A/34/PV.68 General Assembly

Thursday, Nov. 15, 1979 — Session 34, Meeting 68 — New York — UN Document ↗

THIRTY-FOURTH SESSION
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55.  Development and in'ernational economic co-operation :* (a) Report of the Committee of the Whole Estab- lished under General Assembly Resolution 32/ 174; (b) Report of the Preparatory Committee for the New International Development Strategy; (c) Network for the exchange of technological infor- mation and the industrial and technological infor- mation bank: report of the Secretary-General; (d) Multilateral development assistance for the ex- ploration of natural resources: report of the Secre- tary-General; (e) Economic co-operation among d(\veloping coun- tries: report of the Secretary-General; (j) Preparations for the special session of the General Assembly in 1980: report of the Secretary- General; (g) Effective mobilization of women in development: report of the Secretary-General; • Resumed from Ihe 61SI meeting. NEW YORK (h) Restructuring of the economic and social sectors of the United Nations system: report of the Sec- retary-General REPORT OF THE SECOND COMM~TTEE (PART I) (A/34/676) I. The PRESIDENT: The Assembly will. consider first this morning Part I of the report of the Second Commit- tee on agenda item 55, which has been recommended for priority consideration. ~. Miss GARCIA DONOSO (Ecuador) (Rapporteur of the Second Committee) (interpretation from Spanish): I have the honour to present to the General Assembly Part I of the report of the Second Committee on agenda item 55 [A/34/676j. 3. That report includes a draft resolution entitled "United Nations Cocoa Conference", 1 which was adopted by the Second Committee without a vote and which is recommended to the General Assembly for similar adoption, as a priority item. Pursuant to rule 66 of the rules ofprocedure, it was decided not to discuss the report ofthe Second Commit- tee.

The positions of delegations regarding the recommendation of the Second Commit- tee on this item were made clear in the Committee and are reflected in the relevant official records. 5. We shall now take a decision on the draft resolution recommended by the Second Committee in paragraph 7 of its report [A/34/676], entitled "United Nations Cocoa Conference". The Committee adopted that draft resolution without a vote. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to do likewise?
The draft resolution was adopted (resolution 34/23).

3.  Credentials of f;~presentatives to the thirty-fourth ses- sion of the General Assembly (concluded):* (b) Report of the Credentials Committee SECOND REPORT OF THE CREDENTIALS.COMMITTEE (A/34/500/Add.l)

If no one wishes to speak on this item, I shall invite representatives to turn their attention 1 II is slated in the report of the Second Committee (A/34/676, para. 2) that the draft resolution in question was also sub- mitted to the Committee under agenda item 56. • Resumed from the 4th meeting. A/34/PV.68
Thedraft resolution was adopted(resolution 34/2 B).

21.  Question of Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General

As representatives will recall, the General Assembly at its fourth plenary meeting, held on 21 September 1979, decided that when consider- ing this item it would invite the Special Political Com- mitteeto meet for the purpose of affording represen- tatives of the Cypriot communities an opportunity to speak in the Committee in order to express their views, and that the Assembly would then resume its considera- tion of the item, taking into account the report of the Special Political Committee. 8. I should like to suggest that the General Assembly invite the Special Political Committee to meet this after- noon in order to hear the views of the representatives of the Cypriot communities. The Assembly will then re- sume its consideration of this item tomorrow morning. May I take it that the General Assembly agrees to the procedure I have suggested?
It was so decided.
I should like to inform the As- sembly that previously the meetings of the Special Political Committee devoted to the question of Cyprus have been provided with verbatim records. May I take it that the General Assembly wishes the same procedure to be followed for the meeting which the Special Political Committee will hold on the question of Cyprus?
It was so decided.
I should also like to propose that the list of speakers in the debate on this item be closed tomorrow, Friday, 16 November, at 12 noon. May I take it that the General Assembly agrees to that proposal?
It was so decided.
