A/5/PV.304 General Assembly

I call upon Mr. Lopez, Rapporteur, to present the report of the AdHoc Political Committee on relations of States Meitlbers and specialized agencies with Spain. 2. Mr. LOPEZ (Philippines)_ Rapporteur of the Ad Hoc Political Committee: The .resolution recommended by the Committee sfteks to revoke therecommendations embodied in resfJlution 39 (1) of the General Assembly of 12 December 1946,.asking Member States to withdraw their ambassadors and ministers .from Madrid. and e:x:cluding Spain from ..membership in the specialized agencies of the United Nations. 3. The delegations opposing .this draft based their stand on the principle that_ since no cl1ange'had taken place id the ..present Government of Spain, there was no justification for aJter-ing in .anymanner or form the resolution of 12 December 1946. 4. r think it important to record two points whieh were stressed by many of the delegations that voted in .favour of this draft resolution in tbe Committee: first, that their affirmative votes did not imply ,"pprovalof the domestic policies of thee present Government of Spain, .but meant only that the Member Statestlnd the specializedagencies should be free to decide for themselves the extent of their relations with the Spanish' Government; and_ secondly_ that this resolution would revoke only the recommendations contained in the 1946 reso-· r lution, leaving·intaetthe remainder' of that resolution. t 5. The PRESIDENT (translated fram .French).: I l shal1 ask the members of the General Assembly to indi- ! cate whether they think it ..necessary to discuss the I Committee's report. . . tt... It 'Was decitlettby. 3.3 "otes laS, with 15 abstentions, not todisCftS$ Ii~' re'/Jort, . . ' l \' lm A1PV.304 Saturday, 4 November 1950, at 10.45 a.m•

r shalt therefore put·to the vote, without discussion, the draft resolution attached to the report of the Ad Hoc· Political Committee [A/1473]. 7. Mr. CASTRO (El Salvador) (translated from Spanish): My delegation only wants to put it on record that it abstained from voting on whether or not there should bea debate. The delegation of El Salv.ador was ready and willing to take part in the debate. had the Assembly decided that there should be one. I, wanted to explain the position and to point out that my delegation, which is one of the sponsors of the draft resolution, simply desired to comply with the wishes of the Assembly as to whether or not there should be a debate. 8. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I still have three speakers on my list. I assume that they wish merely to e:x:plain their votes, without initiating a discussion. 9. Mr. Ki\TZ-SUCHY (Poland): Before the . General Assembly proceeds to a vote.C!n the dra~t resolu... tion approved by the Ad Hoc Poltttcal Conumttee, my delegation finds it necessary, in view of the importance of the matter and of its far-reaching implications, fully to expIain its position and the reasons why We. cast a negative vote. We·want to have these rea~ons on record for ,the consideration of any future session of the General Assembly which may .deal with this probleM. The decision of the Assembly that there should be no general debate on this question forces us to mak"t this statement because we believe that before the Assertlbly adopts that .resolution, it must be fully aware of what it is. doing. 10. The reasons for the indecent and unusual haste with which the sponsors and .supporters of .the draft resolution before us have attemptea to push it throu~h the Ad Hoc Political Committee and now through the General Assembly are quite clear. For it is e'rident th~t· . they .are fully aware that its passage wilt come as a. profound shock to all freedom-loving humanity,and they wish tc bring the debate on this draft to a quick 12~ Let me remind the Assembly in this explanation with what great acclaim resolutions 39 (I) and 114 16. It is enough to remind the General Assembly that (11), of 12 December 1946 and 17 November 1947, the resolutions of 12 December 1946 and 17 November were received. Let me remind you tbat those resolutions 1947 presented a confirmation by the United Nations of were greeted.everywhere-and not least of all by the decisions taken at the Potsdam Conference and the Sari Spanish people-.a.s initial and vital steps towards fur.. Francisco Conference-decisions which made it clear thering the principles of the United Nations and renot only that Franco. Spain w.as to be barred from the solving one of theoutstanding probiems which we of the United Nationsand its activities, but also that, in view United Nations inherited from the Second World War of the fact that the Franco regime was the only governand ..from t~e dOtl]ination of the greater part of Europe ment of a fonner Axis ally still in existence, concrete by the faSCIst AXIS. The memory of that warm and en.. steps were to be taken to help the Spanish people to cast . thusiastic support of our action by world public opinion off the yoke of