A/2/PV.97 General Assembly

We shall continue the discussion of the report' of the Third Committee concerning the transfer to the United Nations of the functions and powers exercised by the League of Nations in respect of traffic in women and children and in obscene publications (document A/412) . I call upon the representative of the United Kingdom. Sir Hartley SHAWCROSS (United Kingdom) : I am very sorry to have to trespass again on the time of the Assembly, but the position in regard to this matter seems to be so widely misunderstood, owing, I am afraid, to my own failure to make it sufficiently clear when I spoke previously, that I must say just a word or two more in regard to it. I am not going to attempt to follow the representative who spoke on behalf of the delegation of Haiti in that exceedingly eloquent, not to say emotional, address which he delivered before we adjourned for lunch. It was, If I may venture to say so, an address which, delivered on some other occasion and about some ot~er matter, would form a very model of that kind of oratory which nowadays unfortunately, is ali too rare and which I always envy but to which I cannot myself ever attempt to aspire. With charm and frankness, the Haitian representative said that he had not really studied the question at issue, but he appealed to our hearts. I am all in favour of appealing. to hearts. I do not mean to feminine hearts but, within reason, La seance est levee a13 h. 10. QUA'rRE~VINGT-DIX-SEPTIEME SEANCE PLENIERE Tenue dans la salle de l'AssembUe generale eFlushing Meadow, New-York, le lundi 20 octobre 1947, a15 heures. President: M. O. ARANHA (Bresil). 38. Suite de la discussion sur le transfert a l'Organisation des Nations Unies des fonctions et pouvoirs exerces par la Societe des Nations en ce qui con~ cerne la traite des femmes et des en~ fonts et les publications obscEmes Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Nous alions maintenant poursuivre la discussion sur le rapport de la Troisieme Commission relatif au transfert a l'Organisation des Nations Unies des fonctions et pouvoirs exerces par la Societe des Nations en ce qui concerne la traite des femmes et des enfants et les publications obscenes (document A/412). Je donne la parole au representant du Royaume-Uni. Sir Hartley SHAWCROSS (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Je regrette vivement de devoir abuser de nouveau du temps de l'Assemblee mais, en ce qui concerne cette question, la situation me semble donner lieu a de tds malentendus - dus, je le crains, au manque de clarte de mon expose precedent - qu'il me faut ajo~ter quelques mots a ce sujet. Je ne vais pas essayer de suivre le representant qui, parlant au nom de la delegation d'Haiti, a prononcc un discours extremement eloquent, pour ne pas dire emouvant, avant que naus ne levions la seance pour le dejeuner. Si je puis ainsi dire, c'est un discours qui, prononce en une autre occasion et sur un autre sujet, constituerait le modele meme de ce genre d'610quence, malheureusement trop rare al'heure actuelle, que j'envie toujours mais que, pour ma part, je dois renoncer aatteindre jamais. Avec une franchise charmante, le representant d'Haiti nous a avoue qu'il n'avait pas reellement etudie la question, mais il a fait appel a notre cceur. Je suis tout a fait d'avis de faire appel aux sentiments. Je ne veux pas parler de As I said many times in my previous remarks to the Assembly, the question at issue here is not whether these Conventions, these important Conventions about the traffic in women and children and about obscene literature, should be applied in our colonies. There is no question as to that; they are already applied; they have been applied for a very long time and they are going to continue to be applied, whatever the decision of this Assembly and whether or not we assume the functions of the League, as indeed I hope we shall. The question at issue here has really nothing to do with the application of , the existing Conventions in regard to the traffic in women and children and obscene literature. We are all agreed about that. At least, I say we ourselves are all agreed. There are some State~ represented here, of course, which have not signed or ratified these Conventions, but, so far as the United Kingdom and its colonies are concerned, we are all agreed that these Conventions must be applied in the future as they have been applied in the past. The only question at issue here is whether we should establish a precedent now, reversing the previous practice in this matter, by stating that the colonial territories which' have their own legislatures and their own governments are not entitled to be consulted and are not entitled to decide for themselves whetherj in the future, to adhere to the other conventions dealing with trade or other matters which may arise from time to time and which may be of a non-political nature. It is wholly untrue to say, as the delegation of the USSR said-and not for the first time-- that we are seeking to secure some privileged position for our colonies and to exempt them from obligations which may arise under these or other conventions. States are free to adhere or not to adhere to these or other conventions, as they choose. The USSR has not chosen to adhere to these Conventions about the traffic in 'Y0men and children. All our colonies have, and they' will continue to adhere to those Conventions. What we seek to preserve, and to preserve for the future, is the constitutional right of the colonies to decide for themselves whether they shall or shall not adhere to conventions on all the other matters which, may arise on future occasions. Comme je I'ai deja repete a plusieurs reprises en m'adressant a 1'Asemblee, il ne s'agit pas ici de rechercher si les Convenpons en question, ces importantes Conventions sur la traite des femmes et des enfants et sur la litterature obscene, doivent etre appliquees dans nos colonies. I1 n'y a aueun doute a ce sujct: elles sont deja appliquees; eUes le sont depuis tres longtemps et vont continuer de l'etrej quelle que soit la decision de l'Assemb16e et que nous assumions - cornme je l'espere - ou non les fonctions de la Societe des Nations. La question qui nous occupe n'a reellement rien a voir avec l'application des Conventions existantes sur la traite des femmes et des enfants et la litterature obscene. Nous sommes tous d'accord sur ce point. Tout au moins, je veux dire que pour nous-mcmes, nous sommes taus d'accord. 11 y a evidemment certains 'des Etats representes ici qui n'ont ni signe, ni ratifie ces Conventions mais, en ce qui concerne le Royaume-Uni et ses colonies, nous sommes tous d'accord pour considerer que ces Conventions doivent etre appliquees al'avenir comme elles 1'ont ete dans le passe. La seule question qui nous occupe est de savoir si nous devons maintenant erecr un precedent en admettant, contrairement a la pratique precedemment suivie en la matiere, que les territoires coloniaux possedant leur propre legislature et leur propre gouvemement n'aient le droit ni d'ctre consultes ni de decider par euxmemes, sur le p0int de savoir s'ils ratifieront a l'avenir les conventions relatives a d'autres questions - questions commerciales ou autres - susceptibles de se poser de temps aautre et n'ayant pas un caractere politique. 11 est tout a fait contraire a la verite de declarer, comme la delegation de l'URSS l'a fait a plusieurs reprises) que nous cherchons a assurer a nos colonies une situation privilegiee et a les exempter des obligations qui peuvent decouler pour eUes des Conventions dont il s'agit ou d'autres conventions. Les Etats sont libres d'adherer ou non a ces Conventions, a leur gre. L'URSS a prefere ne pasadherel' aux Conventions relatives a la traite des femmes et des enfants. Toutes nos colonies, ellesj y ont adhere et continueront de le faire. Ce que nous cherchons a sauvegarder pour l'avenir, c'est le droit constitutionnel des colonies a decider par ellesmcmes si ellesadhereront ou non a des conventions relatives a toutes les questions susceptibles de se poser. However, we maintain for our colonies the right to decide for themselves in future cases, as and when they arise, whether they will adhere to conventions or not. That is a right which wc insist is in accordance with good democratic practice, and one which is consistent with the progressive development of real self-govcrnment and autonomy among the colonial peoples.

I call upon the representative of Pakistan. . . Mr. PIRZADA (Pakistan): This question came up before the Third Committee too soon after our admission to the United Nations to give us an opportunity to express our attitude on the subject before that' Committee. Hence, I thought I would make it clear now. I was glad to hear the representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Hartley Shawcross, express himself in favqur of consultation with the colonial legislatures before any adherence to these Conventions on behalf of the colonies. He went further 'in his second speech today and said that we must even let them decide things for themselves rather than decide things on their behalf. These two sentiments are really very good, and I am in perfect agreement with this principle, the principle that they should be allowed to have their own way and that they s~ould decide these matters whenever thequestIOll comes up. I further hope that this principle C'est pourquoi nous insistons non pas sur le droit qu'ont les colonies de ne pas ctre liees, dans le cas particulier, par les Conventions sur la traite des femmes et des enfants - e1les le sont dejamais sur le droit qu'a chaque colonie de decider par elle-meme a l'avenir, par la voie de sa legislature ou de son Gouvernement, si elle adherera ou non aux conventions de caractere non politique qui pourraient intervenir sur d'autres questions. Les colonies doh'cnt etre lihres de prendre leurs propres decisions a ce sujet, quel que soit le point de vue du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni. Nous nous efIorccrons de veillcr a ce que nos colonies examinent ces questions sous un angle vraiment international et nous userons de nos bons offices pour les amener a adherer a toutes les conventions recommandees par l'Assemblee. Toutefois, nous maintenbns pour nos colonies le droit de decider par elles-mcmes" al'avcnir si, le cas echeant, dIes adhereront ou non a des conventions nouvelles. C'est un droit qui, nous le rcpetons, est conforme ala veritable methode democratique et qui est compatible avec le developpement progressif d'une autonomic rcelle des populations coloniales. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je donne la parole au representant du Pakistan. M. Pm.ZADA (Pakistan) (traduit de l'anglais): La question que nous discutons actuellement. a ete soumise a la Troisieme Commission trop peu de temps apres notre admission au sein de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour que nous ayons eu l'occasion d'exposer notre attitude a cc sujet devant cette Commission. C'est pourquoi j'ai cm devoir preciser id cette attitude. J'ai ete heureux d'entendre le representant du Royaume-Uni, Sir HartIey Shawcross, e declarer partisan de consultations avcc les pouvoirs lcgislatifs coloniaux prealablement a toute adhesion a ccs Conventions au nom des colonies. 11 est alle encore plus loin dans son second discours aujourd'hui et il a dit que nous devons meme les laisser prendre la' decision plut6t que de decider eI1 !cur nom. Cc sont HI. reellement d'excellentes intentions et j'admets parfaitemel1t qu'il faille en principe laisser les colonies agir d'elles mcmes ct prendre une decision sur ces questions toutes les fois qu'clles se posent. J'espcre egalement que ce prindpe sera. applique jusqu'a sa I am sorry to say, h~wever, that this attitude on the part of the colonial Powers is not consistent with that adopted by them in the Trusteeship Committee. No doubt, Sir Hartley Shawcross was not present when certain questions were being discussed there, which accounts for the fact that he has expressed certain hopeful sentiments in this Assembly. He has said that evidence will be observed in the proceedings of the Assembly of the fact that the colonial territories are progressing quickly towards the attainment of self-government. I am sorry to say, how~ ever, that proceedings in the Committee, on the contrary, showed that this progress is in fact slackening and slowing down. In this connexion, I refer particularly to the attitude of some of the colonial Powers in stoutly refusing to supply to the United Nations information on political questions concerning Non- Self-Governing Territories. Not only did they oppose the proposal, but they expressed their intention not to supply the informatibn even if the resolutiQn concerning it were adopted by the General Assembly. I am sorry, also, to have to refer to the attitude of another State which has refused to place South West Africa under trusteeship, although the General Assembly has asked that this should be done and has twice'recommended it. In view of all these facts, I find it impossible to accept the intentions to which I have referred, and my delegation is not in a position to support the amendment moved by the representative of the United Kingdom. Quite apart from the considerations to which I have already referred, the reasons for this attitude on the part of my delegation are obvious. The first is that the constitutional position of the Non-Self-Governing Territories at present does not justify consultation with them or even allowing them to reach decisions for themselves. This is the position held by the colonial Powers: these Non-Self-Governing Territories are either approaching or a~e on the verge of self-govern- , ment so that it is not necessary to consult them, since they can decide for themselves; or else they . have legislatures consisting entirely of nominated members, or a majority of nominated members, who can be counted upon to dance to the tune of the, colonial Power and to say "yes" to whatever it suggests. In these two cases, therefore, consultation is held to be unnecessary. The third category consists of colonial territoties whose legislatures do not include any of A cet egard, j'ai particulieremenf en vue l'attitude prise par certaines des Puissances eoloniales qui ont refuse resolument de fournir aux Nations Unies des renseignements sur des questions politiques interessant les territoires non autonomes. Non seulement elles se sont opposees a la proposition qui avait ete faite concernant la communication de ces renseignements mais encore elles ont manifeste l'intention de. ne pas donner suite a toute resolution qui porrait etre adoptee ace sujet par l'AssembIee generale. Je regrett~ aussi d'avoir a faire mention de l'attitude d'un autre Etat qui a refuse de placer le Sud-Ouest Africain sous le Regime de tutelle bien que l'Assemblee generale eut demande qu'il en flit fait ainsi et l'eut par deux fois recommande. En raison de tous ces faits, il m'est impossible de me fier aux intentions exprimees ici et auxquelles j'ai fait allusion; ma delegation n'est .pas en mesure d'appuyer l'amendement propose par le representant du Royaume-Uni. Independamment ,des considerations que je viens d'exposer, les raisons de l'attitude de notre delegation apparaissent clairement. La premiere de ces raisons c'est que, la situation constitutionnelle des territoires non autonomes, telle qu'elle existe a l'heure actuelle, ne justifie pas des consultations avec eux et ne les met meme pas en mesure de prendre des decisions d'~ux­ memes. Void l'attitude prise par les Puissances coloniales: ou bien les territoires non autonomes approchent de l'autonomie, ou sont meme sur le point d'obtenir l'autonomie, de sorte qu'il n'est pas necessaire de les consulter puisqu'ils peuvent decider d'eux-memes; ou bien, iIs ant des corps legislatifs comprenant exclusivement des membres nommes -ou une majorite de membres nommes - et 1'0n peut escompter qu'ils se conformeront docilement aux vues de la Puissance coloniale et acquiesceront a toilt ce qu'elle proposera. Daus ces deux cas, estime-ton, les consultations sont donc inutiles. Une troisieme cat~gorie comprend des territoires coloniaux dans les corps Iegislatifs des- A fourth category consists of territories where there are no legislatures at all, the legislative and other work being carried out by the officials of the colonial government which legislates by orders in council. In these cases, therefore, it would be futile to' consult non-existent legislatures concerning the ratification of the' present Conventions. The second reason why the delegation of Pakistan opposes this amendment is that the omission of the colonial' application clauses, as recommended by the Third Committee, would not prevent the colonial Powers from consulting the legislatures of Non-Self-Governing Territories, if they wished to do so, before agreeing to ~hese ratifications. They would have ample time, and it would be a simple routine matter for the colonial Powers to consult their officials in the territories concerned. If this amendme)1t is passed, it will provide a loophole for the reactionary elements in the colonies, and there can be no doubt whatsoever that there are certain elements opposed to the advancement of the indigenous populations of . these' colonies. Creating a loophole, I say, in a matter in which it is not at all necessary to do so, will provide encouragement for those reactionary elements. r Finally, I should like to inquire-if it is still doubtful-whether or not these Conventions are for the be~efit of humanity in general. If the answer is that they are not, then certainly it is necessary to give the colonial Powers time to consult their colonies. However, if it is held, as I believe all the delegations will hold, that these Conventions are definitely for the benefit of humanity, then certainly I do not see any' reason why the colonial Powers should not adhere to them on behalf of their colonies. Under the Charter, as the Assembly is awaJ;'e, the colonial Powers have the responsibility of administering these territories. They take very many decisions on behalf of these territories, and then they justify those dec~sions on the grounds that the people concerned are not sufficiently advanced to decide things for themselves and that therefore the colonial Powers must take decisions for them. If that responsibility, under the Charter and otherwise, is accepted by the Colonial Powers in other matters, I see no reason why it should not be accepted by them in this case. . For all these reasons, my delegation opposes the amendment proposed by the United Kingdom. Enfin, je voudrais demander, s'il subsiste encore un doute a ce sujet, si ces Conventions ont oui ou non pour objectif l'interet de·l'humanite en general. Si la reponse est negative, il est alors certainement necessaire de donner aux Puissances colonialesle temps de consulter leurs colonies. Mais si 1'0n estime, comme le feront, je crois, tautes les delegations, que ces Conventions sont nettement dans l'interet de I'humanite, alors je ne vois aucune raison pour que les Puissances coloniales n'y adherent pas au nell de leurs colonies. Aux termes de la Charte, comme le sait l'Assemblee, les Puissanc,es coloniales assument la responsabilite de l'administratian de ces territoires. Elles prennent beaucoup de decisions au nom de ces territoires; puis, eUes justifient ces decisions en pretendant que les populations interessees ne sont pas suffisamment avancees pour les prendre d'elIes-memes et qu'en consequence c'est aux Puissances coloniales qu'il appartient de decider au nom de ces populations. Si ·les Puissances coloniales acceptent pour d'autres questions cette responsabilite, en vertu de la Charte ou pour d'autres raisons, je ne vois pas pourquoi elIes ne devraient pas l'assumer dans le cas present. Pour tous les motifs que je viens d'indiquer, ma delegation s'oppose a l'amendement propose par ~e Royaume-Uni. . Mr. LANG;E (Poland): I request a roll-call vote. A vote was taken by roll-call. The result of the voting was as follows: In favour: Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France,'Iceland, Luxem~ bourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States of America. Aogainst: Afghanistan, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet SoCialist Republic, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, Hon~ duras, India, Iran, Liberia, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Swedeh, Ukrain- 'ian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist R~publics, Venezuela, Yugoslavia. Abstaining: Australia, China, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Siam, Syria, Y"men, Uruguay. Absent: Ecuador, Greece. The amendment was rejected by 23 votes to 21, with 11 abstentions) two delegations being absent.

