A/37/PV.51 General Assembly

Before calling upon the first speaker, I should like to propose that the list of speakers in the debate on this item be closed tomorrow, Wednesday, 3 November, at 12 noon. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Assembly so decides. It was so decided. 2. The PRESIDENT: I call first on the Rapporteur of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Ded~ration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and . ~eopl,es, Mr. Adhami, of the Syrian Arab Republic, to mtrouuce the report of the Committee. 3. Mr. AD~AMI (Syrian Arab Republic), Rapporteur, Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (intelpretation from Arabic): On behalf of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and as the Rapporteur of that Committee, I have the honour to introduce to the General Assembly chapter XXV of the report of the Spedal Committee relating to the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). The chapter is contained in document A/37/23 (part V). fo~ms of colonial domination still persist today, in spite of the efforts of the United Nations to eradicate them. 8. As is well known, the recent conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom would not have arisen had colonialism and its ominous consequences been effectively erased from the face of the earth. Unfortunately, international order is still based on the existence of unequal relations and on the predominance of force, instead on being built on the foundations ofjustice and the full prevalence of peace. 9. After 17 years of fruitless bilateral negotiations undertaken pursuant to General Assembly resolutions, through which my country proved its flexibility and good will, expressly recognized by the Uni.ted Nation~, we must return today to request agam the att"ntlon of the Assembly, whose historical role in the process of decolonization is the most fruitful function it has performed since the establishment of the Organization. This is proved by the fact that the membership of the United Nations has reached 4. The Special Committee considered the question of this Territory at its 1206th and 1223rd to 1225th meetings, between 29 April and 20 August 1982. In so doing, the Special Committee was guided in particular by paragraph 12 of reso~ution36/68 of 1 December 1981, in which the Assembly requested the Special Committee to continue to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in all Territories to~ay the figure of 157. Let me remind representatives tha~ of the ~1 founding countries, 20 belonged to the Latm Amencan group, which had a decisive influence in the intitial impetus and further develop· ment of the decolonization process. That is why we Argentines and our Latin American brothers feel particularly offended by the fact that there' should still exist a colonial enclave in our very continent especially since the Assembly has labeled colo~ nialisJ? in all its manifestations as a crime against mankmd and has laid down the legal obligation for all Members of the international community to cooperate in bringing it to an end. That is also why those 20 Latin American countries, founding Members of the United Nations, requested at the appropriate time the inclusion of the item on the question t~at have not yet attained independence and, in partIcular, to formulate specific proposals for the elimination of the remaining manifestations of colonialism an.d to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. The Special Committee also took into account decision 36/416 of 25 November 1981 concerning the Territory. 5. During the course of its consideration of this question, the Special Committee had before it the working paper prepared by the Secretariat, in docu- ~ent ~/AC.l0~/7!2 and Add.I. Following its con- SideratIon of this Item, the Special Committee, at its NEW YORK 10. I shall not. repeat in extenso the historical basis of my country's right to the islands because it is fully known to my fellow representatives and, moreover, has been summed up in the annexes to document A/37/553 and Add.I, as well as in the statements of successive Argentine representatives in the Organization. 11. In any event, I should Hke to point out that we have never received an answer from the United Kingdom to questions such as the following. Why did British Ambassador Keene request in 1749 from Spain's Minister Carvajal authorization for an aomiral to make an exploratory tour-supposedly to visit the islands? Why, following the refusal by Minister Carvajal, did the admiral refrain from undertaking that journey? 12. Why is it that Great Britain did not object when the King of France ceded to Spain the colony established by Bougainville in 1764, following protests by the Spanish Crown? 13. Why, when the British precariously resettled one point on the islands, as a concession to the British Crown for the injury to its honour by Spain, did they concede the express reservation entered by Spain on 22 January 1775, affirming the Spanish right to sovereignty over the archipelago? 