oppression and establish a democratic would in ,itself be sufficient to demonstrate that the government. problem of Franco Spain is not a minor or unimportant 17. It was in those terms and in that spirit that we in one ~o. be prushedaside ~y specious ar~ents, by the United Nations. implementing the desires not only legalistic tw1StS or by tilocktng debate. Fot It would not of the Potsdam Conference but also those expressed in be in keepLt'1g with our,obligations to the great people the declaration made by France, the United Kingdom of S~p., and 'it wouldp not be in accordance-with the and the United States in March .1946,1 took steps to Jl(Anciples of this Orgt,mization, if we passed over this solve the problem· o£ Spain and to achieve what was ,~~4testion lightly and cYASt our vote in favour of this draft. clearly understood to Qe one of the basic aims of the 13... The problem of Franco Spain is and has been a great struggle against the fascist Axis. When, in resotouchstone o£ out democratic convictions,.and haste or lution 39 Cl), we specifically mentioned the specialized mild woro.s will !:.ttot obscure the meaning of the draft agenci~s.andsuggested the witqdrawal of ambassadors resolu,ti~:m on which we are invited to vote without o. and mttusters, we laid down clearly that this was not th~ substantial aid which Franco gave to Hitler arid Mussolini during the war -was extended;··the Same documents will show how Franco rejoiced in every Axis victory. He expressed joy at the fall of France. He congratulated the Japanese on Pearl Harbor and on the capture of Manila. - . 21. Only one or two of those who spoke in the Ad Hoc Political Committee dared to suggest that the characterization of· the_Franco regime did not remain true in all its details j but if th':lt basic·characterization remains true, then our originalconc1usion that .the existence and activities of the Franco regime constitute a situation likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security also remains true, and must constitute our basic line of reference with respect to the draft resolution now before us. . . . 22. It therefore follows that the draft resolution must be rejected. My delegation will vote most categorically against it. This draft resolution must be rejected if the General Assembly has any respect either for its own estimate of the Franco regime-an estimate which cannot be c~staside--or for the opinion of mankind and the Charter of the United Nations. 23. It.is clear that themecbamcal majority whichapproved the draft resolution in the Ad Hoc Politkal Conunittee has attempted here to have a no less mechanicalapproval of it. I know. that the reason which that mechanical majority gives is that the draft does not c0!lstitute anything important and represents only a nunor' change; lam aware of the attempt to present this draft hi that way, despite the fact that such an action would be a blunt and cynical rejection of the facts on the basis of which the Potsdam and. San Francisco Conferences branded the Franco regime as a fascist regime, as a regime which had been imposed by force on the Spanish people, and the continuance of which in power rendered Spain's full co-operation with.the nations of the worldinipossible. They try to present this draft resoluti01l in that way despite th~ obvious fact that it is an attemptto smuggle Franco into the ·United Nations through the back door, that .it i$ a deliberate connivance with Franco to defeat the aims of the nations which joined together to defeat the Axis Powers and their ally Franco and.which promised to do everything to assist the suffering people of Spain to establish a democratic regime and thus. eliminate a continuing threat to peace... ' . , ':j 24. It waS evident in the Committee· that in pressing for the passage of this draft resolution-a draft which is contrarY to tqe facts and so opposed to the sentiments of the people the world .over-strange and pqwerful consiUerations motivated its sponsors and supporters. I say" strange considerations" for they have nothing to 1947 were circumvented, sabotaged, weakened and m~Ae inoperative. . . . 25. The main responsibility for the existence of the Franco regime today and the continuation of the reign of terror against the Spanish people resides entirely with United States action taken in the political,eco... nomic and military field. With .the change· in its foreign policy and the increase of United States domination in Spain, the United States threw in its lot with the Fran... co regime. Spain began to play an important tolein. the strategic plans of the United States. That can ·be proved by.the visits of the United States military and naval officers, by military alliances, by visits of warships and the establishment of a· Spanish military mission in Germany. Some could. ask whether this mission is helping or supervising the denazification of Germany~ In the same connexion I cited in the Committee the fact that loans were being granted, war material was being delivered and military bases were being equipped and supervised. I may recall only that now, in 1950, there. exist 54 airports, 37 aerodromes, 7 airplane bases and 54 ports built, reconstructed or converted under the supeI'V'ision of United States officers, ready to serve the caUse ofwar. 