A/57/PV.46 General Assembly

I hope that we can conclude consideration of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency today, including an important vote on the draft resolution. I would now like to invite the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei to present the report of the agency for the year 2001. Mr. ElBaradei: Since the establishment in 1957 of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), we have been dedicated to the achievement and promotion of a vision “Atoms For Peace” — on the one hand, the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation, with the aim of their eventual elimination, and on the other, the sharing of safe and secure nuclear technologies in peaceful applications that benefit humankind. I will speak briefly today about the IAEA’s progress in working toward those goals. The urgent need for sustained human development will clearly necessitate increases in the supply of energy in the coming decades. Nuclear power continues to be a significant contributor to the world’s electricity supply, and is the only source that can provide electricity on a large scale with comparatively minimal impact on the environment. In 2001, nuclear power supplied 16.2 per cent of the world’s electricity, up from 15.9 per cent in 2000. This increase was mainly due to continuing improvements in the management of nuclear power plants. With regard to the construction of new plants, Asia and Eastern Europe remain the centres of expansion. At the beginning of 2002, 17 of the 32 nuclear power plants under construction globally were in four States — China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea — with the Russian Federation and Eastern Europe accounting for an additional 10 units. Some important developments have also taken place recently in Western Europe and North America. The United States Government is committed to work with the nuclear industry to have a new nuclear plant operating in this country before the end of the decade. This would be the first decision to build a new nuclear plant in this country since the 1970s. In May, the Finnish Parliament ratified the Government’s favourable decision-in-principle to build a fifth nuclear power plant. This is also the first decision to build a new reactor in Western Europe in 15 years, and contrasts with past decisions in Belgium, Germany and Sweden to phase out nuclear energy. In the light of this renewed interest in nuclear power, a key challenge for the industry will be to prove that available new designs address the often-expressed concerns about nuclear power. Work is being carried out on many new designs that aim to produce electricity at an enhanced level of safety and with improved economic competitiveness. Some designs include additional goals, such as producing potable water at minimal cost, incinerating long-lived radioactive waste and reducing plutonium stockpiles. The IAEA continues to encourage technology development and innovation, for example, through its International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). INPRO is currently working with both developed and developing countries to understand and define the requirements of future potential users of nuclear power, in areas such as safety, non-proliferation, waste disposal, infrastructure capabilities and economics. With respect to the management and disposal of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste — a major point of public concern with respect to nuclear power — I am pleased to report that some important progress has taken place in the past 12 months. In the United States, the President and the Congress approved have already the selection of the Yucca Mountain site as a repository for high-level waste and spent fuel. Sweden has begun geological investigation of candidate sites for a spent fuel repository. Thus, together with Finland’s decision last year to go forward with a deep disposal facility near the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant, it is likely that by the end of the next decade, one or more high level waste repositories will be in operation. This is essential to gaining public acceptance and confidence through demonstrating that technologically and environmentally sound waste disposal solutions exist and are actually working. Late last year, the Agency launched a new initiative to assist member States in their efforts to move forward with the disposal of high-level and long- lived radioactive wastes through a “network of centres of excellence” for training and for demonstration of disposal technologies in underground research facilities. This network, built initially around facilities made available by the Governments of Canada and Belgium, has now expanded to include underground facilities in Switzerland and the United States. To date, 19 developing member States have indicated an interest in training scientists through the network. Nuclear technologies in many areas other than nuclear power provide preferred solutions — and sometimes the only solutions — to economic and social problems. As the Agency reported at the recent World Summit on Sustainable Development, of the more than $500 million worth of technical cooperation provided by the IAEA in the last ten years, more than 800 projects, valued at over $200 million, have specifically supported Agenda 21 priorities such as land and agriculture, human health and fresh water. I would point out that one of the conclusions of the Summit emphasized the need to ensure capacity building, and the transfer and use of modern technology as a prerequisite for development. The IAEA is contributing energetically to this effort. Many of the IAEA’s developing member States have given high priority to the introduction or upgrading of radiotherapy services. Radiotherapy is used with curative or palliative benefit for over 50 per cent of cancer patients in industrialized countries. However, fully two thirds of global tele-therapy equipment serves the populations of these countries while the remaining one third is stretched among the remaining 5.5 billion people. We expect, therefore, that requests for assistance will increase, especially given our recent successes in initiating radiotherapy programmes in developing member States such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Mongolia, Namibia and Uganda. Tsetse flies, along with the sleeping sickness they transmit to humans and the ngana disease they transmit to livestock, create a significant burden on rural populations across sub-Saharan Africa, not only in terms of direct health effects but also by restricting the use of draft animals in crop production. The IAEA supports the efforts of African member States to implement their tsetse eradication campaign across the continent through the expanded application of the radiation-induced sterile insect technique. Mali has begun preparation for releasing sterilized tsetse flies over an area of 2,500 square kilometres, and Ethiopia is constructing a factory for sterile tsetse production that will supply a similar project over a 5,000 square kilometre area. The use of isotope hydrology to manage water resources is continuing to gain recognition through IAEA technical cooperation projects in 40 countries around the world. Isotope hydrology is being used in Latin America and elsewhere to map underground aquifers for improved groundwater management and has been used in Asia for investigation of, and recovery from, contamination events. In addition, we are exploring uses of isotope hydrology to assist in river basin management and, based on our successful experience in Venezuela in isolating and correcting dam leakage, we are working with multiple teams under the African Regional Cooperative Agreement to assess the leakage and structural integrity of dozens of dams across Africa. Radiation is used regularly in an extensive array of industrial applications, ranging from the sterilization of medical products to the surface treatment of sheet metal and piping to enhance corrosion resistance. Radioisotopes are used to map and enhance the productivity of oil fields in the Middle East and elsewhere, and for troubleshooting in various operational aspects of petrochemical complexes. In the Republic of Korea, an electron beam facility is being used to enhance the treatment of waste water from a dye complex. These are only a few of the ways in which the IAEA is using nuclear technologies to support development goals, by working closely with, and responding to, the needs and priorities of our member States. Safety in nuclear activities around the globe is vital to the continued sustainability of nuclear technologies. While safety is primarily a national responsibility, it is equally a legitimate international concern. A nuclear or radiological accident, like other environmental accidents, respects no boundaries. It is satisfying, therefore, to note that nuclear safety continues to improve at power plants worldwide. Still, more work needs to be done, and the need for a more effective and transparent global nuclear safety regime continues to be a high priority for the IAEA. The development and adoption of legally binding norms has proven to be a powerful mechanism for enhancing safety worldwide. The Early Notification and Assistance Conventions are long established. The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management has been in force for over a year. And in April, the IAEA hosted in Vienna the Second Review Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. However, many States are not yet party to those conventions, and certain key areas of the nuclear fuel cycle are still not subject to conventions. The continuing evolution of a comprehensive body of safety standards, together with assistance in their implementation, is another key component of the global safety regime. In the mid-1990s, the IAEA undertook a systematic, rigorous effort to overhaul its entire corpus of standards. The resulting new standards are of the highest calibre, representing current international best practices, and should be viewed as being universally applicable. Safety standards are only effective, however, when applied in practice. The IAEA’s safety services — which range in focus from operational and radiation safety to safety culture and regulatory review — use Agency standards as a baseline, assist member States in their application and provide important feedback on their effectiveness. Those safety services provide support and share valuable insights, and I continue to urge all member States to use them. Many member States express concern over the risks involved in the transport of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive material. Work is continuing on refining IAEA regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material. Transport Safety Appraisal Service (TranSAS) missions, which help transporting countries to assess their effectiveness in applying IAEA transport standards, were carried out in Brazil and the United Kingdom this year. A TranSAS mission will be carried out in Turkey early next year, and preliminary discussions are under way with the Panamanian authorities for a possible mission that would include appraisal operations in the Panama Canal. It is important that member States — particularly transporting countries — make use of this valuable service. Naturally, the Agency will continue its efforts, in cooperation with all concerned, to enhance all aspects of transport safety. At an international conference next year, we will provide a forum for all interested member States to discuss these transport safety issues in a comprehensive manner. Although the responsibility to counter potential acts of nuclear terrorism rests primarily with individual States, international cooperation is essential. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the IAEA moved swiftly to conduct a thorough review of its programmes related to preventing acts of nuclear and radiological terrorism and to develop a comprehensive plan for upgrading nuclear security worldwide. The plan supplements national efforts in areas such as the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities; the detection of malicious activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials, such as illicit trafficking across borders; and improved control of radioactive sources. The plan is now being implemented on all fronts. Peer reviews have been carried out to assess physical protection at nuclear power plants and other facilities. Workshops and training courses have been held to help Governments assess the threats to their nuclear facilities, raise their standards of security, improve control of nuclear and radioactive material, upgrade their border monitoring and prepare response plans for nuclear and radiological emergencies. We have also sent missions to Afghanistan, Georgia and Uganda to assist in recovering radiological sources that went astray or were not adequately protected. And in mid- June, a partnership was established between Russia, the United States and the Agency to locate and secure powerful radioactive sources that were lost or abandoned during the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. In parallel, we are also working towards global adherence to a strengthened Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Effectively upgrading security to protect against nuclear and radioactive terrorism will require a sustained, multi-year effort. We will continue to work vigorously with Governments to reduce our vulnerability to nuclear terrorism. The universalization, consolidation and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, including concrete steps to reduce the number of, and dependence on, nuclear weapons, are more important than ever for the continued credibility of the regime. As reaffirmed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA verification continues to play a critical role in ensuring the health and vitality of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The IAEA’s verification activities are designed to provide assurance that nuclear material and facilities are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. In the early 1990s, after the discovery of the clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq, the international community committed itself to give the Agency the authority to strengthen its verification capability, specifically, its ability to provide assurance not only that declared nuclear material has not been diverted for non-peaceful purposes, but equally or more important, that no undeclared nuclear material or activities exist. This broader authority is, however, still far from universal. Regrettably, 49 States have yet to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to bring safeguards agreements with the IAEA into force, and, since 1997 — when the Model Additional Protocol was adopted — only 28 such Protocols have entered into force. This is clearly not a satisfactory situation — far from it. Without safeguards agreements in force, the Agency cannot perform any verification activities or provide any assurance of non-proliferation. And, for States without additional protocols, the IAEA rights of access remain essentially the same as in the pre-Iraq days. The Agency can provide the required assurances only if we are given the corresponding authority. Since December 1998, the Agency has not been in a position to implement Security Council-mandated verification activities in Iraq. The inspection activities that came to an abrupt halt at that time had successfully thwarted Iraq’s efforts to develop a nuclear weapons programme by destroying, removing or rendering harmless all of Iraq’s facilities, equipment and material relevant to nuclear weapons production. In the intervening four years, we have continued to use satellite monitoring and to conduct other analytical work. However, no remote analysis can enable us to reach conclusions without thorough on-site inspections. With the adoption last Friday of Security Council resolution 1441 (2002), we are now preparing to resume our inspection activities in Iraq as early as next week, when the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and I are expected to lead an advance team of inspectors to Baghdad. In my view, the success of inspections in Iraq will depend on five interrelated prerequisites: first, immediate and unfettered access to all locations and sites in Iraq and full use of the authority provided to the inspecting organizations by the Security Council; secondly, timely access to all sources of information, including all information available to States; thirdly, unified and full support by the Security Council throughout the inspection process; fourthly, preservation of the integrity and impartiality of the inspection process, free from outside interference; and fifthly, active cooperation from Iraq, with a sustained demonstration of its stated willingness to be transparent and to assist the inspecting organizations in fully carrying out their missions. I appeal to the Government of Iraq to provide its full cooperation, and appeal to the international community to give the inspections all the required support. I hope and trust that, with such cooperation and support, we should be able to effectively discharge our mandate. Since 1993, the IAEA has been unable to fully implement its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Owing to a lack of access to information and to sites, we continue to be unable to verify that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has made a complete and correct declaration of its nuclear material that is subject to Agency safeguards under its NPT safeguards agreement. Recent reports have suggested that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has, in addition, been working on an undeclared programme to produce highly enriched uranium. We have promptly asked the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to confirm those reports, and we have expressed the need to discuss, at a senior level, that and all other issues relevant to compliance of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with its obligations under the NPT safeguards agreement. We have yet to receive a response. Pursuant to the mandate given to me by the IAEA General Conference, I have continued to consult with the States of the Middle East region on the application of full-scope safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East and on the development of model safeguards agreements that would contribute to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. I regret to report that I have not been in a position to make any progress in the implementation of that important mandate of direct relevance to security in the Middle East. As before, I shall continue to exert every effort within my authority and, I trust, with the cooperation of all concerned, to move those discussions forward. Earlier this year, the Presidents of the Russian Federation and of the United States signed a treaty in Moscow to further reduce their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700 and 2,200, respectively, by the end of 2012 and agreed to remove additional amounts of fissile material from military use. Also, at their June Summit, the Group of Eight heads of State established a Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and made a commitment to raise up to $20 billion over the next 10 years to fund, inter alia, the disposal of excess weapons-origin fissile materials. Those are important steps that, it is hoped, will be followed by others, generating momentum in moving forward the stalled nuclear arms control agenda. I should mention that preparatory work has been largely concluded at the initiative of Russia and the United States to submit nuclear material released from their military programmes to IAEA verification in order to provide assurance that they are irreversibly removed from those programmes. It is now up to Russia and the United States to indicate timing, modalities and the types of material that they are ready to submit to IAEA verification. This brief overview of some of the IAEA’s activities makes it clear that the scope of our work continues to expand. Yet, for 15 years, despite steadily growing responsibilities, the regular budget of the Agency has been essentially frozen. That policy has resulted in inadequate levels of financing for most of our areas of work. A primary example is in the safeguards area. With the chronic and corrosive degree of underfunding of that programme and a continually expanding mission, we are coming close to being unable to provide credible safeguards. For the IAEA to fulfil its obligations and high priorities — while continuing to maintain an appropriate balance between development and other statutory activities, as directed by Member States — an increase in the level of resources for the next biennium is inescapable. This overview of IAEA activities over the past year reflects a continuing evolution in all our areas of work and, I believe, the dynamic nature of our programme in anticipating and responding to that evolution. The Agency continues to play a key role in ensuring that the benefits of nuclear technology are shared globally, that nuclear activities are conducted safely, that nuclear and radioactive materials and facilities are adequately protected and that a credible inspection regime exists to verify compliance with non- proliferation commitments. Naturally, our ability to effectively perform those functions depends on the commitment and support of Member States, which I trust will continue to be forthcoming. Let me conclude by expressing my sincere appreciation to the Government of Austria, which for more than four decades has continued to be a most gracious and welcoming host to the IAEA.

