A/47/PV.44 General Assembly

I congratulate the States that have been elected members of the Committee on Programme and Coordination. May I take it that it is the wish of the Assembly to conclude its consideration of sub~:Ltem (.) of agenda item 161 It was so decided.

I therefore request those representatives wishing to inscribe their names to do so as soon as possible. I now invite the Dlrector General of th~ International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Bans Blix, to present the report of the Agency for the year 1991. Mr. BLIX (Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA»: In December this year the fiftieth anniversary of the world's first controlled nuclear chain reaction will be celebrated. The brilliant scientific feat of Enrico Fermi in Chicago has left a deep imprint on the world ever since. The development to which his discovery gave rise raised hopes at one stage for electricity generation "to cheap to meter". Later, it raised fears of the very extinction of humanity. For five decades we have lived with the d~al challenge of preventing the use of the atom for weapons and of exploiting its many peace~uluses. For most of its e%istenc~ the Unite~ ~ations has been inhibited in its actions by a cold-war stalemate, the essence of which was an ever spiralling nuclear arms race. The IAEA was established 35 years ago to promote the peaceful of the atom for development and to verify that commitments to exclusively peaceful uses were respected. This has been in no small measure a successful operation, part of the reason being that the lAEA has had a high degree of pr~ctical East/West cooperation despite the cold war. The intergovernmental activities pursued in and through the lAEA have contributed to the evolution and world-wide use of a bread range of nuclear applications, inclu~inq nuclear power plants generating some 17 per cent of the world's electricity. The ~ctivities of the IAEA have also constituted an important part of the international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The dual challenge which was presented by President Eisenhower in his "Atoms for peace" speech before the United Nations General Assembly in 1953 is still valid. Last month the General Conference of the IAEA left no doubt that it wished the Agency to meet vigorously both challenges. It urged the Agency to continue promoting the use of nuclear technology, inter alia, through work in the fields of nuclear safety and waste disposal and through the dissemination of numerous nuclear techniques in the fields of medicine, agriculture and industry. .\t the same time it welcomed the various measures taken in in the past year t: strengthen the lAEA's safeguards system as a part of the challenge to reduce the risk of a further 6pread of nuclear weapons. When in my report. today·I dftvote the larqest: part to safeguardlS and non-pruliferatlon, it is because 1$0 much new has oc:;cuJ:'lI:'ed in this area in the past yea~, nut because larger resources or efforts have been devoted to it tha."1 to the prOllOtion of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Thus, the two challei'lCj'es of the early days of nuclear energy remain, but today's world is drastically different from that of the 19S0s. Most importantly~ ~ a~~ moving into ~.vorld where, at long last~ less resources will be used for military purpOSQS, including nuclear arsenals - a development that favours non-proliferation. On the other hand, many new serious problems now face humanity. Qne of them, which has a bearing on nuclear power, is the need for groving energy production at a time vhen there iE increasing concern about the effects upon the global climate of emissions of greenhouse qases, notably the carbon diozide emissions that are associated with the use of all fossil fuels. I shall revert to this issue later. At this point I should lite to address the issue of non-proliferation and the lAEA's role in the efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Today the risk of military conflict between the qreat Powers is rapidly receding, and the consequences in the form of disarmament, including accelerated nuclear disarmament, are as visible as they are welcome. The easier cooperation between the great Powers is also helping to settle many long-standing local or reqional conflicts. This new climate and the process of democratization i~ a number of countries are factors which favour non-proliferation. Let me cite some significant developments. Argentina and Brazil have decided to open all their nuclear installations to lAEA inspection, and following the recent adoption of some amendments there is a very good chance that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America - the Treaty of Tlatelolco - will come into force and make the whole of Latin America a nuclear-weapon-free zone. (Mr. Bliz. Director General, DB) South Africa has joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the !AEA has been invited to insspect all nuclear installations in that count~. In this new climate, African States are renewing efforts to draft a treaty making Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has concluded the safeguards agreement required of it under the NPT, and the first inspections have taken place. China and France have joined the NP'r, so that the Treat.y is now supported by all the declared nuclear-weapon States. In the Middle East, there is new hope that peace talks will lead to agreement on a nuclear-weapon-free zone or a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. At the General Conference of the IABA last month a resolution was adopted without a vote noting the consensus support for such a concept and calling upon the Director General of the IAEA to continue consultations with Governments in the region and work on a model for safeguards verification. I shall do so. A new wave of accessions to the NPT is coming, or expected to come, from States that formerly were parts of the Soviet Union: the Baltic States, Ukraine, Belarus and others. The lAEA is in contact with several of them in order to prepare for the application of lAEA safeguards. All this augurs well for a succesaful conference in 1995 to extend the non-proliferation Treaty. However, some other elements would be of signal importance for achieving a ~niversal commitment by non-nuclear-weapon States to non-proliferation and an unlimited extension of the NPT. An agreement through which a date for the cessation of all nuclear testing was accepted by all nuclear-weapon States would be such an ~lement. It would signal that the world would no longer tryout new and "better" nuclear: weapons. Another (Hr. IsH... DiLector General, DB) highly positive element: would :bG ea agreement on a cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons ptt.rp9sas. Such. an agreement would seem logical in a world moving towards nuclear disanuu18nt - and perhaps not very burdensome in view of the difficulties which ezist today in disposing of surplus weapons-grade material. The foregoing considerations may seem too optimistic. Yet at no time since disa~ament talks began hes the political climate seemed more favourable than now for far-r~aching agreements. The safeguards system which the IABA has now been operating for over 25 years was the world's first on-site inspection system. It has great merits, but also limitations. I shall discuss both, and I shall begin with some thoughts on the potential further use of the system in the contezt of nuclear di8a~ament. Given adequate resources, IABA safeguards could be employed to verify the peaceful storage or use of fissionable material that is recovered from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, if the world wants international assurances that such material is not goin9 into Dew weapons. A cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes could also be v9rified by international safeguards. The safeguarding of enrichment and reprocessing plants, though a difficult task, is a problem to which much international work has already been devoted and a task which is already ODe of the lAEA's duties. There could also be renewed consideration of the concept of so-called international plutonium storage - that is to say, arrangements under which the growing quantities of separated plutonium from the peaceful cycle and quantities of plutonium expected from dismantled weapons would be subjected to special controls, which would give additional assurances concerninq (Mr. Blix. Director General, !AlA) non-diversion and an exclusively peaceful use. The statute of the IAnA envisages a function of this kind for the Agency. While the IAEA's safeguards system is a resou~ce that could be more extensively used by the international community, its limitations, too, must be considered - and remedied. In a world of fewer weapons there needs to be great confidence that no State is violating commitments and secretly producing fissionable material for weapons or, indeed, making new nuclear weapons. The case of Iraq showed that it was possible in a very closed and controlled society to mount a sizeable secret effort for the enrichment of uranium and for weapons dev~lopment without this being detected by the safeguards system. What can be done and what is being done to minimize the risk of the same thing happening again in the future? Public discussion often focuses on forcaful inspections. While these are important, it must be recognized that information on where and what to inspect is the first and basic requirement. It is not possible for inspectors to visit and examine every building and basement in a foreign country, and random visits will not help very much. Inspectors must have access to information leading them to sites and installations of possible interest. In the case of post-war inspections in Iraq, relevant information about sites has b~en obtained, through the United Nations Special Commission, from Governments. In the strengthened safeguards system now taking shape in the IAEA, the information provided by the inspected State will be supplemented by other data, for instance data from other States concer~ing the export and i,nport of nuclear material and certain types of equipment. Had such data regarding Iraq been available to the IAEA and analysed, it is probable that special explanations and visits would have been (Mr. Vlis, Director GeLeral, !AlA) requested by the Agency. Any data, wb.ather obtained by the IABA through its analysis of declared nuclear activities or from external sources, must obviously be critically analysed and assessed to avoid unnecessary suspicions and false alarms. It must be recognized that there is a special difficulty in verifying the completeness of a nuclear inventory when the IAEA is given this task in respect of a n"clea~ progrmrnne which has been going on in a territory for a long time and has attained a certain size, as is at present the case in South Africa and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and as will be the case in some countries which were parts of th9 Soviet Union. In the case of South Africa, the General Assembly has requested tbe Director General of the IAEA to report on the completeness of the inventory of South Africa's nuclear installations and material. The Agsncy has carried out a large number of inspections of South African facilities aad locations outside declared facilities. It has carried out an extensive audit of historical operating and accounting ~ecords and performed a large number of analyses. With the cooperation of the South African authorities, lAEA inspectors have been able to visit all the sites they asked to see - declared or not declared, military or civilian - and they have found no evidence that the inventory is incomplete. o HOor is the IAEA in possession of any other information suggesting the ~xistence of any undeclared facilities or nuclear material. Naturally, if relevant information were obtained suggesting the need for access to additional facilities, locations or data, the Agency would request such access. The report of the Agency on this matter has been transmitted to the United, N~tions. (Mr. Bliz. Dfr§ctor General, .DU) A problem similar to the one I have described reg~xding South Africa is encountered in the verification of the initial inventory presented by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea under the safeguards agreement which entered into force on 10 April this year. Here, only three inspection missions have been perform0d so far. and much work remains. Cer~ain steps taken by the Damocratic People's Eepublic of Korea ha~e facilitated the task. Some o%iginal historical operating records have been provided for ozamination and analysis. klso, as in the case of South Africa, the Agency has been given a standing invitation to send officials to sites and in~tallations regardless of whether th&y are included in the initial declaration of the Democratic I1eople's Republic of Korea. Such invitat.ions, if lived up to in practice, are of co~rse uBeful. