureuse et qu'elle n'est pas con~ue dans les termes qui conviennent. 11 est vraiment regrettable que bien que nous approuvions tous I'intention qui a inspire cette resolution et bien qu'elle nous agree engrande partie quant au fond, sa forme, la maniere dont elle est redigee en certains endroits soient tenes qu'eHes aient donne lieu a des objections de la part de plusieurs delegations, non seulement a la Premiere Commission maisaussi a l'Assemblee. Je crains donc que, dans ces conditions, la resolution qui s'inspire de la proposition australienne n'aille tres probablement aI'encontredes fins que nous poursuivons, a savoir l'amelioration du fonctionnement du Conseil de securite, par l'amelioration des methodes de vote de cet organe. C'est la raison pour laquelle il ne nous est pas possible de'voter cette resolution; toutefois, noUs ne voterons pas contre. Nous approuvons en grande' partie cette resolution, mais nous allons nous abstenir, parce que nous ne pensons pas que cette resolution puisse atteindre le but qu'elle se propose, etant donne que plusieurs deIegations-notamment celles de certains Etats membres du Conseil de securite-se sont eleves contre cette resolution. Voila pourquoi la delegation chinoise s'abstiendra lorsque le projet de resolution dont l'Assemblee est saisie sera mis aux voix. Mr. KrSELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from Russian): We have listened attentively to the speeches of the representatives of Australia and Cuba explaining the motives by which they were guided in submitting proposals for the appIicl\tion of Article 27 of the Charter regarding the voting procedure in the Security Council and for calling a general conference of States Members of the United Nations under Article 109 of the Charter with a view to the revision of the present Charter. We are witnessing a carefully prepared and well thought out attack on the Charter of the United Nations by the representatives of Australia and Cuba. M. KISELEV (Republique socialiste sovietique de Bielorussie) (traduit du russe): Nous avons suM avec attention les interventions au cours desquelles les representants de l'Australie et de Cuba ont expose les motifs qui les ont amenes a presenter leurs propositions sur l'ap· plication des dispositions de l'Article 27 de la Charte, relatif a la proc~dure de vote au Conseil de securite, et sur la convocation cl'une conference generale des Etats Membres, conformement a l'Article 109 de la Chartc, aux fins de revision de la presente Charte. Nous avons affaire id aune attaque bien reflechie et soigneusement montee par les representants de l'Australie et de Cuba contre la Chacte des Nations Unies. 'Le chef de la delegation sovietique, M. Molotov, dans le discours historique qu'il a prononce ' devant l'AssembIee. generale le 29 octobre, a fait une analyse penetrante de cette question du point de vue politique. II a montre que deux tendances s'affrontent actuellement dans la poIitique internationale, que deux tendances principales s'opposent au adn de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, et cherchent a determiner le cours de ses travaux. L'une de ces tendances s'appuie sur le respect des principes qui sont a la base de l'Organisation des Nations Vnies. ' L'autre tendance, au contraire, s'efforce d'ebranler les bases de 1'Organisation et de frayer la voie aune nouvelle politique. Ce sont les representants de cette politique qui menent actuellement des attaques de toutes sortes, en operant de front et par mouvement tournant; la.delegation de l'Australie represente avec eclat cette tendance. Je dois declarer tres nettement que la dele~ gation australlenne bonleverse notre Charte. Au lieu de defendre la Charte alaquelle l'Australie a appose sa signature, au lieu de travailler a la mise en application de cette Charte selon 1'esprit et la lettre de ses articles, au lieu de lutter pour renforcer l'autorite de l'Organisation qui vient d'etre creee, la delegation australienne a entame une lutte active contre la ChaTte, des le lendemain de la signature, et dIe a tente, en toute circonstance, de discrCditer la Charte. En agissant ainsi,la delegation australienne sape l'autorite d'une Organisation qui est encore trap neuve pour avoir atteint sa pleine vigueur. En paroles, la delegation australienne proteste de sa fideIite a l'Organisation et se pose en champion de la liberte et de la demoncratie, mais en realit6 cette delegation, qu'elle le veuille ou non, parte atteinte ala Charte de l'Organisation. Cette attitude nous l'avons deja observee Iors de la Conference de la paix, a Paris. On veut donner l'impression que la delegation austraIienne est la seule a lutter pour la pane, la securiteet la democratie, et que les autres Membres de l'Organisation s'y opposent. La realite est tout autre. In his historic speech at the meeting of the General Assembly on 29 October, the head of the delegation of the Soviet Union, Mr. Molotov, gave a profound political analysis of this question. He pointed out that a struggle is going on between two trends of international politics: two basic tendencies are involved in a struggle, within the United Nations, to gain influence over the fundamental course of its work. The proponents of one view take their stand on the basic statutes of the United Nations and on respect for the principles on which that Organization is based. The other attitude, on the