26. The eagerness with which Franco is preparing to turn Spain into a war base is appreciated by the United States, the spokesmen of which often call Franco their best and most reliable ally. Franco has become a part of the preparations for the so-called preventive war. Only a few months ago, in discussing "the possible course of the third world war/'. the American Press described Spain and Britain as expendable territory, thus placing the United Kingdom in the invidious position of sharing with Franco Spain the doubtful honour of being the main United States base in Europe. 27. I submit, and these are the reasons for our negative vote, that such economic and militaryconsiderations, however important they may be for the profits and war plans, furnish no .ground for changing even one comma of onr previous resolutions. lask this General Assenlbly, before we take a vote, to stdke, as we did, a simple balance sheet on the problem of Spain. On the one hand place these economic and strategic considera- ~ tions, and on theothet hand the facts of the internal situaH..:J1l, the increased terror and religious and political persecution, and the desperate economic plight of the Spanish people. When. these considerations are weighed, which of them weigh most in determining our attitude to the draft resolution before us, a resolution which can only strengthen the fascist regime .and its hold on the Spanish pepple? There can be only one answer, and.:tny delegation gives it: the rejection of this dr~ft resolution, cSpanish people themselves.' 28. Those who submitted this draft, who,voted in f~your 'Of closing, th~ debate and-who, want quietly to pass over the problem, ca.nnot ~ aware, as we are, that the state of civil war proclaimed in July 1936 still prev~ls jn Spain. They r..now that, for ten years, ,28 million Spanlards have been kept in a state of bondage by an army of otci.1pation instructed in the art of terror by ~estapooffiters still, functioni~ under assumed names. 1 hey ale aware,that thousand~ have been tortured and hundreta's are being executed. They know of the plundering of villages by the civil ~ds. They know(\i tbe le:y~q ~ga which is being used to cover up hundreds of politic:al murders. They are well aware, of the police terror against the Protestant Church in S~ They ha.d an opportunity to read of the religious and political ~rsecution fJf the Mosl€:1U population in Spallish Morocco. They cannot brush aside these dalllning facts about the .fI\r~co regime and the situation in Spain; They d~onptrate that the situation in SPa-in.which motivated our resolution ,remains unchanged. We cannot therefore changethe position which we took on the basis I of those fads. 29. Facts are facts. Neither ·hypocrltical talk about concern for the plight of, the Spanish people not promises that ambassadors will not be dispatched and relations will not improve can hide ,the fact that the adoption of the draft, resolution before the Assembly will be a victory for Franco and will encourage bw to take further repressive measures against the Spanish people.. It will be a victory which can only encourage Franco to express even more sharply his tontetnpt for the United. Nations, for this Organi~tion which he ea11ed a "filutrid corpse", and for the sponsors of the· draft resolution. ' 30. My delegation noticed that, on the day thi$draft was introduced in the Committee, the entire Falangist Press started 'a, campaign against the United Nations, stating that Sllain would. 'refuse a partial settlement in the form of8,dtnission to the specialized agencies or the .. 35. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I noticed that .during the,speech of the representative of .Poland a l1umber of representatives looked at me as though 'they wished to raise a 'pc?int of order. If that was their intention, they were quite right. It is hardly fair that a representative should deliver a. half-hour speech on the 'pretext of explaining his vote. I t1~ght to have limited the length of speeches, and 1'did not do so. I shall profit by this experience in the future. 36.' Therea.i'~ several names on my list of speakers. I shall 'limit the lellgth of explanations of votes to seven minutes. That is long enough for a statement. 37. Mr~ KATZ..SUCHY (Poland): I wish to raise a point of order. 38., The PRESIDENT (translattd from FrenCch): If your point of order is not in order, I shall be obliged to stop you. Perhaps you wish to reproach me for not interrupting' you during your r~marks? 39. Mr. KATZ-S'O'CHY (Poland): 1 wish to raise a point of order in connex!n~ ~ith th~ President's remarks. I wish to point out that ~.a delegatiun has the right to d~ermine the time which it will take to explain its '\Tote. returwng (.fe!