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has cooperated with us in organizing a visit by IAEA officials in September, and I expect prompt assistance will be offered in connection with a further visit. Over time, the acceptance of such visits and openness and assistance to them will help to create a record of cooperation and transparency. A right of unimpeded access for inspectors to relevant sites and material is certainly of crucial importance when information is available suggesting the need for inspection of specific sites. In the case of inspections in Iraq, the United Nations and the IAEA have obtained the ~ight of unimpeded access under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and an exchange of letters of 14 May 1991 between the Secretary-General and the Foreign Minister of Iraq. This right relates t·) any sites, installations, equipment, persons, or documents. In the case of routine IAEA safeguards inspections, rules exist which allow a recipient State to reject inspector designations and to subject (Mr. Bl1z, Director GeDAEal, llIA) the visit of inspec~ors to visa r~quirements. Once a designation has been accepted or a visa issued, however'.. there is a right to visito I have repeatedly urS_"'" that these restrictions be eliminated, th&t all Agency inspectors be accepted as the international ci~il servants which they are, and that they be exempt from visa requirements and allowed entry on the basis of a United Nations laissez-passer and a certificate indicating that they are cuminq Qn inspection dut,.. Some p!"lOq!"ess has been mad5 towardl!! abolishing visa requirements or issuing multiple visas or accepting inspectors without a special designation procedure; but much remains to be done to facilitate inspections. In the past year the Board of Governors of the lAEA has confirmed the right of the Agency to perform special inspections when there are reason~ to believe that installations or material which should have bee~ declared have not been so declared. No use has yet been made of this right. There is no doubt that in the case of Iraq the readiness of the Security Council to support the right of unimpeded inspection has been of great importance. It is reassuring that, in the summit statement of 31 January 1992, the Council emphasized the int&gral role in the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty of fully effective lAEA ~afeguards and that the members of the Council declared that they "will talce appropriate measures in the case of any violations notlfiled to them by the IAEA." (8/23500, Pp 4) The relationship agreement ,f 14 November 1951 between the United Nations and the !AEA contains rules all,~in; prompt interaction between the United Nations, including the Security Council, and the IAEA. Any denial of access (Mr. Blis. Director General, .DB) for inspection or any other a~parent violations could speedily be placed before the Council. In the case of lraq, the IAEA has now performed 14 inspection missions, on which reports have been submitted to tbe Security Council through the Secretary-General. In response to the first task laid down by the Council, that of mapping Iraq's nuclear progr8llll\8, the Agency has been able ovel' the past year to put together a picture that is relatively consistent and coherent. However, as the Iraqi authorities have refused to provide information on sources of foreign procurement and foreign technical advice, there could still be missing elements in the picture. Inspections must continue of any sites or objects that may be designated by the United Nations Special Commission on the basis of new information that may beco~~ available to it. Some elements of the long-term monitoring have already been phased in side by side with investigative inspections. Considering that Iraq's ) scientific and technical knowledge remains largely intact, such monitoring is clearly of great importance, the more so as the clandestine procurement network is still in place. It must be kept in mind, on the other hand, that the vast infrastructure needed for any revival of a prohibited programme for the production of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material in Iraq has been destroyed or rendered harmless, reservation being made for the possible continued existence of undetected installations. I now turn to the other side of the nuclear challenge, that of ezploiting the peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology for development in medicine, agriculture and industry. While at the time of Enrico Fermi's (Mr. Bllx, Director General, lAD) experiment in Chicago 50 years ago, "nuclear" mainly meant research and science, ~e practical applications are now many and significant. Let me give a few examples. I mentioned that, today, 17 per cent of the world's electricity comes from nuclear-power reactors - slightly less than the 20 per cent that comes from hydro power. Today every third patient in industrialized countries is examined or treated by some nuclear-related method, either for therapy or diagnostic. Today, the cotton crop in Pakistan and the rice crop in Indonesia have been greatly boosted by the use of suitable mutagens, that is to say, new strains produced through mutations induced by irradiating seeds. Today, nuclear methods are used in animal husbandry to measure the efficiency of protein uptake from various locally available foodstuffs. Based on such measurements, optimum combinations of local feeding materials for buffaloes have been introduced in India and Indonesia, which has led to a dramatic increase in buffalo milk and meat production. I shall Dot prolong this list of examples of nuclear techniques which help to maintain or restore health, boost industrial production and promote the production and preservation of food. I should underline, however - in view of the expectations of the Rio Conference on Environment and Development that all organizations in t"'1e United Nations family should contribute to the fulfilment of the Agenda 21 - that nuclear techniques have a remarkably wide use not only in development but also in the monitoring and protection of the environment. Let me give two examples of this. Isotopes a~e a powerful tool in the fight against groundwater and soil contamination through exces&ive use of fertilizers. They allow precise measurement of the amount of fertilizer that goes into the plant, so that the most appropriate fertilizer regime can be established for any particular agronomic systam. Similarly, nuclear techniques allow the determination of the amount of nitrogen which different crop plants obtain from the soil. This has not only led to the development of better fertilizer strategies but also helped in the selection of the most officient nitrogen-fixing plant va~ieties within each speciss, reducing the need for nitrogen fertilizer, to the benefit of the environment and the economy of the countries involved. Most controversial - but also most interesting - is the question of how helpful nuclear power is and could be in generating the increasing amounts of electricity which the world will need without emitting carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and thereby contributing to a possible global warming. The Framework Convention on Climate Change which was signed at Rio soeks to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations, but does not prescribe how this is to be done or set any targets concerning C02 emissions or other greenhouse qas emissions. There is no doubt that global development will require the use of more energy, especially electricity, and that a dilemma is inherent in the circumstance in which an increased use of fossil fuels, today's dominant energy source, would set us on a collision course with the probable need to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide. There is a growing awareness that the saving of energy and greater use of renewable sources of energy, like solar power and wind power, will be very inaOequate responses to this dilemma. There is also a growing awareness that the continued and, indeed, expanded use of nuclear energy is one of the few options at tha world's disposal for increasing ene:gy generation without significantly adding to carbon 4101£i4e ..baio:!la. It i. worth 80118 reflection that, if the world' s 400 or SQ nuclear-power plants vere to be cloSG4 an4 the electricity they qenerate VO~. ta be produced instead frOll th& bUt'aiuq of coal, there would be an ~ual increase of soma 7 per cent in carbon dioxide emissions. Nuclear enargy alone cannot solve the carbon dioxide problem, but that problem can hardly be solved without nuclear power. It is still true, however, that the usa or ezpanded use of nuclear power is opposed by a sizeable segment of public opinion in many countries, mainly for fear of radioactive releases from an. accident or from the disposal over long periods of time of nuclear waste~. Comparisons with the risks associated with the generation of energy through coal, hydro power, gas or oil are certainly relevant and should be carried C)ut to provide a basis for rational discussion. However, we must be aware thl!lt the public might find damage to health and the environment thruugh radiatio~ leas tolerable than injury through coal-mine accidents, the bursting of hydro dams or the explosion of gas cisterns. This is also the premise upon which extensive international co-operation is now taking place within and outside the lAEA to strengthen safety worldwide in th(. operation of nuclear power plants and in the disposal of radioactive waste. In a year's time I hope a draft convention on nuclear safety will be ready, containing rules which will be