We shall now proceed to vote on the report of the Third Committee as, a Whole. The report was adopted by 52 votes to none with 3 abstentions.

I call upon the representative of the United Kingdom. Sir Hartley SHAWCROSS (United Kingdom) : I merely wish to explain the United Kingdom delegation's vote. The United Kingdom delegation voted in favour of the adoption of the report of the Third Committee' because, as I had attempted to indicate, our delegation agreed with it in principle. Of course, we shall reserve our position as, to any future conventions, and we shall not regard the present decision as constituting any kind of precedent for the future. 39. Utilization of the services of the Sec- 39. Utilisation des services du Secretariat retariat

We shall now discuss the draft resolution proposed by the Swedish delegation concerning the utilization of the services of the Secretariat (document A/403). I call upon the representative of Argentina. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): It is always disagreeable to oppose something which, in principle, seems to meet with general approval" but the Argentine dele- M. LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je demande le vote par appel nominal. On procede au vote par appel nominal. Les resultats du vote sont les suivants: Votent pour: Argentine, Belgique, Bolivie, Canada, Costa-Rica, Cuba, Danemark, Republique Dominicaine, Salvador, France, Islande, Luxembourg, Pays-Bas, Nouvelle-Zelande, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Perou, Turquie, Union Sud- Africaine, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. Votent contre: Afghanistan, Bresil, Republique socialiste sovietique de Bielorussie, Chili, Colombie, Tchecoslovaquie, Egypte, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Inde, Iran, Liberia, Norvege, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Pologne, Suede, Republiquc socialiste sovU~tique d'Ukraine, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Venezuela, Yougoslavie. S)abstiennent: Australie, Chine, Ethiopie, Irak, Liban, Mexique, Arabie saoudite, Siam, Syrie, Yemen, Uruguay. . Absents: Equateur, Grece. L)amendement est rejete par 23 voix contre 21 avec 11 abstentions) deux delegations etant absentes. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l)anglais): Je met& maintenant aux voix l'ensemble du rapport de la Troisieme Commission. Le rapport est adopee par 52 voix contra zero, 'avec 3 abstentions. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l)anglais): Je donne la parole "aU representant du Royaume- Uni. Sir Hartley SHAWCROSS (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Je desire simplement expliquer le vote de la delegation du Royaume- Uni. La delegation du Royaume-Uni a vote pour l'adoption du rapport de la Troisieme Commission parce que, comme j'avais essayede l'indiquer, notre delegation etait d'accord sur son principe. Bien entendu, nous reservons notre position au sujet de toutes conventions futures et nous ne considerons pas que la decisionactueUe constitue un precedent quelconque pour l'avenir. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Nous allons discuter maintenant le projet de rCsolution propose par la Suede relatif a l'utilisation des services du Secretariat (document A/403). Je donne la parole au representant de l'Argentine. M. ARCE (Argentine) (traduit de Pespa':' gnol): Il est toujours desagreable de devoir s'op-, poser a ce qui semble, en principe, recueillir l'assentiment general; mais la delegation argen- The Assembly cannot delegate responsibility to the Secretariat for a number of tasks which must be performed by the Assembly itself, or by the Security Council, Economic 'and Social Council, or Trusteeship Council, or by the commissions appointed by the Assembly. Moreover, it is obvious that the Secretariat. must collaborate in this task, not because it is asked to do so, but because it is its duty. In the light of these considerations, not to mention others, the Argentine delegation wishes to state that it cannot vote in favour of this resolution because, I repeat, it does not like votes of confidence and compliments, especially in this case, when such a compliment from the Assembly to the Secretariat would reflect on the Assembly itself, since we are asked to economize and make fuller use of the Secretariat's services. Besides this reason, and more as a personal matter than as the Argentine delegation's opinion, I also could not give this vote of confidence because, as is patent and well known, r . have on a certain occasion criticized the activities o~ some members of the Secretariat who have overstepped their limits and sometim~s even usurped the powers of the Assembly itself. That is all I have to say. I assure you I am not asking for anything: I merely wanted to explain my negative vote, that is why I have had to impose upon the kind attention of the Assembly. The PRESIDE'NT: I call upon the representative of Sweden. Mr. HAGGLOF (Sweden): When the delegation of Sweden raised this question during. the General Assembly, we thought that it would be a non-controversial matter, and I still believe it is. I think there is a ,slight misunderstanding of our proposal. At this time, I should like to explain what our intention was. . The head of our delegation explained during the general debate that he had observed a certain tendency on the part of committees and councils to set up sub-committees and ad hoc committees whenever a technical question de- .manded investigation, instead of asking the Secretariat to help the committee or council in question. It is very easy to explain how this habit of setting up sub-committe~s on every occasion has Le PRESIDENT: Je donne la parole au representant de la Suede. M. HAGGLOF (Suede) (traduit de l'anglais): La deIe~ation suedoise en soulevant la question au Cours de I'Assemblee generale, pensait qu'elle ne donnerait lieu a aucune controverse, et c'est encore notre opinion. Je crois qu'il existe un leger malentendu sur notre proposition. .Je voudrai~ expliquer maintenant quelle est notre intention. Le chef de notre delegation a expose au cours de la discussion generale qu'iL avait note de la part des commissions et des conseils une certaine tendance aereer de sous-commissions et des commissions ad hoc toutes 'les fois qu'une question technique nccessitait une enquete, au lieu de demander au Secretariat de preter son concours a la commission ou au conseil interesse. 11 est aise d'expliquer comment cette habitude d'ctablir des sous-commissions en toutes occasions The situation today is obviously quite different. We are now happy to have a permanent and impartial Secretariat. We therefore thought it would be a good idea to draw the attention of the various bodies of the United Nations, by adopting this resolution, to the fact that very often they can ask the Secretariat to carry out investigations instead of setting up ad hoc committees. I think it is clear that, by asking the Secretariat to perform these services, we are not in any sense giving away what belongs to the Assembly or to a Committee or Oouncil. We are simply asking the Secretariat for a technical .service. I now beg to ·move this draft resolution, and I do so for reasons which I may sum up as follows. First, by adopting this resolution and its principle of asking the Secretariat whenever possible for its services instead of setting up subcommittees, we shall save time. Secondly, we shall save money. Thirdly,if, as I still hope, this resolution is adopted unanimously by the Assembly, we shall pay a tribute to the Secretariat, a tribute which I think is fully merited if we look back on the two years of United Nations activities and think of the impartiality and highmindedness which, in our opinion, the Secretariat has always shown. A vote was taken and the Swedish draft resolution was adopted by 45 votes to 1, with 9 , abstentions. 40. Threats to the political independence and territorial' integrity of Greece: reports of the First and fifth Committees' .

I shall first call upon the Vice-Ohairman of the First Oommittee to present the Oommittee's report (document A/409), which has been distributed. After the presentation of the report of the First Oommittee, I shall call upon the Rapporteur of the Fifth Oommittee to present the report of that Oommittee ( document AI415 ), which states, in accordance with rule 112,' the effect which the resolution 40. Menaces it I'independance politique et a I'inh!grite territoriale de la Grece: rapports des Premiere et Cinquieme Commissions Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : J'inviterai d'abord le Vice-President de la Premiere Oommission a presenter le rapport de la Oommission (document A/409) qui vous a ete distribue, apres quoi, j'inviterai le Rapporteur de la Oinquieme Oommission a presenter le rapport de cette Commission (document A/415) qui expose, conformement a l'article 112 du reglement interieur, les repercussions qu'aurait I should like to point out that the report of the Fifth Committee does not require action by the Assembly in connexion with the consideration of the report of the First Committee. The report of the Fifth Committee reveals that that Committee ,has considered the effect which the resolution proposed by the First Committee would have on the budget of the United Nations. rhe budgetary estimates required, in case the Assembly approves the resolution of the First Committee, will, appear in the supplementaryestimates for 1947 and in the budget for 1948, items, which will be considered by the Assembly at a later date. I now call upon Mr. Costa du Rels, Vice- Chairman 'of the First Committee, Mr. COSTA DU RELS (Bolivia) (translated from French): Mr. Kaufmann, the Rapporteur of the First Committee, who, as you know, is the Ambassador of Denmark to the United States, has been called to Washington. As he is consequently unable to be present at to-day's plenary meeting, he has asked me to submit his report for him (document A/409). I have described the First Committee's work in chronological order. You will notice that, in this report, the commentary is reduced to a minimum. The report <;:learly shows the nature of the draft resolutions and amendments pre" sented to the First Committee and the way in which they were received by it. It also records the voting on these resolutions and amendments, and emphasizes certain delegations' attitude to the substance of the measures proposed in the resolution, which was adopted 'by a majority of the C0111mittee. This last point seems to require special mention and detailed explanation. In this connexion, I should like to tell the Assembly that the Chairman of the Political and Security Committee, Mr. Bech, has received a letter from, the secre-, tary-general of the delegation of the USSR informing him that paragraph 7 of the First Committee's report does not entirely cover the point in question, that is to say,that the statements , made by the representative of the USSR, and supported by the representatives of the Byelorussian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Colombia and Egypt do not sufficiently cover this point. According to the letter of the secretary-general of the delegation of the USSR, these States were opposed to the procedure adopted for votil1g on the United States resolution on the grounds that that procedure was contrary to the United Nations Charter. Furthel1110re, I wish to draw the Assembly's attention to an error in the English text of the report. On page 7, in paragraph 7, the word "obligations" should be replaced by the word "functions". M. COSTA DU RELS (Bolivie) : Le Rapporteur de la Premiere Commission, M. Kaufmann, qui, comme vous le savez, represente le Danemark aupres du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, a ete appele aWashington. Ne pouvant donc assister ala seance pleniere d'aujourd'hui, M. Kaufmann m'a demande de presenter son rapport (document A/409). J'ai rendu compte des travaux de la Premiere Commission dans l'ordre chronologique. Vous remarquerez que, dans ce rapport, le commentaire est reduit au minimum. Le rapport etablit clairement la nature des projetil de resolutions et celle des amendements presentes a la Premiere Commission et indique l'accueil que la Commission leur a reserve. Le rapport rend compte aussi du vote de ces resolutions et de ces amendements; i1 souligne l'attitude de certaines delegations a. l'egard des mesures proposees dans la resolution qui a ete adoptee par la majorite de la Commission. Ce dernier point devait, semble-t-il, faire 1'0bjet d'une mention speciale et d'une explication detai11ee. A ce sujet, je voudrais faire connaitre a I'Assemblee que le President de la Commission des questions politiques et de securite, M. Bech, a re~u une lettre du secretaire general de la delegation de l'URSS, lui faisant connaitre que l'inea 7 du rapport de la Premiere Commission ne couvre pas tout a fait le point en question, c'est-a.-dire que les declarations faites par 'le representant de l'URSS, et appuyees par les representants de la RSS de Bielorussie, de la RSS d'Ukraine, dela Tchecoslovaquie, de la Pologne, de la Yougoslavie, de la Colombie et de I'Egypte, ne couvrent pas suffisamment ce point. Ces Etats se sont opposes, selon la lettre du secretaire general de la deh~gation de l'URSS, a la procedure adoptee pour le vote sur la proposition des Etats-Unis, comme etant contraire a la Charte des Nations Unies. . En outre, je tiens a attirer l'attention de l'Assemblee sur une erreur dans le texte anglais du rapport. A la page 7, paragraphe 7, il faut remplacer le mot obligations par le mot functions.

I call upon Mr. Bagge, Rapporteur of the Fifth Committee. Mr. BAGGE (Sweden): Members of the Assembly have before them document A/415 entitled "Financial implications of establishment of a General Assembly special committee on the Greek question". I shall summarize the basie points. In accordance with the request of the President of the General Assembly in this communication dated 18 October 1947 (document A/C. 5/170), the Fifth Committee gave priority on the agenda of its seventieth meeting, on 18 October 1947, to the financial implications of the establishment of a General Assembly special committee on the Greek question (document A/C.5/172). In accordance with the terms of rule 112 of" the provisional rules of procedure of the General Assembly, this report of the Fifth Committee does not constitute an appropriation; the Committee· is merely transmitting information to the General Assembly concerning the effect of the proposal upon the budget of the United Nations. The Fifth Committee agreed that, if the proposal of the First Committee for the establishment of such a special committee were to be acted upon favourably by the General Assembly, the lump sum estimate approved by the Fifth Committee would be referred to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, with appropriate supporting details supplied by the Secretary-General, for study and report to the Fifth Committee· before amounts for specific items were voted. The total estimate of the Secretary-General, together with 193,200 dollars added for travel and subsistence of one representative and one alternate for each Member State was approved by the Committee by thirty-two votes to six, with seven abstentions. The Fifth Committee therefore has the honour to state to the General Assembly that it believes the effect of the proposal concerning the establishment of a General Assembly special committee on the Greek question to be 72,840 dollars in 1947 and 538,600 dollars in 1948, a total of 611,440 dollars. Attention is called to 'the fact that, if the General Assembly approves the report made by the Fifth Committee, it will be necessary to add to the resolution of the First Committee the following provision: "Authorizes the Secretary- General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of a representative and an alternate repre~ sentative of each Government to be represented on the special committee on such basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances." . . M. BAGGE (Suede) (traduit de l'anglais): Vous avez sous les yeux le document A/41'5 intitule "Incidences financieres de la creation d'une commission speciale de l'AssembIee generale pour la question grecque". Je vais en resumer les points essentiels. Conformement a la demande formulee par le President de l'Assemblee generale dans sa communication en date du 18 octobre 1947 (document A/C.5/170), 'la Cinquieme Commission a donne la priorite, parmi les questions inscrites al'ordre du jour de sa soixante-dixieme seance, tenue le 18 octobre 1947, aux incidences financieres de la creation d'une commission speciale de 1'Assemblee generale pour la question grecque (document A/C.5/172). • Conformement aux dispositions de 1'article 112 du reglement interieur provisoire de l'Assemblee generale, ce rapport de la Cinquieme Commission ne comporte pas d'allocation de credit; la Commission ne fait que transmettre a l'AssembIee generale des renseignements concernant les repercussions de la proposition sur le budget de 1'Organisation des Nations Unies. La Cinquieme Commission a decide que si l'AssembIee generale devait donner une suite favorable a la proposition de la Premiere Com- . mission visant a la creation de la commission speciale dont il s'agit, les previsions d'ensemble des depenses par la Cinquieme Commission seraient renvoyees a la Commission consultative pour les questions administratives et budgetaires, avec, a l'appui, des details appropries fournis par le Secretaire general aiin que ladite Commission les etudie et fasse rapport ala Cinquieme Commission avant que 1'on ne passe au vote sur les sommes aallouer achaque article particulier. Le montant total des previsions presentees par le Secretaire general, plus une somine de 193.200 dollars pour frais de voyage et d'entretien d'un representant et d'un representant suppleant de chaque Etat Membre, a ete approuve par la Commission par trente·deux voix contre six avec sept abstentions. La Cinquieme Commission a done l'honneur de porter ala connaissance de l'Assemblee generale que l'adoption de la proposition visant acreel' unecommission speciale de 1'Assemb16e generale pour la question grecque entrainerait, i a, son avis, une depense de 72.840 dollars pour l'annee 1947 et de 538.600 dollars pour l'annee 1948, soit au total 611.440 dollars. Nous signalons que si l'Assemblee, generale .approuve le rapport de, la Cinquieme Commission, il sera ne~essaire d'ajouter a la resolution de la Premiere Commission le passage suivant: "Autorise le Secretaire general arembourser les frais de voyage et d'entretien d'un representant et d'un representant. suppIeant de chacun des Gouvernements representes a la commission speciale sur les bases et de la maniere qu'il estimera convenir le mieux aux circonstances." The delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics cannot agree to the proposals submitted for your consideration on behalf of the majority of the First Committee. It considers these propo.sals wrong, absolutely unwarranted and therefore quite unsuitable for settling the Greek question and the relations which have developed between Greece, on the one hand, and ,its three northern neighbours, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, on the other. The Greek question has already a history o{ its own in the United Nations. Perhaps it may not be irrelevant to recall that, on 21 January 1946, the delegation of the USSR was instructed by its Government to ask the Security Council to consider the situation which had arisen in Greece and tq take measures to remedy it in accordance with Article 35 of the Charter of ,the United Nations. How and why did the Government of the 'USSR call the Security Council's attention to the Greek question at that time? The United Kingdom representative in the Security Council tried at the time to present the position in such away as to suggest that, in raising the question of the Greek situation in the Security Council, the Government of the USSR was pursuing other ends. At least, at the Council meeting on '1 February 1946, Mr. Bevin said outright: " . . . Whenever the problem of Greece has' arisen in any negotiations with the USSR, it has always come about when we have been discussing Roumania or Bulgaria or Poland", and further: ".. ~ there has always been a counter-attack 'on Great Britain whenever we have raised a matter affecting some other part of Europe.m Thus, the leader of British foreign policy attempted to depict the whole of this Greek question as a manoeuvre by the USSR and as a counter-attack against Great Britain to make it appear that in itself the Greek question was of no importance. That, of course, is completely' unfounded. There were no grounds whatever for such statements, since there was no question then any more than there is a question now of counter-attacks against Great Britain or the United States of America. The question has its own. independent and extremely grave significance. It arose from the internal situation of Greece, which was a source of arpdety for the peace and security of the nations and, primarily, ~ La question grecque a deja son histoire a1'01'- ganisation des Nations Unies. 