A/1/PV.62 General Assembly

I call upon Mr. Aujoulat, representative of France. Mr. AUJOULAT (France) (translated from French): For nearly thirty years, France has exercised without friction the mandates entrusted to her by the League of Nations over Togoland and the Cameroons. She has perfonned this task with the desire to fulfil, to the best of her ability, the aspirations of the native populations; the numerous testimonies from the Mandates Com~ mission and from the League of Nations itself pay tribute to her effort. Need I recall that in 1939, at a critical period for France and for Europe, spontaneous demonstrations took place at Yaounde, at Douala and in different parts of the Cameroons in favour of the continuance of the French mandate? There were impressive processions in which chiefs, notables and natives took part. The French administration, however, refrained from taking advantage of this enthusiasm to ask for any modification of the mandate. TABLE DES MATrERES Pages 174. Approbation des Accords de tutelle. Rapport de la Quatrieme Commission. Resolutions (suite de la discussion).. 1272 175. Principes regissant la reglementation et la reduction generales des armements. Rapport 'de la Premiere Commission.. 1289 President: M. P.-H. SPAAK (Belgique). 174. Approbation des Accords de tutelle. Rapport de la Quatrieme Commission. Resolutions (document A/258) (suite de la discussion) Le PRESIDENT: Nous allons poursuivre la discussion sur le rapport de la Quatrieme Commission concernant les Accords de tutelle (annexe 72). La parole est aM. Nieto del Rio, representant du Chili. M. NIETO DEL RIO (Chili) (traduit de l'anglais): En votant contre les resolutions, a la Quatrieme Commission, le Chili desirait marquer que les Accords de tutelle presentes pouvaient etre ameliores par certains amendements, que les Etats charges de l'administration ne semblaient d'aiIleurs pas disposes aaccepter. Le resultat du vote a la Quatrieme Commission a ete influence par ces circonstances. Le Chill avait, comme la pIupart des Membres de I'Assemblee, le desir de voir constituer des maintenant le Conseil de tutelle, ce qui n'aurait peut- ~tre pas ete possible si les amendements auxquels j'ai fait allusion avaient ete acceptes par la majorite de la Commission. Le Chill desire prouver maintenant que son intention etait de cooperer et non de faire obstruction. C'est pourquoi le Chill appuiera de son vote le rapport presente par le Rapporteur· et les projets d'accord de tutelle. Le PRESIDENT: Je donne la parole a M. Aujoulat, representant de la France. M. AUJOULAT (France): Pendant prcs de trente ans, la France a exerce sans heurt sur le Togo et le Cameroun le mandat qu'elle avait re~u de la Societe des Nations. Elle l'a rcmpli avec le soud de repondre de son mieux aux aspirations des populations autochtones; les temoignages nombreux emanant'de la Commission des mandats et de la Societe des Nations ellememe rendent hommage a son effort. Faut-il rappeler qu'en 1939, a un moment critique pour la France comme pour l'Europe, des manifestations spontanees eurent lieu a Yaounde, aDouala, et dans differents centres clu Cameroun, en faveur de la continuation clu mandat fran~ais. On put voir des defiles impressionnants auxquels participaients des chefs, des notables et des autochtones! L'administration franc;aise, cependant, ne crut pas devoir profi~er de cet enthousiasme pour demander une modification qudconque du regime du mandat. At a meeting several weeks later on Came~ roons territory, to which the chiefs and representatives of the native populations had been summoned, General de Gaulle reiterated the assurance that France would abide by the Covenant of the League of Nations and by the obligations assumed towards the League. This plainly loyal attitude was rewarded by the confident behaviour of the populations throughout the duration of hostilities and by their spontaneous co-operation in the war effort of the Allied nations in providing resources and volunteers. When liberation came, the inhabitants of the Cameroons and Togoland might well have wondered what status would be given to mandated territories. By taking part in drafting the San Francisco Charter, France clearly indicated her intentions towards those peoples. She was also one of the first to declare her readiness to place the French mandates of Togoland and the Cameroons under the Trusteeship System but, as Georges Bidault stated in London last January, only on condition that the rights which her populations enjoyed during their association with the French community would not thereby be diminished. France did not wait for Trusteeship Agree- 'ments to take definite form before promoting the advancement, in all its various forms, of the inhabitants of Togoland and the Cameroons and developing their capacity for self-government. As soon as France was liberated from enemy occupation, her first concern was to set up popular assemblies in the mandated territories, with a view to giving them representation., The natives understood. The elections in which they took part, far from arousing anxiety among them, on the contrary, gave rise to great hopes. Not only did those elections not prejudice whatsoever the liberty which all populations under trusteeship have and always will have of soliciting their autonomy or their independence, but they immediately offered an incomparable platform for native representatives to voice and realize their claims. The essential reform which followed liberation consisted in the setting up of representative assemblies, elected by direct universal suffrage in each territory. The electoral regime was, Inoreover, established under conditions which enabled all ethnic sections of .the population to be represented in these assemblies. We do not deny that these institutions constitute an experiment as bold as it is generous, for those assemblies have been straightway given a role which is not merely: advisory. In fact, ... Reunissant, que1ques semaines plus tard, sur la terre meme du Cameroun, les chefs et les representants des populations autochtones, le general de Gaulle leur renouvelait l'assurance que la France restait fidele ala Charte de la Societe des Nations et aux engagements contractes envers la Societe. Cette attitude de simple loyaute trouva sa recompense dans le comportement confiant des populations pendant toute la dUl'ee des hostilites et dans leur collaboration spontanee, en ressources et en volontaires, a l'effort de guerre des nations alliees. La liberation venue, les habitants du Cameroun et du Togo pouvaient se demander ce que deviendrait le statut des territoires sous mandat. En participant a l'etablissement de la Charte de San-Francisco, la France a nettement indique dans queUe voie dIe entendait engager ces populations. Elle fut egalement l'une des premieres afaire connaitre qu'eIle etait prcte a placer sous Regime de tutelle le Togo et le Cameroun sous . mandat fran~ais, mais a condition, avait precise Georges Bidault a Londres en janvier dernier, qU'il n'en resulte pour les populations aucune diminution des droits qu'elles tiennent de leur association avec la communaute franc;aise. Car la France n'a pas attendu que soient mis au point les Accords de tutelle pour favoriser le progres, sous toutes ses formes, des poputations togolaise et camerounienne et pour deve10pper leur capacite a s'administrer elles-mcmes. Des que la France a ete liberee de l'occupation ennemie, son premier souci a cte d'instituer dans les territoires sous mandat, des consultations populaires en vue de leur offrir une representation. Les autochtones ne s'y sont pas trompes. Les elections auxquelles ils ont participc, loin de susciter panni eux des inquietudes, ont au contraire fait germer de grands espoirs. Non seulement ces elections ne prejugent en rien la libertc qu'ont et qu'auront toujours les populations sous tutelle de solliciter leur autonomie ou leur independance, mais eIles offrent - et sans attendre - a leurs representants une trib.une incompar.abl~ pour faire entendre et aboutir leurs revendlcations. La reforme essentielle qui a suivi la liberation a consiste en l'institution d'assembIees representatives elues au suffrage universel direct dans chaque territoire. Le regime .e!ectoral a ete etabli d'ailleurs dans des condItIOns teUes que tous l~s elements' ethniques de la population peuvent etre representes au sein de ces assemblees. Naus ne nions pas que l'experience de cette institution soit aussi hardie que genereuse, car on a confie d'embIee aces assembIees un role q~i qui n'est pas de simple consultation. En faIt, At a time when the Constitution of the Republic was setting up, for all overseas territories of the French Union, territorial assemblies whose powers might range from the deliberative to the legislative, how could we make an exception for mandated territories on the pretext that they were not part of the French community? France did not see fit to delay granting the populations of mandated territories the benefits of the principles and advantages proclaimed by the Constitution and adopted by the Government in favour of nationals of the French Union. Thus she has already extended to the mandated territories: full liberty of expression, association and movement; suppression of the special native regime; suppression of the native penal code, and unity of jurisdiction in penal matters; and the recognition in the case of all individuals without distinction of race or creed not only of human rights but also of the citizen's right to have his personal status respected. These are, briefly, the political arrangements now applied to the Cameroons and to Togoland, in the spirit of the United Nations Charter, that is to say with a view to promoting the advancement of the inhabitants and their development towards maturity. In the present state of these countries, it was impossible to go further than we have done. But we also believe that the very spirit of the reforms which we have accomplished is in accordance with the end which we are pursuing. Thus, although we rejoice to see at last the end of our long discussions on the Trusteeship System, we deeply regret that consideration of these Agreements has occasioned unfavourable and perfectly unjustified criticism of the mandatory Powers. If these Powers really had underlying designs, why did they accept so readily all the exigencies of the Trusteeship System? We have'gone still further and given our draft agreements wide publicity among the inhabitants concerned. The texts have been distributed officially; they have been discussed· at length by the natives at public meetings; they have received their support. We do not therefore see how it will be possible to introduce any amendments into Our text other than those which we accepted in committee. The three amendments which the Fourth Committee has seen fit to retain seem useless to us; they add nothing to our agreements. They really do not afford any guarantee to the populations of the Trust Territories which does not already appear in our text. For in- 1«~gislatif, faUait-il reserver le cas des territoires sous mandat, sous pretexte qu'ils ne font pas partie de la communaute fran~aise? La France n'a pas cru devoir attendre pour accorder aux populations des territoires sous mandat le benefice de principes ou d'avantages proclames par sa Constitution ou adoptes par son Gouvernement en faveur des ressortissants de l'Union Fran~aise. C'est ainsi qu'elle a deja etendu aux territoires sous mandat: la liberte totale d'expression, cl'association, de deplacement; la suppression du regime de l'indigenat; la suppression du code penal indigene et l'unite de juridiction en matiere pena1e; la reconnaissance a tous les individus, sans distinction de sexe, de race ou de religion, non seulement des droits de l'homme, mais aussi du droit du citoyen au respect de son statut personnel. Telles sont, en definitive, les dispositions politiques appliquees des rnaintenant au Cameroun et au Togo, dans l'esprit de la Charte des Nations Unies, c'est-a.-dire en vue de favoriser le progres des populations et de les conduire aleur maturite. Dans l'etat actuel de ces pays, il etait impossible d'aller plus loin que nous l'avons fait. Mais nous croyons aussi que l'inspiration meme des reformes que nous avons accomplies repond pleinement au but que nous poursuivons. C'est pourquoi, si nous nous rejouissons de voir enfin I'aboutissement de nos longues discussions relatives au Regime de tutelle, n011S demeurons profondement peines ala pensee que l'etude de ces Accords ait pu fournir I'occasion de remarques desobligeantes et parfaitement injustifiees a l'egard des Puissances mandataires. Si elles avaient nourri des arriere-pensees suspectes, pourquoi se seraient-elles pretees si volontiers a toutes les exigences du Regime de tuteIle. Nous sommes alles plus loin encore. Nous ;:!.vons donne a nos projets d'accord une large publicite aupres des populations interessees. Les textes ont ete diffuses officiellement, ils ont ete longuement discutes par les autochtones en reunions publiques; ils ont re~u leur adhesion. Nous ne voyons done pas la possibilite d'apporter a. nos textes d'autres modifications que celles que nous avons pu accepter en commission. Les trois amendements que la Quatrieme Commission a cru devoir retenir nous paraissent inutilesj ils n'ajoutent rien a nos accords; iIs n'apportent vraiment aillc: populations sous tutelle aucune garantie qui ne figure deja dans notre texte. Pa.r exemple, la fixation d'un terme Nou~ airnons a penser que le souci primordial de l'Organisation des Nations Unies comme du Conseil de tutelle sera de faciliter la tache qui incombe desormais awe Puissances mandataires. L'etiquette a change, mais les obligations se sont accrues, et par consequent nous sommes en droit de compter sur la cooperation totale de 1'organisme qui va remplacer maintenant ]a Commission des mandats. Nous envisageons avec confiance et avec optimisme cette cooperation. Nous avons derriere nous l'ceuvre substantielle deja accomplie au Cameroun et au Togo: nous ne demandons qu'a la poursuivre. Daus ces territoires, nous avons fait germer une elite; nous avons constitue des cadres importants, nous avons multiplie le nombre des medecins africains sortis de l'Ecole de medecine d'Ayos, au Cameroun, ou de celle de Dakar; et demain ce seront ces docteurs en mcdecine, ccs professeurs, ces ingcnieurs, actuellement etudiants dans nos universites ou nos ecoles metropolitaines qui reviendront se devouer au service de ]eurs compatriotes et de leur pays d'origine. Nous avons apporte aussi tous nos soins a l'enseignement des masses. Nous savons, certes, qu'en cette matiere il reste beaucoup a. faire. Nous prevoyons pour servir de base aux ecoles normales, aux ecoles techniques et aux colleges secondaires dont l'edification fait partie de notre plan d'equipement, des ecoles de villages multiplees jusque dans les coins les plus recules de la brousse. Si la realisation de ce plan peut demander du temps, du moins n'y a-toil pas d'hesitation sur le but a atteindre: ce n'est pas cent mille enfants sco]arises qu'il faut avoir, c'est la totalite des enfants du Cameroun et du Togo que nous esperons faire passer par nos ecoles. Parlerons-nous de tout ce qui a ete fait pour relever la condition de la femme? Nous pouvons faire etat, sur ce point, de toute une legislation generale ou locale en vue de proteger les fillettes, de favoriser les mariages, de liberer les veuves. .Nous songeons a. tout ce que cet effort a sus- .cite de sacrifices et de devouements. On a vite fait de parler de colonialisme ou d'exploitation. Mais peut-on oublier ainsi, sans une mention I particuliere, ceux qui ont vraiment donne leur activite et parfois meme leur vie pour que le Cameroun et le Togo echappent au £leau des grandes end6nies. Le nom d'un docteur Janot est venere au Cameroun comme celui d'un grand bienfaiteur. Les resultats. de son ceuvre s'inscrivent, d'annee en annee, clans les chiffres All this cannot be forgotten, particularly because in the social sphere the Cameroons and Togoland are not backward. A labour code has been elaborated, and trade unions have been organized. Trade unionism is playing an increasingly important part in the evolution of these countries: it is now among the recognized institutions, through which the natives are participating to an ever increasing extent in directing their own economy and in conducting their business, for we recognize that it is mainly their business. Finally, we are quite ready to develop to its maximum extent the economic personality of Trust Territories. They must not remain tributaries of a selfish metropolis and of foreign countries which might only regard them as convenient outlets for their manufactured products or as sources of easily accessible raw materials. One of the fears expressed by native notables is that trusteeship may promote the intensive and pitiless exploitation of their natural resources for the profit of aliens. "When the time comes for us to undertake the government of Our country," they say, "we shall inherit a land which has been bled white." What is the use of political independence without an economic basis? These fears are perhaps unjustified. However, they are the motive for the refusal to introduce into these territories any private monopoly of any kind. The chief thing required is to provide equipment with a view to rational exploitation in which the natives will have a large share. We think, therefore, that the various territories hitherto administered by mandate will pass smoothly into the Trusteeship System within the framework of the proposed agreements. The inh~bitants are expecting these agreements, WhiCh are in accordance with their aspirations. It is as desirable for them as for the administering authorities, that they should be offered an institution which is not precarious and which allows for lasting co-operation. We do not underestimate the value of the approval which I ho~e, you w~ gi~e to these agreements, and 'by whIch you Wlll giVe them final sanction. An African representative introduced into the statutes of the French Union the expression "associated territories", to indicate territories hitherto under mandate. France will be able to prove ~hat the peoples under trusteeship will be the chIef beneficiaries of this association.

