A/37/PV.53 General Assembly

The General Assembly is once again considering a problem which gives us cause for concern. The re-emergence last May of the longstanding issue of the, Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and the increased tension' in that region turned the South Atlantic into an acute focal point of international politics. 2. We consider the war in the South Atlantic yet another manifestation of how unresolved problems of colonial origin threaten stability and world peace. In our view, the explosive issue of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) is a question of decolonization and should be treated accordingly. 3. The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples began to review the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in 1964. In its conclusions and recommendations, adopted on 13 November 1964, the Committee invited the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to initiate negotiations to settle their differences. I 4. These recommendations of the Special Committee were reiterated by the General Assembly in its resolution 2065 (XX), adopted in 1965. In 1966, the General Assembly reached a consensus for the first time on urging the parties involved to find a peaceful solution as soon as possible. 5. Regrettably, the negotiations between the two parties proved to be inconclusive, and the frustration led to the outbreak of open hostilities and war, causing heavy loss of life and severe material damage on both sides. 6. The Hungarian delegation shares the view with regard to this war outlined by the Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries, held from 31 May to 5 June 1982 in Havana [A/37/333, annex, paras. 109-117]. 7. We hold that the draft resolution before us [A/37/ L.3/Rev./], which was introduced on behalfof20 Latin American countries, is a constructive effort towards a peaceful and just solution of the dispute. This wellbalanced draft resolution calls for the resumption of negotiations between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to this question. The Wednesday, 3 November 1982, at 3.20 p.m. NEW YORK Hungarian delegation is ready to support the draft resolution. 8. We particularly support the paragraphs requesting the Secretary-General to undertake a renewed mission of good offices and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on the progress made in the implementation of the resolution. In this connection, we should also like to express the Hungarian delegation's appreciation to the Secretary-General for his tireless efforts during the days of the crisis. We hope that his coming efforts, based on his diplomatic skills and negotiating experience, will result in a useful contribution to the solution of the problem in the future, too. 9. When the process of decolonization is totally completed-and we hope that this will be in the nottoo-distant future-and the former colonial Powers cease their insistence on their so-called right to certain possessions which are very often far from their own territories and which were once taken by force, th~re will be less danger to international peace and security. That is why we firmly support every effort by the United Nations· aimed at the speedy implementation of the Declaration qn the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [resolution 1514 (XV)].

The question of the Malvinas Islands is almost 150 years old. That is indeed a long time-long enough, there are those who might say, to bestow a certain degree of legitimacy upon a de facto situation. But that is obviously not so in this case. Members must still have vividly in mind the inspiring statement made by the Minister for External Relations of Argentina, Mr. Aguirre Lanari, during the general debate at this session of the General Assembly [14th meetinr-, To say that in 1833 an act of aggression deprived t).~ newly independent Argentine Republic of part of its territory may at this stage sound rather hackneyed. Perhaps it is; but it states the very essence, the gist, of what this question is all about: that is, the occupation of foreign territory by the, most powerful nation of those days. 11. Ever since that humiliation was foisted upon the' Argentine Republic, its leaders have never failed to protest against the 'Jnlawful occupation ofthe Malvinas Islands by Brii;st, forces. As time has passed, Argentine resentment has only grown more bitter, and the international aspects of the case have never changed so as to warr~nt a different interpretation of the nature ofth~dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom. In this connection, I should like to quote from the statement I made. in the Security Council last May, which repeated the wOI:ds of the Minister for External Relations of Brazil at. ~he Consultative Meeting of the Organization of American States: 12. In 1833, the Government of Brazil associated itself with Argentina's protest to the British Government and, ever since, Brazil has unwaveringly supported Argentina's legitimate claim to the Malvinas Islands. 13. On the other hand, Brazil has always insisted that a peaceful settlement to the dispute can and must be achieved. For this reason, Brazil gave its full support to the bilateral negotiations launched in the 1960s on the recommendation of the General Assembly. We deeply regret the scuttling of those negotiations. 14. In 1982, the smouldering tensions finally exploded into a conflict which resulted in the loss of many lives, both British and Argentine. We were shocked by the tragedy that befell the peoples of those two nations, both friends of ours with which we have always maintained close and mutually beneficial relations. Our shock was all the greater be:cause the tragedy could have been avoided. Indeed, we believe that good sense and moderation could have prevented the escalation of events to the point of no return. We may unconsciously have been deluding ourselves at the time, but, imbued with this belief, my Government made every effort in its power to help avoid the outbreak of armed confrontation. Once it has begun, we redoubled our efforts to assist in bringing it to an end. The Brazilian Government pledged its full support for the attempts of the Secretary-General to find a formula that could have resulted in a peaceful solution. While he was so engaged, we expressed the v~ew that, since the Secretary-General was so close to success, everyone, and particularly the two parties involved, should give him a chance to fulfil his mission by refraining from actions that would polarize the dispute. 15. The scars of war remain and should be healed. I .should like to quote from the statement made at this session by the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil: "It is time for those who so vigorously condemn the use of force in the solution of controversies to d~monstrate the consistency and sincerity of their designs. Negotiations must start in order to avoid the risk of increasing tensi(nls in an area naturaHy inclined to co-operation and prosperitv." [5th meetinR, para. /6.] 16. Ind~ed, negotiations flre the only way to achieve a ju~t and lasting settlement, and when I speak of negotiations, I rnt~an serious negotiations. Security Council resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982) provide both the basis and the framework for negotia- Hons. My country makes an appeal to the two parties not to squander any more time and effort and to address the fundamental question: that is, whose claim to sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands is the more legitimate? My G<wernment is certain that, inescapably, the only true answer is not inconsistent 17. With peace and justice as our one and only purpose, Brazil and 19 other Latin American countries requested the inclusion of an item entitled "Ques~ tion of the Malvinas Islands" in the agenda of the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly [A/37//93]. The same 20 countries are sponsors of draft resolution A/37/L.3/Rev.l, the sole purpose of which is to request the Republic of Argentina and the United Kingdom to resume negotiations with a view to reaching "a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute" relating to the question of the Malvinas Islands. The draft resolution also requests the Secretary-General to assist both parties in the negotiations they are expected to conduct. 18. I should like to make one final comment on the draft resolution. The revised text is the result of the informal consultations that took place during the past few weeks with a number of delegations and representatives of different regional groups. Let me point out that certain changes were introduced in order to allay apprehensions and to give an answer to some delegations with regard to the interests of the Islanders, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX), which was adopted by an overwhelming majority and without any dissenting vote. The revised text also records the cessation of hostilities and the intention of the parties not to resume them. In this connection, let me stres~ that Argentina, as a sponsor of the draft resolution, is giving a pledge not to reopen hostilities in the South Atlantic. 19. The sponsors have introduced into the draft resolution a preambular paragraph that reaffirms the principles of the Charter on the non-use of force or the threat of force and on the peaceful settlement of disputes. My country believes that, in voting in favour of the draft resolution, all Governments represented in this Hall with be vouching for their peaceful intentions and for the sincerity of their adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter. 20. Before concluding 9 let me state that Brazil's purpose is to contribute to the achievement of peace and justice. We therefore make an honest and sincere appeal to both parties to seek a settlement of their l~ifferences at the negotiating table. Brazil caunot accept the South Atlantic being transformed into a sea of confrontation. After all, the South Atlantic has always been the least militarized of all the oceans of our globe, and we intend to do our utmost to ensure that it remains so. We are convinced that the South Atlantic will be known to the world as a region where there is no room for any activity other than open and friendly co-opc;ation among the coastal developing countries of Latin America and Africa, free from the tensions between the great Powers and free from any military presence associated with outside interests. 