11 n'est peut-etre pas inutile de rappeler que le 21 janvier 1945, la delegation de l'URSS, sur les instructions de .son Gouvernement, a propose au Conseil de securite d'examiner la situation qui s'etait creee en Grece, et de prendre des mesures, conformement a l'Article 35 de la Charte des Nations Unies, pour mettre fin acette situation. , Comment et pourquoi le Gouvernement de l'URSS a-toil, a l'epoque, attire l'attention du Conseil de securite sur la question grecque? A l'epoque, le representant du Gouvernement britannique au Conseil desecurite a tente de pre- ' senter l'affaire comme si, en soulevant devant le Conseil de securite la question de la situation existant en Grece, le Gouvernement de l'URSS poursuivait d'autres desseins, C'est du moins ce que M. Bevin a declare ouvertement a la seance du Conseil de securite du 1er £evrier 1946: cc. • • chaque fois que le probleme grec a ete souleve dans des negociations avec l'URSS ce fut toujours au cours de discussions relativ.es a la Roumanie, a la Bulgarie ou a la Pologne." Et plus loin: ". . . la Grande-Bretagne a ete en toute occasion contre-attaquee, lorsqu'elle a voulu soulever une question interessant quelque autre partie de l'Europe.w Airisi, l'homme qui dirige la politique exterieure britannique tentait de presenter toute cette affaire grecque comme une manceuvre de l'URSS, comme une contre-attaque dirigee contre la Grande-Bretagne; il voulait presenter la chose comme si la question grecque n'avait pas de signification par elle-meme. Voila que est evidemment depourvu de tout fondement. De telles declarations ne reposaient sur rien. En realite, il ne s'agissait alors nullement de contre-attaques contre la Grande-Bretagne ou contre les Etats- Unis d'Amerique, pas plus qu'il n'est question aujourd'hui, dans cette affaire, de contre-attaques contre la Grande-Bretagne ou contre les Etatsurns d'Amerique. Cette affaire a une significa- The Government of the USSR submitted another memorandum on the situation in Greece to the first session of the' Council. of Foreign Ministers in London. In this memorandum, it pointed out that the Internal situation of the country had reached a pitch of tension which could be fraught with grave consequences for both the Greek people and the peace and security of the neighbouring countries. But even then this warning met with no response from the United Kingdom and the United States of America. However, the constantly deteriorating political situation in Greece induced the Government of the USSR to raise the Greek question once more at the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers in December 1945 in Moscow.. At that time, the question of the presence of British forces in Greece had already assumed great'importance. In raising the question of the Greek situation in the Security Council in January 1946,1 the Government of the USSR based its attitude principally on the fact that the presence of British forces in Greece had become a means of exerting pressure on the internal political situation, a circumstance frequently exploited by Greek reactionary elements against the democratic forces of the country. Hence the proposal about the need to .withdraw the British forces from Greece, since this would certainly have introduced the peace and order that was needed in the Greek situation. The proposal was vehemently opposed at that time by the British Government which claimed that the British forces had remained in Greece to restore order. However, the British have been restoring order in Greece for two years past and yet there is still no order. The restoration of order in Greece is first and foremost the business of the Greeks themselves. They could handle their own internal affairs even without the help of foreign· troops. Moreover, the Greek people ask for no such assistance. It is the Greek Government which is demanding and appealing for help in order to maintain itself in power against the heroic resistance of the overwhelming ma- Si en janvier 1946 le Gouvernement de l'URSS a souleve devant le Conseil de securite la question de la situation de la Grecet, c'est surtout parce que la presence des troupes britanniques en Grece etait devenue un mayen de pression politique et que les reactionnaires grecs s'en servaient frequemment contre les forces democratiques du pays. De la, la proposition tendant au retrait des troupes britanniques de Grece, ce qui aurait sans nul. doute ramene le calme et l'ordre necessaires dans la vie de ce pays. A cette proposition, le Gouvernement britannique de l'epoque a manifeste la plus vive hostilite. Il a essaye de prouver que les troupes britanniques restaient en Grece pour y retablir l'ordre. Void deux ans que les Britanniques retablissent l'ordre en Grece, mais c'est toujours le desordre qfli y regne. Le retablissement de 1'01'- c1re en Grece est, en premier lieu, l'affaire des Grecs eux-memes. Le peuple grec pourrait regIer lui-meme ses affaires interieures, sans l'aide de troupes etrangeres. D'ailleurs, le peuple grec ne demande pas cette aide. C'est le Gouv~rnement grec qui demande, qu~ implore cette ald~ pour se maintenir au pouvOlr en face de.la reSlstance 'Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de sOcurite, Premiere Annce, Premiere Serie, Supplement No 1, Annexe 3, pages 73 et 74. I do not wish to dwell particularly on this question, but I raise it now because it was discussed in the First Committee. I must point out on this subiect that the present Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Sophoulis, declared at the time, in March 1946, on the eve of the elections, that "according to information from every part of Greece, it was only the monarchists who were free to put forward candidates and express their opinions". Is it not a fact that the then Deputy Prime Ministers, Kaphandaris and Tsouderos, resigned because they could not and would not put up with the electoral excesses and that Kaphandaris declared: "We are rapidly approaching the point where th~ elections are becoming a farce, and this will involve serious danger ... ?" These statements were made pub. lidy. And by whom? By the former and present Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Sophoulis, and his two deputies, Kaphandaris and Tsouderos. . Did not the then Minister of the Interior, Havinis, say of the elections ill the Epirus, that they were "nothing but the nomination of Zervas candidates by means of violence and terror"? Again, was it not Sophoulis who stated, according to the Estia of 7 September 1946, that is, a week after the puppet show of the plebiscite, that "only people with a bad conscience can talk of a plebiscite, for there was no plebiscite in Greece"-these are the words of Sophoulis-"but only a manoeuvre planned beforehand?" Did not the British Press, or at least certain organs of the British Press, including The Times of London, state that "impartial observers doubt the genuineness of the plebiscite~'; and is it not a fact that three British eye-witnesses, Messrs. Dodds, Tiffany and SoIley, members of the Executive Committee of the British League for Greek Democracy and Members of Parliament, quote in their book The Tragedy of Greece innumerable instances of crude falsification of the 1946 elections in Greece? .The book includes the following passage: 1 "We Socialists in Greece are compromised by his (Bevin's) policy, for the people say to us: 'If you belong to Bevin's party we cannot join, you' and they turn more to the Left. The victory of the British Labour Party in the general elec· 1 This and subsequent quotations from The, Tragedy of Greece are re.tran81at~d from the Russian. Je ne voudrais pas m'arreter specialement a cette question, mais je l'aborde parce qu'elle a ete discutee au sein de la Premiere Commission. Je dois dire, a cc propos, que c'est precisement le Premier Ministre ac~uel, M. Sophoulis, qui declarait en mars 1946, a la veille des elections: "ll ressort des renseignements recueillis dans toutes les parties de la Grece que personne en . dehors des monarchistes n'a eu la liberte de presenter des candidats ni cel1e d'exprimer son opinion." Les Vice-presidents du Consei1 d'alors, Kaphandaris et Tsouderos, n'ont-ils pas demis· sionne alors Parce qu'ils ne pouvaient pas se resigner aces abus electoraux et Kaphandaris, n'a-t-il pas declare alors: "Nous sommes entralnes vel'S une situation ou ces elections ne seront qu'une parodie, et ce1a creera un grave danger ..."? Cette declaration a ete faite publiquement. Et par qui? Par M. Sophoulis, Premier Ministre d'alors et Premier Ministre actuel de la Grece, ainsi que par ses deux adjoints, Kaphandaris et Tsouderos. M. Havinis qui etait alors Ministre de I'Interieur, n'a-t-il pas declare au sujet des elections dans l'Epire qu'el1es "consistaient simplement a se servir de la violence et de la terreur, pour designer les candidats de Zervas"? M. Sophoulis n'a·t-il pas declare d'autre part, ainsi que l'a rapporte le journal Estia le 7 septembre 1946, c'est-a-dire une semaine apres la comedie du plebiscite, qu' "il faut vraiment etre de mauvaise foi pour pader de plebiscite, car ce n'est pas un plebiscite qui a eu lieu en Grece, mais urie machination preparee a l'avance"; voila ce qu'a dit M. Sophoulis. Les organes de la presse britannique, au moins certains journaux et notamment le Times de Londres, n'ont-ils pas affirme que "les observateurs impartiaux doutent de la regularite du plebiscite"? Trois temoins oculaires britanniques, MM. Dodds, Tiffany et Solley, membres du Comite executif de la Ligue britanniqlle pour la democratie en Grece et membres du Parlement britannique, I)'ont-iIs pas reIeve dans leur livre intituIe La TragMie de la Grece de nombreux faits indiquant que les elections qui avaient eu lieu en Grece en 1946 avaient ete fiPsifiees? Ce livre contient notamment le passage sui· vane.. "Nous, socialistes grecs, nous sommes compromis par sa politique (c'est-a-dire par la politique de Bevin) car les gens nous disent: 'Si vous appartenez au parti de Bevin, nous ne pouvons pas vous suivre.' Et iIs se rallient aux partis qui 1 Les citations qui 8uivent de La TragJdie de' la Grdc8 ont 6t6 retraduites du russe. This book, furthermore, contains the following passage: "Speaking of the elections, Prime Minister Sophoulis said: 'Mr. Bevin knew from the information that I gave him that the election would result in a victory for the extreme Right. I also told him that the first action the extreme Right would take would be to restore the monarchy.' Throughout our visit we found that, with the exception of the extreme Right wing, everybody said that the election was carried through by me~ns of deceit, treachery, terrorism, assassination and every possible form of corrupt practice." In their book, The Tragedy of Greece, Dodds, Tiffany and Solley cite an important conversation, also with the then Prime Minister of Greece, Sophoulis, who as you know, is the presen~ head of the Greek Government, and who might profitably be reminded of this conversation. The three authors quote Sophoulis as saying that there ~vas an agreement between him and Bevin to hold a plebiscite in two years time, in 1948, as otherwise reaction would triumph and there would be "a reactionary State". . "'I hope', said Sophoulis-and I am now quoting from the book of the three members of the British Parliament-'that Mr. Bevin, who is known to be a man of honour, will keep his word and insist on the second part of the programme: the date fixed for the plebiscite. If not, I fear there may be a danger of Civil war. I should like to tell Bevin, if he remembers me and loves Greece, that he must keep to the agreement as regards the plebiscite'." Those were the words of Sophoulis. ;However, the agreement was not fulfilled.. That is the history of the "elections" upon which the present Greek G6vernment of Sophoulis and Tsaldaris bases its claim to be a representative Government enjoying the confidence and support of the people. That is the 'history of those electiorls in which, according to the report of the Greek Minister of the Interior, 1,117,000 out of 2,211,000 voters voted, and 1,094,000, that is, almost 50 percent of the . voters abstained from voting, that is to say, boycotted the elections. Such is the outcome of the order brought about in Greece by British military authorities with the help of their armed forces. It is obvious that· the experience of these "democratic" elections in Greece, under the supervision of foreign forces, is now inspiring Mr. Marshall with some ideas on Korea. It will be seen from Mr. Austin's letter. to Mr. Trygve a-~ire ont boycotte ces elections. Voila les resultats de l'ordre que les autorites militaires britanniques ont instaure en Grece, avec l'appui de leurs forces armees. L'experience acquise au cours de~ elections "democratiques" en Grece, effectuees sous la surveillance des troupes etangeres, semble inspirer M. Marshall lorsqu'il s'agit de la Coree.En effet, il ressort de la lettre adressee par M. Austin I am speaking of Greece again. How can the Grcek representative in such circumstances, now with a straight face invoke these so-called elections to prove the constitutional and democratic character of the present Greek Government? Returning to the history of the Greek question, let me remind you that, in 1946, Mr. Bevin made the following statement in the Security Council: "In so far as Greece is concerned, as soon as we have carried out our obligations that we have undertaken with the Greek Government, those troops will b~ withdrawn and we shall not menace or cause any trouble to any other nation."2 Although the precise nature of these obligations was not explained, nevertheless, the USSR delegation to the Security Council, in view of this declaration, stated that, as it was actuated by a desire for co-operation, it would, for its part, agree to the discussion of the Greek question being closed with an informal statement by the President, and to the question being regarded as exhausted at that time without a formal resolution. The USSR delegation was prepared to agree to the whole matter being confined to an informal statement by the President of the Security Council-the Australian representative, Mr. Makin, was in the Chair at the time-that, in consideration of the British Government's promise to withdraw its forces from Greece at the earliest possible date, the subject could be considered closed at that meeting. It was more or less in this spirit that the discussion of the Greek question ended at that time. Nearly two years have now passed and the British forces are still in Greece. Moreover, they have been supplemented by American military personnel: instructors, experts and others. As you all know, and I think it unnecessary to waste time proving the point, the situation in Greece has not only not improved, but has still further deteriorated. The civil war in Greece is at its height. Let me draw the attention of the General Assembly to a letter from the central committee 6f the Greek National Solidarity Movement sent to the United Nations Secretariat in August of this year. This document is a cry from the tortured hearts of the Greek patriots. It is an appeal from these tormented fighters for their country's independence and freedom, an appeal asking the United Nations to protect them from the terror and the savage reprisals directed ."En ce ,qui concerne la Grece, aussitot que nous aurons execute les obligations que no.us avons contractees envers le Gouvernement hel- Unique, nos troupes seront retirees; nous ne menacerons aucune autre nation, et ne lui occasionnerons aucune difficulte2." Bien qu'on n'ait pas precise au juste quels etaient ces engagements, la delegation de l'URSS a pris en consideration cette declaration et a annonce a son tour au Conseil de securite que, fidele ason desir de collaboration, elle consentait ace que la discussion de la question grecque £Ut terminee par une declaration non officielle du President et a ce qu'on la considerat comme reglee sans qu'aucune resolution formelle ne £Ut prise. La delegation de I'URSS a estime possible d'accepter qu'on se bornat a une declaration non officielle du President du Conseil de securite - a cette epoque c'etait le represent.ant de l'Aus~ tralie, M. Makin - et qu'il £O.t dit dans cette declaration que, compte tenu de la promesse du Gouvernement britannique de retirer ses troupes du territoire de la Grece dans le plus breI delai, on considerait cette question comme reg16e. C'est ainsi, grosso modoJ que s'est terrnine, a l'epoque, l'examen de la question grecque. Pres de deux ans se sont ecoules depuis. Les tro1,lpes britanniques continuent a stationner en Grece. En outre des instructeurs militaires et des experts americains de toute sorte sont venus les rejoindre. Loin de s'ameliorer, la situatio~ en Grece a empire, nous le savons tous, et je crois qu'il et inutile de perdre du temps a le demontrer. La guerre civile sevit en Grece. Je dois attirer l'attention de l'AssembIee generale sur la lettre que le Comite central de la "Solidarite nationale grecque" a adressee au Secretariat de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au mois d'aout dernier. Ce document constitue un appel dechirant de la part des patriotes grecs. C'est un appe1 decombattants extenues, luttant pour l'independance et la liberte de leur pays, adresse aI'Organisation des Nations Unies pour lui demander protection contre la terreur et la I Voir document A/C.l/218. •Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de slcurill, Premi~re Annee, Premi~re S6rie, No 1, pa6C 86. ..are frequently murdered by bandits. of the Right, .as has happened in Nigteta and a number of towns in Crete and Macedonia. The central committee's document tells of systematic mass shootings, carried out in execution of sentences passed by the military tribunals, and asks the United Nations to intervene in the name of humanity. We cannot ignore this letter, which testifies ' to the. indescribable horrors which are taking place in Greece under the present political regime. . In the face of these facts, hQw could the Greek representative in the First Committee , have the audacity to talk of Greece as a model of democracy and as a country where democracy flourishes? There you have a democracy: the 50,000 exiles and Greek patriots being systematically exterminated who are referred to by the central committee of the Greek National Solidarity Movement. The extern"al political situation of Greece is growing more and more confused, and it must be said quite frankly that it is the United States of America and tne United Kingdom, the dominant factors in Greek politics, which bear the main responsibility. We are again having to discuss the Greek question, on the initiative of the United States Government, but not in the form in which it was originally raised in the Security Council by the Government, of the USSR. The· question is being presented in a completely false and distorted form, I am sorry to say. In spite of the British Government's promises to withdraw its forces f~om ,Greece as soon as it had carried out its obligations, those forces are still in Greece, and the reference to Great Britain's obligations to Greece has proved to be nothing but a worthless bill of exchange which the drawee neither intended nor intends to honour. Meanwhile, the campaign against democracy in Greece has gained strength. The situation in the country has reached a point of extreme tension. The fonner head of the United States mission to Greece, Mr. Porter, recently stated t~ouva.ient. ~eja 7.000 autres dcportes. I'lle d Ikana. amSl que celles de Lemnos et d'Anaphi sont plemes de deportes. Les detcnus sont jetes . sur les roches desertes de Psitalia all Hs sont condamnes a mourir de faim. I1 rGssort de ce document que le total des detenus et des deportes atteint en Grece le chiffre de 50.000 environ. La maitied'entre eux attendent leur jugement depuis plus de deux ans. Souvent .des bandits appartenant a la droite assassinentles detenus, comme cela s'est produit a Nigreta et dans un certain nombre de villes en Crete et en Macedoine. Dans ce document, le Comite central mentionne les executions en masse qui ont lieu systematiquen1ent ala suite des sentences prononcees par·les tribunaux militaires et il demande.a l'Organisation des Nations Unies d'intervenir au nom de l'humanite. On ne peut passer sous silence cette lettre qui temoigne des atrocitcs indicibles qui ont lieu en Grece sous le regime politique actue!. Comment dans ces conditions le representant de la Grece a la Premiere Commission a-t-il eu l'audace d'affirmer que la Grece etait un pays democratique modele, que la democratie y fleurissait? Cette democratie la voila: cc sont les 50.000 deportes, ce sont les patriotes grecs que 1'on decime d'une fa~on systematique et dont parle le Comite central de la Solidarite nationale grecque. En ce qui concerne la politique exterieure, la