legally binding on all States adhering to it. It is currently being negotiated within the lAEA, as recomm9nded by the Rio Conference. The attainment of a nuclear safety culture embracing all countries operating nuclear power plants is also the objective of present efforts to assist countries in Eastern Europe to upgrade nuclear power plants or in some cases, where this may not be feasible or economic, to phase them out. Agenda 21 of the Rio Conference contains a chapter on the safe and environmentally sound management of radioactive wastes. Let me report in this regard that a code of practice on the international transboundary movement of radioactive waste was adopted by the IAEA in 1990. While cases have occurred in which chemical wastes have been exported to developing countries, no such case has been found in,,"olving radioactive wastes. I should add that, at the request of developing countries" experts sent by the IAEA have investigated several cases - and found chealcal uaste but not radioactive waste. I should also report that intensified efforts are under way in the lAEA to work out a comprehensive series of internationally agreed radioactive waste safety standards which may form the basis of, or complement, national standards and criteria. It is reasonable to require that radioactive waste be disposed of with the same level of safety all over the world, and regardless of whether the wastes originate in military or civilian programmes. If px'esent efforts to ensure a uniformly high level of safety in the operation of uuclear power plants and in the disposal of radioactive waste around the world continue to be vigorously pursued within and outside the lAEA, I believe that the expanded use of nuclear power, which may become indispensable, may also become fully acceptable to "Nst people. Let me conclude with some comments not on the past year but on the long-term role of the IAEA. International organizations are mechanisms through which Governments jointly meet international challenges. I would submit that over the years the lAEA has been a useful and efficient tool of its member States. The energy crisis focused attention on the practical and potential use of nuclear power and the role of the lAEA. The Chernobyl crisis led the lAEA to launch the concept and principles of a nuclear safety culture accepted and respected by all; in the environment crisis, the lAEA has been able to show that peaceful nuclear applications, inclUding the use of nuclear power for electricity generation, are of crucial value both for the environment and for development; in the Iraqi crisis, the lAEA has helped the United Nations to neutralize the nascent nuclear weapon capacity. The Aqency is also learning the broader lessons of Iraq and strengthening the verification system in order to increase the probability that any violation will be detected and be dealt with by the Security Council, to which the lABA reports in these matters. As the lABA is obliged to undertake increasing activities in the fields of technology transfers, nuclear safety and safeguards, the organization - like the United Nations - ought to be spared financial crises. This year we have been forced to reduce our activities in order to manage a shortfall of no less than 13 per cent of our budget, due to uon-~ayment, in particular by a large contributor. Such financial crisis management in an organization inevitably undermines its capacity to address the serious issues it is asked to deal with. The ongoing erosion of pay levels for 0,1' staff also reduces our ability to attract staff of the required calibre. I Submit that more mileage will be obtained from the mechanisms that Governments create for our joint journey into the future if these mechanisms are adequately financially fuelled and managed by well-motivated and competent crews. Lastly, I should like to express in this forum the thanks of the lAEA to the Government of Austria, which is an excellent host to all the international organizations located in Vienna.

I call on the representative of Australia to introduce draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.l. Mr. O'SQLLIVAN (Australia): I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.l on the annual report of the lAEA (A/47/374). The following countries have joined the 32 sponsors listed in document Al47/L.9/Rev~1: Japan, the Republic of KOrea, Costa Rica, Latvia, Botswana and Turkey. I should like to explain first that Australia is introducing the draft resolution on behalf of the sponsors because it wa~ requested to do so by a number of interested delegati4)ns. We are not this year a member of the lAEA Bureau, the group that traditionally manages the draft resolution. However, we were a member of the Bureau in 1991 and we ara strongly committed to the lAEA, its role and its future. Thi.s year, unfortunately, there was no agreement in the Bureau about introducinq a draft resolution on the IAEA. Obviously, there had to be such a draft resolution. In the circumstances, Australia was prepared to take on the task of introducing it, and there was no objection from this year's Bureau to our so doing. We have consulted widely, and we believe this draft resolution broadly reflects a common view. The pa~t year has been an important one for the IAEA. In all its areas of activity with regard to nuclear non-proliferation and strengthening the safeguards system, the year saw the signatu~e of safeguards agreements by South Africa, Argentina, Brazil and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the initiation within the Boar6 of Governors of a series of measures designed to strengthen the safeguards system. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferatio~of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Agency's safe~lards systems together constitute the principal international assurance of the peaceful uses of _~clear energy. The safeguards system is fundamental to nuclear non-proliferation, and the measures initiated in 1991 are very encouraging, both for the future of the safeguards system itself and its underpinning' of nuclear trade and cooperation. Ne bellevethat the General ~sembly should specifically launCh the preparatory process for the NPr extension conference. Nuclear safety is a key area of the IABA"s work. Safety standards are constantly being developed and upqraded by the Agency, not least in response to public perceptions concerninq the benefits and risks associated with nuclear snerqy. Nork has n01l col'l'l'ftenced on an international nuclear safety convention, and in 1991 a document vas published on the desiqn deficiencies of certain reactor plants that provides a basis for operators and requlatory bodies alike co develop a proqramme for enhancinq safety at these plants. There have also been important developments in technical assistance and cooperation activities, where the potential benefits of nuclear technology continue to be demonstrated in a variety of applications. In addition to those mentioned just now by the Director General of the IAEA, there are other examples. The use of the sterile-insect technique has enabled the new-world screw worm fly to be eradicated from North Africa. That pest, which had become established in Libya, posed a threat to livestock throughout Africa and the Mediterranean. Other application techniques resulted in improved crop yields, improvements in nuclear-medicine capabilities, and greater inte~est in environmental monitoring. ~urning now to this year's draft resolution, we wish to note that it is substantially the same as the resolution adopted in 1991. In paragraph 4, we would emphasize the centrality of strengthened safeguards to international security, regional security and technical cooperation. In paragraph 5, we would draw attention to the Agency's actions in strengthening technical assistance and cooperation activities. In paragraph 6 r we would emphasize that the Agency is continuing to do very valuable and dangerous work in Iraq, which we believe requires recognition by the General Assembly, arising as it does from the first blatant breach of an IAEA and/or non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement; and also that effective fulfilment of Security Council resolutions is es~ential for the continued effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime and the assurances it provides to all members of the international community. We commend this draft resolution" which has attracted a broad sponsorship, to delegations. It is a balanced text and seeks to be responsive to the needs and interests of all IAEA members. Above all, it is in our (Mr. Q·Sullivan. Australia) common interest to see the ~aintenance and strengthening of the IAEA and the protection from the proliferation of nuclear weapons its activites provide. To support this draft resolution is to support that objective. ML....~ (Hungary): file annual report for 1991 of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) submitted to the General Assembly and the introductory statement to the Assembly by the IAEA Director General, Mr. Hans B1ix, reflect very well the results of dedi~ated work aimed at fUlfilling the objectives enshrined in the statute of the IAEA 35 years ago. The overall activities of the Agency have remained faithful to the noble ideas of its founders: t~ promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy all over the world and to serve, through its safeguards activities, the cause of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. These have been and remain the fundamental tasks of the Agency. The maintenance of an appropriate balance in its activities has always been a major prerequisite both for the general support lAEA enjoys on the part of its member States and for its growing international prestige. Hungary continues to believe that the International Atomic Energy Agency plays a pre-eminent role in all its fields of activity and is firmly convinced that the latest developments in international relations open up new possibilities for the Agency and at the same time pose new challenges for it. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the lAEA safeguards system together constitute an important international guarantee of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We have witnessed important new developments indicating the overall str~ngthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. (n this context, we view the following as encouraging factors: the a:cession of China and France to the NPT; ~he (Mr. 601do, Hyp!1oa) conclusion of comprehensive safe~~ards agreements with South Africa and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; the steps towards full-scope safeguards in Argentina and Brazil, the good prospects of bringing the Treaty of Tlatelolco fully into force in the near future; and the declaration of full-scope safeguards as a common policy for nuclear exporters. We expect the States parties to the NPT to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA without any delay and hope that similar steps will soon be taken by other States not yet parties to the Treaty. It is the firm and definite position of the Hungarian Government that the newly emerging States cannot serve the fundamental interests of their own peoples and the global interests of peace, security and development unless they become parties to the non-proliferation Treaty without any undue delay. The recent accession of 8stonia and Lithuania to the Treaty and the conclusion of the respective safeguards agreements by them are promising' siqns in this respect. At tha 1995 NPr extension Conference, where we shall strongly argue for the indefinite extension of the Treaty, we should lite to see these positive measures further strengthened. In view of the renewed global interest in nuclear non-proliferation, the IAEA safeguards system continues to be of crucial importance. Hungary has always accorded high priority to the continuous improvement and strengthening of that system. Now, after Iraq's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, and when the IAEA safeguards system faces new challenges owing to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it is imperative to increase the ability of the safeguards system to detect any possible undeclared nuclear activity and to render the safeguards system capable of carrying out its activities - whose scope has widened - with respect to declared nuclear facilities. We commend the initiative taken by the Director General in encouraging us to reflect together On possible ways to strengthen the present system while making it less costly. We have supported the action of the Board of Governors with regard to special inspections, the provisions for furnishing early design information, and the application of the universal reporting system on nuclear exports and imports. I should like to recall in this regard that a few weeks ago my Government announced its readiness to provide information on a voluntary basis to IAEA on all its nuclear export and import activities. Let me also reiterate my Government's intention to continue to participate in the Agency'~ efforts to improve the reliability and transparency of IAEA safeguards. Also in this context, 1 wish to refer to one particular issue: the designation of safeguards inspectors. Many member States, in rasponse to the repeated appeals of the Director General, have introduced simplified procedures for designating inspectors, and we are of the view that the time has now come for the lAEA to develop a widely acceptable policy on this question. The respective provisions of the agreed text of the draft Convention on chemical weapons could serve as a guideline for IAEA to develop, adopt and apply such a policy. Let me note here, in passing, that the Agency could - and, I feel, should - offer its advice and assistance to the soon-to-be-established preparatory committee and later to the new chemical weapons organization to hele it in the early ~hases of its evolution. (Hr. Gajda. Hungary) The IABA secretariat deserves credit for the excellent work done, sometimes under very difficult local conditions, in the implementation of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991). The results ef the 14 on-site inspection missions have proven that the concerns of the international community about the Iraqi nuclear programme ¥ere well-founded, and the resolute international action against such a violation of Treaty obligations was justified. The remaining questions about the Iraqi nuclear programme are to be clarified. The mandate given by the Security Council regarding the long-term monitoring activity to verify Iraq's compliance with the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions remains an essential task for the Agency. The issues of nuclear safety have always been high on the agenda of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Recently, a broad set ~f !~ternational and bilateral programmes was launched, with the participation of various international organizations and the highly industrialized countries, to provide assistance in the field of nuclear safety to Central and Eastern European countries. We believe that the long experience of IAEA cooperation with these co~t~ies, as well as the professional knowledge the Agency has accumulated, are of great value and should be used in a proper way. In this context, we welcome the efforts to avoid duplication in providing safety-related assistance and to increase the effectiveness of such assistance. We lend our support to the Agency in creating appropriate mechanisms for its active participation. Hungary appreciates th~ Agency's work in promoting the necessary legal basis for the strengthening of nuclear safety. Significant preparatory work has been launched by the lAEA to elaborate a nuclear-safety Convention• (M!:. Gajda, HungarY) Although the national authorities are, and should remain, responsible for the safe operation of nuclear facilities, there is no doubt that an international commitment by the participating States to the provisions of such a Convention would be an important step towards improving nuclear safety all over ~~a world. In this connection, my Government is extremely concerned about the need for adequate physical protection of nuclear materials, and is doing everything in i~s power to prevent Hungary from becoming thG scene of illegal transit of nuclear materials. At the First Review Conference of the States Parti~= to the Convention on the Phy5ical Protection of Nuclear Material, we noted, therefore, with satisfaction, the increased number of States Parties to the Convention, as well as -the positive outcome and successful work of the Conference. We are also pleased to note that the international legislative framework for nuclear liability has been strengthened by the entry into force of the Joint Protocol to the Vienna and Paris Conventions, elaborated and adopted with the active participation of the Agency. The Hungarian Gove~nment highly appreciates the Agency's work in the field of technical assistance and cooperation. International cooperation has been vital for the development of our nuclear industry, research and education. It has not only contributed to achieve the present, widely recognized high standards in nuclear sciences but also made our institutions capable of transferring our knowledge and experience to countries less developed in the nuclear field. Our intention is unchanged: to remain a corr.ect and competent ;?::-.rtner as a donor and recipient country in the future too. (Nr. Gajda, Hungary) In 1991 the net generation of electricity from our nuclear power plant represented almost one half - 45.8 per cent~ to be p~eGi8e - of Hungary's total production of electricity. This is a convincing figure, underscoring the importance of nuclear energy for our economy. In spite of th5 excellent operational record of our nuclear power plant, we are continuously reassessing and u~aating the nuclear safety and operational practice of the plant. In this activity, we continue to rely on the Agency's cooperation. Apart from the traditional services, like the missions of the Operational Safety Review Tea-on (OSART) and of the Analysis of Safety-Significant Bvents Team (ASSET), we encourage the secretariat to broaden its services ~o the member States in such vital fields as spent fuel mlUlagement and radioactive w(ste disposal. In conclusion, I wish to express our appreciation to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Rans 81ix, and his staff for their excellent work during the previous yaar. Mr. RQV Zhitong (China) (interpretation from Chinese): The Chinese delegation has listened very carefully to the statement made by Mr. Hans 81ix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and has studied the Agency's annual report seriously. Over the past year, the Agency has done a great deal of work, and made positive efforts in such important fields as safeguards, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear safety. We are satisfied with these re~ults. The promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is an imperative task for the Agency. Nuclear energy, as a clean and reliable alternative source of energy, has broad prospects. Many countries, particularly the developing countries, ~eed urgently to develop nuclear energy in order to develop their economy and protect the environment• Therefore, we hope the Agency will sake a greater contribution to promotinq the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The implementation of safeguards with a view to preventinq nuclear proliferation is another important sission of the IAXA. In order to ensure the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it is necessary to make the acceptance of lAEA safeguards a precondition for international nuclear energy cooperation. The Aqency has done much work in this field, and has accumulated rich experience, continuously improvinq the safeguards reqime and makinq it the universally acceptable measure against nuclear proliferation. Evidently, it is a complicated and demandinq task for the IAEA both further to promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to implement the safeguards. The Chinese deleqation is of the view that the Aqency's two functions should be assiqned equal weiqht. Neither can be neglected, and still less can the two be pitted aqainst each other; otherwise, the further development of the IAXA would inevitably be affected. China supports the Aqency' s work in safecr.aards. At the same time, we &lso believe it is impermissible to allow the use of any excuse to infrlnqe upon the legitimate rights and interests of any country, especially the developing countries, in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Yet what should be noted here iD the fact that some people put disproportionately heavy emphasis on the prevention of nuclear proliferation while ove~lookin9 and misrepresenting the legitimate demands of the developing countries for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear e~ergy. Some individual countries even go so far as to restrict such cooperation under the pretext of preventing proliferation, in an attempt to monopolize nuclear technology and nuclear euergy. Undoubtedly, such a practice not only affects the economic and social development of developing countries but is also of no help to international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. There£ore~ the tendency should be rGctified. It is known to all that China's consistent policy has been not to advocate, encourage or engage in nuclear proliferation nor to help other countries develop nuclear weapons. China's nuclear export strictly abides by the following three principles, namely, assurance for peaceful purposes, acceptance of the IAEA's safeguards and no retransfer to a third country. China has officially acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. China has taken an active part in the international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, signing, from 1980 to 1986, intergovernmental agreements for ~uclear energy cooperation with 11 countries. Recently, China and the Islamic Republic of Iran signed an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the future China will, as always, follow that policy, further develop its international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nUClear energy and make its contribution to enabling nuclear energy to render more service to mankind. Mr. BAJNOCZI (Austria): At the outset, I should like to express Austria's deep oppreciation for the work of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IA,EA) and its highly competent