21. M:r. -SANZ DE SANTAMARIA (Colombia) (interpretation from Spanish): The Argentina cause, lenc~. Hence, it is quite clear that the Latin American States do not recognize the validity of territorial conquest. Furthermore, Colombia has a long anticolonialist tradition, and any action not involving bloodshed rightfully adopted by the international community to combat colonialism has our active and resolute support. . 24. Colombia defends Argentina's cause and its claim against the United Kingdom because it is aware of the existence of a genuine title justifying Argentina's aspiration to exercise full sovereignty over the territory which is the subject of the confrontation with the United Kingdom. There is no other way to explain or justify the decisions of the United Nations on the question of the Malvinas Islands. First, it has been recognized that the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples apply to the Malvinas Islands. 25. Subsequently, resolution 2065 (XX), in recognizing the existence of a dispute on sovereignty between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom and inviting them to bear in mind the interests-not the desires-of the population, let it be understood openly and unequivocally that the principle of self-determination was not applicable to the dispute over the Malvinas Islands, since it involved an occupied territory and thus the principle of territorial integrity prevailed, in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV), which makes it clear that any breach of territorial integrity by a country is incompatible with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. 26. Similarly, resolutions 3160 (XXVIII), of 14 December 1973, and 31/49, of 1 December 1976, expressly recognize the efforts made by the Argentine Government to promote the well-being of t.he population of the Islands. 27. Since the Argentine title to the Malvinas is genuine, it would not be proper to leave the fate and future of a territory whose sove~eignty is the subject of a conflict in the hands of those that occupied it by force. That would mean .accepting an improper procedure to legitimize the use of force. 28. My delegation is confident that, in view of the indications given by the United Nations, the wellfounded solidarity of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the categorical statement of the Inter- American Juridical Committee, the General Assembly will approve and support the just and con~iliatory 31. In approaching the problem of the Malvinas Islands, it should be borne in mind that this Territory is on th~ list of the Non-Self-Governing Territories of the Special Committe on decolonization and that the General Assembly has on several occasions adopted decisions by consensus and recommended negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom. It seems to us that this clearly indicates how the solution should be sought at this moment. 32. Tb~ statement issued by the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, after the outbreak of the armed conflict in the Malvinas Islands in the spring of 1982, said, inter alia, that the use of force and the heavy loss of life made Yugoslavia even more convinced of the necessity to seek ~ negotiated settlement in accordance with the Charter and relevant United Nations resolutions and the documents of meetings of the non-aligned countries concerning this problem. 33. In accordance with that statement, Yugoslavia has, since the very beginning of the crisis concerning the Malvinas, in contacts with both Argentina and the United Kingdom, pointed to the danger of the use of force and called for the utmost restraint by the parties involved in order to prevent a further deterioration of the situation and to achieve a just and lasting solution by peaceful means, in the interest of 35. In our view, this constitutes the only possible way for the solution of the problem. Peaceful negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom should be resumed. They are the only viable and realistic way to improve the situation in the South Atlantic. Any successful negotiating process must take into account all facts and interests, particularly the rights of Argentina and the interests of the population of the Malvinas Islands, which should not be neglected. 36. The Yugoslav delegation would like to point out that it wil! be possible to solve the problem of the Malvinas Islands only through negotiations with strict adherence to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, we feel that the restoration of confidence between Argentina and the United Kingdom is of substantial significance. 37: Yugoslavia will vote in favour of the draft resolution sponsored by 20 Latin American States. We consider that in order to achieve a lasting and just solution to the problem it is necessary to resume negotiations between the United Kingdom and Arg(ntina, within the framework of the United Nations and with the assistance of the good offices of the Secretary-General, to find a peaceful solution as soon as possible.

Uruguay is taking part in this debate with a constructive attitude and in a spirit of harmony. This position of my country is not new and is not made to fit this instance. It corresponds to a policy which has always been followed and advocated by Uruguay, that of seeking peaceful solutions. Even before the universal embodiment of rules in t1;lis regard, our Constitution established that policy as a self-imposed obligation. . 39. No one is unaware of the strong links that bind us to the Republic of Argentina in brotherly relations which are daily renewed with growing common undertakings. That is, and always will be so. That does not prevent us from considering the question objectively, nor does it prevent us from recalling our long-standing relations with the United Kingdom. 42. But it is necessary for general rules accepted by all to be translated also into a specific criterion for each situation, to give the parties a safe guide for channelling their conflicts. It is necessary for principles to be followed by practical recommendations for effective implementation, drawn up by the international community according to the circumstances of each case. In accordance with this premise, Uruguay, together with 19 other Latin American countries, has sponsored draft resolution A/37/L.3/Rev.1. 43. I wish to mention brieflY the main aspects of the draft resolution which, in the view of my delegation, recommend the adoption of the text: it is a balanced document, which does not prejudge the positions of the parties; it promotes the holding of negotiations, which is one of the universally recognized means of peaceful settlement; itstresses the functions of the Secretary-General, who is given a flexible mandate to act in a mission of good offices in order to help both parties; it confirms that this problem should be dealt with by peaceful means; it maintains the item under the care of the General Assembly. 44. Through all those things, the draft provides a political and legal framework for resolving the conflict through negotiations. Thus, by a simple mechanism, it fills the vacuum between the principal parties and the situation created. In this regard, I wish to stress that the mandate of the Secretary-General is particularly timely, both because of his powers in the office which he occupies and also because of the acknowledged action he has already taken in this matter. This gives everyone the necessary guarantees and, at the same time, is a positive factor for the carrying through of a delicate and highly sensitive task. 45. I do not wish to confine an analysis of the draft resolution to its most immediate legal or political aspects. The simplicity of the text and its clear purpose of peace are also a positive contribution to creating an atmosphere for dialogue. The changes introduced in the initial draft resolution bear witness to this: a reference to a cessation of hostilities, reaffirmation of the principle of the non-use of~force or the threat of use of force, and reaffirmation of the 47. The changes eloquently emphasize a firm purpose of understanding and peace. I am aware that the wounds are recent and deep. I understand the urge to remember the sacrifices made. But that natural feeling, which is worthy of respect, should not prevent us today from working together to lay the foundations of a peaceful settlement under internationallaw. 48. Throughout the general debate and also during the second special session on disarmament, we have reviewed the many situations and areas of tension and crisis, if not of open conflict. Those facts and the thought-provoking report of the Secretary- General have highlighte'd the need to strengthen the United Nations, particularly its role in the preservation of international peace and security. Above all, the need has been stressed for prior preventive action. 49. The item under discussion provides an excellent opportunity to put into practice all these ideas and resolutely to approach the question through a draft resolution dealing with the item in a balanced and timely manner. 50. During the del}ate on the Malvinas Islands, both within the Organization and outside it, reference has been made to the principle of self-determination. Without any doubt, that principle is highly important, as recognized in the Charter and as an essential element for the independence of States. However, as far as my delegation is concerned, it is not applicable in the present case. From the point of view of form, what we have is a dispute concerning sovereignty which should be resolved through negotiations. Therefore, there is no ground for referring now to the content or theresult of the negotiations, qualifying them with the principle of territorial integrity, self-determination or any other principle that refers to the substance of the matter. To do so would imply going beyond the negotiations themselves and prejudging their outcome. 