situation de la Grece· devient de plus en plus confuse et, i1 faut le dire ouvertement, ce sont les Etats-Unis d'Amerique et le Royaume-Uni qui en portent la responsabilite principale,' car ces pays jouent un role essentiel dans la politique· grccque. Sur l'initiative du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, nous avons a nous occuper une fois de. plus de la question grecque. Mais, cette fois-ci, cette question nous a ete presentee sous un autre aspect que lorsqu'elle avait ete soumise au Conseil de securite par le Gouvernement de l'URSS. Malheureusement la question grecque nous a ete presentee maintenant sous .un aspect absolument deforme. Malgre les promesses faites par le Gouvernement britannique de retirer ses troupes de la Grece .des que le Royaume~Uni aurait rempli· ses obligations, ces troupes restent toujours en Grece et quand il parle d'obligations assumees a l'eg~rd de la Grece, le Gouvemement britannique ne fait que signer un billet a ordre qu'il n'a nullement l'intention d'honorer. ~ntre temps, l'offensive menee contre les forces democratiques en Gn~ce continue ase developpcr. La situation a l'interieur du pays est devenue extremement tendue. M. Porter, l'ancien 'chef de la mission americaine en Grece, a recemment "The British formula in such cases was always collaboration with the native ruling classes, buying their support by confirming them in their power to exploit the masses, and relying 'on them to hold the people down with gendarmerie and whips." Mr. Porter's description, one must certainly aamit, is not lacking in forcefulness. I shall not comment on his description; it is enough, I think, to make it known and leave denials or amendments to the interested parties. Such is British policy in Greece. It is a policy which aims at destroying the democratic movement and strengthening the reactionary groups which have thrust themselves into power in Greece with the support of the Anglo-American military authorities. This policy has. led, as it was bound to lead; to such a situation that, to quote once more the words of our esteemed American friend, Mr. Porter, only, "a miracle" can now save Greece.. I do not wish to comment at length on the present Greek Government, or to argue whether it is in fact constitutional or unconstitutional. However, I cannot ignore all these circumstances, especially as in the opinion of the delegation of the USSR, the root cause of the external political complications which have led to the discussion of the Greek question in the General Assembly at the present time are to be found precisely in the internal political activity of the Sophoulis-Tsaldaris Government-not the Sophoulis who was in power at the time of the March elections, bu~ the Sophoulis who is now exploiting the results of elections which he himself condemned to strengthen his position in the Government. ' This point was commented on in the First Committee, and I myself must therefore pay some attention to it here. It can be concluded, at least, from the state~ ment made by the representative of Norway on 7 October, that internal antagonisms in Greece are the main cause, of the present troubled situation in that country. In order to remove t,he threat ~o peace in that part of Europe, the representative of Norway suggested that three condi- 'See Collier's Df 20 September 1947, Wanted: A 1 Voir, clans le numerD de Collier's du 20 septembre Miracle in Greece, by Paul A. Porter. 1947, Wanted a Miracle in Greece, par Paul A. Porter. interi~urs qui existent dans ce pays. Le representant de la Norvege a declare qu'il faIlait remplir trois conditions pour ecaiter la menace ala paix Although Mr. Delbos, the representative of France, supported the c4arges. of the United States of America and of Greece against Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania in the First Committee, he had to declare in this connexion that "the causeS of the disturbances which have led to the present situation are to be sought in Greece itself".2 Even Mr. Spaak, that self-sacrificing advocate and enthusiastic supporter of the American charges, had reluctantly to make this admission in his. statement on 3 October 1947 in the First Committee. (I am quoting from the Russian translation of the verbatim report of this statement) : "I am convinced that the situation inside Greece i'i caused by internal difficulties resulting from the political, social and economic opposition which exists between two important groups of the Greek people. Therefore, as I have said, this accusation seems to me to be excessive.m These are the words of Mr. Spaak, whom noboay could possibly suspect of having too much sympathy for Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and . Albania, or of being excessively critical of Greece, much less of the United Kingdom, and much less still of the United States of America. To the above might be added another remark of Mr. Spaak himself, to the effect that the situation in Greece is caused not only by internal difficulties, but also, to use his own florid and .very timid expression, "by an undeniable degree of American intervention in the internal politics of Greece". These statements are sufficient to cast some light on the real ·causes which have given rise to the so-called "Greek question", which has become such an acute issue at the present time, and which has attracted so much ~erious attention from the United Nations. • However, the American and British delegations, as I have said, have done everything possible to give this question a false character and present it here in a distorted light. That was made particularly clear by all that went on in the First Committee during the discussion of 1 Sixty-eighth meeting of the First Committee. The speaker is quoting from an interpretation from English into Russian. • Sixty-third meeting of the First Committee. "Je suis convaincu que la situation interieure de la Grece provient de ses difficultes internes, de l'opposition politique, sociale et economique qui existe entre deux groupes importants du peupIe grec et par consequent cette accusation-la, si elle etait portee, me paraitrait tout a fait excessive.S" Voila ce que dit M. Spaak et pourtant on ne saurait le soupc;onner de sympathies excessives pour la Yougoslavie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie, ni d'une attitude trop critique al'egard de la Grece, encore moins al'egard du Royaume-Uni, ni surtout, a l'egard des Etats-Unis d'Amerique. On pourrait completer cette declaration de M. Spaak en citant ses propres paroles sur la situation en Grece. Il a dit en effet que cette situation etait due non seulement aux difficultes interieures, mais enCOre "pour une part incontestable, al'intervention am~ricaine dans la polltique interieure de la Grece4". C'est en ces, termes ala fois prudents et pretentieux que s'est exprime M. Spaak. Il suffit de citer ces declarations pour faire la lumiere sur les causes veritables de ce qu'on appelle la "question grecque", qui est devenue tellement aigue et qui preoccupe tellement 1'0rganisation des Nations U:qies. Pourtant, comme je l'ai deja dit, les d8ega- . tions americaine et britannique ont tout fait pour deformer cette question et pour en fausser id la presentation. Cela a ete rendu particulierement clair par ce qui s'est passe a la Premiere Commission pendant l'examen de la question 1 Soixante-huiti~me seance de la Premiere Commission. Cette citation est tirt~e de l'interpretation de l'anglais en russe. , • Soixante-troisieme seance de la Premiere Commission. S Soixante-cinquieme seance de la Premiere Commission. • Retraduit du russe. Everything we witnessed in the First Committee's discussion of the Greek question: the arguments, considerations and proofs advanced by the United States delegation against Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania; the suspicious spectacle of one American draft resolution being replaced by another, literally on the spur of the moment; the trade, a real bit of horse-trading, which the United States representatives in the First Coni- - mittee attempted to put through with the representatives of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania; the completely inadmissible methods of coercion and pressure on these three countries in order to obtain their agreement to a control commission; the manoeuvres of every kind to which the United States representative resorted in order to achieve his aim, the establishment of a control commission; the going even so far as the use of such an absolutely abnormal voting method as voting on a resolution not consecutively from beginning to end, but in separate sections, arbitrarily lifted from the middle of the resolution, followed by the end and returning then, and only then, after having made sure of the end of the resolution, to the very beginning of the resolution (this procedure caused one representative to declare quite rightly that it was a headless resolution)-do not all these manoeuvres, tricks and machinations reveal the true ends pursued by the Government of the United States of America in placing the .Greek question on the .agenda of the General Assembly at the present time? We answer tlus question in the affirmative. The idea, obviously, is that of making a political attack on Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania" of accusing them of-without the slightest juridical or moral foundation for such an accusation-violating the standards of international law and threatening the politicalindependence and territorial integrity of Greece, in order to justify thereby the intervention of the United States in Greek affairs, to fortify even more strongly the basis for sw:h intervention in the future, to justify in the eyes of world publIc opinion the "assistance" which the United States of America has given Greece and to transform Greece--under cover of this assistance-into its strategic military base. r shall attempt hereafter to quote as briefly as possible facts which will, I hope, be sufficient to show ho~ artific~al, unjust, fictitious and unsubstantial are these accusations against Yugo- We demonstrated in the First Committee the unsoundness of this evidence, its artificiality and, what is worse, the fact that it was falsified. We pointed out, for example, a fact which nobodyeven the accusers themselves, the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and Greece-ventured to deny, that the mostimportant documents are forged and the depositions of the most important witnesses are false. It was established quite definitely, recorded i~ the documentation of the Commission of Investigation submitted to the First Committee, and must be known to everybody, that this false evidence was extracted from the witnesses by torture and violence and bought from them at the price of their lives. Of course it would be very wearying and take a great deal of time to analyze all these depositions and other evidence at length, and to repeat what has already been said in the First Committee. Yet, I would remind those who were not present that the First Committee studied the Greek question for three weeks, that during those three weeks we of the delegation of the USSR and those who supported us in everyone of our speeches, quoted the first names, surnames and addresses of those perjurers, agents provocateurs, criminals and traitors to their country, like Kologanov, an ex-president of a Bulgarian court who fled to Greece and there gave evidence against Bulgaria. We pointed to persons' who had been bought at the price of their lives (I call them witnesses released from thehangman's noose). We demonstrated the unreliability of those false witnesses, and then called on the, accusers in their turn to give us the names of a dozen or so honest witnesses who would corroborate the accusations against Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and.Albania, to name ~hem, to show us Ainsi done, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis. d'Amerique et celui de la Grcce accusent la Yougoslavie, la Bulga,rie et l'Albanie de menacer l'independance politique et l'intt~grite territoriale de la Grece. QueUes preuves nmis a-t-on fournies pour etayer ces accusations? En premier lieu, des depositions de temoins; en second lieu, on nous a presente ce que les juristes appellent des piecesa conviction: des articles de journaux, des comptes rendus de la presse sur les declarations de certains hommes d'Etat yougoslaves, bulgares et albanais, ainsi qu'une interview que le marechal Tho a donnee le 16 octobre sur la question macedonienne. Nous avons deja releve ala Premiere Commission que ces preuves n'avaient aucune valeur, qu'elles etaient artificielles, et pis encore, qu'elles avaient ete fal~i£iees. Nous avons ,plOntre, par exemplc, un fait que personne n'a ose nier, que les accusateurs eux-memes, les representants des Etats-Unis, du Royaume-Uni et de la Grece, n'ont pas Ose 'contester. Je veux parler de la falsification des documents les plus importants, des depositions mensongeres faites par les principaux tcmoins,' comme cela a ete clairement demontre, comme ce1a figure dans les documents de la Commission d'enquete qui ont ete presentes a la Premiere Commission et comme tout le monde devrait le savoir; je veux parler des temoins auxquels on a arrache de fausses depositions par la torture et la violence ou dont on a achcte le temoignage en leur promettant la vie sauve. Il serait evidemment trap long et trop fatiguant de nous arreter a l'analyse de tous ces . tcmoignages et des autre~ preuves alleguees, en repetant tout cc qui a deja ete dit ala Premiere Commission. Je rappelIerai cependant a ceux qui n'ont pas assiste aux travaux de la Premiere Commission, que cette derniere a examine la question grecque pendant trois semaines et qu'au cours de cette periode les' representants de l'URSS et ceux qui lesont appuyes ont donne dans chacune de leurs interventions, les noms, prenoms et adresses de faux temoins, de provocateurs, de crirninels de droit commun, de traitres aleur patrie tcls que ce Kologanov, ancien president de tribunal bulgare qui s'est enfui en Grece et qui a depose contre la ~ulgarie. Nous avons parle d'hommcs que 1'0n a achetes en leur promettant la vie sauve et j'ai dit que c'etaient la des temoins qui depcisaient la corde au cou. Nous avons montre que les depositions de ces faux tcmoins etaient sans valeur, et anotre tour, nous avons dit aux accusateurs: citez-nous une dizaine de tcmoins de bonne foi qui soutiennent vos accu- Mr. McNeil preferred to say that there was really no point in plunging into this "fog of detail". Of course, it is much better not to plunge into this "fog of detail" because this detail would present you with the risk of exposing to public opinion the falsification of testimony and the monstrous deception which is concealed here because many representatives are not familiar with the actual documents and have not studied those 20,000 pages; and because many, perhaps, hold different opinions in their heart of hearts from those which they have expressed in their votes on particular points of the United States resolution. That is their private matter and a matter for their conscience. I neither venture nor desire to deal with that point. However, I am in duty bound to say this: Today you are about to pronounce a decision. It will be a court sentence. You are now formed here into a supreme court of justice and you must be familiar with the documents and the data, to know what weight can be attached to these data, how pure the sources from which , they have been drawn, if you are to pronounce witl1 a clear conscience a decision which accuses Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania of crimes which they have not committed. As I shall try to show hereafter, even the majority of the First Committee did not venture to accept the responsibility of accusing them of these crimes, for the resolution which has been submitted does not refer to the opinion of the First Committee. In this resolution the truth-seekers turn from Pontius and appeal to Pilate. The resolution says whereas the majority of the Commission of Investigation established the existence of such and such breaches of the law on the part of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, the First Committee recommends setting up a committee, recommends meddling in the internal affairs of these three States and "putting one's feet on the table" in other people's houses. But the majority of the Committee did not accept the responsibility of saying: we, the majority of the Committee, have seen all this evidence, and on the basis of all these data, declare the accusations to be legitimate and well-founded. You will not find that in the resolut~on, but I intend' to .deal with it later. I declare that the documents were forged and that the witnesses were specially picked out and successfully played their part in this business as perjurers. If you want facts, I shall supply them. You ask me to realize my responsibility for what I say in this August Ass~mbly. I am aware of that responsibility and accept it without qualification. Here, are the facts: THE WITNESSES The General Assembly must know that the Greek Government submitted a varie.ty of material to the Commission of Investigation and the pr~ndre en toute conscience une decision qui accuse la YougoSlavie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie de crimes qu'elles n'ont pas commis. Comme je m'efi'orcera;i de le demontrer plus loin, la majorite de la Premiere Commission n'a pas ose prendre la responsabilite de ces accusations; en effet, la resolution qui nous a ete presentee ne mentionne pas 1'0pinion de la Premiere Commission. Dans cette resolution, on renvoie de Caiphe a Pilate ceux qui cherchent la verite. La resolution dit: etant donne que la majorite de la Commission d'enquete a reconnu l'existence de telles et telles infractions commises par la Yougoslavie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie, la Premiere Commission recommande de creer une commission, de s'ingerer dans les affaires interieuers de ces trois pays et de s'installer chez autrui, les pieds sur la table. Mais la majorite de la Commission n'a pas pris sur elle de declarer: nous, qui sommes la majorite de la' Commission, reconnaissons, sur le vu des preuves et des donnees qui nous ont ete fournies, que ces accusations sont justes et fondees. Vous ne trouverez pas de te1les declara~ tfons dans la resolution; d'ailleurs, je parlerai de ceIa plus tard. j'affirme que les documents ont ete fasilifies, que les temoins ont ete specialement choisis et ont joue avec succes leur role de faux temoins. Vous voulez des faits, je vais en citer. Vous demandez que je prenne pleine 'et entiere responsabilite pour les paroles que je prononce ici, de cette noble tribune; j'ai conscience de mes responsabilites et je les assume entierement. Voici les faits: ' LES TEMoINS L'AssembIee generale doit savoir que le Gouvernement grec a remis a la Commission et au Groupe subsidiaire divers documents au I have studied the depositions of these twentysix witnesses very carefully. I could give you all their names, and I assure you that these are the very witnesses whom I am about to have the honour of introducing to you life-size. It appears that of these twenty-six witnesses, ten were found to be perjurers, exposed as such in the course of the, investigation by their own contradictory and lying testimony. Some of them admitted having received money from the Greek authorities in payment for false evidence (for example, the witness Zaphiris). Some of them are'like the witness Bobtsis, whom the Commission, at the suggestion of Mr. Urrutia, representative of Colombia, refused to hear out because he talked such rubbish that it contradicted all the obvious facts, with which even the Commission was familiar; or the witness Velianidis, who was unable, when asked by the members of the Commission, even to say in what year he was born, and who made so dubious an impression that the Commission of Investigation took a special decision to make further inquiries as to his identity. So much for the first group of ten witnesses, who declared that a certain railway line running in a particular direction was aimed directly at Greece and had a strategic significance, whereas that railway was situated in the interior of Yugoslavia, led in exactly the opposite direction and, of course, had no strategic significance. I could quote an abundance of facts to characterize everyone of these witnesses, but I have not yet heard a single fact adduced by the accusers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania to show that their accusations have a really sound basis. Of the twenty-six persons interrogated by the Commission of Investigation, six were common criminals and agents provocateurs. Here are their names: Vlahos, the murderer of ex-minister Zevgos, and his fellow conspirators, Partoulas, Tsaoussis and Sidiropoulos. Moreover, Sidiropoulos admitted in a letter 'published in the Greek Press that he had received money from the Greek