I caU upon Mr. Novikov, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Mr. NOVIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (translated from Russian): At the Le PRESIDENT: Je donne la parole a M. Novikov, representant de l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. M. NOVIKOV (Union des Republiques sodalistes sovietiques) (traduit du rum): Au debut Des le debut des travaux de la Quatrieme Commission, la delegation sovietique a re1eve ces imperfections dans les projets d'accords: elle a pris une part active aux travaux de la Commission de la tutelle et des Sous-Comites 1 et 2, en s'effor~ant d'eliminer ces imperfections. A cet effet, la delegation sovietique a propose plusieuIS amendements portant sur le fond de ces projets. EIle s'en est toujours tenue au principe que les territoires sous tutelle ne sont pas la propriete de I'Autorite chargee de l'administra. tion. Ces territoires doivent etre places sous une juridiction internationale, sous la juridiction de l'Organisation des Nations Unies qui assure l'application du Regime international de tutel1e. Les amendements proposes par la delegation sovietique avaient pour objet de mettre ces PlO' jets d'accords en harmonie avec ce principe fCJ damental. Dans cet ordre d'idees, il faut not .' en premier lieu, que, dans l'un de ces amcnCl._ ments, la delegation sovietique proposait de supprimer, dans sept des projets d'accords, la disposition selop laqueIle: "1'Autorite chargee de l'administration a le droit d'administrer le territoire sous tutelle comme partie integrante du territoire national". La delegation sovietique considere comme inacceptable une telle disposition qui signifie en fait l'annexion des territoires sous mandat par les Puissances mandataires, en contradiction directe avec les principes de la Charte. En effet, l'Article 76 prevoit "I'evolution progressive" des peuples sous tutelle "vers la capacite a s'administrer euxmemes ou l'independance". En somme, nous nous trouvons ici en presence d'une tentative d'annexion d'un territoire sous mandat, tout a fait analogue acelle qu'a fait l'Union Sud-Afri.- caine 10rsqu'el1e a tente d'annexer le territoire sous mandat du Sud-Ouest Africain. La seule difference, c'est que l'Union Sud-Africaine a expose ses pretentions d'une fac;on ouverte, alors que Another amendment, concerning the time limit for revision of Trusteeship Agreements, is connected with the above-mentioned amendment proposed by the Soviet delegation. The Soviet delegation noted the fact that not a single draft agreement contained any indication concerning either the duration of the trusteeship, the aim of which is the attainment of self-government or independence by the trust territory, or even concerning the time limits for a revision of the agreements in accordance with the progress which may be achieved by the trust territory towards self-government or independence. It is quite clear to us that such progress must take place, because such are indeed the very aims of trusteeship, but this means that those clauses of the agreements which correspond to the present level of development of the trust territories, will no longer correspond to the level which may be attained in a certain time. We cannot allow the Trusteeship Agreements to remain unchanged for too long, because this would in practice mean that the Administering Authority could exercise its trusteeship indefinitely, without taking any steps to promote the development of the Trust Territories towards self-gm'- ernment or independence. If we were to allow this, we would create the objective possibility of preserving artificially the present level of political, economic and cultural development of the peoples of the Trust Territories. The creation of the United Nations and the establishment of an international Trusteeship System gave rise to hopes among the peoples of the Trust Territories that the way to development in economic, cultural and political fields would be open to them also. The Trusteeship System must raise these at present backward territories to such level that they should be able to take their place in the family of nations as self-governing or independent peoples. The peoples of these territories have an equal right to enjoy the benefits of contemporary civilization and to improve their welfare. The possibilities for such development are to be found in the Trusteeship System, and our first concern for the backward peoples of Trust Territories is to ensure that all thc:,,(' pussibilities are realized. Only then shall we have fulfilled the trusteeship tasks laid upon us. The delegation of the Soviet Union would welcome the possibility of cstablishing a time limit for the termination of trusteeship over individual Trust Territorics, if it were possible to determine now at what period these territories would be sufficiently mature to receive self-government or independence. At the very least, however, periodical dates for the revision of Trusteeship Agree- 11 est parfaitement, clair, a nos yeux, que cette evolution doit avoir lieu, car tels sont precisement les buts de la tutelle; mais cela signifie que les clauses des Accords qui correspondent a l'etat actucl de developpement dcs territoires sous tutelle, ne correspondront pas au niveau qu'ils auront peut-etre atteint d'ici quelque temps. Nous ne devons pas permettre qu'un Accord de tutdle wit conclu pour un temps trop long et qu'il reste immuable, car cela signifierait, en fait, que l'Autoritc chargee de l'administration de ces territoires exercerait la tutelle pour un temps indefini et sans s'occuper de l'cvolution de ces territoires vers l'autonomie ou l'independance. Si nous admettions cela, nous etablirions un etat fie choses dans lequel les peuples de:; territoires sous mandat pourraient ctre maintenus artificiclJement a leur niveau actuel de developpe:ment politique, economique et culture!. La creation de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et 1'6tablissement du Regime international de tutel1e a fait naitrc, chez les peuples des territoires sous tutelle, l'espoir qu'eux aussi pourraient suivre la voie du progres economique, culturel et politique. Le Regime de tutelle doit clevelopper les pays retardataires et les amener it un niveau qui leur pem1ette d'entrer dans la famille des nations, atitre de peuples autonomes CJU indcpcndants. Les peuples de ces territoires ont le mcme droit que les autres de jouir des bienfaits cle la ch'ilisation contemporaine et d'amcJiorer leur nivcau de vie. Le Regime de tlltelle rend un tel developpement possible. Notrc premier devoir envers les pays arrieres sous tutelle, est de veiller a cc que ccs possibilites se rcaliscnt. Ce n'est qu'ainsi que nous nous acquitterons des taches qui nous incomben~ en maticre de tutelle. La delcgation sovietlque serait heureuse de voir fixer la date a laquelle prendrait fin la tutelle sur les differents te~ri. toires, s'il etait possible de determiner, des mamtenant, le moment ou ccs territoires seront assez developpes pour qu'on puisse leur acco~~~ l'autonomie ou l'independance. D'ores et deja, il est possible et meme necessaire de fixer des ~o the. degree to which the purposes laid down 10 ArtIcle 76 of the Charter have been attained. !he pr?posal of the Soviet delegation to fix a time hmIt for the revision of Trusteeship AgreemeI?ts was adopte? by the Committee, which decIded that all eIght Trusteeship Agreements should be re~ised after a. lapse of ten years. However; as III the precedmg case, the mandatory Powers showed a complete unwillingness to take the Committee's decision into consideration, .and declared their refusal to accept the establIShment of a time limit for the revision of the Agreements. Finally, the delegation of the Soviet Union submitted a 'proposal which it considers to b~ extremely important. It concerns those articles of the ~?I'ee?1ents whi7~ provide for the right of AdmmIste~mgAu~hontIesto construct military, nav~, a~d aIr bases m the trust territory, to build foruficatlOns and keep their armed forces there. The .right of the Administering Authority is not restrIcted by any limits or obligations in the draft agreements submitted. As a result, the trustee Powers can use the Trust Territories for military purposes, at their entire convenience, and treat these territories as their own property. As we all know, the for·mer system of the League of Nations mandates neutralized the mandated territories and prohibited their utilization for military purposes. No military bases or fortifications could be constructed in such territories and their population could not be utilized for military purposes. Now we have a different situation, because Articles 76 and 84 of the Charter provide that the Trust Territories may play a definite part in the maintenance of international peace and security, while under Articles 82 and 83 strategic areas may be designated in the Trust Territories. But the utilization of Trust Territories for the maintenance of international peace and security is only admissible where the Administering Authority assumes this obligation before the Security Council, which is the competent body for these most important questions. Therefore, if conditions require the establishment of military bases and the maintenance of the armed forces of the Administering Authorities in the Trust Territories, then we will have the situation provided for in Articles 82 and 83 because the erection of fortifications and the establishment of military bases in trust territories by the Administering Authority will thus transf<;>fll'l these territories into strategic regions. There can be no doubt that the approval of any Trusteeship AgreeI?e?t relating to such strategic areas will be WIthm e~:l.OnCees. par l'Article 76 de la Charte des Nabons Umes. La Commission a adopte la proposition de la delegation sovietique concernant les delais de revisiOl: des Accords de tutelle, elle a decide que les hmt Accords doivent etre revises dans dix ans. ~ependant, comme dans le cas precedent, les Pmssances mandataires n'ont pas voulu tenir compte de l'avis de la Commission et ont refuse d'approuver sa decision quant aux delais de revision des Accords. Enfi?: la d~legation sovietique a fait une propOSItIOn qu elle considCre comme tres importante. Cette proposition concerne les articles des Accords qui prevoient, pour l'Autorite chargee de l'administration, le droit d'etablir sur le territoire sous tutelle, des bases militaires, navales'ou aeriennes, d'y elever des fortifications et d'y maintenir ses propres forces armees. Dans les pr~jets. d'.accord qui nous ont ete presentcs, le drOIt amSI accordc a l'Autorite chargee de l'~dt;Iinist~ati0!1 n.e comportc pour eUe ni restnctIOn m.obhgatIon. Par consequent, les Puissances qUI exercent la tutelle peuvent utiliser comme bon leur semble a des fins militaires les territoires sous tutelle i en d'autres termes, elles p.eu~ent e? disposer comme de leur propre terntorre natIOnal. Nous ,savons tous que le regime institue par la Societe des Nations prevoyait la neutralisation des territoires sous mandat, et en interdisait l'utilisation a des fins militaires. Il ne devait y avoir, dans ces territoires, ni bases militaires ni fortifications, et leur population ne pouvait etre utilisee a des fins militaires. Mais aujourd'hui, il en est tout autrement: en efIet, les Articles 76 et 84 de la Charte prevoient que les territoires sous tutelle peuvent jouer un certain role dans le maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales, et les Articles 82 et 83 permettent que l'on determine des zones strategiques dans ces territoires. Les territoires sous tutelle ne peuvent contribuer au maintjen de la paix et de la securite internationales que si les Autorites chargees de l'administration contractent des obligations a l'egard du Conseil de securite dont la competence s'etend a ces questions d'importance primordiale. Si, en des circonstances determinees, il devenait necessaire d'etablir dans un territoire sous tutelle des bases militaires, et si l'Autorite cHargee de l'administration devait y entretenir des forces armees, nous nous trouverions en presence du cas prevu par les Articles 82 et 83, puisqu'en fortifiant les territoires sous tutelle et en y etablissant des bases militaires, l'Autorite chargee de l'administration transformerait ces territoires en zones strategiques. Il n'y a pas de doute que tout Accord de tutelle relatif aux Should the Assembly agree that the Administering Authorities should have the right to establish military bases in Trust Territories and to fortify such territories without the consent of the Security Council, this would mean that these Powers may utilize Trust Territories for their military purposes without being subject to any control on the part of the United Nations. The grant of such a right would not serve the interests of international peace and security, but merely the narrow egoistic interests of certain countries. Thus a statute would be enacted in favour of these countries which would be worse than the oid system of mandates, because even that system did not peJ;mit mandated territories to be utilized for military purposes by the mandatory Powers. Bearing in mind all these considerations, the delegation of the Soviet Union submitted a proposal relating to the articles mentioning the establishment of bases in Trust Territories, which was more or less the same for all the draft agreements. This proposal provided that the construction of naval, military and air bases and the maintenance of the armed forces of the Administering Authority in trust territory should be carried out only on the basis of the obligations of the Administering Authority to the Security Council, as defined in a special agreement concerning strategic areas which is subject to the approval of the Security Council in confonnity with Article 83 of the Charter. This amendment, which embodies a very important principle, was rejected in the Committee by eighteen votes to fourteen. The results of the voting of this amendment show that many delegations are not in agreement with the present provisions of the drafts, which give the Administering Authority the possibility of utilizing trust territories arbitrarily for its military aims. On the other hand, we should bear in mind the specific composition of the majority which rejec~el;l the above-mentioned proposal of the Soviet Union delegation. Among the eighteen members of the Committee who voted against the Soviet Union amendment were six mandatory Powers, five of which had submitted their draft agreements for eight Trust Territories, and one of which - the Union of South Africa - has not yet submitted the draft agreement for the former mandated territory of South-West Africa. Thus this group contained a compact block of six mandatory Powers, who have a common interest as regards the former mandated territories. This circumstance was thrown into clear relief by the fact that the mandatory Powers. always supported one another against any proposal to lay down conditions of trusteeship such as would make the Trusteeship System a truly international institution, and not merely a screen behind which the Administering. Certain other countries, connected with these mandatory Powers by political ties or certain spe~al interests...co-operated with them closely. It 18 not surpnsmg that in such circumstances the above-mentioned proposal of the Soviet Union delegation was rejected owing to the influence of the group of mandatory Powers and the representatives of certain other countries. . These. ~ircumstancos also influenced the negative declSlon of the Committee in another exc.eedingly import~~t. question, namely the quesnon of so-called directly concerned" States as . . ' proVlded ID the Charter with respect to trust territories. The fact is that the draft trusteeship agreements submitted to the General Assembly were not agreed upon by the States directly concerned as should have been done in accordance with Article 79 of the United Nations Charter. This Article, however, provides that the terms of trusteeship for each Trust Territory shall be agreed upon by the States directly concerned, including the mandatory Power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of the United Nations. During the entire period between the first and second parts of the first session of the General Assembly no attempt was even made to read an agreement as to which States should be considered "directly concerned". At the same time, in certain cases the question as to which States were directly concerned in regard to one or the other of the mandated territories to be included in the Trusteeship System, was decided unilaterally and arbitrarily by the mandatory Powers, themselves. Such a state of things is contrary to the provisions of Article 79 of the Charter. During the work of Sub-Committee 1 of the Trusteeship Committee, the delegation of the Soviet Union proposed to define the States which were considered directly concerned according to the sense of Article 79 of the Charter. This Article lays down that the mandatory Powers are included in the States directly concerned, but does not indicate what Powers, except the mandatory Powers are to be considered as States directly concerned. This is a matter to be d~­ cided by the United Nations in order that It should not become the subject of a private arrangement between the mandatory Powers ~nd individual States behind the back of the Umted Nations. That would be an infringement of the Charter. The delegation of the Soviet Union believes that the five great Powers should be included first of all among the States directly concerned. The reason for this is primarily the fact that the United States of America, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and France are permanent members of t~e Trust~e~~p Council, and this emphasizes theIr responsIbilI~y for all Trust Territories. It must also be borne III Au cours des travaux du Sous-Comite 1 de la Corrimission de la tutelle, la delegation sovietique a propose d'etablir quels etaient les Etats qu'on pouvait considerer comme directement interesses, au sens de l'Article 79 de la Charte. Cet Article stipule que les Puissances mandataires sont comprises parmi les Etats directcment interesSes, mais il n'indique pas quels sont les Etats qui peuvent etre consideres comme direct~­ ment interesses en dehors des Puissances mandataires. 11 faut que I'Organisation des Nations Unies tranche cette question, afin, d'eviter que les Puissances mandataires ne se mettent a conclure, a l'insu de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, des arrangements particuliers avec telle ou telle puissance - ce qui constituerait une violation de la Charte. La delegation sovietique estime que, parmi les Etats directement interesses, il faut ranger en premier lieu les cinq grandes Puissances. Cela tient tout d'abord a Cf que les Etats-Unis d'Amerique, le Royaume-Dni, l'Union des Republiques sociaHstes sovietiques et la France sont membres permanents du Conseil de tutelle, ce qui met en evidence'leur responsabilite a l'egard de tous les territoires sous tutelle. D'autre Mais le Sous-Comite et la Commission - en raison surtout de l'opposition manifestee par les Puissances mandataires - ont rejete la proposition sovietique, qui etait de s'entendre sur la question des Etats directement interesses. Certaines autres delegations ant soutenu activement les Puissances mandataires dans leur opposition. En raison de cet etat de choses, les projets d'accords de tutelle soumis a l'Assemblee cornportent une violation des principes de la Charte relatifs au Regime de la tutelle. En fait, il est impossible de considerer ces accords comme des Accords de tutelle, puisque, selon l'Article 79 de la Charte, les conditions du Regime de tutelle doivent faire l'objet d'un accord entre les Etats directement interesses. Or, on n'a meme pas etabli jusqu'ici quels etaient ces "Etats directement interesses". Considerant, en vertu des raisons ci-dessus, que ces projets sont inacceptables, la delegation sovietique soumet a l'Assemblee generale le projet de resolution suivant: " "L'Assemblee generale estime que les projets d'accords de tutelle qui lui ont ete soumis par le Royaume-Uni pour le Tanganyika, le Togo et le Cameroun, par la France pourllJ.e Togo et le Cameroun, par la Belgique pour le Ruanda-Urundi, par l'Australie pour la Nouvelle-Guinee, et par la Nouvelle-Zelande pour le Samoa Occidental, sont rediges en violation des dispositions fondamentales de la Charte des Nations Unies en ce qui conce~le le Regime de tutelle, a savoir: "Second, the draft agreements include the provision whereby the territory in trust shall be admin~tered as an integral part of those States WhlCP. are Administering Authorities which, in fact, amounts to annexation of the territories in trust by the said States whereas Article 76 of the Charter provides'that the ~rusteeship System shall promote the progres- SIve development of the trust territories towards self-government or independence. • "Third, the proposed draft agreements provide as one of the terms for the establishment in Trust Territories of military, naval and air bases, without the Security Council's consent, which is contrary to Article 83 of the Charter, which requires the consent of the Security Council for the establishment of military, naval and air bases in Trust Territories. "The General Assembly, therefore, resolves: "1. To reject the draft agreements submitted for the above-mentioned territories under mandate as being inconsistent with the Charter; "2. To recommend to the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Australia and New Zealand to submit for the consideration of the General Assembly new draft trusteeship agreements for the above-mentioned territories under mandate, drawn up in conformity with the Charter." The Soviet Union delegation hopes that the Assembly will adopt this resolution and, by so doing, express its disapproval of the terms contained in the draft trusteeship agreements which are contrary to the interests of the peoples of the Trust Territories, and can only serve the interests of certain countries in their endeavour to increase their colonial possessions at the expense of the Trust Territories. This would be a flagrant contravention of the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Trusteeship System should be set up in full conformity ~it~ the United Nations Charter. Only thus WIll It be possible to fulfil the fundamental task o~ a Trusteeship System, which consists in pron:0tl~g the progressive development of Trust Terntones towards self-government or independence.