I thank the Director General for his introduction of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I now give the floor to the representative of Kuwait to introduce draft resolution A/57/L.14.

On behalf of Kuwait and in my capacity as Chair of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/57/L.14 on the report of the IAEA. The draft resolution is sponsored by Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Japan, Kuwait, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Slovakia and Spain. Since the issuance of document A/57/L.14, the following delegations have become sponsors: Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovenia, Sweden, Thailand, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. This draft resolution underlines the vital role being played by the IAEA in the collective effort to promote sustainable development and global peace. I would like to thank the Director General, Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, for the statement he just made, in which he highlighted the major achievements and activities of the IAEA over the past year. By this draft resolution, the General Assembly recognizes the importance of the work of the Agency in promoting the further application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in implementing and strengthening safeguards system, ensuring and promoting safety standards, including the safe transport of radioactive materials, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, improving nuclear security and protecting Member States from nuclear terrorism. The draft resolution being introduced today is the outcome of an extensive and exhaustive process of open-ended negotiations and consultations. We started this process following the conclusion of the IAEA General Conference session, on 20 September 2002. The consultation process was guided by the following considerations. First, the aim was to produce a draft resolution of a substantive nature. As the work of the IAEA increasingly gains international attention and recognition, members of the IAEA were of the general view that a substantive text was warranted. Secondly, we needed to keep the content of the draft resolution close to the language and substance of resolutions adopted last September by the General Conference of the IAEA so as to avoid reopening already agreed text for further debate here in New York. Thirdly, we attempted to gain broad support among delegations for the draft resolution. I am pleased to report that, with the help of IAEA member States and with the constructive spirit shown throughout the consultation process by all parties, we reached agreement on the draft resolution. Agreement was possible thanks to the understanding of delegations and their common concern to address the totality of the IAEA’s work. This was done after difficult compromises had been reached on several crucial issues and after a great investment of effort and time. At the conclusion of the negotiation process in Vienna there was a general understanding among delegations that the current text would not be unraveled or renegotiated here in New York. I renewed my appeal to Member States to support that understanding during consultations last week here in New York. As members know, the IAEA works by consensus. That tradition has become known as the spirit of Vienna. It is encouraging to see that, notwithstanding their differences and divergent positions on important issues, Member States continue to make every effort to preserve that tradition. This undoubtedly contributes to the efficient and professional performance the Agency is known for. It is my sincere hope and the hope of Member States that this constructive approach will be maintained here in New York. Therefore, we hope that the draft resolution will be adopted in the same spirit, preferably today.

