A/41/PV.82 General Assembly

I should like to propose that the list of speakers in the debate on this item be closed today at 12 noon. If I hear no objection, it will be so decided. It was so decided.

I call on the Rapporteur of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Mr. Ahroad Farouk Arnou~s of the Syrian Arab Republic, to introduce the report of the Committee. Mr. ARNOUSS (Syrian Arab Republic), Rapporteur of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Special Committee of 24): Mr. President, on behalf of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, I have the honour to introduce to the Assembly chapter 10 of the report of the Special Committee (A/41/23 (Pa.t VII», containing an account of the Committee's consideration of the auestio~ of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). As indicated in the report, in that connection the Special Committee took fully into account resolution 40/57, of 2 December 1985, on the implementation of the Declaration on the Grantihg of Independence to Colonial Countries and peoples, as well BS rep-olution 40/21, of 27 Nt)vember 1985, relating to the Terdtory. -The special Committee- heard a sta~ement on the item by the Permanent Representative of Argentina, a sUIllDBry of which is contained in the annex to the chapter of the report. The Committee also heard the statements of three individuals having an interest in the question. Sumnaries of the statements of the petitioners are cootained in Conference Room Paper 4 of the Special Committee. The delegation of the United Kingdom did not participate in the Conunittee's consideration of the item this year. Following its consideration of the item, the Special Committee, on 14 August 1986, adopted a resolution as set out in paragraph 14 of the c:hapter of the report. In this resolution the Conunittee recalled General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), of 14 Dec:eJrber 1960, as well as all other resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the security Council and the Special Committee on this question. In so doing the Committee regretted that, in spite of the widespread i~ternational support for comprehensive negotiations between Argentina and the Uni ted Kingdom that included all aspects of the future of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), the im~lementation of the General Assembly resolution on this question had not yet started. It therefore called for the resumption of negotiations between the two Governments and reiterated its support for the renewed mission of good offices by the secretary-General. Mr. CAPUTO (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like at the outset to convey to the Secretal'y-General the most sincere thanks of the Argentine Government for the mission of good offices that he has been conducting in conformity with the resolutfnns of the G~neral Assembly on the auestion of the Malvinas. We hope that his efforts will continue and, as in the past~ Argentina is prepared to co-operate fully in making them a success. Once again the G~neral Assembly is consider in~ the auestion of the ..lalvin2ls IsIBndS. unfortunately, it is doing so without any progress having been noted during the post ye~r towards finding a solution to a conflict which has kept the South Atlantic region in a state of tension. In fact, hased upon recent developments, the situation has worsened. Not only has the United Kingdom failed to comply with last year's General Assemh1y resolution, it has also introduced a new and ~:arming factor, as a result of its declaration of 29 October last. In the light of these facts, and the tensions they have generated, it is worth while considering the profound wisdom of General Assembly resolution 40/21, a simple, almost elementary resolution, free of any value judgement, which clea~ly stated the crux of the problem, its essence: the sovereignty dispute between the parties. All the events of the past month in connection with this issue have been, and remain, nothing more than the ~onseauence of that dispute, that fundamental controversy. It is not that the auestion of the dispute is the only problem, but rather that it underlies all the problems. This leads us to believe, as we have argued so many times, that to ignore the motives which separate the positions of Argentina and the united Kingdom is, and will remain, an inexhaustible source of new and continuing tehsions and problems. This, I insist, is what has come to light clearly as a result of recent events. Indeed, the united Kingdom declaration of 29 October last regarding fisheries in the South Atlantic does not arise from a concern for conservation, nor is it just an isolated act which seeks to prevent excessive fisheries exploitation. It is simply an act which now seeks to expand British domination over a sea over which my country has exercised, and continues to exercise sovereign rights and (Mr. Caputo, Argentina) jurisdiction. !t is an act, in other ~-rds, which fall& essentially wi~hin the sovereignty dispute with Argentina. It is an additional, and indeed dangerous, proof of what can happen when one persists in ignoring the real problems and in acauiring title by force. In short, when one insists on being intransigent. For all the above reasons, I felt it necessary to analyse these events carefully, to explain the facts to the Assembly, to weigh the arguments which have been adduced, and to ascertain their truthfulness, in order to reach the conclusion which is our fundamental thesis: the underlying motivation of the 29 october decleration is the auestion of the sovereignty over the islands and the British desire to expand the exercise of its purported sovereignty over them. Therefore, let us begin with a hrief review of the facts. The dispute with the united Kingdom started in early 1833 with the occupation by force of the Malvlnas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. Since that time, my country has protested against the colonial regime established there and demanded that these territories be raturned to effective sovereignty of Argentina. Historically, this dispute includes the islands and three miles of territorial sea. For many years, Argentina has exercised its jurisdiction and control in a peaceful and uncontested manner over all the surrounding maritime area, namely, beyond the three miles. After the 1982 conf.lict, the British Government irnrosed over part of these waters a military "protection zone", in nature which extended 150 miles from the centre of the archipelago. ~his zone was never recognized by Argentina. Its existence, and the threat of British attack, prevented Argentine vessels and aircraft from patrolling the area, as they had been doing regularly up until that time. (Mr. caputo, Argentina) In addition, the United Kingdom increased the military fortifications of the Malvinas islands 1n a manner totally out of proportion with the dangers it purportedly sought to avoid, even though the Government of President Alfonsin had formally and repeatedly indicated that it would resort only to peaceful methods to obtain a legitimate and irrevocahle restitution of the Islands. In this context, on 29 October, the British Government issued its "Declaration on south-west Atlantic fisheries". In that declaration, the United Kingdom arrogated to itself the right to establich a fisheries juridiction in a zone up to 200 nautical miles around the Malvinas Islands, measured from the coast, and in addition appropriated to itself jurisdiction over the continental shelf, stating that these measures were to become effective immediately. In addition, it announced that legislative measures would be taken to ensure the conservation and management of the resources within the 200 mile fisheries jurisdiction zone in an area to be called the "Interim Conservation and Management Zone", the limits of which were later set at 150 miles. These are the salient facts. Now let us examine the arguments &dduced by the United Kingdom, in reaching that decision, and their accuracy. We will verify their accuracy not on the basis of our own assessment but of objective facts. In taking this decision, the Government of the United Kingdom used four main arguments is an attempt to justify itself before the international community. These arguments were: First, the need to set im motion a mechanism to ensure the conservation of fishirq resources in the presence of a danger of depredation. Secondly, Argentine intransigence towards the signing of a multilateral agreement that would govern fisheries exploitation. Thirdlyp my country's failure to co-operate in achieving this agreement by entering into other bilateral agreements. (Mr. Caputo, Argentina) Fourthly, Argentina's lack of willingness to co-operate with the Food and Agriculture Organiz3tion of the United Nations (FAO). All the aforementioned arguments can be summed up as follows: given the urgency to p~otect fisheries, and since multilateral agreements could not be obtained, unilateral measures had to be adopted to avoid this dramatic situation. Let us analyse the first argument, namely, the urgent need to avoid the plundering of resources. This argument is the focal point of the whole united Kingdom position and the cornerstone of its decision. Thus, the British Foreign Secretary, in his statement to the House of Commons on 29 October, stated: •••• the rapid increase in fishing in the South-West Atlantic, with its serious imp~ct on fish stocks there, has aroused widespread concern·. Unfortunately for the Government of the United Kingdom, the preliminary report of the FAO on this issue has recently been released, and it stated that: (Mr. Caputo, Argentina) WIn present. circumst.ances there seems t.o be no reason to expect. that. the fishing pressure in the aouth-west. At.lant.ic by the high seas fleet. will have an impact upon the eC06~TSt.em of the area greater than that of other fisheries with similar characteristics in other parts of the world.. " I should like to emphasize that, prior to its release, thIs report was thouCjbt of particularly bigbly by the British Go\rernment, so much so that it sought to justify its action of 29 october, among other things, by the absence of this report. Indeed, in the House of COIll1\Ons, the British Foreign secretary, in response to a Memer of Parliament, Hr. Townsend, who asked whether it would have been more prudent to await the report of FAO, stated: • It would not have been possible to continue to wait since it is estimated that the first draft report of the FM will not be released before the end of the year. n Actually, all indications lead us to believe that the opposite was the case: the decision had to be taken before the report's release on 18 NoveJrber, since its distributioo would have d~stroyed any conservationist support for the Britisb decision. In any case, and independently of any presumptions we can make, the facts are incontrovertible. The main British argument falls precisely because of the opinion of the war ld organization which specializes in topics relating to fisher iea. Let us move on to the second argument: Argentina's intransigence regardi~g signing a multilateral agreement. In the House of Commons, the Foreiqn secretary stated on 29 october: "Argentina has pursued a different course, and its eotions have undermined the multilateral approach." TWO issues must be distinguished in oonnectioo with this question: first, the need for a multilateral agreement~ secoodly, the real motives of the British As to the first question, 1 simply wish to refer once again to the FNJ report. At no time does that report recoJIIUend a multilateral agreement. Indeed, it clearly ad'locates the need to consider the Malvinas waters as a special situation owing to the fact that a sovereignty and jurisdiction dispute axists in that area, which is being discussed in the thited Nations. The only reference there to the multilateral action, and this only beyond the 200-mile limit, is set forth as follows in the report. The recommendation is made for: ·Some form of co-operab.on between the countr ies which operate in the atea is recommended." It must be recalled that Great Britain does not fish in that zooe. In fact, having demonstrated that there is no need for a mUltilateral agreement, the question remains as to why this argument was adduced. Here an explanation should be offered which ooce again shows what is the real problem that we are discussing. In fact, what the United Kingdom wanted to do was to sit at the same table, together with Argentina, both as coastal States in the south Atlantic, and negotiate multilateral agreements with the countries which have fishing vessels in the zooe. Thus, under the appearance of a laudable aim, that of preventing the depredation of fishing resources, the uni ted Kingdom hoped