51. From the substantive point of view, it is also clear that there is no reason to refer to self-determination. The introduction of settlers since 1833 is at variance with the principles governing the occupation of territories, both those acknowledged by general opinion at the time and those accepted now. In the technical sense, occupation as a means of acquiring sovereignty must come under res nullius or res derelictae. In the case of the Malvinas Islands, in 1833 neither of the two situations existed, as the territories were neither without a sovereign nor had they been abandoned; abandonment, in order to be proved, requires, as well as a physical or a natural elemellt t also one of intent, that is, the desire to abandon t which obviously never existed. Neither is there any ground for invoking prescription since, in the light of the foregoing, the initial act did not give rise to title and was promptly contested in any case. 58. During the recent general political debate, the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko" emphasized that: "When a centre of tension appears in some part ofthe globe there can be no doubt that it is caused by the actions of those who have no regard for the legitimate interests of others. Not infrequently they are inspired by attempts to retain by force positions inherited from the colonial past." [13th meeting, para. /37.] 59. The conflict in the South Atlantic broke. out precisely as a result of the desire of the administering Power to keep in its own hands, by every possible means, the vestiges of its former extensive colonial possessions. This conflict has already cost hundreds of lives, but in the light of the position of those States bent on maintaining and strengthening their own military and strategic positions. in this region, it continues to remain the source of a . , 66. When the conflict in the South Atlantic worsened, the United Kingdom placed its stake on the restoration of the colonial status of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) by armed force and' undertook a broad operation using its air force, navy and marines, in spite of the persistent attempts of the Security Council and the Secretary-General to avoid bloodshed and to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict. 67. During the mediation efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General at the first stage, definite prospects appeared for bringing together the positions of the parties. But the closer the British expeditionary force got to the conflict region in the Sou~h Atlantic, the firmer became the position of the United Kingdom. In the light of that policy of the British Government, a legitimate question arose amongst delegations in the Security Council as to whether or not the participation of the United Kingdom in efforts to achieve a settlement by peaceful means served only as a diplomatic cover for military preparations. The further development of events, the rapid unfolding of military action and even a veto imposed by the United Kingdom and the United States, on 4 June of this year, in respect of a draft resolution for a cease-fire in the conflict region7 confirmed that such suspicions were justified. 68. It is clear that, no matter what positi9ns were taken by the parties as to the substance of the conflict, the questions involved should be solved by . 83. In all these areas my delegation is of the view that the administering Power has fulfilled its obliga;:ions, having due regard to the wishes of the Falkland Islanders, as stipulated under Article 73 of the Charter and as subsequently amplified and underscored in 1960 in the Decl~ration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. M4. As the administeri""g Power, the United Kingdom has kept the Secretary-General regularly informed and has, in O;lr view, co-operated with the Special Committee on decolonization, which has reviewed th~ 3ituatiop. in the Falkland Islands every year. rrhe CommiU~e hRS closely monitored the developments in all colonia~ Territories, incIudirtg the Falklands, and has noted with satisfaction that tt.; United Kingdom has introdu<;ed political advances, with a Legislative Coundl and an Executive Council with elected members. 85. ThrrJugh their elected representatives, the 86. In conclusion, my delegation maintains the position that the administerjng Power should be allowed to continue to promote the interests of the Falklanders and respect their wishes as regards their future. The decolonization process under way should con:~~:Je in close consultation between the United Kingdom and the Falkland Islands, in accordance with Article 73 of the Charter and resolution 1514 (XV). 87. Turning now to the draft resolution before us, my "delegation is of the view that it does not address itself to the main issue-that is, the universally recognized inalienable right to self-determination of the Falkland Islanders themselves. Even though the question is essentially a colonial one, there is no explicit reference m the operative paragraphs to the applicability of resolution 1514 (XV) to the Territory and the right to self-determim:~ion, which is referred to only in a preambular paragraph. Moreover, the scope of the negotiations is confinded to the "sovereignty dispute" without explicitly mentioning that the people of the Falkland Islands should be fully involved in the process of self-determination in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV). 88. For those reasons, my delegation is of the view that the draft resolution addresses itself only partially to the important question before us.

An armed conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom set the South Atlantic on fire earlier this year. A peaceful island inhabited by a peasant community and its environs became the arena of a full-scale war which endangered peace and security m the area, with dangerous portents for world peace and stability. Many precious lives were lost on both sides, unto11 suffering was inflicted on the island's population, valuable property was destroyed, international trade and other arrangements were adversely affected and the economies of both countries w~re seriously disrupted. 90. India was pained to see two friendly and responsible membe; States of the international community engaged in destructive combat. When the conflict finally ended, there was no solution to the problem but only the status quo ante, with the added complications that a devastating war brought iri its wake. The process of negotiations between two friendly 91. Though the present debate on the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) is being held under a new item included in the agenda at the request of 20 Latin American States, the United Nations had long ago included the Islands on its decolonization agenda and listed them as a Non-Self-Governing Territory. The United Kingdom had been transmitting information on the Territory to the United Nations under Article 73 of the Charter, and the United Nations, for its part, had actively been encouraging Argentina and the United Kingdom to continue the negotiations between them with a view to finding a lasting solution to the question. Numerous General Assembly resolutions have urged an early settlement of the dispute through peaceful negotiations between the two parties. In the declarations adopted since their Ministerial Conference of 1975, the nonaligned countries have, while supporting the restitution of Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, reiterated the call for the speeding up of peaceful negotiations between the United Kingdom and Argentina. The Special Committee on decolonization, of which India is a member, kept a close watch over these negotiations. The Committee noted that, in December 1977, Argentina and the United Kingdom, in accordance with an agreement reached in July of that year in Rome, had held a ministerial meeting in New York to continue negotiations on "the future political relations, including sovereignty, with, regard to these islands and Anglo-Argentine economic co-operation with regard to the said territories in particular and the South-West Atlantic in general". 92. It was in view of the progress being made in the negotiations that the General Assembly had decided in recent years not to consider the question in detail, but requested the Special Committee to keep the situation in the Territory under review. Even as recently as February 1982, we were pleased to note that, after a ministerial meeting of the two countries, with the participation of the Legislative Council of the Territory, it was announced that "the two sides reaffirmed their resolve to find a solution to the sovereignty dispute and considered in detail an Argentine proposal for procedures to make better progr~ss in this sense". 93. It was because of our conviction that the negotiations were proceeding in the right direction and that there was the real possibility of a peaceful solution being found that we were particularly distressed to learn in April 1982 that the dialogue had broken down, resort had been made to the use of force, relations between Argentina and the United Kingdom ha~ been .ruptured and a !tlajor a~J!1~d conflict was brewing. Expressing its regret at the use of force to resolve a political problem, India appealed, on 6 May 101. The People's Republic of Bulgaria, in its capacity as a long-standing member of the Special Committee on decolonization, has always firmly and consistently explained its position on the question of the immediate implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. As early as 1965, in the debates in the Fourth Committee at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, my country said8 that the occupation of the Islands by the 'united Kingdom bore all the characteristics of colonialism. On several occasions, the People's Republic of Bulgaria has supported the settlement of the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) through peaceful means, on the basis of the appropriate United Nations resolutions. Those are the reasons why the Bulgarian delegation supports the draft resolution submitted by 20 Latin American States [A/37/L.3/Rev.J]. 102. In conclusion, I wish to express the conviction of che delegation vf the People's Republic of Bulgaria that the adoption and implementation of this draft resolution and the fulfilment of the mediating role entru~ted to the Secretary-General will contribute to the achievement, within the framework of decolonization, of a peaceful and just solution of the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