contrary, is aimed at shaking the foundations on which the United Nations rests and clearing the way for its own proponents. At present, all kinds of attacks are emanating from the'latter, both in the form of direct assault and flanking manreuvres. An outstanding representative of the second trend is the delegation of Australia. It must be said openly that the Charter of the United Nations is being turned upside down by the Australian delegation. Instead of defending the Charter which it has signed, instead of securing the enforcement of the Charter in accordance with the spirit and the letter of its articles, instead of fighting to strengthen the authority of the newly-created Organization, the Australian delegation, only a day after it had appended its signature, started an active struggle against the Charter, and, proceeded to discredit it at every step. In doing sO, it is undennining the authority of the young and immature United Nations Organization. The Australian delegation declares, in words, its loyalty to the United Nations and comes forward as the protagonist of, freedom and democracy. But in fact, whether it desires to , do so or not, it is undermining the Charter of this Organization. This motive is already familiar to us from the Paris Peace Conference. The impression is created that the Australian delegation alone is fighting for peace, security and democracy, while the other Members ol the United Nations are acting in a contrary manner. In reality the opposite is the case.' Les delegations de I'Australie et de Cuba ne veulent pas tenir compte du fait que l'Organisa~ tion des Nations Unies est jeune, qu'en quinze mois d'existence dIe n'a pu atteindre son plein developpement, et que l'experience que cette Organisation a pu acquerir au cours de ses premiers travaux est encore insuffisante. Il est donc naturel que le travail de l'Organisation presente des imperfections. Le devoir des Etats Membres est de travailler a. renforcer notre Organisation, a ameliorer partout le fonctionnement de ses nombreux organes, conformement aux buts et aux principes eleves de la Charte, auxquels se sont rallies tous les peuples epris de paix. La cooperation entre les grands et les petits peuples, pour laquelle les delegations sovietiques luttent avec opinHl.trete, a pour condition premiere le maintien de l'action concertee des cinq gl'andes Puissances, telle qu'elle s'cst etablie au cours de la guerre. th~t there may have been shortcomings in its work. The task of the States Members of the United Nations is to strive to strengthen our Organization still further, to bring about an all round improvement in the work of its numerous organs in accordance with the high purpoSes and principles of the Charter, which was ac~ cepted by all the peace-loving nations of the, world. Co-operation between the large and small nations, for which the Soviet delegations are fighting stubbornly and consistently, pre~ supposes, above all, the retention of the practice established during the war of co-ordinated action among the five great Powers. Generalissimo Stalin, the great leader of the Soviet Union, said: "Can we depend upon the actions of this international Organization being sufficiently effective? They will be sufficiently effective if the great Powers, which carried on their shoulders the main burden of the war against Hitler's Germany, will act in the future in the same spirit of unanimity and agreement. They will not be effective if this vital condition is violat~d.': These are the simple, but profoundly slgmficant words of the great Stalin. Le grand chef de I'Union sovietique, le generalissime Staline dit: «Pouvons-nous compter que l'action de cette Organisation intemationale sera suffisamment efficace? Cette action sera efficace si les grandes Puissances qui ont parte sur leurs epaules la plus grande part du fardeau de la guerre contre l'Allem.agne hitlerienne continuent a agir dans un esprit d'entente et d'unanimite. Cette action ne sera pas efficace si cette condition indispensable n'est pas remplie." Telles sont les paroles simples mais riches de sens du grand Staline. U~fortunately, .some representatives, reflecting Mal.h~ur~~sement, des .representants qui se font, lCI, I echo de certams milieux reactionnaires attaquent avec violence les bases memes de cette Organisation, en masquant leurs inten~ tions reelles derriere un ecran de phrases d'une belle allure democratique. Ces representants ~he Vle~s of certam reactionary circles, are makmg funous attacks on the very foundations of the United Nations, while concealing their real aims behind a smoke screen of all sorts of fine sounding and democratic phrases. They want to undermine the principle of unanimity and agreement of the ~ve great Powers, which is the pledge ?f the effectIveness of the United Nations. That lS why such a course of action may conceal the greatest danger for the United Nations. veule~t porter atteinte au principe de l'accord un~mme des cinq grandes Puissances, principe qUI .est le g~ge du ~ucces de l'Organisation des NatIOns Umes. VOlla pourquoi ces tendances peuvent faire counr les plus grands dangers a notre Organisation. The proposals which have been submitted are unacceptable not only to the Soviet Union but also' to many small democratic countries. These proposals are contrary to the fundamental inter~ ests of ~he great popular masses of the whole