Now I give the floor to the representative of Iraq to introduce an amendment contained in document A/57/L.17.

My delegation is honoured to present its amendment (A/57/L.17) to the draft resolution entitled “Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency” (A/57/L.14), introduced to the Assembly today. The text of the amendment contains a factual statement quoted from a letter of the Secretary- General, Mr. Kofi Annan, dated 16 September 2002, addressed to the President of the Security Council, document S/2002/1034, which informed the Council of Iraq’s decision to allow the return of the United Nations weapons inspectors to Iraq without conditions. Last year, the paragraphs related to Iraq in the draft resolution presented to the General Assembly on same item called upon Iraq to accept the return of the inspectors. This year, we note that, instead of welcoming Iraq’s decision to allow the unconditional return of the inspectors, new language has been introduced to the twelfth preambular paragraph that contradicts the language contained in previous resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and that reflects political aims rather than technical realities. My delegation sought to participate last week in any discussions on the draft resolution in order to try to contribute its amendments and explain its position to interested delegations. But it faced the decision of the sponsors that the text would not be open to discussion. In the light of that fact, my delegation has decided to present this factual quotation as an amendment, fully benefiting from the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations giving Member States the right to express their views about matters before the General Assembly. My delegation strongly believes that the words of the Secretary-General will enrich the text and will contribute to providing it with the needed balance.

It is a great pleasure for me to extend our gratitude to Mr. ElBaradei for presenting the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the year 2001. The report is reflective of the dynamic leadership he has provided to the Agency’s staff and of their endeavours in promoting the peaceful application of atomic energy. Being a founding member of the IAEA, Pakistan has always upheld the goals and objectives of the Agency. The IAEA’s role in the process of economic development through the enhanced contribution of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is universally acknowledged. As rightly projected in the IAEA report, the global electricity demand is likely to triple in the next 50 years. Such a demand cannot be fulfilled by fossil fuel alone, which would impose an unacceptable burden on natural resources and on the environment. Keeping in view the present growth of the world’s population, which is likely to double in another 50 years, reliance on fossil fuel will not be possible. Therefore, the only other proven and sustainable option is the use of nuclear energy. We feel that opposition to nuclear power, despite its good safety record and environmentally friendly character, is either based on misunderstanding or is a deliberate tactic to deny this technology to the developing countries. Technology, safety and verification remain the three pillars of the IAEA’s mandate. The IAEA has been assigned important responsibilities for verification and monitoring, and we believe that these responsibilities should be fully discharged. However, the IAEA must not lose the balance which is required between the various facets of its mandate and functions. Unfortunately, one finds disparities in the application of the IAEA principles and standards, especially with regard to the developing countries. Despite their adherence to safety norms, they are denied access to the latest technologies relating to nuclear energy. Undue restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology for energy, health and agricultural purposes are bound to affect the economic and social development of the developing countries. We have also carefully studied the report of the Director General on nuclear security, “Progress on Measures to Protect against Nuclear Terrorism”. We have taken careful note of the recommendations concerning nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists. We hope and trust that this will never happen. Precautionary measures should be taken by the States which possess nuclear materials, facilities and technology. But the instruments of terror can be unexpected, as we discovered on 11 September. The IAEA should address real concerns regarding so-called nuclear terrorism. It should not be used to serve partisan political objectives. The global focus should not be allowed to be shifted from the priority goal of complete nuclear disarmament by all States. The crucial relationship between peace, economic growth and technology cannot be overemphasized. Economic growth is synonymous with the availability of easy and affordable sources of energy. Pakistan’s limited hydro fossil fuel resources are insufficient to cater to an ever-increasing demand for energy. Therefore, nuclear generation is an indispensable element of our national energy strategy. We are encouraged by the recent positive shift in attitudes towards nuclear energy at the international level. The Agency’s report for the year 2001 predicts even better prospects for nuclear power. Mr. Aboul Gheit (Egypt), Vice-President, took the Chair. Pakistan wants to build safeguarded nuclear power plants and seeks the cooperation and assistance of the member States of the IAEA for this purpose. We have embarked upon the second phase of the projects for the Karachi nuclear power plant and the Chashma nuclear power plant. We believe that the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant not only has direct economic advantages for the developing countries but also creates thousands of jobs for poorer people. Apart from nuclear energy, Pakistan has applied nuclear science in the development of agriculture and in the fields of health and the reclamation of wasteland, as well as in combating the problem of salinity. We also appreciate the growing cooperation between the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and the IAEA in all these fields. We are fully aware of the importance of safety in nuclear establishments. We are active adherents to the International Convention on Nuclear Safety. The recent Review Conference, held in Vienna, expressed its appreciation for the safety record of Pakistan. We accord the highest priority to the strengthening of the culture of safety in all our nuclear establishments. Subsequent to the setting up of an independent Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority, which reports directly to the head of Government, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission has further strengthened its own Directorate of Safety, which addresses the issues of nuclear safety, radiation and protection, and operates the Nuclear Emergency Response Coordination Centre. We look forward to greater cooperation with the advanced countries in terms of the unhindered availability of technology, in keeping with the spirit of the Nuclear Safety Convention. As in the past several decades, the safeguards record of Pakistan has remained impeccable during the past year as well. We are convinced that agreed safeguard measures provide strong complementary means to achieve greater safety and security of nuclear material. This conviction has led us to work for the strengthening of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, in cooperation with the international community. While the safety of nuclear establishments and safeguards measures are crucial in dealing with nuclear technology, there is a need to reassess the current framework, which is based on discrimination, and to build upon new strategies which may benefit all member States equitably. We therefore suggest, first, acceptance by the developed countries of the importance of technical cooperation activities vis-à-vis regulatory activities of the Agency, and a fair balance between the two; secondly, the provision of more assured funds for technical cooperation activities, technology transfer and training facilities for the developing countries; thirdly, a higher percentage of expert assignments from developing countries, at least at the regional level; fourthly, higher openings of Technical Cooperation for Developing Countries in project design and implementation; fifthly, the payment by member States of their contributions to the Agency’s Technical Cooperation Fund in full and a timely manner; and sixthly, increased utilization of regional resource centres from the developing member States, with increased outsourcing to them. We all have great expectations from the IAEA in the promotion of technical cooperation. This objective can be achieved through strict adherence to the Statute of the Agency. More importantly, we expect the IAEA to pursue a balanced and non-discriminatory approach in providing access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, particularly to the developing countries.