authorities for his false testimony against ,Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. His letter was publisped not in the Yugoslav, Bulgarian or Albanian Press, nor was it sent from a Yugoslav, Bulgarian or Albanian prison; it was sent from a Greek prison, when he was in· Greece, and in it Sidiropoulos accused the Greek authorities of having paid him money to bear, false witness, which he admits that he did. ~ituee au centre de la Yougoslavie et ne se dirigeait nullement vel'S la Greee, et bien entendu ne presentait aucune inlportimce stratcgique. Je pourrais vous citeI' encore de nombreux faits qui etabliraient le caractere de chacun de ces temoins, mais les accusateurs de la Yougoslavie, de la Bulgarie et de l'Albanie n'ont pu, autant que je sache, citeI' le moindre fait qui tendrait a prouver que ces accusations reposent veritablement sur un terrain solide. Sur ces vingt-six personnes interrogees par la Commission d'enquete, six individus sont des criminels de droit commun et des agents provoca- 'teurs. Void leurs noms: Vlahos, assassin de .1'ex-Ministre Zevgos; Partoulas, Tsaoussis et Sidiropoulos, ses complices. Sidiropoulos a d'ailleurs reconnu clans une lettre publiee dans la presse grecque qu'il avait re~u de 1'argent des autorites grecques pour ses faux temoignages contre la Yougoslavie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie. Cette lettre de Sidiropoulos, ce n'est pas dans la presse yougoslave, bulgare ou albanaise qu'elle a ete publiee, ce n'est pas d'une prison yougoslave, bulgare ou albanaise qu'elle a ete envoyee, mais bien d'uneprison grecque, situee en territoire grec; dans cette lettre, Sidiropoulos accuse les ' autorites grecques'de lui avoir verse unesomme d'argent pour qu'il rende de faux temoignages, et il reconnait qu'il a effcctivement rendu des faux temoignages. Finally, we have the Kologanov already mentioned, the president of a military court in Bulgaria during the German occupation, who fled to Greece and there gave false testimony against Bulgaria, his own country. An impressive sextet, indeed. Take ten, add these six and add five more persons. I shall give you their names: Valtadoros, Pitas, Zahos, Ikonomov and Serbakov. These five person~, who had been sentenced to death, were then pardoned and brought. before the Commission of Investigation to expose their own comrades. On that occasion Valtadoros, when he was asked why his four comrades had been executed while he was still alive, answered: "1 don't know; probably s() that I could come before the Commission and give evidence against those four." There are your ten, six and five-twenty-<;me out of the twenty-six witnesses brought by the Greek Government. And now it is for you-on the basis of these depositions made by agents provocateurs, by common criminals snatched from the hangman's noose, who plead for their lives, redeemed at such a frightful cost in slander and-treachery, and supply the evidence needed by the Greek authorities who offered them as witnesses-it is for you now to pledge your honour and repu- ..t:ation on the truth and reliability of these witnesses who have come forward as the accusers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. Can you do such a thing? Is there one amongst you to raise his hand, on the basis of such evidence, to vote in favour of the resolution so hurriedly and injudiciously submitted to the General Assembly by that section of the First Committee which secured a majority only because very many of the members of the Committee are not familiar with the actual. documents, or because they approached this question with the political and preconceived intention of doing everything possible to put through this frontier commission? For, indeed, if the accusations are unfounded, why have the commission? If the accusations are unfounded, what is the point of saying, in the resolution, that we call upon Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania not to repeat in the future the crimes alleged by the false witnesses, which Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania have never in fact committed? But if it is unnecessary to address these appeals and requests to these three countries not to do in the future what was never done in the past -although they are alleged to have Clone itwhy establish such a commission? What will they do with the commission?·Of cO~lfSe, the whole thing collapses. We assert that this is all a trumped-up business, or as we say in Russian, "all this porridge All this runs off, as the saying goes, like water from a duck's back. Yet, at some point or other, the question must finally be cleared up. Since it has been raised here, in the General Assembly, we must settle it. How does the case stand with these witnesses? The Commission heard not only these twentysix witnesses but many more. It heard witnesses selected by the Commission itself from the Greek concentration camps and prisons, from Zervas torture chambers of every kind. Amongst them were a large number of leading figures in politics and social affairs, thrown into jail by the Greek authorities and the Greek Government, and of ordinary rank and file people. For example, we find amongst them General Gregoriadis, the leader of the leftist Liberal Party; Mr.Paparigas, the President of the General Confederation of Greek Trade Unions; General Bakirdzis, and Hercules Petsimetsas, President of the All-Greek Federation of Democratic Associations. These are all persons' of unimpeachable character and of undoubted moral standing, and their political honour is proved by their courage and inflexibility in the struggle against fascism and against the continued fascistmonarchist terror in Greece. They all testified that neither Yugoslavia nor Bulgaria nor Albania was guilty of the crimes ascribed to them; that responsibility for everything that is happening on the Greca-Albanian, Greco-Bulgarian and Greco-Yugoslav frontiers devolves on the Greek Government itself, which has failed to, and is unable to, come to terms with its own people who have taken up arms to fight that Government. They testified that the whole responsibility lay with the United States Government, of which Mr. Porter wrote: "The United States .of America is the dominant factor in Greek politics." They testified that the whole responsibility lay with the British Government, which has its divisions in Greece. Mr. McNeil says that he does not know how many of these divisions there are. It makes no difference whether there is one division or more; in any case there are enough of them to be able to." take an active part' in the repression of the What happened in the First Committee? Quite obviously, the First Committee could not remain indifferent to all these facts. These facts could not remain unnoticed, even though everything had been decided in advance by a firmly compacted group-I shall be frank and call it-the British-American-French bloc. ADd here is what happened. The representative of the Norwegian delegation made a statement. I quote from the relevant part of his speech: "In my judgment} the evidence before the Committee is not sufficient to entitle us conclusively to lay down that the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have given aid and assistance to Greek guerrillas in contravention ofthe Charter.m I shall take as an example another group, which had already decided that, in one form or another, with this or that wording, under one pretext or another, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania must be directly or indirectly accused. I shall take as an example. Mr. Spaak, man whom we all know, who is considered to be an eminent jurist and a rather intrepid expert on a number of questions about which he makes pronouncements, beginning with national sovereignty. After everything which had been said and repeated for three weeks in the First Committee, did Mr. Spaak hurl his ridiculous accusation rutWessly at the three Governments, the three small northern neighbours? No; when he spoke of the witnesses, he was obliged to acknowledge that they did not appear to be pillars of society. These perjurers, these common criminals are, for Mr. Spaak, not altogether pillars of society. If they had fewer crimes and murders on their consciences, they might perhaps even belong to the category of pillars of society. He is prepared to admit that they are not pillars of society and that their testimony cannot, there~ fore, be entirely believed. But with regard to certain witnesses, although Mr. Spaalt has not' 1 Sixty-eighth meeting of the First Committee. It is not surprising that even those representatives who thought it essential at all costs to support the American charges against Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, were unable to say more than, for instance, did Mr. Delbos, the representative of France. I would remind you that, after analyzing all the proofs submitted by the United States and United Kingdom delegations against Greece's three northern neighbours, Mr. Delbos said word for word the following: "It would seem to us that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania have taken some part in the Greek civil war, rendering some aid to the guerrillas, because without their aid the guerrillas would, of course, not have been able to cross the frontier."l Observe the language used by Mr. Delbos. He thinks, "it would seem to us" that Yugoslavia rendered assistance, took "some" part in the civil war. But wait, you must say what part. "Some part" means some not exactly defined part. Mr. Delbos does not take it upon himself to prove what part, because he does not know. "Rendering some aid": the guerrillas were aided by Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, which threw open their territories out of respect for the principle of asylum, gave them medical assistance, bound up their wounds, fed the hungry and exhausted guerrillas who had been cornered at the frontier by Greek monarchist troops. Does Mr. Delbos think it is a breach of international law to give such assistance? It is the sacred duty of every State to give asylum on its territory to the political opponents of a Government against which they are fighting in their own country, to bind up their wounds if they are bleeding, to give them bread if they are hungry and water if they are thirsty. By using these words: "it would seem to us", "taken some part", "rendering some aid", Mr. Delbos indicates that he has doubts, that he has hesitations ~bout this matter, that he is not convinced that all these slanders and wicked calumnies uttered by the political opponents of Greece's neighbours are indeed well-founded; but he cannot act otherwise. It is said that ((volentem fata ducunt, nolentem trahunt"-"the unwilling are dragged along by fate, but the willing are led". He is obliged to say: "Since we are in for a ride, let's have a ride." There is a story about a parrot which was grabbed by a cat and dragged away. All that the parrot could do was to say: "Since we are in for a ride, let's have a ride:' In the same way, Mr. Delbos realizes that it merely seems to him that there are some disconnected facts which merely enable him to assume that there have been some violations. What can you do 1 Seventy-second meeting of the First Committee. The speaker is quoting from an interpretation from French into Russian. 1 Soixante-douzieme seance de la Premiere Commission. Cette citation est tide de l'interpretation du fran~ais en russe. That is the situation in the First Committee. "Th . The representative of Norway says: e ~v~: dence is queer; I cannot base my charges on It. Mr. Spaak said the witnesses v:er.e, of course, bandits, cutthroats, common cflmmals, agents provocateurs, perjurers, of whose character tenfold evidence had been given, in fact, they were what Mr. Spaak described as "not pillars of society" and could not be regarded as trustworthy. . Mr. Delbos says outright that there is no concrete evidence but only that "it would seem", "it would appear", or "it is possible that". Th.at being the position, a solution is, nevertheless, dIScovered, that proposed in the qraft resolution submitted by the First Committee of the General Assembly. ..' The majority ohhe Firsf CommIttee, as I Said, admitted that they were not really familiar with the documentation. That is the supreme tragedy of the situation. Mr. McNeil, for instance, said: "Do you mean to say you want everyone to know and study these documents? It would be better not to delve into a fog of deta.il. We should rely on the Commission, because it is a very good Commission." Mr. McNeil assured us that it was a very good Commission, because there was a friend of his on it, a very good friend and a splendid chap. I am quite willing to believe that he is a splendid chap, that he is a very good friend of Mr. McNeil's and that it all amounts to this: "Tell me who your friends are, and I shall tell you who you are." Nevertheless, I should like to see the proofs; I should like to have the facts; I should like to read the depositions of witnesses; and I should like to be con- .vinced that these were honest witnesses who were not bribed or tortured by the Greek police or a military tribunal. But there are no such proofs. We are told: Just a minute, the Security Council set up a Commission of Investigation; the Commission of Investigation nominated a 'Subsidiary Group; the Subsidiary Group has been doing something or other; it saw something or other. It should be trusted; the Commission trusts it. The Commission submitted a report. We should trust this Commission and so the First Committee should, without going into detail, without delving into this fog of detail, take all this on trust and submit it to the Assembly. Of course, the Assembly will affix its rubber stamp. How can such a large number of people study everything we say here? But I am giving you names and surnames and I am telling you that these are false witnesses and criminals. Let someone get up and say: "No, they are not At an earlier stage, they submitted a document 1 reading as follows: "The General.Assembly ... finds that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, in contravention of principles of the Charter of the United Nations, have given assistance and support to the guerillas fighting against the Greek Government". In the resolution submitted to us now2, however, we find the following: "Taking account of the report of the Commission of Investigation which found by a majority vote"- that is, neither we, nor the Committee, nor the majority of the Committee but the majority of the Commission and the Commission must bear responsibility for this-"that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had given assistance" and the Assembly calls upon them to abstain therefrom in future. Compare these two resolutions. Do they coincide? Does the substitution of the second resolution for the first not bear witness to the fact that the accusers themselves do not believe in their accusations, that they are withdrawing these accusations, that they do not wish to be held responsible and are sheltering behind the fact that this has been recognized by the Commission -and I shall have more to say about this Commission. That was the position with regard to the witnesses. How did matters starid with regard to documents? Mr. Tsaldaris spoke in the Security Council on 12 December 1946.8 As a proof that Yugoslavia had designs against the territorial inviolability and integrity of Greece, he referred to an interview given by Marshal Tito, the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, on 16 October 1946. But it was proved at the time that this interview was falsified, or at any rate, the part of it which was most offensive and which constituted the gravest charge against the Yugoslav Government. .Tsaldaris had done a very simple thing. He took one sentence out of the interview given by Marshal Tito of 16 October 1946 and substituted for it another sentence which Marshal Tito did not use but which did indeed make the interview offensive. Marshal Tito said, more or less, that Yugoslavia, which sympathized with her Macedonian brethren, would take measures in 'Document A/C.l/191. • See documents A/409 and A/409/Corr.1. Voila pour.les temoins. Voyons maintenant la question des documents. Le 12 decembre 1946, M. Tsaldaris a fait une declaration au Conseil de securite2• Pour prouver que la Yougoslavie voulait porter atteinte al'integrite territoriale de la Grece, il s'est refere a l'interview que le marechal Tito, Premier Ministre de Yougoslavie, avait donne le 16 octobre 1946. Or, il a ete prouve a l'epoque que cette interview a ete falsifiee, tout au moins dans la partie qui contenait le passage le plus odieux et qui devait constituer l'accusation la plus grave contre le Gouvernement de Yougoslavie. M. Tsaldaris a procede a une operation fort simple. Il a e111eve une phrase de l'interview donnee le 16 octobre 1946 par le marechal Tito et ill'a remplacee par une autre, par une phrase que le marechal Tito n'avait pas prononcee et qui donnait a cette interview un caractere veritablement adieux. Le marechal Tito avait dit a peu pres ceci: la Yougoslavie, qui eprouve de 'Document A/C.l/191. • Voirles documents A/409 et A/409/Corr.l. The Yugoslav Government is, accused of having organized on its territory the Buljkes camp, in which there were Greek guerrillas who were given military instruction. For this purpose, even a special book was published-a manual, a book of instructions or textbook. This is an interesting matter, one which should be gone into. Unfortunately, the First Committee was unable to go into this question. Apparently, the existence of a military school in the Buljkes camp is corroborated by those same witnesses of whom I have already spoken. When the Commission itself came to Buljkes, however, "no traces of a military school were found", as we see from the records of that Commission. In Part Ill, conclusions, of document 8/360 entitled "Report of the Commission, of Investigation concerning Greek frontier incidents", it is stated that "at the time of its visit to the camp at Buljkes on 2 April 1947, the Commission was unable to find evidence of military activities or of military training ..." There is yet another noteworthy point in the report of the majority of the Commission which is by way of proof of the existence of a military school at Buljkes. Apparently, the Commission was given a copy of a military manual of instruction in guerrilla tactics. Certain witnesses have testified that this manual was used' as a textbook in BuIjkes. A witness was even found, a certain Greek refugee, who testified he was one of the authors of this manual when it}Vas corp.piled in the summer of 1945 at another camp, Rubiga, by a whole group of officers, forty-five in number. . The Commission of Investigation and the First Committee have one copy of this manual, in Greek; it is in their archiveS, along' with 20,000 pages of various documents. Incidentally, this book has no title-page, so it is not known where it was published, where, when, and by whom. We do not know. There is, however, one interesting thing: a list of the problems which the guerrillas studied when they took this course of military instruction. There are sixty-four such problems. Furthermore, the manual has an introduction about which I must tell you, because it so clearly exposes the false and provocative nature of this manual, this document, this forgery. What problems were the guerrillas studying in those troubled times? Here they are. The - So, while this desperate struggle was going on, the guerrillas were to study the historical development of the army. But why should guerrillas study this question at all? During the German occupation, there were many guerrilla detachments in our country which did considerable damage to the German occupation forces; they trounced them soundly, wiped them out or drove them across the borders of our country. They certainly had no time to study, for instance, the history or development of the German army. Instead of studying the history of the development of the German army, the guerrillas preferred to fight against that army. It appears, however, that the first thing these Greek guerrillas in Yugoslavia had to do was to study the history of the army. Take part two: Strategy and tactics. You all know, of course, that guerrillas learn the strategy and tactics of modern armies by actually-fighting these armies. Other parts are entitled as follows: 3. The equipment of modern armies; 4. The air fprcesj 6. Aspects of infantry warfare; 7. Firing, march. ing, terrain; 8. Missions, etc.; 11. Mobilized detachments. . Then we have part 17, which is entitled: The tasks of the soldier in actionj then there is part 51: Movement of the supply train during action and part 58: Artillery, etc., From this list alone, is it not clear to anyone who is in the least acquainted with the habits, organization, living conditions, activities and operations of guerrillas, is it not clear that this manual can be of