world, smce t~e peoples a~e yearning for a stable . Les propositions qui nous sont soumises sont l~acceptables non seulement pour l'Union sovie~ tlq~e, mais aussi pour un grand nombre de petIts pays democratiques. Ces propositions vont a l'encontre des inter~ts fondamentaux des masses populaires du monde entier car les peuples aspirent aune paix solicle et a~ssi durable que possible. Nous qui parIons enleur nom nous devons tenter d'unir les efforts des peuples' grands t h't d ' . e pe s, pour ren re leurs rapports pea~e that wlll ~e a.s lastmg as possible. In ref1ectmg these asplratlons, we must strive to unite the efforts ?f larg.e and small nations in the task of de.ve~opmg fnendly relations among them, ~stabhshm~ firm p~ace and security, and extend~ mg th~ fleld of mternational co-operation by promoting the develop!ilent of practical to~Jour~ plus amiGaux et pour donncr des assises sohdes a la paix et a la secun·te' N d . ous evons nous efforcer de developper la cooperation inter- That is what we must all strive for in our every-day practical work. But, unfortunately, the Australian delegation is not pursuing this course. On the contrary, it seems to be troubled by the fact that, during the past year, Article 27 of the Charter was applied in a way that gave rise to delays and ambiguities and weakened the work of the Security Council in its endeavours to settle the various questions submitted to it for consideration. We are aware of the reasons for this hasty "concern" of the Australian delegation. The stem lessons of history teach us that you cannot build a house if the foundations are insecure, if it is built on sand, that such a house will not stand for long and that it will soon collapse. An example of such a tumbledown house was the League of Nations. It was built on wrong principles. These provided certain interested States with the opportunity of frustrating the serious decisions that were proposed. The League o~ Nations proved to be powerless to take measures against the aggressor Powers of those days, Germany, Italy and Japan. As we know, that house, built<:m sand, collapsed ~ngloriously. Efforts are being made to represent the matter to us as though the principle of unanimity of the five great. Powers was accepted by accident in connexion with the situation that arOse at the time at San Francisco. This is quite incorrect, We all know that the principle of unanimity of the great Powers was accepted at San Francisco, not by accident but after a lengthy and all-round discussion, which took into account the historic fatal mistakes of the former League of Nations. This great principle of unanimity is directed and will be directed against any possible new aggression. The object of the resolution proposed by the Australian delegation, it is alleged, is to help the Security Council to restore order in its own house. Actually, it undermines the foundations on which the United Nations is built. The reso- . lution recommends that the Security Council adopt a method and procedure, which is said to be in conformity with the Charter, in order to help reduce the difficulties in applying Article 27, and that the Security Council should ensure the speedy and effective execution of its functions in regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes. In the opinion of the Australian delegation, the Security Council, without such a recommendation, cannot successfully carry out its work, nor will it be able to fulfill the tasks entrusted to it..Without such a recommendation, the Security Council will not be able to contend actively against any new aggression. The Byelorussian delegation considers that such a recommendation is unnecessary and superfluous and that the Security Council will successfully cope with its work without it. But, at the same time, the Byelorussian delegation expresses delt~gation se montre preoccupec par le fait qu'au cours de l'annee derniere l'application de l'Article 27 de la Charte a entraine des retards, a amene une certaine confusion et a gene I'action du Conseil de sCcurite, lorsque celui-ci a tente de regler les diffCrentes questions qui lui etaient soumises. Nous connaissons les raisons de cet "interet" si subit que la delegation australienne manifeste pour cette question. Les mdes le~ons de 1'histoire hous enseignent qu'on ne peut construire une maison si les fondations ne sont pas solides, et qu'une malson batie sur le sable ne tarde pas a s'ecrouler. L'exemple d'un edifice ecrouIe nous est donne par la Societe des Nations. Elle avait ete fondee sur des principes errones, cc qui a permis a certains Etats de saboter des decisions importantes qui menaCJaient leur interets. La Societe des Nations a cte incapable, a l'epoque, de prendre des mesures contre les agresseurs: l'Allemagne, l'Italie et le Japon. Bati sur le sable, cet edifice nous le savons, s'est effondre sans gloire. On nous presente les choses comme si le principe d'unanimite des cinq grandes Puissances n'avait 6te adopte que d'une maniere fortuite, a la faveut" de la situation qui s'etait creee a San-Francisco. Cela est completement inexact. Nons savons tous que ce principe d'unanimite a etc adopte a San-Francisco, non par hasard, mais apres une etude detaillee et approfondie au coms de laquelle on a tenu compte des erreUrs qui, I'histoire l'a mantre, devaient etre fatales a l'ancienne Societe des Nations. Ce grand principe