to obtain recognition of its purported rights in those waters. That we could not accept, since we \I,ould have recogn ized that an illegi timate occupant of Argentine insular territory had the status of a coastal State. Yet, that is not all. Suppose Argentina had agreed to hold negotiatioos with the united Kingdom to settle questions relating to fisheries only. Is it possible to think, even with the most fertile of imaginations, that those issues could be addressed without jurisdictional disputes arising, in other words, disputes relating to the exercise of soverei9nty? Obviously, one party or the other would inevitably hav~ asserted its claim t~ the areas in dispute. ~his is why we insist on the need for global negotiations. This is why we are once again confronted with the solution of the sovereignty problem. The third British argument held, and once again I auote the 29 October declaration, that "Argentina has concluded bilateral fisheries agreements with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. Through these agreements Argentina purports to exercise jurisdiction that is, as a matter of international law, the entitlement of the Falkland Islands. These agreements are incompatible with the multilateral initiative." Indeed, Argentin~ initiated bilateral negotiations, which are now at different stages of progress, with countries which in fact already have vessels in ~he fishing area, in order to legislate and control the exploitation of resources in our sea. In this way, Bilateral agreements have thus been signed which the British Government has termed contrary to international law, even though they fall completely within articles 61, paragraph 2, and 62, paragraph 2, of the united Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is the instrument which governs, inter alia, the conservation and use of the living resources of the seas. For its part, the aritish Government, which has not signed the Convention, is surprisingly now invoking international law, based on that Convention, to justify its position. Moreover, regardless of the fact that Argentina does not recognize any British rights in the area, when the bilateral fishing agreements with the Soviet union and BUlgaria were agreed upon~ the territorial zone established by the United Kingdom (Mr. Caputo, Argentina) arol.l'lc. the Malvino.s Islands extended three i1autical miles~ consequently, there was no ov$rlapping of jurisdictions that could give rise to a dispute. It is precisely on the basis of the BritiSh 2QO-mlle declaration that there is a Za1~ of overlapping, which could well cause serious friction. Fourthly, as I stated earlier, Lcndon claims that Argentina is unwiliing to co-operate. I quote the 29 OCtober statement~ "The Argentine Government's recent actions show an indifference to conservation needs and a preference for obstruction rather than co-operation." Yet the preliminary report. of the FAO indicates, that the reality is different: "Argentina provided detailed information about capture and the fishing operations of its high seas fleet, and made available data and information from its most recent surveys to assess fishing resources~ Argentina also contributed with an up-ta-date revision of the fishing resources and other relevant issues in connecd~ with fishing in the south-west Atlantic." In other words, this argument is also invali~. To be sure, other incidental pretexts ha~!e been used, as claiming simultaneously that we carry out aggressive patrolling operations in the area and that. we are not concerned about conservation. This implies a flagrant contradiction which need not be demonstrated. But what is sure is that the essence of the British argument is disproved by objective facts, which I need not underscore. However, there are certain other facts which must be merAtioned in order to conclude this part of my analysis. Oldoubtedly, an important one is the House of Commons Foreign Relations Committee report on this particular subject, which even further emtmasizes the contradictions and weaknesses c)f the united Kingdom's position. (Hr. CQp.lto, Argentina) Indeed, the 19(1,4 report of the House of COllUllOnB Foreign Relations COl"1l1ittee, paragraphs 145 and 146, states; -us. nespi te the envirCll1mental t'c::Iwbmcks ~f the existing free-for-all in Falkland Reers, we are not convinced that the establishment of an ;,xclusive fishing zc:ne in Falkland waters can be justi fied.- (Mr. Caeum, Argentina) "146. There is Wldoubtedly a strong case for the regulation and licensing of fishing in the area of the Falklands and dependencies, but there are considerable political and practical problems to be <wercome. In the first place, if it were not for the existence of the sOITereignty dispute, it is a matter which would be expected to be pursued in consultation wi th the Falklands' neighbours, inclUding Argentina. In the second place, there must be doubts about the international accept~ilityof a unilaterally-imposed zone, particularly allDngst third-world and Communist countries, in view of their sympathy for the Argentine sOITereignty case. In consequence, the p)licing of such a zone would raise difficult legal problems and would be likely to be expensive. It would not necessarily be a proper function for the B:>yal Navy vessels deployed in the area, nor do we believe that IM Government should lightly enter into commitments which -,ould increase, rather than reduce, the need for a large naval presence in the SOuth Atlantic." For its part, in its observations regarding the House of Commons Foreign Relations Committee, the British Government stated~ "42. The GoI7ernment agree with tile view of the Committee (paragraphs 143-145) that there are coOlsiderable p)litical and practical problems to be overcame in relation to the regulation and licensing of fishing in the area of the Falklands and dependencies, and we note the Committee's view (paragraph 145) that the establishment of an exclusive fishing zooe cannot be justified. The Government are consider ing actively what measures would be most appropriate in the circumstances of the Falklands, not least in view of the environmental and conservation issues involved." Therefore, ooe must conclude the following. First, the Committee recognizes the existence of a sovereignty dbpute, the facts of which the British GOI/ernment purports to ignore. (Mr. Caputo, Argentina) secondly, it adioits, with good reason, that the establishment of an exclusive fishing zone would create serious legal problems and would therefore be of questionable international validity. Thirdly, the Committee states categorically that establishment of the zones would make it indispensable to reinforce the Bdtish naval forces, with all the consequences this implies, among the must serious being an increase in tension and the possibility, not to be rejected out of hand, that sedous incidents may occur. These are the facts, the arguments and the reality. All these elements lead us to take stock and to reiterate our proof. If conservation is not the real underlying cause, what motive remains to explain the BritiSh action? I believe that the answer is simple. Based upon the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the conduct of the British Government is based on expansionist logic that seeks at all costs to extend its illegal occupation of the madtime and island territory of my country. My Government is convinced that the maintenance and extension of this logic on the part of the British Government would entail serious risks for the area, about which I wish to warn the General Assembly. The 29 OCtober declaration has already caused an increase in tension in the area, as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the r.t:>vement of the Non-Aligned Countries have both observed. Tension and insecurity in the south Atlantic may increase as a consequence of this aggressive behaviour on the part of the United Kingdom. Moreover, it is possible that in the final analysis it is seeking to create friction and provoke armed incidents that will consolidate its colonial usurpation and will bring about the desired political and electoral gains. Is it possible to think otherwise, when the Chairman of the British Conservative Party, Mr. Norman Tebbit, suggested - incidentally 10 days prior to the declaration by the United Kingdom GoverJr\l1lent - the adoption of "a warlike approach reminiscent of the Malvinas spirit". We are indeed witnessing an alarming (Kr. Caputo, Argentina) logic, which must be stopped, especially in view of what Minister E9gar said a few days ago in response to questions in the House of Commons relating to vigilance in the area. He said: liThe use of the Royal Navy and Air Force, whic'd a'.: present patrol the area, is open to the discretion of the Government. 11 This serious declaration is astonish'" -'g, especially when we remember that the uni ted Kingdom voted in the General AssellOly in favour of the resolution proPOS ing the demilitarization of the SOuth Atlantic. Confronted with this disturbing attitude on the part of Great Brit:3in, my country has responded with calmness and caution, increasing the possibilities of a lessen ing of tension in the area. Indeed, on 17 Noverrber my GOI7ernment issued a declaration to the international conmunity, the operative part of which states that the Argentine Government "EKpresses its willingness to: "1. Initiate global negotiations with the united Kingdom in accordance with resolution 40/21 of the General Assenbly of the united Nations; "2. Initiate, as a previous and preparatory step towards these negotiations, an open dialogue with the united Kingdom in order to create the conditions of confidence necessary for approaching the negotiations successfully and determining the timetable for t.11~m; "3. Facilitate the start of negotiations by means of a declaration Which, at the appropriate time, although not legally necessary, would establish the formal end of hostilities, as part of a process for eliminating the sequ'~ls of the conflict and which should put an end to the so-called l50-mile military 'protection zone'; "4. Settle, as it has always maintained, in the framework of global negotiations pursuant to resolution 40/21 of the General Asserrbly of the (Mr. Caputo, Argentina) united Nations, all problems that exist between the two parties besides the dispute over sO'/ereignty, namely, the elimination of the effects of the conflict, trade, consular and diplomatic relations, trans~ort and cOlIIRunications and, in so far as pertinent, matters pertaining to the conservation of fishing resources, all this to be done w1 th the assistance of the secretary-General of the united Nations~ "5. Analyse, within the framework of talks and subsequent negotiation, all possible fOJ:mulas for settling the dispute which provide, in particular, for the creation of confidence-building measures for the iphabitants of the Malvinas Islands, with the assistance of the secretary-General of the United Nation." (A/4l/845, p. 3) There is another point that I must make. Wi thout prejudice to the foregoing considerations, and regardless of the alternatives which continue to characterize this dispute, it seems particularly negative that a permanent member of the 5ecurity Council, that is, one of the five Sta tes wi 'al special respons ibility for maintaining international peace and security, should persist in refusing to undertake the solution of a conflict recognized more than 20 years ago by our Organization, ignoring the appeals of the majority of the international colIII\unity. In the final analysis, the General Assenbly can canpare the two lines of logic which have developed during the past month: the British logic of confrontation and expansion and the Argentine logic of peace, rationality, and prudence. (Mr. Caputo, Argentina) That was all that we wished to demonstrate. So long as the core problem ",,'O.~tinues to be ignored, we shall not be able to solve the accessory problems. So long as the reality - a reality which strikes us every day - is not accepted, we shall not be able to change it. Nothing is more removed from the practical approach than disregarding problems. The simplest and most practical thing to do is to recognize what is obvious: everything the United Kingdom is doing is aimed at asserting its purported sovereigntYJ everything Argentina is doing is aimed at recovering its sovereignty. Nothing can obscure that basic evidence. That is why the General Assembly will vote once again, this year, on ~ draft resolution which begins with what is essential: a reuuest to the parties to sit down and negotiate, without ignoring, without disregarding, without prejudging any auestion. If the General Assembly is wise, it will cat aside the accessory and demand the essential - in a word, it will prevent future dangers.