no value to guerrillas, that it is, rather, a handbook adapted for the commanding officers of regular armies and that probably this "handbook" was brought into the Buljkes camp from Greek territory by a soldier who had been in the Greek Army and was now in Yugoslav territory? Finally, if the manual really had been writte~ in Y~goslavia by forty-five authors, what can thIS pOSSIbly have to do with the Yugo-' slav Government? Is it not a well-known fact ~hat in prisons w~ich are most vigilantly guarded, m all concentration camps, fortresses and other places of incarceration, enterprising people can always manage to read, to obtain the necessary books, to study and to teach others without the knowledge of those in charge of these places of incarceration? And yet this so-called manual appears as one of the weightiest proofs that the Yugoslav Gover~~ent w~s giving ~reek guerrillas military trarnmg on Its own terntory to fight against the Greek Government. This so-called handbook, this tattered volume, which has not even atitle page, is prefaced by a sort 'of introduction. If you were to read this introduction, you would understand at once what Apart from that, the introduction contains the following statement: "The aforementioned course was given and is still 'being given to the 'comrades' (in inverted commas) who belong to the Greek Communist group of Rubiga." I would ask you: Is this fraud, which was to have served as evidence of Yugoslav-Bulgarian- Albanian assistance to the guerrillas in their struggle against the Greek Government, not too crude and clumsy an invention of the latter? Clearly, the Greek accusers have tried to do too much. Charges are brought regarding Yugoslav and Bulgarian designs against the territorial inviolability of Greece. I shall not dwell on this in detail, since I wish to save time. In the text of my speech which has been distributed to representatives and to the Press, I explained this aspect in detail. I am bound to say, however, that all the grounds for such charges are based on two or three statements by certain Yugoslav and Bulgarian politicians, who said that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav peoples were bound by ties of blood, by fraternal ties with the Macedonian people and hoped that in the future the Macedonian people would be united under the aegis of the Yugoslav Republic. But what importance has this imaginary aspirationto violate the terri· torial integrity of Greece compared with the utterances of Mr. Tsaldaris or certain members of the Greek Parliament, who assert very definite claims to almost a quarter of Bulgarian territory and make outright proposals, as they did during the Paris Conference, for instance, when the Greek representative suggested to Mr. Bebler and Mr. Vilfan that they come to an amicable agreement and finish with Albania by dividing her equally between Greece and Yugoslavia? Of what importance are the innocent statements of a communist newspaper like Rabotnichesko Delo or of some individual politician that the Macedonian people should in future be united with other sections of its population which have been torn from it and are located in the territories of other States? This is the only charge made of designs against the territorial integrity of Greece, and is so laughable that even the accusers themselves did not dare to include it in the draft resolution they are submitting to you on behalf of the majority of the First Committee. In these circumstances, in view of the numerous false witnesses, machinations, forged docu- Mr. Nils Langhelle made a very guarded but quite definite protest against the United States resolution, which lays the responsibility for the present troubles at the door of Greece's three northern neighbours. Mr. Langhelle said: "We have some doubts as to whether the evidence produced by the Commission of Investigation and its Subsidiary Group justifies such a definite conclusion, especially in the case of Bulgaria.m Mr. Delbos, the French representative, whom I have already mentioned, declared: "I do not want to say, because this does not seem to have been proved legally-since presumption is not proof-that the Govermnents of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia lend assistance to these guerrillas." 2 In spite of his aggressive attitude towards Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, Mr. Spaak had no option but to give way in face of the undeniable evidence of the falsity of these accusations. Mr. Spaak had every reason for saying ID the First Committee: "I do not think that any one can even hope to maintain that the northern neighbours of Greece are the inciters of the civil war which is taking place in that country, I personally do not believe that they are, and if any one says otherwise, I think it is excessive and hyperbolical."3 If these were the opinions of representatives who supported the Anglo-American position and who made every attempt to reinforce that position and to justify the policy pursued by the British and American delegations in this matter, does this not prove the complete collapse of the charges brought against Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania? The British and American accusers realized this very quickly and hastened to accept ~onditionally the French amendment, grabbing It as they would at a sheet anchor to save them from the grave moral defeat which they would have sustained had they ~sisted further. Indeed, when Mr. Johnson submItted, on behalf of the Govemment of the United States of America, the incriminatory text contained in document 1 Sixty-eighth meeting' of the First Committee. S Sixty-third meeting of the First Committee. • Sixty-fifth meeting of the First Committee. The speaker is quoting from an interpretation from French into Russian. ' Tout en se montrant fort agressif a 1'egard de la Yougoslavie, de la Bulgarie et de l'Albanie, M Spaak a du reeuler devant les preuves irrefutables qui etablissent la faussete de ces accusations. C'est ainsi que M. Spaak a declare ala Premiere Commission: "Je ne crois pas qu'on puisse nourrir l'espoir d'etablir que les voisins septentrionaux de la Grece soient les instigateurs de la guerre civile qui se deroule dans ee pays. Personnellement, je ne crois pas qu'ils le soient et si quelqu'un affirme le contraire, je pense que c'est une exageration, une hyperbole4." Venant de representants qui se sont rallies a la these anglo-americaine qui se sont efforces de soutenir eette these par tous les moyens et de justifier la ligne de conduite tracee par les delegations britannique et americaine, un tellangage ne temoigne-t-il pas de l'ecroulement total des accusations portees contre la Yougosla;vie, la. Bulgarie et l'Albanie? Les accusateurs britanniques americains l'ont tres vite senti; iIsse sont empresses d'aceepter eonditionnel1ement l'amendement franc;ais, iIs s'y sont accroehCs comme a uhe bouee de sauvetage, afin d'eviter la defaite morale qui les cut attendus s'ils s'etaient obstines. En dIet, M. Johnson en presentant au nom du Gouvemement des Etats-Unis d'Amerique son acte d'accusation, tel qu'il figure dans 1 Soixante-huitieme seance de la Premiere Commission. • Soixante·troisieme seance de la Premiere Commission. aSoixante-cinquieme seance de la Premiere Commission. Cette citation est tiree de l'interpretation du fran- "ais en russe. In the First Committee, the USSR delegation pointed'out that such a bargain was inadmissible and that it was inadmissible to use all possible means of pressure, to threaten, intimidate, and insist, in order to obtain from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania an admission of something they cannot admit, a confession of having done something they have not done, promising them in return for this a milder and more lenient resolution, which would he submitted for the considn etait clair des le debut que cette declaration constituait une manreuvre, une ruse, que c'etait un moyen de pression sur ces trois Gouvernements pour les obliger a accepter la creation d'une commission de frontieres dans laquelle les Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni et des Etats- Unis d'Amerique semblent mettre tous leurs espoirs. Il etait clair, des le debut, que les premieres accusations, que j'ai deja examinees de fal$on detaillee et qui etaient contenues dans la ' resolution americaine, par laquelle I'Assemb16e generale etait invitee areconnaltre comme etabli que la Yougoslavie, l'Albanie et la Bulgarie avaient viole les regles du droit international en pretant assistance aux partisans grecs dans leur lutte contre le regime Tsaldaris; il etait clair, dis-je, que ces accusations n'etaient autre chose qu'une intimidation doubIee de marchandage; on se reservait la possibilite de baisser le ton, d'en rabattre sur le prix et, en cedant sur la question de l'accusation formulee contre les trois Gouvernements, de rallier ceux des representants qui avaient proteste contre ces accusations mais qui neanmoins jugeaient possible de ereer la Commission proposee par les Britanniques et les Americains. Qu'il s'agit d'un marchandage, d'un moyen de pression, l'attitude de la delegation du Royaume-Uni le montre bien. A la veille meme du jour ou la question devait etre tranchee, M. McNeil presentait une resolution (le document A/C.l/207) qui ne contenait aucune accusation contre la Yougoslavie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie, mais qui, sur ce point, se referait simplement al'avis de la majorite de la Commission. Il proposait de substituer son· amendemcnt aux paragraphes de la resolution americaine, qui contenaient ces accusations, si la Yougoslavie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie acceptaient les conditions dictees par M. Johnson. Or le lendemain, sans avoir meme rec;u de reponse de la Bulgarie ou de,I'Albanie, iI s'est emprcsse de faire distribuer aux membres de la Premiere Commission une nouvelle resolution plus severe que la premiere; il n'a pas craint aque1ques heures d'intervalle de se contredire lui-m@me d'une fal$on formel1e et flagrante. La delegation de l'URSS a dit ala Premiere Commission que ce marchandage etait inadmissible, qu'il etait inadmissible d'avoir recours a des moyens de pression de toute sorte, de mena.- cer, d'intimider, de revenir a la charge, pour extorquer de la Yougoslavie, de la Bulgarie, et de l'Albanie l'aveu de crimes qu'clIes n'ont pas commis et que par consequent elles ne sauraient avouer, en leut promettant en echange de sou~ mettre une resolution moins severe, moins dure Thus, the United States delegation finally managed by sundry machinations to obtain a majority of votes; the various paragraphs of the American resolution, after being watered down considerably by the French and United Kingdom amendments,. were adopted, with six to eight delegations voting against and a considerable number of delegations, sometimes as many as ten to fifteen abstaining. Here it should be pointed out that in the subsequent voting on the other resolutions, the number of abstentions rose to twenty~six, with six to eight delegations voting in favour of the resolutions, but when a vote was taken on the draft resolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, some paragraphs of that resolution were rejected by an insignificant majority of seventeen delegations to eleven, with twenty-five to twenty~seven abstentions. It is only when such monstrous rules of procedure are used as in this case, when delegatiOns abstaining are not reckoned as present and vot~ ing, that you get such a situation as this: eleven delegations vote against, and twenty-seven abstain (Le. do not agree with either resolution), making a total of thirty-eight; and yet the resolution is considered to be adopted because seventeen votes have been cast for it. The trick is so glaring that it can be performed only on someone who has been blind from birth. Do not these undeniable facts serve as a proof of the moral and political defeat of the Anglo- American bloc, which saw itself compelled by the criticisms expressed by many delegations to withdraw its original accusations and be satisfied with resolutions in which no trace really remains of the Greek-British-American accusations? Of course, we should be satisfied with this, but We cannot be satisfied, because this is not all. The accusers beat a retreat from the original, absolutely unjustified positions to others which are 11. vingt~six; alors que six a huit delegations votaient en faveur de ces resolutions; enfin', lorsqu'on a vote sur la proposition de l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, quelques~uns des paragraphes ont ete rejetes par la tres petite majorite de dix-sept voix contre onze, avec vingt~ cinq ou vingt-sept abstentions. En effet, c'est seulement en appliquant une . regIe de procedure aussi grotesque que celle qui a ete adoptee ici, et en vertu de laquelle les delegues qui s'abstiemlent ne sont pas consideres comme presents et votants, que l'on peut aboutir a pareille situation: onze voix contre; vingt-sept abstentions de la part de representants qui ne sont pas d'accord avec telle ou telle resolution; cela fait trente-huit, mais la resolution n'en est pas moins declaree adoptee, parce qu'elle a obtenu dix-sept voix. C'est la une manceuvre si evidente qu'e11e ne saurait tromper que les aveugles de naissance. Ces faits indeniables ne temoignent-ilspas de la defaite morale et politique subie par le bloc anglo~americain? Il adtl abandonner ses premieres accusations devant les critiques vigoureuses que lui ont adressees de nombreuses delegations, et i1 d0it se contenter de resolutions ou, en somme, il ne reste pas trace des accusations greco-anglo-americaines. Nous devrionsevidemment etre satisfaits de cette constatation, mais nous ne pouvons l'etre, parce que cela n'est pas tout. Les Anglo-Amencains abandonnent leur position de depart, qui We cannot adopt a resolution which is in any way based upon the testimony of these perjurers, agents prouocateurs and criminals, for whom no one wants to take responsibility, as was shown by the First Committee which placed the responsibility entirely upon the Commission of Investigation. You are asked to approve in this form a decision which cannot bring peace, order or tranquillity but which, .on the contrary, may become a source of fresh difficulties and complications, fresh grievances and insults, which may become a source of new complications in the various foreign policy questions which for two years past have been constantly on the agenda of one or another organ of the United Nations and for which no solution has yet been found. If the work of the Commission of Investigation which was sent at the time to the Greek frontiers by the Security Council is to result finally in what is contained in the majority resolution, there will be every justification for saying that "the mountain has given birth to a mouse". There was, of course, no point in sending this Commission merely for this purpose. There was no point· in setting it up. But the Commission was set up. The Commission was sent. The Commission has given us worthless material which cannot serve as a basis for our decisions. And now, in spite of the obvious failure of the work of this Commission and its Subsidiary Group, it is proposed that we set up a new commission, which will again be sent to the same place, to Salonika or to some other place, so that . it may observe what is happening on the frontiers, so that it may be able to control the activities of the Yugoslav, Albanian and Bulgarian Governments, so that it can interfere in their internal affairs, tackling once again its task in an irresponsible manner and failing to act as it should in an unbiased and objective manner, just as did the first Commission. It is impossible to agree to set up such a commission, the functions of which, moreover, directly contravene the fundamental principles of our Charter, namely, the sovereign equality of peoples. That is why the USSR delegation voted against setting up this Commission, .and, a fortiori, against sending it The USSR delegation drew the attention of the First Committee, and before that the attention of the Security Council, to numerous facts which confirm that the Greek Government itself is responsible for this internal political situation and the foreign political situation resulting therefrom. These facts were pointed out to the Commission of Investigation, which showed a complete disregard for impartiality and for its duty of thoroughly and impartially investigating the facts which, in the interests of truth were pointed out by the Yugoslav, Bulgarian ~d Albanian authorities. Do I not have the right to point out, from this distinguished platform, that this Commissi?n, incidentally, acted in such a provocatively bIased manner that, when, for instance, the Greeks suggested that fourteen incidents on the Greek-Yugoslav frontier should be investigated, all these incidents except one, ·that at Agnos. Germanos, were investigated? When the Yugoslav representative proposed that three incidents-those at Pericleia, Chrissi and Lake Doiran, which took place in September, October. and November 1946 respectively-be investigated, not one of these incidents was investigated by the Commission., When the Albanian Government recommended that eight incidents be investigated, only three were investigated. When it asked for thirty-two witnesses to be given a hearing, only eight were heard. The demands of the Greek Government were, however, given almost complete satisfaction. That is how the Commission operated in the past. We have no guarantee that a commission will act differently in the future, because there is no justification for the activities of such a commission except the political .plan which has been worked out in the labyrinths of the State Department. and the British Foreign Office, and which consists in placing Greece under tutelage and . turning her into a strategic base, under We say: if the Commission had done its work objectively and impartially, the First Committee would have had sufficient data exposing the intrigues of the Greek authorities against Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. But for us to be able to establish this reliably and to raise the question of the Greek Government's responsibility for all that is happening on the Greek-Yugoslav, the Greek-Bulgarian and Greek-Albanian frontiers, there is quite enough information even in that wretched documentation.. in those rubbishy 20,000 pages, which were collected in the territories where the Commission worked in Greece and around Greece. That is why the USSR delegation proposes in its resolution (document AIAC.1 1199) that the Greek Government be held responsible and that the appropriate conclusions be drawn from this. The most important conclusion reached by the USSR. delegation, on the basis of numerous factS and of a thorough study of the situation which has arisen in Greece, is that the responsibility for this situation must be borne by the banking and commercial cliques which wield power in Greece and by the Governments of States which are the main motive forces of Greek policy as a whole. The support given by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to the present Greek Government, which serves the interests of Greek reactionaries, is the main reason for the political and economic crisis Greece is undergoing. All these facts leave no room for doubt that the entire guilt and responsibility for the various events and incidents in the relations between Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, on the one hand, and Greece on the other, must be borne by the Greek Government and must also be borne by those foreign States .which, by their interference in Greek internal affairs and their support of the·anti-democratic and reactionary forces within Greece, are creating and increasing the numerous difficulties and abnormalities, such as the clashes and complications which have given rise to the tense situation in Greece and in that part of Europe as a whole. We are convinced that the presence in Greece of British troops and the presence ID Greece of many military instructors and experts complicates the matter still further. That 'is why the Government of the USSR has been insisting, for more than a year, on the withdrawal of British troops from Greece, and on the recall of the United States military missions, instructors and experts. Satisfaction of Nous disons: vous voulez aider la Grece; formons donc une commission chargee de veiller ace que cette aide serve uniquement a satisfaire les besoins du peuple grec et non pas aconstruire des routes strategiques, des terrains d'atterrissage ou a former de nouveaux corps de gendarmerie et de police pour ecraser le mouvement des partisans, pour lutter contre l'avant-garde des forces democratiques en Grece, pour combattre le peuple grec tout entier. Nous disons: si la Commission d'enquete avait agi avec objectivite et impartialite eIle aurait fourni a la Premiere Commission un nombre suffisant de documents devoilant les