d'unanimite est une arme dirigee contre toute agression qui se prodnirait a l'avenir. La resolution proposee par la' delegation australienne pretend avoir pour objet d'aider le Conseil de securite a mettre de 1'0rdre dans sa maison; en realite, cette resolution ebranle les fondements memes de 1'Organisation des Nations Unis. Oette resolution recommande que le Conseil de securite adopte des methodes et procedures conformes a la Charte, nous dit-on, et destinees a. reduire les difficultes d'application de l'Article 27; dIe recommande en outre que le Conseil de securite s'acqnitte avec rapidite et efficacite de ses fonctions, en ce qui conceme le reglement pacifique des differends. La delegation australienne pretend que, s'il n'est pas tenu compte de cette recommandation, le Conseil de securite ne pourra pas accompliI' son reuvre, ni mener a bien la tache dont i1 est charge, et que le Conseil ne pourra pas lutter assez energiquement contre une nouvelle agression. La delegation bielorusse estime, au contraire, que cette recommandation est parfaitement ,superflue et que le Conseil n'en a nullement besoin pour s'acquitter avec succes de sa mission. La delegation bielorusse est persuadee, d'ailleurs, qu'a l'avenir le Conseil de ~emocratie, et en particulier selon le principe de l'unanimite des grandes Puissances et de tous les Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Voila pourquoi la delegation bielorusse votera contre la .resolution qui nous a ete proposee. Le Pd.SIDENT: Je n'ai plus d'orateurs inscrits sur ma liste, et nous pouvons passer au vote. Vow serez d'accord, je pense, pour estimer que cette resolution doit obtenir]es deux tiers des voix pour etre consideree comrrte adoptee. n s'agit de la proposition australienne, c'est-adire de la proposition de la Premiere Commission. Now allons proceder au vote par appel nominal. . The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I have no more speakers on my list, and we can ow proceed to a vote. I think you will agree in considering that this resolution requires a two-thirds majority in order to be considered as adopted. We are dealing with the Australian proposal, that is to say, the proposal of the First Committee. We shall proceed to a vote by roll-call. ~

The result of the voting is as follows: Voted for: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand Le PRESIDENT: Voici le resultat du vote: Votent pour: Afghanistan, Argentine, Australie, Belgique, Bolivie, Bresil, Canada, Colombie, Cuba, Republique Dominicaine; Equateur, Egypte; Salvador, Grece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iran~ Irak, Liban, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexlque, Pays-Bas, Nouvelle-Zelande, Nicara- ~icarag~a, Pa~aguay! Peru, Philippine Repub~ lic, Saudi Arabia, Syna, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela. Voted against: ByeIorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland Ukrainian Soviet Socialist RepUblic, Unio~ of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia. g~a, Paraguay, Perou, Republique des Philippmes, ~ra?ie saoudite, Syrie. ~urquie, Union Sud-AfrIcame, Roya ume- UnI Etats-Unis d'Amerique, Uruguay; Venezuela: . Votent ,:ontre: Republique socialiste sovietlque de Blelorussie, Tchecoslovaquie Pologne Republique socialiste sovietique d'Ukraine' Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques' Yougoslavie. ' S'abstiennent: Chili Chine Danemark Ethiopie, France; Haiti, 'rslande, Inde, Norv~ge: Abstaine~:. Chile, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France; Haiti, IceI~nd, India, Norway. Absent: Costa Rica, Panama, Sweden. Sont absents: Costa-Rica, Panama, Suede. peci~ion: The. res~luti~n was adopted by thtrty-Slx votes to SIX wzth nme abstentions three delegations being absent. J Deci~ion: . La resolution est adoptee par tre!"te-stx VOtX contre six, et nett! abstentions, trots delegations etant absentes. 173. A. Adoption of trusteeship agreements. B. Establishment of the Trusteeship Council: report of the Fourth Committee (documents A/258 and A/258/Add.1, A/258/Corr.2, A/258/Corr.3 and A/258/Rev.1) The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I propose that we alter the order of the items on 173. A. Approbation des accords de tutelle. B. Etablissement du Conseil de Tutelle. Rapport de la Quatrieme Commission (document A/258 AI 258/Add.l, A/258/Corr.l, A/2581 Corr.3, et A/258/Rev.l) Le PRESIDENT: Je propose de modifier l'ordre des questions qui sont a l'ordre du jour Mr. PEREZ CISNEROS (Cuba) (translated from French): I support the proposal which the President has just made, but it would be advisable to examine all the items relating to the Fourth Committee one after the other, as the representatives concerned with those items are present at this meeting, and it would be desirable to deal with all these questions together. M. PEREZ CISNEROS (Cuba): J'appuie la proposition que vous venez de faire, mais il y aurait lieu d'etudier ala suite toutes les questions se rapportant a la Quatrieme Commission, car les representants qui traitent ces questions sont presents a cette seance, et il serait souhaitable de pouvoir traiter tous ces problemes a la fois. Le PRESIDENT: Nous sommes d'accord. Nom diseuterons done les points 7, 3, 4 et 5 de l'ordre du jour. Je donne la parole a M. Lisicky, representant de la Tchecoslovaquie, Rapporteur de la Quatrieme Commission.