I now call on the representative of Brazil, who wishe~ to introduce draft resolution A/41/L.19. Mr. MACIEL (Brazil, (interpretation from Spanish): On behalf of the delegations of Algeria, Ghana, India, Mexico, U~uguay and Yugoslavia and my own delegation, I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/41/L.19. Its text, which is based faithfully on resolution 40/21, once again provides a framework fer a peaceful solution to the differences on the auestion of the Malvenas Islands. On this occasion, it would not be fitting for me to repeat in full the position that the Government of Brazil has espoused since 1833 - that is, unreserved support for the Argentine Republic's rights of sovereignty over the Islands. The text we are submitting does not in fact enter into the merits of the issue. In absolutely neutral terms, it sets forth a negotiating process which, while not prejudicing the legitimate positions of the two parties, is capable of (Mr. Caputo, Argentina) solving the set of problems that now divide them. The co-sponsors, in proposing a framework of action that could solve outstanding problems, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, have given due regard to the need to agree to the meticulous application of all the principles that are relevant to this case. I can assure the Assembly that at no time have we had any desire to set aside important aspects pertaining to the future of the Islands, including the need to give due regard during the negotiating process to the satisfaction of the interests of its inhabitants. The reference in operative paragraph 1 to the United Nations Charter is designed precisely to ensure the impartiality that can now be discerned in the auest for a diplomatic solution. Indeed, impartiality is the essential feature of the draft resolution that we have submitted. It was in order to maintain that impartiality that in 1985 the General Assembly rejected amendments that had been proposed to a similar text submitted on that -nccasion by the same countries that are now sponsoring draft resolution A/41/L.19. As was the case in 1985, our draft resolution is procedural, well-balanced and objectiveJ it inclUdes no reference to the arguments or positions of either party. Any amendment designed to include in the draft the position of one of the parties would naturally make it biased and unacceptable. For that reason the General Assembly, as in the past, should not agree to amendments that would upset the neutrality of the draft. The countries that h4VU joined in supporting this appeal for negotiations - and they now make up the large majority of the states Members of the United Nations - believe that the reauest contained in resolution 40/21, and now repeated in draft resolution A/4l/L.19, should have led without any hesitation to the initial stage of the negotiating process. In that connection, we have noted with regret that it has not proved possible to find common ground between the parties - (Mr. Maciel, Brazil) as we are told by the Secretary-General i~ his ~eport in document A/4l/824. we are grateful for the efforts which have been made and which are described in that report, and we agree, with special concern, that time is not necessarily working in favour of a mutGally acceptable solution. Measures of a dubious nature - to put it mildly - imposed unilaterally, will not contribute to the establishment of the climate of mutual trust that both parties acknowledge to be indispensable to a final solution to the dispute. In a meeting held a few days ago in Guatemala, the Standing Council of the Organization of American States considered the situation brought about by the declaration on South-West Atlantic fisheries made on 29 October by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. At that meeting, it was recognized that the declaration added a further element of tension and potential conflict to the continuing dispute over the Malvenas Islands. Brazil believes - and in this, we are expressing the broad views of the co-sponsors of draft resolution A/41/L.19 - that everything should be done to avoid any measures that could lead to an increase in tensions and impede the establishment of the conditions necessary for political dialogue. It is therefore essential to ensure that the effects produced by the British declaration will not create additional obstacles to the settlement of the dispute. On 2 November, at a meeting in Punta del Este, the Foreign Ministers of uruguay and Brazil studied the British announcement and confirmed their full solidarity with the Argentine position. They stated their determination to promote solving the dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom, in all its aspects, exclusively by peaceful means. That is the central message which draft resolution A/41/L.l9 fUlly reaffirms. The Argentine Republic, acting strictly in accordance with t~e spirit of Gan~~ai Asaaably ~esolution 40/21, made a declaration (A.41/845) of major importance on 17 November 1986, in which tne Argentine Government formally manlfesteC its political will to initiate global r.egotiations with the united Nations, giving due regard to all items of interesc to the parties. Argentina has thus reaffirmed its ~illingness to achieve a definitive solution, and in that statement A~gentina pointed out the stages which would be advisable in order to establish a climate of confidence, and in due course an appropriate time-table for bilateral understandings. It is proposed that all the problems that exist between the two parties, besides the dispute over sovereignty, should be settled in the fr.amework of global negotiations. The talks and subsequent negotiations would include an analysis of all possible formula~ for settling the dispute which provide, in particular, for confidence-building measures for the inhabitants of the Malvinas Islands, with the assistance of the united Nations Secretary-General. We wish to emphasize Argentina's willingness to facilitate the start of negotiations by a declaration establishing the formal end of hostilities, which should put an end to the protective measures which remain in force, which have been established, or have been announced b~ the United Kingdom. This proposal, which is certainly a constructive one, has, however, met with a reserved and rather negative reception on the part of the United Kingdom Government. In particular it is regrettable that immediate advantage has not been taken of an opportunity that could lead to the removal of the conflict and reduce tension in the South Atlantic, which is the central aim of the declaration of tbat region by the General Assembly as a zone of peace and co-operation. We hope that even during this session of the Assembly we shall still be able to receive from Her Majesty's Government an acknowledgement of the merits of the Argentine declaration. The importance of finding an acceptable comprehensive settlement within the framework of the United Nations resolutions has led the sponsors of draft resolution A/4l/L.19 once again to seek the broadest possible support for the text. In so doing we reiterate our firm belief that by maintaining the neutral character of the proposal the Assembly will reaffirm its resolute support for the path of negotiation which, with the co-operation of the Secretary-General, can lead to a solution of all aspect3 of the problem at an early date. Hr. ALBAN-HOLGUIl'! (Colombia) (interpretation from Spanish): The question of the Malv~nas Islands, which is now before the General Assembly, &ffects all the western world and if it is not properly dealt with it could jeopardize international peace and seourity. The problem is particularly disturbing to Latin America which, instead of having to deal with this vestige of colonialism, should be devoting its energies to seeking in conjunction with Europe appropriate means to improve the quality of life of the millions of human beings who are living in absolute poverty. FOr that, an essential condition is to have justice, peace and security in our continent. Today as never before the peoples of Latin America are facing innumerable challenges, in combination with innumerable problems. After years of painful change, we have succeeded in establishing a stable democracy and political pluralism in virtually all our States, and that fact has united us, for the reconciliation of Governments with their own peoples has restored trust between Governments and has created an irreversible unity and solidarity. Despite the challenges it faces, Latin America is finding its destiny. A shadow has been cast over that prospect by the fact that no progress has been made in settling the issue of the Malvinas Islands, claimed by Argentina on the basis of overwhelming title. In this case it has not been possible to establish a dialogue between the parties, as recommended by the Charter of our Organization in settling disputes by peacefuL means. The civilized world, which has accepted dialogue as the standard means of developing its relations, has not been able to convince the united Kingdom to come to the negotiating table with Argentina, in order to move towards a settlement of the dispute. On two occasions the General Assembly has recommended open dialogue and there is a growing consensus that that is the right course far dealing with this vexed question. The resolutions concerned contain the basis for making progress with fruitful conversations. Unfortunately, time has elapsed without any regard for the express will of the overwhelming majority of the General Assembly, instead the international community has observed with great concern the steps being taken to militarize the Malvinas in recent months, while it is now taken aback by the unilateral action of the united Kingdom by establishing an exclusive 200-mile fishing zone around the islands. In so doing it has altered the situation that existed when the Malvinas war broke out, a situation that was not much more satisfactory but in which there was some hope of change through common agreement between the parties. The 3uccessive militarization measures and the latest steps are obviously such as to cause increased international tension and instability in the hemisphere, especially in the south Atlantic. Moreover these developments are taking place at a time when Latin America and the world in general have been buffetted by an escalation of violent deeds, each of which could lead to broader conflicts. The alternative to dialogue is generally violence, and experience has shown how ephemeral ~re the results of using force, which always lead to reactions nnd generate further violence in turn. That leads nowhere. My delegation consequently makes a new and friendly appeal to say goodbye to other times and other deeds Which, though they may appear glorious, have nothing to do with the real world in which we are living as we stand on the thresholc: of the third millenium of the Christian era. It would be a cause of great satisfaction to my delegation if the will and the interest of the international community as a whole were recognized and the necessary steps were taken to fulfil that will. We have taken careful note of the report presented by the secretary-General pursuant to resolution 40/21 on the exchange of views and the meetings on the auestion with the authorities ef the Governments concerned, despite which the positions of those Governments have remained unchanged. However, we are pleased to note that the Secretary-General is persisting in his efforts and that he is prepared to assist the two parties to find a peaceful and permanent solution to their differences. For its part, the Argentine Government has reiterated its willingness to seek a negotiated settlement of its dispute with the United Kingdom. The old colonialist logic that made possible the political and economic domination of many parts of the world can no lODger work in a world desirous of breaking those patterns to bring about the rule of justice. The unwillingness to accept historical imperatives has been at the root of social disturbances, revolts and revolutions which might well have been avoided if actions had been channelled in a rational way towards specific aims. It would have been wise to recognize the realities of the situation in which we live. With this in mind, the democracies of the West, united and in solidarity, must respond with firmness to the reauirements of a new international order that will rescue multilateralism from the present crisis and open the way to major reforms. Diversity of views is not incompatible with coexistence. That is why international law has been created and is regularly improved. As has been rightly said in this forum, it is better for the world to experience a confrontation of ideas than a confrontation of arms. Disagreement must find a natural environm~~t for civilized expression until satisfactory solutions are found. In September of this year the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, which seeks the establishment ~r eha"nels for the independent development of peoples and peace instead of war in inter-State relations, reiterated in the Political Declaration of Harare, Zimhahwe, through the Heads of State and Government, their firm support for (Mr. Alban-Holguin, Colombia) the Republic of Argentina's right to secure the restoration of its sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands through negotiations designed to achieve a speedy, peaceful and just solution to the auestion in conformity with the relevant resolutions, including United Nations resolutions. The Reads of S~ate or Government also reaffirmed that the massive British military and naval ~resence in the area of the Malvinas, South Gea~gia and south Sandwich Islands, which in/~lude a strategic airport, ~re 1\ cause of great concern to the countries of Latin America, endanger peace and adversely affect stahility in the rec;rion. It is a matter of elementary logic that a negative position towards dialogue cannot he sustaitJed for ever. ultimately, the dnti-colonial1st decision of the overwhelming majority of countries will prevail. Among that majority is Colombia, whose Government has expressed a firm and unwavering position in support of Argentina's legitimate rights over the Malvinas Islands. We hope that negotiations will be undertaken as soon as possible to find a just and peaceful solution to this dispute. In this context, Colombia has noted with concern and believes to be contrary to those purposes unilateral steps that could cause an extension of the conflict. The choice of unilateral action, such as the issuance of the declaration on south-west Atlantic fisheries, based on a disputable right to regulate the exploitation and conservation of fish stocks in an area up to 200 nautical miles around the islands and to exercise jurisdiction over the continental shelf around it is an act of provocation and, as might be expected, has been rejected by Argentina, which denies that the British Government has any right to exercise sovereignty and jurisdiction in those areas. That unilateral measure, adopted in persistent disregard of the recommendations of the General Assembly, has increased tension and could have unpredictable conseauences. The decolonization of the Malvinas Islands ana their return to the effective sovereignty of Argentina are the cause of all Latin America, a cause that has the unwavering solidarity of my country. In this connection, the Colombian Foreign Mi~ister said: ~It is opportune to reiterate Colombia's firm and unwavering support for the Republic of Argentina regarding its legi~imate rights over the Malvinas Islands and fo~ its just de3ire that its differences with the united Kingdom be resolved in a just, legal and peaceful way.