staff. This has been a particularly challenging year, in which the IAEA has performed very well. The ezamplary manner in which Director General Rans 8liz has been conducting the work of his Agency merits our gratitude and respect. The Austrian Government has always held the view that on the way towards a nuclear-weapon-free world a non-profileration regime is an essential step and that the IAEA has an indispensable role to play in that regime. We are glad to note that the regime has been broadened in important regards. France and China have acceeded to the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as nucle~~-weapon States, so that all nuclear-weapon States in the terms of that Treaty have now become parties to it. South Africa and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have joined the Treaty and concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA. We also appreciate that the Ukraine, 8elarus and Kazakhstan have declared their intention to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. We are looking towards 1995, when the NPT Review Conference will give us an opportunity to renew our faith in the need of this Treaty for a peaceful world order and to remove its time limits. The non-proliferation regime has also been greatly strengthened by the important developments that have taken place in Latin America in that respect. The full-scope safeguards agreement between Argentina, Bra~il and the Agency is an important step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America in accordance with the T~eaty of '. Tlatelolco. The importance of an effective verification regime with regard to the obligations of the non-proliferation Treaty has been highlighted by Iraq's failure to live up to its obligations under the Treaty and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The close collaboration between the Agency and the Security Council in this matter has resulted in the implementation of measures that were the necessary consequence of Iraq's gross breach of international obligations. The Director General and his staff have earned our admiration for their excellent performance in implementing the tasks entrusted to them by the Security Council. The IAEA will continue to pla,y an important part in the process of making the NPT obligations effective and ensuring that nuclear development will not be used for other than peaceful purposes. The activities of the IAXA are essential for rebuilding international faith in the workability of a non-profileration regime. When the term "nuclear energy" i8 used, it is sometimes - and erroneously - equated with nuclear power. But as everyone who follows the activities of the Agency knows, there are many non-power uses of nuclear energy, and the IAEA's promotion of these is viewed as particularly significant by many countries. Any assessment of the role of the IAEA has to bring out the fact that the use of nuclear energy in the fields of medicine, science and technology is raising the standards of living worldwide. That distinction is important for Austria, whose Parliament, on the basis of a referendum held in 1978, has adopted legislation forbidding the use of nuclear-fission energy for the purpose of power production in Austria. (Mr. H~noczi, Austria) It is a policy of the Austrian Government to make this decision known to other members of the international community and to inform them of the reasons that have led to it in the hope that our example will be followed by other States, especially our neigbboursn But whereas views on nuclear-power production differ, there can be only one view regarding the necessity of making nuclear plants as safe as possible so long as they exist. Austria, therefore, welcomes the activities of the IAEA in this respect, and particularly those concerning nuclear plants in Central and Eastern Europe. There is today a much wider awareness of the dangers arising from the continued existence of those reactors and of the need for urgent corrective action. It is not surprising that in an international organization of 113 States different views should be held on the order of priority of its aims. Some of its objectives will find general acclaim, while others will be a matter of disagreement. That fact, however, does not prevent us from appreciating, especially in the light of the past year's experience, the importance of the IAEA as an essential part of the organized international community in its search for peace. Mr. GQUDlMA (Ukraine): First of all, my delegation would like to express its appreciation to Mr. Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and to his staff for their excellent work in the period under review. The report submitted to the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly by ~e International Atomic Energy 1gency contains detailed information concerning the activities of this organization in 1991. In the period under review the IBA was operating against the background of the dramatic changes I in the world pursuant to the emergence of many new members of the international community and to the development of a new model of relations between States. (Mr. Goudima, Ukraine) (Mr. Gougima, Ukraipe) With the pulitical situation in the world changinq for the better and the end of confrontation in relations between formerly antagonistic States, there is every reason to believe that mankind can enter the new millennium with the threat of nuclear war left behind. In these conditions the role of the IAEA is of special ~ignificance, as the Agency is designed to promote international cooperation in the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy, to monitor its use, ensuring that it is not used for military purposes, and to render practical assistance within its competence to developing countries as well as to countries in transition. Of special relevance today is the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The delegation of Ukraiu.e commends the IAEA for its role in implementing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In this connection, I remind the Assembly that Ukraine, which recently celebrated the first anniversary of its independence, bases its policy on non-participation in military blocs and observance of the three non-nuclear principles: not to accept, produce or acquire nuc~ear weapons. Ukraine has resolutely set out on the road to non-nuclear status and takes consistent measures to reach this.goal. In May 1992 all tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Ukrainian territory. On our insistence, Ukraine exercised effective control over the process of dismantling the nuclear weapons withdrawn from our territory. After signing the Protocol to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in Lisbon on 23 May 1992, Ukraine pledged to ratify the Treaty in the very near future and to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear State. The Ukrainian Government submitted the required documents to the Verkhovna Rad, the country's Parliament, for consideration, and we hope that the decisions on the ratification and the accession of Ukraine to these Treaties will be taken soon. (Mr. Goudima. Ukraipe) Our delegation deeply appreciates the Agency's activi.tiea on the implementation of its safeguards, which assume particular significance in the framework of the nuclear disarmament process. We also support the Agency~s efforts to develop further the system of comprehensive safeguards. Intensive work is under way in Ukraine on matters that form the basis of the non-proliferation regime, such as creating a national accounting and control system for nuclear materials, improving the physical protection of such materials and developing a control system for nuclear imports and exports. As wo lack the necessary competence and maans, ho~avar, ~a would ba most grateful to other countries and to the Agency for assistance in creating the organizational and technical conditions that would allow us to accede to the NPT as soon as possible and to conclude an agreement on safeguards with the IAEA. As this work will require some time, our Government has confirmed its readiness to put under the Agency's safeguards immediately Ukraine's nuclear installations used for peaceful purposes. We are satisfied that a proper solution to this question was found at the last session of the IAEA's governing body. The member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States have signed an agreement entitled "The Main Principles of Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy". The agreement, which has already come into force. is based on the principles of non-proliferation. As a party to the agreement, Ukraine has endorsed the proposal to convene the first coordinating meeting of the competent bodies of the participating countries. Ukraine commends the AJency's efforts to strengthen international cooperation in the field of nuclear and radiation safety. Mr. Sliz, Director General of the IAEA, was absolutely right in stating at the 1991 session of the Agency's General Conference that there was a real need to transform international activity in the field of nuclear safety into an international regimeQ It is evident that a serious accident at any nuclear power station today would discredit the very idea of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. That is why the IAEA efforts to work out the fundamental principles of nuclear and ·radiation. safety and to create a coordinated programme of cooperation in this field are entirely justified. In this regard, we support the Agency's endeavours to elaborate a convention on nuclear safety and to review the main safety standards of radiation protection, and we hope that this work will soon be completed with the adoption of relevant documents. Ukraine is involved to the fullest possible extent in the creation of an international nuclear safety regime. The consequences of the tragedy et the Chernobyl nuclear power station in April 1986, which affected our peoples and territories and those of neighbouring States, are still deeply felt in Uk~aine. A complex of measures to diminish the consequences of the accident is being implemented by the Ukraine Government, although current political and economic transformati.ons have no doubt affected the efficiency of this work. We take this opportunity to express our appreciation to the world community for understanding and assistance in dealing with these problems. The results of the International Chernobyl Project, addressed in the annual report of the lAEA, have elicited considerable interest in our country and abroad. While those results have been evaluated in various ways, we consider it important to note that the lAEA did la good job of implementing a project on such a scale wit~in a short time. We feel, however, that the project did not fully and adequately reflect a number of problems caused by Chernobyl. These problems might form the basis of the Agency's Chernobyl-related activities in the future. (Mr. Goudima, Ukraine) In the Agency's programme of activities for 1993-1994 we found only one subprogramme - entitled "Radiological Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident" - directly related to the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. A number of other important scientific and technical issues that fall within the competence of the Agency, such as the problems of long-life radiation contamination, methods for decrea~inq the radiation background of large territorie~ and the influence of low radiation doses on biological objects, were not included. We feel that given the complez and diverse problems raised could more fully participate in solving these problems. I should also like to draw attention to the problem of the shelter over the damaged fourth block of the Chernobyl nuclear power station, known as the "Sarcophagus". As its current condition gives every reason for anziety, an international contest has been announced to find the best possible solution to the problem. We hope that experts from many countries .of the world will participate. I should now like to say a few words about the problems of Ukraine's nuclear energy industry, which is in a difficult condition. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, its multiple scientific, technical and productive ties were disrupted; the centralized system of management and supervision of the safety of nuclear installations ceased to ezist. A national system to ensure the safe transportation of radioactive substances ia needed. This is important, not only for us, but for others, since fresh and processed nuclear fuel is transported through Ukrainian territory to Russia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and BUlgaria. We have inherited particularly complicated problems in tre~ting processed nuclear fuel. New conditions in the nuclear energy complez have made it necessary to reasseC8 the problems of the nuclear fuel cycle of Ukraine as a whole. ~o overcome these difficulties we need well-coordinated assistance from i~dustriclly developed countries. We are also interested in assistance from the IAEA in creating in Ukraine the regime for nuclear regulation that has been developed, as well as in solving other problems relating to nuclear activity in our country. In conclusion, I should like to stress again that Ukraine supports the multifaceted activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency and will promote in every way possible the accomplishment of the ezceptionally important tasks that the Agency faces today. The assistance prcvlded to the developing countries by the Ac;ency in assessing their need for nuclear power is highly commendable. The application ef nuclear technology ilP the fields of food, agriculture, livestock, medicine and physical sciences has proved to be eztremely useful in the efforts of the developing countries aimed at attaining socin-economic development. In this contezt one of the Agency's major successes in 1991 was tho eradication of the screwworm flies from North Africa. We note from the Agency's report that DDT dissipates 30-40 times faster in tropical environments than in temperate regions, suggesting that it could perhaps be used in certain developing countries. However, in our view, while nDT is certainly an economic and readily available aid to agricultural production, it must not be overlcoted that once it enters the food chain it is capable of causing genetic changes in human beings. Pakistan greatly appreciates the co~tinuing efforts of the IAEA to help strengthen the infrastructure for the planning, establishment and safe operation of nuclear-power projects in the developing countries through intraregional and international training courses and technical assistance projects. The Agency's efforts in promoting nuclear safety world wide are commendable. The nuclear-safety colloquium held every year since 1985 during the General Conference provides an invaluable opportunity to review ana exchange ideas on current sdfety issues and future p~ogrammes. Pakistan recommends that this event which has proved its usefulness should be continued on a regular basis. Similarly, the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme, which was initiated by the Agency in 1983 to assist member States in reviewing the operations of their nuclear-power plants, has proved to be of great benefit. Pakistan is also appreciative of the efforts being made by the Agency to extend the Assessment of Safety Significant Events Teams (ASSET) services to all mamber Stat.eso !n our view these missions would definitely contribute to the improvement of the operationalsatety of nuclear-power plants. The Agency's recent programme to upgrade the safety of nuclear-power plants in the former USSR and Eastern Eurcpe is highly noteworthy. We expect that the Agency will take suitable initiatives fo~ upgrading safety, refurbishing and extending the useful life-span of the other ageing nuclear-power plants in developing countries as well. In recent years, nuclear-reactor accidents have underlined the essential need for the proper maintenance and repair of nuclear reactors. Yet in certain cases essential spare parts are not being provided for reactors even when they are under Agency safeguards. This situation is totally unjustified and requires urgent redress. We call upon the supplier States to provide full maintenance coverage for the reactors provided by them. We commend the Agency's efforts in convening a meeting of experts with a view to arriving at an international nuclear-safety convention. There should indeed be certain minimum binding international standards for nuclear safety. However, nuclear safety is, and should remain, the responsibility of national regulatory authorities. The Agency's safety-related services to member States such as the OSART, ASSET, the Waste Management Advisory Programme (WAMAP) and the Radioactive Waste Management Safety Standards (RADWASS) missions can be of tremendous help to national regulators, and member States could be encouraged to make further use of these missions. We would suggest that the Agency, in providing various safety-related services to its member States, should make. increased use of the experts available from developing countries in order to benefit from their familiarity with and knowledge of the facilities in question. Pakistan has actively sought to promota an inter~ational agreement prohibiting attacks against all nuclear facilities. In this connection, I would mention that Pakistan and India have ratified the agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. In our view such ag~eements will enhance nuclear safety. Pakistan has always adhered to and will continue to lend its fullest support to the Agency safeguards. We have tiroe and again reaffirmed, at the highest level, our commitmept to nuclear non-proliferation and to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In efforts to keep the world f~ee from the scourge of nuclear weapons, Pakistan has been calling for the total prohibition of nuclear testing. Pakistan has, in addition, made several proposals to keep our region free of nuclear weapons. Pakistan's proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been repeatedly endorsed by the General Assembly since 1974. Last year, the Prime Minister of Pakistan called for consultations among the United States, the Russian Federation, China, India and Pakistan to en3ure nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis. We are encouraged by the positive response by th6 United States, Russia and China to the Prime Minister's proposal. We hope that India will also respond positively. This proposal reflects our sincere commitment to the objective of nuclear non-proliferation. I should like to take this opportunity to reiterate Pakistan's full support for the development of nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes. It is our earnest hope that the Agency, in keeping with its charter and mandate, will assign top priority to this objective. This has become all the more important as developing countries are faced with increasing resistance from some States in their efforts to obtain technology for the development and advancement of their peaceful nuclear-energy programmes. The General Assembly, in its resolution 32/50, has categorically affirmed that "All States have the right, in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality, to develop their programme for the peaceful uses of nuclear technology for economic and social development, in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs". (~l1tion 32/50, para. 1 (1'» The resolution also clearly states that: "All States, without discrimination, should have access to and should be free to acquire nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy". (resolution 32/50, par&. 1 (c» Pakistan believes that all States Members of the United Nations should abide by these principles, in order to check and reverse the negative trends impeding international cooperation in the field of peaceful usem of nuclear energy and technology. There is a growing realizatlon in the world today that, along with energy conservation, increasing reliance on nuclear enerqy is vital for limiting and controlling the "greenhouse effect", nere is consequently a growinq resurgence of interest in many countries in increasing the share of nuclear power in their national power-qeneration programmes. Under the circumstances, it is all the more important that the benefits of nuclear power be made technically and economically accessible to energy-starved developing countries without discrimination. We believe that an equitable balance should be maintained between the funds allocated by the Agency for technical assistance and those provided for safeguards. The regulatory and promotional functions af the IAEA are indeed complementary. We suppo~t the Agency's proposals for improvements in its safeguards applications and procedures. We hope these improvements will be effected, as far as possible, through streo<:.~.