~:Yoys. It lashed out at the sponsors of the draft resoItltion, demanding a t(.\tal sUlrender and, berating them for not proposing, it. After the Yote had taken place in the Ad HocPolitical Cotritnittee, Franco himself made it clear--to quote the New York Times' stunmary of his remarks-that any improvement in r<"lations with the United S;',.rtes and the United Nations could not be based on a half-way meeting; he must be met on his own terms. Facts are facts. 31. The PRESIDENT: How many pages have you left, Mr. Katz-Suchy? ' . 32. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): 1 shall speak for . only,a few minutes more. No sugar-coating cart disguise the bitterness of the pill which the Spanish people ate being a.sked to swallow by the sponsors of this draft resolution. The brave and proud Spanish people, who have in, the past demonstrated that they prefer to die ,standing for, freedom rather"than to remain a,liveon their knees, have not ceased their struggle for freedom. If the. sponsors., of this draft ~---pe that itei adoption will viOtts~y no need for any cha.nge in the. ;felations of the United Nations and its Members with the Franco regim~. A change in ou~ relations with th~ regime which now.holds sway in Spai11 would be poSSIble only if there were a change in the state of affairs in that cO'l1ntry. In the present. circumstances, revocation of the General Assembly resolution of 1946 can only serve to cloak support of the. anti-popular Franco regime in complete and flagrant dellanceof the interests of the Spanish people. In the interests of the Spanish people, the decision taken by the General Assembly in 1946 on the withdrawal from Madrid of ambassadors and mini$t~rs of the Member 5tatesof the United Nations must be· upheld. 46. It is stated in the preamble of the draft resolution before us that the establishment of diplomatic relations and the excha.nge of ambassadors and fniuisterswith .1 government does .notimply any judgment upon the dome$tic policy of th~t government. . 5<1 As regards the proposal for revoking the recommendation that Franco Snain should be debarred from membership in international specialized agencies,. the delegation of the Soviet Union will vote against it for reasons which I shall explain. 51. The preamble of the draft resolution points out that the specialized agencies of the United Nations are technical and largely non-political in character and have been established in order·to benefit the peoples of all nations, and that they should therefore be free to decide for themselves whether the participa.tion of Franco Spa~n in their activities is desirable. 52. The USSR delegation considers· it wrong to·allege that the specialized agencies are non"political organi.. zations and can therefore disregard in their activities the principles and tasks arising out of the political policy laid down by the Unite? Nations. It cons!ders it wrong to say that those. agenCIes need not be gUIded by that policy or may even pursue a policy contrary to that of the United Nations. If that were tl'"t so, those organizations· could not be regarded as i.nternationa,l specialized agencies of the United Nations. 53. Here again it ,,:ould be. appropriate to poi~t out that even the delegatIOns whIch propose revocatton of the General Assembly.recommendation of 1946 em.. phasize the fact that the condemnation of the Franco regime ctontained therein remains in f()rce~ '; I1 ·1 1 1j I j 54. How is it possible to allow the anti-popular Franco regime, which was condemned and remains CQn.. demned to this day, to. be represented in the Unit-ed Nations specialized agencies, which must carry on their work in their respective specia.lfields in ac.cord.ance With .• thegelleral policy of the United Nations? For this reason the General Assembly decision of 1946 to debar the Franco Government £1'0111 roembershipin international agertciesmust be maintained in force. ~S6.Thoseare the reasons why the delegation of the 'S9viet Union will vote against the draft resolution sm"mitted by the Ad Hoc Political Committee on the que'stion of the relations' of States Members and specializt.'<1 agencies with Franco Spain. . 57. I thank the President. I think I have exceeded the time he allowed me by only one minute. 58. The PRESIDENT .(translated from French): I believe Mr. Arutiunian has not even exhausted the seven:" minutes' limit. Besides, when I fixed the limit at seven minutes, I merely meant not more than seven minutes; no representative should feel obliged to use that entire time. 59. Mr. DEMCHENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from R'ussian): The delegation of the .Ukrainian SSR wishes toindi~tc the reasons why it will vote against the draft resolution submitted by the Ad Hoc Political Committee. 