- My Government is convinced that all America agrees that unilateral declarations cannot invalidate the legitimate and inalienable rights of a state over a part ef i~r' ~erritory that belongs to it, in accordance with the principle of uti possidett~ a.nd other principles of international law. Nor can sovereignty and the maritime jurisdiction of a State be annulled by mere declarations of this kind that seek to ignore its maritime jurisdiction. My Governm@nt is convinced, further, that in the framework of the appropriate united Nations resolutions, and with the good offices of the Secretary-General the negotiations r~uired to resolve this conflict can be carried out in a peaceful, just and permanent way. This position is clearly stated in the draft resolution, of which Colombia is one of the sponsors and which this Assembly will adopt by an overwhelming majority. Mr. MOrA PALENCIA (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): The peaceful and definitive solution of the auestion of the Malvinas Islands is of vital importance for the Argentine Republic nnd the whole of Latin America, and has aroused the interest of the international community as a whole. That interest is reflected in the fact that today, for the fifth consecutive year, the General Assembly is considering this item. In that time, the conditions needed for a start to be made on the negotiations between the Governments of Argentina and the united (Mr. Alban-Holguin, Colombia) Kingdom on the tibole range of ~oblems outstanding between these two countries have gradually been identified. BU.t there can be no doubt that the central issue in those negotiations is the definitive solution of their differences with regard to the territory of the Malvinas, SOuth Georgia and SOuth sandwich Islands. (Kr. M3ya Palencia, Mexico) This was recognized by Security CQuncil resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982) as well as by the five resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on this matter. Year after year the General Assembly has taken note of the interest of both parties in a normalization of their relations and, in this connection, has reiterated the need for global negotiations that would enable them to build up once again their mutual trust on solid foundations and to resolve pending problems, including all aspects of the future of the Malvinas Islands. In those resolutions the General Assemhly also reauested the Secretary-General to continue his renewed mission of good offices with a view to assisting the two Governments in their auest for a peaceful solution to their differences. We wish to thank the Secretary-General for his efforts during the last 12 months to that end pursuant to General Assembly resolution 40/21. However, it is to be regretted that the Secretary-General was obliged to report yet again that Wit has not proved possible so far to find common ground to engage the two parties in the kind of talks envisaged in resolution 40/21". (A/4l/824, para. 6) We are even more concerned at the fact that recently this auest for common ground has been further complicated. The road to a possible understanding has been jeopardized by the United Kingdom Government's Declaration on south-west Atlantic Fisheries of 29 OCtober. By that Declaration, the British Government not only extended the fishery limits around the Ma1vinas Islands to a maximum of 200 nautical miles, but also proclaimed its jurisdiction over the continental shelf of those islands. It has thereby encroached upon the sovereign rights of Argentina and acted at variance with the objectives set by the General Assembly itself on this matter. (Mr. Moya pa1encia, Mexico) In spite of the foregoing, the Argentine Government has continued to maintain a conciliatory position, as confirmed today by the Foreign Minister of Argentina, Mr. Dante Caputo. Another demonstration of its conciliatory attitude was provided by the Argentine Government's Declaration of 17 November 1986. Here we find, among other SighS of the good will of the Argentine Government, its willingness to "Facilitate the start of negotiations by means of a declaration which, at the appropriate time, although not legally necessary, would establish the formal end of hostilities, as part of a process for eliminating the seauels of the conflict and which should put an end to the so-called ISO-mile military 'protection zone'." (A/41/845, p. 3) Recent events in the South Atlantic confirm what we have maintained from the outset, namely, that the dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Malvinas Islands is fundamentally a dispute about sovereignty. Its solution should, as the Latin American countries have stated repeatedly, be placed within the context of united Nations efforts to eliminate all vestiges of colonialism and to put an end to any kind of illegal occupation. On previous occasions we expressed our opinion that the argument of a supposed right to self-determination cannot be used in the case of the settlers of the Malvinas Islands, for the question is one of territorial enclaves referred to in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which are a source of tension in the South Atlantic area. It should be borne in mind in this connection that only a few weeks ago, on 27 october, the General Assembly adopted resolution 41/11 by an overwhelming majority, in which it solemnly declared the South Atla.,tic to be a "zone of peace and co-operation". There can be no doubt that a prompt solution to the problem of the Malvinas Islands would he in the interest of the peoples of that zone. (Mr. Moya Palencia, Mexico) once again Mexico has the honour to be one of the sponsors of the draft resolution on the question of the Malvinas. We are convinced that, by adopting draft resolution A/41/L.19, the General Assembly would promote negotiations between A~gentina and the united Kin~dom and encourage the Secretary-General to press ahead with his renewed mission of good offices. It would also, once again, send a clear signal of the need to find a final and peaceful solution to the dispute in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Mr. ALZAMORA (peru) (interpretation from Spanish): The Government and people of Peru firmly support the sovereign rights of the Argentine Republic over the Malvinas Islands. That position is based on the fundamental consideration of promoting the elimination of remaining colonial situations. In that context, it also reflects an awareness of the feeling of solidarity that the peoples of Latin America have created through a shared history in the struggle against colonialism and in defence of the sovereignty and independence of our States. In asserting our solidarity with the Argentine RepUblic and the legitimate aspirations of its people, we are also affirming our conviction that peaceful negotiations, under the auspices of the united Nations, offer the only means of achieving a peaceful and negotiated overall solution. The Government of Argentina has, on repeated occasions, has openly and in a responsible manner expressed its continuing willingness to engage in dialogue. That willingness to compromise is fully supported by the Government of Peru which, even during the most tense and dramatic moments of the conflict, devoted all its efforts to the task of finding a negotiated and peaceful solution. Unfortunately, in the past few years situations have been created which, far from promoting peace, dialogue and negotiation, seem designed to introduce further (Mr. Moya Palencia, Mexico) elements of tension and c6nflict into the south Atlantic a"d, conseauently, into the Malvinas Islands. The dispute over the Malvinas has always been and still is a problem involving a claim to national sovereignty over the islands in the setting of a colonial situation. But when colonialism is compounded by strategic and military considerations, past experience suggests that tne colonial Powers are trying to introduce additional factors of tension in order to impede the process of decolonization. For example, since 1982, the stockpiling of sophisticated and long-range weapons, th~ construction of excessive military facilities and the emergence of doctrines that aim to include the Malvinas as a strategic factor in the East-West conflict have increased the various elements making for tension, thus threatening, along with other similar trends, to cunvert the South Atlantic into a new area of great Power confrontation and an area dominated by global concepts that threaten the peaceful coexistence and the very sovereignty of the developing coastal countries. (Mr. Alzamora, Peru) The danger of that trend is a cause of increasing concern that is shared by the Organization of American states, which recently express~d its deep concern over "the establishment of military installations by the united Kingdom in the Malvinas Islands, thus increasing tension in the area and placing obstacles in the way of negotiations that that country and Argentina must resume to settle the question." That concern was also shared by the Heads of State of the non-aligned countries at the Harare summit, when they stated that "the massive ••• military and naval presence in the area of the Malvinas, the South GeOrgias and the South Sandwich Islands, which include a strategic airport, are a cause for great concern to the countries of the tatin American region, endanger the peace and adversely affect stability in the area." (A/4l/697, p. 118) To those important political appeals for the preservation of the Malvinas Islands from strategic deployment in the East-West clash has been added the recent statement of the General Assembly, which, by adopting resolution 41/11, declared the South Atlantic a zone of peace and co-operation, which unequivocally demonstrated the strong political resolve that peace and detente should prevail in the area. Nevertheless, only a few days later, on 29 October, the British GOvernment unilaterally established a zone for fisheries conservation and management of 200 miles around the Malvinas Islands, which constitutes a unilateral act involving powers that belong exclusively to the Power that exercises sovereignty over those islands. In view of that fact, which my GOvernment deeply regrets, since it will not help to bring about the reopening of negotiations, it is the international (~. Alzamo~a, Peru) community's duty to redouble its efforts to prevent any increase in tension and to induce the two parties to adopt a constructive attitude that will permit negotiations to begin on all aspects of the dispute including, obviously, the central aspect of sovereignty over the islands. This auestion cannot be left out of the talks because Britain's own decision to establish a fisheries conservation and management zone has made it even clearer that the auestion of sovereignty is central to the dispute and that therefore no negotiating process can lead to comprehensive and definitive solution, or demonstr&te the true political will of the parties, if it fails to recognize the key factor in the dispute, which is sovereignty over the islands. In that context my Government appreciates the dispassionate and open attitude of the Government of President Alfonsin, Which, despite the new elements of tension that have emerged~ has clearly and indubitably demonstrated the willingness of Argentina to move towards a process of peaceful negotiation, inclUding an immediate dialogue with the United Kingdom to create the necessary conditions of trust, in which case Argentina states that it is prepared to eRtab1ish the formal end of hostilities. We are convinced that there will be a response to this readiness for peace and dialogue. In this process the Secretary-General, as he indicates in his report, can assist the two parties in a frank and open dialogue to solve all the differences that currently' separate them. Peru, like all of Latin America, supports the claims of Argentina, as was recently demonstrated by the fraternal visit of President A1an Garcia to President A1fonsin as soon as the British decision was made public. That solidarity is based on two factors: the Latin-American tradition and the universal principle of deco1onization. (Mr. Alzamora, Peru) For those reasons I now reaffirm my Government's full willingness to contribute in a dedicated and disinterested spirit, together with the international community, to this cause, which is synonymous with Argentina, with Latin America and with non-alignment and is the cause of all peoples devoted to peace and the anti-colonial