A/41/PV.65 General Assembly

Tuesday, Nov. 11, 1986 — Session 41, Meeting 65 — New York — UN Document ↗

14.  REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (a) NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE REPORT OF THE AGENCY (A/4l/517 and Corr.l) (b) DRAFI' RESOLUTION (A/41/L.32) The PFESIDENT: 'The Assembly will begin its consideration of agenda item 14, entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency". In this connection the Assembly has before it a note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Agency (A/41/517 and Corr.l) and a draft resolution contained in document A/4l/L.32. Before I call on the first speaker for this morning, I should like to propose that the list of speak~rs in the debate on this item be closed at 12 ~oon today. It was So decided.

I therefore reauest those representatives wishing to inscribe their names on the list to do so as soon as possible. I invite the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. B1ix, to present the report of the Agency for the year 1985. Mr. BLIX (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA»: Sir, it is a pleasure for me to deliver my statement under your presidency. The IAEA annual report for 1985, which is now b~~ore the General Assembly, gives an account of the work of the Agency for that year. My statement initiating this discussion gives me an opportunity to underline some trends and activities, to review events which have taken place this year and therefore are not covered in the report and, finally, to add some personal reflections on the wor.k of the Agency and on its role as a part of the united Nations system. This kind of introduction of the item on the agenda may be especially appropriate this yea.r, when the Chernobyl accident has prompted important new activities and developments in the field of nuclear safety and raised pUblic auestions concerning the role of nuclear power. I shall deal with the broader issues and their implications before touching on some of the detailed activities of the Agency. Six months ago the nuclear industry was able to point to some 4,000 power reactor years of operating experience without ~ single known fatal radiation accident or major environmental contamination. This record was tragically interrupted by the accident in the number 4 power reactor at Chernobyl. The accident prompted comprehensive Soviet measures to st~~ radioactive releases, to give medical care and to protect and decontaminate the environment. The destroyed reactor is now encased, and two undamaged units are again, after some technical modifications, in operation. Other countries in Europe took a variety of protective measures, and a series of actions was initiated at IAF~. Shortly after the accident, the Soviet union invited me and two of my collaborators to Moscow and Kiev. Following an extensive briefing we discussed with the Soviet authorities the acti~ns which could be taken within lAEA to enable all to learn from the accident and to consider the national and international nuclear safety measures which should be adopted. In May and June the IAEA Board of Governors decided on the actions that were to be undertaken immedidtely by the Agency. Among these actions was the convening in July and August of a governmental expert group at lAEA headquarters to draft two international conventions on early notification of a nuclear accident and on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency. Two consensus texts emerged from the four-week meeting and were adopted at a special session of the General Conference in September. The Conventiona have already been signed by some 60 States. The Convention on early nQtification in fact entered into force on 27 october 1986. Under this Convention, the parties undertake to report immediately any nuclear accident which may result in a ~ransboundary ~elease of radiological safety significance. In the spirit of the Convention, the So~iet Union immediately notified IAEA about the recent accident of its nuclear submarine in the Atlantic. Under the Convention on assistance, the parties unde~take to facilitate prompt assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency in order to minimize the consequences and to protect Ufe, property and the environment. Another action was a post-accident review meeting in Vienna in August with over 500 nuclear experts from all over the world pa~ticipating. A comprehensive and frank report was presented by Soviet experts and was discussed in a detailed and open manner. Against the backdrop of extensive media reporting which was not always accurate, it was of great value that this remarkable international expert analysis was able not only to explain the causes of the accident but also to reach more precise conclusions concerning the real dimensions of the accident. Some 30 persons have died of radiation - DQt several thousands as was widely reported. Of major medical interest wUI be follow-up studies on the longer term health consequences of low-level radiation - if, indeed, there are any such consequences. The contamination caused by the accident will make a substantial area of land and forest around the plant uninhabitable for some time, perhaps for several years, but certain areas are already decontaminated. The health effects of the radiation which spread to o~~er European countries appear not to be significant. However, contamination of land, in particular animal grazing areas, was significant in some regions, £~r instance in parts of Scandinavia. Many of the lessons learnt from the Chernobyl accident are specific to the RBMK type reaotor and are being acted upon by the SOviot Union. SOme lessons have a broader bearing, however. A consensus report summarizing the results of the expert meeting and adding recommendations for actions and programmes to strengthen ~uclear safety was prepared by an international group of eminent nuclear safety experts (INSAG). As a result of that report, inter alia, a considerably expanded nuclear safety programme for the Agency is to be considered by the Board of GOvernors of the Agency next month, and will commence in 1987. The special session of tbe lAEA General COnference to which I referred earlier was convened in september for the sole purpose of considering measures to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear safety and radiological protection. The consensus reached by the Conference on certain basic policy questions was significant, namely, that nuclear power will continue to be an important source of energy for social and eoonomic development, that each country is responsible for securing the highest level of safety, that there is soope for further international co-operation in nuolear safety, and that lAEA has the central role in encouraging and facilitating such co-operation. FOr the Agency, this is a great challenge and the expanded safety programme has been worked out to meet it. At this juncture, I should like to make some brief comments on the fundamental question which has been frequently heard this year, namely, whether- nuclear power entails unacceptable risks. The first point to make in this regard, I think, is that many Governments have already given a practical answer: today 15 per cent of the world's electricity is nuclear-generated. If this amount of electricity were to be generated by oil,' it would take something like the entire 1982 Saudi Arabian oil production to achieve it. And were it to be generated by coal, it would require the annual coal production of the United States. It has never been Nsintained that such a quantity of electricity can be generated without risk - whether by hydro, coal, oil, gas Ol' nuclear power stations - to merltion those sources that can make significant new contributions to the world's supply of electricity. In industrialized countries, the future choice of an energy source for electricity production will in most cases be limited to coal and nuclear. with coal, accidents in mines and transportation do take many lives, but the major anxiety is not about accidents. Rather it is about the environmental consequences of the burning of huge quantities of coal. Through the emission of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide, the burning of coal and oth~r fossil fuels causes damage to forests and lakes, and the carbon dioxide which inevitably results from its combustion contributes to the risk of a rise in the temperature of the earth's atmosphere, the so-called greenhouse effect. These harmful effects do not arise as a result of any accident, but through quite normal operations. As they are gradual processes, they do not attract our attention in the way a singular dramatic event, such as Chernobyl, does. Yet their collective impact on the sustainability of life on this planet is incomparably higher. I draw these conclusions from studies published by the Economic COmmission for Europe (ECE), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) • With nuclear power, the major anxiety lies with the risk of a large accident and with the radioactive waste that has to be isolated for a very long time. I think it is fair to say that, with the signficant exception of Chernobyl, the risks of nuclear ~lectricity generation to health and environment have remained precisely that - risks, while the daily and normal use of coal and oil to generate electricity have had the fdest serious environmental'consequences. My conclusion is that nuclear power through fission is a reality we shall continue to live with. It will help our transition from the oil era to another energy era, perhaps solar or fusion. No such new sources are around the cor.ner, however, for the large-scale additional electricity generation which the world will need to help raise standards of living and promote development. While it may be difficult for many people to accept the conclusion that the continued and expanded use of nuclear power is needed until some other technology can provide la~ge quantities of electricity at reasonable cost, no one will disagree with the conclusion that everything must be done further to improve nuclear safety and that this question has now acquired a much stronger international dimension. A radioactive cloud does not respect national boundaries; hence, the call for the establishment of an international nuclear safety regime ensuring a high degree of safety everywhere. The question of binding and uniform nuclear safety norms is complex, because nuclear reactors differ from one type to another and also because siting connitions vary. Nevertheless, it should be seriously considered whether some basic commoru safety principles could not be established and whether there could not be a greater measure of voluntary acceptance and implementation of the IAEA's existing comprehensive nuclear safety standards. A preliminary discussion of the matter was undertaken just last week by a group of government experts meeting in Vienna. While the question of the elaboration and adoption of some universally-valid nuclear safety principles will .require more intergovernmental reflection and consenaus-building, a number of mechanis~ which are already in existence within the Agency might be developed an~ used more extensively to foster nuclear safety and public confidence in it. 