14. Why, when Captain SHas Duncan, commanding the United States war frigate Lexington, attacked and invaded the Malvinas Ir"a"ds in 1831, did Great Britain, whose diplomatic papers of that time reveal full knowledge of the situation, leave it completely to Argentina to submit complaints and claims, in implicit but categorical ~dmission oi the fact that it .had nothing at stake in the incident? 15. Why did British consuls recognize, up to 1833, the normal jurisdiction of Buenos Aires over the islands, for instance, by issuing consular certificates to validate the English language version of official acts of the Buenos Aires Government regarding the distribution and assignment of State land in' the Malvinas? 16. i could clearly go on asking questions which, in order to be brief, I shall not ask. But all of them would prove, as those I have mentioned do, that the United Kingdom seems to have forgotten that there is a principle ID Anglo-Saxon law called estoppel, which precisely prevents Stah~s from acting against their former recognition of certain situations, especially if, when called upon in the interest of international order to act in defence of their sovereignty -if they have any right to claim it-they do not act, thus exposing themselves to a situation of total irrelevance. 18. Spain's sovereignty over its American dominions, including the Malvinas Islands, was inherited by the newly born American countries, successors of the metropolitan Power with all its titles and rights. Argentina, upon becoming independent from Spain in 1810, succeeded to an its titles and rights, including those of sovereignty over the islands which Spain possessed. Consequently, and until 1833, the Malvina~ was administered by six governors, through whom the peaceful and exclusive possession of the archipelago by my country was exercised; its titles and rights and the innumerable acts ofjurisdiction and administration perform~d by those governors were not disputed or challenged by any State. 19. Moreover, Argentine sovereignty over the islands was not even challenged by the British, who, in recognizing my country as a sovereign State through a treaty of friendship, trade and navigation in 1825, did not enter any reservation about their supposed claims to the Malvinas Islands or other adjacent territories. 20. For all those reasons, I reiterate that the occupation by force of the Islands by the United Kingdom is illegal and has been challenged and disclaimed by Argentina at all times. Indeed, the occupation of the Islands by the United Kingdom has not been recognized in international law or by the community of nations to be a legitimate means of acquiring sovereignty. To make that possible, the Malvinas Islands would have had to be territodes not belonging to a sovereign State (res nullius) or abandoned territories (res derelictae). But it so happens that Argentina exercised full sovereign rights over them and, as is well known-especially by the United Kingdom-my country never intended willingly to abandon those territories. 21. When the conflict in the South Atlantic flared up, 17 years of fruitless negotiations-negotiations initiated in accordance with the will of the General Assembly in 1965 [see resolution 2065 (XX)]-had elapsed. During those 17 years, the United Kingdom never gave any serious evidence of entering into negotiations in good faith on sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. On the contrary, at all times it set out to obstruct them, showing lack of political wiJl to discuss the only question that justified and made those negotiations necessary: the question of the dispute concerning sovereignty. For this is the true essence of the "Question of the Malvinas Islands": the dispute concerning sovereignty over the islands. ~,et us see now what the frame of reference is for that dispute. 24. The crystal clarity of this wise provision made it the basis of the three resolutions and the four consensus decisions relative to the question of the Malvinas Islands and of the resolutions on the Comorian isiand of Mayotte, Gibraltar, the Malagasy Islands and the territorial integrity of Namibia. With regard to Gibraltar, for instance, the General Assembly, contrary to what the United Kingdom maintained, accepted Spain's interpretation based on paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV). Thus, in resolution 2353 (XXII), the General Assembly stated that: " ... any colonial situation which partially or completely destroys the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and specifically with paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)"' . 25. Moreover, in paragraph 2 of the same resolution, the General Assembly considered totally invalid the referendum held in Gibraltar by the United Kingdom on 10 September 1967. Let us recall that through the manreuvre of that referendum, the United Kingdom at that time attempted to use the right of selfdetermination .as a tool to perpetuate its colonial domination in a foreign territory. But that manreuvre did not deceive the General Assembly, which, in rejecting the referendum, ratified the general principle of decolonization according to which the right of self-determination is applicable only when the territorial integrity of a country would not be partially or totally destroyed. 