struggle. Mr. BARTKEVICR (Union of Soviet SOcialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The tense situation that continues in the South Atlantic necessarily gives rise to serious concern on the part of the Soviet Union. For many years the question of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands has been before the United Nations as part of the historical problem of the elimination of the system of colonialism. Indeed, in its first resolution on the question, 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, the General Assembly confirmed the need to put an end to colonialism in the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. The international community has repeatedly called on the Governments of the United Kingdom and Argentina to proceed without delay t9 conduct negotiations with view to seeking a peaceful solution to the problem, with due regard for the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. In recent years the United Nations has repeatedly reiterated its appeal for such negotiations to be held and to be conducted with despatch. An important milestone in the United Nations consideration of the problem was the adoption of General Assembly resolution 40/21. As we know, that resolution is designed to bring about a just solution of the problem of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands by means of negotiations between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom in the interest of normalizing relations between the two States and strengthening international peace and security. (Mr. Alzamora, Peru) The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction that Argentina has unswervingly demonstrated its readiness to seek a political settlement of tha question of the islands on the basis of United Nations decisions. The constructive and flexible approach the ~vernment of Argentina has adopted in recent years has met with a positive response from ~ll those who advocate the peaceful settlement of international disputes and conflicts and the strengthening of the foundations of international security. In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, the statement of the Argentine Government of 17 November of this year should be considered in that spirit. The position of the Soviet union on the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) has been stated a number of times from the rOSU\1ffi of the General Assembly. The Soviet UP.ion, as in the past, consistently upholds United Nations decisions on this problem. It views with sympathy the position of the Non-Aligned States on this question and in particular their statements of support for Argentina's right to the restoration of its sovereignty over the islands through negotiations. As is well known, that position was confirmed yet again by the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned M;)vement at its meeting on 20 November this year. An important and integral part of efforts to secure a Peaceful settlement of the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) is the mission of good offices which, in accordance with General Asserrbly resolutions, is being carried out by the secretary-General. The SOviet Union supports that mission. As the joint Soviet-Argentine statement of 18 OCtober emphasizes, in summing up the results of the visit to the Soviet Union of President Raul Ricardo Alfonsin of the Argentine Republic: "The Soviet union and Argentina confirm their position of principle concerning the need to achieve a political settlement of the problem of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) on the basis of releYant united Nations resolutions." In spite of the efforts of the international community, the unresolved conflict in the South Atlantic continues to be one of the sources of international attention. The reason for that situation is that, notwithstanding decisions of the General Assembly and the appeals of the Non-Aligned r.t:>vement, the United Kingdom continues to espouse a policy of rejection of a just and definitive settlement of the unresolved problems between the two countries. Clearly, such an unconstructive approach cannot yield positive results. No matter how different the positions of t.'1e two sides, the disputes, between them must be resolved at the negotiating (Mr. Bartkevich, USSR) table. There is no justification for the persistent policy of unilateral action and failure to respect United Nations decisions, which leads to a worsening of the situation with regard to the islands~ In this connection, it is appropriate to recall that at their Conference in Barare the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries made an urgent appeal to the Government of the United Kingdom to refrain from taking decisions that would imply the introduction of unilateral modifications in the situation while the sovereignty dispute remains unsettled. As the Secretary-General rightly observed in his report of 13 November on the auestion of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas): "Recent events have made clear that time is not necessarily working in favour of overcoming the obstacles that stand in the way of a peaceful and lasting settlement to the problems pending between the two countries." (A/4l/824, para. 6) The deliberate policy of militarization of the islands carried out by Britain, with the support of the United States, is a source of concern. A strategic military airfield has been established on the islands and there is a large garrison of British military ~~rsonnel, thereby turning the islands into a military beachhead in the region. It is clear that it is possible to detect in this policy gobal purposes which go beyond the framework of the sovereignty dispute over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). ~he Soviet Union resolutely condemns the policy of militarization of the region, which poses a direct threat to all the tatin American States, because it means that a dangerous focal point of conflict is being maintai.ned in the area. Ttp.re can be no doubt that the continuance of the colonial conflict on the auestion of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), and the increasing militarization of those (Mr. Bartkevich, USSR) islands are incompatible with the purpose of establishing a zone of peace and co-operation in the SOuth Atlantic, as called for in a resolution of this sessial of the General AsseDbly. The SOviet delegation confirms its position of principle in support of the prompt beginning of negotiations between Argentina and the uni ted Kingdom wi th a view to finding ways to resolve the dispute on the basis of the relevant decisions of the united Nations. In our opinion, the draft resolution submitted to the Assembly on this matter is Cbsigned precisely to bring about such an approach, therefore the SO'Iiet delegation will support it. Sir John TIDMSON (United Kingdom); This has become an annual ritual. It is not, I submit, a debate which has seriously changed, since I first took part in it in 1982. We have to go over the same facts aga in and aga in. I will begin by rehearsiklg some of them, but I will come at the end of what I have to say to what the Foreign Minister of Argentina said this morning. I am sorry to note that he appears not to be here, but perhaps his delegation will relate my remarks to him. (Mr. Bartkevich, USSR) In 1982 Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. on 17 Novenber 1986, in a public declaraticm, the Argentine Government offered to end the state of hostilities. Why has Argentina been so unwilling in the past to declare hostilities definitively at an end, and why is its declaration n04l subject to so many ccmditions? In consider lng this question it is wor th br iefly looking at the recent history of Anglo-Argentine relations. In 1982 the Argentine Government's attempt to win sovereignty with the gun failed. At the end of 1983 President Alfonsin was elected. We welcomed the restoration of dellDeracy to Argentina as did the rest of the world. My Government saw this as an opportunity for a new start, setting aside the differences of the recent past and getting down to negotiations that would help restore more normal relations. Within six months of the return of democracy to Argentina, British and Argentine delegations, at British initiative incidentally, met around a table in Berne. That meeting had been extremely carefully prepared. One of the most difficult elements in the preparation was agreeing on how to deal with the question of sovereignty. Unfortunately, and to .our deep regret, the Argentine side failed to observe the very precise agreement reached beforehand. As a result, the talkS failed. Since then, as the world is wearily aware, the sovereignty issue has dogged at every,turn the attempts we have made to make progress in Anglo-Argentine relations. But returning to my question, why has a democratic Government COlll1litted to the ways of peace continued to maintain a state of hostili ties? What profi t has Argentina drawn from maintaining tension in the South Atlantic? These 9re legitimate questions. The Argentine Government has provided no valid answers to them. The declaration made by the Argentine Government on 17 November takes us no further. It ccmtains no new elements and, as the Argentine Government has made (Sir John Thomscm, uni ted Kingdom) clear, is to be treated as a package. The proposal to end the state of hostilities is conditional upon my Government agreeing to enter global negotiations, which the Argentine Foreign Minister himself defined as including negotiations on sovereignty. In other words, my Government should agree to discuss the transfer of sovereignty wi th the Argentine GoI7ernment. We very much regret that even under a democratic Government Ar~entine policy towards Britain has been subordinated to pursuing the goal of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands by exploiting the heritage of mistrust and tension left by the predecessor GoI7ernment. But we have not allowed this Ar'ijentine approach to affect our attempts to re-establish the friendly relations that Britain >_as enjoyed with Argentina up to 1982. Despite the disappointment in Berne, we continued to take a series of initiatives aimed at the necessary goal of re-establishing contacts and thereby rebuilding Ill1tual confidence between the two Governments and peoples. Regrettably, these efforts have either been ignored or rejected by the Argentine Government. My Government has also sought areas in which we could co-operate with Argentina to our Ill1tual benefit. The fisheries issue provides a good example of this. The patrimony of the South Atlantic is under threat. We wanted to find a way to manage j.t effectively in the interests of all concerned. We supported a collaborative approach under FM auspices and sought Argentine co-operation. We knew that sovereignty would be a difficult issue but not one that was insurmountable. After all, Britain and Argentina co-operate within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty, notwithstanding the sovereignty dispute we have there. The same applies to the Convention on the Cooservation of Antarctic Living Mar ine . Resources which applies to the waters around South Georgia and the Antarctic convergence. These international frameworks show that what we were (Sir John Thomsoo, united Kingdom) aiming at was not impossible. It has been dme before. lily should it not be done again? I cannot answer that question. Perhaps the Argentine delegation can. As it became plain that Argentina had no intention of supporting a multilateral approach, and in view of the rapidly increasing fishing effort - from 200 boats two years ago to (Wer 600 boats today - and t..'le concomitant threat to the marine stocks, my Government had no choice but to act on conservation grounds. In taking action to establish a conservation and management zone, we have scrupulously observed international law. We hav.~ also made it plain that our a~rangements are interim and that our preference remains a multilateral solution. I stress that: our arrangements are interim and our preference remains a multilateral solution.. But from statements made by Argentine Government's spokesmen since, it appear s that Argentina now has no more interest in the nultilateral approad'a than before. Last year the Assembly adopted a resolution on the Falkland Islands that I argued was incomplet:.. and unbalanced. This support nay have been taken by the Argentine Government as an endorcement of its policy on the Falkland Islands. The year 1986 has shown what this endorsement led to. In waters over 200 miles from Argentina and less than 200 miles from the Falklands, Argent1~ne coast guard vessels did not shrink from using force to assert their Government's claim to sovereignty. several foreign fishing vessels were strafed and one was sunk, with consequent loss of life. The Argentine Government sought to justify its action in terms of sovereignty. At the same time, Argentina was negotiating with the soviet and Bulgarian Governments bilateral fisheries agreements which 3pply to Argent~na's Exclusive Economic zene which, according to Argentine law, purports to cover (Sir John Thomsm, united Kingdom) Fallclands. These actions undermined the prospects for a multilateral arrangement by forcing the issue of sOl7ereignty centre-stage. My Government believes that the AssellOly has previously endorsed resolutions that have not only failed to make a positive contr ibution but have rendered yet more intractable the differences between Britain and Argentina. In providing this support for Argentina, the Assembly has also ignored a vital pr inciple, and one moreover enshrined in the trlited Nations Charter - that is to say, the right to self-determination. OVer the last 150 years on the Falkland Islands, a small, homgeneous community, almost entirely of British stock, has developed its own political and social customs and conventions. They have made clear through their elected representatives that they do not want to become part of Argentina. Instead, they wish to remain Br itish with their ClrIn arrangements for local self-government. Those members who will do the representatives of the people o~ Falkland the courtesy "'f going to listen to them this afternoon before the Fourth Committee will hear them say themselves that they do not want to be Argentine, that they do wish to remain BritiSh, that they do feel that they, like others, have the right to self-determination. Go and listen to them and see whether you are con;,;inced that they, like other people, should be allowed to determine their own future. My Government is committed to supporting their right to self-determination. I am surprised that others are not. In the last few weeks we have had debates on Namibia, on apartheid, on Palestine, and so on, in which great stress has been laid on the universal right of self-determination. 