The delegation of Peru wishes to thank Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei for his introduction of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for 2001. The report reflects the progress made in terms of the organization’s three fundamental pillars: the system of verification and security for all activities throughout the nuclear cycle; technical cooperation; and transfer of technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Peru would like once again to emphasize how important we consider the work of the IAEA to be with regard to transfers of technology and know-how for the peaceful and safe use of nuclear energy. We therefore appreciate the IAEA’s ongoing support, which has made it possible for us to develop invaluable nuclear energy applications in the fields of medicine, mining, industry, the management of water and soils, disease control and nutrition. Furthermore, we are grateful for the training opportunities provided to personnel who are responsible for such applications, which is a central element of the system of technology transfers promoted by the IAEA. One year ago, we were discussing the impact of the terrorist attacks that shook this city and the world. The international community was beginning to close ranks in order to confront that threat. The mind boggles at the prospect of criminal elements gaining access to fissionable or radioactive materials or attacking any kind of nuclear facility or transport mechanism of such material. The delegation of Peru therefore welcomes the opportunity to participate actively with the Agency with a view to enhancing its capacity to prevent, or provide protection or security against, nuclear terrorism, which has also been expressed by, inter alia, the recent adoption at the forty-sixth session of the IAEA General Conference of the resolution on measures to improve nuclear security and to protect against threats in this regard. Peru also highlights the crucial importance of international instruments agreed upon under IAEA auspices, including the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the parties to which recently held their second review meeting to consider national reports, with a view to increasing security for nuclear activities. This is an abiding and vital goal of great significance, not just for the present but for the future — a goal that the delegation of Peru firmly supports. The IAEA is carrying out fundamental work in the area of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The importance of an efficient and strengthened system of verification and inspection that makes it possible to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities has been clearly underlined during Security Council debate. Council members have agreed on the need for enhanced and transparent verification mechanisms with regard to nuclear materials so as to provide reliable non-diversion guarantees that ensure that no State has undeclared nuclear materials or engages in nuclear- related activities. Peru has always acknowledged such a need. Peru was the first country in Latin America to put in force an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA — an instrument carefully designed to increase the Organization’s data collection and evaluation capacities in determining whether or not undeclared nuclear material is present. In the same vein, Peru hosted in December last year a regional IAEA seminar on the Additional Protocol for the benefit of the countries members of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. That initiative stimulated a region-wide dialogue that helped to prompt seven Latin American States to sign or ratify that important instrument. Radiological protection, including the safe transportation of radioactive material, is also a source of concern and an issue of particular importance for Peru. As a coastal country that is keenly conscious of the need to protect its marine environment, Peru fully shares the concerns of other States with regard to possible ecological damage, repercussions on human health and the economic losses that an accident or incident during the transportation of radioactive material or waste might trigger. The adoption of a major new resolution on this issue at the forty-sixth General Conference of the IAEA was confirmation of the need to pay particular attention to this issue in a holistic way. This must include machinery to ensure that those responsible for damage are held to account, as well as to provide for the timely and complete exchange of information among the transporting and coastal States prior to the departure of any vessel; the enhancement of physical safety; and the setting up of an emergency response system to deal with any possible accident or incident during such transportation. The annual report of the IAEA for 2001 states that those who transport radioactive materials have built up an impressive track record of safety and security. It is precisely for that reason that Peru believes that the process of establishing an integral and effective international system for transporting those materials should not present any serious obstacles. We hope and expect that the international conference to be held in Vienna from 7 to 11 July 2003 will make it possible for us to make progress in that respect.

I should like first of all to thank Mr. ElBaradei, the Executive Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his briefing and his comprehensive report on the activities of the IAEA. I would also like to pay tribute to him for his efforts to improve the performance and effectiveness, as well as to broaden the scope, of activities and programmes in this area relating to developing countries. Sudan was a member of the IAEA Board of Governors from 1998 to 2000 and participated effectively in amending article VI of the Statute of the IAEA to expand the membership of the Board, which was adopted during the 1999 session of the General Conference. The amendment was approved by the Republic of the Sudan in 2001, and we deposited the amendment with the United States so that it could enter into force. My country also expresses its support for the progress made in responding to the challenge of international nuclear terrorism with a view to protecting humankind from that scourge. We firmly and unequivocally condemn all forms and manifestations of terrorism. We must take measures to prevent nuclear terrorism, the threat of which is very grave. My country is concerned, however, that the fight against international terrorism is taking resources away from technical assistance programmes, which could have a very negative impact on such programmes and projects. The fight against nuclear proliferation, as well as the signature and ratification of additional protocols, are among the most important issues for the Agency. Hence my country signed and ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1973. The treaty entered into force in July 1997 — a long time ago. But the situation in the Middle East requires in-depth analysis and a comprehensive view, since the only nuclear entity in this region, Israel, refuses to sign the NPT or an Additional Protocol, and it offers some unacceptable justifications and pretexts for not doing so. This is distorted logic that is making it impossible to bring about true peace in the Middle East. And this, in turn, means that the region is now caught in a vicious circle. We support the Iraqi Government’s reply to the appeals of the Secretary-General, the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference for the unconditional return of the inspectors so that they can finish their job. The Sudanese delegation pays a special tribute to the Agency’s technical cooperation programme for its technical support and useful information for developing countries. We also welcome the fact that draft resolution A/57/L.14 stresses the need to provide sufficient resources for those activities. We hope that additional financial resources will be forthcoming and will become an integral part of the IAEA’s budget, beyond contributions and assistance from donor countries, so that we can meet the challenges faced by developing countries, and given the importance of the programme, which exists for the developing countries. Donor countries, of course, could still give more to developing countries in order to complement IAEA programmes. My country had the privilege of receiving the Director General of the IAEA last December. We are gratified by the success of his visit, which took place within the framework of technical cooperation. During the first half of this year we hosted two regional meetings to evaluate African projects. The executive bodies in Sudan are prepared to host further regional meetings on Africa, which could take place in Khartoum, our capital. Technical cooperation programmes are the ideal way for developing countries to build their national capacities in the areas of medicine, health, water, the environment and nuclear radiation safety. At present, great efforts are under way to meet the challenge of eliminating the tsetse fly and malaria-bearing mosquitoes throughout Africa. I hail the joint efforts of Sudan and Ethiopia, our neighbour, to put a programme in place to fight this problem in the 80-kilometre-long Khor Yabous area and to eradicate this scourge along that part of the border between our two countries. I would like to thank the IAEA’s technical assistance programme, which is seeking to eradicate the tsetse fly through sterile insect technique. We welcome their successful efforts. We have made some progress also in getting rid of the malaria-bearing mosquito, which is a major problem for the economic and social development of developing countries in general and for that of African countries in particular.

I would like to thank Mr. ElBaradei, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to say how much we appreciated his statement, which introduced the Agency’s 2001 annual report. He summarized the main achievements of 2001 and outlined the challenges we will face in the future. Egypt is aware of the important role played by the IAEA in terms of the maintenance of international peace and security through its nuclear-non- proliferation activities. Egypt also appreciates the outstanding contribution of the Agency to implementing the priorities for international action through its activities and achievements in the areas of sustainable development, the transfer of nuclear technology and know-how, technical assistance, verification and nuclear security. Technical cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy is one of the major activities of the IAEA. It contributes to the prosperity of the world’s peoples, those of developing countries in particular. Egypt appreciates the Agency’s efforts to develop and update a cooperative strategy for technology, with the development of member countries as a priority. The IAEA makes a crucial contribution to those activities. In this way, technology can make a clear, short- and medium-term contribution; this is one of the pillars of the Agency’s activities. In terms of safeguards activities, we have noted the efforts of the secretariat to enhance the safeguards regime. At the same time, we are aware that the effectiveness of safeguards can be achieved only if all aspects are universal: comprehensive safeguards and Additional Protocols must be part of that. We take this opportunity to inform the Assembly that without universal IAEA safeguards it will be impossible for the efforts to eliminate the danger of nuclear proliferation to yield fruit. Therefore, it is necessary to act to bring about universal implementation of these safeguards, because they are the pillar of non-proliferation. Egypt has proposed on several occasions, both internationally and regionally, that we do something to confront the danger of nuclear proliferation. In 1974, we called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon- free zone in the Middle East. That appeal has been reiterated, by consensus, by the General Assembly since 1980. In April 1990, President Hosni Mubarak called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Through the IAEA, Egypt has always advocated, and still advocates, the implementation of comprehensive IAEA safeguards for all nuclear facilities in the Middle East, without discrimination. In spite of all those efforts and initiatives to attain peace and stability for all States in the region, Israel has never seriously shown the will to accept the safeguards regime for its nuclear facilities. This has had negative consequences for the implementation of comprehensive safeguards for nuclear facilities in the Middle East. It means that the international community now has a double responsibility: to put an end to all the dangers of proliferation for the sake of peace and security, and to ensure the implementation of comprehensive IAEA safeguards. On several occasions, Egypt has said that Iraq must comply with provisions of Security Council resolutions. We view favourably the statement made by Iraq last September in which it stated that full cooperation and inspections would resume unconditionally. Now that the Security Council has adopted resolution 1441 (2002), of 8 November 2002, we must call on Iraq to implement the resolution fully. As the Secretary-General has said, Iraq’s cooperation will be the first step in confirming that Iraq does not possess weapons of mass destruction. That will lead to the suspension of the sanctions that have caused great harm to the Iraqi people. Egypt regrets the absence in the recently adopted resolution of any mention of establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The credibility of the international community vis-à-vis Iraq requires international efforts to ensure that the Middle East is a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. That should be done in accordance with resolution 687 (1991), and in order to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and the threat they pose throughout the world, especially in South and East Asia. With regard to nuclear safety, the events of 11 September 2001 have served to underscore the need to strengthen the activities of the IAEA with regard to securing fissile materials, nuclear facilities and other radioactive materials and to protecting them from the danger posed by international terrorism. Egypt understands that the danger and the threat of terrorism will continue to exist so long as nuclear materials remain outside international supervision. As we have just said, we reaffirm that the position of our Governments with respect to the production of fissile material is based on the need to subject nuclear materials, including stockpiled materials, to international supervision. Egypt has taken part in every effort to draft additional measures within the IAEA to protect us from nuclear terrorism. We believe that such measures must be in line with fundamental standards and that they must not be an alternative to national measures. We should not diminish the responsibilities of the international community with regard to security, which should be financed through voluntary contributions. In the same vein, Egypt hopes that the additional measures and activities proposed in this regard will complement cooperation in the area of technical assistance, so that the Group of Experts established by the IAEA will be able to complete its work and present its recommendations to strengthen the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. My delegation would like to express its appreciation for the intensive and effective efforts that have been made in Vienna to produce the draft resolution under consideration and reaffirms its support for the activities of the IAEA aimed at strengthening its ability to face future challenges.