26. This is a precedent of fundamental importance which the Assembly will certainly not forget. Furthermore, the categorical resolutions of the General Assembly are complemented by concurrent pronouncements of international jurisprudence, which clearly 29. Equally definitive is the last paragraph of the advisory opmion, paragraph 162, from which it is inferred that for the internaticnal tribunal, in situations where there may be a dispute concerning sovereignty over a colonial Territory, the applicability of the principle of self-determination is dependent on the nature of the ties between the Territory in question and the claiming State at the moment of the occupation by the colonial Puwer, which in the case of the Malvinas dates back to 1833. 30. The case of Gibraltar, which I have already mentioned, also served to establish that, in accordance with Article 73 of the Charter and paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV), there must be an ··identity", a legitimate relationShip of the population to the Territory, for the population to benefit from the right of self-determination. We must then ask ourselves whether, in the case ofthe Malvinas Islands, that legitimate relationship exists between the present inhabitants and the Territory. In this connection, we must point out that the British subjects settled in the Malvinas Islands under the protection of the illegal occupation of 1833, during the .period that followed the occupation by force of the islands by Great Britain and the expulsion of the original Argentine authorities and population established there. 31. This territorial usurpation was never consented to by Argentina, and its illegitimacy deprives the present inhabitants of the Malvinas of legitimate ties with the territory they occupy. This obviously invalidates any suggestion that the present inhabitants of the islands possess the right to self-determination on that part of Argentine soil. 32. In fact, the claim by the United Kingdom that the population of the Malvinas-which does not exceed 1,800 inhabitants, 70 per cent of whom are employed by the Crown or the oligopolistic colonial "wish(~s" were always subordinated to the "wishes" of the British Parliament. 34. These ideas are a far cry from the concept of self-determination of the International Court of Justice, which ~t has defined as the freely expressed will of peoples, unless it is claimed that in the present case the self-determination in question is that of the British people, through its Parliament. We would then be very far from self-determination and quite close, instead, to the British intention of maintaining.its colonial domination over the islands. 35. The right to self-determination is basically a collective right recognized to peoples, nations or States. It presupposes a legitimate relationship between the beneficiaries and the territory to be decolonized and not any kind of territorial relationship, since the right of self-netermination cannot be an instrument of territorial dismemberment. 36. Should the British position be accepted, a serious precedent would be established concerning the right of peoples to liberate themselves from colonial and foreign domination. For instance, with respect to the illegal settlements established in the Arab and Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, the British' thesis would force us to recognize that the inhabitants of those settlements could exercise the right to self-determination with regard to those territories. This is unacceptable, for it would be tantamount to legitimizing the violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity. of the States concerned and the fraudulent exercise of the right of self-determination. ! 37. Self-determination by a population fo;~cibly implanted, after the similarly forcible eviction of those that were the lawful occupiers of the territory, would ·make a mockery of all the efforts of the United Nations to eradicate colonialism and only lead to the re-establishment of the colonial ties under the guise of a .freely agreed arrangement. That is why the relationship between those that want to exercise 40. As far as the British subjects at present residing in the Islands are concerned, they are merely instruments of colonial domination, agents of the occupier in the occupied territory. The only "people" legitimately entitled to self-determination in the Malvinas question is, then, the one that was robbed of part of its territory by an act of force in 1833-that is, the Argentine people, the people of my country. 41. The present inhabitants of the Islands must naturally be taken into account and, in all fairness, their interests must be safeguarded in an appropriate manner. But it would be unacceptable, a mockery of the process of decolonization and a perversion of the principle of self-detej'mination for the United Kingdom to attempt to alter radically or to upset the colonial relationship, as it has been defined in General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX), namely, as a relationship between the United Kingdom and the Argentine Republic, the sole parties involved in this decolonization process, which must end with the reparation of the colonial plundering and the restitution of the Territory to its lawful owner. 