1 could produce many quotations. If every delegation which had called for the application of the principle of self-determination were to support the Fallcland Islanders, they would have an OI7erwhelming majority. (Sir John Thomson, uni ted Kingdom) When this General Assembly recognizes the Falkland Islanders' right to self-determination it may be able to make a useful contribution to resolving the problems o~c~~anding between Britain and Argentina but for as long as it continues to adopt motions as prejudicial and unbalanced as the one before it today, and which we have been taken as endorsement for a policy that is at once unrealistic and irresponsible, my Government will reject them. But in doing so, I want also to make clear that my Government's commitment to achieving normal relations with Argentina remains, notwithstanding the many disappointments, as firm as ever. I listened with attention to the speech by the ~reign Minister of Argentina this morning. It seemed to me that he was concerned to make three principal points. The first dealt with the British declaration on the Falkland Islands interim conservation and management zone. The second dealt with the Argentine declaration of 17 November, which he quoted at length, and which he said was an expression of peace, rationality and caution. And the third was somehow to explain what last year's resolution was about, and presumably, this year's also, since the wording is in all substance the same. I should like to examine these three propositions which the Foreign Minister of Argentina put before us. The first was an attack on my Government's declaration of the Falkland Islands' interim conservation and management zone. He said that this had nothing to do with the conservation of fish stocks. Indeed, he said that it was solely motivated by our wish in some way or other to acquire an advan~age in the sovereignty dispute. This overlooks facts in all sorts of directions. First of all, the South Atlantic is the last great fishing area in the world for which there is no international multilateral regime concerned to manage with regard to the ecological problems as well as the economic problems, the fisheries of the area. Indeed, in last year's debate the same Foreign Minister of Argentina chided us for not paying enough attention. He said that an example of this fact is the problem of the fisheries in the South Atlantic where there is a risk of sauandering a major natural resource and creating serious disruptions in world markets. I am not sure what happened in the year intervening to change the Argentine position. What has actually happened is that the number of boats fishing in the South Atlantic has gone up dramatically, three-fold in the last three years. This next remark of mine may sound trivial, but perhaps it will help to bring home to the Assembly the realities of the situation there. Penguins are dying in thousands. Why were they dying last year and not in the same way in previous years? Because there is a shortage of fish. The ecology is itself speaking to us. We do not need to rely solely on the Food and Agriculture Organization of the united ~ations (FAO) reports. But if we do rely on FAO reports, we should read them carefully. The Foreign Minister has auoted very selectively from the interim report which came out last week. He did not refer, for example, to the passages which make it clear that the most valued fish, the sauid, is in danger. It is over-fished. And if this goes on, it will be eliminated from the waters of the South Atlantic. The Foreign Minister of Argentina did not mention that his country, under the same international law as my Government used, already has a 200-mi1e zone stretching from the ~hores of Arqentina. Nor did he make it clear that his Government also claims a 200-mi1e zone centred on the Falkland Islands. In these circumstances, since there is a dispute, it is hard to see why the United Kingdom can be making it worse by claiming 150 miles, for the time being, around the Falkland Islands. It seems to me that we are only following in the path already taken by Argentina. Indeed, we are forced to follow. If we had not made (Sir John Thomson, united Kingdom) such a declaration, we might have found Argentina arguing that since its law said the 200-mile centred on the Falkland Islands was Argentine, and we had done nothing corresponding, that we were in effect admitting their sovereignty. I repeat that for us conservation is the reason for the declaration. But as I have just indicated there is some tincture of sovereignty in the problem. I have mentioned the Argentine claims. We had not wanted to make a big fuss about them. These claims have existed for some time. But Argentina took a new step this year which brings the whole matter vividly before us. Argentina, after the united Kingdom had proposed to it a multilateral regime for the South Atlantic, and after a long delay l'.lading finally to an Argentine statement, that in principle they could consider a mUltilateral regime, after these two events, what did it do? It made bilateral fisheries agreements with Bulgaria and the USSR. I ask, in parenthesis here, who is it who is bringing the East-West struggle to the South Atlantic? These bilateral agreements are a challenge to the Falkland Islanders and to the United Kingdom Government. If they were made with the object of conservation of fisheries, then why not go, as we proposed, for a mUltilateral. agreement which would bring in all the fishing countries, not just two of them?* *Mr. Kabanda (Rwanda), ~ice-President, took the Chair. The fact that they were made with only two countries shows that there was a special Argentine national purpose her(:\ that had nothing to do with fisheries. Argerttina's object was to get those two countries hooked to the Argentine thesis that the waters for 200 miles around the Falkland Islands belonged to Argentina. That is where sovereignty comes in. It was not the British declaration at the end of OCtnber that brought sovereignty into the fisheries question: it was the original Argentine claim to exercise authority over 200 miles around the Falkland Islands, a claim wnich it Wlderlined by its two bilateral agreements - one of them wi th, of all people, the Scwiet Olion. Does that sound conciliatory? Does that sound like the way to begin a dialogue which will resolve all the problems between Britain and Argentina? I can think of steps that would have been more practical to that end. I can think of ways in 'Which both the people of the Falkland Islands and the people of Britain might have been reassured. But I can think of few ways in which both the Falkland Islanders and my people could be more insulted or more challenged, and more inclined to distrust what the Argentines say. Earlier this mcxning, Argentina criticized my Government for bringing sovereignty into the fisher ies question. I have nOtl laid out for the Assembly the sequence of events. I think it will be l.I'lderstood that we came very reluctantly to this declaration on fisher ies. We came to it basi08lly for conservation reasons, but also - I do not disguise - because we were being challenged on the sovereignty question. I come nCM to the second point made by the Foreign Minister of Argentina this morning. He sought to create a contrast between the alleged confrontation and expansion involved in the British fisheries declaration and the Argentine attitude in its declaration of 17 Novenber, which he characterized dS a declaration of peace, rationality and caution. (Sir John Thomsoo, United Kingdom) I am sorry to say that in his statement this morning the Fo~eign Minister allowed himself to describe my Government's declaration - the origins of which I have just explained - as "aggressive behaviour". He even suggested that maybe it was intended to "provoke armed incidents" (supra., p.l7). Well, there have been armed incidents in the South Atlantic. The Argentines have strafed fishing vessels even outside ~he 200 miles from the Argentine coast that they claim. In short, they are trying to exercise sovereignty in the waters that belong to the Falklands. Their action was so forcible that there was loss of life. Does that sound like British aggression? Besides, let us just think back to 1982. Who committed aggression then, and what did it cost my Government in men, money and anxiety to restore the position? How ridiculous it is t~ suppose that we would want to be involved in aggression in the South Atlantic again. It is expensiveJ it is contrary to our interestsJ and, if I may say so, it is contrary to the United Nations Charter - a document for which we have the greatest respect. We tried to underline our concern for peace in the South Atlantic by our vote here recently in favour of the draft resolution sponsored principally by Brazil and establishing a South Atlantic zone of peace. Much has been made of the offer in the Argentine declaration of 17 November to declare a cessation of hostilities. But it is, of course, an offer hedged about with all sorts of conditionsJ it is not the unconditional declaration that we are looking for. Only the other day Mr. Caputo told the press that even a cessation of hostilities was "conditional on Britain being at the outset ready to negotiate about pro:vereignty" - with the inevitable outcome being, as he himself has so often said, the transfer of sovereignty to Argentina. (Sir John Thomson, United Kingdom) The fact is that immediately after the conflict in 1982 Jfr'i Government took pronpt steps to confirm through the p~otecting Powers - Brazil in the case of Argentina, and switzerland in the case of the O\i ted Kingdom - that the surrender of Argentine forces on 14 June that year did indeed reflect a total cessation of hostilities. We proposed that if such confirmation were received, the exclusion zones imposed by both countries would be removed and trade restrictions would be lifted. But the Argentine response was that there ., 8 only ~ de facto c;:easation of hostilities and that it would be precarious so long as British forces remained in the Islands. I would remind the Assenbly that when the war began in 1982 there were 43 British soldiers in the Islands. Argentina has never withdrawn that formal statement of the Argentine position. NO!: is such a wi thdrawal implicit, let alone explicit, in its declaratioo of 17 November. Of course, Argentina's failure to declare a definitive cessation of hostilities has been an important consideration in British policy. I repeat that an uncoodi tional declaration such as we have made would give a welcome impetus to the normalization of relations. But the Assembly will be aware that we have not made such a declaration a pre-coodi tion for the first steps in this process. we are ready to talk even while the Arg~ntines maintain their position that hostilities have not ceased. Nor, incidentally, would it commit Britain to any particular step in return, and certainly not to discussioo of scwereignty. More relevant to the consideration of the future of the Islands is the impact of the conflict itself and Argentina's continuing insistence that any discussion on the subject could have only one outcome; the transfer of scwereignty to Argentina, irrespective of the wishes of the Falkland Islanders. That, as I have said many times, is totally unacceptable. Now we come to the third point. l'ilat does the d[aft resolution before us mean? In introducing the draft resolution this morning the Ambassador of Brazil said that it was absolutely neutral; that it did not prejudice the position of the parties. He said "i t includes no reference to the ••• positions of either party" (supra, p. 22). I am surprised, because this speech came immediately after the speech by the Foreign Minister of Argentina, in which he spoke about the resQlution last year, a resolution whose wording is identical in all substantive parts wi th this year's draft resolution, and said at the outset, speaking of resolution 40/21, that its essence was the sovereignty dispute which exists between the parties. We have here a conflict. On the one hand we are told that the draft resolution in no way refers to the position of either party; on the other hand we have one of the parties, saying that in fact the draft resolution, when it talks about resolving all the questions, includes the sovereignty displte. That is precisely the heart of the Argentine case, as the Argentine Foreign Minister so eloquently said this morning and as he has said on numerous previous occasions from this rostrum. So it is not true, I say with respect, that the draft resolution contains no reference to the position of either party. It contains the position of the Argentine Government; it does not contain the position of my Goverment. It is true that last year, when we discussed the draft resolution, the sponsors and the Argentine delegation claimed a great deal of credit for omitting the word "sovereignty" from the resolution. But now, this morning, we hear that it is the essence of the draft resolution - in other words, what I said from this rostrum last year is borne out by the Argentine delegation itself, although one year late. It is the essence of the draft resolution now before us, but that, I submit to the Assenbly, is not the essence of the displte. The essence of the dispute is really M1ether the Falkland Islanders