For yet another year the orange and lemon trees in north Cyprus blossom and fruit for the benefit of people other than their rightful owners. Extensive investments and installations in industry, tourism and agriculture beyond the line of occupation which scars the placid scenery are in the hands of strangers who never toiled for their creation and expansion. Forty per cent of the land whose "waves will cast up ijJhrodite once more"-the description of Cyprus by Seferis, winner of the Nobel prize for literature b 1963-still awaits justice. 12. A resolution decreeing such justice was adopted by this Assembly last year. A similar one was adopted the year before, and three, four, five years ago; resolutions decreeing justice of which Turkey has made a mockery time and again. Very characteristic is a recent statement by the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktas, and 1 13. How does one view a problem such as that of Cyprus five and a half years after the invasion? There is no doubt that, as time passes and the scalding events of Turkey's military intervention fade away and disappear into the depths of time and history, people tend to judge by what they have before their eyes now, forgetting the origins of the problem and its correct dimensions. The Cyprus problem cannot capture the headlines any more, because it is not tinted with what the international press and media consider to be dramatic and newsworthy. It is a chronic problem. It is not newsworthy in exactly the same way as famine, which for years now has been relentlessly killing an average of 100,000 people a day throughout the world; is not newsworthy, as opposed to a hunger strike or even a devastating phenomenon such as that of Kampuchea, which, although much smaller in scale, are newsworthy. Cyprus is not a bleeding wound. It is a mute pain that lies within. 14. Beware of such a mute, silent pain that comes from within, especially when human feelings are in- volved, especially when the historical pride, the na- tional existence and the future aspirations of a whole country are in the balance. We are content to note that the overwhelming majority of this Assembly have always refused to be carried away by the preaching of Turkish propaganda about the so-called "present-day realities". A post-aggression reality is no doubt a fait accompli, but so is murder. Do we ever treat murder as a reality, and do we base our actions on the validity of such a fait accompli? 15. I have started with this preamble so as to place our problem before you in its correct perspective. True, life goes on in Cyprus. The cities are filled with bustling people looking after their everyday occupational in- terests. Activity continues from the instinct for survival, from necessity. People do not reveal their feelings and their memories in their everyday dealings, but the feel- ings and the memories exist. In every house, every church, every factory, every tree that rises up in the free part of Cyprus there is a reminder of what used to be a dynamic presence and is now an image that lies in the haze beyond the lines of occupation. After all, it is a dignified and ennobling trait of human existence, as opposed to that of the lower animals, to view current events in the light of the mandates of the past and the aspirations of the future. 16. The foregoing analysis shows that, although it is true that from the practical point of view negotiation is the current answer to our problem, the problem still presents many other facets. In real terms, the problem is not one of negotiation; it is one of aggression, occupa- tion and international injustice. Negotiations do not constitute absolution for attacks against and murder of 17. Negotiations have been carried out with zero results so far; they will be tried optimistically in the future as well. Their success or failure willdepend main- lyon a single factor: the attitude of mind and the ulterior motives and objectives of those who pull the strings in Turkey and of those in the high echelons of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. A post mortem of the events of the last five years shows that the constant and consistent dream of Denktas has been and still is the partition of the country, probably to be followed by a unilateral declaration of independence. 18. ' Actually, Denktas has been working along these lines since 1954. We have harangued you in the past in speeches containing scores of facts and statement~ giv- ing evidence" of the above objectives. We have pointed out Denktas's manoeuvres, his evasiveness, his efforts to undermine every process of talks or rapprochement between the two communities; his devious overtures and offers, which, when examined, prove to be devoid of content; his vanity and his desire to install himself as the ruler of territory occupied by a foreign army and of peo- ple forced into a state Of partition. Time and again we have referred to his machiavellian machinations in stipulating agreements and then torpedoing them later, as expediency may dictate. Believeme, it is an agonizing experience to follow Denktas's ment.al processes. 19. The four following examples reveal the essence of Denktas's aims and orientations. 