We must settle our work for this evening. We must, in fact, know what we intend to do. If we wish to deal with questions relating to dis- Le PRESIDENT: n s'agirait de regler les travaux de notre soiree. Nous devons, en effet, savoir ce que nous voulons faire. Si nous voulons aborder, ce soir encore, les questions relatives au Mr. Perez CrsNERos (Cuba) (translated from French): I understood that the Assembly had decided about two hours ago that after dealing with item 7, we would take up items 3, 4 and 5, which constitute all the proposals submitted by the Committee dealing with trusteeship questions. I should like to know if this is really the case. Several delegations have made arrangements to allow some of their members to rest, and they have left here representatives who are competent to deal with trusteeship questions. Consequently, they are not prepared to discuss the problem of disarmament. Mr. MOLOTOV (Union of Soviet Sdcialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, the Soviet delegation does not object to your proposal and to there being no English interpretation of my speech, but we would like the English translation of the draft resolution on the trusteeship question which was read by our representative.

I call upon Mr. Bartos, representative of Yugoslavia. Mr. BARTOS (Yugoslavia) (translated from French) : The Yugoslav delegation feels it necessary to make a short statement on the trusteeship question. Our delegation considers that the Trusteeship System constitutes progress in the field of international law, a step towards the final liberation of colonial peoples, towards their independence, and towards realizing the principle of the right of self-determination. This achievement is due to the Charter of our Organization, that instrument of peace, security and international co-operation based on the high aims of modern civilization. However, if we wish this achievement to be complete, we must implement our Charter, our constitution. The provisions of the Charter which relate to trusteeship are the minimum guarantees which can be given to peoples who do not yet enjoy full independence. These solemnly declared guarantees are the due of peoples under trusteeship, and we would run the risk of breaking solemn promises if we allowed ourselves to make a false application of the provisions relating to the Trusteeship System at the very outset. M. PEREZ CISNEROS (Cuba): Je crois bien avoir compris que l'AssembIee avait decide, il y a a peu pres deux heures, qu'apres le point 7, nous traiterions les points 3, 4 et 5, qui constituent l'ensemble des propositions transmises par la Commission qui s'est occupee des questions de tutel1e. Je voudrais savoir s'il en est bien ainsi. Plusieurs delegations ont pris des dispositions pour permettre a une partie de leurs membres de se reposer, et elles ont laisse ici les representants susceptibles de traiter des questions de tutelle. Elles ne sont, par consequent, pas preparees a discuter ·le probleme du desarmement. M. MOLOTOV (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Monsieur le President, la delegation sovietique ne s'oppose pas a votre proposition. Nous acceptons qu'il n'y ait pas d'interpretation anglaise de notre discours; toutefois, nous vous prions de faire tra· duire le projet de resolution sur la question de la tutelle que notre representant vient de lire. Le PRESIDENT: Je donne la parole aM. Bar- tos, representant de la Yougoslavie. M. BARTOS (Yougoslavie): La delegation yougoslave est obligee de faire une courte decla- ration concernant la question de la tutelle. Notre delegation considece que le Regime de tutelle represente un progres dans le domaine du droit international, une etape vers la liberation defini- tive des peuples colonises, vers leur independance, vers la realisation du principe du droit des peu-' pIes a disposer d'eux-m@mes. Cette acquisition est due a la Charte de notre Organisation, cet instrument de paix, de securite et de collabora- tion intemationale fonde sur les buts eIeves de la civilisation d'aujourd'hui. Mais, si nous voulons que cette acquisition soit complete, nous devons appliquer notre Charte, notre constitution. Les dispositions de la Charte concernant la tute1le constituent le minimum de garantie qui puisse ctre donne aux peuples ne jouissant pas encore d'une pleine in~ dependance. 'Ces garanties, solennellement pro- clamees, sont dues aux peuples sous tutelle et nous courrions le risque de compromettre les prbmesses solennellement donnees si nous nous permettions, des le debut du Regime de tutelle, de faire une application fausse des dispositions qui s'y rapportent.

I call upon Mr. MacEachen, representative of Uruguay. Mr. MAcEACHEN (Uruguay) : This propol3ed amendment is in direct opposition to the position which was taken by a majority of thirty-five out of forty~three representatives pre~ent and voting in the Committee, a vote which commanded nearly two-thirds of the Assembly, even without eleven Members present. c'est~a-dire traitant ce territoire presque comme une colonie. L'Article 81, de la Charte limite strictement, a la defense nationale, l'utilisation a des fins militaires de ces temtoires. Toute utilisation strategique des territoires sous tutelle est placee sous le controle du Conseil de securite ainsi que le stipulent les Articles 83 et 85 de la Charte. Au lieu d'appliquer ces deux principes, les accords qui nous sont soumis ant reconnu aux Puissances mandataires le droit d'utiliser les territoires sous Regime de tutell~ 'a des fins milltaires, sans tenir compte des interets des habitants et des principes poses par la Charte. La delegation yougoslave, respectant les principes poses par la Charte et exprimant sa sympathie aux peuples des pays sous tutelle, considere que les garanties offertes par la Charte sont minimes, et qu'elle se trouve dans l'impossibilite de voter en faveur d'accords qui ne donnent meme pas ce minimum de garantie. Notre delegation appuie egalement chaleureusement la resolution presentee par la delegation de l'Union sovietique. Le PRESIDENT: Je donne la parole aM. Mac- Eachen, representant de l'Uruguay. M. MACEACHEN (Uruguay) (traduit de l'anglais): L'amendement qui nous est propose va· entierement a l'encontre du vote emis a la Commission a une majorite de trente.cinq representants sur quarante-trois presents et votants; un te! vote engage prcs des deux tiers des Membres de I'AssembIee sans memetenir compte ~es onze Membres presents qui n'ont pas vote a la CommIssion.

We shall indeed be able to proceed to a vote. The resolution of the Soviet Union, which is opposed to that of the Committee, must be put to the vote first. You have all heard the French and English texts of this resolution, and I take it that it is not necessary for it to be read again. Mr. MOLOTOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) I request a vote by roll-call.