60. The draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly proposes the revocation of two. of the most important clauses of the General Assembly resolution of 12 .December 1946-the recommendation for the witbdrawal of ambassadors and ministers from Madrid and the recommendation for debarringthe Franco Gov'- ernment from membership inintern:ational age:o.cies established by or brought into relationship with thl~ United Nations. 61. Those clauses of the 1946 resolution are not independent; they are the direct consequence of the General Assembly's appraisal of the Franco regime in Spain, which it found to be in origin, nature, structure and general conduct a fa.scist regime patterned pn" andestablished largely asa result of aid received from Hitler'snazi Germany and Mussotilni's fascist Italy. On the strength of that finding, the General Assembly adopted the two above..mentione,d recommendations with a view to isolating the fascist regime from Member States of the United Nations and its agencies nntil such time as a new and acceptable government was formed in Spain. 62. The situation in Spain bears out the fact that the rewme in power in that country has not become any more democratic since the adoption of those decisions by the General Assembly. That fact is also borne out by the report of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, which emphasized that no representative in: that Contmittee claimed that the present Spanish regime had undergone any change .along the tines indicated. in the. General Assembly resolution of 12 De.cember 1946. If, therefore, the situation which led to the adoption of the General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1946 remains unchanged, there are no grounds for revoking it. 63. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR accordingly considers that the revision of the resolution of 12 December 1946 is illegal and contrary to tbe United Nations Lnarter; its adoption wotdd serve to strengthen the Vatican, and elsewhere. 66. Secondly, this resolution would. reverse the' operative part of the General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1946, by which Franco's regime was branded as acfascist regime established by Hitler and Mussolini, as having entered into a conspiracy with those dictators which brought about the Second World War, and as an active participant in that war on the siete of Hitler and Mussolini. We .consider that resolution of· 12 December 1946 to be the minimum expression, .on the part of the United Nations, of the views and c;entiments concerning fascist dictatorship in Spain of hundreds of millions ~f people everyw~ere. We consider those ~iews and sent!- ments as.a baSIC lesson learned bymankmd a.t the terrible cost of lives and. property lost in the Second.WorId War, and we consider it highly immoral to act in contradiction to them. 67. Thirdly, it is the more immoral since it is evident that the Franco regime has not changed at all in its origin nature, structure and general conduct, and the betrayal of this' Organization's principles is sought purely for the benefit of'the United States expansionist and aggrel3sive policy of war preparations. The 'United States is building naval and air bases in Spain and it wants this Organization to make a friendly gesture ,towards the fascist criminal, Franco, in order to make him more amenable to accept that part which the United States wishes him to plaY in the framework of its ~g­ ~ressive North Atlant1c Treaty system. We do not thmk the principles .and· prestige of this Organization should be sacrificed for sttch an unworthy purpose. 68. Fourthly, this proposed resolution means a betrayal of the Spanish people, who are looking to the United Nations for moral support in their effort to free themselves of the Franco dictatorship forced upon them by Hitler and Mussolini, having ?~ its conscience the lives of almost one and a half mtllton people and oppressing the Spanish people i~ a horrible manner. We do not want to be associated with such a betrayal, and we wish to assure the Spanish'people of our sympathy. 69. Fifthly, we see in this draft resolution a clear indication of two very serious phenomena, namely, that the United States is today conducting a foreign policy in the framework of which Franto, the fascist war criminal, fil1ds a ready place-.f~cts are, on this poi!1t, more eloquent than words of dental--and that the poltey of the United States and its associates is a direct continuation of thl~ policy which is .for us and for .the whole world cbaracterized by the ugly name of Munich. Then, as flOW, fascists were~ppeased~ given moral 75~ In the period which has elapsed since the first session of the General Assembly, no political changes have taken place in Spain. Spain is still ruled by the anti..pop'alar Franco regime, a regime whose methods are imprisonment,political terror and the ensla-vement of the Spanish people. As in the past, hundreds of thousands of Spanish patriots are languisWng in prison or wandering through foreign countries seeking for shelter. The fascist Falange is the only organization which is allowed to exist in Spain. The trade unions, schools and churches areaU made to serve the fascist cause. 