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe associated with the European Union — Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia — and the associated countries of Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, as well as the European Free Trade Association countries of the European Economic Area Iceland and Norway align themselves with this statement. It is with great interest that the European Union acknowledges the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the year 2001. We welcome the statement of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which he provided additional information on the main developments in the activities of the Agency in 2002. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the secretariat of the IAEA and Director General Mohamed ElBaradei on the excellent work the Agency does. The draft resolution on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency presented to us in document A/57/L.14 represents broad agreement among Member States in Vienna. We hope it can be adopted by consensus. We welcome the outcome of the forty-sixth regular session of the IAEA General Conference, held in Vienna from 16 to 20 September this year. The Agency has an essential role to play in combating nuclear terror. We commend the Director General and the IAEA secretariat for responding quickly to this challenge, first of all by reinforcing and reorienting some ongoing activities and, shortly thereafter, by presenting plans for activities aimed at helping Member States to secure a stringent nuclear security framework for nuclear installations and materials. The primary responsibility for ensuring the necessary nuclear security clearly rests with Member States. The activities of the Agency can only be in support of national measures to counter nuclear terrorism. Technical cooperation programmes are already playing an important role in upgrading safety and security. They will also be valuable instruments in this context. An international nuclear-non-proliferation regime of a universal character, backed by a strong international safeguards system requiring States to properly account for and control nuclear materials, is an absolutely essential basis for international efforts to maintain our collective security. It is the responsibility of Member States to promote the universality of the non-proliferation regime and to adhere to the applicable international instruments. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the global non- proliferation regime, the essential international instrument of the IAEA safeguards system. At the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference, held in April of this year, the responsibility of the IAEA in further strengthening both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional-protocol components of the regime was strongly underlined. Noting the concerns expressed by the Director General in that regard, the European Union recognizes the need for a properly funded safeguards system that is both effective and cost- efficient. The Union is prepared to consider growth in the safeguards budget whenever such requirements can be demonstrated. All the States Members of the European Union have made a clear commitment to the ratification process for their respective additional protocols, a process most of them have finalized. We have committed ourselves to have the protocols of European Union member States enter into force simultaneously. We consider that additional protocols are an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system, and that adherence to them is an essential means of demonstrating fulfilment of the obligations of article III of the Non- Proliferation Treaty. The European Union therefore urges all States that have not yet signed and ratified an additional protocol to do so. We share the concern of the Director General that 48 States that are parties to the NPT have not yet entered into safeguards agreements. We call upon those States to fulfil the obligation they entered into under article III of the Treaty, and to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements. The European Union wishes to recall its concern regarding the continued existence of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and materials in States not parties to the NPT or equivalent treaties. The EU calls upon those States to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. The situation in Iraq remains a major concern for the EU. Three and a half years have now passed since the IAEA was last able to implement its mandate in Iraq. The Agency is therefore unable to provide any assurances regarding Iraqi compliance with its obligations. The EU underlines that, on return to Iraq, the Agency must, in particular, resolve the key issue of whether Iraq’s nuclear activities and capabilities have changed since December 1998. The EU reiterates its demand that Iraq adhere fully to all the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, especially that it let the United Nations inspectors return to Iraq without precondition and that it fully cooperate with the inspection teams in all aspects, including granting immediate and unhindered access to all sites and facilities the inspectors might want to investigate. We are deeply concerned over reports that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has admitted conducting a clandestine nuclear weapon programme. The European Union urges North Korea to immediately offer clarification on the issues. Such a programme is a serious breach of the North Korean commitments under the NPT, the IAEA safeguard agreement, as well as the Joint Declaration between North and South Korea on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the Agreed Framework. It also calls into question the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) project. The EU calls on North Korea to take immediate steps to comply with international non-proliferation commitments and to eliminate its nuclear weapons programme in a verifiable manner, in accordance with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement. The EU stands ready to work with all parties to find a peaceful resolution to this situation, which constitutes a serious development for peace and stability internationally and regionally. The EU attaches great importance to a high level of nuclear safety worldwide and undertakes to maintain a high level of nuclear safety in the Union. The EU member States and the associated countries closely cooperate in that field. The EU attaches great importance to technical cooperation as one of the pillars of the Agency’s activities. Our support is well demonstrated by the very high level of voluntary contributions provided by EU member States, which in 2002 will amount to approximately 35 per cent of the total contributions. The EU continues to wish to see adequate financing for those important activities, and will contribute constructively next year when the Board of Governors reviews the funding mechanism for technical cooperation. The EU is well aware of the increasingly difficult context in which the Agency has to finance its statutory obligations under the regular budget. Every effort should be made to ensure that the Agency has the financial resources to do so. The EU is concerned that an important number of member States of the IAEA do not live up to their financial obligations to the Agency. The EU strongly urges all member States to pay in full and on time their assessed contribution to the regular budget, as well as outstanding contributions from previous years that now amount to approximately $18 million. The EU proposes to introduce to the Agency a single currency system based on the euro, taking effect from the 2004-2005 biennium. The fact that the overwhelming majority of its expenditure occurs in euros underlines the advantages of a euro-based financial system. In our opinion, that system will substantially contribute to improve transparency, effectiveness and efficiency in the Agency’s management of its financial resources of both the regular budget as well as extrabudgetary funds. We appreciate the work done so far by the IAEA secretariat to examine the issue and to provide member States with information on the provisional findings. We look forward to a comprehensive report later this year in order to reach an agreement on this proposal during the first half of 2003. The EU fully supports the Director General in his continued efforts to improve the effectiveness of the Agency. A results-based approach to budgeting requires strong management and a clear definition of crosscutting activities. Enhanced cooperation and coordination between departments should be encouraged, leading to more synergy and better use of resources, human as well as financial. In that context, we welcome the Director General’s decision to engage an outside management consultant to review the achievements so far and to suggest further measures to be to taken. Finally, let me assure Members that the EU and the States that have associated themselves with this statement fully support the role that the IAEA plays as the competent authority for verification of compliance with the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well as its role in promoting the safe usage of nuclear technologies for peaceful application in those member States that have chosen to use that technology.