20. First, Mr. Denktas made a statement in New York on 28 November 1978 which went as follows: "I personally believe that the time has come for the establishment of a separate State". That statement was followed by another, made in Ankara on 2 December 1978: "I come to Turkey and 1 make my statement that 1believe that the time has come for the establishment of a Turkish Cypriot State in the north". 21. Secondly, there was a news item in the Turkish newspaper Tercuman on 14'March 1979 to the effect that Denktas had submitted a secret report to the Turkish Government in which he stated that the only course left was to declare independence. 22. Thirdly, the Turkish Cypriot political leader, Durduran, made a statement on 16September 1979that Denktas had undermined completely the agreement of 19 May 1979 and that Denktas's administration would never solve the Cyprus problem. 23. Fourthly, the Turkish Cypriot political leader, Ozgur, made a statement on 9 November 1979 to the Turkish newspaper Yen; Duzen, which reads as follows: "The administration which comes from Denktas's party of national unity by its policies is 24. So our observations, remarks and arguments over the last five years as to Denktas's intentions have now been proved beyond any shadow of doubt, both by Denktas's confessions and by the statements of the Turkish Cypriot political leaders Durduran and Ozgur, who control between them 28 per 'cent of the so-called Turkish Cypriot Parliament. 25. The language is succinct, unequivocal, ~nd clea~­ cut. Denktas is leading the country to partmon; he IS sowing the seed of secession; ~e is trying t~ break Cyprus up into two parts. He wlshe~ to give birth t<;> a new sovereign regime with the blessing of the Turkish army and its weaponry. This isan ominous develop~ent because it constitutes an endorsement of our own find- ings and fears regarding Denktas's aims and the type of rule he envisages imposing beyond the lines o~ the Turkish tanks. At the same time, however, there IS an auspicious tone in the statements of, Durduran ~nd Ozgur that shows that there are voices of sobriety amongst the Turkish Cypriots, and 1 can tell you that there are many such voices. 26. 1 wonder how, with Denktas at the helm, ne~otia­ tions can lead to fruition, given his aforementioned stance. 27. Each year you ask us to negotiate. Each year ar- duous efforts are made towards this end. But what are these negotiations about? As far as Turkey and Denktas are concerned, they revolve around a single axis: partition. You and we are thinking in terms of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity for Cyprus; Turkey and Denktas are thinking in terms of partition. You and we are thinking in terms of a unified State, based on the principle of federalism; Turkey and Denktas are thinking in terms of partition. You and we are thinking in terms of the withdrawal of Turkish troops of invasion; Turkey and Denktas are thinking in terms of perpetuating the foreign occupation so that partition will never be eradicated. You and we take the view that the United Nations does exist and that it has adopted resolutions; for Mr. Denktas such resolutions do not exist. 28. No wonder that the efforts towards an agreement on Cyprus during the past five years have been a tale of woe. 29. The Assembly may take it for granted that the seat of the Greek Cypriot interlocutor at the negotiating table will always be filled by a person who will be doing his utmost to find a solution to our problem. Some of you have at times indicated that we have to act fast because, with the passage of time, situations become cemented and not easily reversed. That is true, very true. But then we should act fast to move towards what? The "separate State" of Mr. Denktas or "the parti- tion" corroborated by Mr. Ozgur? We want to move fast towards a solution, but not t00 fast towards parti- tion. If Denktas is aiming at a unilateral declaration of 31. On 19 May 1979, an agreement was reached be- tween President Kyprianou and Mr. Denktas for the resumption of negotiations [see A/34/6lO and Corr.I, annex V]. That agreement was arrived at after strenuous and commendable efforts on the part of the Secretary- General, Mr. Waldheim, whose personal presence, as- siduity and determination made such an agreement possible. It has been stated categorically by us on many occasions, and I repeat it now ~ that we are and have always been prepared to negotiate on the basis of that agreement. Denktas is not so prepared. He insists that we should accept, in advance and without even discuss- ing them, conditions that are not included in the agree- ment. This is typical of the man and consonant with his past performance. But, then, where are we heading for? 32. Today the problem is before the General Assembly for the sixth consecutive year since the invasion. The fact that previous resolutions remain unimplemented and ignored constitutes a stigma, but it does not hinder us from invoking your support, which is beneficial in all spheres not affected by Turkey's arrogance. Your espousal of our cause not only bolsters our hopes for a just solution in the future, but in addition affords inter- national recognition of our Government. This recogni- tion forms the infrastructure of our achievements in the fields of finance, trade, culture and politics. 