'l'hey have one thing in common: they build on an openness that enables Governments to learn from each others' experiences. One such mechanism which may be more extensively used is the operational Safety Review Teams (OSARTs). Under this programme, the Agency sends international teams of some 12-15 nuclear safety experts to review ..the operational safety of nuclear power plants at the request of national authorities. An OSART mission spends several weeks at the plant examining ana exchanging information and eventually prepares a report for the inviting authority. We have had some three or four of these missions per year in the last few years. They differ, of course, significantly from safeguards inspe~tions, which verify that peaceful nuclear installations are not ueed for military purposes, and have nothing to do with plant safety. In the case of safeguards, the State has legally accepted systematic inspection by the Agency. An OSART mission, on the other hand, is invited by the State on an ad hoc basis. More and more authorities, Gover.nments and plant owners are finding it useful to hear the views of a highly competent, international team on the ~perational safety of their nuclear plants. The reports of OSART missions may indeed also help to create confidence in the pUblic and between neighbouring States. We have already witnessed a spontaneous increase in the demand for OSARTs, and one can foresee arrangements under which they would develop from a sporadic, ad hoc activity to a DDre regular activity. The knowledge that both the ~ree Mile Island and the Chernobyl accidents were caused in large part by operator error has focused attention and discussion on the broader question of the manjmachine interface, and on the specific questions of design features to neutralize operator errors. As with any other technology, safety can always be further improved. COnstructors of nuclear reactors will continue to look for new technical devices which can offer good guarantees against off-site radioactive releases in case of accidents, and will continue to search for & next generation of highly standardized nuclear-power plants with inherent safety features. Design activities will take place within the respective countries, but results may be facilitated or speeded up by an international exchange of ideas and experience. International organizations are instruments for co-operation among Member States. In the nuclear field, these past few months have seen international co-operation at its best: GOvernments determined to reach concrete results, willing to make mutual concessions to achieve them, and making full use of the organi7.8tions they have etablished. All that is especially encouraging at a time of crisis in mUltilateral diplomacy in general and in international ins~itutions in particular. On that last point I should like to make a few comments, since the crisis at the united Nations has some direct consequences for working conditions in the IAEA. The United Nations has been urged to streamline ita adminietration, and the recommendations of the Group of High-level Intergovernmental Experts can be seen as an input into that process. It would not be appropriate for me to comment on those recommendations, but I feel obliged to convey to the General Assembly my complete support for the general concern voiced by the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) as regards the recommendations dealing with staff entitlements. As the ACC has pointed out, salaries for Professional and higher categories have remained unchanged for the past 11 years, subject to oost-of-living adjustments, and those adjastments have been frozen for the last two years, while pension entitlements have been the object of successive reductions in the past four years. The IAEA Professional staff, which in recent years has managed to administer an expanded programme despite a zero-growth budget, is naturally dismayed at being rewarded by an actual reduction in take-home pay over the last two years. I have received an increasing number of resignations from some of our most competent and long-serving staff, either because of the future impairment of pension rights or because of uncertainty about entitlements and conditions. As a technical organization which relies partly on a rotation of highly competent staff, we see this as a disturbing trend that makes attracting such staff more difficult. I share the fea~ of the ACC that "mediocrity will ultimately be the price of further reductions in staff entitlements". (A/41/763, para. 4) I trust that that is not the intention of either the Group of 18 or the General Assembly, whose wish instead is to revitalize the Organization. As the SecretarY-General has stated, "TO seek to solve the Organization's financial difficulties at the expense of staff entitlements would be extremely short-sighted and counter-productive". (A/4l/663, para. 9) I shall now return to the main theme of this statement. The high visibility of the Agency's activities in the field of nuclear safety this year should not lead to the erroneous conclusion that other areas of work have been de-emphasized. The Agency's entire programme has continued unabated and an approach has been maintained that seeks a balance between activities that are of interest and use to different member categories: industrialized countries and developing countriesJ countries with nuclear power and countries without nuclear power. In the area of nucl~ar power and its fuel cycle, the global contribution of nuclear-power units to total electricity-generating capacity in the world increased last year by 14 per cent. Nuclear power at present provides betwaen 40 and 70 per cent of the electricity i,n a growing number of countries or in large indust~ialized regions within countries. With better maintenance, management and attention to operator training, the performance of nuclear plants has improved in most countries. In Europe, for example, nuclear plants showed higher availabilities than their oil and coal-fired counterparts in all size categories. We must note, on the other hand, that a variety of constraints work against the nuclear-power option in many countries, and these vary considerably. In some industrialized countries, pUblic opposition, complicated regulatory procedures, high interest rates and policy uncertainties have acted as impediments. Por developing count~ies the high initial capital investment is just one of the many hurdles that must be overcome. Pollowing the requests that were made at the Third Review COnference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985 and at the subsequent Agency General COnference, a senior expert group was established to advise the Agency on mechanisms to assist developing countries in the promotion and financing of nuclear-power programmes. In addition to investment capital, a number of other important constraints are likely to be found working against the introduction of nuclear power in the developing countries - for instance, inadequate supply of I trained manpower, weak infrastructures, small electric-grid sizes, and absence of adequate industrial s~pport programmes. Some of the constraints I have mentioned (Mr. Blix, IAEA) might be overcome if medium-sized reactors of simpler design with more inherent safety were available at competitive pric~s. TO overcomp. other constraints - for instance relating to cadres - well-planned, long-term efforts would be required. FOr several years now experts all over the world, basing their findings on detailed studies and designs, have been convinced that no scientific or technological breakthough is needed to achieve safe high-level t~dioactive-waste disposal. However, a significant sector of public opi~ion in several countries is still concerned about nuclear waste. Although the construction of high-level waste repositories is not perceived - for good reasons - by the nuclear community as a technologically urgent issue, demonstrated solutions to waste disposal are clearly essential for increasing the public acceptabliity of nuclear power in many countries. As part of 11:s extensive programme in the area of waste management, the Agency is planning in 19~7 to initiate an interregional technical co-operation programme to advise developing countries on their long-term plans and strategies for the development and iL~lementation of low- and medium-level waste-management systems. That is by far the majar kind of waste in most developing countries. I turn now to some of the other practical applications of nuclear technology and their contribution to development. Progress has been made in building up a~d improving radiotherapy services in developing countries for the treatment and control of cancer. Isotope techniques are also increasingly being used in stUdying the characteristica of groundwater resources so crucial to areas affected by desertification. A regional project in the Sahel area is planned for 1987 to help identify tho~~ areas which receive groundwater recharge and those which do not. In this way an IAEA project contributes to the broader efforts of the united Nations (Mr. Bl!x, lAEA) system to assist those African countries affected by drought to clarifY the processes at work and find ways to reverse them. Radiation and radioisoto~ techniques are also being more frequently used to monitor, improve and protect the environmentJ to study pesticide and other chemical residues in soils and cropsJ to reduce unnecessary use of fertilizers, to monitor trace-element pollutants; and to preserve food without resorting to chemicals. Industrial applications of radiation are also attracting increased interest. Examples are the decontamination of animal food and the use of accelerators'for removing toxic gas from c08l- and oil-burning power plants. Those are some of the down-to-earth and practical applications of nuclear technology to human health, environment and development that the IAEA is helping to promote. On the subject of advanced scientific research, I am also happy to report that the International centre for Theoretical Physics at Trieste, which is run jointly by the United Nations Educational, SCientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the lAEA, is becoming more and more highly valued by scientists from all over the world. Its programme, which aims at fostering the growth of advanced studies and research capabilities in the developing world, has expanded rapidly. Nearly 3,000 physicists now visit the Centre annually to carry out research or take part in over 20 seminars, symposia or workshops organized each year. About 75 per cent of the man-months spent at the Centre are spent by scientists from developing countries. (Mr. Blix, IAEA) Although the IAEA has operated for several years now on a zero-growth bUdget, its Technical Co-operation Programme has been a notable exception. In 1985 $36.1 million was available for the financing of technical co-operation activities. There is a consensus among the membership of the Agency that the Technical Assistance ana Co-operation FUnd, which is financed fr~, voluntary contributions, should be increased ann~ally by 12 per cent over the next three years. This is an indication of the special importance attached to the Programme by Member states. The General Assembly, through its First Committee, devotes a good deal of its time each year to disarmament-related issues. verification, an issue on which many arm9 control agreements have stumbled, is now recognized by all as being a sine gua non for effective agreements. The lAEA'S safeguards system has been repeatedly referred to in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, as well as in other forums, as a unique experience in international on-site verification, which might serve as a model for the design of verification measures in future arms control agreements. That the experience of the Agency's safeguards system might be of relevance in arms control and disarmament contexts makes it even more important that the system function effectively and credibly, in reality as well as in perception. Conversely, should this first experiment in systematic international verification falter, it would be a setback for the prospects of nuclear-arms control and nuclear disarmament. The IAEA safeguards system is a service which the Agency provides to sovereign States to create confidence that they are complying with obligations they have assumed for the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear installations. There is no question of foreign intrusion on, or coercive infringement of, State sovereignty. States enter into agreements to accept lAEA safeguards because they perceive them (Hr. BUx, IAEA) to be, like many other international obligations, in their own national interest. This confidence-building function of the safeguards system has great practical significance, both globally and regionally. without safeguards, moreover, there would be very little nuclear trade, because suppliers insist on a verification that what they sell will not contribute to a nuclear-weapons capacity. During 1985, nearly 2,000 inspections were carried out at over 500 nuclear facilities all over the world. As in previous years, no anomaly was detected which would indicate the diversion of safeguarded nuclear material for military purposes. There is no doubt that the number of nuclear installations and the amount of nuclear material in the world will continue to increase, along with the knowledge and expertise to manufacture nuclear weapons. with determination and adequate resources, many states with a sufficiently well-developed industrial infrastructure would be able to manufacture them. Safeguards alone cannot prevent this, no matter how sophisticated they become. It is vital, therefore, that the rationale which originally led so many States to make treaty commitments renouncing nuclear weapons be maintained, and that conditions be created so that other States, too, will feel that the rationale applies to them. Such a prospect would be greatly enhanced by tangible progress in the field of nuclear disarmament and by the establishment of conditions of global and regional security and stability. In June this year the Agency concluded a first full-scope safeguards agreement with a State that is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Albania. Such a voluntary submission of all nuclear activities of a State to Agency safeguards is an option for a State that is not a party to the non-proliferation Treaty, but nevertheless wishes to submit all its nuclear activities to lAEA safeguards. Following the decision of China last year to submit certain of its peaceful nuclear activities to Agency safeguards, an Agency team went to Beijing in August for preliminary diseussion6. A draft voluntary offer agreement is now being prepared by the Agency for further discuss!