We shall proceed to a vote, taking as our basis the Committee's resolution. I say "taking as our basis t~e Conuruttee's resolution", because this resolutlOn calls for a separate vote on each trusteeship agreement. We shall therefore vote eight times by roll-call. Mr. MACEACHEN (Uruguay): May I suggest, Mr. President, an informal procedure: that we have a roll-call vote on the first agreement and th.en enquire whether there are any changes regardmg votes on the other agreements. Any such changes could be indicated by representatives from the floor. Le PRESIDENT: Nous allons, en effet, pou- voir passer au vote. La resolution de l'Union sovietique, qui s'oppose a celle de la Commis- sion, doit etre mise aux voix la premiere. Vous avez tous entendu la lecture du texte fran<;ais et du texte anglais de cette resolution, et je suppose qu'il n'est done plus necessaire de la lire. M. MOLOTOV (Union des Republiques so- cialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Je de- mande un vote par appel nominal. Votent pour: Republique socialiste sovietique de Bielorussie, Tchecoslovaquie, Pologne, Repu- blique socialiste sovietique d'Ukraine, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Yougoslavie. Votent contre: Argentine, Australie, Belgique, Bolivie, Bresil, Chill, Chine, Costa-Rica, Cuba, Danemark, Republique Dominicaine, Salvador, France, Grece, Honduras, Islande, Liban, Luxembourg, Mexique, Pays-Bas, Nouvelle-ze- lande, Nicaragua, Norvege, Panama, Paraguay, Perou, Suede, Syrie, Turquie, Union Sud- Africaine, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Ameri- que, Uruguay, Venezuela. S'abstiennent: Colombie, Equateur, Egypte, Ethiopie, Guatemala, Inde, Iran, Irak, Liberia, Republique des Philippines, Arabie saoudite. Decision: Le projet de resolution de l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques est re- pousse par trente-quatre voix contre six, et onze abstentions. Le PRESIDENT: Nous allons proceder au vote en prenant comme base la resolution de la Commission. Je dis hien "en prenant comme base la resolution de la Commission" parce que celle-ci demande qu'il y ait un vote separe pour chacun des Accords de tutelle. Nous procederons done huit fois al'appel nominal. M. MACEACHEN (Uruguay) (traduit de l'anglais): Puis-je me permettre, Monsieur le President, de suggerer qu'au lieu de recourir a la procedure reguliere, l'on emploie la methode qui consisterait a voter par appel nominal sur le premier accord et a demander ensuite aux representants s"ils desirent modifier leur vote sur les accords suivants, ce qu'ils pourraient signaler de leur place. La procidure proposee par le representant de l'Uruguay est adoptee. Proposed agreement for Ruanda-Urundi sub- mitted by the Government of Belgium The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The delegations which wish to change the votes they have just cast are asked to say so. Mr. LISICKY (Czechoslovakia) (translated from French): I wish to speak, not in order to change my vote but, in my capacity as Rap- porteur, to draw the Assembly's attention to page 14 of our report, where the preamble to the agreement for Ruanda-Urundi is mentioned. It must be understood that the vote on the draft agreement for Ruanda-Urundi will also include a vote on the Fourth Committee's proposal re- garding the preamble (page 14 of the French text ofthe report, page 13 of the English text). The PRF,SIDENT (translated from French): . This means that in voting on the agreement for Ruanda-Urundi, the Assembly recommends that this agreement should be preceded by a pre- amble similar to that of the agreement for Tanganyika. Decision: The Trusteeship Agreement for Ruanda-Urundi was adopted by forty-one votes to six) lVith five abstentions. Proposed agreement for the Cameroons under French mandate submitted by the Government of France The PRESIDENT (translated from Frenc~): The remark which has just been made regardmg the preamble to the Trusteeship Agreement for Ruanda-Urundi also applies to the agreement for the Cameroons under French mandate. Mr. LAN"G-E (Poland): I want to register an abstention. Decision: The Trusteeship Agreement for the Cameroons under French Mandate was adopted by forty-one votes to five with six abstentions. Accord de tutelJe pour le Ruanda-Urundi soumis par le Gouvernement de la Belgique Le PRESIDENT: Les delegations qui YOU- draient modifier le vote qu'elles viennent d'cmet- tre sont prieC:5 de le manifester. M. LISICKY (Tchecoslovaquie): Je demande la p!.role, non pas pour modifier mon vote mais pour attirer 1'attention de l'Assemblee, en ma qualite de Rapporteur, sur la page 14 de notre rapport ou l'on parle du preambule a l'Accord sur le Ruanda-Urundi. 11 doh ~tre entendu que le vote sur le projet d'accord du Ruanda-Urundi comprendra egalement le vote sur la proposition de la Quatrieme Commission au sujet du pream- bule (page 14 du texte franc;:ais du rapport, page 13 du texte anglais). Le PRESIDENT: Cela revient a dire qu'en vo- tant l'Accord sur le Ruanda-Urundi, l'Assemblee recommande que cet accord soit precede d'un preambule semblable a celui de l'Accord sur le Tanganyika. . Decision: L'Accord de tutelle pour le Ruan- da-Urundi est adopte par quarante et une voix contre six, et cinq abstentions. Accord de tutelle pour le Cameroun sous mandat fran~ai5 soumis par le Gouvernement de la France Le PRESIDENT: L'observation qui vient d'Ctre faite concernant le preambule de l'Accord de tutelle sur le Ruanda-Urundi s'applique egale- ment a l'Accord concernant le Cameroun sous mandat franc;:ais. M. LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais): Je demande que mon abstention soit mentionnee au proces-verbal. Decision: L'Accord de tutelle pour le Cameroun sous mandat franfais est adopee par quarante et tlne voix contre cinq) et six absten- tions. Mr. LANGE (Poland): Abstention. Decision: The Trusteeship Agreement for Togoland under French mandate was adopted by forty-one votes to five with six abstentions. Proposed agreement for Western Samoa sub- mitted by the Government of New Zealand Mr. LANGE (Poland): I vote against. Decision: The Trusteeship Agreement for Western Samoa was adopted by forty-one votes to six with five abstentions. Proposed agreement for Tanganyika submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom Decision: The Trusteeship Agreement for Tanganyika was adopted by forty-one votes to six with five abstentions. . Proposed agreement for the Cameroons under British mandate submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom Decision: The Trusteeship Agreement for the Cameroons under British mandate was adopted by forty-one votes to six with five abstentions. Proposed agreelnent for Togoland under British mandate submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom Decision: The Trusteeship Agreement for Togoland under British mandate was adopted by forty-one votes to six with five abstentions.

We have a second resolution of the Committee, which provides for a vote on Annex 2 of the Fourth Committee's repprt. In the opinion of the President and the Secretary, we should postpone our vote on this question until tomorrow. (It was so agreed). We have now to decide whether we should continue to deal with questions reported on by the Fourth Committee, or if we should reverse the decision which we took just now. If some delegations wish that we should now deal with the questions of disarmament and the ,presence of troops of members of the United Nations on foreign territory, I am at the Assembly's disposal and have no preferences. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation prefers that We proceed now to discuss the question of disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and, of course, of troops. I mean the presence of United Nations troops on foreign territory. Mr. NICHOL~S (Union of South Africa): I hope that we WIll adhere to our previous decision M. LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais): Je m'abstiens. Decision: L'Accord de tutelle pour le Togo sous mandat franfais est adopte par quarante et une voix contre cinq, et six abstentions. Accord de tutelle pour le Samoa occidental soumls par le Gouvernement de la Nouvelle- Zelande M. LANGE. (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais): Je vote contre. Decision: L'Accord de tuteUe pour le Samoa occidental est adopte par quarante et une voix contre six, et cinq abstentions. Accord de tutelle pour le Tanganyika soumis par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni Decision: L'Accord de tuteUe pour le Tanganyika est adopte par quarante et une voix contre six, et cinq abstentions. Accord de tutelle pour le Cameroun sous mandat brltannique soumis par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni Decision: L'Accord de tutelle pour le Cameroun sous manda,t britannique est adopte par quarante et une voix contre six, et cinq abstentions. Accord de tutelle pour le Toga sous mandat britannique soumis par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni Decision: L'Accord de tuteUe pour le Togo sous mandat britannique est adopte par quarante et une voix contre six, et cinq abstentions. Le PRESIDENT: Nous avons une deuxieme resolution de la Commission c(ui prevoit un vote sur l'annexe 2 du rapport de la Quatrieme Commission. Le President et le Seeretaire sont d'avis que nous devrions remettre ~ demain notre vote sur cette question. (It en est ainsi decide.) Nous devons decider maintenant si nous entendons continuer ~ nous occuper des questions rapportees par la Quatrieme Commission ou si nous voulons revenir sur la decision que nous avions prise tout al'heurc. Si certaines delegations desirent que nous abordions maintenant les questions du desarmement et de la presence de troupes de Membres des Nations Unies sur des territoires etrangers, je suis a la disposition de l'AssembIee, et je ·n'ai pas de preference. M. VYCHINSKY (Union des Rcepubliques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): La delegation sovietique prefere que nous passions ala discussion de la question du desannement, de la reglementation des armements et - bien entendu - des troupes. Je precise: il s'agit de la presence de troupes de Membres des Nations Unies en territoire ctranger. M. NWHOLLS (Union Sud-Africaine) (traduit de l'anglais): J'espere que nons nous en

The danger of the kind of proposal r have just made is that it may give rise to long discussions on procedure. I shall put the question to the vote at once. Le PRESIDENT: C'est ,6videmment le danger du genre de proposition que je viens de faire que de provoquer de tres longues discussions sur la procedure. Je vais mettre la question aux voix tout de suite. Decision: L'Assemblee decide, amain levee, de prodder ala discussion des principes regissant la n}glementation et la reduction generales des armements. Decision: The Assembly decided by show of hands to proceed to the discussion of the general regulation and reduction of armaments. 175. Principes regissant la reglementation et la reduction generales des arme~ ments. Rapport de la Premiere Commission (document A/267) 175. Principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments: report of the First Committee (document A/267) . Le PRESIDENT: La parole est a M. Byrnes, representant des Etats-Unis d'Amerique.