We thank Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei for his presentation of the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (A/57/L.14). We also wish to welcome the entry of Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan and Seychelles to the IAEA membership. Following up on the announcement made by the Minister for Foreign Relations of Cuba on 14 September 2002 to the General Assembly, the Government of the Republic of Cuba proceeded to deposit the instruments of adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on 4 November 2002, in Moscow. With the Cuban adherence, 188 States are now parties to that international instrument. At the time of adherence, Cuba reiterated its position of principle to the effect that military doctrines based on the possession of nuclear weapons are unacceptable. It also reaffirmed its criteria that no country or group of countries should be allowed a monopoly over nuclear weapons or over their quantitative or qualitative development. Cuba is convinced that the only way to overcome the original flaws of the NPT and its selective and discriminatory essence is by achieving the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In complying with the provisions of the NPT, the legitimate right of States to have full access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must also be respected. Therefore, the imposition of restrictive unilateral measures on the exchange of equipment, supplies and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must also cease. Cuba’s decision to become a State party to the NPT reaches beyond its national interests and is a clear indication of the political will and the commitment of the Cuban Government to promoting and strengthening the United Nations, multilateralism and international treaties on disarmament and arms control. As a State party to the NPT, Cuba intends to become actively involved in the preparatory process for the next NPT Review Conference and to work together with other States that, like Cuba, aspire to achieving total elimination under strict international monitoring of all nuclear weapons. On 23 October in Mexico City, the Government of Cuba also deposited its instruments of ratification of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, along with all its amendments. With Cuba’s ratification, the Treaty of Tlatelolco enters fully into force throughout its area of application and Latin America and the Caribbean will thus be formally declared the first inhabited area of the planet free of nuclear weapons. Cuba signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco on 25 March 1995, essentially as an act of solidarity with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, despite the fact that the United States, the sole nuclear Power in the Americas, was pursuing a policy of hostility against us and tightening its economic, trade and financial blockade, while maintaining by force and against the will of the Cuban people the illegal occupation of a part of our national territory. As we ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco, these obstacles remain in place and are even increasing. However, in contrast to the interest of the global super- Power in ensuring the prevalence of unilateralism in the resolution of international problems, Cuba is once again demonstrating its commitment to promoting and strengthening multilateralism and international disarmament and arms control treaties. The step Cuba has taken also contributes to regional efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and international peace and security. Cuba attaches great importance to the IAEA’s work and reiterates the need to attain an appropriate balance among the three fundamental pillars of that organization’s work: technical cooperation, security and verification. We welcome the fact that, following a prolonged deadlock, the target figure for the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund will be increased for the biennium 2003-2004. We hope that this figure will continue to rise in the future in correspondence with the real and growing needs of the recipient countries. It is essential that the IAEA maintain a Technical Cooperation Fund marked by constant, predictable and secure growth. Cuba maintains a major technical cooperation programme with the IAEA and has always made the optimum use of allocated resources. Such resources have been directed into our country’s priority programmes in such spheres as human health, agriculture and industry and the implementation of these projects has had a significant impact. Cuba reaffirms its support for the Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean (ARCAL), which it recently ratified. We view the ARCAL programme as the ideal framework for cooperation among the countries of the Latin American and Caribbean region. In the context of our firm will to promote the important work of ARCAL, Cuba will organize the fourth meeting of its Technical Coordination Board, to be held in Havana in May next year. Cuba believes that the IAEA can and must play a very important role in fighting nuclear terrorism. That is why we support the efforts of the IAEA to undertake programmes and activities to protect against nuclear terrorism, without prejudice to the human and financial resources earmarked for sustainable socio-economic development. We support the proposal to establish voluntary funds for extrabudgetary contributions to finance new activities, such as the campaign against nuclear terrorism. At the same time, it is important to preserve the voluntary funds that are currently devoted to IAEA technical cooperation, which many developing countries so urgently need.

The Russian Federation welcomes Director General ElBaradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and expresses its gratitude for the annual report of the Agency. We are pleased to welcome the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Seychelles and Eritrea as new IAEA members. We have warm neighbourly and partnership relations with the Kyrgyz Republic in the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as strong business links in implementing the programmes of uranium fields development and radioactive waste disposal. We hope that the accession of the Kyrgyz Republic to the IAEA will make our bilateral cooperation in this field even more effective. The Russian Federation is an active IAEA member engaged in the multifaceted activities of the Agency, which embrace such key areas as non- proliferation of nuclear weapons through its control functions, the peaceful use of nuclear energy for development, and the development of safe and environmentally friendly innovation technologies in this field. Last year, terrorist attacks in the United States and the very recent tragic events in Moscow, when terrorists took more than 700 hostages, highlighted the threat of international terrorism to the entire world. This credible threat calls for concerted multilateral efforts in creating a global system to counter new challenges and threats, in particular in the nuclear field. In this regard, we would like to commend the Agency’s efforts to fight nuclear terrorism, including in the light of the decisions made by the G-8 leaders in Kananaskis, Canada. We believe that enhanced physical protection regime, the safe storage of nuclear materials, the prevention of their illegal trafficking, and the improvement of their record-keeping and control, combined with other measures to increase the efficiency of the IAEA control system, will make it possible to deny terrorists and their accomplices any access to hazardous materials. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is of crucial importance to international security. We expect that the preparatory process for the Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, to be held in 2005, will help to consolidate a maximum number of States to attain the Treaty goals. The Russian-United States Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions signed in Moscow earlier this year is an important contribution to strengthening strategic stability. Russia has already begun work on its ratification. The importance of this treaty and the declaration on a new strategic relationship between the Russian Federation and the United States goes beyond bilateral relations and meets the interests of all States. In this regard, we welcome the recent adoption by consensus of the draft resolution supporting this document in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. Excessive weapon-grade materials utilization and nuclear weapons reduction are an important aspect of nuclear disarmament. We continue to implement the agreement between the Governments of the Russian Federation and the United States of America concerning the disposition of highly enriched uranium extracted from nuclear weapons dated February 18, 1993. The Russian nuclear weapons industry is being converted to serve the interests of nuclear energy. We note with satisfaction that the promotion of nuclear energy remains one of the key priorities pursued by the Agency. In 2000, the IAEA General Conference passed the resolution on “Strengthening the Agency’s Activities Related to Nuclear Science, Technology and Applications” (GC(44)/RES/20). The international project on innovative reactors and fuel cycle, which is being carried out within the framework of this resolution, is becoming increasing authoritative. We view this project as one of the practical steps towards the implementation of the initiative launched by the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Putin at the Millennium Summit on energy supply for sustained development of mankind, radical solution to the problems posed by proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as for a global environmental improvement. Russia is giving greater and greater attention to new nuclear technology research and development. In accordance with the nuclear energy development strategy of Russia for the first half of the twenty-first century approved by the Government, several innovative projects based on thermal and fast neutron reactors are under way. These will particularly help address the problems of safe use of weapon-grade and energy plutonium while preparing for the transition to complete closed fuel cycle. The Russian Federation supports the efforts made by the Agency to foster cooperation in the field of nuclear technology. We attach great importance to the implementation of a number of projects, in particular the regional project on research reactor safety and the model project on improving the radiation protection infrastructure in several member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States. We find that the financing of the technical assistance fund through the IAEA member States’ assessed contributions in national currency according to the United Nations scale of assessments is an effective approach. We will pay our current year’s contribution in the near future and continue contributing to this fund regularly. The Russian delegation is grateful to Ambassador Nabeela Al-Mulla, the Chairman of the IAEA Board of Governors, for presenting the draft resolution on the IAEA Report to the General Assembly. The Russian Federation is one of the co-authors of the draft, which succeeds in reflecting the balance of interests of most States. We call for support for this draft.