42. How-ever, if we want to delve even more deeply into this matter, I can affirm that, while the legitimacy of the Argentine titles and rights to the Islands is indisputable, the same cannot be said of the claims of the United Kingdom, since they are founded on an initial act of force and on prolonged usurpation never consented to in any way by Argentina and maintained by force and the politics of power that are au essential and necessary pre-condition of colonial domination. 43. Furthermore, if this colonial "title", a~quired by conquest by the United Kingdom in 1833, had at any time existed legally, it would in any case have expired;irremediably by virtue of the new international law of decolonization developed by the United Nations, and especially by the General Assembly, beginning with its resolution 1514 (XV). 44. I would remind representatives, moreover, that the basic assumption of the decolonization process is the denial of the sovereignty of the colonial.Powers over the Territories subject to that process. Thus, 46. Since 1946, the question of the Malvinas has been considered by the General Assembly. In that year, the United Kingdom included the Malvinas Islands on its list of 43 colonial Territories on which it would report to the General Assembly. In view of that decision by the British Government, Argentina entered a reservation regarding sovereignty, which it reiterated every year when the question of the information on Non-S~lf-Governing Territories was examined. 47. Later, following the adoption of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1654 (XVI), by which the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was established, the Organization's consideration of the question of the Malvinas Islands became more dynamic, in full conformity with the ideals of the great majority of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which set for themselves as one of their main objectives the speeding up of the final elimination of colonial empires through the positive action of the United Nations. 48. On 20 April 1964, in a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee,3 the Argentine Government indicated its desire to participate in the Committee's discussions, stating that it was doing so by virtue of its sovereign right over the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. On 3 September of the same year, in the meeting of Sub- Committee III ofthe Special Commii:!ee, my country's delegation demanded the restoration of its territorial integrity through the return of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. It also declared that it would take into account especially the welfare and material interests of the inhabitants of the islands. The Argentine delegation also emphasized that the indiscriminate application of the right of self-determination to territories inhabited by nationals of the colonial Power that had occupied them illegally by force would pLt ',ue fate of those territories in the hands of that Power, and it maintained that the right et self-determination could not be used to transform iHegitimate occupation into full sovereignty under the protective umbrella of the United Nations.4 50. In spite of this fundamental opposition by the United Kingdom to considering the most suitable way of putting an end to the colonial situation in the Malvinas Islands, the Special Committee essentially endorsed the positions of the Argentine Govemment when, on 13 November 1964, ~t adopted without objection the following conciusivos and recommendations: "The Special Committee confirms that the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples apply to the Terri~ory of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas); "The Special Committee notes t.he existence of a dispute between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and that of Argentina concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas); "The Special Committee invites the Gov;;:;rnments of the United KingdGm and Argentina to enter into negotiations with a view to finding a peaceful solution to this problem, bearing in mind the provisions and objectives ofthe United Nations Charter and of resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, the interests of the population of the islands, and the opinions expressed during the course of the general debate.' '6 51. The conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Special Committee were reiterated by the General Assembly when, on 16 December 1965, resolution 2065 (XX) was adopted by an overwhelming majority. In it, the General Assembly, considering that its resolution 1514 (XV) was prompted by the cherished aim of bringing to an end everywhere colonialism in all its forms, one of which covers the case of the Malvinas, and noting the existence of the dispute between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom concerning sovereignty over those hlands, invited both parties to proceed without delay with the negotiations, bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of resolution 1514 (XV) and the interests of the population of the Islands. 