On 16 December 1965, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2065 (XX) on the question of the Malvinas Islands. That resolution contains very important elements, which should be borne in mind, namely: the fact that thf question of the Malvinas Islands falls within the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV); recognition of the ex~stence of a dispute over sovereignty between the Republic of Arg', ntina and the United Kingdom; and a request for negotiations, without delay, on a peaceful settlement of the dispute, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and with resolution 1514 (XV) and taking into account the interests of the population of the Malvinas Isbmds. 104. That text was adopted by an overwhelming majority. I should recall that among the votes in favour were those of several member countries of the European Community and countries ofAfrica, Asia and the English-speaking Caribbean region, members of the British Commonwealth. There were 14 abstentions by members of the Group of Western European and other States, including the United Kingdom and South Africa. It should be remembered that there was not a single vote against; not even the United Kingdom opposed the resolution. 108. On 1 December 1976, the General Assembly adopted resolution 31/49, couched in terms similar to the earlier rt"solu~·ions and repeating an expression of gratitude to the Government of Argentina fur its efforts (0 facilitate decolon;~ation and to pr6mote the well-being of the population of the Islands. In this regard, it was no accident that the gratitude was extended only to Argentina. It also made reference to the Declaration of the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, h~id at Colombo i~ U76. Once again, the General Assem.)ly adopted t~ .; resolution by an overwhelming majority of votes, but for the first time the United Kingdom voted against it, which most unfortunately demonstrated not just the usual tendency to stagnation but a new trend tpwards regression. 100. I should like to make a few comments. This year we have witnessed an armed conflict in the South Atlantic with the loss of the precious lives of young Argentines and Britons and of inhabitants of the Malvinas. 110. In human societies there are various ways of exercising and provoking violence; there are physical and non-physical forms of the use of violence. For example, in human relations, racism, which is an aberration of the human conscience and human conduct, does not necessarily have to take the form of isolation, persecution, torture, imprisonment or death before :t is regarded as a form of violence. The very 113. After resolution 502 (1982) came Security'" Council resolution 505 (1982), which was certainly very difficult to draft and which called upon the parties to cease hostilities. Then came the draft resolution submittt>,d by Panama and Spain,? which met with the determined veto of the representative of the United Kingdom because it ordered an immediate cease-fire. 114. As to the repeated disregard for the appeals of the competent bodies of the international COInmunity, suffice it to say that the British" Government did not even play by its own rules. Let us recall the tragic and treacherous sinking of the cruiser General Belgrano by a British submarine, very, very far from the exclusive zone illegally established by the armed forces from outside our continent., How many dead? How many defenceless victims fell outside the war zone? 115. The representative ,of the United Kingdom, in his statement in this debate [51st meeting], certainly convinced that we Latin Americans are stereotyped as being particularly emotional, gave us a moving story of his concern for the inhabitants ofthe Malvinas 116. In the case of the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone, such an anomaly did not come about because the Panamanian' claim, promoted and supported by the whole of Latin America, met with a sensibie and realistic response from a super-Power, the United States, whose interests, nationally speaking, of whatever kind in the Canal were far in excess of any British interests ift the South Atlantic. Let us remember also that the American public did indeed know where the Canal was to be found, whHe the British public discovered"the Malvinas in AprH 1982, In that month, British citizens discoven;~ that they were neighbours of Argentina and that Great Britain was also a Latin American COUf'ti}". 117. The cause of the lvialvinas is not the cause of the Argentine Government; the Argentine cause: is not the ca\!se ofthe Argentine cP"Posit;on, or ofArgentine military men or civilians, or of poLitical parlties, business or trade ~mion circles in Argentina. The cause of the Malvinas is the cause of the whole Argentine nation. 118. The cause of the Malvinas is not just that of the whole of the Argentine nation: it is the cause of the whole Latin American continent, a pioneer in the process ofdecolonization and a sanctuary ofpeace. Hence Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela jointly submitted draft resolution A/37/L.3/Rev.1. 119. It is a draft resolution which was moderate in its initial version and which became broader and even more moderate in its revised version becau.se we paid heed to and agreed to recommendations made in good faith by our friends from the five continents, and because it even took into account the peculiarities of the present political situation in the United Kingdom. It is a draft resolution which takes up the spirit and the language of previous resolutions of this body and even makes reference to Security Council resolution 502 (1982), which in spirit and in letter w~s a product of the British delegation. The draft resolution reflects the commitment of 20 Latin American States to the non-use of the threat or use of force in international relations and to the peaceful settlement of disputes between States. It calls for negotiations between the parties for a peaceful solution of the dispute over sovereignty and again asks for a mission of good offices on the p2rt of the Secretary-General. In no way does it require any country to make a judgement 122. I must admit to deep confusion as to the attitude ofthe British Government towards Latin America for the following reasons. The date of 12 October was chosen by the British author3ties to hold a military parade in the streets of London for the UVictory" in the Malvinas. That date is of special significance for Latin America. It symbolizes the Latin American identity in the coming together and mixing of histories, cultures, geographies and races. What we wonder today is how the "Foreign Office, with its mastery of sophisticated diplomacy, came to have overlooked that detail. Or did they perhaps want to give us some message? We received no message, just an insqlt. In his statement yesterday, the representative of the United Kingdom called into question the sincerity . and seriousness of the draft resolution. My delegation's response is to wonder whether the representative of the United Kingdom was indulging in rhetorical excess-more typical of Latin Americans, according to certain prejudiced views-or whether he or his Government is really asserting that the 20 Governments sponsoring the draft resolution are not serious and honest in their intentions and words. . 123. I would draw attention to the statements of the representative of the United Kingdom, who unilaterally condemns or censures 20 Latin American States and insinuates that they are acting in bad faith and with malice. We feel strongly about this, because this is the same kind of prejudiced reasoning that gave rise, to the decision to sink the General Belgrano. Or, remembering what was said by the Brntish representative, was that act also committed in application of natural law under divine inspiration? 124. In order to increase our confusion, the representath'e of the United Kingdom, at the beginning of his statement, hinted at a sort of declaration of love and preference for Argentina which almost gave rise to feelings of jealousy among the. other ,19 sponsors of the draft resolution. 125. As for the statements concerning the historical relations between Great Britain and Latin America, as far as Venezue)a is concerned 1can assure him that we appreciate tl~lem at their proper value and that in my country we have not forgotten the heroes who, under the colours of the British Legion, joined in the struggle for our indepel!dence. or the CODsequencesof our previous good··neighbourly relations. At the same time, there is no reason to question Vene zuela's good will in maintaining good relations with .the United Kingdom based on mutual advantage and respect, as )'s pro.p.er ~etween so.vere'ign States." and ~ between two demoCracies. " I . ~28. We ask the countries of the Group of Western European and other States not to choose betwe.en Argentina and the United Kingdom, but to support a broad and moderate draft resolution which does not deal with the substance of the issue. But we can say to them that no Government in Western Europe has the right to force other members of that Group to maintain and obstinately keep alive a situation of confrontation with Latin America against their individual national'interests. We ask them to support this draft resolution which will serve to strengthen the forces of moderation in the United Kingdom and to encourage the immense majority of Argentines who wish for peace and democracy. . 