should be able to say M1at their own future is to be. We use the grand term "self-determination". Last year Mr. Caputo said that he regretted the amendment dealing with self-determination which Britain had submitted. He said that it might prejudge the final solution to be found in the negotiations. He added: "Argentina has been, and always will be a staunch chanpion of the principle of self-determination of peoples", (A/40/PV. 92, pp. 9-10) I am sorry that he did not say that again today. I am sorrier still that Argentina does not accept that the principle of self-determination should be enjoyed by the Falkland Islanders. This is the heart of the matter. What is prejudging a solution is to say that scwereignty must be involved in any discussions. Mr. Capu to says in his declaration of 17 November and r epeated th is mor ning , ·we insist on the need for global negotiations". (supra, p. 13) Perhaps this conflict, Which, as I began by saying, has become an annual routine, reflects in some ways the national characteristic of the two peoples. For the Argentines it appears to be all or nothing: total sovereignty - and, since they are not going to get total sovereignty, nothing. We are ready to go step by step. We wish to be pragmatic. We are ready to discuss all the issues mentioned by the Argentines in their declaration of 17 Ncwenber - all the issues except sovereignty. Those issues were listed by the Foreign Minister of Argentina again this morning. He said that in addition to the sovereignty dispute there were the elimination of the consequences of the conflict - so here we have again the ending of hostilities - commerce and trade, diplomatic and consular relations, transport and communications and, whenever approp~iate, the matters relating to th~ conservation of fiShing resources. We could add to that list, for example, sport, air links and so on. (Sir John Thomsal uni ted Kingdom) I repeat that rrrj Government is ready to discuss all the matters at issuE' between us except the one question on which we know we cannot agree. Is it sensible to refuse to hold any discussions unless the one matter on which we caMot agree is first included? That means, certainly, that there will be no discussions. We deeply regret this. I ask the Argentine Foreign Minister whether he will not get up and tell us that, yes, for the sake of improving relations between two countries which for so long enjoyed good relations, he will be prepared to discuss these questions that he has listed as being at issue between us, the questions such as the elimination of the consequences of the conflict, commerce and trade, diplomatic and consular relations, transport and communications and, whenever appropriate, the matters relating to the conservation of fishing resources. Let us start with these practicalities, then, I think, relations will improve~ but if everything is held hostage to the decision to include sovereignty in the discussions, we shall make no progress. That is asking us to negotiate with a pistol at our heads. I do not believe that if anyone in this Hall were in the same position he would give in. We are ready for negotiations. Let us negotiate on all the many matters on which I have no doubt we can agree, and let us leave aside the one question on which I know we cannot agree. That is the way of praoticality~ that is the way of canpromise; that is the way in which the united Nations works. ME'. SllMUDIO (Panama) (interpretation from Spanish): My country gives the question of the Malvinas Islands pride of place among our international concerns, because in this item two essential bases of our foreign policy which are rooted in the historic experience of my country converge. I refer to the struggle against colonialism in all its forms and manifestations and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. (Sir John Thomsoo uni ted Kingdom) Consequently, it is no accident that Panama should be among the fifteen Latin American countries which in 1965 sponsored resolution 2065 (XX), the first adopted by the General Assembly on the question of the Malvinas, in which the Assembly invited: "the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee on the Situatic~ with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem, bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)". (resolution 2065 (XX), operative para. 1) Since that time, we have consistently supported all resolutions, decisions and consensuses of the General Assembly aimed at reaching a peaceful settlement of the sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the united Kingdom regarding the Malvinas Islands. With that same hope, Panama last year supported the resolution of 27 November 1985, in which the General Assembly once again requested: "the Governments of Argentina and the united Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to initiate negotiations with a view to finding the means to resolve peacefully and definitively the pennin~ problem9 between both countries, including all aspects on the future of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), in accordance with the Charter of the united Nations". (resolution 40/21, operative para. 1) It was with a sense of disappointment that we received the report of the SecretarY-General to the Assembly in which it is pointed out that it has not yet (Mr. Samudio, panama) proved possible to find a common hasis for the parties to begin the kind of talks provided for in resolution 40/21 of the General Assembly. Our disappointment was all the greater upon le~rning of the declaration on south-west Atlantic fisheries, issued on 29 October 1986 by the Government of the united Kingdom, claiming to regulate fishery resources in an area up to 200 miles round the Malvinas Islands and exercising jurisdiction over the continental shelf of those islands. That unilateral measure has added new sources of tension and conflict to the dispute between the two countries and has created a situation that endangers peace and security in the region, in open contradiction of resolution 41/11 in which, two days earlier, the General Assembly had declared the South Atlantic a zone of peace and co-operation, with the affirmative vote of the United Kingdom. Expr~essin~ the fe 11ngs of the entire Latin American continent, the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) meeting in Guatemala on 11 November this year, adopted a resolution exp~essing: "its deep concern with regard to this new element of potential tension and conflict introduced by the declaration of 29 OCtober". We believe that measures such as that adopted by the British Government are hampering the efforts of the international community, especially the Secretary-General, to find a peaceful, just and lasting solution to the dispute over the sovereignty of the Ma1vinas Islands and at the same time violating the resolutions of the General Assembly recommending to the parties not to introduce unilateral changes in the situation and co refrain from acts which might aggravate it. My delegation wishes to pay tribute to the peace-loving sentiments of the present Government of President Raul A1fonsin which, given the situation created by (Mr o Samudio, Panama) the declaration of 29 OCtober, has shown clear evidence of generosity, a sense of international responsibility and sound judgement by sUbmitting, on 17 November, a new proposal to the united Kingdom to begin an open dialogue between the two countries, designed to create conditions of confidence that could open the way for the beginning of negotiations. We consider t~e Argentine proposal as an important initiative in the right direction. Fbr that reason, we cannot conceal our disappointment at the negative attitUde of the BritiSh Go~ernment towa~ds this new peace initiative from Argentina. We hope, however, that the United Kingdom will reconsider its position and adopt a constructive attitude, so that both countries, in conformity with the unanimous appeal of the international community and with the good offices of the Secretary-General, may speedily arrive at formulations for beginning negotiations to settle their differences once and for all. With regard to the item under discussion, the General Assembly has before it draft resolution A/41/L.19, introdUCed by a group of countries whicn Panama wishes to join as a co-sponsor. We believe that the draft is in accord with the unwavering policy of this Assembly of promoting peaceful solutions to international disputes. Accordingly, it reiterates its appeal to the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to initiate negotiations with a view to finding the means to resolve peacefully and definitively the problems pending between the two countries, inclu~in9 all aspects on the future of the Malvinas Islands, in accordance with the Ur.~~ed Nations Charter. Adoption of this draft will give both countries a new opportunity to break the present deadlock and sit dOWP ~t the negotiating table in an honourable manner with the support of the who,le inte~national community. (Mr. Samudio, panama) Panama has consistently maintained its support for Argentina's legitimate struggle to recover the Ma1vinas Islands as part of its territorial heritage and to exercise effectively its sovereignty and jurisdiction over those islands. Panama is a country which itself has endured colonial incursions upon its territory. The struggle of several generations of our countrymen have shown us that the path of dialogue and negotiations reauires patience and tenacity, but we have also learned that it is the only way to secure just and definitive solutions to international conflicts.

Several representatives have asked to speak in exercise of their right of reply. I should like to remind Members that, in conformity with decision 34/401 of the General Assembly, statements in exercise of right of reply are limited to 10 minutes for the first intervention and to 5 minutes for the second, and that statements should be made by representatives from their seats. Mr. DELPECH (Argentina) (interpretation fr~m Spanish): As the rules of procedure stipulete that the right of reply must in practice be limited to 10 minutes, I wish to enter a reservation to the effect that I might ~~haps amplify some statements at our next meeting_ Having said this, my delegation should perhaps congratulate the representative of the United Kingdom on his ability to present the Argentine position in a manner which is, to say the least, unclear to t1"le rest of the Assembly, although we feel that what tlas said by the Foreign Minister in the Assemhly last year and again this yeur, was ahsolutely clear. (Mr. Samudio, Panama) I do not intend to prolong the debate at this time, but some parts of the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom reauire a response, which had been largely anticipated in the statement of the Foreign Minister this morning. Some aspects were clearly pointen out, such as the auestion of alleged British conservation measures embodied in the ~eclaration of 29 OCtober. It is auite clear to us that the FAO report, as indicated by the Foreign Minister this morning, clearly shows that there is no ur.gent need in the region for the auestion of conservation to ~ raised. Statements made by the representative of the united Kingdom himself that there has been an increase from 200 to 600 in the number of fishing vessels during the last few years indicate that it is precisely t~e lack of control and the impossibility of exercising Argentina's jurisdiction with respect to patrolling the area which has led to that situation. The fact that there has been a threefold incre~se in the fishing fleets compared with the past two years is due to the absence of Argentine control and sho~g that Argentina is the party concerned, among other things, over the need to exercise that jurisdiction. The FAO report also states that none of the species is in real danger of extinction. In any case, if there has been an exponential increase in the fish haul, that is a ~irect conseauence of the military measures imposed by London in the south-west Atlantic. As I have just said, these Ih(!asures have prevented mt country from exercising the necessary administration, COl.trol and jurisdiction in the region. But over and above that justification and the legal connotations the ~iscussion on this matter. may have, I believe that the General Assembly must almost unanimously agree that the measures mentioned in the British declaration are provocative. It has become perfectly clear that there is no justification for a (Mr. Delpech~ Argentina) A fundamental matter for the Argentine delegation is the British allegation that Argentina does not uphold the principle of self-determination. Argentina has always upheld that principle, as it did during the lengthy struggle of the peoples of Asia and Africa precisely against BritiAh colonial rule. Argentina was and always will be at the side of those peoples, just as we are at the side of the people of Namibia and of South Africa. Resolution 4U/2l, which has just been criticized by the United Kingdom, uneauivocally endorses the Argentine position, namely, the need for peaceful negotiations to solve the problem. It is really tWisting logic to argue, after the statement of the Foreign Minister this morning and thp. hrilliant exposition of the suhstance of the draft resolution by the representative of Brazil, that the Argentine position is basically to deal only with the issue of sovereignty. That is not true. Last year the Foreign Minister clearly demonstrated to the Assembly that for Argentina "global negotiations" mean a discussion precisely of all the problems which each of the parties is in a position to raise at the negotiating table. I repeat, on the specific instructions of my Foreign Minister, that the Argentine position is that the essence of this problem is the sovereignty issue, as the British representative himself has just recognized. The issue lR that at the negotiating table each of the parties will present all its problems and that from those global negotiations, which we consider to be fundamental, a definitive solution will he possible. The dispute has been recognized in various official documents not just by the United Kingdom, but also by various bodies of the world community represented by this General Assemhly. In conclusion, I wish to clarify two points made by the representative of the united Kingdom. The failed talks in Bern were a great sou~ce of fru~tration for (Mr. DelpechL_Argentina) the Argentine delegation. Tbus, in the earlier conversations between the parties on preparations for those talkS, a basic prerequisite was established that there should be an open agenda, with no interpretation of any kind or any parties other than the two delegations. Just as the talks were beginning, the united Kingdom officially disclosed its delegation's position to the auth~rities present. some of the ideas discussed at the time, wben officially translated at the meeting, impeded continuation of the talks because some of the British positions officially presented tbere hampered further progress in the dialogue. Before concluding my remarks, I wish to make the Argentine position absolutely clear. Argentina recognizes, as does the international colllllunity as a wbole, and as the united Kingdom bas also recogniZed, that there is obviously a sovereignty dispute. T~is does not mean, as the representative of the United Kingdom indicated, that the question of sovereignty is enbodied in the draft before us. The draft, on which a vote will be taken tomorrow, seeks, as did last year's draft, to ensure that both parties meet at the negotiating table as soon as possible and try to settle their dispute. The fact that Argentina will bring up the sovereignty issue at the negotiating table does not prevent the other party from bringing up problems or adducing arguments that it considers necessary. NothS.