~ing and enhancing efficiency and not through the divereion of resource~ f~Q~ the equally vital objective of promoting the penceful uses of nuclear technology. Moreover, as in the case of nuclear safeguards, the technical assistance activities of the IAEA should also be financed through a predictable and assured source of funding. Pakistan is pleased to join in supporting the draft resolution on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Mr. KRASULIN (Russian Federation) (interpretation from Russian): The Russian delegation wauld like, first of all, to express its gratitUde to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the comprehensive presentation of the Agency's report for 1991, which gives us a fairly full picture of the broad and varied activities carried on by IAEA for the benefit of the entire international community. Today those activities are taking place against the backdrop of radical changes in the world. For 21.11 its complezit.y, the emerging DeW situation is objectively leading to the enhancement of the role and potential of central agencies for international cooperation, including such an important international organization as lAEA. Our country will continue to provide lAEA with the necessary support in all areas of its activities, thereby strengthening the Agency's authority and influence. We find very timely the broad spectrum of lAEA programmes for studying and resolving such important problems as current and future technology for nuclear power and its fuel cycle, the handling of radioactive waste, non-proliferation o~ nUClear weapons and the physical protection of nuclear materials. We commend the work done by the Agency to ensure nuclear and radiation safety, and we feel that it is necessary to help raise that safety to the highest level, both in our own country and throughout the world. Unquestionably, a key activity of the Agency is convincing the world community that the nuclear materials and installations under the control of IAEA are used ezclusively for peaceful purposes. I would especially like to mention in this connection that a great deal of ~ork is being done by lAEA in Iraq in pursuance of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. Under new conditions - and this was also confirmed, in particular, during the general debate at this dession of the General Assembly - foremost among multilateral efforts are the problems of ensuring non-proliferation of all types of wsapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems and strenqthening the existing non-prolif~rationregimes. A major effort here is aimed at strengtilening the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and making it a universal agreement of unlimited duration, and we view this as the main goal of the Conference on the Treaty, to be held in 1995. (Mr. Krasulin, Russiap federatioA) Russia welcomes the fact that China, France, South Africa and a number of other countries have acceded to the NPr and that Argentina and Brazil have assumed appropriate obligations in the area of safeguards. It is significant that not only is an active process under way to make the Treaty universal, but also some of its particular provisions, such as its important Article VI, which contai~s obligations regarding disarmament measures, are being implemented. A convincing example of such progress and a radically new step in the area of weapons monitoring was the agreement reached at Washington by the Presidents of Russia and the United States on further substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons. That agreement represents a logical extension of the Treaty on the Reducti~n and Limitation of Strategic Arms and the Lisbon Protocol to it. It has become a practical reflection in the military spbere of the radically new pattern of relations between Russia and the United States and of a different role for those two Powers in the world. For the first time, a joint understanding has been built not on the basis of arithmetical equality but on the basis of reasonable sufficiency. This circumstance is of significance as a matter of principle, and we hope that it will have a positive effect on the position of other nuclear Powers and on the strengthening of strategic stability and international security ss a whole. Russia considers it essential that the disintegration of the former Soviet Union should not lead to any complications of the situation with regard to non-proliferation. It is of fundamental significance in this context that Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have undertaken to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear States. (Hr. Irllul!n, RuSliU Federatiou) At the present t:iae, u we .H it, all true supporters of a non-proliferation regime DlUst inteaify their joint efforts to the D1uimum, so as to prevent nuclea.r veapoWl frOll spreading all over our planet. In that respect, pursuant to the decree issued by the President of Russia on 27 March 1992, nuclear esports fr~ our country to non-nuclear States will in fu~ure be c::.=riad cut 0:17 0: condition that those States place all of their nuclear activity under the contrc.l of IAEA. It 111 also in that light that we v~ew the agreement of a number of countries which are nuclear suppliers to introduce a unifie~ monitoring mechanism for the esport of. dual-purpose articles. (Mr. Irasulin, Russion FederAtiop) Russia regards as a prio~ity area of the Agency's "activity the monitoring of the peaceful use of atomic energy and the improvement olf the Agency's system of international safeguards. In our opinion, tbft Agency has substantial capacity for further improvement in this field, and 110 'Welcome its recent decisions along those lines. We are convinced that in order to strengthen the regime of nuclear non-proliferation, it is necesary to have safeguard measures and nuclear-facility-inspection programmes that are adequate to cope with the level of today'S scientific and teChnical prcqres•• Russia is prepared to make its contribution to the solution of that important problem. In the light of the genuine progress made in nuclear disarmament, the further reconciliation of the positions of various countries in the matter of limiting nuclear tests, to the point of their total cessation, takes on increased importance. Russia advocates making an immediate start in drafting an international agreen~nt on the subject, with the participation.of all States. Russia's moratorium, which was recently eztended to 1 July 1993 by a I decree of President Yeltsin, France's halting of its tests and the recent decision taken by the United States demonstrate that approaches to the problem are changing in a constructive way. In the current favourable situation, it is important to give new impetus to progress towards banning nuclear tests and to intensify efforts in the search for universally acceptable and effective practical resolutions to ezistinq problems in this sphere. The United Nations should continue to consider questions relating to the further improvement of the reqime of safeguards for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Russia's position as the Soviet Union's successor as a Member of the United Nations and a member of the Security Council and ~ (Mr. Krasulin€ Russian Federation) ~ party to international agreament~ confirms the statement made by the Soviet representative in the Sacurity Council on 17 June 1968 with regard to so-called positive safeguards. We also see some value in having the General Assembly recommend that the Conference on Disarmament should encourage the efforts of the special committee on safeguards in order to stimulate the search for universally acceptable practical solutions in that sphere. For example, more comparable, even if not identical, formulas for so-called negative safeguards for non-nuclear countries could be drafted. In our view, the United Nations and iAEA are capable of making a substantial contribution to the creation of effective international machinery for monitoring thQ production and export of fissionable materials. In particular, the General Assembly could support the rapid preparation of an international agreement to end the production of weapons-grade fissionable materials. We advocate the immediate inclusion of problems of this type in the negotiations. The Russian Federation welcomes the decision of the United States that, in order to promote nuclear disarmament, it will forgo the production of plutonium and highly enrichdd uranium. For its part, the Russian Federation confirms its intention to continue the programme of shutting down its remaining facilities for producing weapons-grade plutonium. Our proposal to the United States to begin negotiations iim~ediately on the supervised cessation of the production of fissionable materials for the manufacture of weapons also remains open. With regard to IAEA's multifaceted activities, we should like to point out that in the main, the Agency has indeed resolved major problems in such areas as promoting the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy and (Mr. Kraluli», Russion Federation) providing technical assistance. Accordingly, we tate a favourable view of the enhancement of activities in respect of the comparative assessment of various sources of electrical energy from the standpoint of the environment, economy and safety. We also support the activities of the Agency in connection with nuclear power generation and its fuel cycle, nuclear safety, the handling of radioactive waste, the International Nuclear Information System (INIS), technical assistance and other ~reas of interest to all Member States. Of special significance in our view is the great effort that the Agency has made and is continuing to make for an international assessment of the consequences, of the Chernobyl disaster. The eradication of those consequences and the safe operation of nuclear power plants continue to be at the focus of tha Russian Government's attention. Support for IAEA presupposes that financial obligations to the Agency will be met. Between September of tbis year and March 1993, Russia, despite its economic difficulties, will pay '12 million in partial settlement of its debt to IAEA. In conclusion, the delegation of the Russian Federation would like once again to express its approval of the IAEA report for 1991, In cOmm8nding the Agency's activities, we associate its success with the effective wort of its secretariat and its Director General, Mr. Bans Bliz. Sir Michael NESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I should like, on behalf of the European Community and its member States, to thank Mr. Bliz and the staff of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for their work over the past 12 months. The period since the last IAEA report to the General Assembly has been one of great activity, and we should like to express our appreciation of the role that the Agency has played in it. (Sir Michael Weston. United Kingdom) Of all the Agency's activities over the past year, none has been more important or more visible than tb~ efforts, made under the relevant Security Council resolutions, to uncover and render harmless Iraq's nuclear-weapons programme, which was pursued covertly over a considerable period in flagrant breach of the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and safeguards obligations. We are grateful to the Director General and his staff for the painstaking and determined way in which they have pursued their tasks, notwithstanding persistent and wilful deception and obstruction from the Iraqi authorities. We are confident that they will continue to demonstrate the same dedication. In this context the Conwunity and its ~~mber States reiterate the demand contained in resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/579 of the IAEA General Conference, which was adopted on 25 September 1992, that Iraq immediately and fully comply with all its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the Agency and under relevant Security Council resolutions, including the requirement, under Security Council resolution 707 (1991), that it submit a full~ final and complete declaration of Iraq's nuclear programme, including all information called for by Security Council resolution 687 (1991). The information that Iraq has provided to date has been seriously lacking, and a number of important lacunae still exi:Jt - most notably on procurement, enrichment and weaponization. The Community and its member States hope that Iraq is in no doub.t about the resolve of the international community to pursue this issue to a satisfactory conclusion. During the year, there have been more welcome highlights, which have reinforced the non-prolifer3tion regime. China and France have acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty. this means that all five permanent members of the Security Council are now parties to the Treaty. (Sir Machae1 Weston, United Kingdom) We also welcome the positive developments towards