52. Thus, the General Assembly declared. very precisely that in connection with the question of the Malvinas, there existed a dispute concerning sovereignty over the Territory and that there were solely two parties to that dispute: the Governments 55. Negoti"ations continued in 1967. The General Assembly was apprised of them and at its 1641~t meeting, on 19 December of that year, adopted a second consensus,s the contents of which were similar to those of the 1966 consensus. 56. In August 1963, the Argentine and British delegations to the negotiations agreed on the final text of a memorandum of understanding which, had the United Kingdom not refused to implement it later, would have led to a solution to the dispute. That memorandum established that the United Kingdom would recognize Argentine sovereignty over the Islands as soon as the guarantees and safeguards that the Argentine Government would undertake to grant the Islanders could be considered satisfactory. 57. The United Kingdom's rejection of the memorandum and its subsequent refusal to negotiate the q~estion of sovereignty gave rise to five years of virtual stagnation in the negotiations. Thus, on 15 August 1973, the Argentine Government addressed a note to the Secretary-General9 requesting the Government of the United Kingdom to resume the negotiations without further delay, within the framework of resolution 2065 (XX) and the subsequent consensuses adopted by the General Assembly, with a view to eliminating as soon as possible the colonial situation in the Territory. 58. The General Assembly echoed the frustration felt over the negotiations due to the British intransigence. Accordingly, on 14-December 1973, it adopted resolution 3160 (XXVIII), by which it again declared the need to accelerate the negotiations envisaged in resolution 2065 (XX) in order to arrive at a peaceful solution of the dispute over sovereignty. The Assembly also reiterated its view that only a solution to that dispute would put an end to the colonial situation in those Territories and that there were only two parties to the dispute: the British and the Argentine Governments. At the ~ame time, the Assembly again disavowed the applicability of the right to self-determination. 59. In spite of resolution 3160 (XXVIII), the United Kingdom persisted in its refusal to negotiate the question of sovereignty. That continued intran- 68. The reason for the continental dimension that the dispute has acquired is easy to understand. The dispute concerning sovereignty and the recent conflict between my country and the United Kingdom has connotations and consequences. that clearly go beyond the framework of bilateral Argentine-British retations. In fact, it is an issue that, apart from the !egitimate claims of Argentina and British aggression, reveals the reality of a world in which the colonialism of a former great Power and its disregard for the security, territorial integrity and dignity of our countries rise up again as starkly as in the worst times of imperialist expansion. The dispute over the Malvinas Islands shows clearly that our continent, which has been fighting for independence and democracy in international relations for more than 150 years, is still considered likely ground for colonialist and expansionist adventurism by those who refuse to admit the irreversible nature of the decolonization process. 69. For years, attempts have been made to bring the developing countries into line with sterile and empty policies intended supposedly to satisfy their legitimate aspirations. But when the moment of truth comes, as in the case of the Malvinas, the only reality 71. All these circumstances are more than sufficient to explain the active solidarity of Latin America with Argentina, and its request for the inclusion of this item in the agenda and the submission of draft resolution A/37/L.37/Rev.l, whose practical and unobjectionable goal is the final affirmation of justice and peace in the South Atlantic. Even though certain voices in the British Government describe this positive Latin American contribution as unrealistic, we are convinced that Latin America-Whose opinion cannot and should not be passed over because the territory in question is situated in its geographical area-is proposing an alternative which, above all, is realistic, pertinent and constructive. Indeed, to be strictly realistic, it is obvious that a whole range of political, strategic, historic, economic and geographical aspects-and not the alleged logic of recent eventsmust be considered if what is sought is a just and permanent solution.. 72. No solution can be viable that fails to take into account the stand taken by Latin America or seeks to alter the terms of reference for the decolonization of the Islands established by the General Assembly in its resolutions 2065 (XX), 3160 (XXVIII) and 31/49. Those terms of reference determine that the only way of decolonizing the Malvinas .IsI, ,ds is by solving the sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom, and that the Governments of those two countries be the only parties to the dispute. 