Wc are in agreement. We shall therefore discuss items 7, 3, 4and 5 of the agenda. ,I call upon Mr. Lisicky, representative of Czechoslovakia, Rapporteur of the Fourth Committee. M. LISICKY (Tchecoslovaquie), Rapporteur: Le rapport que j'ai l'honneur de presenter a· l'Assemblee au nom de la Quatrieme Commission, recommande l'approbation de huit accords de tutelle concernant des territoires sous mandat, qui ant ete soumis pour l'approbation de l'Assemblee par les Gouvemements administrant ces territoires en vertu du mandat qui leur fut confie par la Societe des Nations•. Mr. LISICKY (Czechoslovakia), Rapporteur (translated from French): The report which I have the honour to submit to the Assembly on behalf of the Fourth Committee recommends the approval of eight trusteeship agreements regarding territories under mandate, which have been submitted for the Assembly's apPloval by the Governments administering those territories by virtue of mandates entrusted to them by the League of Nations. These agreements are as follows: the agreement submitted py the Government of Australia for the mandated territory of New Guinea; the agreement submitted by the Belgian Government for Ruanda-Urundi; the agreements submitted by. the French Government for the Cameroons and Togoland under French mandate; the agreement submitted by the New Zealand Government for WesteriJ. Samoa and the agreements submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom for Tanganyika and for the Cameroons and Togoland under British mandate. When these agreements are approved, the conditions necessary for the establishment of the Trusteeship Council will be fulfilled, and the international trusteeship system provided for in Chapter XII of the Charter can at last be brought into operation. The report which we submit to you marks the end of long, arduous and, I think I may be allowed to add, conscientious work accomplished during the present session of the. Assembly, both in the plenary Committee and especially in its first Sub-Committee of seventeen members, to which the Fourth Committee entrusted the detailed examination of eight draft agreements and two hundred and twenty-nine proposed . amendments of the texts submitted by its mem- 11 s'agit des accords soumis par les Gouvemements suivants: accord soumis par le Gouvernement de l'Australie pour le territoire sous mandat de la Nouvelle-Guinee; accord soumis par le Gouvernement beIge pourIe Ruanda-Urundi; accord soumis par le Gouvernement fran~ais pour. le Cameroun et le Togo sous mandat fran- ~ais; accord soumis par le Gouvernement neozelandais pour le Samoa occidental; accord soumis par le Gouvemement du Royaume-Uni pour le Tanganyika, le Cameroun et le Togoland sous mandat britannique. Par l'approbation de ces accords, les conditions necessaires a la constitution du Conseil de tutelle seront remplies et le regime international de tutclle prevu par le Chapitre XII de la Charte pourra enfin etre etabli. Le rapport que nous vous presentons marque la conclusion d'un travail long, ardu et, j'ai le· droit d'ajouter consciencieux, accompli au cours de la presente session de l'Assemblee, tant a. la Commission pleniere que, et surtout, au sein de sa premiere Sous-Commission de dix-sept membres a laquelle la Quatrieme Commission avait confie l'examen detailIe de huit projets cl'accords et de deux cent vingt-neuf propositions de modifications des textes presentes par ses membres. Tous, sans exception, nous etions conscients du devoir dont nous devions nous acquitter: arriver a un resultat positif pour notre_ travail, et cela dans le delai impose. C'est pourquoi, au cours des dix jours qui viennent de s'ecouler, nous avons ete obliges de peiner, litteralement, jour et nuit sans desemparer, mus parla volonte d'aboutir. bers. We were all, without exception, conscious of the duty which we had to accomplish, namely, to reach a positive result in our work, and this within the prescribed time limit. For this reason, during the ten days which have just elapsed, we were .obliged to work literally day and night without respite, insp~red by the will to succeed. ApPROVAL OF TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENTS "The General Assembly approves separately the following eight Trusteeship Agreements: "1. The proposed.Trusteeship Agreement for New Guinea submitted by the Government of Australia (document A/153/Rev.2). "2. The proposed Trusteeship Agreement for Ruanda-Urundi submitted by the Government of Belgium (document A/ 159/Rev.2). "3. The proposed Trusteeship Agreement for the Cameroons under French mandate submitted by the Government· of France (document A/155/Rev.2). "4. The proposed Trusteeship Agreement for Togoland under French mandate submitted by the Government of France (document A/154/ Rev.2). "5. The proposed Trusteeship Agreement for Western Samoa submitted by the Government of New Zealand (document A/ 160/Rev.2). "6. The proposed Trusteeship Agreement for Tanganyika submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom (document A/152/Rev.2). "7. The proposed Trusteeship Agreement for the Cameroons under British mandate submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom (document A/151/Rev.2). "8. The proposed Trusteeship Agreement for Togoland under British mandate submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom (document A/ 150/Rev.2) ." ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL "The Gener:o Assembly approved, on 13 December 1946, 111 accordance with Article 85 of the Charter, the terms of the Trusteeship Agreements for New Guinea, Ruanda-Urundi, Cameroons under French administration and Togoland under French administration West n S~m?~, T~nganyika, Cameroons under Brit~:h a .n:ll1ISt~ation and Togoland under B it' h dmmlstration. r IS a "In these agreements Australia Bel' France, New ~eah:tnd and the United KingId~~ ~::e been deSIgnated as Administering Aufhori- L'heure n'est plus aux discours, mais aux actes. Je m'arrete done a ces quelques remarques, en presentant a l'approbation de l'Assemblee les deux projets de resolution dont je vais vous donner lecture. ApPROBATION DES ACCORDS DE TUTELLE ('L'Assemblee generale approuve separement les accords de tutelle ci-apres: "1. Accord de tutelle pour la N ouvellc- Guinee, soumis par le Gouvernement de l'Australie (document A/153/Rev.2). "2. Accord de tutelle pour le Ruanda-Urundi} soumis par le Gouvernement de la Belgique (document A/ 159/Rev.2). "3. Accord de tutelle pour le Cameroun sous mandat fran~ais, soumis par le Gouvernement de la France (document A/155 /Rev.2). , "4. Accord de tutelle pour le Togo sous mandat fran~ais, soumis par le Gouvemement de la France (document A/ 154/Rev.2). "5. Accord de tutelle pour le Samoa occidental~ soumis par le Gouvernement de la Nouvel1e- Zelande (document A/160/Rev.2). "6., Accord de tutelle pour le Tanganyika, soumlS par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni (document A/152/Rev.2). "7. Accord de tutelle pour le Cameroun sous mandat britannique soumis par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Ulli (document AI 151 /Rev.2). "8..Acc~rd de tutelle pour le Togo sous mandat bntanmque, soumis par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni (document A/150/Rev.2)." ETABLISSEMENT DU CONSEIL DE TUTEl.LE "L'As bI' "I semee genera e a approuve~ le 13 decembre 1946, conformement al'Article 85 de la Charte, les termes des accords de tutelle pour la Nouvelle-Guinee, le Ruanda-Urundi le Cameroun. S?Us a.dministration fran~aise, l~ Togo sous admmISt~atlon fran~aise, le Samoa accidental, le T~nga~Ylka, le Cameroun sous administration bnta;lll1lque et le Togo sous administration bri. tanmque. "Dans ces acc~rds~ I'Australie 'la Belgique la Fran~e~ la ,:r~l"ouvelle-zelandeet l~ Royaume-Uni l~nt e~e. desl~nes comme autorites chargees de admlmstration. "By application of Article 86b, CHINA, the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, being such of the members mentioned by name in Article 23 of the Charter as are not administering Trust Territories, will also be members of the Trusteeship Council. . "In accordance with Article 86c, it is necessary, in order to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those Members of the United Nations which administer Trust Territories and those which do not, that two members should be elected ·by the General Assembly. "1. Elects MEXICO and IRAQ as members of the Trusteeship Council for a term of three years; "2. Directs the Secretary-General to convoke the first session of the Trusteeship Council not later than 15 March 1947, and to draw up and communicate to each member of the Council the provisional agenda for that session at least thirty days in advance of the date of the session."

I call upon Mr. Singh, representative of India. Mr. SINGH (India) : There are no chapters in the Charter of the United Nations more important and, more far-reaching than Chapters XI and XII. The former deals with Non-Self- Governing Territories and the latter with the International Trusteeship System. India, which has not yet attained full freedom and has known from her experience the difficulties which face all dependent nations, sympathizes wholeheartedly with the aspirations of peoples who have not secured a full measure of self-government or are at present governed under a mandate. It is for this reason that she is keenly anxious for all territories under mandate to be placed under the trusteeship system and for the early establishment of a Trusteeship Council. And such is her confidence in the trusteeship system that she wishes that territories detached from enemy States as a result of the second world war should also become Trust Territories. Moreover, we strongly hope, as I have had oc;:casion to say before, that some of the Non- Self-Governing Territories under Chapter XI will be voluntarily placed under Article 77, paragraph 1c, under the trusteeship system, by the States responsible for their administration. This system, established under Chapter XII, is an advance on the provisions of Chapter XI inasmuch as it permits of a more impartial administration "L'AssembUe generale, "1. Choisit le MEXIQUE et l'IRAK comme membres du Conseil de tutelle pour une duree de trois ans; "2. Prescrit