129. From the countries of Africa and Asia, which gained their independence.on the battlefields or around the negotiating tables and which have had Latin American support in the United Nations, all we ask is that they support this draft resolution calling for the beginning of negotiations to bring about a peaceful settlement of the dispute. 130. We ask the Scandinavian countries, which have always abstaim~d ori the question of the Malvinas and which have always also shown great interest in the problems of peace and in some Latin American issues, to think about this draft resolution, whose adoption would serve peace in Latin America. 131. To our sisters and neighbours, the Englishspeaking nations in the Caribbean, whose identity, concerns and recommendations we have deep respect for and have borne constantly in mind, we say that as we have all supported the declaration of the Caribbean as a zone of peace, we hope for their support, so that, through negotiations, the South Atlantic too may be a zone of peace. We ask for their support for the draft resolutioq, which ratifies the commitment of 20 Latin American States to the peaceful settlement,of international disputes. 132. Since 1965, the General Assembly has been urging the United Kingdom and Argentina to begin negotiations to settle the dispute concerning sovereignty over t~le Malvinas Islands. It can hardly be considered logical and consistent for the intern~­ tional community, in the very year when the dispute broke out into armed conflict, not to reaffirm its previous appeals. On the contrary, the beginning of negotiations between the parties would help to put the process of decolonization on the right course, with good prospects for the elimination of tension and the achievement of the proper result. Hence, to vote in favour of this draft resolution is to cast a vote of confidence in the Organization; to vote for the draft resolution is to vote for geace. 133. Mr. President, the Malvinas are Argentine. 134. M:r. DEL ROSARIO CEBALLOS (Dominican Republic) (interpretation from Spanish): Once again the General Assembly is considering the question of the Malvinas Islands, a matter of very deep concern to all Latin American, countries; and today we have 145. The draft resolution submitted by 20 Latin American countries should commend itself to the approval of the parties if they sincerely wish to find a definitive solution to their dispute. It proposes the most viable formula, because it advocates the resumption of talks between the Argentine and British Governments, which in this case may rely on the good offices of the Secretary-General. 146. It is, moreover, the position which the Haitian Government has always expressed vis-a-vis the Malvinas question, in which it became involved for historical and geographical reasons. 147. It wonld be superfluous to repeat other speakers' historical arguments in favour of the legitimacy of the Argentine po:;ition. An undeniable fact remains, that a dispute exists between the Government of Argentina and the Government of the United Kingdom over sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands. This is, moreover, the conclusion reached in 1964 by the Special Committee on decolonization and confirmed by the General Assembly in its resolution 2065 (XX). 148. While deeply regretting the material and human losses caused by the war in the South Atlantic, the international community also recalls the comments made in 1973 with such perspicacity by the General Assembly in its resolution 3160 (XXVIII), in which it emphasized with concern "the fact that eight years have elapsed since, the adoption of resolution 2065 (XX) without any substantial progress having been made in the negotiations". parti~s to undertake them in good will in their own interest as well as in the interest of peace and that of the whole international community. 160. The important role of the United Nations in solving this question cannot be overestimated. My delegation sees a strong need to request the Secretary-General to offer both sides his good offices again. The appropriate Assembly resolutions, namely, 1514 (XV), 2065 (XX), 3166 (XXVIII) and 31/49, as well as Security Council resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982), constitute, in fact, an infrastructure for fair negotiations and fair solutions. Only through dialogue and meaningful negotiations, under the auspices, one hopes, of the United Nations, can a lasting political settlement, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, be achieved. The revised draft resolution submitted by 20 Latin American countries offers such a possibility and that is why my delegation would be ready to support it.

The fact that, at the request of 20 Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Latin American countries, the General Assembly decided unanimously to consider the question of the Malvinas Islands as a separate item on the agenda of this thirtyseventh session is ample testimony to the concern of the entire international community over the situation prevailing in that region and its desire to find a definitiv~ and just solution to the long-standing sovereignty dispute over those Islands. 162. Seventeen years ago, t~~ General Assembly adopted resolution 2065 (XX), which explicitly recognized the existence of a sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas Islands between Argentina and the United Kingdom and invited the two parties to pursue without delay negotiations to find a peaceful solution to the problem while bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and General Ass'embly resolution 1514 (XV), which laid down that: "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the pur- 165. As we know, the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in 1976 at Colombo and the Sixth Conference, held in 1979 in Havana, as well as other ministerial meetings held at later dates, have consistently reaffirmed the position of firm solidarity of the nonaligned countries with Argentina in its efforts to put an end to the anachronistic colonial presence in the Malvinas Islands and prevent its restoration there. 166. Speaking on behalf of a non-aligned country which is faithful to the fundamental principles of the Movement and on behalf of a people which suffered so much under colonial and neo-colonial regimes and is still struggling at this time to obtain from the Chinese authorities the restoration of the Vietnamese Archipelago of Hoang-Sa-which is known on Western international maps as the Paracel Islands-illegally occupied by China since January 1974, the delegation of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam wishes to express its militant sympathy and total support for the people of Argentina in its just, heroic and resolute struggle to defend its independence and recover its sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, which are an integral part of the national territory of the Argentine Republic. 167. This sympathy and support on the part of Viet Nam for Argentina dates from the very first days when Argentina came to grips with the United Kingdom expeditionary forces. Indeed, as soon as news of the attacks by British air and naval forces against Argentine forces in various areas of the Malvinas Islands reached Viet Nam, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam made two statements-on 29 April 1982 and on 4 May 1982-reaffirming the consistent position of the Government and the people of Viet Nam which recognizes Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, as affirmed by the relevant resolutions adopted by the non-aligned countries and the United Nations. At the same time, after having vigorously condemned the warlike acts of aggression of the British authorities and denounced the complicity 173. This dangerous phenomenon was witnessed last spring in the most remote area of the South Atlantic, where well-known disagreements and a long-standing conflict between Argentina and Great Britain over the Malvinas Islands took a serious turn that led to the launching of overt armed aggression by British imperialism against the Argentine people. That aggression naturally elicited the justified concern and deep indignation of the Argentine people, the other peoples of Latin America and world public opinion, which immediately condemned the aggressive and warlike behaviour of Great Britain. 174. The dispute between Argentina and England is very old and very well known. The United Nations has considered it in the past. There is no doubt, nor has there been any doubt for a long time, that the case of the Malvinas Islands is a case of decolonization according to all the norms and criteria recognized and applied by the United Nations. Therefore, in this case there is a need to remove the vestiges of the colonial system that still exists in the Malvinas Islands. One of the main foundations of that hateful system has been and remains the policy and activities of British imperialism. The heart of the conflict between Argentina and England is the restoration of the national rights of Argentina and the sati~faction" of its legitimate demand to establish and exert its national sovereignty over a part of its own territory taken from it by force and occupied by an imperialist Power. When we are dealing with an affair of this sort, there is no purpose in attempting to complicate matters, as Great Britain is trying to do, for the true facts and the principles governing such cases are clear and leave no grounds for taking an ambiguous position. 