~~ during the first half of 1987. After conclusion of this agreement the Agency will be applying safeguards in all nuclear-weapon states, albeit on a moderst scale. The Third Review COnference of the Par~1es to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons last year recommended the continued pursuit of the principle of the universal application of lAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuelear activities in all States, and recommended to this end further evaluation of the economic and practical possibility of extending the application of safeguards to additional civil facilities in nuclear-weapon states. While I can report that there has been some increased safeguards activity in nuclear-weapon States, I should also note that the increase has been very limited so far, because of financial restraints. On the question of safeguards in South Africa, I have, unfortunately, nothing positive to report. The situation with regard to the application of full-scope safeguards to all of South Africa's nuclear facilities has remained unchanged, and no response has yet been received to my requests for the initiation of a discussion on this issue. FUrthermore, the negotiations with south Africa on the application of safeguards to its semi-eommercial enrichment plant are at an impasse. Following my report on this question to the lAEA General Conference this year, a resolution was adopted which, inter alia, called upon all Member states which have not yet done so to halt all nuclear co-operation with south Africa, and requested the Agency's Board of Governors to consider recommending to the next session of the General Conference the suspension of South Africa from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership in accordance with the Statute of the Agency, if by that time South Africa has not complied with the relevant General Conference (Mr. BUx, lAEAJ resolutions and conducted itself in accordance with the purposes and principles of the united Nations Charter. The question of Israel's nuclear capability was also included in the agenda of the General COnference this year. At the conclusion of the discussion the Conference decided to adjourn the debate on this question, and no resolution was adopted. The question of protecting nuclear-power stations against terrorist and other attacks has attracted some public attention. I may note in this regard that the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, which has been concluded within the framework of the Agency, has already been ratified by 19 Member States. Only two more ratifications are needed for that COnvention to enter into force. I hope that they will come in the very near future. As the Assembly knows, the question of an international agreement prohibiting military att~cks on nuclear installations is still outstanding. The importance of reaching an agreement on this matter was rightly et-ressed by many States at the recent session of the IABA General COnference. Absence of such agreement and fear of such attacks may well contribute to the concerns many people feel about the development of nuclear power. I wish to conclude by recallin9 some of the lessons which we have learned this year and which we might do well to remember as we look to the future. Pirst, if nuclear power and other applications of nuclear energy are to continue to be used to contribute to human well-being and prosperity, all scenarios which affect its safe and peaceful uses should be scrutinized· in a comprehensive manner. These scenarios include diversion of nuclear materials for military purposes, armed attacks against nuclear installations, nuclear terrorism and serious nuclear . accidents. Effective measures on all these fronts are important to the world's use of atoms for peace. (Hr. Blix, lAM) Secondly, international rules and regulations must not lag behind the leaps made by science and technology. It is gratifying that notification procedures for nuclear accidents with possible transboundary effects have now been adopted. However, it would be better to regulate our technological achievements in advance rather than on a post-mo~~em basis. Thirdly, international organizations continue to perform an indispensable role in our turbulent world, despite criticisms directed against the United Nations and its system of organizations. Fourthly, in the computer, space and nuclear age, co-operation between nations is an absolute necessity to reduce the ri~K8 of our modGrn technologies. Above all, this co-oper~tion is required to avert the threat of the ~se of nuclear weapons. The international community must redouble its efforts to ensure non-proliferation, to end the nuclear-arms race and to work towards disarmament. The remarkable international solidarity and co-operation which we have witnessed in the wake of the Chernobyl accident is an example of how the worla can draw together and try to ensure that technology will be used safely and for the benefit of humankind.
I call on the representative of Pakiatan to introd~ce draft resolution A/41/L.32. (Hr. 81ix" lOA) Mr. AGBA (pakistan): Twenty-nine years ago, we made a pledge to carry out the main objective3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world and to ensure so far as it is able that assistance provided by it, or at its request or under its supervision or control, is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. The development and application of nuclear energy for peacefUl purposes has since been recognized internationally a6 the most vi~ble recourse in the face of the fast depleting fossil energy resources. The lAEA has thus assumed a catalytic role in the socio-economic development of our countries. Pakistan takes pride in its long association with the work of the IAEA and like many other developing countries has greatly benefited from the co-operation, support and expertise in elaborating its nuclear-power generation programme in the country. We are most gratified that at its General Conference in September this year, Pakistan was unanimously elected Chairman of the Board of Governors of the IAEA. I wish to take this opportunity to express our appreciation and thanks to Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the lAEA for his valuable contribution in promoting the Agency's objectives. The Pakistan delegation wishes him success in carrying out his important functions and assures him of our full co-operation. I need not dwell on all the aspects of the annual report of the lAEA which was the subject of a detailed discussion during the General Conference in Vienna, where my delegation had the occasion to express its views on the various activities of the Agency. It is a matter of great satisfaction to my delegation that the Technical Assistance Programme of the IAEA has continued to receive necessary attention in the Agency's activities. The Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund again accounted for the largest share of technical co-operation resources increasing by 13 per cent over the previous year's level. The technical co-operation programmes maintained o~erall emphasis on agriQulture, nuclear engineering and technology, industry and hydrology, safety and nuclear physics. In the field of nuclear powor, the Agency's activities were aimed at helping developing countries to assess the role appropriate for nuclear power within their national ene~gy plans. During 1985, the total installed nuclear power capacity in the world increased by 14 per cent. The nuclear ~hare in electricity generation varies greatly from country to country and also from region to region. If this growth rate is maintained the world-wide nuclear power capacity is expected to be around 370 GW (e) by 1990, with a contribution of 20 per cent to the world's electrical energy supply. The obvious conclusion that can be d~awn from this projection is that the Agency should expand further its programme aimed at providing assistance for the development of nuclear power. Regarding the other aspects of the Agency's activities, namely the safeguards system, it should be noted that the Agency did not detect any anomaly which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or for any other military purpose. The nuclear material under Agency safeguards in 1985 remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adeauately accounted for. At the same time, we cannot disregard the limitations of the Agency in the field of safeguards. The IAEA is not an intelligence gathering agency and its functions remain confined to such installations and facilities which are covered by the IAEA safeguards. The Agency is neither eauipped nor competent to deal with tasks beyond this responsibility. The development of nuclear energy and international co-operation in this field are the indispensable elements in our efforts to restore equilibrium in world economic relations by fostering development of the developing countries. The clear recognition by the international community for affirmative action in this direction is contained in the General Assembly resolution 32/50 which was adopted by consensus. In this resolution, the international community affirmed that: ~All States have the right, in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality, to develop their programme for the peaceful use of nuclear technology for economic and social development in conformity wi;;h their priorities, interests and needs·, (2!ra. lj SUb-para. (b» The resolution also stated: ilAll States, without discrimination, should have access to and should be freed to acquire nuclear technology, eqUipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy·, (sub-para. (c» In pursuance of the broad objectives identified in the aforementioned resolution of the General Assembly, it was decided to convene, next year, the united Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. We look forward to the elaboration and adoption by this Conference of an action-oriented plan for the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful application of nuclear technology. The lAEA, as the lead agency in the United Nations system in this field has a special responsibility in contributing to the preparatory process now underway in Vienna and for ensuring its successful outcome. My delegation would like to commend the lAEA for its recent speedy responses and initiatives in the field of nuclear safety, in co-operation with its member States and with other international organizations concerned, and for its timely and expeditious efforts in the conclusion of two conventions on early notification of nuclear accidents and on emergency assistance in the event of such accidents. While appreciating the emphasis placed by the IAEA on nuclear safety issues, we feel that any concerns in this respect should not be allOWed to inhibit effective international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. On the (Mr. Agha, pakistan) other hand, th9 increasad concern for nuclear safety underscores the need for having a more rational, equitable and non-dise~iminatory regime covering the various aspects of internation~l co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Pakistan has endeavoured to promote an international agreement prohibiting attacks against all nuclear facilities. Such an agreement could further reinforce measures for nuclear safety. Allow me now in Pakistan's capacity as Chairman of the Board of GoveLnors of the lAEA to introduce draft resolution entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency contained in document A/4l/L.32 on behalf of canada, Czechoslovakia and Pakistan. This draft resolution has been evolved after close consultations both in Vienna and New York. The draft resolution follows to a large extent the format and the text of the earlier resolutions adopted at the General Assembly under this item with some additions to reflect the recent activities of the IAEA on nuclear safety both in the preambular and in the operative parts. The reference in the last preambular paragraph of the draft resolution is to two resolutions adopted at the first special session in September this year. In the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly is requested to take note of the Report of the IAEA and affirm its confidence in the role of this Agency for the application of nuclear energy for pe~ceful purposes. In operative paragraph 3, the draft resolution: ·Urges all States to strive for effective and harmonious international co-operation in carrying out the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, pursuant to its Statute, in promoting the use of nuclear energy and the application of the necessary measures to strengthen further the safety of nuclear installations and to minimize risks to health, in strengthening technical assistance and co-operation for developing countries, and ~r. ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system,·' (Hr. Agha, pakistan) Since several States have already signed the convention concerning nuclear safety, it would only be appropriate for the General Assembly to welcome this development and to call upon those states that have not done so, to become party to these conventions as soon as possible. This is .reflected in paragraph 4 of the draft resolution. Operative paragraph 5 request~ the Secretary-General to transmit to the Director-General of IAEA the records of the forty-first session of the General Assembly relating to the Agency's activities. We are confident that, in keeping with our previous traditions, as well as in view of the importance of the subject-matter of this draft resolution, the General Assembly will adopt it by consensus. Mr. FLORIN (German Democratic Republic) (interpretation from RuSsian): The delegation of the German Democratic Republic listened with great interest to the statement made by Mr. Blix, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in which he presented the report of the Agency for 1985. I must say that we greatly appreciate Mr. Blix's work. The report gives a clear picture of the many different types of lAEA's activities and testifies to its role as a reliable instrument in the development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while also ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons& Nuclear power opens up for mankind grandiose prospects for solving raw material and fuel problems - a decisive pre-condition for which is that the atom must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The tragic events in Chernobyl and accidents at other nuclear power plants have shown how dangerous the consequences can be if the peaceful atom gets out of control, and how much greater the danger would be if even a small proportion of stockpiled nuclear arsenals were brought into action. In the opinion of the German Democratic Republic, therefore, all countries must immediately combine their efforts to achieve comprehensive nuclear safety. That implies, first of all, ending the arms race and embarking upon the path of disarmament until nuclear weapons have been completely eliminated; and, secondly, ensuring the safe development of nuclear power. We welcome the fact that the USSR, in its programmes for the complete elimination of nuclear weapohs and for the safe development of nuclear power, which were presented this year, has gi'lTen a comprehensive ?icture of both aspects of nuclear safety. These proposals enjoy the support of the German Democratic, Republic. There is no doubt that war involving the use of nuclear weapons would lead to the disappearance of life on earth. The preservation of human civilization is the task of all States. It demands a new approach to international safety. To this end, the socialist States have presented this meeting with comprehensive ideas. Their implementation would decisively improve the general pre-conditions for the peaceful use of nuclear power, ~nd in the final analyais would ensure'that nuclear power was used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The German Democratic Republic considers that the following measurec are particularly important: a comprehensive nuclear-test ban; strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation system, conunitment to a policy of non-first-use of nuclear weapons by States which have not yet done sOJ the gradual reduction of nuclear weapons, up to and including their complete elimination; and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Through its repeated extensions of a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, the Soviet union has given an example to all and th~~eby has emphasized its unswerving will to achieve progress in limiting nuclear weapons and in the matter of disarmament. prospects for a comprehensive nucle~r-test ban would be significantly improved if the united States were to associate itself with this moratorium. The past year was marked by a number of international actions in tIle peaceful development of nuclear power. An extremely important event was undoubtedly the first special session of the General COnference of lAEA. The Conventions approved th~re with regard to early notification and assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or a radiation emergency, and the confirmation of the conclusions of the meeting of experts on nuclear accidents, all play. an important role in the further work of lAEA and are also of great significance for inter-State relations. The German Democratic Republic, as was stated by the Chairman of its state Council and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist tJn~ty Party of Germany, Erich Honecker, on 15 September of this year, regards such conferences of lAEA experts and their work on international conventions, as: Wa way of increasing the safety of nuclear power plants and mastering complex technologies for the good of mankind-. The results of the special session showed that, given the necessary political will and a realistic approach by all parties, complicated problems can be solved in a short time as well. Thanks to its efficient and rational method of work, lAEA, as the most competent international organization in this field, contributed to the speedy drafting of both those Conventions. As Chairman of the Working Group on drafting the Convention on assistance, and also as Chairman of the General Committee of the special session, the German Democratic Republic actively assisted in finalizing the Conventions. Like many other countries, the German Democratic Republic brought those important agreements into force even before they were ratified. The Apeeial session of IAEA convincingly demonstrated the aspirations of the overWhelming majority of States to continue programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear power while at the same time increasing nuclear safety. In the opinion of the German Democratic Republic, the task now is to be guided by both conventions and resolutely move along the path which has been laid. The Soviet union's programme on the matter of actions to be taken enjoys the German Democratic Republic's full support. '!'he implementation of that programme demands the close co-operation of all countries, so that in the interest of all peoples we can create the material, scientific and technological bases and the relevant internationa legal nOlms and agreements for the safe development of nuclear power. The German Democratic RepUblic is ready for that. An important aspect of the safe development of nuclear power is the prevention of the deliberate destruction of nuclear power plants, experimental reactors and other such installations. Therefore, we should draft as quickly as possible an international convention banning attacks on nuclear-power installations. The German Democratic Repua'lc considers the lAEA's monitoring activities to be a politically important func'i::":"~n. By doing those things> the orgar,i2ation promotes to a significant extent insurance against the spread of nuclear weapons. Again, in its report for this year, the lAEA was able to note that the nuclear material under its control "remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for". (A/4l/Sl7, para., 333) The German Democratic Republic will continue to support the lAEA in improving monitoring measures, that especially applies to the training courses for new inspectors. An important area for further increasing the effectiveness of this monitoring system could be a comprehensive monitoring of the nuclear cycle, that is, full-scope safeguards, in those countries which have still not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Therefore we pay tribute to the conclusion of an agreeaent on monitoring between the lAM and the People's Republic of Albania. Monitoring specific nuclear actions in states which possess nuclear weapons undoubtedly serves to strengthen international trust and bring about further development in the lAM monitoring system. We welcome the readiness of the People's Republic of China to conclude the relevant agreements with the lAEA and wish the negotiatioo,'I that have begun every success. We agree with what was said by the Director General of lAEA, namely, that the experience accumulated by the Agency thus far: in monitoring activities could be of great interest for other disarmament areas. What I am talking about primarily is the ~,r:;. of that experience in the process of eliminating nuclear weapons in acc~?~~nce with the proposals published by the Soviet Union on 15 January of this year. The German Democratic Repub~ic attaches great significance to the physical prot~ction of nuclear installations and fissionable materials. My country demonstrated that by joining in the relevant international Convention and enacting a new law on atomic energy in 1983. FOr the safe development of nuclear power it would be useful if the Convention were to enter into force as quickly as possible. Therefore the German Democratic Republic joins the appeal addressed to all countries whieh have so far not joined the Convention to do so as quickly as possible. The German Democratic RepUblic is doing everything in its power to promote the implementation of the lAEA programme on technical assistance. In addition to providing equipment and materials, my country is giving great attention to the training of scientists from the developing countries, sending experts from the German Democratic Republic to those countries, holding training courses in the German Democratic Republic, and.providing scholarships. In aceordance with a long-term agreed upon enhancement and inCrease of contdbutions to the Technical Assistance Programme, the German Democratic Republic has confirmed its contribution for 1987. Moreover, in so doing we wish to emphasize that the principle of voluntary participation and payment in national currencies have put the Technical Assistance !'Und on a reliable regularized basis. In conclusion, allow me to note that the German Democratic Republic is giving great attention to the activities of the IAEA in ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, assisting international co-operation in the peaceful use and safe development of nuclear power. The German Democratic Republic will continue to support the Agency in carrying out those important tasks. Mr. TEMERBAEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation has studied with great interest and satisfaction the 1985 report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) submitted to the General ASsembly for its consideration. We have also studied with great interest and satisfaction today's statement by the Agency's Director General, Mr. Rans B1ix, and join those delegations which have given a positive assessment of IAEA's activities. We ezpress special thanks to Mr. B1ix for his great pers~na1 contribution to the Agency's activities and to the Agency's staff members for their productive and effective work. The Soviet Union consistently supports the activities of the IAEA, that unique international organization which plays an imPOftant role in ensuring the non~proliferationof nuclear weapons, the development of co-operation among States in the peaceful use of atomic energy, and strengthening the system for the safe development of nuclear power. Next year we shall celebrate the thirtieth annivers~ry of the Agency's establishment - the only agency in the ~~r1d which is an intergovernmental body on matters of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In carrying out programmes in a broad area of the application of the nuclear atom for constructive purposes, the IABA encompasses in essence the full spectrum of the development