33. The three main issues to which our recourse this year relates, in addition to those of past resolutions, are all well founded and substantiated, and we should like it to be on record that we have raised them before this Assembly and that we have expounded to you the ra- tionale of our position, even though some of our re- quests may not be granted for reasons of tactics or policy. 34. The first issue is that of sanctions. We are rightful- ly entitled to ask for them as a result of the flagrant violation by Turkey of her obligations under the Charter. If sanctions are not the appropriate remedy in 35. The second issue concerns an international con- ference. We are not pressing for such a conference this year in viewof our efforts to reactivate the dialogue and our request for the appointment of a committee on Cyprus. We should like, however, to have our position of principle reflected in the resolution and to reserve our right to request the convening of such a conference whenever appropriate. 36. The third issue concerns the establishment of a committee on Cyprus. The existence of such a commit- tee would afford a new plateau of action in the efforts for the implementation of United Nations resolutions. Moreover, the committee may prove to be of assistance to the Secretary-General. Details about the committee and its terms of reference have been given to all of you during our private meetings. 37. What is the right conclusion for a speech, the focus of which has been an invaded country, the plight of its people and the inability of a willing international community to take remedial action? One might suggest a crescendo composed of references to excruciating suf- fering and gross injustice. However, that is not what I am going to resort to. I am going to call upon the Assembly to act inexorably and to condemn Turkey for its unduly protracted contemptuous behaviour. But at the same time I shall extend a hand of goodwill and friendship to the Turkish Cypriots, relying heavily on your assistance. The omens are not propitious, but our will to rebuild the country dwarfs the difficulties. I should like to remind the Turkish Cypriots that the power which at this moment props up their political, social and economic structure is artificial, volatile and vulnerable. It may be theoretically vulnerable today; tomorrow it will be practically vulnerable as well. 38. A foreign army of occupation will prove to be a tool of destruction, not of construction. Long-term prosperity cannot be built on the roofs of tanks. Let us build it in the fields and on the mountains of peace, in a free and unified Cyprus.
More than five years have passed since the tragic events of July 1974 with their grave consequences for the Republic of Cyprus. 41. The wish of the Cypriot people remains unful- filled-the wish to live and to work in a united and non- aligned country, free from external interference and without military bases of alien Powers or foreign troops stationed in their island. Although the Government of Cyprus has succeeded in providing decent housing to 200,000 refugees in their own country, those refugees still wish to return to their homes. The fate of many a missing person has still to be elucidated. 42. In the face of these facts my delegation feels com- pelled to state that the sovereignty, independence, ter- ritorial integrity and non-aligned status of Cyprus con- tinue to be seriously endangered, the more so since foreign military bases continue to exist in Cyprus and no decisive measures have been initiated for the withdrawal of the foreign troops stationed in the island. 43. What really underlies the difficulties involved in resolving the problem of Cyprus is the adherence in cer- tain quarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NA TO] to the military concept of making the island republic an unsinkable aircraft carrier of NATO - a scheme which, in the light of the recent political changes in the region of the Middle East, has assumed new and dangerous dimensions. It is therefore with attention and concern that my- delegation views the attempts in those quarters to interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign State Member of the United Nations and to exert pres- sure on the Government of the Republic of Cyprus on behalf of a solution to the problem which would meet the interests of NATO. That approach and anyconcept that tends to sanction the disunity of Cyprus aggravate the situation in the eastern Mediterranean, which has been subjected to additional tensions as a result of ac- tivities in the region by circles opposed to detente. 44. In the summer of this year the General Secretary of the Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus declared that the most intransigent enemies of Cyprus did not wish and continued not to wish for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to live together in a com- mon and truly free homeland. They wished to see them live in disunity and hostility. They wished to see Cyprus a divided and occupied country serving as NATO's military .base and spearhead. 45. Basing itself on the provisions of the Final Act of Helsinki," and unrestrictedly subscribing to the Moscow Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty? as well as to the communique of the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty held at Budapest on 14 and 15 May 1979 [see A/34/275-S/13344, annex], the German Democratic Republic advocates. a political solution by means of negotiations. 