intrigues des autorites grecques contre la Yougoslavie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie. Mais, meme ces documents si peu sa~isfaisants qu'ils soient, ce fatras de vingt mille pages qu'a reuni la Commission chargee d'enqu€ter en Grece et aux frontieres grecques, suffisent pleinement ademontrer ces intrigues et nous permettent de poser la question de la responsabilite du Gouvernement grec pour tout ce qui s'est produit aux frontieres greco-yougoslave,. greco-bulgare et greco-albanaise. C'est pour cette raison que la delegation de l'URSS propose, dans sa resolution (document A/C.l/199), de reconnaitre la culpabilite du Gouvernement grec et d'en tirer les conclusions qui s'imposent. La conclusion principale que la delegation de l'URSS tire d'un grand nombre de faits ainsi que d'un examen soigneux de la situation qui s'est creee en Grece est que la responsabilite de cette situation incombe a la clique de banquiers et de marchands qui est au pouvoir en Grece, ainsi qu'aux Gouvernements des pays qui sont le moteur principal de la politique grecque. L'appui accorde par les Gouvernements des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni au Gouvernement grec actuel, qui sert les interets des milieux reactionnaires grecs, est la cause principale de la crise economique et politique actuelle dans ce pays. Tout cela ne laisse aUCun doute que toute la responsabilite des evenements affectant les relations entre la Yougoslavie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie d'une part, et la Grece d'autre part, incombe au Gouvernement grec lui-meme, ainsi qu'a ceux des pays etrangers qui, par leur intervention dans les affaires interieures de la Grece et par l'assistance qu'ils pretent aux forces antidemocratiques et reactionnaires dans ce pays, creent ou aggravent les nombreuses anomalies et difficultes, les nombreux conflits et complications dont provient la tension qui existe en Grece et dans toute cette partie de I'Europe. La presence en Grece de troupes britanniques ainsi que de nombreux instructeurs et experts ne fait, nous en sommes convaincus, qu'aggraver la situation. C'est pour cette raison que, depuis plus d'un an, le Gouvernement de l'URSS dernande avec insistance que les troupes britanniques soient retirees de Grece et que les missions militaires, les instructeurs et les experts americains soient Le Gouvernement de l'URSS estime qu'il est indispensable d'assurer que les ressources qu'on envoie en Grece, sous pretexte d'aide economique a ce pays, soient effectivement utilisces a cette fin, c'est-a-dire'aux fins d'aide economique. C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement de I'URSS insiste pour qu'on cree une commission speciale chargee de veillera ce que l'aide fournie a la Grece soit utilisee uniquement dans l'interet du peuple grec. Je termine par ou j'ai commence. La question veritable, le point essentiel dans tout ce probleme grec, c'est le retrait des troupes etrangeres stationnees en Grece. Personne ne saurait mer que la presence des troupes britanniques en Grece est loin d'etre bienfaisante; son influence sur la situation est en effet defavorable, puisqu'eUe est la cause de complications sans nombre. Nous avons deja mentionne a la Premiere Commission, une declaration du commandant Willis, membre du parti travailliste, qui avait dit, i1 y a deux ans, qu'on ne pourrait regler la crise grecque tant que se prolongerait la situation qui existait alors et tant qu'on continuerait, sous le nez de l'armee britannique et des fonctionnaires politiques anglais, a traiter les meilleurs flls du peuple grec comme des criminels. Nous avons mentionne une declaration faite au meme moment par M. Greenwood, membre du PaJ:lement britannique, qui avait dit: "Il est intolerable que les troupes britanniques soient utilisees d'une fa~on qui a deja provoque un differend international en Grece." Je vous rappellerai une lettre qu'un aviateur britannique avait envoyee de Salonique et qui a ete lue a la Chambre des Communes. En decrivant une manifestation pacifique des patriotes grecs, l'auteur de cette lettre disait que si les autorites britanniques n'envoyaient pas dans ces regions des troupes hostiles aux masses popu- . laires, aucune guerre civile ne pourrait se produire. Ce n'est pas un 'hasard que les chefs des partis de droite en Grece justifient ouvertement leurs actes de brigandage en declarant que, de toute fa~on, ils ne risquent rien puisque les Britanniques les soutiennent et que, forts de l'appui des troupes britanniques, il n'ont pas besoin de chercher un compromis avec les autres partis politiques du pays. On nous pade de la situation difficile ou se trouve la Grece. Mais il y a dans ce pays assez de forces neuves et jeunes capables de trouver une solution aux difficuItes sans l'assistance de personne, sans l'assistance de troupes etrangeres, d'autant plus que l'aide apportee par celles-ci aboutit en realite a des resultats dont le peuple grec est le premier a. souffrir. C'est pdur toutes ces raisons que la delegation de l'URSS insist<; sur sa proposition concernant le retrait des forces armees britanniques station~ otrary, a negative influence, and is giving rise to very many complications. I have already referred in the First Committee to a statement by Major Willis, a member of the Labour Party, who pointed out two years ago that the Greek crisis would not be settled so long as the existing state of affairs continued, so long as the best elements of the Greek people were considered as criminals and treat((d. as criminals under the very noses of the British Army and of British political officials. I drew 0 attention to the statement made at the same time by another British Labour Member of Parliament, Mr. Greenwood, who said, "It is intolerable that British troops should be used in a way, which has led to international strife in Greece.m I would remind you of a letter from a British airman stationed in Salonika, which was read in the British House of Commons. In describing a peaceful demonstration by Greek patriots, the writer of this letter who declared that if the British authorities would only abstain from bringing troops hostile ~v the people into these regions, there would be no civil war. It is after all no mere chance that right~wing leaders in Greece openly justify their acts of banditry by saying that nothing will happen to them, because the British support them and, since they enjoy the support of British arms, they do not need to make any compromise with any political Parties within the cout;J-try. People talk of the difficult position of Greece. There are enough new and fresh forces in that country, however, which can find a solution for the difficult situation which has arisen there without outside help, without the help of foreign troops, the more so as this help actually produces results from which the Greek people are the greatest sufferers. That is why the USSR delegation insists upon its proposal regarding the immediate withdrawal from Greece of British armed forces and also of The USSR delegation is convinced that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Greece will prove to be an ,effective and powerful way of helping to solve the Greek question finally and permanently to the benefit of the Balkan peoples and the peoples of ,the whole world.

I call upon the representative of Poland. Mr. LANGE (Poland): You are called upon today to pass judgment upon a question which has vexed the United Nations almost since the very beginning of the Organization's existence. The Greek problem has been before the forum of the United Nations since January 1946 and it is no closer to a solution today than it was nearly two years ago. On the contrary, the situation has become progressively worse, and today the Greek question has caused a deep split in the ranks of the United Nations. There certainly must be something wrong with the way in which this problem has been handled within the framework of our Organization. The Greek question was brought pefore the Security Council in January 1946 by the representative of the Soviet Union.1 At that time, the representative of the USSR drew the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the presence of British troops in Greece is "fraught with serious consequences, both for the Greek people and for the maintenance of peace and security".2 The majority of the members of the Security Council 'did not share this view and denied it. Finally, the problem was considered as solved after a statement had been made by the representative of the United Kingdom that' British troops would be withdrawn from Greece as soon as possible. Indeed Mr. Bevin, who then represented the United Kingdom in the Security Council, declared on 1 February 1946-and I quote Mr. Bcvin's statement: Cl••• I have been pressing the Greek Government to get on with the task of establishing tranquillity in the country, to get the elections over with, and let the British troops come home. As anybody knows who knows our country, after six years of war everybody in this country is anxious for our troops to return home."3 , Again on 4 February 1946 Mr. Bevin stated: ". . . it is the policy of the British Government to try to get a stable government out of that election and to carry out what we have promised the Greek Government. As soon as the Greeks have got that over and have their government, they should by tllat time have the IJolice or- Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je donne la parole au representant de la Pologne. M. LANGE (Pologne)(traduit de l'anglais) : On vous demande aujourd'hui de porter un jugement sur une question qui a ete un sujet de preoccupation pour les Nations Unies depuis la creation meme de l'Organisation. Le probleme grec a ete porte a la tribune de l'Organisation des Nations Unies des le mois de janvier 1946 et aujourd'hui nous ne sommes pas plus pres d'une solution qu'il y a bientot deux ans. Tout au contraire, la situation s'est aggravee progres- sivement et actuellement la question grecque pro- voque une scission profonde dans les rangs des Nations Unies. Ildoit certainement y avoir quelque chose de defectueux dans la maniere dont ce probleme a ete traite dans le cadre de notre Organisation. La question grecque a ete portee devant le Conseil de securite en janvier 1946 par le repre- sentant de l'URSS\ A cette epoque, le repre- sentant del'Union sovietique a attire l'attention du Conseil de securite sur le fait que la presence des troupes britanniqucs en Grece etait "grosse de consequence graves pour le peuple grec ainsi que pour le maintien de la paix et de la secu- rite2". La majorite des membres du Conseil de sccurite ne partagerent pas cette opinion et la reIuterent. Finalement, le probleme a ete consi- dere comme regIe apres que le representant du Royaume-Uni ellt declare que les troupes bd· tanniques seraient retir~es de Grece des que possible. En efIet, M. Bevin qui representait alors le Royaume-Uni au Conseil de securite a fait, le 1er fevrier 1946, la declaration. suivante: c'. . . j'avais insiste aupres du Gouvernement helIenique pour qu'il entreprit de retablir le calme dans le pays, de proceder aux elections, et de permettre ainsi a nos troupes de regagner la Grande-Bretagne. Comme aucun de ceux qui nous connaissent ne l'ignore, chacun, dans notre pays, a,pres six ans de guerre, est impatient de voir nos soldats regagner leurs foyers8." Le 4 fevrier 1946, M. Bevin declarait a nou- veau que la politique du Gouvernement britan- nique est: cc ••• tenter de faire surgir un gou- vernement stable des elections grecques, et . . . executer les engagements que nous avons pris envers le Gouvernement grec. Aussitot que les elections ~eront terminees et que la Grece aura 1 Voir lea Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de sscu- rite Premi~re Annee, Premiere Sene, Supplemen~ No 1, Annexe 3, pages 73 et 74. •Ibid., No 1, page 74. • Ibid., page 84. After these declarations, the Security Council considered the matter closed. Indeed, the Greek question might have been closed forever if the promise made by the Government of the United Kingdom had been carried out. But one year passed, and another is nearing its end, and for- eign troops and foreign military personnel are still stationed in Greece. They are stationed there with the explicit purpose of supporting the Greek regime which was brought into power in De- cember 1944 with the aid of British troops. However, the Greek regime, a child of foreign intervention, maintained in power through for- eign military aid, proved itself unable to win the support of the Greek people. In order to organize its political machine, this regime had to rely strongly on extreme right-wing elements, or- ganizations and armed bands, definitely of a fascist character. It staffed its army, police and administration with people who collaborated with the nazis at the time when the Greek nation suffered under German occupation and carried on a heroic struggle of resistance agaiJtSt the Germans. Those elements embarked upon a war of revenge against all democratic forces among the Greek people which had fought for dem- ocracy and the reconstruction of the country under· thepre-war right-wing dictatorship as well as during the period of German occupa- tion. The forces of Greek democracy organized in the EAM and other democratic groups were suppressed and persecuted. All this took place under the benevolent eye and with the active aid of foreign troops. But, although suppressed and persecuted,· these democratic forces refused to give up their struggle for the· freedom of the Greek nation and for a democratic reconstruc- tion of their country. Deprived of the means of legal and normal political activity, some of them went underground and took up their activity as guerrillas. At the same time the Greek regime, in order to divert the attention of the Greek people, em- barked upon an aggressive campaign against the country's northern neighbours. The first step in the campaign was a systematic persecution of the Slav-speaking and Albanian-speaking na- tional minorities in northern Greece. Then the campaign was extended to Albania. In an at- tempt to enlist the support of the Greek people, the Greek Government brought forth territorial claims for the southern part of Albania and de- clared that it was in a state of war with Albania. This attitude on the part of the Greek Govern- ment towards Albania still persits today and, during the last debate on the Greek question in 1 Ibid., page 105. c~mbre 1944 avec l'appui des troupes britan- lllqUes. . Cependant, le regime grec, ne de l'interven~ tion etrangere et maintenu au p~lUvoir grace a l'aide militaire etrangcre, s'est avere incapable de gagner l'appui du peuple grec. Pour organi- ser ses cadres politiques, ce regime a dil compter en grande partie sur des elements d'extreme droite, sur des organisations et des bandes ar- mees dont le caractere fasciste ne laisse aucun doute. Son armee, sa police et les fonctionnaires de son administration ont ete recrutes parmis des gens qui avaient colIabore avec les nazis a une epoque ou la nation grecque souffrait de l'occu- pation allemande et menait une resistance hero- i'que contre les Allemands. Ces elements se sont lances'dans une guerre de revanchc contre toutes les forces democratiques du peuple grec qui avaient combattu pour la democratie et la res- tauration de leur pays, sou~ la periode de dicta- ture d'extreme droite d'avant-gucrre, comme au cours de la periode d'occupation allemande. Les forces democratiques grecques groupees dans l'organisation EAM, et dans.. d'autres groupements democratiques ont ete aneanties et persecutees. Tout cela eut lieu sous le regard bienveillant et avec l'aide active des troupes etrangeres. Mais, bien que decimes et persecutes, ces elements democratiques se refuserent a aban- donner leur lutte pour la liberte de la Grece et pour la reconstruction democratique de leur pays. Prives des moyens d'activite politique 1e- gale et normale, certains de ces elements orga- niserent une resistance clandestine et poursui- virent leur activite sous forme de guerilla. En meme temps, le Gouvernement grec,aiin de detoumer l'attention du peuple grec, entre- prit une campagne agressiye contre les voisins septentrionaux de la Grece. Il comment;a par une persecution systematique des minorites na~ tionales de langt!e slave et de langue albanaise du nord de la Grece. Puis la carnpagne se de- veloppa et fut dirigee contre l'Albanie. Pour essayer de s'assurer l'appui du peuple grec, le. Gouvemement grec fit valoir des revendications territoriales sur la partie sud de l'Albanie et se dec1ara en etat de guerre avec ce pays. Actuellement, cette attitude du Gouvernement grec envers l'Albanie n'a pas change et, au cours des derniers debats qui se sont deroules au 1 Voir les Proces-vcrbau;c du Conscii de sacuriU, Pre- miere Annee, Premiere Serie, Supplement No I, Annexe 3, page 105. On 4: October 1947, in my speech before the Political and Security Committee of this As~ sembly,2 I invited Mr. Tsaldaris, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was present in the committee room, to explain to the Com- mittee whether his Government still maintained that position. I repeated the same question on 13 October, but no answer was ever given. Mr. Tsaldaris is in this room, and I would ask him with all respect to give us a straightforward answer to this question, an answer 'of "yes" or "no". This attitude of the Greek Government to~ wards Albania led to a number of frontier inci- dents which qlarmed the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, a close neighbour of the Balkan countries. Accordingly the Ukrainian Government brought the problem of the incidents between Greece and Albania to the attention of the' Security Council on 24 August 1946. In his telegram to the Secretary- General, Mr. Manuilsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re- public, stated the following: HI ask you to place on the agenda for the next meeting of the Security Council the situa- tion in the Balkans which has resulted from the policy of the Greek Government, and which en- dangers the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as the question of measures to be adopted by the Security Council without delay in order to eliminate this threat to peace.m . , Thus, Mr. Manuilsky pointed out the inter- national dangers inherent in the attitude of the Greek Government towards its northern neigh- bour. Unfortunately, at that time the majority of the Security Council refused to recognize these dangers and dismissed the request of the Ukraine -and this was said by some members quite clearly and can be found in the verbatim records -as "a mere piece of propaganda". At the re- quest of the representative of Australia, the Greek question was removed from the agenda. Thus, the Security Council went on record as stating that it did not consider relations between . Greece and her northern neighbour as endanger- ing the peace. 1 Voir le document S/P.V.j164 qui sera publi6 dans les Proces-verbaux oDiciels du Conseil de slcuritl, Deuxieme Ann6e, No 62. • Voir le document A/C.ljSR.66 qui sera publi6 danll les Documents oDiciels de la deuxieme session de l'As. semblee glnirale, Premiere Commission. 