of nuclear power and its fuel cycle, including sa.fety problems. It also gives broad assistance to the developing countries in this area. The realities of the nuclear space age have placed before the lAEA new massive tasks in the areas of the peaceful mastery of atomic energy and prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. This makes it urgently necessary for the role of the Agency as an acknowledged co-ordinator of the joint efforts of States in this area to be enhanced. The task of ensuring the peaceful uses of atomic energy is inextricably bound up with the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the world. There is not, nor can there be, any guarantee against tragic mistakes that could be linked with atomic war. The only reliable "insurance policy· for mankind against mutual destruction is complete nuclear disarmament. In a histotic statement made by Mikhail GOrbachev on 15 January this year, a concrete and realistic programme was put forward for eliminating nuclear weapons from the world and freeing the Earth from nuclear weapons by the end of this century. The complete elimination of the nuclear threat is realistic and possible. That could be seen from the Soviet-American high-level meeting at Reykjavik, as a result of which it was possible to move to qualitatively new areas in the fight against nuclear weapons. The Soviet Administration put forward at that meeting far-reaching interlinked proposals whinh took into account the interests of both States and of all countries. Those proposals constitute an integrated programme. We hope that the United States will show the necessary political will and reality and in its practical actions will be guided by the axiom of international relations in our era, which is summed up in the simple words "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought" (A/40/l070, p. 3). The International Atomic Energy Agency has been called upon to makes its own worthy contribution to solving the nuclear problem and promoting the establishment of the necessary conditions for 'truly broad international co-operation in the area of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. A special place in the activities of the Agency, in accordance with its charter, should be given to the monitoring of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and a steady improvement 1n the safeguards system. 'Ibe SOviet union has consistently advocated the comprehensive strengthening of the non-proliferation system and attaches great significance to the universalization of the Treaty and to increasing the number of parties to it, which already exceeds 130. The successful conclusion of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in which the lAEA played an active part, was of great significance with regard to further efforts to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The lAEA has been called upon to fulfil the extremely important function of monitoring compliance with their obligations by the parties to the Treaty. It seems to us that the efforts of the Agency should be directed primarily to enhancing the effectiveness of the monitoring system in the so-called near-nuclear countries, especially those that have not yet acceded to the Treaty. Unfortunately we must note that the South African authorities - as we were informed this morning by Mr. Bans Blix - are persisting in their stubborn efforts to avoid control by the Agency~ The Soviet Union feels that the lAEA safeguards system is a possible prototype for exercising control in the area of limiting armaments and of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. We note with great satisfaction that the Director General of lAEA, Mr. Blix, also takes that approach. As part of the programme of scientific and technical support for the safeguar.ds system of the lAEA, the Soviet Union has constantly expanded its participation in the technical assistance activities of the Agency in connection with further enhancing the effectiveness of its safeguards. Finance for programmes in that area from 1986 to 1988 increased more than two-fold and now amounts to 5 million roubles. Moreover, the Soviet Union has made Cl special contribution of 330,000 roubles to finence IAEA activities carried out in the Soviet Union as part I of its programme. We support the activities of the IAEA in such programmes as the International Nuclear Inforluation Service (IRIS) and co-operate in the IAEA programmes, with regard to nuclear data, nuclear energy and its fuel cycle, and so on. The Soviet union actively supports the Agency's activities in the area of controlled thermoriuclear fusion, which in the future could be an inexhaustible supply of energy. The SOviet Union has constantly increased its participation in programmes of technical assistance carried out by t~e Agency. In 1987 our voluntary contribution to the IAEA Technical ASsistance and CO-operation Fund will be increased to SUS 3,434,000 in national currency. The Soviet Union is firmly convinced that at the present time there is no alternative to nuclear power. However, it should be developed in conditions of maximum safety for people and for the environment. The accident: at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and accidents at other nuclear power plants are overwhelming testimony to the need for broad international co-operation and joint efforts by States in ensuring nuclear safety in the full sense of the word. By the same token we note with satisfaction that as a result of collective efforts within the IAEA it was possible to draft and adopt tWQ important international conventions in a short space of time: the Conventions on early notification of a nuclear accident and on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency. Those Conventions, which are intended to unite for decades to come the efforts of many States in ensuring the safety of nuclear power 'installations, provide a firm foundation f@, an integrated programme for the reliable, safe development of nuclear power. The Soviet union participated most actively in the drafting of those documents. 'l'be Soviet Union, which was among the first to sign the Conventions, stated that it would apply them from the moment of signing. TO date, more than 60 States have acceded to the COnventions-and it is our hope that the number of participants will expand world-wide. We share the belief of other countries that it is necessary to give prompt warning about nuclear incidents, including those which may be linked with military installations and nuclear testing_ (Hr. Timerbaev, USSR) The desire to bring about broad international co-operation in preventing and eliminating nuclear power plant accidents is at the root of the programme for the establishment of an international regime for the safe development of nuclear power, put forward by the USSR for consideration at the last regular session of the General Conference of lAEA which has also been distributed as united Nations document A/4l/652. The Soviet programme provides for the establishment of a material scientific and technical basis for the safe development of nuclear energy, which would be further supplemented by international legal norms and agreements. The programme involves a series of practica1 measures, including the establishment in the near future of a system for early notification of accidents and problems in nuclear power plants when accompanied by a transboundary threat. It also involves the establishment, as a component of the international system for the safe development of nuclear energy, of an effective mechanism for giving assistance in the event of dangerous situations arising, achieving agreement that all countries in their nuclear activities will operate on the basis of the recommendations drawn up by IAEA with regard to ensuring the safety of nuclear installations. OUr programme contains a reference to the collection, processing and exchange of information on nuclear accidents and their causes, evolution and consequences. It involves also a joint project or joint projects for new-generation reactor systems of both the thermal and the fast-neutron type. Another element of our programme is the development of a safety system for preventing attacks against nuclear installations and the completion of the preparation of an international convention on the subject. Similarly, a reliable system should be worked out with regard to nuclear terrorism. Finally, the programme provides for the rapid entry into force of the convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which, .:IS Mr. Blix told us today, 19 countries have already signed. We hope that those countries that have not yet ratified the COnvention will complete the ratification process as soon as possible so that it can enter into force in the near future. Our programme provides, furthermore, for the drafting of a multilateral legal instrument on liability for nuclear damage and enhancement of lAEA's role in strengthening the system for the safe development of nuclear power. A substantial contribution in this important matter could also be made by such bodies as the WOrld Health Organization, the united Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Scientific committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the United Nations Educational, SCientific and Cultural Organization. In a word, the development of nuclear missile technology makes new and greater demands on the united Nations and its specialized organs and agencies the fulfilment of which requires the mobilization of all available resources. In conclusion, we are convinced that IAEA and other international organizations will continue to work in every way possible to ensure that the energy of the atom is used exclusively for peaceful purposes for the good of all mankind. Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): The activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as reflected in the annual report for 1985 clearly demonstrate the importance of that organization. As we see it, the three main functions of the organization remain the following: first, the promotion of peaceful uses of atomic energy through co-operation in the fields of research, technology, information exchange and technical assistance, with special attention to the needs of developing countriesJ secondly, the elaboration of ways and means to ensure the (Mr. '.l'imerbaev, USSR) safety of all these activities, as already provided for in the programme of the AgencYJ and, last but not least, the safeguarding of the peaceful aims of nuclear energy applications, as prescribed by the statute of the Agency, especially since the time when the Agency was entrusted with the task of monitoring and verifying implementation of, and adherence to, the non-proliferation regime. Hungary, being committed to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, strongly supports the Agency's activities. For more than 30 years we have been applying various nuclear technologies for both research and energy production purposes and have found them useful and in many cases irreplaceable. As a matter of fact Hungary, being poorly endowed with conventional energy resources, found itself obliged to turn to nuclear energy, and began the construction of its first nuclear-power station - 4 1,760-megawatt, four-block plant - at Paks in the mid-l970s. In 1985 the first two reactor units at the Paks nuclear power station already accounted for nearly 25 per cent of electric energy production in Hungary. The third block was connected to the power grid for the first time only a few weeks ago. That, together with the two other blocks, will enable the power station to supply one third of the total domestic electric power by next year. The fourth block, also with a 440~megawatt capacity, is to begin operation in 1987 or 1988. Plans call for the construction of two additional blocks in the 1990s, each with an output of 1,000 megawatts. In constructing the power station special attention was devoted to safety auestions to ensure the fail-safe operation of the plant. Particular attention was given to the prevention of radiation hazard. One fifth of the roughly 100 billion forints invested in the four blocks will be allotted to safety facilities. In addition to the multilayered safety hardware, there are 21 measurement stations set up within a 30-kilometre zone, and samples are taken at over 100 points. But I (Mr. Meiszter, Hungary) would like tc) underline what 8eems to us to be even more important, that during the whole construction period a,0 well as during the operational phase exceptional attention was devoted, and i't continues to be devoted, to high professional