I call upon Mr. Byrnes representative of the U)1ited States of America. M. BVRNES (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Les Etats-Unis d'Amerique appuient chaleureusement le projet de resolutionl qui nous est soumis. Je tiens d'abord a feliciter les membres de la Commission d'avoir conci1ieS leurs divergences de vues afin de presenter cette resolution. lis ont rendu un' tres grand service ala cause de la paix. J'ai su aussi combien avait ete precieuse l'aide que l'excellent President de l'Assemblce a apportce a la Commission; je sais que vous vous joindrez tous a moi pour rendre hommage aux efforts de l'eminent representant de la Belgique, M. Spaak. Des la fin des hostilites, la politique des Etatl\- Unis a consiste a h~ter le l'etablissement de la paix. Nous voulons permettre aux combattants des Nations Unies de rentrer dans leurs foyers, dans leur familles. Nous voulons donner a taus les peuples la possibilite de reconstruire ce que la guerre a demoli. 11 n'y a pas lieu de douter de la ferme volonte du peuple americain de faire tout le possible pour se liberer et pour liberer le monde du fardeau des armements excessifs. Ce qui, ces dernieres annees, inquietait les nations pacifiques ce n'etait pas de voir les Etats-Unis trop armes, mais bien au contraire, de constater que ce pays ne possedait pas des armements suffisqnts pour sauvegarder la paix. Lorsqu'en septembre 1939, Hitler declcncha la guerre mondiale, il y avait plus de cinq ans que l'Allemagne se preparait a la guerre. Or, a ce Mr. BYRNES (United States of America): The United States supports wholeheartedly the proposed resolutions\ I first wish to congratulate the members of the Committee on reconciling their differences and reporting the resolutions. They have made a splendid contrib"ution to the cause of peace. I have learned too of the splendid assistance rendered the Committee by the accomplished President of the Assembly, and I know you will all join me in expressing appreciation of th~ efforts of the distinguished representative of Belgium, Mr. Spaak. Ever since the close of hostilities, it has been the policy of the United States to hasten the return of conditions of peace. We want to enable the fighting men of the United Nations to return to their homes and their families. We want to give the people of all lands the chance to rebuild what the war has destroyed. There need be no concern about the .willingness of the American people to do everything within their power to rid themselves and the world of the· burden of excessive armaments. In the recent past, the concern of peace-loving nations has not been that America maintained excessive armaments. The concern has been that America failed to maintain adequate armaments to guard the peace. When Hitler started the world war in September 1939, 'Germany had been preparing for war for more than five years. But at that time, there were in the active service of the United States Army, Navy and Air Force, only 330,000 men. It was our military weakness, not our military strength, that encouraged -Axis aggression. moment~la, le total du personnel en service actif dans l'armee, la marine; et les forces aeriennes des Etats-Unis ne depassait. pas 330.000 hommes. C'est notre £aiblesse, et non notre force militaire, qui a encourage l'agression de l'Axe. Apres la premiere guerre mondiale, le Japon rec;:ut un mandat sur des iles du sud-ouest du Pacifique ayant une importance strategique, contre l'engagement que ees lles resteraient demilitarisees. Bien qu'il fut evident que le Japan violait les termes du mandat, les Etats- After the ,first world war, Japan was given a mandate over strategically important islands in the South-West Pacific which bound her to keep those islands demilitarized. Although the evidence showed that Japan was violating the terms of the mandate, the United States delayed While before the second world war the peaceloving nations were seeking peace through disarmament, aggressor nations were building up their armaments. And all the while aggressor nations were building up armaments, they were claiming that they were being smothered and encircled by other nations. While we scrapped battleships, Japan scrapped blueprints. While we reduced our Army to the size of a large police force, Germany trained its youth for war. Too late, those who had taken a leading part in the struggle for general disarmament before the second world war discovered that Axis agents were deliberately organizing and supporting disa.rmament moven1ents in non-Axis countries in order to render those countries powerless to resist their Ilggr~ion. Too late, those who had taken a leading part in the struggle for general disarmament discovered that it was not safe to rely upon any diSarmament which is not collectivel;y enforced and made a part of a system of collective security. It will take time, patience and goodwill to achieve really effective disarmament. The difficulties are great and the complexities many. The defence needs of States vary greatly. The elements which make up the military lltrength of States likewise vary greatly and cannot readily be compared or appraised. Effective disarmament cannot be secured by any simple mathematical rule. Demobilized divisions can be speedily recalled to the colours. But a scrapped plane or a scrapped battleship can never be recommissioned. Disarmament, to be effective, must look to the future. It is easy for us now to see what folly it would have been, when gunpowder was discovered, to start disarming by limiting the use of the bow and arrow. We must see to it that disarmament starts with the major weapons of mass destruction. We must see to it that disarmament is general and not unilateral. We must see to it that disarmament rests not upon general promises which are kept by some Sta.tes and ignored by other States. We We must see to it that these safeguards are so clear a~d explicit tha~ there will be no question of the rIght of complymg States-veto or no veto -to take immediate action in defense of the rule of law. No disarmament system which leaves law-abiding States weak and helpless in the face of aggression Can ever contribute to world peace and security. But in meeting the problems of disarmament first things should come first. The first task which must be undertaken is the control of atomic energy to ensure that it will be used only for human welb,re and not for deadly warfare. There are other weapons of mass destruction, but unless we can meet the challenge of atomic warfare-the most dreadful weapon ever devised-we can never meet the challenge of these other weapons. The United States, with Britain and Canada, have demonstrated their awareness of the grave responsibility inherent in their discovery of the means of applying atomic enerID". In· a world of uncontrolled armaments, atomic energy. would. be an advantage to the United States for many years to come. But it is not the desire of the United States to be the leader in an armament race. We prefer to prevent, rather than to win, the 'next war. That is why President T~uman announced as soon as he knew that the atomic bomb would work, that it was our purpose to collaborate with other nations to ensure that atomic energy should not become a threat to world peace. Shortly thereafter, the heads of the three Governmentll responsible for the discovery of atomic energy, met at Washington and urged that the United Nations set up a commission to recommend proposals for the effective intemational control of atomic energy and all other weapons adaptable for mass destruction. One of the primary reasons for my trip to :Moscow in December 1945 Was to ask the Soviet Union to join with Britain and Canada in sponsoring a resolution to this effect before the General J\ssen1bly. As soon as the agreement of the Government of the Soviet Union was obtained, France and China were also asked and they agreed to join in sponsoring the resolution. These efforts resulted in the unanimous passing of the resolution by the General Assembly in January, 1946, only six months after the discovery of the aton1ic bomb. a~.compapne de garanties reelles sous la forme ?mspec~lOns et d'autres mesures sous contr8le mternatlOnal, a~n ~e proteger les Etats qui executent,.leurs ~bhgatIons, contre les risqucs resultant d mfractlOns et de subterfuges. Il faut .nous assurer que ces garanties sont ~ssez p.recIses et explicites pour que ne puisse etre mls, en doute-veto, ou non-le droit des Etats e~ecu:ant ~eurs obligations, d'entreprenclre une act~on Imme,diate pour faire respecter la loi. Un systeme de desarmement qui laissera les Etats r,espect~nt la loi, f~ib1es et impuissants devant I agresslOn, ne contnbuera jamais a la paix et 1- la securitc internationales. ' Mais, lorsqu'on s'occupe de desarrnement il fa~t co~men~er par le commencement. La premIere tache a' entreprendre c'est le controlc de ~'ener.gie atomiq~~ afin ,d~ s'assurer que cette energle ne sera utIhsee qu en vue du bien-etre des ~om~es et,non pour l~ur faire'une guerre amort. 11 eXIste d autres engms de destruction massive . . . , maIs SI nous ne pouvons tl'lompher de la menace de.la ~ombe atomique-l'arrne la plus terrifiante qUI sOlt-nous ne pourrons jamais venir about des problemes que posent ces autres engins. De mcme que la Grande-Bretagne et le Canada,. les Et~ts-Unis ont montre qu'ils avaient conSCIence de la grave responsibilite qui leur incombait du fait qu'ils avaient decouvert les moyens d'utiliser 1'energie atomique. Dans un monde ou les armements ne seraient pas reglen1entes, l'energie atomique constituerait un avantage pour les Etats-Unis pendant de longues annees; mais les Etats-Unis ne se soucient pas de tenir la premiere place dans une course al1X armements. Nous preIerons prevenir la prochaine guerre plut6t que de la gagner. Aussi, des que le President Truman a su que la bombe atomique etait au point, il a annonce que notre intention etait de collaborer avec les autres nations pour faire en sorte que l'energie atomique ne puisse devenir une menace pour la paix du monde. Peu apres, les chefs des trois Gouvernements auxquels on doit la decouverte de 1'cnergie atomique, se sont reunis a Washington et ont demande instamment que les Nations Unies constituent une commission chargee de faim des propositions en vue d'un controle international effectif de l'energie atomique et de tous autres engins pouvant etre utilises pour des destructions massives. Un des objectifs essentiels de n10n voyage a Moscou, en decembre 1945, etait de demander a 1'Union sovietique de se joindre a la Grande- Bretagne et au Canada pour appuyer une resolution dans ce sens al'Assemblee generale. Des que le Gouvernement de 1'Union sovi& tique eut pron1is cet appui, la France et la Chine furent egalemcnt sollicitecs et ell.es accentcre?t, elles aussi d'appuyer cette resolutIOn. A la Sl1lte de ces efforts la resolution a etc adoptee a l'unanimite p~r l'Assemblee generale, en janvier 1946, soit six mois seulement apres la decouverte de la bombe aton1ique. Our proposals, when fully operative, would leave with the States responsible for the discovery of atomic energy no rights which would not be shared with other Members of the United Nations. Our proposals outlaw the use of atomic weapons and contemplate the disposal of existing atomic weapons. They set up an international authority with power to prevent the national manufacture and use of atomic weapons for war purposes, and to develop atomic energy for human welfare. Our proposals also provide effective and practical safeguards against violations and evasions. They enable States that keep their pledges to take prompt and collective action against those who violate their pledges~ We do not suggest any diminution of the right of veto in the consideration of the treaty governing this subject. We do say that once the trea,ty has become effective, then there can be no recourse to a veto to save an offender from punishment. We are willing to share our knowledge of ato1p.ic weapons with the rest of the world on the condition, and only on the condition, that other nations submit, as we are willing to submit, to ,internationally controlled inspection and safeguards. From the statements made in the Committees and in the Assembly we have been encouraged to believe that others are willing likewise to submit to international inspection. If other nations have neither bombs nor the ability to manufacture them, it should be easy for them to agree to inspection. But the world should understand that without collective safeguards there can be no collective disarmament. The resolution we proposed here urges the expeditious fulfilment by the Atomic Energy 'Commission of 'its terms of reference. Those terms include the control not only of atomic energy but the control of other instruments of fa~on a permettre a la Commission en question de remplir sa tache d'une maniere equitable, effective et pratique. Le jour OU elles seraient vraiment appliquees nos propositions ne laisseraient aux Etats qui ont decouvert l'energie atomique d'autres droits que ceux qu'ils auraient en commun avec les autres Membres des Nations Unies. Nos propositions prohibent legalement l'emploi des armes atomiques et prevoient la destruction des armes atomiques existantes. Nos propositions prevoient l'institution d'une autorite internationale qui aurait le pouvoir d'empecher, dans chaque pays, la fabrication et l'utilisation d'armes atomiques en vue de la guerre, et qui serait chargee de developper l'utilisation de l'energie atomique pour le bien de l'humanite. Nos propositions prevoient egalement des garanties pratiques et efficaces contre les violations et les subterfuges. EIles permettent aux Etats respectueux de leurs obligations de prendre promptement des mesures collectives contre les Etats qui violent les leurs. Nous ne suggerons nullement de restreindre l'exercice, du droit de veto durant l'examen de 1'instrument diplomatique re1atif a la reglementation des armements, mais nous dec1arons formellement qu'une fois que cet instrument sera entre en vigueur, il ne pourra plus y avoir de recours au veto pour epargner le cMtiment a un Etat qui viole ses obligations. Nous sommes prets a partager avec le reste du monde nos connaissances en maticre d'armes atomiques ala condition-et il s"agit d'une condition sine qua non-que les autres nations se soumettent, comme nous sommes nOUS-melnes prets a le faire, a un systeme international de controle, d'inspection et de garanties. Les declarations faites dans les commissions et a l'Assemblee nous ont donne bon espoir que les autres Etats sont comme nollS prets a se soumettre a une inspection internationale. Si d'autres nations ne possedent pas de bombes et n'ont pas non plus la possibilite d'en fabriquer, elles devraient pouvoir sans peine accepter l'inspection. En tout cas, le monde devrait comprendre que, sans garantie collective, il ne saurait y avoir de desarmement collectif. La resolution que nous avons presentee demande instamment que la Commission de l'energie atomique s'acquitte sans retard du mandat qui lui est confie. Ce mandat comprend le contrale, non seulement de l'energie atomique, Let us ~o~centrate upon ~hose major weapons and not dISSIpate our energIes on the less important problems of controlling pistols and hand grenades. qu~ le controle des revolvers et des grenades a mam. ' Si nous tenons vraiment a voir se realiser le dcsarmement et pas seulement adiscourir sur ce probleme, 110US devrions inviter nos represcntants a la Commission de l'energie atomique a pousser a~tivement l'elaboration des propositions constructIves que cette Commission doit presenter. Il y a deja six mois que la Commission travaille; eile peut deposer un rapport provisoire la semaine prochaine: je ne voudrais pas voir les travaux de la, Commission ajoumes indefiniment ou sabotes. Je suis heureux que la resolution proposee cvoque, au sujet du probleme du desarmement la question du stationnement des forces arme~ et de la justification de la presence de telles forces sur des territoires etrangers. Au probleme du desarmement se trouve liee la question de l'usage qui peut etre fait des armes et des forces armees qui restent autorisees. La reduction des' armements n'amenera pas la paix si 1'on emploie les annes et les forces armees qui subsistent asaper la securite collective. Les Etats-Unis ont demande avec persistance que les traites de paix avec l'Italie et les anciens satellites de l'Axe soient rapidement conclus. Nous voulons rendre possible le retrait complet des forces armees stationnees dans ces pays. Les Etats-Unis ont demande avec la mcme persistance que l'on conclue un traite reconnaissant 1'independance de l'Autriche et prevoyant le retrait des forces armees ctrangeres. L'Autriche est, a nos yeux, un pays libere et non un pays ex-ennemi. En tant que signataires de la Declaration de Moscou de 1943, les Etats-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et l'Union sovietique sont tenus de delivrer le plus tot possible l'Autriche du fardeau de l'occupation. Les Etats-Unis estiment que l'occupation d'un pays par des forces armees doit ct~e strictem.ent limitee aux necessites' de la secunte collective. C'est pourquoi au Conseil des Ministres des Affaires etrangeres, nous avons propose que l'on fixe d'un commun accord des plafonds pour les effectifs des forces d'occupation en Europe. Nous n'avons pas pu parvenir.3o un accord cette semaine-ci, mais nous poursUlvrons nos efforts pour reduire ces forces d'occupation en Europe. Nous somrnes egalement disposes a f~xer par entente, des plafonds pour les forces d occupation au Japon et en Coree: , Le jour de la victoire contre le Japon, ~ous avions plus de cinq millions d'hommes, s~tIon­ nes outre-mer. Nous avions dO expedIer,. en mcme temps que ces forces armees, des quantlt~s considerab1es d'approvisionnements et de materie! qui ne pouvaient ctre liquidees seance tenante. If we are really interested in effective disannament ~d not merely in talking about it, we should Instruct our representatives on the Atomic Energy Commission to press forward now with its constructive proposals. The Commission has been at work six months. They can file an interim report next week. I do not want the work of that Commission to be side-tracked or sabotaged. I am glad that the proposed resolution raises, in connection with the problem of disarmament, the question of the disposal of troops and the justification of their presence on foreign soil. Disarmament necessarily raises the question of the use which may be made of arms and anned forces which are not prohibited. Reducing armaments will not bring peace if the arms and armed forces that remain are used to undermine collective security. The United States has persistently pressed for the early conclusion of peace treaties with Italy and the ex-satellite States. We want to make possible the complete withdrawal of troops from those states. The United States has also persistently urged the conclusion of a treaty recognizing the independence of Austria and providing forthe withdrawal of foreign troops. Austria, in our view, is a liberated and not an ex-enemy country. The United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, as signatories of the Moscow Declaration of 1943 are obligated to relieve her of the burden of occupation at the earliest possible moment. The United States believes that armed occupation should be strictly limited by the requirements of collective security. For that reason we proposed to the Council of Foreign Ministers that we should fix agreed ceilings on the occupation forces in Europe. We could not secure agreement this week, but we shall continue our efforts to reduce the occupation forces in Europe. We are also prepared to fix agreed ceilings for the occupation forces in Japan and Korea. On V-J Day we had over five million troops overseas. We had to send with them extensive supplies and equipment which could not be disposed of overnight. ell~ s'est Hvde et de l'experience qu'eile a acqUlse, , ce~te Commission est l'organisme le plus ap~e a elaborer des plans quand il s'agit de traIter les principales questions de desarmement. .Co~centrons notr~ attention Sur les armes prmClpales et ne dispersons pas notre cnergie sur des questions de moindre importance telles The great majority of the troops we have on the territory of the other States outside these occupation areas are supply or administrative personnel. Let me state specifically just what combat troops we have in these other States. We have a total of 96,000 military personnel in the Philippines but only about 30,009 are combat forces, air and ground, and of these 17,000 are Philippine Scouts. These troops are in the Philippines primarily to back up our forces in Japan. Substantial reductions are contemplated in the near future. Of the 19,000 troops we have in China, about 15,000 are combat troops and roughly one-half of these are today under orders to return home. We have about 1,500 troops in Panama, excluding the Canal Zone. One thousand of those, composed of a small air unit and some radar air- ~arning detachments, can be classified as combat forces. We have, of course, our nonnal protective forces in the Panama Canal Zone proper. We have no combat units in countries other than those I have just mentioned. Our military personnel in Iceland number less than 600 men.· They include no combat troops. They are being withdrawn rapidly and all will he withdrawn by early April 1947, in accordance with our agreement with the Government of Iceland. The military personnel have been there only to maintain one of our air transport lines of cooununication with our occupation forces in Germany. In the Azores, on the southern air transport communication line to Germany, we have about 300 men. Again there is not a single combat soldier among them. They are technicians and administrative officials. They are there under an agreement with the Government of Portugal. Our combat troops are in North China at the request of the Chinese National Government. Their task is to assist in carrying out the terlllil of sun-ender with respect to the disarming and deportation of the Japanese. Their mission i5 nearly completed. Instructions have already been issued for the return of half of our forces now in China although the Chinese Government has urged that they be retained there until conditions become more stabilized. Because the representative of the Soviet Union has referred to our troops in China, it is fair for me to say that I am confident that the number of American troops in North China is far less than the number of Soviet troops in South Manchuria, in the Port Arthur area. ~ fait allusion a nos forces armees en Chine, 11 me parait bon de dire que je suis convaincu que les effectifs americains dans le nord de la Chine sont tres inferieurs aux effectifs sovietiques en Mandchourie meridionale, dans la region de Port-Arthur. Par le traite de paix avec la Finlande, l'Union sovietique acquiert le droit de prendre a bail la base navale de Porkkala en Finlande et d'y maintenir des forces armees. Les quelques milliers de soldats americains qui sont temporairement stationncs en Chine, a la demande de ce pays, ne posent assurement pas un probleme qui differe essentiellement de celui que cree la presence permanente de forces armees de l'Union sovietique dans un pays etranger, en execution des clauses d'un traite. Nous desirons respecter dans sa lettre et dans son esprit la Declaration de Moscou. Nous n'avons pas l'intention d'utiliser, contrairement aux buts et aux principes de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, nos forces armees stationnees sur le territoire d'autres Etats. La mise en reuvre de la Declaration de Moscou ne se trouve pas facilitee si l'on se lance des accusations et contre-accusations sans fondement. Cette declaration prevoit des consultations, et telle est bien la methode que nous devrions suivre si nous voulons servir la cause du desarmement et de la securite collective. En decembre dernier, a Moscou, nous avons consulte l'Union sovietique et le Royaume-Uni au sujet de nos forces armees stationnees en Chine. Nous venons de demander une consultation du Conseil des Ministres des Maires etrangeres au sujet de l'effectif des forces armees qui seront maintenues en Allemagne, en Pologne, en Autriche, en Hongrie et en Roumanie a partir de la conclusion des traites de paix avec les anciens satellites de l'Axe. Notre tache est d'assurer la securite collective en veillant scrupuleusement au respect du prin-. cipe de l'egalitcS souveraine de tous les Etats. Ceci depasse la question des armements et des forces annees. Les pays agresseurs ne partent pas en gue~re parce qu'ils sont armes, mais Under the Finnish Peace Treaty the Soviet Union acquires the right to lease the Porkkala naval base in Finland and to maintain troops there. The temporary presence of a few thousand United States troops in China at the request of that country certainly raises no essentially different question than the permanent presence of Soviet troops in another country under treaty arrangements. It is our desire to live up to the letter and the spirit of the MOBCOW Declaration. We do not intend to use our troops on the territories of other States contrary to the purp08eS and principles of the United Nations. The implementation of the Moscow Declaration is not made easier by lOO5e charges or counter-charges. The Declaration requires consultation and that is the method we should pursue if we wish to advance the cause of disarmament and of collective security. Last December at Moscow we consulted tile Soviet Union and the United Kingdom regarding our troops in China. We have now asked for consultation in the Council of Foreign Ministers regarding the number of troops to be retained in Germany, Poland, Austria, Hungary and Rumania upon the conclusion of the peace treaties with the ex-satellite States. The task before U3 is to maintain collective security with'scrupulous regard for the liIOvereign equality of all States, This involves· more than the question of armaments and armed forces. Aggressor nations do not go to war because they are anned, but because they want to get with Great States must strive for understandings which will not only protect their own legitimate security requirements but also the political independence and integrity of the smaller States. It is not in the interest of peace and security that the basic power relationships among great States should depend upon which political party comes to power in Iran, Greece or in China. Great States must not permit differences among themselves to tear asunder the political unity of smaller States. Then, smaller States must recognize that true collective security requires their co-operation just as much as that of the larger States. Without the co-operation of large States and small States, all of. our disarmament pla;ns are doomed to failure. A race for armaments, a race for power is not in the interest of any country or of any people. We want to stop the race for armaments and we want to stop the race for power. We want to be partners with all nations, not to make war, but to keep the peace. We want to uphold the rule of law among nations. We want to promote the freedom and well-being of all peoples in a friendly civilized world.