76. In the light of these facts, there is no justification whatsoever for. revoking the recommendation in regard to the Franco r~gime contained in General Assembly resolution 39 (I) of 12 December 1946 or for adopting .a new reeommendation legalizing the anti.. popular Franco regime in Spain and favouring its con.. tinuedexistence. 77.' From the numerous facts published in the world Press, as well a~ from· those emanating from various official sources, it is clear that it is essential to the ruling circles ot certain States that the Franco regime should be rehabilitated so that .Spain 'may'beinc1uded in the aggressive North Atlantic bloc and be used more readily asa .military arsenal in Europe. That is contrary to. the ptjndpJ~sunderlyittg the United 'Nations struggle for 81. There would have been no need for me to justify the abstention of my delegation, because, like the dele.. gation of El Salvador, it is· one of the ·sponsors of d~;c; draft and was prepared; to ,discuss it if the majority had so wished. My delegation's interpretation of rule 67 ofour rules of procedure is objective, in other words, it is based on the wording of.·that rvle. My delegation eOllsiders, thetefore,. that the sole purpose of that rule is to prevent further ~iisc.ussion.on.a questio.n.. which has already been sufficiently studied Jfi Cotnnllttee and on which an overwhelming majority has been securedwhich is precisely what has happened in the case ot the draft resolution now under consideration. ,My delegation therefoteabstained from voting becrtusecertain representatives, speaking from thisrostru1tl, had· tried to show that, other representatives were seeking to impose the adoption, by shameful and underhand means, of a draft resolution Which, according to them, we did not want to discuss because we were not sure of the rightness of our action. It is my duty to explain that my country cal1.i1ot tolerate such statements which, di.. rectly or inditeetly,are derogatory to its dignity. 82. The case is very simple and I shall confine myself to saying something which is perfectly clear: this room.. ing's vote was the, :expression of circumstances against which words and rJhrases are of no avail. The fact is that by .resolution. 39 ,tI), adopted in 1946, Memt>er States volul'lt:u:ily limi.tedtheirso-vereignty in order to eliminate the remaining traces of nazism and fascism which had perished in blood in the Second World War after having plunged the world, by their arrogance, into one of the worst tragedies in history..Yet, when that resolution was adopted, nobody could have forseen the tragic fact that those totalitarian systems were to be reproduced in other parts of' the world~ under different names, and that the same politieal phenumenon would con.ti1'J.l,1e, ~o threaten our liberty and indepelldence. That is why all the speakers who try to prove to'us that the i~g to kill soldlers in Korea,\Vhen at the same time ~nera\ Franco, on the other hand" is mlllking a friendly vi~t(rthe Canary Islands. I ~msaying !tbis to show.the contrast between the two attttude~, and my delegatton, when it $)llOnsored this draft reboluiion, did so in the firm conviction that it wasservin~ the Spanish peoJ.le as a whole, and respecting all their domestic proble.ms and also the feelings of the Spanish patriots, whatever may be·the circumstances in which their feelings as citizens have placed them. 84. Mr. CASTRO (El Salvador) (translated from Spanlsh): I wish briefly to ~plain my delegation's vote, though it might appear unnecessa~ since El Sal.. vador is one of the sponsors of the draft resolution. So many efforts, however, have been made to obscure the issue that it has become necessary to define the bases upon wbi~h the draft resolution rests. 85. 'the draft under discussion really comprises two resolutions. 86. Paragraph 1 of the operative part would have the effect of restoring to Members of the United Nations their right to decide for themselves, that is, without any outside intervention, what rank they wish to bestow on the diplomapc representatives,accl'editedby them not only to Spam but to any other State in the world. To decldeupon the rank of diplomati~ representatives, to send or to withdraw diplomatic missions, is the sov- ~reign prerogative of each State. S? In view of the circumstances prevailing at the time, the majority of the Members of the United Nations voted in 1946 for resolution 39 (1) wlUch re.;: stricted that right, although it is one of the sovereign rights of every State. Four years have elapsed since then. The resolution then approved has been quite ineffectual, and indeed, CQuld hardly have beta otherwise. For persons not fully acquainted with such matte-ra, the resolution appeared equivalent to the breaking off of diplomatic relations; yet that was not so. It implied simpl~ the withdrawal of ministers and ambassaat:lrs trom Madrid and their replacement by charges d'affaires. That meant that diplomatic relations continued, but in a different form. Such diplomatic relations continued unchanged. A c,harge d'affaires has the same functions as ambassador or a minister. The resolution produced no results and that is why the Members of the United Nations are .reconsidering their former attitude and finding that it is absolutely· unnecessary to continue to renounce their ,right to decide for them" selves, that is, without outside intervention, what rank t() bestow on their diplomatic· envoys. 