au Secretaire general de convo- quer la premiere session du Conseil de tutelle le 15 mars 1947 au plus tard, et d'etablir et de transmettre a chacun des membres du Conseil l'ordre du jour provisoire de cette session, trente jours au moins avant la date de la session." Le PRESIDENT: ]e donne la parole a M. Singh, representant de l'Inde. M. SINGH (Inde) (traduit de l'angtais): 11 n'est aucun Chapitre de la Charte des Nations Unies qui soit plus important et qui ait une portee plus etendue que les Chapitres XI et XII. Le premier traite des territoires non autonomes et le second du regime international de tutelle. L'Inde, qui ne jouit pas encore de sa pleine liberte et qui a connu, par experience, les diffi- cultes avec lesquelles toutes les nations depen- dantes sont aux prises, partage sans reserve les aspirations des peuples 'qui ne s'administrent pas encore completement eux-m€mes au qui sont actueIlement administres en vertu d'un man- dat. C'est pour cette raison que l'lnde est vivement desireuse de voir ,placer sous le regime de la tutelle tous les territoires sous mandat, et de voir instituer sans tarder un Conseil de tutelle. La confiance de la delegation de l'lnde dans le regime de tutelle est si grande qu'elle vou- drait que les territoires detaches d'Etats ex-enne- mis a la suite de la deuxi<:me guerre mondiale fussent egalement transforrnes en territoires sous tutelle. En outre, la delegation de l'Inde espere ferme- ment, comme j'ai eu l'occasion de le declarer precedemment, que certains des territoires consi- deres comme non autonomes aux termes du Chapitre XI, seront volontairement places sous le regime de la tuteIle par les Etats responsables de leur administration, conformement aux dis- positions de l'Article 77, paragraphe 1 c). Ce regime, institue en vertu des dispositions du Coming to the trusteeship agreements, the Indian delegation feels that, though some im- provements, which we appreciate, have been made in the original drafts, there are still im- portant and serious objections which have been made by us in Committee but have not been met. Concession on such points would have en- hanced the prestige of· the mandatory Powers. For instance, the creation of military forti- fications in Trust Territories without even the approval of the Security Council is open to grave objection.. Such a provision did not exist under the mandatory system and may result in disturbing rather than furthering international peace and security. What is the objection to obtaining the approval of the Security Council, which is a more representative body than the administering authority? We also object to the administration of a Trust Territory as an integral part of the metro- politan area or adjacent territories. There is no proved necessity for the words "integral part", which indeed complicate rather than clarify. They do not help the administering authority, while they raise suspicio.fl. of annexation and in- fringe the sovereign and latent independence of the peopleS concerned, which, in our view, is fundamental. As regards the trusteeship agreement for Tan- ganyika, we have strongly objected to the United Kingdom not consulting us on its terms, as India considers herself directly concerned, because of the considerable Indian population in that tem- tory, numbering 40,000 souls, the large part that this population has played in the development of commerce and trade, India's strategic position in the Indian Ocean, and last but not least, the vital and successful part that Indian troops in large numbers took in the conquest and de- fence of Tanganyika in both world wars. . It was, therefore, a matter of great surprise and regret to us that the Union of South Africa and Belgium were consulted, while India, which has far greater interests i~ Tanganyika, was ig- 'nored. We hope that before any alterations or amendments are made in this agreement in the Lastly, we would prefer that, instead of ad- ministration by a single State, the United Na- tions itself should be the administering authority, if not immediately, at leallt within a reasonable time. Under Article 81 of the Charter, such administration is fully pe.nnissible. We believe that the United Nations, as the administering authority, will be more impartial and will inspire greater confidence among the inhabitants. More- over, we consider that the political advance of the 'people, which to us is and always will be a matter of the first concern, will be thereby expedited. Indeed, we suggested a time limit for the termination of trusteeships, or at least their periodic revision, but our suggestion was not accepted. Because of these omissions, anxious as we are that the Trusteeship Council should come into being, we shall not be able to vote for the agree- ments as they stand. We can only hope that the Trusteeship Council will, by its vigilant super- vision, including the valuable provision for peri- odic visits, remedy some of the defects pointed out and lead" the peoples of these territories, by the spread of education and representative insti- tutions, to the goal of early self-government and independence.