nuclear non-proliferation in Latin America, in particular the steps taken by various countries in the region towards brinqing into force the Treaty of T1ate101co and the signing of a fu11scope safeguards agreement between Argentina, Brazil and the Aqency~ We are following with interest the implementation of this agreement as well as the agreement concluded last year between the Agency and the South African Government. We are also following with interest the work being conducted by the Director General to identify possible model safeguards agreements for the Middle East, and we welcome the widespread consensus of support for his eiiorts expressed by last month's G~neral Conference. We welcome, too, the ratification by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its safeguards agreement with the Agency. We look to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea fully to implement this agreement as soon as possible. In this context we also look forward to full implementation of the bilateral agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The Community and its member States have long attached the highest priority to the continuing task of improving and strengthening the whole safeguards system. Proposals by the 7Yelve have helped to shape discussion of how this can best be done. We welcome in particular the reaffirmation of the Agency's right to conduct special inspections. We are also working out the best way to meet the Director General's request to extend the information reported to the Agency by voluntarily providing additional information on the production of concentrates, on inventories of nuclear materials and on international transfers of sensitive equipment. We must emphasize the importance of the Agency's px;,~ssing on with its fundamental study of possible alternative safeguards regimes. In the same context we attach great lmportance to the agreement between the Director General and European Communities Commissioner Cardoso E Cunha on a new partnership between the Commission and the Agency safeguards departments to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. We see tne ]I,' partnership as a vital opportunity, not only to secure the full implementation of Information Circular 193 in a way which respects the responsibilities of both sides, but also to refocus resources on areas where safeguards can make the greatest contribution to non-proliferation. We should not lose sight of what has been achieved during the past year in ~e Agency's more directly promotional functions - for example, in developing non-power uses of nuclear energy, where many examples of fine work could be quoted. Recognition is also due to the high level of continuing work in supplying technical assistance. Concerning nuclear safety generally, the Community and its member States note with satisfaction that agreement has been reached on the formulation of safety fundamentals. This will be a basic document. The Agency's review teams have also expanded the practical enhancement of nuclear safety world wide. The increased number of requests for Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions and Assessment of Safety Significant Events Team (ASSET) missions is the clearest evidence of thei~: value. Last year the Community and its member States welcomed the start of a step-by-step approach towards the establishment of an international nuclear safety regime. As the instigators of the Conference on Nuclear Safety, held in Vienna in September 1991, we continue strongly to support the concluaion of a nuclear safety convention. We would see such a convention as an important contribution to raising the general level of nuclear safety world wide and to creating a harmonized international approach to all aspects of nuclear safety. We are pleased to note that a group of experts has started work on a nuclear safety convention, and take the view that their activities should be completed as soon as possible. The Community and its member States are committed to playing a positive part in its negotiation and in the continuing discussions, based on current international nuclear safety experience, of the means of implementing it. The Community and its member States also recognize the contribution of the Agency in assisting the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in their efforts to improve nuclear safety. We wish to continue our ~lose cooperation with the Agency in the development of its technical assistance programmes in the area. Similarly, we support the call by the Economic Summit in Munich for the international community to contribute to the financing of an urgent programme aimed at improving the safety of nuclear installations in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. We welcome, too, the agreement among the Group of 24 that stronger coordination of these efforts is required and that the resulting machinery will look to the Agency for advice. Last December the European Energy Charter was signed in The Hague. The Community and its member States are grateful for the help which the Agency has so far given in the negotiation of the nuclear protocol to the Charter. We look forward now to quick conclusions to the Charter's basic agreement and nuclear protocol on principles governing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the safety of nuclear installations. In conclusion, I should like once again to express, on behalf of the Community and itc msmber States, gr&titude to the Director General and hie staff for having maintained over the last year such a high level of professionalism in their work. We are sure they will continue to keep up these standards in the years to come.

I call on the representative of Turkey to introduce draft ~esolution A/47/L.8. Mr. AKSIN (Turkey): The eruption of Mount Pinatubo that began in June of last year has turned out to be a major natural disaster whose effects will be felt for many years in the Philippines. As a result of the eruption of a volano that had remained dormant for many centuries, some of the most fertile agricultural areas of central Luzon have been turned into wasteland. Many thriving cities, towns and villages have been devastated by thick layers of volcanic dust that settled on a vast area surrounding Mount Pinatubo. Roads have been cut and infrastructure has been destroyed. The eruption resulted in much loss of life and extensive matGrial damage. Close to a million people have been displaced. When the monsoop rains arrived they caused the volcanic dust on the slopes of the mountain to descend into the lowlands in the form of huge mud slides. It looks as though this condition will recqr for a number of years, turning this cata~trophe into a continuous, unfolding disaster, with painful consequences for the victims and for the Philippine economy. The Government, of the Philippines must be commended for the urgent measures it has taken to alleviate the suffering of the victims. However, qiven the ma~ituda of the calamity, it is clear that the national efforts by the Philippines will not suffice. There is a pressing need for international assistance by Governments as well as other orqanizations. It is in response to this need that I have the honour to introduce, on behalf of the 61 sponsoring countries, draft resolution Al47/L.8, entitled "Emergency Assistance to the Philippines". In addition to the sponsors listed in the document; the £ollowinq countries have joined in sponsoring the draft resolution: Afqhanistan, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Jamaica, the r..ibyan Arab Jamahiriya, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the Sudan, Spain, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States of America and Viet Nam. This draft resolution is made up of five preamhular aud three operative paragraphs. Under the draft resolution, the Assembly would call upon the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the relevant organs and organizations of the United Nations system and in close collaboration with the Government authorities, to assist in the rehabilitation efforts of the Government of the Philippin~l. It would also request all States and international organizations to extend, on an u~gent basis, further support to the Philippines in ways that would alleviate, for the duration of the emergency and the ensuing rehabilitation process, the economic and financial burden borne by the Philippine people. Tbis draft r••olutio~ is an ezprosslon of international support and solidarity for the victims of the disaster and demonstrates our readiness to . contribute IIOrally and materially tow~rds their rehabilitation. Its adoption will set the stage for mustering international support to assist the people and Gover"'!:J,t 'of the Philippines. I _ confident that the General Assembly will adopt the "raft resolution by consensus. Hr.. DRNANPJ!iZ PITA (Spain) (interpretation from Spanish): My country, which has traditional historical ud cultural ties with the Philippines, has the honour of being a sponsor of draft resolution Al47/L.8, entitled "Emergency assistance to the Philippines". My Government wishes to stress how important the draft resolution is for the people and the Government of the Philippines, which has been afflicted by various types of natural disasters in recent:: years. The adoption of this draft resolution would give important support to the efforts the Government and people of the Philippines are making to help the country recover from these disasters. Tbe PRBSIDENT: I should like to inform the Assembly that there are two additional sponsors of the draft reBolution: Bangladesh and Sac Tome and Principe. The Assembly vill DOW ta~e a decision on draft resolution Al47/L.8. May I take it that the Assembly decides to adopt it? praft resolution A/47/L.8 was adopted (resolution 47/7). Mrs. BSCALlR (Philippines): On behalf of the Government and people of the Philippines, I should like to ezpress our most profound appreciation to, first of all, the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations for his perceptive and sympathetic introduction of the draft resolution juat adopted; to the representative of Spain and the delegations of 63 Member States for tbeir sponsorship of the draft resolution; to you, Sir, and the other officers of the General Committee for the speedy and favourable consideration of our request for inclusion of the present item on the agenda; and to all the members of the Assembly for having joined the consensus on the resolution. Bchoing Ambassador ~sin's remarks, the Philippines takes the resolution and its adoption today by acclamation as an unequivocal expression of international support for, and solidarity with the disaster victims and the Filipino nation. This magnanimous action of the Assembly will give positive encouragement to my Government and people to intensify our efforts to provide relief and emergency assistance to the peoples affected. The process of rehabilitating the shattered lives of numerous communities, given the continuing nature of the calamity, will be long and arduous. Yet, with unwavering international support, which the Assembly expressed today, we know that we shall overcome. ThPc, PRRSIDBNT: May I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 1481 It was so decided. The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.