88. Paragraph 2of tbeoperative part·of the draft resolution refers to the specialized, ~ncies which are con.. cerned with the interest~ of Mankind. Thus the goal of the World Health Or~nization is to p'rotect health throughout the world: it should be a sufficient answer to those who make such protestations of their love for or amendments rule 88 refers. Does it reler. ontyto draft resolutions submitted by minorities? Sucli an interpretation can certainty not be accepted. Rule 88 is not a discriminatory rule .direeted agamst .tbe rights of mino~it!es. Suppose a minority !ere unable to ~gree . to a deCISIon - to a draft resolution -- adopted by a· to explailltheir votes. "rlte result would be that the represcntativesof the mitmrity would be deprived in e'V~ry way of the possibilitrand the 'right to defend their position in the Assembly. . 98. How can such an int~rpretation of rule 88 -or rathert of the last ~rt of that rule - be admitted? I feel tl-41.ttbe last partQf the rule.. where it is stated that the President '(shall not pertnit the proposer of a proposal' or of an amer.Jment to explain .his vote on his own proposal c;>ramendment", refers to tbeproposers of any proposals, wherever they may bave beell previously considered. In . the present case, the l>roposers are Bolivia, Costa Rica.. tile Dominican Republic, El Salva.. dor, Honduras, Nicaragu.a, Peru and the Philippines, and no one questions the fact thatthey are the.sponsors .of the draft resolution before us. . . 99. The majority in the .Ad Ho~ Political Coml11ittee app-roved this dl-aft resolution. Should someone arrive at a christening to christen a child, it does not mean that he is t.ne father of that child. The child's father remains thefatber. The author of this draft resolution is the group of eight delegations which Spol'lsored it:1ndno one els~, Th.e Committee is not the proposer. As a matter of fact, it cannot even write. It.may approve a draft resolution submitted· by a delegation. The Committee, as such, does not submit any draft resolution for its own consideration. Every draft resolut.ion, therefore, has its own 'proposer --a specific delegation. 111 the present case, there are eight sponsoring delegations. That, of course, is why· statements made by the repre.. sentatives ot Bolivia and of El Salvador were not in order. 100: ~ can .ullde~stand our President. F:rotn the. very beg1l1nmg, hiS attttude has, been to refram from l11terrupting speakers on such politically delicate issues as the relations of States Members and of the specialized agencies with the fascist Franco Government of Spain. I understand such an attitude. It probably accounts for the fact that the President refrained from interrupting the representatives of Bolivia and of El Salvador. I can understand such a position but I cannot understand 01" in any way agree with the general interpretation of the last part of rule 88,. which would result in restricting therigbts of minorities alone in the Assenlbly. I believe that such a restriction cannot be accepted and I feel that the President cannot have intended to interpret the clause in such a way 'as to restrict the rights of the minority. We cannot agree to such a restriction or to an interpretation which would unquesti01'1ably' set a precedent unacceptable to tl1e General Assenlbly. 101. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): rhave explained how I understand this rule, but I do not want to set a precedent. We have more important . work to do than to~et lf~gal· prece~et1~s. The record will showtbat the PreSident stated Ius 'VIews and that one delegation opposed. them. Let future Presidents or jurists study the legal aspects of the .question if they wish to, For the.thne being I am not giving a ruling or setting any precedents.

It is not only 1.03. The PRESIDENT (translatl1dJrom FrffflCh): The President bas made a statement an .one delegation has opposed that stat.M1ent. No delegation bassupported the President's opinio~. The record will show that the President explained hi\~ point of view. Other delegations have made no criticisms, pethapsout of courtesy to the Chair. The Ptesid('.nt'$' interpretation hala been oppos~d by one delegat;ion~ VVhat bas happened has supported. that delegation's point of view, since mine has received, 110 support. I have not even asked for such support, since we have more important work to do. 104. The representative of France has the floor in ordel' to explain his vote.