~g is to be excluded. Everything 1:3 open for discussion at those global negotiations. Tbat is What not only Argentina but the sponsocs of the draft resolution as well are really trying to bring about. Mr. MACIEL (Brazil): In his statement sir John Thomson said that contrary to what I said in my introductory statement, tJraft resolution A/4l/L.19 was not neutral. I would chaUenge the Ambassador of Her Britannic Majesty to point to one word that would make this draft resolution partial or would favour one of the parties. (Mr. Delpech, Argentina) tt woul,,' he natural, of COllrse, fi)r thl~ rJllited Kingdom, which is an interested party, to read into the araft resolution whatever might favour its views in the General Assembly. It might also be in the interest of Argentina, which is also an interested party, to read into the draft resolution whatever might favour its own interests in the General Assembly. But I do not think that the contradiction that was pointed out by the United Kingdom representative exists. Minister Caputo said: . (spoke in Spanish) -a simple, almost elementary resolution, free of any value judgement, which clearly stated the crux of the problem, its essence: the sovereignty dispute between the parties". (supra, p. 6) (continued in English) Both parties have agreed that the essence of the problem is the sovereignty dispute. I will reiterate what I said in my statement: (Spoke in Spanish) "The text we are SUbmitting does not in fact enter into the merits of the issue at all. In absolutely neutral terms, it sets forth a negotiating process which, while not prejudicing the legitimate positions of the parties, is capable of solving the set of problems that now divide them." (pp. 21, 22) (continued in English) In my introductory statement I also said: (Spoke in Spanish) "at no time has there been any desire on our part to leave aside important aspects of the matter pertaining to the future of the islands, including the need to take into account during the negotiating process the satisfaction of the interests of its inhahitants".(~) (continued in English) Turning now to the text of the draft resolution, I do not find anything in the text which could be said to be partial, nor do I find any contradiction between what Minister caputo said and what I said. Hence, my challenge to the Ambassador of the United Kingdom is valid. I ask him to let me know what is partial or not neutral in this draft resolution - not right now, since it is late, but at another time. Sir John THOMSON (United Kingdom): I now have two separate comments to which I have to reply. I have to reply to the Argentine Ambassador - and I reiterate my regret that its Foreign Minister was not present to hear the British case - and I have to reply to the Brazilian Ambassador. I hope~ although these are two separate points, to make my reply fairly brief. The Brazilian Ambassador challenged me to say what it was in the draft resolution that we found partial. The draft resolution has been skilfully drafted, as I conceded with regard to the draft'resolution last year, but it is partial because in operative paragraph 1, which is the essential paragraph, it talks about resolving peacefUlly and definitively the p~oblems pending between the two countries, including all aSPeCts on the future of the Falkland Islands, and so on. We have been told repeatedly by the Foreign Minister of Argentina that it is essential for him that these talks should include sovereignty. I have repeatedly told the General Assembly that it is essential for the United Kingdom that these talks should not include sovereignty. Therefore, we are at once in a position of conflict over these words, and it is perfectly clear that they are partial, and partial in favour of Argentina. So there is no doubt that this draft resolut~ion is what Argentina wants and not what Britain wants. Moreover, it is not the case that, as the Brazilian Ambassador said, (Mr. Maciel, Brazil) both parties agree that the essence of the problem is the sovereignty dispute. Those who listened to my statement earlier would have heard me say that, while there is a sovereignty dispute, the essential question is the question of self-determination. So I do not think that the Brazilian Ambassador is correctly representing the British position. Unfortunately, the situation is rather plain. The Argentines say, "no talk unless sovereignty is includedJ we will not talk about anything else." The British say, "~. ~ill talk about everything else, but not about sovereignty." That is why, with the phrase "all aspects on the future" in operative paragraph l of the draft resolution, it is partial. It would be helpful, I think, if we could be quite clear as to what it is that the Foreign Minister of Argentina means. I quoted from the beginning of his statement - this was repeated by the Brazilian Ambassador - where he referred to the essence of the problem being the sovereignty dispute which exists between the parties, but I now quote from the end of his statement, where he said: ·So long as the core problem continues to be ignored, we shall not be able to solve the accessory problems." (supra, p. 21) Is that not exactly what I have been complaining of this morning? Did I not at the conclusion of my statement Q~k the Foreign Minister of Argentina to get up and say whether he was willing to discuss with us all the problems he listed, other than the sovereignty question? I have heard no answer to that, and that is really the essence of what I have to say in reply to the Argentine Ambassador. He said at one point that it was pushing logic a bit far to say that the heart of the Argentine case is to deal only with sovereignty. Well~ its FOreign Minister has said that the heart of the Argentine case is sovereignty. I have not said that the Argentines want to deal only with sovereignty. What I have said is that they refuse to deal with anything else unless they deal with sovereignty. So, again, I (Sir John Thomson, united Kingdom) do not think that the Argentine Ambassador was representing me quite correctly there. Howevar, we come back to the essence of the matter. We British are ready to discuss all the questions at issue, except sovereignty. (Sir John Thomson, United Kingdom) The Argentines are not willing to discuss any of the questions at issue unless sovereignty is included. There is a real difference, and the draft resolution goes in the Argentine directicm. That is why I am opposed to what both the Atgent1ne Ambassador and the Brazilian Ambassador said and, most of all, to the draft resolution. Mr. DELPECH (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): A little while ago I said that the representative of the united Kingdom was catrying logic to extremes that were a bit hard to follow. Re tells us clearly that for the United Kingdom the question of sovereignty is not a subject for discussion in any negotiations. I l«>uld like to read from the statement which the Foreign Minister of Argentina made this morning. He referred to paragraphs 145 and 146 of the 1984 report of the House of Commons Foreign Relations Committee. I should like to quote parag:aph 146 again to shed Cl little light on this rather canplex discussion, which seems also to be the intention of the British representative. It states: "There is Wldoubtedly a strong case for the regUlation and licensing of fishing in the areas of the Falklands and dependencies, but there are considerable political and practical problems to overcome. In the first place, if it were not for the existence of the sovereignty dispute, it is a matter which would be expected to be pursued in consultations with the Falkland's neighbours, including Argentina." I repeat that this report of the House of Commons Foreign Relations Committee cleatly states this as the first problem, saying "if it were not for the existence of the sovereignty dispute". Those are the words "sovereignty dispute". so this British report makes it quite clear that there is a sovereignty dispute. (Sir John Thomscm, un!ted Kingdom) The Minister then quoted paragraph 42 of the report, which says; "The Government agree with the view of the Conmittee (paras. 143-145) ..... (supra, p. 16) What sort of logic is this? If the Government of the United Kingdom agrees with the report of the House of Commons Foreign Relations Committee, which refers to a "sovereignty dispute", I ask myself - repeating the question of my Foreign Minister - how a permanent mellber of the security Council, which cle;~j:ly recognizes that there is a sovereignty dispute over a given territory, can disregard and declare publicly in the General Assemly that it will discuss everything except the question of sovereignty, the dispute over which is recognized by bodies of that Government? As the Argentine Foreign Minister said this morning, the draft resolution does not raise the problem of sovereignty; it indicates that the parties should discuss all pending problems. We recognize as does the international conmunity, and even the United Kingdom, that there is a sovereignty dispute. I wooder why that dispute cannot be discussed together with all the other practical or substantive questions that Argentina is prepared to discuss. I therefore want to make it clear to the General Assent>ly that the United Kingdom has" recognized that there is a sovereignty dispute, which is the background to this entire situation that we and other countries in the General Assembly are expel: iencing. Sir John TII>MSON (United Kingdom); My Government, my people and, above all, the people of the Falkland Islands are only too vividly and sadly aware that there is a sovereignty dispute. We have no doubt about our s0\7ereignty over the Falkland Islands; nor have the Falkland Islandsrs. But somebody else has raised a dispute with us. That is a fact. My Government has never denied that there is a (Hr. Delpech, Argentina) sovereignty dispute, and the Anbassador of Argentina should not be in any confused about this. We agree that there is a dispute which Argentina has raised against rrt.y Government. That is beside the point, however. The poinie that we were discussing was how we were to get into negotiations. Britain is proposing that we negotiate on all the matters except sovereignty, on which we have once again this morning demonstrated that we are not going to be able to agree. Let us try and get on wi th the other points on which there is a good prospect that we can agree. Whereas Argentina is saying yet again, and I repeat the fllords 1 quoted from the Foreign Minister's speech this morning: "So long as the core problem continues to be ignored, we shall not be able to solve the accessory problems." (supra, p. 21) so there we are at a standstill. WOuld it not be more sensible to try and get on with ".hose accessory problems, as the Foreign Minister calls tbe4U, which he listed in his speech this morning - diplomatic relations, trade, and so on - and try and improve relations that way? That is what I asked and it is to that that I have not yet received an answer. Mr. BATLLE (uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): As a sp::>nsor of the draft resolution under consideration by the General Assenbly, it is my understanding that the Ambassador of Brazil has clarified all the points, and we fully agree with his comments. I believe that we have a right to respond to the representative of the united Kingdom regarding his interpretation of this draft resolution. When the spo;\sors of the draft resolution state that we include all aspects on the future of the Malvinas Islands, ·all aspects" includes all points of views, (Sir John Thomson, uni ted Kingdom) those of the Republic of Argentina and those of the Uni ted Kingdom. To the extent that a country may not be prepared to discuss all viewpoi:lts, that country is denying essential principles of international law and peace among nations. The one that is not prepared to do so is the united Kingdom, which in this matter, this body and this Organization has special responsibilities as a permanent member of the Secur i ty Council. "All aspects" means all points of views. It does not mean thae all points of views will be accepted, it means that they will all be discussed, and if the United Kingdom refuses to discuss them it is denying the fundamental principles on the basis of which we are all meeting here. (r.tr. Batlle, uruguay>