I call upon Mr. Makin, representative of Australia. Mt. MARIN (Australia): The passing of this resolution will mean the commencement of a great work. It is an expreBSion of our common resolve to take a path leading towar.ds peace and security, and of our determination to advance towards that goal side by side. We do 'not know yet where this day will stand in history. That depends on the way in which we work in the coming years. All we say, and that is all we can say at this moment, is that we will do our best, placing confidence in each other, to attain the high purposes of this resolution and to follow the principles which it lays down. At the commencement of the disarmament debate the Australian delegation presented a proposal on disarmament, and we are happy to find that' all of the principles which we then advanced have been incorporated in the present text. Le PRESIDENT: Je donne la parole a M. Makin, representant de I'Australie. M. MARIN (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais) : L'adoption de cette resolution marquera le debut d'une grande reuvre. Cette resolution exprime notre volonte commune de nOus engager sur une voie qui conduise a la paix et a la securite et notre ferme intention' de marcher cote a cote vers ce but. Nous ne savons pas encore queUe place cette journee occupera dans l'histoire; ceIa dependra de la manihe dont nous travaillerons au cours des annees a venir. Tout cc que nous disons, et c'est tout ce que nous pouvons dire pour le moment, c'est que nous nouS efforcerons, dans un esprit de confiance mutuelle, .d'~tteindr~ les buts eleves et d'appliquer les pnnclpes qUi sont enonces dans cette resolution. Au commencement du debat sur la question, la delegation australienrie a presente une proposition relative au desarmement; nous sommes heureux de constater que tous les principes alors enonces par nous, ont ete incIus dans le texte soumis al'AssemblCe. (b) The fulfilment of the terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission should be expedited. (c) The reduction and regulation of armaments and the prohibtion of weapons of mass destruction should be based on an international convention or conventions. c) La reduction et la reglementation des armements, ainsi que l'interdiction des armes de destruction massive, devraient etre regies par une ou plusieurs conventions internationales. d) Le systeme devrait comprendre des garanties efficaces protegeant les Etats respectueux de leurs obligations contre les risques de violation et de subterfuge. e) Pour la realisation des fins ci-dessus, i1 faudrait etablir un organe international special de contr01e et d'inspection, dote de pouvoirs suffisants pour lui permettre de s'acquitter de ses fonctions. Pour parler franchement, nous estimons que le texte de la resolution proposee n'est ni aussi clair ni aussi precis qu'il pourrait l'etre. Nous aurions prefere une resolution beaucoup plus simple qui visat directernent et uniquement a permettre de commencer l'elaboration des plans de desarmement. Mais les imperfections de ce texte proviennent de la maniere dont il a ete etabli et de l'activite intense qui a ete d6ployee dans les differentes Commissions en vue de coordonner les idees cxprimees par les delegations. Apres avoir participe aux travaux des Commissions et entendu les declarations faites par les chefs des diverses delegations, nous estimons qu'aucun doute ne peut plus subsister sur ce que la resolution entend signifier et sur le fait qu'el1e contient, entre autres notions generales et declarations de principes, les principes memes aUKquels la delegation australienne a attache, depuis le debut de la discussion, une importance capitale, parce qu'elle les considere comme essentiels a l'edification d'un systeme solide et efficace de desannement. ' Pour conclure, je tiens a. dire combien nous avons apprecie l'elevation d'esprit dont les grandes Puissances ont fait preuve en mettant leUT force au service· du bien commun. La vote du desarmement ne s'ouvrira que lorsque les grandes Puissances abaisseront les barrieres, lorsqu'elles s'engageront a desarmer et a participer a un systeme de reglementation et de reduction des armements. En s'associant a cette resolution, les grandes Puissances ont nettement marque leur intention d'agir dans ce sens, et fait nahre ainsi un espoir chez les hommes de tous les pays. Les nations qui ne sont pas aussi grandes ont, eUes aussi, un interet vital au succes du desarmement, et un role tres important a. jouer. Peut-etre est-ce un fait significatif que 1'on ait incorpore ala resolution qui est actuellement soumise a. l'Assemblee un bon nombre des suggestions faites par les petites nations. On peut y trouver, en efIet, outre les idees exprimces par (d) The system should include effective safeguards to protect complying States against the hazards of violation and evasions. (e) For the above purpose there should be established a special international organ for control and inspection, with powers adequate for the discharge of its duties. To speak frankly, we do not think the text of the resolution is as clear and as precise as it might be. We would have preferred a much simpler and much more direct resolution sufficient for the single purpose of commencing the work of formulating disarmament plans. But any clumsiness in the text is the result of its history and the intensive work done in a succession of Committees in bringing together the various ideas of various delegations. We believe from our participation in the work of the Committees and from hearing the statements made by the leaders of various delegations that there can now be no doubt as to what the text of the resolution is intended to mean, and that, among other principles and statements of opinion, it contains those principles to which our delegation has from the commencement of the debate attached first importance, because we regard them as essential to the building of a sound and effective system of disarmament. In conclusion, I should like to express our ap· preciation of the spirit shown by the great Powers in bending their strength to serve the common good. The 'way to disarmament can only be opened when they take down the barriersand when they pledge themselves to disarm and to co-operate in a system of regulation and reduction of arms. By joining in this resolution, they have given earnest proof of their intention to do so, and have raised the hopes of men in all lands. At the same time the nations who are not so great have a deep interest in disarmament and a very real part to play. It is perhaps significant that this resolution now before us contains a good measure of the suggestions put forward by the smaller nations. Here will be found, in addition to the words and the ideas of the great Powers, the words and the