175. The origin and cause of the armed conflict that broke out between Argentina and England in April and May of this year are to"be found in the constant and stubborn refusal of British imperialism to take into consideration and to satisfy the just demands ofArgentina, as well as in Britain' ~ perfidious manreuvres designed to make Argentina seem responsible "-ror the aggravation of the situation. The chronological order in which events, and the way in which the various episodes of the armed and diplomatic war, succeeded each other and were juxtaposed cannot change the origin of the conflict and the nature of its causes. No one has been or is able to provide sufficiently convincing arguments-they do not, in fact, exist-to refute the fact that the Malvinas Islands are, historically and geographically, part of the territory of Argentina and must be returned to that country. British imperialism continues, in spite of everything, along its basically erroneous course and, with twisted logic, seeks to prove the opposite. For a century and a half, ever since it drove the Argentines from the Islands by force, that imperialism has been trying to deny Argentina its undeniable right by advancing all kinds of fabricated and unfounded 180. The stand and the demands of Argentina are just, because the sovereignty of States and nations over the territories belonging to them historically and by right can never be lost or proscribed and, consequently, it cannot be denied by evoking the length of foreign occupation or agreements and treaties into which the imperialist Powers may have entered. Historically, England is one of the rapacious colonial Powers which not only has occupied and continues its occupation of territories belonging to others, but has also, if it felt like doing so, juggled with the frontiers and the sovereignty, of various peoples and nations and has dismembered and redistributed lands of other peoples among its clients and thosE. who agreed to become defenders and policemen. in the interests of British colonialism. London was the centre where secret and open treaties were drawn up to effect that type of despoliation. Even after the decline and collapse of its colonial empire, that imperialist Power deliberately left in existence several areas of dispute in relation to the borders or territories, which the super-Powers ar:.d the imperialist Powers now use to sow discord and provoke conflicts and local wars. People are well aware of the nature of the intentions and the methods of British imperialism and, consequently, nothing that the British imperialists can do by way of manreuvres and diplomatic pirouettes will deceive the peoples of the world and lead them to accept any justification for the aggression against Argentina. 181. Nothing can change the reality of the British aggression, whatever the various opinions expressed in certain circles concerning the circumstances created around the Malvinas Islands before the unleashing of military hostilities by Great Britain and despite the confusion which that country attempted to sow by propaganda and through its diplom~tic service, especially here at the United Nations, where it attempted to label its aggression self-defence and claimed to be acting in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and Security Council resolutions. 182. TJte armed conflict in tiie Malvinas Islands has resulted in a considerable worsening of the international situation and has occupied the attention of the world public and of States and Governm~nts. ~t has led ~o intense activity on the part of military strategists and politicians, military alliances and aggressive blocs. It has also provided an opportunity to test the value of treaties and pacifist slogans preached by the imperialists and the social-imperialists. 183. The peoples of the world and public opinion have condemned the E~glish aggression against Argentina as a very dangerous adventure imbued with the spirit of colonialism and a flagrant challenge to the· whole of Latin America. The peoples and countries of this region have demOl:strated their 187. The other British allies in NATO tried to excuse themselves for supporting the aggression against Argentina by referring to their alleged obligatory solidarity stemming from their participation in NATO, but the true reasons were the same as those of the United States, since this is not the first time that the major imperialist Powers, members of aggressive blocs, have united or shown solidarity in blockades and hostilities against other peoples. They took similar action during the war against the Korean people, the aggression against the Vietnamese people, the Suez Canal crisis, and so on. 188. The imperialist economic blockade against ArgeI!tina, organized to punish it for its resistance to British aggression, was truly an irony nffate. Those same countries which imposed that blockade have always been among the first to declare themselves opposed to the application of sanctions against the racists of southern Africa or the Israeli Zionists by claiming that, in principle, they are against that type of action. 193. Irrespective of the consequences of the Malvinas warfor Argentina, it is England that has emerged as the real loser, because it has been greatly discredited in the eyes of the world as an aggressive imperialist Power blindly committed to the preservation of the vestiges of its colonial system. Great Britain has also suffered enormous economic and military losses. This is an example of the fact that military adventures can be. very costly for imperialists and aggressors, even if the victim of the aggression is a smaller State. 194. The Socialist People's Republic of Albania has always supported and continues to support the right of Argentina to enjoy and exercise fully sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands. It has always condemned and continues to condemn the aggression ofthe British imperialists against Argentina and their arrogance in denying that country's legitimate rights and preventing a solut!on of the problem. We support the position of Argentina and its determination not to renounce its rights, and we are convinced that Great 196. The seeds of many already full-blown or as yet only incipient conflicts between countries and peoples were sown by the pitiless hand of the colonizers during the dark period of unlimited domination by the colonial empires, v:~ich rapaciously seized by force more and more lands, even in the far corners of the world. Among such dangerous consequences :)f the remnants of colonialism is the conflict over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), the origin of which is now very well known to the world public. Among the key facts of this entire history are the following. 197. Argentina possessed the Islands until 1833. In that year, they were seized by the British warship Clio and Argentine citizens were driven from the Islands. Since that time, there have been ceaseless efforts by the people of Argentina to restore their own historic, just position. The United Nations recognized the Islands to be a Non-Self-Governing Territory, and the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in resolution 1514 (XV), and, subsequently, resolutions 2065 (XX), 3160 (XXVIII) and 31/49, which were aimed at the decolonization of the Islands and called for negotiations between Great Britain and Argentina on that question. Great Britain's delay in starting negotiations showed that it openly aspired to maintain its own illegal domination over the islands. 198. An objectjve analysis of these and other circumstances leads to the only possible conclusion, namely, that responsib.ility for the situation in the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) is borne by Gre~) Britain, which for many years stubbornly opposed t!1e implementation of United Nations decisions on the decolonization of .the Islands and on the peaceful settlement of the dispute with Argentina over the future of the Islands. 199. At the very beginning of the current stage in the conflict, Great Britain, relying on armed force, sent an armada to the South Atlantic and began military action against Argentina. Moreover, Great Britain blocked efforts, including those of the Secretary-General, undertaken for the purpose of preventing armed conflict. The large-scale military action by British forces in the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), contrary to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and in conflict with the fundamental rules of international law, has created a threat to international peace and security. 200. The great concern of the world public over the conflict in the South Atlantic is undoubtedly shown by the fact that 66 delegations dealt with this question in the general debate at this session. Along with other delegations, the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic supports the just cause of Argentina with regard to the decolonization of the 204. The conflict and the subsequent action by Great Britain s's a member of NATO again visibly confirmed the aggressive policy of that bloc for the purposes of expanding its own military presence in more and more new regions of the world. This time it was the strategically important region of the South Atlantic. According to press communiques, work is going ahead full blast at the present time to transform -the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) into a major military base for Great Britain and NATO. 205. As was pointed out in this connection in the Buenos Aires Declaration, adopted in August of this year at an international conference held to discuss the sovereignty of Argentina over the Malvinas Islands, peace in the South Atlantic and in the entire world, the actions of the British armed forces, supported by the 'United States and other allies, have political, economic and military goals and are intended to establish on the Islands military bases for the control of the South Atlantic and to use the Islands as a strategic strongpoint or harbour for the exploitation of the natural resources on part of Argentina's 208. Those sanctions were imposed against Argentina, with rare unanimity, at a time when measures of crude economic pressure were being applied against Cuba, Poland, the Soviet Union and other countries, measures that were completely illegal in terms of international law, without any decision of the Security Council to justify them. Yet, at the same time, the United States and its allies were trying to avoid implementing the arms embargo against South Mrica called for by the Security Council and, here at the United Nations, were doing all they could to protect the aggressors in South Africa and Israel against sanctions and even giving them direct military, economic, financial and other support. In the absence of such support, the rights of the Palestinian people would have been restored long ago, Namibia's right to self-determination would have been ensured, and peace would have come to long-suffering southern Africa. 