73. Latin America fully supports those' terms of reference, which are reiterated in draft resolution A/37/L.3/Rev.l, and therefore trusts that the Assembly will ratify them once agatn. In so doing, the General Assembly will have prevented the consolidation of the present situation in the South Atlantic and its development in a direction contrary to its own decisions regarding the question of the Malvinas Islands. 74. A part of the territory of the Argentine Repubhc, a part of Latin American soil, is under military 78. I am sad, however, that the occasion of this first speech should be in the context of a quarrel. May I say it is not a quarrel ofour choosing? The whole Assembly knows the events of last April to which I refer. I shall have something to say about them later in my statement, but for the moment I would rather stress the long ties of friendship and mutual interest which have existed between Britain and Argentina, and ind~ed, more widely between Britain and Latin America. I 79. Numerous memorials and statues all over Latin America eloquently bear witness to the fact that Britain played an important role in the liberation of Latin America, in support of just that principle of self-determination which is at issue here today. Britain is proud of its relationship with the countries of Latin America and places a high value on their unique contribution to our common civilization, and I am glad to pay a tribute to the fact that twice 86, Those are the facts. In short, in April a military confrontation was forced upon us by the Argentine Government in spite of a mandatnry resolution of the Security Council calling for an immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces. Now an unnecessary political confrontation has been forced upon us. We shall no more run away {fom the one than we did from the other. 87. This unnecessary confrontation is ill-timed alid ill-considered. It is bound to exacerbate an already serious situation. Everyone knows that it is seven months ~o the day since Argentina invaded the Falklands against the resistance of a tiny but valiant garrison. Everyone knows that the life of the islanders was totally ahd brutally disrupted. It will take time to !epair the damage, both materially and psychologIcally. Everyone knows of the depth of feeling that was aroused in Britain and the determination not to allow aggression to be rewarded. Many women saw their sons and husbands leaving their homes abruptly to fight a war they did not seek in very difficult and dangerous conditions. They fought in defence of noble principles which are not to be brushed aside as being of no account. Everyone knows that there were severe casualties on both sides and that the dead are still being mourned. Lives are still in peril from the mines so indiscriminately scattered by the ~rgentine ?ccupying forces. It is not surprising that, In these clrcumstances~ the people of my country and the people of the Falkland Islands should feel very strongly. So soon after the Argentine invasion it is unrealistic to expect that a resolution could b~ devised which could be accepted by my country and by Argentina. 88. Since we did not seek this political confrontation, our next thought was whether we could reduce its effect. It seemed to us that the requirements and emotions of all parties might be satisfied by making their positions clear to the General Assembly. We took soundings to see whether there was any possibility that we could have a debate without a draft resolution and a vote. The answer was no. We were told that such a possibility did not realistically exist. We were told that Ar~entina would not accept it. Subsequently, we heard that a major campaign had been launched against us in the capitals of most of the countries represented here. 89. However, we did not oppose the proposal that this year the question of the Falkland Islands should be considered in the General Assembly instead of the Fourth Committee, as has been the practice in the past. We felt that a matter which involves such fundamental principles, the decent conduct of international affairs and the rights of people should be given the serious attention it deserves in what I have already called the parliament of the world. 90. We believe with total conviction that we are standing for principles and codes of behaviour that matter to the whole world. I will come to this in a moment, but first I am obliged to deal with fiome of 92. I note that in the general debate, the Argentine Foreign Minister [l4th meeting] set special store by the question of who first landed in the Falklands and who first settled on the Islands. Of course, these matters have some relevance for the question of abstract sovereignty. Whoever first sighted the Islands, there is no doubt that the first landing was British and the first attempt at settlement was made by a Frenchman in 1764, followed closely by the British in 1765. The Foreign Minister, in other words, had his facts wrong. But of far greater significance for consideration of the Falkland Islands