On behalf of the Government of Japan, I would like to express my gratitude to Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his statement as well as for preparing the report of the Agency now before us. In addition, I am pleased to extend a hearty welcome to Eritrea, the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Seychelles, which have recently become members of the IAEA. Promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy contributes to the world’s stable supply of energy and the protection of the global environment. Japan greatly appreciates the IAEA’s role in fostering and strengthening international cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy as well as on nuclear safety and nuclear non-proliferation. As the only country to have suffered the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and that has long been committed to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Japan is determined to use its wealth of experience for the greater benefit of humankind. It attaches the highest priority to safety in utilizing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and is striving to promote safety both domestically and internationally. Allow me to briefly highlight some aspects of the activities of the IAEA that we deem to be particularly important. I would like first of all to emphasize the importance of the universalization of the Additional Protocol in responding to the various challenges to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. It strengthens the Agency’s capability to detect undeclared nuclear materials and activities by enlarging the scope of the information to be provided and by implementing complementary access. In order to help maintain the momentum for the universalization of the Additional Protocol, Japan, in cooperation with the IAEA, will host the International Conference for Wider Adherence to Strengthened IAEA Safeguards next month in Tokyo. This Conference will be held from the global perspective, in order to consolidate the results of the five regional seminars and symposia that have been held so far. It will also provide participants with the opportunity to reconfirm the importance of the IAEA safeguards that guarantee international peace and security, and consider concrete steps toward the strengthening of the Additional Protocol. Japan, in this context, urges the IAEA secretariat to make further efforts toward the early adoption of integrated safeguards in order not only to realize the rationalization of the safeguards but also to provide an incentive to conclude the Additional Protocol. The nuclear weapon development program of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a serious security issue for Japan. It is also a major concern for the international non-proliferation regime. In the Japan — Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Pyongyang Declaration issued at the time of Prime Minister Koizumi’s meeting with Chairman Kim Jong II last September, “Both sides confirmed to comply with all related international agreements for an overall resolution of the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula.” (Pyongyang Declaration, September 17, 2002). In the official high-level bilateral normalization talks held in Kuala Lumpur last month, Japan once again expressed its concerns in detail, and called upon North Korea to comply with all related international agreements. In the trilateral leaders’ meeting of Japan, United States and Republic of Korea, and in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders’ meeting — both of which were held on the 26th of last month, the leaders noted the potential for North Korea to benefit from greater participation as a member of the international community. However, North Korea’s relations with the international community now rest on its prompt and visible actions to dismantle its programmes to develop nuclear weapons. In that connection, it is important that North Korea implement the IAEA safeguards agreement fully and allow the Agency to take the necessary actions to draw conclusions on the situation regarding nuclear development programmes in North Korea. Japan intends to continuously work upon North Korea on this point. Japan also expresses its great appreciation for the IAEA’s announcement that it is ready to dispatch a senior team to North Korea or to receive a North Korean team in order to discuss the implementation of the safeguards agreement. Japan calls upon North Korea to accept the proposal of the IAEA. In closing, allow me to reiterate my Government’s strong commitment to, and support for, the activities of the IAEA.

At the outset, I would like to thank Mr. ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, for his informative and comprehensive opening statement highlighting the achievements of the activities of the IAEA in the course of the most recent period. As the Czech Republic associates itself with the statement delivered by Denmark on behalf of the European Union, I will touch upon only some of the topics that are of particular importance to my country. The efforts and activities of the IAEA are scrutinized in the light of the present debate on global security problems and the role of nuclear energy in sustainable development. The key role of the Agency lies, in our view, in helping humankind to maximize the benefits and minimize the risks related to the exploitation of nuclear power. The international community expects the Agency to continue playing its important role under the three pillars of its mandate: verification, safety and technology. In the most recent period, the IAEA succeeded in achieving its main objectives: serving as a unique platform for the transfer of nuclear science and technology; building and maintaining a global nuclear safety regime; guarding against proliferation of nuclear weapons; and strengthening the security and physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. My country has continued to work hard with other countries to enhance the global non-proliferation regime and its verification. The recent completion of ratification by the Czech Parliament of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement, signed between the IAEA and the Czech Republic, is the most visible contribution to those efforts in the most recent period. The full implementation of the Protocol has been among the highest priorities of the State administration. As has the European Union, we would like to use this opportunity to urge those who have not yet done so to conclude similar protocols with the Agency without delay in order to make the strengthened safeguards system as broad as possible and, ultimately, universal. From the very beginning of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the major supplying countries have recognized the responsibility to ensure that such cooperation activities do not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That principle is reflected in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and in the multilateral regimes on export controls. The Nuclear Suppliers Group, together with the Zangger Committee, play an important role in support of the NPT and non-proliferation in general. The Czech Republic, which currently chairs the Nuclear Suppliers Group, attaches high priority to the Group’s dialogue with other non-member States, in particular potential nuclear suppliers. In the exercise of that office, we are as transparent and cooperative as possible in pursuing the non-proliferation objectives. Non-proliferation efforts also have their anti- terrorism dimension. The Czech Republic will not stand aside; it wants to join new initiatives in the area of protection against nuclear terrorism, including the Agency’s plan of action. Both in-kind and financial contributions are being considered. The Czech Republic belongs to the group of countries that broadly employ nuclear technology to satisfy various needs of their society. In our view, most of the nuclear technology non-power applications in human health, food and agriculture and chemical and physical sciences are able to bring distinct economic and social benefits to every part of the world. Of course, any such use shall be carefully tailored to the specific needs and existing infrastructure of individual countries and regions. In that context, the Czech Republic recognizes the importance of technical cooperation among member States. With the aim of contributing to those endeavours, Czech organizations and individual experts take active part in various cooperative programmes and other IAEA-sponsored activities in order to encourage sound progress in the development and peaceful use of nuclear energy in Europe and other regions. As in previous years, the Czech Government allocated additional financial resources to support activities under the Agency’s Technical Cooperation Programme and made voluntary contributions to specific projects in Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine. The Czech Republic also welcomes all efforts to efficiently direct Technical Cooperation funds to the indispensable activities of the Agency’s major programmes. A results-oriented approach applied in the process of planning for the programme and budget for the period 2004-2005 is an appropriate vehicle for achieving more efficient spending of funds, not only in the area of technical cooperation. Since the Czech Republic is a country with scarce energy resources, nuclear power is an important part of our energy mix. Currently, approximately 20 per cent of the country’s electricity is generated by the four units of the Dukovany nuclear power plant. The commissioning of the two units of the Temelin nuclear power plant is in progress. When at full power, the installed capacity of Czech nuclear power plants will more than double. With respect to the Temelin nuclear power plant, I cannot fail to mention nuclear safety issues. I have to underline that the Czech Government attaches the utmost importance to the safety of nuclear installations operated on its territory. In order to demonstrate that, the system of nuclear safety assessment continues to be based on the principles of independence and transparency. Peer reviews organized by the Agency are an important part of the safety assessment structure in the Czech Republic. Bringing independent and internationally recognized expertise, missions to the Temelin and Dukovany nuclear power plants, organized under the IAEA umbrella, confirmed again at the end of last year their very good status in all aspects of safety. The missions also offered a number of ideas for further improvements. In this respect, allow me to use this opportunity to express once again appreciation to the individual member States who made their experts available and to the IAEA secretariat, in particular the Department of Nuclear Safety and the Department of Technical Cooperation. However, we are concerned at the attempts to exclude the Agency’s peer review services from the regional Technical Cooperation Programme. The high level of safety required for nuclear installations and for workplaces with sources of radioactive and ionizing radiation, and physical protection from radiation, are among the constraints on any use of nuclear technologies, and it is logical that that principle be applied before any technical cooperation project is launched. One hardly need reaffirm the importance of independent third-party peer reviews in maintaining and further developing safety and security levels for the use of nuclear energy and of ionizing radiation. The same applies to the complexity and the well-defined framework required for the conduct of the review services offered by the Agency. Worth mentioning, however, is the unique design of those review services, which allows for the sharing of experience gained and of the results achieved, at least among interested groups, such as users of similar technology or regulatory authorities. Offering a platform for the sharing of experience and information and for the discussion of common issues is one of the most important missions of the regional component of the Technical Cooperation Programme. In conclusion, I should like to assure the Assembly of my Government’s continuing commitment to supporting and expanding the Agency’s role in international cooperation to promote the peaceful and safe use of nuclear energy and ionizing radiation for the benefit of all Member States.