At this titne~ when we are about to vote on the draft resolution. submitted by the Ad H()c Political Committee on the initiative of Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dom.inican Republic, El Salvador, Hondur.as,· Nicaragua, Peru and the Philippines regarding relations of States Members and specialized agencies with-Spain, the French delegation wishes to explain its position. 106. The feeling of the French Government for the Spanish pe()ple cannot be questioned. They were clearly expressed during the various debates onrela.tions with the Spanish Governm.ent which have tak~n J)la~ m ..the General Assembly.:rhey wer~ teflec~ed 1~ t1ie Varl?~S measureS taken; WhICh were 111 keepIng wlth the sPlrtt of resolution 39 (1)0£ 1946 and SOlne of which were actually taken only by France. It must be recognb;ed, however, that results have not come up to expectations and that the sitl.tation in Spain does tl.otappear to have changed. 107. The French delegation cannot seea.t1Y valid rea.. sons for changing its basic position. It·considers,on the other hand, that·the decisiollsproposed to the Genel'al Assembly l1lay prove expedient even if they are not Justified. My delegation obsel'ves, however, that the draft resoltttiondoes notill'V'olve the revocation·of the statc::ments tnade in the preamble totlte resolutiOl'l adopted Ott 12 December 1946; it takes note of that circumstance. . lOS, At a time when the Assen1bll is·abouttQ vote, it is an honour and a pleasure for the French delegation to show its sympathy for the Spanisb people -8 sytnpathy which is in keeping with Ottt' tradition al1.d the intellectual ties which unite the two eotuttries - by recalling the desire expressed by the United Nations in 1946 to giveSpain a warm welcome when circumstal'iCeS allowed it to enter the Organizaiiotl. . 109. It is out dutyto recall the hope expt'essed ill the resolution adopted by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of EUl'ope on 2.8 August 1950, that the Spanish people may in thet~earf~tturehold .elections and establish a constitutional1'eg1me whose representa.. dves l'ilay become members 'of the Consultative Assembly~ . 110. I should also like to express the hope that Spain may be in a position, ·as·soon. as possible, to reSUttle' the ~ptendid role conferred upon it ~y its. history and the nobility of its thought in an it'!ternational community based on equal rights and freedom. . . ~pla.nationJ and that as long as neither the President Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northnot the General Assemblyitsel£ establishes a time limit, em Ireland, Australia, Burma, CubaJ Denmark, Ethi- $Ch delegation is free to decide what shall be the opia, France, India. length of its explanation. Paragraph 1 of the operative part was adopted by 38 117. I do not doubt that the President knows the rules votes to 10, with 12 abstentions. of procedure better than I, atld I realize that as President he should do so. Nevertheless, 1 wish now to 123. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): protest against the use of such words and to endorse I now put to the vote paragraph 2 of the operative part. the request made yesterday [303rd meetingJ by the A vote was take1J. by roll-call. representati.ve of Iraq that the President should show a little more leniency to representatives, which could Afghanistan, having been drawn by lot by the Presionly facilitate smooth workil1tg. defllt, was ctJ1!ed upon to vote first. 118. The PRESIDENT (trl1#~lated from French): In favour: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bel- Broadly speaking I ask only two things of delegations - giumt Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, that they should observe order and that they sllould not Costa Rica, Dominican .Republic, Ecuador. Egypt, El attack each other. I have often said and I repp..at it - Salvador, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, 'the President is willing to submit to all sorts of attacks Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicara.. against himself without ruling his at1ackers out of oi'fier. gua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, .Philippines, 119. With regard to the ren..arks of the representative Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South of Poland. I am in oomplete agreetnen~ withhinl; I hoad Africa, United States of America, Venezuela, Yemen. not set any time limit on speeches. If I had, I shouM Against: Byetorussian Soviet- Socialist Republic, certainly have interrupted the representati1le of Poland. Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Israel. Mexicot Poland, Instead, I al1o'wed him to speak for haUan bour. I have Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,· Union of Soviet told the ASltsembly t'hat it is the business of the President Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Yugoslavia. Paragraph 2 of the operative part was adopted by 39 votes to 10, with 11 abstentions. 124. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I shall now ask the Assembly to vote on the draft resolution as a whole. A vote Was taketJ by roll-call. Saudi Arabia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first. In favour: Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand; Turkey, Union of South Africa, United States of America, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m. I j IJj j 1 I j j 1 \ 1I J J