I call upon Mr. El-Sanhoury; representative of Egypt. Mr. El-SANHOURY (Egypt) (translated from French): I note with the greatest pleasure that the question of disarmament has met with general agreement in the First Oommittee, particularly with regard to the. principle of the general regulation and reduction of armaments, the total prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and the institution of an effective system of control and inspection. There is no nobler or higher task than that which we can undertake at this meeting by voting unanimously for the resolution which has already been adopted unanimously by acclamation in the First Oommittee. The essential purpose of our Organization is to ensure international peace and security. However, peace and security can only be established by serious and bold efforts towards disannament, in order to increase general confidence, because, after all, the guarantee of security depends on the confidence which the Powers have in each other. After so many ordeals, the question of security cannot be separated from that of disannament. The resolution before us quite rightly emphasizes, in paragraph 7, the close link which exists between the two questions. I shall confine myself here to elaborating one of the essential points stated in this very important paragraph, the point relating to the· immediate withdrawal of foreign troops stationed on the territory of Member States. It is obvious that every Member State enjoys full sovereignty; that is the very foundation of our Organization. This foundation is defined in the Charter in the clearest and most explicit fashion. Article 2 states that the. Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members. Furthermore, acc?rding to the Oharter itself, one of the prin- CIpal purposes of the United Nations is to develop friendly relations among nations based on Le PRESIDENT: Je donne la parole a M. EI- Sanhoury, representant de l'Egypte. M. El-SANHOURY (Egypte): Je constate avec le plus grand plaisir que la question du desarmement a ete, au sein de la Premiere Oommission, l'objet d'un accord general qui s'est particuliere. ment manifeste sur le principe de la reglementation et de la reduction generales des armements, ainsi que sur l'interdiction totale des armes de destruction massive et sur l'institution d'un systeme efficace de controle et d'inspection. Il n'y a pas de tftche plus noble et plus elevee que cene que nous pouvons entreprendre en cette seance en approuvant unanimement la resolution deja adoptee al'unanimite et par acclamation par la Premiere Oommission. Le but essentiel de notre Organisation est d'assurer la paix et la securite internationales. Or, la paix et la securite ne peuvent etre etablies que par des efforts serieux et hardis entrepris en vue du desarmement, afin d'accroltre la confiance generale car, apres tout, la garantie de la securite est fonction de la confiance que leg Puissances ont les unes envers les autres. Apres tant d'epreuves subies, on ne saurait separer la question de la securite de celle du desarmement. La resolution qui nous est soumise releve tres justement, dans son paragraphe 7, le lien etroit qui existe entre les deux questions. Je me borne a examiner ici Pun des points essentiels qu'affinne ce paragraphe tres important, celui re1atif au retrait sans delai des forces etrangeres stationnees sur des territoires d'Etats Membres. Il est evident que tout Etat Membre jOllit de sa pleine souverainete; c'est la base meme de notre Organisation. On trouve cette base definie dans la Oharte de la fac;on la plus claire et la plus explicite. L'Article 2 dit en ciiet que POrganisation est fondee sur le principe de l'egalit'e souveraine de tous ses Membres. L'un des buts principaux des Nations Unies, se10n la Oharte elle-meme, est d'ailleurs de deve10pper entre les Nations des relations amicaIes fondees Sovereign equality is, therefore, a rule of international public law. No Member State can, even by a voluntary act, abolish or diminish its sovereign equality without losing, by this very act, its right to membership of our Organization. Now, it goes without saying that the presence of foreign troops on the territory of a Member State might constitute a violation of its inde- . pendence, a diminution of its sovereignty. This is particularly the case when the presence of troops is aggravated by occupation or control imposed on that country. It is with this principle in view that paragraph 7 of the resolution under discussion recommends the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops stationed on the territory of Member States. This is the general rule on the question. That must be borne in mind. There is, however, an exception to this rule; that is in cases where foreign troops are stationed on the territory of the State concerned with its freely and publicly expressed consent. This exception, like others, must be limitatively interpreted. An essential condition is that there should first be free and public consent given by the State on whose territory the foreign troops are stationed. This consent may take the form of a treaty, an agreement or any other arrangement. But whatever form it takes, it must not be vitiated by violence or pressure; it must be free, spontaneous and public. Any consent extorted by force, intimidation, constraint or threat of armed force is not valid. Where there is force, there can be no free consent. This condition of free consent is not the only one. There is another condition to be fulfilled in order that the presence of foreign troops on the territory of a Member State may be justified; the consent, whatever form it may take, whether it is expressed in a treaty, an agreement or any other arrangement, must be in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Charter. Although necessary, the fact that the consent is free is insufficient. In addition, the consent must not infringe upon the imperative fundamental principles of the Charter. We have just seen that one of these imperative principles is that of the sovereign equality of Member States. According to this principle, we have already pointed out that the said Member State cannot, even by a freely negotiated treaty, renounce an essential attribute of its sovereignty. This is a point I must dwell on for a moment. When foreign troops are stationed on the territory of a Member State, even with the latter's consent, it is not possible to determine at once whether the presence of these troops is in accordance with the principle of the sovereign equality of this State or not. Everything depends on the purpose and nature of the presence Tel est le critere auquel on doit s'arreter pour determiner si un accord ou traite portant sur le stationnement de troupes etrangcres est compatible ou non avec la lettre et l'esprit de la Charte. C'est un critere tire de la nature des choses, du texte de la Charte et des principes fondamentaux du droit intemationaL Jusqu'ici, nOUli n'avons envisage que l'aspect juridique du probleme. Il est temps d'aborder l'aspect politique, qui n'est pas moins important. Le stationnement de troupes etrangeres sur , le territoire d'un Etat, au cas ou ce stationnement n'est pas compatible avec la Charte, constitue une situation intemationale pleine de dangers. On ne saurait exagerer les soup<;ons, les inquietudes et les troubles qui en resultent. D'une part, cette situation comporte une grave menace, une atteinte directe a l'independance et a la liberte du pays dont le territoire est occupe par des troupes etrangeres, d'ou le heurt continu, les troubles incessants, et I'instabilite mena~ante. D'autre part, l'influence de cette situation anormale sur la paix et la securitt intemationales n'est pas moins grave. Ainsi que je l'ai dit mardi demier, le stationnement de troupes sur les territoires d'autres Etats implique une politique de defense par action unilaterale. Ce vieux systeme suranne, avec ses corollaires indispensables-le systeme de l'equilibre des Puissances et celui des zones d'influence - avait fortement etabli la politique du secret et de la peur. Et, comme l'a fort bien dit Sir Hardey Shawcross, le secret et la peur n'ont jamais servi et ne serviront jamais la cause de la paix. A la place du systeme de d6fense unilateraIe. la Charte a institue celui de la defense univer- Firstly, such a situation constitutes a serious threat, a direct infringement on the independence and freedom of the State whose territory is occupied by foreign troops, hence the constant friction, continual disturbances and menacing instability. Secondly, the effect of such an abnormal situation on international peace and security is no less serious. As I said last Tuesday, the presence of troops no the territory of other States implies a policy of unilateral defence. This old, obsolete system, with its indispensable corollaries-the system of the balance of power and of spheres of influence ~firmly established the regime of secrecy and fear. As Sir Hartley Shawcross has well said, the cause of peace has never been furthered by secrecy and fear and never will be. For the system of,unilateral defence the Charter has substituted that of universal defence which goes even further than collective defence~ If we really wish to conform to the directives of the Charter and save generations to come from the scourge of war, to re-affirm faith in fundamental human rights, in th~ dignity and ~orth of the human person, to establish conditIOns under which justice can be maintained t~ ensure that armed forces shall not be used ;ave in the.con;m?n inter~t and to unite our strength to rnamtam mternatlOn~1 peace and security, we must adhere to the policy of universal defence and not withdraw from it. d~ons nous attacher ala politique de la defense ull1verselle et ne point nous en ecarter. C'est ae vous que dependra la decision. Elle sera, je l'espere, unanime, et elIe marquera sans doute une ctape nouvelle dans I'hi<;toire de .l'humanite. The decisio~ will depend upon you. It will, I hope, be unammous and it will doubtless mark a new era in the history of mankind. sou~erainete de l'Etat. Si, au contraire, le sta· tionnement n'implique aucune idee de domination et a pour unique but l'accomplissement d'une tache legitime et con£orme aux fins et principes assignes aux Nations Unies, par. la Charte, un tel etat de choses ne se heurte pDillt a4 principe de l'egalite souveraine des Etats: la presence des troupes etrangeres est alors compatible avec la Charte. s~lle, encore. plus etendue que la defense collective., .Si ,:,raiment nous voulons, conformement aux dlrecuves de la Charte, preserver les generations futures des fIeaux de la guerre, proclamer a nouveau notre foi en les droits fondamentaux de l'hornme, en la dignite et la valeur de la personne humaine, cl1eer les conditions necessaires, au maintien de la justice, ne pas faire usage de la force et des armes sauf dans I'in· teret cornmun, urnI' nos forces pour le maintien de la paix et de la securite mondiaJes, nous Mr. BEVIN (United Kingdom): I desire to make just a few observations on this problem of disarmament and security. Like the United States we were involved in the production of the atomic weapon, and immediately after the war was over my Government took steps, through Prime Minister Attlee, to raise the issue of obtaining control of this deadly weapon. This resulted in the conference of the three producing Powers held in Washington last year. Our great desire has been to try to control the development of this discovery, so wonderful if used for peaceful purposes, but such a deadly thing if used for war; and to try and find a way, as is so essential in the development of confidence between nations, which will make control and use efficient. M. BEVIN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais simplement presenter que!- ques observations sur le probleme du desarmement et de la securite. qomme les Etats-Unis, nous av;ons participe a la fabrication de l'arme atomique, et des la fin de la guerre, notre Gouvernement, par l'intermediaire du Premier Ministre Attlee, a entrepris de poser la que~tion du controle de cet engin de mort. I1 en est resulte qu'une conference des trois Puissances productrices s'est tenue a Washington l'annee derniere. ~ous desirons ardemment que l'on parvienne a controler l'exploitation de cette decOllverte, merveilleuse quand on la fait servir a. des buts pacifiques, mais qui devient un si terrible instrument de mort quand on l'emploie a la guerre; nous voulons aussi trouver, et ceci est indispensable pour accroltre la confiance entre nations, une methode qui permette de controler et d'utiliser au mieux cette decouverte. C'est pour cette raison que le Royaume-Uni s'est associe a la decision d'instituer la Commission de l'energie atomique. Nous nous estimons lies desormais par cette decision, et nous avons pris l'engagement d'appuyer l'action de cette Commission atomique jusqu'a l'entier accomplissement de sa tache. Cette tache est l'une des plus difficiles qu'une commission ait eu a accomplir; il faudra y apporter un~ grande attention, et je me permets de signaler qu'il ne sera pas possible d'aboutir a une solution si 1'0n se place sur le terrain de l'opposition politique. La Commission ne pourra reussir dans sa tache que si tous les membres s'appliquent de toute leur energie et de toute leur intelligence a trouver la bonne solution. Je suis persuade, et mon Gouvernementl'~st aussi, que le danger que cette recente decouverte de l'energie atomique soit utilisee a des fins de guerre, peut etre ecarte a condition que toutes les Puissances viennent a prendre conscience de leurs responsabilites. En consequence, le premier point que je veux etablir est que, lors de tout examen de ce probleme, nous ne devons pas detourner ou laisser detoumer notre attention des travaux et de la mission confies a cette Commission atomique qui a deja accompli tant de choses. Pour revenir a la question generale du desarmement, j'ai dit a la Commission et je le repete ici: mon pays a fait deux longues guerres, et je crois que tous les membres de l'Assemblee s'accorderont a reconnaitre que,. quoi que 1'0n puisse dire de ce pays; il a combattu du bon cote, c'est-a-dire que, par deux fois, nouS avons combattu l'agresseur, nous avons lutte des le debut et jusqu'a la fin sans que notre peuple cede ou renonce jamais. Nul pays au monde, c'est evident, ne peut, plus que nous, desirer la paix, le desarmement, la securit6, et ces trois idees, en realite, n'en font qu'une: l'action ~ollective exercee par une organisation gouvernementale mondiale, capa- Therefore we entered into the agreement for the setting up of the Atomic Energy Commission. We regard ourselves as bound by that decision now and are pledged to support the Atomic Commission until it has completed its task. The task it has to perform is one of the most difficult that has been given to any Commission to perform. It will need very great care, and if I may suggest, it cannot be settled if it is dealt with on a basis of political conflict. It can only achieve success if all the parties to that Commission bend their energy and intellects to try and discover the right solution. I believe, and my Government believes, that it is possible to separate this new discovery of atomic energy (rom the dangers of being used for war, providing all Powers can be brought to realize their responsibility. Therefore, the first point I want to make is that in any consideration of this problem, we cannot be diverted or cannot agree to be diverted from the work and the responsibilities of the Atomic Commission which has already done so much. Turning to the general question of disarmament, I said in the Committee, and I repeat here, that we have been engaged as a country . in two long wars, and I think the whole Assembly will agree that whatever may be said about us we fought on the right side; that is to say, we fought against the aggressor on both occasions, and we were in it from the start, to the end and our people never flinched and never failed. Obviously then, there c'an be no country in the world that has a greater desire to see peace, disarmament and security, which though three words are really one thing: that is, collective action by a world government organization The Assembly will pardon me, I am sure, if I say that we approach it with caution; that the carrying of resolutions, compromise resolutions, without careful study of long duration and deliberate intent may mislead the public into a false sense of security. That is what happened in 1919. The document that was produced in the League of Nations was perfect. But before we knew where we were, first one nation had gone, then another nation had .gone. Even then, my country proceeded first by promoting the limitation of naval armaments, and secondly by promoting the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, to try and get some sane approach to this problem of war and its dangers. But while the very act was being performed, let me remind the United Nations, with all that had been put down, one nation admitted to the League was secretly, designedly, violating it long before they withdrew. In the end, it flouted the whole international organization. Therefore, there seems to us to be two things necessary: not merely to prosecute disarmament but to organize the pacific nations, the pacifist nations, the liberty-loving nations, so that those who love liberty and democracy are ready to defend it notwithstanding their pacifism and their love of peace. It is in that sense that my country is studying this, and I say to every nation represented in this great Assembly, we are ready, ready at any moment, to supply you with any information you desire in order to give effect to the Charter of the United Nations. We are ready to discuss any scheme, and indeed, to bring the benefit of such experience as we have to bear to get a correct scheme that we believe will work. We are not influenced at all if resolutions are put on this agenda for any other purpose than the carrying out of obligations under the Charter. If it is done-and I want to be quite frank-to pick out a nation, or to put it on the spot, or to use it for propaganda, however much we may be abused, we cannot sacrifice the interest of our people on that account. But we will go deeply, soundly and honestly, with any otheD'nation that will come, into this great study. Mr. Byrnes on behalf of the United States na.~ made references to the action of that great country on demobilisation and the changes in the forces. I am not in possession here at this Assembly of detailed figures but we have anfa~on qu'on nous maltraite, nous n'accepterons pas pour cela de sacrifier les interets de notre peuple. Par contre, nous apporterons notre concours entier, fermeet loyal, a toute nation qui participera a l'etude de ce grand probleme. M. Byrnes vient, au nom du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, de donner un aper~u des mesures de demobilisation prises par ce grand pays et de la reorganisation de ses forces armees. .Te n'ai pas ici les chiffres detailles concernant le It is obvious that a country like ours which has had to spend in two wars over five thousand million pounds of its accumulated savings and foreign investments, and has destroyed its total exchanges in the world; it is obvious that we cannot afford, even afford in our own interests, to carry great forces of arms and we are not going to do it except if we are attacked. We can again, as we always have, try to defend ourselves to the best of our ability. Therefore, if numbers of troops are wanted by the Security Council, at home or abroad, let them write for it. Send the same letter as they do to all other nations and we will give the figures. We sball not hesitate. But we want to feel that when they are asked for, it is for the purposes required by the Charter in order that the knowledge which we readily give will be used by that Council and by the Organization to defend collective security and regional defence and all the other obligations we have entered into. I have read this resolution with very great care and I have also read the resolution of the First Committee which calls upon the Security Council: "to determine, as soon as possible, the information which the States Members should be called upon to furnish in order to give effect to the resolution", and the resolution which refers to the information on armed forces of the United Nations. I accept that resolution. On behalf of my Government, I accept this general resolution which I regard as a basis for real work to be commenced. I trust that it will be adopted, and not merely adopted but taken as a directive to the Organization of the United Nations to begin seriously working with the best brains they can get in order to achieve this objective as early as they possibly can. The quicker, the better. I would utter this warning, however. I believe that in this matter, as in the Organization itself, it will be a matter of growth o.f confidence. I once said in our own House of Commons that if you live together long enough and trust each other enough, without too many rules and regulations, you' grow together and you achieve a common understanding in that way. Therefore, in de~ling with this problem, the Military Staff Committee, the Security Council, and I pledge my country - ihdeed, its' his~ory is well known in this field - to do what It can to make it a success. With regard to troops in other countries. This Government of which I am a member has been in office since July, 1945. During that ~iz:ne we have been doing nothing else but stnvmg to create the situation to establish freedom over. as wide an area of the world as we can, and I think the steps we have taken indicate our attitude of mind. We are striving to settle the great problem of India, 'and I pray and h~pe that all pkties will be able to combine III order t~ achieve the right results for that great sub-connnent, which will make it unnecessary for us to keep troops there at all. We had a ten-year treaty, a solemn treaty between Egypt and ourselves. I think all the ~lli~s are indebted to Egypt for the great serVIce It rendered during the war in giving its territory . and communications, which prevented the enemy joining hands through the Middle East, and probably making the war much longer and much more disastrous. But when we were approached to revise it we readily agreed, and negotiations are going on for the same results. In other fields too, as soon as we can see peace and achieve resettlement, my Government is endeavouring to carry out a long-term progressive policy. , I apologize to nobody for our conduct. We have based our attitude on the establishment of this United Nations, but I have been, as I said, both in the Committee and elsewhere, cautious, and the reason I am cautious is that once already in our history my country w~ nearly wiped out. We were within an ace of being defeated. Therefore, this time we want to see that we build soundly and safely, not merely on a basis of sentiment, but on a basis of collective responsibility in which everyone, great and Sniall, takes their share to obliterate war forever.