qualifications and - if the expression may be used - the danger-awareness of operators and all plant personnel.. We highly appreciate the Agency's activities in this field, which help us in more than one way. The nuclear accident at Chernobyl, which caused very serious material damage, not to speak of the tragic human losses, and the possibility of similar accidents in the future called for immediate measures to ensure the safe use" of nuclear energy. Though the search for complementary sources of energy, especially in the field of the so-called renewable energy sources, is going on in a more expedient way than before, it is more and more evident that an increased use of nuclear energy will become a necessity in the decades to come. It is this reality that determines the need for enhanced nuclear safety. This is the domain par excellence where the search for solutions cannot be confined to national boundaries. In this respect, the International Atomic Energy Agency is undoubtedly the most appropriate forum for seeking the best solu~ions and it is the most competent institution to adopt direct measures in this area, which will also, of course, have certain inevitable organizational and material implications. The competent organs of the united Nations and its specialized agencies should also become involved, as in fact they have already started to do, in the search for a Solution,pf these urgent and important tasks. Bearing in mind such concerns, last June an initiative, also falling within the competence of the Agency, was launched from the capital of my country. In that initiative the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty member States voiced their opinion that the role of international organizations, such as the Agency, the united Nations and its specialized agencies, should be increased in the establishment of an international nuclear energy safety development system. In this respect, my delegation is gratified to note that a number of positive developments have tak,-en , place since that time and realistic and viable solutions have been found to a number of issues, such as early notification and mut~al assistance in the case of nuclear accidents. The special session and the thirtieth regular session of the International Atomic Energy Agency have provided evidence that the member States of the Agency are determined to co-operate in guaranteeing the safety of the expanding use of atomic energy. My Government highly appreciates and attaches great political significance to the speedy el~boration and approval by the Agency of two major international conventions on nuclear safety, namely, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. We sincerely hope that an increasing number of united Nations Member States not members of the Agency will become parties to the two conventions signed at the special session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Hungary, for its part, will do its utmost to complete the process of ratification of the two conventions without delay. We should like to draw attention to another important agreement, namely, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Agency has repeatedly underscored the importance of this Convention. As we have heard today, 19 States out of the 21 needed for the Convention to enter into force have deposited the instruments of ratification. My Government would be pleased to see action taken by the signatory States to this effect. The events of recent months were a strong reminder of the extent of our responsibility, which some groups concerned with the future of mankind express very succinctly: there is but one Earth. We can serve the preservation of this planet by using nuclear power to replace other sources of energy which in the long run are far more destructive to our environment. But we can do so only by ensuring that this power remains safe, and by making every effort to prevent and suppress any possibility of its military application. Mr. BIERRING (Denmark): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the five Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, and should like to make the following statement on the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). (Mr. Meiszter, Hungary) First of all, the Nordic delegations wish to commend the Agency for the efficient way in which it has carried out its tasks both during 1985 and this year 0 We should also like to reiterate our full support to the ~ and its Director General, Mr. Bans Blix. Our comments on the work of the IAEA will this time be less related to the report on activities in 1985 and focus instead on the impact of recent events. The efforts undertaken in the wake of the accident at Chernobyl in April 1986 have dramatically demonstrated both the need for intensified international co-operation with regard to the safety of nuclear installations and the capacity of the international community to deal with this challenge in the framework of the !AEA. It is, indeed, remarkable that it has been possible within a very short time this year to launch an expanded programme for nuclear safety and agree on two ~rtant conventions dealing respectively with early notification and with emergency assistance in the case of nuclear accidents. The Nordic countries were among the more than 50 States that signed the conventions at tbe special session of the IAEA General Conference in September in Vienna. They have furthermore declared that they will apply both conventions on a provisional basis immediately, even before they are legally bound by their provisions. The Nordic countries strongly support the two conventions and wish to appeal to those States which have not already done so, to accede to both conventions. Although the two conventions are important, they naturally do not cover all the necessary and detailed information needed in order to prepare adequately for possible future emergency situations. Therefore, there is an evident interest in many cases to supplement the conventions by bilateral and regional arrangements. The Nordic countries have for many years had a very close co-operation in the nuclear field. As early as 1957 they created a Nordic Liaison Committee for Atomic (~i~rring, Denmark) Energy. A Nordic emergency assistance agreement in connection with radiation accidents was concluded in 1963 between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency. Important Nordic nuclear safety research programmes have been initiated. Furthermore, it was agreed in 1976 that a Nordic country has to inform other' Nordic countries in advance on safety-related aspects of new nuclear facilities to be built in the border areas. At present, a further expansion, or perhaps rather a formalization, of the Nordic co-OPeration in the nuclear safety field, is under discussion. It is enVisaged that the Nordic countries will in<:rease their exchange of safety-relevant information on nuclear facilities and activities. Th~ expansion will probably, inter alia, inclUde more extended and specific commitments concerning notification and consultation between the countries concerned. As a first step bilateral agreements along these lines have been co~cluded between Denmark and Sweden and Norway and Sweden respectively. Simila~ provisions could probably be applied elsewhere in relations between neighbouring countries. The Nordic countries, for their part, will apply the experience of their mutual arrangements in future bilateral contacts with other countries regarding nuclear facilities. At the special session of the IAEA General Conference mucb attention was also given to the question of international liability for nuclear accidents with transboundary effects. An urgent task for the Agency is to make more efficient and more widely applicable the existing liability rules in this field laid down in various international conventions. These rules should be adhered to by all countries. It is, however, not sufficient to take measures to mitigate the consequences of nuclear acoidents: it is even more important to make an effort to reduce the risks of nuclear accidents as such. We therefore welcome the fact that the lAEA has expanded its WDrk to promote international collaboration in nuclear safety and radiation protection. Much remains, however, to be done in that field. Especially it is the view of the Nordic countries that more work should he done in order to dev~\op further, or establish new, international criteria and guidelines for the safety in design, siting, construction, operation and maintenance of nuclear installations. The Nordic countries are ready to support appropriate measures in the IAEA framework that would make it possible to verify internationally that the highest standards of safety are maintained. In this respect, concern for national sovereignty should not be allowed to hamper efforts to strengthen safety - efforts which are in the interest of all countries. My comments on behalf of the Nordic countries with partiCUlar attention to nuclear safety are not intended to imply any disregard for the other important aspects of the activities of the IAEA. In particular, the Nordic countries attach crucial importance to the lAEA safeguards system, the first international on-site verification system. The Nordic countries welcome the fact that in 1985 for the first tUne lAEA safeguards were applied in pursuance of voluntary offers in four nuclear-weapon States and that the fifth nuclear-weapon State decided to place some of its civilian nuclear facilities under ~ safeguards in due course. The Nordic countries hold the view that the IAEA safeguards activities should gradually be expanded with the aim of reaching universal application of ~ safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in all states - a principle which was supported by consensus at the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Finally, the Nordic countries wish to commend the IABA for its efficient technical assistance programme. Technical assistance through the IAEA is of great importance to the developing countries. It is also an important means of fulfilling the principles of article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Nordic countries have supported the growth of the IAEA Voluntary Fund for Technical Assistance. Hr. MARIN BOSCR (Mexico) (interpretation from spanish): The delegation of Mexico expresses its appreciation to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IABA), Mr. Rans Blix, for his frank description of the Agency's activities as well as for his well-known dedication to the attainment of its objectives. The peaceful applications of nuclear energy to the agricultural, food and medical spheres are increasing. In 1985, nuclear energy generated 15 per cent of the world's electricity. That emphasizes the growing role that the IAEA will have to play in promoting the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As we did last yea~ in respect of 1984, we are pleased to note that in 1985 there was again an increase in the resources devoted to technical-eo-operation activities, indeed, those resources amounted to $38.1 million. As we see in the report, that increase of resources led to an expansion in the Agency's technical co-operation programme, comprising expert missions, equipment, fellowships and training courses, Which are of special benefit to the developing countries. We must all recognize, however, that a great deal undoubtedly remains to be done. (Mr. Blerring, Denmark) My delegation is pleased to note that the report emphasizes the growing and ever-more-active participation of the developing countries in the technical co-operation programmeJ they organize meetings, hold training courses, provide expert and conference services, ~nd grant fellowships and in-kind assistance. Only through concerted efforts by the developed and the developing countries can the continued success of the programme be guaranteed. In that context, my Government would point out again the advisability of encouraging an increase in the hiring of . experts from developing countries. Similarly, my delegation commends the Agency for its efforts to strengthen the planning of nuclear-energy programmes in the developing countries, and we fully support the conclusion of the seminar on the costs and financing of nuclear-power programmes regarding the useful role that the IAEA could play in presenting financial feasibili~ studies. That would make it easier to obtain the necessary credits. We note with satisfaction, also, the privileged place that agriculture and food continue to have in the Agency's broad programme of activities. The Third Review ~onference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in