209. This is the real attitude of the imperialists towards decolonization, revealed not in their words but 'in their deeds. As we see it, the crisis in this Anglo-Argentine conflict has forced people to see things as they really are, which is as they should not be. 210. For those reasons, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR, together with other delegations, supports the draft resolution before the Assembly, which is a balanced, carefully thought-out text. In our view, it pursues the generally acceptable goal of resumption of negotiations between the parties to the conflict for the purpose of a rapid and peaceful solution to the dispute over the sovereignty of .the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). It also calls for a resumption of the good offices mission of the Secretary-General. The negotiations between Argentina and Great Britain on the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) are necessary to arrive 217. Thus, we believe that ways and means do exist at a political solution to a long drawn-out conflict. and that there are many examples for solving this dis- In this connect.4ln, there is some surprise over the. pute in accordance with the legitimate interests of all stubborn refusal of the United Kingdom, using all the parties involved, both those of Argentina and the sorts of far-fetched pretexts, to engage in such nego~ United Kingdom and those of the inhabitants of the tiations. A rejection of negotiations at this time cannot Falkland Islands (Malvinas), in accordance with the be justified, no matter how we assess the causes of letter and spirit of the Charter and the relevant resothe conflict. We hope that the draft resolution will lutions of the United Nations. not only be adopted but will also be implemented. 218 It . d d . h' h h h d I . was ID ee WIt ID t at context t at tee e- 211. Mr. KAMANDA wa KAMANDA (Zaire)(intergation of Zaire noted with great interest the formal pretation from French): As a non-9.ligned coun~~ ~ and assurances given by Argentina in April 1982 that it L:===o~s a:=::..W:l~ participate in negotiations, and its commit- 214. It is regrettable that the efforts and repeated appeals both of the Secretary-General and the Security Council were not heeded by the parties involved, in the interests of international peace and security. 215. According to the reasoning that led it to decolonize its possessions, the United Kingdom should have been able to approach this problem in a generous spirit, and with a serenity based on the many 'proofs of its willingness to decolonize, in order to adopt a position in accordance with the flow of history. 216. Argentina, for its part, should have been able te realize that failure to respect the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the nonuse of force, and the inevitable consequences are not likely to create favourable conditions for a negotiated settlement. Many peoples and nations of the world facing similar problems do not have the means to settle such disputes by force, even if they wished to do so, and the creation of such a dangerous precedent could be prejudicial not only to international relations but also to their own vital interests, because they would provide an opportunity or a facile pretext to the strongest nations to settle certain international disputes by the use of force, by scorning the principles of the Charter and the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation betw~ekl States. (XV)~ which states that "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations," to say that this extract applies not only to the colonial territories whose national unity and territorial integrity should not be violated at the time of their independence, but also to the independent countries which have made claims to certain territories under a colonial regime and which the~T wish to recover, especially since here Wf: have a Latin American territory governed by a Power that is not Latin American. But what really happened at the time of the independence of Argentina? 224. Should resolution 1514 (XV) be invoI~ed and, if so, can one discard the principle of self-determination which motivates decolonization and on which this resolution is based? 225. These are all questions which emphasize and highlight the complexity of the matter. But it is important to reply to these questions in order to know what the parties to the dispute really think of the nature of the dispute which divides them, in order better to understapd any draft resolution and to make i~ benefiting throughout the years from the experience and genius of many peoples of the earth who were not its authors; but this law is and remains one of the fundamental guarantee-:- of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and a safeguard of the identity of those who have not been able to gain justice by themselves-the small and mediumsize nations. 228. Situations deriving from the law of conquest do not all fall within the strict framework of decolonization, within the terms of resolution 1514 (XV), nor are they all necessarily just, and it is for this reason that the international community, through the United Nations, has set up rules and procedures aimed at resolving problems deriving from such situations. 229. International law and the principles contained in the Charter were conceived to govern and regulate relations between States, and not to crystallize situations of conflict. Thus, rightly or wrongly giving the impression that international law and SOU1~ of its principles might have been conceived and drafted to endorse ce-rtain situations deriving from conquest is not such as to appease those who feel that they have been profoundly injured; and it raises for some, interminable problems of interpretation which themselves give rise to conflict between nations. But it remains paradoxically true that this international law, even if imperfect, is, for nations and peoples who cannot obtain justice by themselves, one of the surest guarantees of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. 230. I should like to add that the principles of fairness and justice, apart from resolution 1514 (XV), by rebalancing the law which qnderlay the old order, and by ada[)ting it to new contingencies, should allow us to move towards a new political and economic international order by democratizing international relations. That is why, in this matter of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), common sense, realism and fairnes~ should also come to the assistance of legalism. These should be sufficient in themse1ves, apart from resolution 1514 (XV), to lay down the bases of a negotiatec settlement. 231. I have already spoken of the role of the United Kingdom in decolonization. Perhaps it 1l)1ight not be wrong to think: in consequence -that its problem here is not that of having to complete a process of decolonization, but undoubtedly that of having had its hand forced, militarily speaking, by a young nation of 233. Draft resolution A/3~/L.3/Rev.l contains one fact which is very clear and which must g~in the support of all, namely, the settlement of the dispute by peaceful means, by negoHations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. But at the same time, we'TI.ust be able to realize that? after the war of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), we find ourselves again in the General Ass.embly, hoping for a resumption and a continuation of the negot~ations to settle this dispute, because we una~imously recognize that the means used in April 1982 were unable to settle the problem. That is a facto 234. But if the draft resolution includes certain dimensions of the problem, in particular the nO:l-use of force, and taking hlto account the interests of the inhabitants of the Is! mds, with a view to restoring th(: whole problem to its historical context, nevertheless in our view it does pose a serious problem in the fIfth preambular p'lragraph when it mentions a de facto cessation of hostilities. Now, what does a de facto cessation of hostilities mean in this context? Does it mean that it was with extreme reluctance that the parties ceased hostilities and that, if necessary, hostilities or even war might resume? 235. Are we then to invite the General Assembly to s~ggest that the problem could be settled by the resumption of hostilities, when the Charter prohibits the use of force? Thus, here we have a concept, an idea-I think we all realize this-which belies the peaceful approach contained in that self-same draft resolution. 236. Furthermore, the sixth preambular paragraph states-and quite correctly so-that account must be taken of the interests of the population of the Islands, in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII). But operative paragraph 1 assigns a single task to the negotiations, a single purpose, namely, the trafisfer of sovereignty. At what particular point, then, would account be taken of the interests of the inhab~tants referred to in the preambular part, if they cannot even be discussed during the negotiations proposed? We, must be realistic. Th~s situation could hardly contribute to the creation of propitious conditions for a negotiated 'settlement of the problem as sought by the draft resolution. O~J~ of the countries of the area that haw: a3k~d that the matter b~ dealt with as a si?:pc.:ate item in tbe work of thi~ session of the General A~sembJy, ~4(;. For the same reason, my country wa:-J rl~t(.~r­ mined to be one of the sponsors of tbe d.