I call upon Mr. Molotov, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. . Mr. MOLOTOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I have already had occasion to explain from this rostrum the views of the Soviet Union Government on the subject of general disarmament. The reasons which guide the Soviet Union Government in this matter were set forth in the statement which Le PRESIDENT: Je donne la parole a M. Molotov, representant de l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. M. MOLOTOV (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): J'ai deja eu l'occasion d'exposer ici meme le point de vue de l'Union sovietique sur le desarmement gene.. raJ. J'ai deja precise, au cours de mon intervention en date du 29 octobre, les raisons dont s'inspire le Gouvernement sovietique. Aussi This presupposes, of course, that in our policy towards the former aggressor States, we will pursue to the end a policy which is demanded by the exigencies of universal peace; we must carry out to the end the demilitarization and disarmament of these States and the control which will prevent them from ever again becoming aggressive forces. We must carry on to the end the fight against Fascism and the struggle for the democratization of these States, since we have accepted and recognized this as the chief aim of the Allies. We recognized this aim during the war, and we recognize it now. Thus, in regard to the forces of aggression, conditions are favourable for taking action to strengthen peace and prevent new aggression. Another important fact is that, since the conclusion of the second WorId War, there are now no countries which keep aloof from the task of international organization for the promotion of peace and security. In these respects, the situation is very different from that which existed after the first World War. Now all the countries, great and small, which are worthy of the name of democratic States and which can participate in the carrying out of a policy ensuring universal peace, are Members of the United Nations; this constitutes a very important prerequisite for the solution of the prob. lem which we are discussing today, the problem of general disarmament. We must admit that it now depends upon us, upon our common efforts; upon our will to work together in the interest of universal peace without dividing the nations among themselves, without setting up one group of States against other peace-loving States and without striving to bring other States into subjection. By working in accordance 'lVith the principles and aims which v~rnements, tant a la Commission chargee d'etudIer cette question, qu'a l'Assemblee generale. En fait, la situation internationale actuelle differe a beaucoup d'egards de celle qui existait au lendemain de la premiere guerre mondiale. Nous avons tous conscience de ces differences, nous savons que l'Allemagne d'apres la deuxicme ' guerre mondiale n'est pas ceIle d'aprcs la premiere guerre. De meme, le Japon d'aprcs la deuxieme guerre mondiale n'est pas du tout celui d'apres la premiere guerre. Souvenonsnous d'autre part que Ce sont ces deux Etats, l'Allemagne et le Japon, qui ont cte les deux principales puissances d'agression, l'une en Occident, l'autre en Orient, et que ce sont elles qui ont entraine dans la deuxieme guerre mondiale tous les Etats, grands et petits. On ne peut donc manquer d'apercevoir l'importance extreme de ce changement radical qui s'est produit dans la situation de l'Allemagne et du Japon - sans parler de leurs allies qui ont pris part a l'agression. II va sans dire qu'a l'egard des anciens agresseurs, nous devons poursuivre une politique qui serve la cause de la paix mondiale. Nous devons mener a bonne' fin la demilitarisation de ces pays, assurer leur desarmement effectif et etablir un controle afin qu'ils ne redeviennent pas des puissances agressives. Nous devons roener a bonne fin la lutte contre le fascisme et assurer le triomphe de la democratie dans ces pays. Pendant la guerre, nous avons reconnu que telle etait la mission essentielle des Allies, et nous continuons a le reconnaitre aujourd'hui. A l'egard des forces d'agression, nous nous trouvons donc aujourd'hui dans une situation favorable qui nous permet de travailler a consolider la paix et a preveni:r: toute nouvelle agression. Autre fait important: aujourd'hui, au lendemain de la deuxieme guerre mondiaIe, aucun pays ne se tient a l'ecart des taches qui incombent a 1'0rganisation internationale chargee d'assurer la paix et la securite. La aussi, la situation actuel1e n'est pas du tout celle qui s'etait creee au lendemain de la premiere guerre mondiale. Aujourd'hui, tous les Etats, grands et petits, qui meritent d'ctre appeles democratiques et qui sont capables de participer a une ceuvre politique chargee d'assurer la paix du monde, font partie de ]'Organisation des Nations Unies. n y a Ut un facteur tres important qui joue en faveur d'une solution du probleme que nous examinons aujourd'hui -le probleme du desarmement general. Aujourd'hui, nous devons le reconnaitre, cette solution depend de nous, de nos efforts communs, de notre volonte de collabcirer dans l'interet de la paix generale, en·evitant d'opposer les pays les uns aux autres ou de constituer des blocs diriges contre des Etats pacifiques, et en s'abstenant d'imposer a certains Etats l'hegemonie de certains autres. C'est donc en restant I will now turn to the resolution submitted for our consideration. The Soviet Union draft, as submitted to the General Assembly, was founded on two basic ideas. First, we considered it important that the United Nations should state its firm opinion regarding the necessity of general disarmament. Secondly, we considered it essential that the United Nations should declare the necessity of prohibiting the production and use of atomic energy for military purposes. The draft resolution submitted contains both these ideas. I will not conceal that the Soviet Union delegation would have liked to see those basic proposals which it has submitted to the General Assembly expressed in a more definite form. However, the resolution contains fundamental concepts which reflect both the idea of a general reductioJ;l of armamerits and that of the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes. Therefore, the Soviet delegation is satisfied with the work of the Committee and with the resolution now submitted for the approval of the General Assembly. Much has been said here today about atomic energy and the use of atomic energy for military purposes. This is quite understandable, since this type of armament calls for our kneest attention at the present time. That is why the Suviet Union draft stated that the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes was a primary objective. Everybody understands that the atomic bomb is not a defensive weapon. Therefore, when we are told of the exigencies of national defense, it must be borne in mind that what is necessary for the defence of a State, for the defence of frontiers, for protection from attack is not a problem that can be settled with the help of atomic bombs. Atomic bombs, as we know, are directed against foreign countries) and are not used for fighting on or defending the home territory. The resolution now submitted for our consideration and decision and which, we are certain, will be adopted by the General Assembly today, . will be the first step towards implementing the idea of general disarmament. Following this decision of the General Assembly, other steps and measures will have to be taken and worked out by the Security Council. This is a necessary and very important task, and we must wish the Security Council success in the preparation and execution of these further measures. Today the delegation of the Soviet Union expresses its satisfaction with the first results of the work for a general reduction of armaments and with the co-operation which we have achieved in preparing this resolution for the General Assembly. Today we still hear it said that the question of the general reduction of armaments arouses Il a deja ete fait etat id de renseignements sur les troupes maintenues en territoire etranger, renseignements dont il a ete beaucoup question ces derniers temps. Bien entendu, il ne pouvait s'agir d'informations completes, qui epuiseraient la question. La delegation sovietique a exprime le desir que cette question des reriseignements a fournir sur les troupes stationnees en territoire etranger, question qui a fait l'objet ici d'une discussion speciale, trouve egalement sa solution. Il faudrait qu'on nous dise exactement quelle est la composition et le dispositif des troupes stationnees a l'etranger, et queUes sont les bases, dont elles disposent: une telIe clarification ne peut avoir que des consequences favorables pour la paix generale. D'autre part, la publication de ces renseignements, au moment meme ou nous devons prendre une decision sur la reduction generale des armements et l'interdiction de la production et de l'emploi de l'energie atomique a des fins militaires, contribuerait a eclaircir le probleme du desarmement. Une decision de l'Assemblee portant sur la .reduction des armements aura assurement des consequences d'ordre economique - notamment en ce qui concerne les budgets des Etats. En effet, ce n'est un secret pour personne qu'en ce moment les budgets de certains Etats sontgonfles a l'exd:s, et que les peuples ant accueilli avec une grande satisfaction la decision de proceder a une reduction generale des armements et de reduire les budgets militaires. En effet, cela constituera pour les peuples un reel allegement des charges fiscales et un remede a l'inflation des prix. Enfin, ces reductions repondent aux interets materieIs essentieIs de tous les hommes, de tous les travailleurs.. II est a souhaiter que l'un des resultats pratiques de notre decision d'aujourd'hui soit de :reduire ades dimensions plus normales les budgets militaires gonfles al'exc~s, et par la me~e d'a~Ie­ ger les charges ficales a la grande satIsfactlOn des peuples. The Soviet Union delegation has expressed the wish that a decision should also be taken on the proposal, which we discussed as a separate question, and which deals with the submission of information concerning troops stationed on foreign territory. Let us all know exactly where and how many troops are stationed beyond our frontiers, where and what bases have been established by our .states. The clarification of these questions cannot but benefit the cause of universal peace. It is at this precise moment, when we are deciding the question of a general reduction of armaments and the prohibition of the production and use of atomic energy for military purposes, that such information would be useful in clarifying this question completely. A decision concerning the general reduction of armaments must certainly also be reflected in the economic field, and particularly in the budgets of the States. Indeed it is no secret that at the present moment the budgets of certain countries are extremely inflated and that the populations will welcome a decision on the general reduction of armaments and military budgets, because this will mean a real decrease in the burden of taxation, because it will prevent the inflation of the prices of commodities, and because it is connected with the vital material interests of every man, of every worker. It is to be hoped that one of the practical results of our decision today will be the reduction of inflated military budgets and of budgets to a more. normal type, thus bringing about a reduction in' the burden of taxation, which will meet with the greatest approval of the populations. I must remind you that even now, in some cases, in this second year after the end of the second World War, frenzied propaganda in favour of a new war is being carried on. Je voudrais vous £aire remarquer que dans certains milieux - moins de deux ans apres la fin de la deuxieme guerre mondiale - on se livre It une propagande effrenee en faveur d'une nouvelle guerre. Le moins qu'on 'puisse dire, c'est qu'en encourageant cette propagande, on nuit aux efforts que nous deployons en vue de la reduction generale des armements. Quand on mentionne a ce The encouragement of such propaganda is not in keeping with the direction of our efforts towards the general reduction of armaments. When we are told of the freedom of the press The present General Assembly has adopted, and will yet adopt, a whole series of decisions. Each one of us understands that the decisions adopted are of varying signifiance. I do not think that anyone can have any doubt that a decision on the reduction of armaments will rank amongst the most important decisions ever taken by the General Assembly. We. have adopted it unanimously. Thi., is further proof that the decision is a timely one, that we have all recognized it as being timely and urgent. Moreover, it corresponds to the interests of all nations, both large and smal~. We adopt this decision unanimously, because we understand that it is in the best interests of our peoples, whom we serve, as well as in the best interests of universal peace. That is why the delegation of the Soviet Union expresses its confidence that the unanimity which we have acchieved in the preparation of this resolution will also be displayed in taking the resolution on the general reduction of armaments. Aussi la delegation sovietique est-elle persuadee que l'unanimite qui s'est faite au cours de nos travaux preparatoires se retrouvera lorsqu'il s'agira d'adopter la resolution sur la reduction generale des armements. . The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I still have two speakers on my list. If each speaks only for ten minutes and their speeches and Mr. Molotov's are translated also, the meeting will last at least another hour. Moreover, we have yet to take a vote. Now I am not sure that we shall not have a discussion on document A/203. If so, we should have to sit llntil six o'clock in the morning. That is impossible for the interpreters, the rest of the Secretariat . . . and the President. Le PRESIDENT: Deux orateurs sont encore inscrits. Si chacun d'eux ne parle que dix minutes, et si 1'on tient compte de la traduction de leurs discours ainsi que celle du discours de M. Molotov, la seance durera encore au moins une heure. Mais il faut, en outre, que nous procedions au vote. Or, je ne suis pas sQr que nous n'ayons pas une discussion sur le document A!203. Si tel etait le cas, nollS devrions siegeI' jusqu'a 6 heures du matin. Or, cela n'est pas possible, ni pour les traducteurs, ni pour le reste du Secretariat, ni . . . pour le President. Dans ces conditions, je demanderai a M. Molotov de renoncer a la traduction de son discours en frari~ais et je prierai le representant du Canada comme celui de la France de bien vouloir, a leur tour, renoncer a la traduction des exposes qu'ils vont nous faire. Under these circumstances I shall ask Mr. ~olotov to forgo the French interpretation of his speech and I shall request the Canadian and French representatives, in their turn to forgo the interpretation of the statements ~hey are going to make. Mr. MOLOTOV (Union of Soviet Socialist M. MOLOTOV (Union des Republiques sodalistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Je n'insiste pas pour qu'il y ait une traduction en fran~ais de mon discours. Rep~b~ics) (translated from Russian): I do not mSIst on a French translation of my speech. Mr. MARTIN (Canada): I shall be very happy to forgo the French translation of Our speeches. M. MARTIN (Canada) (traduit de lJanglais) : Je ne vois pas d'objection non plus ace que mon discours ne soit pas traduit. M. PAROD! (France) : Je renonce egalement a la traduction anglais~ de mon expose. Mr. PAROD! (France) (translated from FTffnch): I shall also forgo the English translatIOn of my statement. The PR.ES~ENT (tr~nslated from French): The questIOn IS now whether we are going to start a ~iscussion on document A/203 or come to unanImOUS agreement. Le PRESIDENT: La question est maintenant de savoir si nous allons commencer un debat sur le document A!203 ou si nous allons arriver a un accord unanime.

In those circumstances we shall have to adjourn the meeting. Le PRESIDENT: Dans ces conditions, il est n'eccssaire de lever la seance. SIXTY-THIRD PLENARY MEE1'ING Held on Saturday, 14 December 1946, at 11.a.m. TABLE DES MATIERES Pages 176. Budgets de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour les exercices 1946 et 1947. Rapport de la Cinquieme Commission. Resolutions 1310 177. Bareme des contributions aux budgets de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour les exercices 1916 et 1947, et au fonds de roulement. Rapport de la Cinquieme Commission. Resolution 1310 178. Principes regissant la reglementation et la repartition generales des armements. Rapport de la Premiere Commission. Re- solution (suite de la discussion) 1310 179. Informations relatives aux forces armees a fournir par les Membres des Nations Unies. Rapport de la Premiere Commis- sion. Resolution 1316 180. Election de deux Membres du Conseil de tutelle. Resolution 1320 CONTENTS Page 176. Budgets of the United Nations for the financial years 1946 and 1947: report of the Fifth Committee: resolutions 1310 177. Scale of contributions to the budgets of the United Nations for the financial years 1946 and 1947 and to the working capital fund: report of the Fifth Com- mittee: resolution 1310 178. Principles governing the general regula- tion and reduction of armaments: report of the First Committee: resolution (con- tinuation of the discussion) 1310 179. Information on armed forces .to be sup- plied by Members of the United Nations: report of the First Committee: resolu- tion 1316 180. Election of two members of the Trustee- ship Council: resolution 1320 President: Mr. P.-H. SPAAK. (Belgium). Agenda of the meeting Le PRESIDENT: L'ordre du jour appelle la suite de la discussion sur le desarmement.

The first item on the agenda is the continuation of the discussion on the disarmament question, M. VANDENBERG (Etats-Unis d'Arnerique) (traduit de Panglais): Monsieur le President, je voudrais presenter une motion d'ordre. Puis-je faire observer que les points 2 et 3 de l'ordre du jour de ce matin, relatifs aux premier et second budgets annuels etau bareme des contributions, ont ete adoptes par la Commission, 'a l'unanimite? Ce sont des questions que nous devons 0 bligatoirement examiner et dont nous devons achever la discussion avant la fin des travaux de la presente session. J'ai pris ala discussion de ces points une part personnelle que -je ne le cache pas-j'aimerais garder jusqu'au bout, or je ne pourrai etre ici cet apres-midi. J'estime que ces deux points, qui ont reuni l'unanimite a la Commission, peuvent etre adoptes sans debat. Je demande done a l'Assemblee de consentir unanimement a modifier l'ordrc des questions et de prendre en premier lieu les points 2 et 3, etant entendu que si ma proposition donne lieu a la moinclre discussion, je la retire immediatement. Mr. VANDENBERG (United States of America): Mr. President, a point of order. May I point out that items 2 and 3 on the printed agenda this morning covering the first and second annual budgets and the scale of contributions passed the Committee unanimously? They are mandatory items which, of course, wc must conclude before we finish the work of this session. I have had some personal responsibility in connexion with them which-I frankly say to my colleagues-I should like to see through to the finish, and I cannot be here this afternoon. In my opinion, both of these items can pass without any debate because there was complete unanimity in the Committee. ' I ask unanimous consent that we therefore take up items 2 and 3, interrupting the present order with the understanding that the request will be immediately withdrawn if there is any debate. La seance est levee a1 h. 30, SOlXAN'rE-rROISIEME SEANCE PLENIERE Tenue le samedi 14 decembre 1946) a11 heures. President: M. P.-H. SPAAK. (Belgique). Ordre du jour de la seance