September 1985, recognized the IAEA's importance as the main agent for the transfer of nuclear-energy technology. My delegation subscribes to that recognition, and we commend the Agency for all its efforts in implementation of the recommendations of the Conference on the strengthening of the Agency's activities to assist the developing countries. Mexico believes that the safeguards system implemented by the Agency is one of its essential tasks. In that connection, my delegation notes with satisfaction that in 1985 the Agency did not detect any anomaly that would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material. The Agency's safeguards system is an important verification mechanism which generates confidence (Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico) among States in regard to guarantees that all the nuclear activities under the system are devoted to peaceful purposes. All States - I repeat: all states - should agree to ~ under that system. My delegation Qttaches special importance to the voluntary a~ceptance by nuclear-weapon states of IABA inspection of their peaceful nuclear installations placed under the safeguards system. If that trend were to become more widespread, the Agency could develop its technical"and scientific capabilities for carrying out in future the tasks of verification of compliance with agreements that might be reached on nuclear disarmament. (Hr. "arin BOSClh, Mexico) without denying the importance of the IAEA safeguards system, my Government is concerned that each year the financial resource/IS devoted to the safeguards programme exceed the amounts allocated for technical co-operation and assistance. The 1985 report shows that the costs of the DePJartment of safeguards have quadrupled in the past decade, rising from a little more than $7 million in 1975 to almost $30 million in 1985. My delegation believes that while the Agency's safeguards programme deserves recognition, it is also necessary to increase the amount of resources devoted to technical co-operation and assistance. The question of nuclear safety has acquired top priority since the tragic accident at the Chernobyl nuclear-power plant. Faced with the deplorable consequences of that accident, the international community had to participate by giving immediate assistance to the victims and taking part in evaluating and assessing the safety systems of nuclear installations. The IAEA provided an appropriate framework for scientists from all regions to carry out discussions on various aspects of nuclear safety and to begin the preparation of a broad programme to improve safety systems at nuclear-power plants. In addition, the first steps were taken to prepare a legal framework which would allow the international community to act promptly in cases of nuclear accidents. During the special session of the General Conference of the IAEA held in Vienna from 24 to 26 September two new Conventions wer.e adopted, intended to ensure ear11 notification in cases of nuclear accidents and to provide assistance in the event of such an accident or a radiological emergency. Only through constructive dialogue and international co-operation shall we be able to reduce the danger of more nuclear accidents and ensure better compliance (Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico) with article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, under which all the Parties to the Treaty undertake IIto facilitate ••• the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy." Next year there will be held, at last, the united Nations Conference for the Promotion of International CO-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. we hope that that COnference will make a significant contribution to enabling the IAEA, in the words of paragraph 1 of its statute, to -accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.- Mr. OCHIRVAL (Mongolia) (interpretation from Russian) a pirst, the Mongolian delegation wishes to express its gratitude to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Blix, for his comprehensive oral report and the Agency's annual report to the Assembly. They have laid out in a succinct and accessible way the results of the Agency's activities over the past year. The Mongolian people's RepUblic attaches great importance to the Agency's activities and to expanding co-operation with it. We feel that the Director General's official visit to our country this summer as a guest of our Government and his meetings and conversations with our Administration laid a good basis for the further development and expansion of our co-operation. Incidentally, he also met with members of our National Academy of Sciences. The establishment of an international system for the safe use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is closely linked with the non-proliferation and elimination of nuclear weapons. The IAEA's main goal lies precisely in those two (Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico) areas. Therefore, our delegation notes with satisfaction the IAEA's growing role in the contemporary world of nuclear energy. The energy that comes from splitting the atom is a powerful achievement of the h,'::;;m mind. It promised to be of huge benefit for mankind, by helping to solve world energy problems and servic9 as a powerful stimulus in the fight against poverty and disease. However, perhaps because of specific historic circumstances, but primarily through the fault of the greedy and ambitious aspirations of militarist and reactionary circles, this great scientific discovery was first applied in the use of weapons of fearful destructive force. It is well known that the Soviet Union, even then, at the very beginning of the atomic age, proposed a ban on the nuclear weapon in its early stages and proposed the drafting of an international system of safeguards to ensure the use of atomic energy only for peaceful purposes. However, imperialist circles, intoxicated by their monopoly of this super-weapon, ignored those proposals. Unheeded also were the appeals of the world community and the warnings of outstanding atomic scientists, such as Einstein and Joliot-Curie and others. They talked about the unforeseeable danger represented by the use of the energy of the atom and its nucleus for purposes of war and destruction. The nuclear race imposed on the world by the imperialist and militarist circles, in their striving for an illusory military strategic supremacy, has led to a situation in which the accumulated arsenals of nuclear weapons now threaten the existence of human civilisation and life itself on Earth. A universal, comprehensive awareness of the danger is legitimately ~resenting as a primary task of the international community the immediate reduction and elimination of all stocks of nuclear weapons, because in the final analysis that will determine progress in other spheres, such as development, economic and social progress, the elimination of poverty and hunger and environmental protection. (Mr. OChirval, Mongolia) Within the United Nations system, and even outside it, everybody is fully aware of the consistent efforts and peaceful initiatives of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to curb the arms race, strengthen the non-proliferation system, achieve disarmament and bring about a universal and complete awareness of the responsibility facing mankind and of the need to show a healthy, realistic approach to matters of peace and security. Those aspirations were precisely what guided the socialist ~ountries when they proposed in the General Assembly the establishment of a comprehensive international system for all aspects of security. Implementing that idea would not only free peoples from fear about their future but would also bring about a sharp change, a radical improvement, in international relations. The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic notes with approval the part of the IAEA report with regard to implementing monitoring of the observance and strengthening of the non-proliferation system. Last year's Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons once again emphasized the IAEA's important role in this field. It can be said that the IAEA safeguards system is an acknowledged reliable instrument for international monitoring of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is in keeping with the goals of universalizing the Treaty and at the same time it promotes the search for a more effective use of the atom's peaceful potential. The Mongolian People's Republic, as in the past, favours ensuring the universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the Third Review Conference it proposed appealing on behalf of the participants in the Conference to all States, primarily the nuclear and threshold Powers, which have still not done so, to accede to the Treaty. (Mr. OChirval, Mongolia) An important, inseparable part of the activities of the ~ with regard to safeguards is improvement of the system of accountability and control over nuclear materials. Mongolia this year signed and ratified the International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. There is no doubt that the speedy entry into force of this Convention would strengthen the system of control in this important field. At the same time, our delegation advocates the drafting of an international instrument that would firmly close the door to nuclear terrorism. We also emphasize the need to guarantee the exclusion of armed attacks on peaceful nuclear installations. The Mongolian People's RepUblic welcomes the positive results of the sp~cia1 and the regular sessions of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. These sessions once again confirm the central role of the IAEA in ensuring the safe development of nuclear power. In this connection, the programme presented by the Soviet union is of great significance. The delegation of Mongolia believes that it is extremely important that within the framework of the IAEA the international community has adopted at both the national and the international level, reliable measures to strengthen the system of safeguards and monitoring and to deal with accidents, include provision for early notification by countries that suffer such accidents and the types of assistance to be given to them. We welcome the approval at the first special session of the General Conference of the lAEA of two Conventions to serve as a basis for an international system for the safe development of nuclear power. In this connection, I should like to refer to the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mongolia during the general debate, in which he emphasized the following: (Mr. OClhirval, Mongolia) liMy Government endorses the efforts being made within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure the safety of nuclear energy use. It will accede to the two important Conventions adopted at the recent special session of the IAEA General Conference. 