8 Voir lcs Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de slcll· ritl, Premiere Annee, Seconde Sene, Supp16ment No 5, Annexe 8. It has been pretty long since then. At the same time, although Greece had received more per capita foreign aid than any other country in Europe-the total aid given to Greece up to 31 March 1947 was 870 million dollars-the Greek regime still proved unable to restore the Greek economy. Unrest grew and so did the terror used against the Greek democratic forces. With it grew the resistance of the Greek people. Driven in part to armed resistance, they or- ganized the Greek democratic army. The Greek Government, unable to cope with this growing resistance, looked for increased foreign interven. tion. A way to achieve it was discovered in De- cember 1946. In that month the Greek Government came to the Security Council with the charge that the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia gave aid and support to the Greek democratic army. 1 During the entire year of 1946, when the Greek problem was twice dis- cussed before the Security Council, this charge was not brought forward. It was not brought forward in September 1946, when relations between Greece and Al- bania were explicitly considered in the Security Council for nearly four weeks. Actually, the majority of the Council believed that nothing was going on which would endanger the main- tenance of international peace and security. Sud- denly it was discovered in December 1946. The alleged aid given by Greece's northern neighbours to the Greek democratic army was discovered suddenly in December 1946, as I said, when the Greek Government felt the need for a new instalment of foreign intervention. But so new were the allegations that the Coun- cil decided· for the time being to take no other action than to investigate them. In this way, the Commission of Investigation concerning Greek frontier incidents was created. It was agreed upon by a unanimous decision of the Council, a decision in which the Polish delegation whole- heartedly concurred. It seemed to us then that such a Commission might prove to be a valuable instrument for finding out the truth and estab- Dne longue periode s'est ecouIee depuis. En meme temps, bien que la Grece ait r~u pat tete d'habitant une aide plus importante que n'importe que! autre pays europeen-la valeur totale de l'aide apportee a la Grece jusqu'au 31 mars 1947 a ete de 870 millions de dollars -le regime grec s'averait toujours incapable de re- mettre .sur pieds l'economie nationale. L'insta- bilite et aussi la terreur exercee contre les forces democratiques grecques allerent croissant. En meme temps la resistance du peuple grec aug- menta. Pousse a la resistance armee, ce peuple organisa l'armee democratique grecque. Le Gou- vernement grec, incapable de venir a bout de cette resistance croissante, rechercha dans une plus large mesure l'intervention de l'etranger. Il trouva le moyen de l'obtenir en decembre 1946. Au cours de ce mois, le Gouvernement grec s'adressa au Conseilde securite en accusant les Gouvernements de l'Albanie, de la Bulgarie et de la Yougoslavie de preter leur aide et leur appui a l'armee democratique grecquet. Jamais au cours de l'annee 1946, alois que le probleme grec avait fait deux fois 1'0bjet de discussions au Conseil de securite, cette accusation n'avait ete portee. Cette accusation n'avait pas non plus ete. portee en septembre 1946, epQque a laquelle la question des relations entre la Grece et l'Albanie avait ete formellement discutee au Conseil de securit6 pendant pres de quatre semaines. En realite, la majorite des membres du Conseil pen- sait alors que rien dans les evenements n'etait susceptible de mettre en danger le maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales. C'est en decembre 1946 que l'on decouvrit soudaine- ment les faits en question. . Cette aide pretendue des voisins septentrio- naux de la Grece a l'armee democratique grecque fut, comme je l'ai dit, decouverte sou- dainement en decembre 1946 au moment ou. le Gouvernement grec eprouva le besoin de faire appel anouveau al'interventionetrangere. Mais ces allegations etaient si nouvelles que le Conseil de secur~te d6cida de ne prendre alors d'autre .mesure que d'enqueter sur les faits. C'est ainsi que fut creee la Commission chargee d'enqueter sur les incidents le long de la frontiere grecque. Cette Commission fut instituee par une decision unanime des membres du Conseil de securite. A cette decision la delegation polonaise s'associa en toute sincerite, estimant qu'un tel organisme 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux ofJiciels tIll Conseil tIll slcu- rite, Premi&-e Annee, Seconde Serie, Supplement No 10, Annexe 16. The Commission of Investigation concerning Greek frontier incidents was still at work, but the Government of the United States already had decided upon its own conclusions and its own programme of action, in complete disregard of the United Nations. However, the criticism which this method of action evoked caused the Government of the United States to come to the Security Council to justify its action. During the debate which took place, the representative of the tlSSR proposed the creation of a commis- sion which, through proper supervision, would guarantee that foreign economic aid given to Greece would be utilized for the reconstruction of the Greek economy. The acceptance of such a commission would have put an end to private unilateral action by Member States with regard to Greece, and would also have been an assur- ance that foreign economic aid to Greece would not be distorted into a means of interfering in that country's internal affairs. For this reason, the Polish delegation supported it, and even proposed an amendment. The proposal was re- jected, and thus the Government of the United States was given full freedom to continue its unilateral intervention in the internal affairs of Greece. The history of that intervention is well known. You can read it in the newspapers, and I shall not take up your attention by going into it. This new policy of the United States with regard to Greece was bound to have an effect upon the Commission of Investigation, for it was laid down before the Commission had finished its work and reached its conclusions. Now a few words about the work of the· Commission. A good characterization is found in a statement of the French representative on the Commission. The French representative stated in his reservations to the report of the. On the basis- of these conclusions, however, the United States delegation proposed in the Security Council the creation of a commission. Since the investigation has been concluded, the second commission obviously could not have been a commission of investigation. It was rather a commission of control. Based on the assump- tion of guilt of the northern neighbours of Greece, it appeared as a punitive measure against them. For this reason, our delegation was op- posed to it and the commission also failed to gain the unanimous support of the permanent mem- bers of the Council, which is required by Article 27 of the Charter. On the other hand, the delegation of the USSR presented a resolution which was found unacceptable to the other pennanent members and to the majority of the Council. Under these circumstances, if a solution was really sought, the members of the Security Coun- 1 The page reference is to the mimeographed docu- ment, S/360, which will be reproduced as Special Sup- plement No. 2 to the OfJicial Records of the Security Council, Second Year. 1 Se referer au document 5/360, qui sera public comme Supplement special No 2, aux: Procds-vsrbaux ofJicieu du Conseil de sBcuriti, DeuXieme Annee. After our conciliatory resolution ,was rejected, the representative of the United States and the representative of Australia intro~uced resolutions which were much sharper and went further than the original United States resolution which had failed to receive the unanimous support of the permanent members of the Security Council. The United States resolution indicted Greece's northern neighbours for breach of peace in the sense of Article 39 of the Charter. Such a charge was not originally made by the Greek Govern- ment and was not examined by the Commission of Investigation sent to Greece. Since much weaker resolutions had failed to receive the unanimous support of the permanent members of the Council, it could have been an- ticipated that these resolutions would not receive such support. I can interpret them only as de· signed deliberately to provoke two more vetoes in the Security Council, and thus to make a case for further intervention in Greece. In any case, the procedure in the Security Council was marked by the absence of any desire' on the part of the United States to reach an agreement. The voting procedure of the Security Council is based on the idea that agreement of the permanent members must be aimed at. This is the fundamental idea which underlies our Or- ganization as well as all international co-opera- tion. In the last stage of the Greek debate in the Security Council, this idea was replaced by at- tempts to make political capital against one of the permanent members by forcing a situation de- signed to make it use the veto. The same unfortunate absence of a desire to reach agreement was characteristic of the pro- ceedings in the First Committee of our Assembly. A number of resolutions were presented by the United States, the USSR, Sweden, and Cuba. If agreement was sought, then all these resolu- tions should have been fully discussed on their merits, and a way should have been found .to bring together the different points of view. One means of achieving this might have been a draft- ing sub.committee; another means might have This decided the basic issue. A drafting sub- committe~, or some other method of bringing to- gether the points of view, was already out of place, and the representative of Sweden, who had a compromise solution, had no other course than to withdraw his resolution. In this way, the Committee had disposed of a compromise pro- posal. Proposals made.by Colombia to introduce a more conciliatory tone into the first part of the United States resolution were also rejected. A Franco-British amendment was accepted with the concun'ence of the United States. However, this amendment, though appearing to be conciliatory, does not introduce any substantial change into the original text. It leaves unchanged the spirit and intent of the resolution. The way in which the establishment of the spe- cial commission proposed by the United States was carried through the First Committee indi- cates clearly that such a commission is not de- signed to serve the purpose of conciliation, but rather to become a means of further intervention in the affairs of Greece and in the relations be- tween Greece and her northern neighbours, an intervention which will not contribute and can- not contribute towards the improvement of these relations. Under the circumstances described, my Gov- ernment finds it impossible to take part in such a commission if it should be established by the General Assembly. I have made a statement to this effect before the First Committee, and I re- peat it now before the whole Assembly. Our readiness to co-operate in any honest at- tempt to solve the Greek question has been demonstrated many times. We have shown it in the Security Council by voting fOf the estab- lishment of the Commission of Investigation con- cerning Greek frontier incidents, and by ac- tively participating in the formulation of its tenns of reference. We have shown it by our active participation in the Commission of In- vestigation and later in the Subsidiary Group. We have shown it by our support of the proposal to create a commission to guarantee, through proper supervision, that foreign economic aid given to Greece be utilized for the reconstruction of the Greek economy rather than for purposes of political intervention. We have shown it by the proposal of compromise and conciliation The Greek problem, however, requires some solution; it requires a positive solution. Such a solution has been proposed repeatedly 'by the democratic forces among the Greek people. The elements of the solution are well known. A recent statement of them was given by the political coalition of parties of the EAM in a memo- randum addressed especially to the General As- sembly of the United Nations. This coalition comprises the following parties: the Agrarian Party of Greece, the Republican Union, the Radical Republican Party, the Communist Party of Greece and the Socialist Party of Greece. The above-mentioned memorandum is dated 14 September 1947. I do not know how many of you, my honourable fellow representa- tives, have read it. I should like to recommend most urgently that all of you do read it. It con- tains positive proposals which deserve your at- tention. Let me read you these proposals. I read from the memorandum: H ••• The EAM proposes, regarding the issue of internal policy, the formation of a broadly representative Government in which the demo- cratic left would also participate." You see a very radical proposal. "Such a Governm~nt would inspire confidence in all the popular strata and thus would have both the authority and the force to apply political equity and equality before the law, and to end the civil war immediately, and to lead the country to free and genuine elections for the promotion of a really people-born national assembly as soon as possible. This programme is not at all theo- retical, but it is the only one which can securely and speedily lead the country to democratic order and normalcy. Moreover, it is completely approved by the democratic army. This has "... L'EAM propose, en ce q~i concerne la question de politique interieure, la formation d'un gouvernement largeinent representatif auquel participerait egalement la gauche demo- cratique." Comme vous le voyez, c'est la une pro- position tout a fait radicale. "Un tel gouverne- ment inspirerait confiance a toutes les couches populaires et jouirait ainsi de l'autorite et de la force necessaires pour appliquer a tous un traite- ment politique equitable et assurer l'egalite de- vant la loi, mettre fin immediatement ala guerre civile et conduire le pays vers des elections libres et sinceres, en vue de reunir aussit8t que pos- sible une assemblee nationale qui soit veritable- ment nee du peuple. Ce programme n'est pas du tout tMorique; c'est le seul programme qui puisse conduire si'lrement et rapidement le pays "..• Regarding the issue of foreign policy, the coalition of EAM proposes the withdrawal of all foreign troops and foreign missions from Greece . . . In fact, the Greek people do not desire their country to become a field for inter- national dissension, nor a centre of dark intrigue against peace and democracy in the Balkans." The memorandum ends with the following appeal: "... The Greek people do not deserve such a destiny for themselves or for their country. They want their independence, the security and integ- rity of their country, peace and equal friendship and collaboration with all their great allies, their neighbours and, in general, all the democratic and peace-loving peoples; and therefore, despite their hard test, they are determined to continue their struggle to the end. "In their misfortune and pain, for which they are not in the least responsible, the Greek people address themselves to the United Nations and anxiously invoke their help to realize their aforementioned claims. These claims, being in full h"armony with the constitutional principles of the United Nations, simultaneously have the practical' quality that they are the only ones which can serve the Greek people, without ex- posing the United Nations to tests or arousing any of its Members in particular. "Their adoption as a whole by your General Assembly would really be of profit to the Greek people who are so hardly tested and, simultane- ously, while reinforcing the authority of the United Nations, would positively serve inter- national peace." This is the voice of the Greek people. Do not let us dismiss it unheard. Let us not withhold the justice which they expect from us. The voice of the Greek people demands an answer. The demands concerning internal policy, such as the formation. of a broad coalition Govern- ment and the holding of new elections, are be- yond the scope of Our competence. But well within our competence is the granting of the basic demand, the demand which is the pre- requisite of the realization of'all other demands, namely, the, withdrawal from Greece of all foreign troop/! and foreign military missions. The General Assembly has the power to recommend such action. Therefore, in the name of my dele- gation, I submit to you for your consideration the following resolution: ,"The General Assembly, <rHaving considered the question of threatS to the political independen.ce and territorial in- tegrity of Greece and the views expressed by the various delegations, ! ) . "Dans son malheur et dans sa douleur, dont il n'est en rien responsable, le peuple grec s'adresse a l'Organisation des Nations Unies et lui demande anxieusement de l'aider a. obtenir satis- faction des demandes exposees plus haut. Ces demandes, qui sont en pleine harmonie avec les principes constitutionnels des Nations Unies, presentent en meme temps l'avantage pratique d'etre les seules qui puissent servir le peuple grec sans exposer l'Organisation des Nations Unies a des epreuves et sans eveiller l'animosite d'aucun de ses Membres. "Votre AssembIee generale, en adoptant l'en,. semble de ces demandes, rendrait un reel service au peuple grec, soumis a une si dure epreuve, et, tout a la fois, servirait veritablement, en renfor~ant l'autorite des Nations Unies, la paix internationale." Voila la voix du peuple grec. Ne refusons pas de 1'entendre. Ne lui denions pas la justice qu'il attend de nous. La voix du peuple gree exige une reponse. Les demandes relatives a. la politique interieure, telles que la formation d'un largegouvernement de coalition et de nouve1les elections, depassent les limites de notre compe- tence. Mais ce qui est bien de notre competence, c'est d'agreer la demande fondamentale, qui est la condition prealable de toutes les autres et qui tend au retrait de Grece de toutes les troupes et de toutes les missions militaires etrangeres. L'Assemblee generale est qualifiee pour reeom- mander de telles mesures. Je soumets done a. votre examen, au nom de ma delegation, le pro- jet de resolution suivant: , . "L'AsembUe generale, "Ayant pris connaissance du probleme consti- tue par les menaces a l'independance politique et a 1'integrite territoriale de la Greee et des opinions exprimees par les diverses delegations, URequests all Governments concerned to re- port not later than 1 January 1948 to the Sec- retary-General on the implementation of this recommendation."

As I have already told the Assembly, we shall have a night meeting. I think it would be best to adjourn now and meet again at 8.15 p.ro. The meeting rose at 6.47 p.m. NINETY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING H eId in the General Assembly Hall at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Monday, 20 October 1947, at 8.15 p.m. President: Mr. O. ARANHA (Brazil). 41. Continuation of the general discussion 'on threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece

I call upon the representative of Czechoslovakia. Mr. MASARYK (Czechoslovakia): In begging the indulgence of the Assembly for a brief moment, the Czechoslovak delegation will not reveal any new and startling facts; it will state in simple terms that the opinion it had the honour of expressing before the First Committee1 has not changed and has not been shaken by the speeches we have heard since our last intervention. My delegation regrets that the very detailed arguments of some delegations against'the proposal to send a new committee to Greece have not been taken up more seriously by the majority, and that there has been almost no effort to refute the facts brought forward by those delegations. That will not help the final settlement of the question. It is true that the declaration about the guilt of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania has been whittled down, but in the eyes of my delegation that does not help us out of the dilemma in which we find ourselves. There is still a potential shadow of guilt on these three countries which I do not consider justified. In other words, the arguments of the minority-and I should like to say that they were very weighty arguments-made no impression on the majority, whose judgment was 1 See the sixty-first meeting of the First Committee. Ulnvite tous les Gouvernements interesses a adresser au Secretaire general, avant le 1er janvier 1948, un rapport sur l'application de la presente recommandation." Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Comme je l'ai deja dit, noUs tiendrons seance ce soil'. Je pense qu'il vaudrait mieux lever la seance maintenant et nous reunir a nouveau a 20 h. 15. La seance est levee a18 h. 47. QUATRE-VINGT-DIX-HUITIEME SEANCE PLENIERE Tenue dans la salle de l'Assemblee genhale a Flushing Meadow, New-YorkJ le lundi 20 octobre 1947, a20 h. 15. President: M. O. ARANHA (Bresil). 41. Suite de la discussion generale sur les menaces Cl I'independence politique et Cl I'int,egrit,e territoriale de la Grece Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Je donne la parole au representant de la Tchecoslovaquie. M. MASARYK (TcMcoslovaquie) (traduit de l'anglais) : Si la delegation de la Tchecoslovaquie demande a l'Assemblee de vouloir bien lui accorder que1ques instants, ce n'est pas pour apporter des revelations sensationnelles, mais pour dire en termes simples que l'opinion qu'elle a ell'1'honneur d'exprimer devant la Premiere Comrnission1 n'a pas change et n'a pas ete Cbranlee par les discours que nous avons entendus depuis notre derniexe intervention. Ma delegation regrette que la majorite n'ait pas examine plus serieusement l'argumentation tres d,etaillee que certaines delegations ont opposee a la proposition d'envoyer une nouvelle commission en Grece, et que 1'on n'ait presque fait aucun effort pour refuter les faits presentes par ces delegations. Cette attitude n'aidera pas a regler . definitivement la question. 11 est vrai que la declaration relative a la culpabilite de la Yougoslavie, de la Bulgarie et de l'Albanie a ete tres . adoucie, mais, de l'avis de ma delegation, cette mesure ne nous aide pas a sortir du dilemme ou nous nous trouvons. Ces trois pays sont encore virtuellement sous le coup d'une accusation de culpabilite, et je n'estime pas que ce soit justifie. En d'autrt';s termes, les arguments de la minorite, et je voudrais ajouterqu'il s'agit d'arguments d'un 1 Voir la soixante et unieme seance de la Premiere Com· mission.