I call upon Mr. Thomas, representative of the United Kingdom. Mr. THOMAS (United Kingdom) :' This is a historic moment in the history of the United Nations. It is historic for two reasons. By our vote in a short time, we shall, as I trust, bring into operation the trusteeship system with all the hope that it holds out for millions of people throughout the world. We shall then be able, when we have established the trusteeship system, to create the Trusteeship Council, the last of the principal organs of the United Nations. By that step, we shall complete the main structure of the building so grandly conceived at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco. The trusteeship system will take the place of the mandate system of the League of Nations in the territories in question. The mandate system was one of the best sides of the League of Nations' work, but with new circumstances it has become necessary to create new machinery. We have taken advantage of the lessons we have learned since 1920 to incorporate'them in the trusteeship system. The main difference, in my opinion, is one of emphasis. Where the old mandate system laid emphasis on the rights of the Member States, the trusteeship system lays emphasis upon tho rights of the.inhabitants of the trusteeship territories. Le PdSIDENT: Je donne la parole a M. Thomas, representant du Royaume-Uni. M. THOMAS (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Le moment present marquera dans l'histoire des Nations Unies. Et cela, pour deux raisons. Dans un instant, nous alIons, je l'eSpere, instaurer, par notre vote, ce regime detutelle en leque1 des millions d'individus de toutes les parties du monde mettent leurs espoirs. Lorsque nous aurons etabli ce regime,' nous serons en mesure de creer le Conseil de tutelle, completant ainsi I'ensemble des organes principaux de I'Organisation des Nations Unies. Nous acheverons la structure principale de l'edifice grandiose con~u aDumbarton Oaks et a San-Francisco. Le regime de tutelle remplacera, dans les territoires en question, le systeme des mandats de la Societe des Nations. Le systeme des mandats etait un des meilleurs aspects de l'reuvre de la Societe des Nations, mais les circonstances nouvelles exigent un mecanisme nouveau. Nous avons beaucoup appris depuis, 1920, et nous avons tenu. compte de notre experience en elaborant le systeme de tuteHe. A mon avis, la difference principale qui existe entre le systeme des mandats et le regime de tutelle reside dans l'accentuation.Tandis que l'ancien systeme des mandats mettait l'accent sur les dfoits des Etats Membres, le· regime de On behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, it is my privilege to present to you three agreements for Tanganyika, Togoland under British administration and the Cameroons under British administration. We have discussed them exhaustively. We have made many changes since these drafts were first drawn up. Indeed, there are only two articles, and they are purely formal articles, that remain the same in the United Kingdom drafts. We have benefited much from the discussions we have had in Committee. Even in the very few cases where we felt obliged to disagree with recommendations made to us, only one of which concerned the present texts, though there were two others which proposed new articles, even in these cases we have benefited very much from the discussions we have had. There will be different opinions among the representatives about these texts. For my part, I feel entirely satisfied with them as they now stand after our discussions. There will be others, a few, I think, who will consider these texts, as regards some articles, as so unacceptable that they will vote against the agreements as a whole and 'the trusteeship system at the present time. There will be a few others, like the representative for India, who do not fed that they can go so far as to vote against these agreements, but who will abstain from voting. I think there will be others among the representatives who would wish to have seen certain changes in these agreements, but they will recognize that they have not a monopoly of good drafting or even of wisdom, and they will be prepared to accept the agreements as they stand rather than jeopardize the formation of the Trusteeship Council and the bringing into existence of the trusteeship system. I feel confident, therefore, that this Assembly will endorse the verdict of the Fourth Committee, which gave an overwhelming majority in support cif the agreements now presented to you. I have said that our main concern must be the interests of the inhabitants, and that will enable us to dispose of many of the difficulties with Je suis donc persuade que l'AssembIee sanctionnera, a une majorite ecrasante, la decision prise par la Quatrieme Commission de recommander l'adoption des accords qui vaus sant presentes aujourd'hui. J'ai dit que cc qui doit nous preoccuper avant tout, ce sont les interets des populations, et cette consideration nous permettra de surmonter beau- It is, therefore, after mature consideration and after full examination that I offer these agreements to you. We in the United Kingdom are proud of what we are doing in the colonial field. It has been with great 'pride that we have been able to bring various members of the British Commonwealth and Empire along the road to full selfgovernment. We feel the same pride that a parent feels when he sees his children going out into the world and making their own way. Sometimes the children, when they are given the key to the door, may kick over the traces a little bit. but we do not mind that any more than the parent does. More often, we have seen growing affection between ourselves and our children and we look forward to an' extension of that process. We shall feel increasing pride as we see ourselves able to bring more and more of the dependent peoples who look up to US, along this road to self-government and independence. The trustet:Ship system symbolizes that aspect of our policy. It is because it is entirely in accordance with our policy that we have voluntarily, I emphasize the word voluntarily, offered to place all our African mandated territories under the trusteeship system. We shall look forward to the operation of this system with confidence that it will be a most valuable part of the machinery of the United Nations and will give great hope to millions of dependent peoples in all parts of the world.

I propose that we suspend the meeting and resume at a quarter past eight as our custom is. Ths muting rose at 7 p.m. Le regime de tutelle represente ce cClte de notre politique. C'est parce qu'il est entierement conforme a notrc politique que c'est spontanement-j'insiste sur le fait--que DOUS avons propose de placer sous le regime de la tutelle taus les territoires africains sur lesquels nous avons un mandat. Nous attendons impatiemmcnt la mise en application de ce regime, convaincus que ce sera un elen;ent ex:reJ:?ement preci.eux du mecanisme de I Orgamsaoon des NatlOns Unies, et qu'iI apportera un gr~d espoir aux millions d'habitants des territOlres non autonomes, dans toutes les parties du monde. Le PRESIDENT: Je vous propose de suspendre la seance et de la reprendre a 20 h, 15 selon notre tradition. La seance est levee d 19 heures.