11 (A/41/PV.20, P. 41) The successful agreement on and conclusion of two such ~portant Conventions in such a short time once again demonstrates the import&nce to the international community of this problem and the possibility of achieving agreement on the most complicated questions when there is the necessary political will and the desire to do so. This was a worth-while ac:hievement and an encouraging example of a respons~~le epproac::h by States to a question of vital importance for mankind. It is also a precedent for action on similar lines in other areas. On the whole the Mongolien delegation supports the programme of activities of the lAEA for the forthcoming biennium, designed to bring about further eXPansion uf international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. There is a special place for activities by the Ag-3ncy in connection with technical co-operation. We note with satisfaction the constant growth in the IAEA Fund for such purposes. Mongolia is inte~ested in developing ties with the IAEA, primarily with regard to the use of atomic technology in the area of health, the 'development of biotechnology and agriculture in general, as the most promising field at the present stage of the development of our economy. In conclusion, our delegation supports draft resolution A/4l/L.32 on the report of the IAEA. (Nr. OChirval, Mongolia) Mr. KENNEDY (United states of America): As the United States representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IABA), it is a great pleasure for me to join repre8entatives today in this opportunity to review the annual report of the IAEA. I am particularly gratifi~d by having the opportunity to reaffirm my Government's strong support for the important work which the IAEA does and to reflect briefly on its solid record of accorrpUshment in promoting the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy for the benefit of people throughout the world. My Government joins those that have commended the Director General for his excellent report and statement and for the Agency's work which they reflect. The IAEA, its staff and its member States can look with justifiable pride and satisfaction on its ongoing safeguards and technic~l co-operation activities and on its accomplishments in the field of nuclear safety. Over the 30 years of its life the IAEA has assumed ever greater importance as a key instrument in the global efforts to protect against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, while ensuring that the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are made ever more widely available. It is an Agency which the United States ranks among the most important of all international institutions. The vital international safeguards programme which the ~ administers providea the necessary confidence to States throughout the world that nuclear energy is being used only in the intended peaceful ways. Thus, the Agency's safeguards programme provides the necessary underpinning for broad co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of all. My Government is particularly gratified that the Agency has continued to strengthen. its safeguards programme, developing new and more effective ways to increase international confidence, while at the same time keeping a watchful eye on the resource commitments that are involved. The Agency is to be congratulated also for its successful efforts to promte widespread peaceful use of the atom. ItG technical co-operation activities in the nuclear energy field, including nuclear medicine and the improvement of food and agriculture, contribute greatly to the well-being of peoples of all the world. The Agency also plays a leading rol~ in ef.forts to ensure that nuclear power is used in a way that fully protects the public health and safety. Earlier this year, following the tragic accident at Chernobyl, we were vividly reminded of the critical role of the IAEA in the field of nuclear safety. The rapid and effective response of the Agency to that accident and its subsequent efforts to address in a comprehensive manner its immediate and long-term consequences amply reflect the initiative and seriousness of purpose which have for so many years distinguished the Agency's wor k. My Government wishes particularly to commend the IAEA for its support of the successful afforts by Member States to complete negotiations within a period of weeks on two Internation~l Conventions regarding early notification and emergency assistance in the event of nuclear accidents. These Conventions are significant not only for their practical application, but for the fact that, they emerged from a spirit of compromise and co-operation all too rare these days in international forums. This same constructive epirit was evidenced at the post-Chernobyl experts meeting in August and again at the special session on Nuclear Safety of ~be lAEA General Conference, which occurred later in September. Each of those meetings resulted in a thoroughly constructive exchange of views, which doubtless will form the basis for the Agency's future activities in the nuclear safety area. I have cited these recent initiatives by the Agency because they so clearly typify the manner in which t~e IAEA does its work year after year. In that light, 1985 - on which the Director General has so well reported - was no exception. While most of its activities are not featured on the front pages of the world's newspapers and while most of its projects, courses and special programmes receive little or no public attention, the Agency consistently approaches its work with dedication and competence. It seeks always to respond effectively to the diverse interests and needs of its member States. At the same time, we must look to the future to ensure that the IAEA remaina an effective international institution, one which maintains a clear focus on its technical mandate of safeguards, technical co-operati~~ and nuclear safety. In the past the Agency, on occasion, has become embroiled in political ~ontroversies and issues extraneous to its statute and its mission. Such controversies, unfortunately, have oc~upied unnecessarily and undesirably the attention of its policy-making organs and governing bodies. The United states is pleased that there appears to be a trend away from sucn extraneous debate. It is incumbent on all members of the Agency to ensure that the Agency not be distracted from its vital technical missions. My Government also believes that the IAEA must continue to be the principal international institution in which all States can join together to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Thus, universality of membership must continue to be a guidin~ principle for the Agency, for, otherwise the goal of ensuring that the peoples of the world can enjoy the greatest possible benefits of the saf.e and peaceful use of nuclear energy will be unattainable. I have high confidence that other Member States share our appreciation of the Agency and concur with us regarding the importance of its technical mission. I am oertain that as the Agency approaches the year ahead - a year which promises to be A/4l/PV.65 67 one of challenge and of growth - it will continue to uphold the high. standards of excellence which it hae established for itself. I am eaually certain that the solid record of achievement which we have seen in this past year will be repeated in the next - in no small measure as a result of the outstanding leadership provided by Director General Hans B1ix. Before closing, I would observe that my delegation has noted with interest the comments of some preVious speakers concerning efforts tt, enhance nuclear arms control and to achieve the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. My delegation would point out that the United States, too, has put forward constructive, viable proposals directed towards these very objectives. The United States, too, hopes that these proposals can be carefUlly considered by the Soviet Union, as discussion of all proposals concerning nuclear weapons continues. My Government is pleased to join with other States in supporting draft resolution A/4l/L.42, on the IAEA annual report. We look forward to working with the Agency and its staff and with the other Member States in supporting all the Agency's programmes fo~ the future, which so clearly benefit us all. Mr. BUTLER (Australia): This year has been a momentous one for the nuclear industry and for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We have witnessed on the one hand a further increase in the electrical power generation by nuclear ~eans, and on the other the tragedy of Chernobyl, in which lives were lost and by which many others may be affected in the future. In short, a nuclear accident in all its frightening reality was seen. The Agency's response to Chernobyl did it great credit. The commitment of Mr. B1ix and his expert staff showed what an international technical agency can and should do. But ~t~ initial response at that time of emergency was followed by an excellent longer-term response, the results of which we saw at the first special I • (Mr. Kennedy, United States) session of the General Conference of lAEA in september. I speak, of course, of the two Conventions on nuclear safety, both of which my Government has, as have many othGrs, already signed. In connending the IAEA for its work in the wake of Chernobyl, we must not lose sight of other vital roles that it plays. The Agency holds a pivotal place in the non-proliferation regime. The Agency's safeguards activities continue to be crucial. Without the., the assurances that flow from international non-proliferation undertakings by various Statee, many under the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, would be open to question. The fact is that safeguards inspections by the !AEA in no way compromise indigenous nuclear technology that is dedicated to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Australia remains concerned that some non-nucleAr-weapon States still refuse to accept this fact and continue to decline to submit their peaceful nuclear facilities, many of them sensitive fuel cycle facilities, to lAEA safeguards. The case for countries with unsafeguarded facilities complying with the provisions of the IAEA safeguards system is sometimes confined to States whose nuclear policies cause particular concern - States, for example, such as South Africa and Israel. And, while there may be clear concerns .:t'f'.)ut the policies of such States, there are other States whose policies cause concern, and therefore the case for those other States' responding also should be made, and made with complete clarity. Australia is proud to have been a founding menber of the IAEA. We have always supported the objective of the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but our involvement in the wor k of the Agency has always had as one of its key objectives the strengthening of the international non-proliferation regime • (Mr. Butier, Australia) There is legislation now before the Australian parliament Which will have the effect of strengthening our State system of accounting and control of nuclear materials through the newly established Australian safeguards Office. Once this legislation is enacted, we will be able to proceed to ratification of the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material. One of the IIIOst important elements of Australia's nuclear policies, however, is ensuring that Australian origin uranium - a material of which we possess some 30 per cent of the world's known reserves - is never diverted from that part of the international exchange of nuclear material that is devoted expressly to peaceful purposes. (Mr. Butler, Australia) we do this, we believe, successfully by negotiating strict bilateral safeguards agreements with countries that wish to purchase our uranium. In this way we are convinced that we contribute to a strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the implementation of the terms of article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons. A little JlX)re than a year ago, in September 1985, representatives of most countries represented in this Ball gathered in Geneva for the Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. When that Conference convened there was complete awareness of the difficulty and importance of the task before it; indeed, one can even say there was some apprehension. It is all the more significant that the result of the Review Conference was the distinct and unqualified success achieved last year at Geneva. That success has been followed by the International Atomic Energy Agency's use of its professional resources in dealing with the aftermath of a nuclear accident and then submitting to Member States proposals for enhanced nuclear safety that were subsequently adopted at the Agency's first special session. The wider role performed by the Agency was admirably outlined to us today in the statement of its Director-General, Mr. Bans Blix, to whom my delegation expresses its gratitude for ~at statement and the Agency's annual report. But we must congratulate and express our appreciation not only to Mr. Blix but also to his dedicated staff and those experts who provide so much for us all. That they were able to do the things they did during the past year speaks volumes for the Agency's professional integrity and its independence - an independence which is vital to the discharge of its functions. In conclusion, let me reflect again that I think it is true that ChernObyl showed us radiation knows no boundaries, and that nuclear energy must be protected and not misused. The responsibility to ensure the protection of populations and their environments is indisputably an international one. The International Atomic Energy Agency has played and must continue to play its central role in the fulfilment of that international responsibility. The draft resolution in document A/4l/L.32 is, I am confident, one that will attract the full consensus of this Assembly. It is largely procedural in terms but has substance, and its acceptance by all the Members of the United Nations will signify our deep and continuing confidence in the International Atomic Energy Agency - a confidence which is held by my Government in full measure. The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.
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