by the General Assembly now, in 1982, are other facts: the fact that a permanent settlement was first established in the IsJands in 1833 and the fact that the settlement has continued ever since to the present day. These 149 years of continuous, peaceful settlement have leJ to a vigorous, firmly rooted community stretching back for six generli:ions of people who know the Islands as their only home. Though it is a small community, it has its own distinct culture. It has its own educational, social and political institutions and this afternoon, two democraticaUy elected members of the Falkland Islands Legislative Council will be testifying on behalf of the Falklanders before the Fourth Committee. These facts have profound conse~llences, which I shall come to in a minute', Before I do. I must pause for a moment in order to mail, once and for all, four persistent myths which have been a perennial feature of Argentine propaganda. 93. First, there is the myth that Argentina inherited titl~ t~ the Falkland Islands from the Spanish Empire. !hlS IS not so. The Islands were abandoned by Spain ID 1811-five years before Argentina's declaration of independence. Mter that and until 1820, the Islands were mostly deserted, apart from occasional visits by whalers and sealers of various nationalities. 94. Secondly, there is the myth that Argentina settled the Falklands after 1820. This is not true either. In the years follo\'ling 1820, various colonizing ventures from Buenos Aires were planned, but these were essentially private in nature and were never effectively ~arried out. In 1829, the Buenos Aires Government issued a decree purporting to appoint a Hamburg merchant as Governor of the Islands. The appointment of Herr Vernet evoked a firm British protest which was repeated in 1832. His activities in the Islands from 1829 onwards were again of an essentially private nature. His authority in the Islands was not recognized by any other Powers. His venture was dispersed in 1831 by the captain of the United States vessel Lexington. It will be apparent that the Falkland Islands were never in any sense part of the territory of Argentina. 95. Thirdly, there is the myth that th~te was a settled Argentine population in the Islands in 1833. Again, that is not true. The Islands were practically devoid m~ delegation this morning. We find the draft resolution, in its initial and its revised form, objectionable both for what it says and, if anything, still more for what it does not say. 99. First of all, let me list some, though in the interests of brevity not all, of our objections to the draft resolution. Many representatives will have read a well-known book entitled How to Win Friends and Influence People. One thing that is clear is that the way to win friends in the Falklands and to influence peop!le in the United Kingdom is not by insulting or threatening them. The second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution does both those things with its reference to colonial situations being incompatible witF', universal peace. Is this a suggestion that the peace is going to be broken again by the same people who undertook the invasion earlier this year? Is this a sensible pre~ude to seeking negotiations? It is true that the draft resolution talks about finding a ··peaceful solution", 1:t·.~t this, I have to point out, is the v~ry same phrase that has been used in previous 'resolutions and in other communications to which the Argentine Government has put its name-and look what happened. 100. The word ··negotiations" is important in international problems. In very ma•./ cases, it is the right way to deal with differences. But all g<?od words can be subverted. There is a proverb in my country that even the Devil can quote Scripture. Let us look at the meaning of the word ··negotiations" in the particular context of the Falklands dispute. 101. Unfortunately f in this context, the word ··negot~ations" has a loaded meaning. Successive Argtmtine Governments have made it. abundantly plain diplomatically and have rammed home the point to their own public opinion-and the point was made yet again in the statement this morning-that negotiations are only to achieve one result, namely, the transfer of sovereignty over the Islands from Britain to Argentina. The Argentines have stressed that, for th-;m, negotiations mean discussions about the 103. Some persons suggest that negotiations could be resumed where they were broken off last April. That shows remarkable insensitivity to human emotions. By what right does anyone ask mothers and widows to forget their SOilS and husbands? The wounded are still in hospital. At this v\Jry time, some of the dead are being r.eburied. What are we to make of people who said that their purposes were pp.aceful and then seized territory and people by force? How can anyone, let alone the Falklanders, have confidence in the good faith of these people? Even now they refuse to accept a definitive cessation of hostilities or definitively to renounce the use of force. If anyone has any doubts about this, let me quote the Commander of the N~nth Air Brigade of the Argentine Air Force, who said only last week: ••... we must be better prepared than ever to make the second battle definitive and annihilate the enemy." 