47. The good will, patience and readiness to com- promise of the parties concerned are required to meet the high expectations associated with a resumption of the intercommunal talks to solve the primarily human- itarian problems afflicting the people of Cyprus. The activities of certain circles in Cyprus which, in disregard of existing arrangements between the two communities and of United Nations resolutions, endanger the Reo. public's unity as a State are not suited to bringing relief to either Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots. 48. For some time, the way towards a just and lasting solution to the problem of Cyprus has existed in the form of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), as well as in follow-up resolutions and in Security Council resolution 365 (1974). Now as before, the situation in Cyprus is a threat to international peace and security. The implementation of these resolutions in all their aspects by concrete and practical measures, if necessary by the Security Council itself, should be regarded as a priority task. Progress in the solution of the refugee problem would be proof of the serious intention of the two sides to achieve progress in the intercommunal talks. It would facilitate such talks, would give them fresh impetus and would improve the general climate. 49. The proposals submitted by President Kyprianou of the Republic of Cyprus in the spring of 1978 to achieve immediate .and complete disarmament and the demilitarization of the island," including the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the elimination of existing military bases on Cyprus, remain valid and the German Democratic Republic continues to support them. The implementation of these proposals would be a genuine step towards detente in the eastern Mediterranean. 50. At the same time, the German Democratic Re- public advocates the convening of an international con- ference, as proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.' The idea also enjoys the support of Cyprus. Such a conference would be likely to advance the solu- tion of the problem of Cyprus and to counteract uni- lateral attempts to resolve the problem. S1. The German Democratic Republic and the Re- public of Cyprus are linked by friendly relatfons. These close bilateral relations are being further developed and intensified in the interests of the two States. 52. In accordance with its policy characterized by solidarity and support for the just and anti-imperialist struggle the Cypriot people are waging for a democratic and peaceful solution to the problem of Cyprus, the 53. In conclusion, permit me to express the German Democratic Republic's firm conviction that the resolu- tion of this problem, which has been a source of crisis for many years, would constitute an important con- tribution towards strengthening peace and security in that part of the world and would be in the interest of an expansion of the process of detente pursuant to the pro- visions of the Final Act of Helsinki.
I call on the representative of Turkey, who wishes to speak in exercise of his right of reply.
I do not propose to go into a refutation of the false allegations made by Mr. Rolandis, the representative of the Greek Cypriot regime, as he will receive a full reply in the statement which I shall make on Monday morning. 56. Nevertheless, I feel that a few brief remarks are called for. 57. To begin with,' let us bring cl~rity. to one importan~ point. There is no army of occupation In Cyprus. There IS a Turkish peace-keeping force which has brought peace and security to the Turkish community of Cyprus for the first time since the Greek massacres and persecutions began in 1963, perpetrated by the Greek Cypriot usur~rs of power in Cyprus. This is a peace-keeping force which IS ready to withdraw as soon as real peace is established in Cyprus through intercommunal talks. 58. False allegations have just been made as to the intention of the Turkish community to declare unilateral independence. I should like to read a statement that appeared as recent as 12 August 1979 in the Greek Cypriot daily Simerini. It is made by the Greek Cypriot negotiator, Mr. Papadopoulos, who says: "I have no information or evidence to show any activity by the Turkish Cypriots to proclaim in- dependence. I am merely reading exaggerated Greek 59. As you can see, an attempt is made at every level of the international community to give the impression that the Turks of Cyprus are aiming at partition or a separate State. This is a very transparent manoeuvre designed to perpetuate the present situation, which is the aim of the Greek Cypriot Administration. They see lasting benefit to themselves in the divided State of Cyprus as it is today because they are prosperous, they enjoy sole sovereignty and power, and they do not wish to share that power with anyone, even in a federated State. 60. Finally, Mr. Rolandis began by referring to the predicament of this institution, the United Nations. In ,fact, the predicament of this institution lies in its inabili- ty to prevent the perpetration of false accusations and misrepresentations such as those to which we have been subjected this morning. Themeeting rose at 12 noon.