~aft res'Illution subP1ia~dl to the nen~ral Assembly. Moreover, this very Assembly has cond.emned coknialtsm as a crime against humanity and h~s POir.tf~d out f,~'Aat aU Membt~r 3tates have 2L legal duty in co-operat~ b Pilt an end tQ it. 241. Therefon~, Bolivia's position is dear and firm; in view \}f the historic fr..;t of the right:s' of Argentine sove;;eignty ov~r the Malvim:s !:olandr, unt,11833, when they were t~ken bv force, giving rise to a (~ispute COllccffimg sovereignty with the United Kingdom which has lasted to the preseilt day, ',:ve should like to confirm the unquest~0nablerightorArgentine sovereignty over the Island.'>. In keeping with our traditional support for peace and moved by the tragic events of last April, we therefore believe that negotiations are essential i~'~ th~; se ....rch f . P", appropriate peaceful settiement. 242, This is a forum for the fight against colonialism. Latin America, which since the founding of the Organization has contributed tenaciously to the struggle to overcome this anachronistic form of domination, is not going to falter in its efforts to eliminate all vestiges of colonialism from the continent. 243.. In the case ofthe Malvinas, it is notjust a matter ofsolving the problem ofthe inhabitants of the Islands, thDugh that admittedly is a problem relevant to other cases of decolonization, as is the right tf' self-determination when put in its proper context. What we have here is a question of the restoration to Argentina of its territory th!lt was usurped from it in W33 by the use of force. 244. Many arguments have already been adduced in the Assembly on certain aspects of the problem, and I shall not dwell on them. However, we believe we have a duty to point out one thing that must be borne in mind when we vote on the draft resolution before us: we shall be taking a stand not only for th.e particular case before us, although it is vexyimportant, but for the great basic principle in the Charter th~ pl'iilH of '/~'-;W o~ flle common interest of tht.~ nnter- Argentina in the early part of the nineteenth ~entury. natiol'al comr>mnity, tho~\~ cons:derations transcend This turns out to be false. The major part of his the c«""nfines of any particular dispute or conflict. statement therefore falls to the ground, because it is WithC'u~ l;oncern for them, the entire fabric of interbased on an unsustainable premise. nation~l rehtions will be impaired. 255. A good half of the stat~ment of the Foreign 248. The tragic conflict of the Falkland Islands Minister was devoted to self-detf'rmination. It was (Malvinas) is not due to the failure of the United dismaying to discover that his p\.;;fpose was not to Nations. The United Nations did what it could; it reaffirm the fundamental importance of self-determiacted through the Security Council and through the nation. Instead, he developed a complex doctrine to well-prepared mediation efforts of the Secretaryshow that the Falkland Islands are a special exception General. The cause for failure lies elsewhere. It lies to this basic and universal principle. In a letter cirin the breach of the code of international conduct to culated on 20 October [A/37/553 and Corr.] and Add.] which nations have subscribed by signing the Charter and 2], Argentina even tries, although on the basis of of the United Nations and by promising to abide by no evidence at all, to persuade us into believing that it. It lies in either ignoring or not making full USt: of the Assembly has previously ruled out the applicability the capacity of the United Nations to act for the pe8ceof self-determination to the Falkland Islands. I have ful settlement of disputes before they erupt into armed dealt with this specious argument in a letter distribconflict, uted as document A/37/582 and do not propose to go 249. International events of this year, including the further into it now. conflict of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), have put 256. The repeated Argentine claims that the Genthe UnHed Nations collective security system to a eral Assembly has specifically excluded the right of harsh test. The action by the Security Council and the self-determination for the Falkland Islanders are not Secretary-General designed to uphold the principles true. They are not even credible. They throw doubt of the Charter and to promote peaceful settlement on the credibility of other Argentine statements. For of disputes have been of no avail. Considerations of instance, how genuine is their c~"c~m for the inpolitical expediency based on narrowly conceiv~d terests of the Falklanders? Anyone \. 310 listened to national interests have continued to erode the authonty the testimony in the Fourth Committee yesterday of the United Nations to the detriment of the inter- [12th meeting] will know that the Argentines aim to ests of the international community. The United set themselves up as the judges of what the inter- Nations cannot escape its inherent weaknesses, comests of the Falklanders are. Most people would think posed as it is of sovereign Member States with widely that the Falklanders would be the best judges of their ditTering ideological, political and cultural values. Ye!, own interests. unduly emphasizing those weaknesses weakens It 257. In his attempt to deny the Falkland Islanders' further. inherent right to self-determination, the Argentine 250. While recognizing this, we should do whatever Foreign Minister used two arguments, both untenable. can be done to enhance the authority of the United First, he attempted to perSlLtOe us that the Inter- Nations and its capacity to act for its primarj task of national Court of Justice itself had decided that the al~eady densely populated. 262. So much for the points that occupied a great deal of the statement of the Foreign Minister. What he failed te mention at all was Argentina's act of aggression in April of this year. Indeed, astonishingly, he actually referred to "Briti§h aggression". He went on to attack my Government for the establishment of a so-called military base in the Falkland Islands. The token size of the British garrison before the Argentine attack is known to all, as is its capture by vastly overwhelming Argentine forces on 2 April. Subsequent Argentine defiance.ofthe Security Council left the United Kingdom no alternative but to act in self-defence. The presence of a larger garrison now is solely a measure of self-detence against a continuing Argentine threat. We 10f"k forward to the day when a fundamental change of Argentine policy allows the garrison to be reduced. 263. Finally, one word about .." colonialism" and one word about the "sovereignty dispute"; both terms figure in the statement of the Foreign Minister. His assertion that "the basic assumption of the decolonization process is the denial of the sovereignty of colonial Powers over the Territories subject to that process" [51st meeting, para. 44] will be greeted with astonishment by this Assembly, which well understands that the basic accumption of the decolo- 265. The Foreign Minister made much of a joint communique agreed by his Government and· my own on 26 April 1977, and he was kind enough to have the full text circulated this morning [A/37/553/Add./, annex]. It can be seen that, far from supporting his assertian about the sovereignty dispute, the communique referred to negotiations on, inter alia, the following: future political relations, including sovereignty; issues affecting the future of the Islands; the establishment of a framework fOj Anglo-Argentine economic co-operation in the South Atlantic; a stable and prosperous and politically durable future for the Islands, and so on. The communique clearly recognizes the need to consult the Falkland Islanders during the cours~ of the negotiations. 266. What the Foreign Minister referred to as 17 years of fruitless negotiations were in fact on a quite different basis from that claimed by him and on a quite different basis from what Argentina now proposes in this draft resolution. Indeed, his point demonstrates very clearly what I said yesterday, namely, that Argentina sees only one possible end to the negotiations, that is, the transfer of sovereignty from the United Kingdom to Argentina. They do not envisage a real negotiation in which the end is not predetermined. Delegations will also wish to take note of the fact that, far from being fruitless, these negotiations led to a number of useful improvements in the conditions for the Islanders, all ofwhich were brutally interrupted and put to an end by the Argentine invasion in April of this year.

We are engaged in this debate in a serious attempt to implement the principles of the Charter of the United Nations by finding a peaceful and negotiated solution to the tragic conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). Our efforts to this end are not assisted by the attempt of the Soviet Union and its East German and Bulgarian clients to introduce extraneous propaganda charges unrelated to the issue at hand. True to its conspiratorial view of world events, the Soviet Union has abused this Hall today with allegations that the tragedy for which both countries paid so dearly was part of a NATO conspiracy to achieve a miHtary springboard in the South Atlantic. I submit that this interpretation is an insult to both the parties and to the nations of Latin America. 268. As my country learned through its extended efforts to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, the issues involved in this tragic dispute are real and of long standing. Let no one belittle them, least of all the Soviet Union, East Germany, Bulgaria and other clients, which played no role whatsoever in seeking to restore peace during the trying" days of that conflict. Their effort now, when we are gathered NOTES IS A/I021'l and Corr.I, annex, para. 87. 10 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports, 1975, p. 12. 11 Legal CO/lsequ'!/lces for States of the Coll1i/lued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) /lotwithstanding Security Cou/lcil Resolution 276 (/970), AdvisOlY Opi/lio/l, J.C.J. Reports, 1971, p. 16.