104. Things cannot go back to where ihey were when the Argentines broke off negotiations and invaded the Islands. They have only themselyes to blame for this. Aftp" the invasion, they again rejected the path of negoH~tion and they chose the r'ath of violence. It is naive to suppose that the illegal use of force has no effect. Once bitten, twice shy. How can the Falklanders, or my Government on their behalf, be expect~d to act as if no invasion had occurred? . 105. What happened last April brought out the real nature of the problem. Delegations will now understand that we are not faced with a small dispute in a distant place which can be wished away by some clever drafting. It is clear that fundamental principles are at stake. I have found in the short period I have been here that, whatever positions various groups may have adopted in the past, there is growing recognition here in the United Nations of the importance and relevance of these fundamental principles to the Falklands problem. How can a solution to the dispute be reached unless it is firmly based on those principles? They have a universal validity. Their validity will be undermined if an exception is made in the case of the Falklands. 106. On these fundamental principles there can be no compromising, no redrafting and no negotiating .to make them mean something else. We stand by the principles of the Charter and reject the negotiations-loaded negotiations-for which some people call. What is needed is a basic change of, attitude, perhaps one should call it a change of heart, on the 112. Under that Article, we have accepted the obligation to "recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount" . Their interests are paramount and they are, of course, the best judges of their own interests. That is one reason why my Government attaches so much importance to their wishes. 114. In doing all this, we are obliged, inter alia ~ to have regard to the particular. circumstances of the Territory and the character of the people. When the shocks of recent events have faded and normal conditions are restored, the Falklanders will want to give careful thought to their constitutional and political future. If the Falklanders wish to strengthen their own political institutions, we will encourage and assist them in this, but nothing can or will be imposed upon them. 115. Article 73 confers rights on the Falklanders and lays obligations on my Government. We intend to go on fulfilling these obligations, and we are entitled to the support of the international community in so doing. When we began to report to the Secretary-General on Non-Self-Governing Territories under Article 73, there were more than 70 of them ill toto. The list has now been reduced to about one quarter of that total. Those who are no longer on the list are now independent, sovereign States or have chosen some other future. They have benefited from Article 73 and the exercise of their right of selfdetermination. There is no reason why the Falklanders should not do so, too. Neither those countries which have benefited from Article 73 nor their fellow Members of the Assembly should ask us to evade our obligations under Article 73 or deny the right of self-determination to those people who remain our responsibility. To do so would be to apply double standards With a vengeance. 116. As I said at the outset, we would like friendly and good-neighbourly relations with Argentina. Article 74 of the Charter-which is also part of Chapter XI-states that Members of the United Nations agree that their policy in respect of Non-Self-Governing Territories must be based on the general principle of good-neighbourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic and comme:rcial matters. We recognize the need for the people of the Islands to construct a stable and harmonious relationship with their neighbours. This is important both for peace in the region and to allow the fuJ! development of its economic potential. It is what we have sought over the years. 117. We are more than willing to live at peace with Argentina and get back to a more normal relationship. We have already taken a number of steps to that end. We acted quickly to return all the Argentine prisoners of war following the Argentine sur- 122. And then we come to the Falkland Islanders. It was significant that the Foreign Minister of Argentina took such pains in his statement to repeat so frequently that there were only two parties to the dis- NOTES t See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.l. Reports 1975, p.12. 2 See Reports ofCases Arguedand Decided in the Supreme Court of the United States (The Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Company, Newark, Wayne County, New York, 1882),7 CRANCH 116, 140/141. J A/AC.I09/66. 4 See A/AC.I09/SC.4/SR.25. 5 See A/AC.I09/SC.4/SR.24. 7 Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/6628, para. 13. B Ibid., Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 16, p. 57. 9 A/9121 and Corr.l. 10 A/I0217 and Corr.l, annex, para. 87.