Slovakia aligns itself with the statement made earlier by the Danish presidency of the European Union on this agenda item, and we fully support its content. However, since the annual reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the General Assembly are traditionally of the highest interest to my delegation, I should like to take this opportunity to comment briefly on a few points from my national perspective. We thank the Director General of the Agency, Mr. ElBaradei, for being with us in New York today and for presenting personally the report on the work of the Agency. We find the report, as well as his complementary remarks, to be factual and highly informative. Mr. ElBaradei’s presence here today is even more appreciated when one considers his demanding work schedule, no doubt further intensified by his active participation in recent days in resolving the most pressing issues on the agenda of the international community. The burden shouldered today by the Agency has become more complex since the three main missions of its mandate — technology, safety and verification — have grown more intertwined than ever before, owing largely to the evolving international security environment and to the increasing needs of economic development. Consequently, promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy, together with ensuring its non- diversion to military purposes, poses an ever-growing challenge. Here, I wish to put on record Slovakia’s firm support for the further strengthening of the effectiveness of the Agency’s safeguards. The right path forward lies in bringing into force the Additional Protocols to safeguards agreements with as many States as possible, in the universalization of the system and, ultimately, in developing integrated safeguards. Slovakia, having concluded a new safeguards agreement with the Agency in 1998, is considering appropriate steps for implementing the provisions of the Additional Protocol it has signed, including the formal measures necessary to bring it into force. My country is also ready to support an early completion of the Agency’s work on developing integrated safeguards, in close cooperation with the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation and with other Member States. The viability of the verification element in the Agency’s mandate is even more crucial for sustaining the global non-proliferation regime, given that certain discouraging realities are still in place. I have in mind the fact that the Agency is still unable to fully perform its duties — as mandated by the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and by the relevant Security Council resolutions — in respect of two States. The challenge to the non-proliferation regime is even greater in the light of recent reports that one of those States is in breach of its commitments under the NPT. We commend the Security Council for the unanimous adoption of its resolution 1441 (2002) last Friday. We encourage Iraq to comply fully with that resolution and with other relevant resolutions of the Council. There are other concrete steps — although they are formally outside the purview of the IAEA — to qualitatively consolidate the NPT non-proliferation regime: a comprehensive nuclear test ban and a fissile material ban. Slovakia joins in the call for the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty and for a renewal of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The completion of both of those undertakings is long overdue; the opportunity should not be missed. The process should enjoy the Agency’s continued support and cooperation. I now turn briefly to cooperation between Slovakia and the Agency. Slovakia is among the countries that operate peaceful nuclear facilities. According to our national energy strategy plan, nuclear energy will remain a substantial source of our energy production for the medium term. The safe operation of nuclear facilities continues to be our utmost priority. Bearing that in mind, we have, since joining the IAEA, promoted and participated in fruitful cooperation with the Agency. With regard to our most recent activities aimed at promoting nuclear safety, I should mention at least the establishment at Bratislava last April of the Centre for Nuclear Safety. The Centre is supported by the Swiss and the Slovak Governments. The objective is to create a network of nuclear safety experts in support of the nuclear authorities in the region. The safety of nuclear installations is also a subject of bilateral cooperation with our neighbours. Meetings involving high governmental experts have been organized with all neighbouring countries to discuss issues of common interest and to exchange experiences in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We consider those meetings to be an important measure to promote confidence. It is the responsibility of the nuclear community to promote nuclear safety in a more global way. Slovakia supports the Agency’s initiatives aimed at contributing to a global nuclear safety regime through networking, through integrating its safety evaluation activities and through promoting adherence to international safety conventions. We support the Agency’s cooperation with various parts of the United Nations system, with the European Union institutions and with other international bodies, such as the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the World Association of Nuclear Operators. I cannot close without touching upon the important role of the Agency and of its activities in the field of combating terrorism. Slovakia welcomes the plan of action approved in principle by the Board of Governors of the Agency. As for the outcome of today’s General Assembly debate, the best message we can deliver to Vienna, in order to demonstrate our unwavering support for the Agency, would be the adoption by the largest possible majority of the draft resolution (A/57/L.14) now before us for consideration.

I would like to start by expressing my delegation’s appreciation to Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for presenting the annual report on the work of the IAEA for the year 2001 and additional information on the main developments in the Agency’s activities during 2002. I also wish to welcome the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Seychelles and Eritrea as new members of the IAEA. Ukraine considers the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency to be a crucial part of overall efforts to ensure a safer and more secure world nuclear environment. Recently, the world has become more aware of what a terrorist threat can be all about if sophisticated technology is involved. We have to be absolutely clear that the treat of nuclear terrorism is potentially one of the most horrifying possibilities in that domain. Ukraine commends the IAEA for the work done since last year’s session of its General Conference. The Agency turned out to be quick in its response and in outlining a practical programme, which will be an important contribution to fighting the global nuclear terrorism. Member countries have to face the reality; these new challenges made a profound impact on the Agency’s priorities while it had to fulfil its statutory obligations under rigid financial constraints. It is imperative that we recognize and support the Agency’s activities that require a sustained response to various emerging challenges. Though the public’s environmental concerns about operational safety and waste disposal still exist, we have to look at the Agency’s role in the future of nuclear power. In the past year the Agency assisted its member States to improve their safety record, and it undoubtedly helps to restore public support for nuclear energy applications as an acceptable option for sustainable development. We add our voice in support of a unique collaborative international effort under the auspices of the Agency: the International Project on Innovative Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). We commend the Agency for this project, which will fit user requirements in terms of economics, waste, safety and non-proliferation parameters. There we come to the most profound functions of the Agency, where it plays the important role of a catalyst for the social and economic development of its Member States. The needs and priorities of Member States are best served under the Agency’s technical cooperation programme. The World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg, once again stressed the need for technology transfer as a prerequisite for development. The Ukrainian delegation underlined at the forty-sixth session of the IAEA General Conference that the Agency’s active position in Johannesburg had contributed to the enhancement of awareness of nuclear technologies that are viewed as a facilitator of Agenda 21. At the same time, the Agency remains a key player in ensuring a more effective and transparent global nuclear safety regime worldwide through a proven and powerful mechanism of legally binding international instruments. We are deeply convinced that to make Agenda 21 feasible due attention should be paid to the rectification of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident as an integral element of regional sustainable development. The Ukrainian delegation expresses its appreciation to the Agency for its initiative to establish a forum of experts as part of the new strategy for recovery. Ukraine welcomes the IAEA’s active role in strengthening the regime of physical protection of nuclear material and in steps that have been taken with regard to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. It is our firm belief that additional efforts should be extended to convene as soon as possible a diplomatic conference for the adoption of an amended Convention. Ukraine has always been a steady supporter of the nuclear-non-proliferation regime. We appreciate the fact that the Agency continues to be the core of that regime, through its verification system. Any Member State’s failure to fully implement safeguards agreements would jeopardize the overall efforts of the world community to curb nuclear proliferation. Ukraine strongly supports binding verification agreements to provide immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to enable the Agency to carry out its United Nations mandate. Ukraine considers concrete steps in further strengthening safeguards mechanisms to be a part of the Agency’s integrated framework concept and thus looks forward to continuing to play a productive role in the progressive development of safeguards.

Like others, I want to begin by thanking Director General ElBaradei for his comprehensive statement on the achievements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and on the challenges it will face over the coming year. We would also like to express our appreciation for his leadership in this challenging year for the Agency, a year of course in which it was Australia’s honour to chair the Board of Governors. Australia expresses its appreciation for the close and productive working relationship we enjoyed with Mr. ElBaradei during our period as Chair. We look forward to continuing our close association with him and the members of the IAEA secretariat. The alarming and tragic events of 11 September 2001 and the developments since then, including the terrorist bombing in Bali, have highlighted the importance of promoting and protecting international frameworks which ensure peace and security for all of us. The Agency’s pivotal role in ensuring the safe and peaceful development of nuclear science and nuclear energy has been underlined by the heightened concern about the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, together with the spectre of nuclear or radiological terrorism. Australia commends the Agency for the substantive progress it has made in tackling these issues. Australia is strongly committed to the three pillars — nuclear safety, verification and technology — which form the basis of the Agency’s mandate. We believe that the global implementation of an effective system of strengthened safeguards delivers universal security benefits. In Australia’s view, the Agency’s verification and promotional activities are mutually reinforcing in nature. Strengthening the credibility of the Agency’s verification system promotes confidence in nuclear science and technology. A priority for Australia is achieving wide application of the IAEA’s Additional Protocols on strengthened safeguards. The Additional Protocols represent the new verification standard for safeguards under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This means that the IAEA safeguards system should come quickly to be regarded as comprising both classical safeguards and the Additional Protocols. Australia was the first member State to ratify an Additional Protocol and is pleased to be the first country in which integrated safeguards are being applied. Australia’s experience demonstrates that integrated safeguards deliver benefits in terms of increased efficiency as well as effectiveness. We urge States that have yet to sign and ratify an Additional Protocol to do so as soon as possible. The ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament will not be achieved without effective measures which ensure nuclear non-proliferation. The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT identified the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty as one of the most urgent disarmament and non-proliferation steps that the international community should take. We commend the Agency for its ongoing contribution to the dialogue on possible verification requirements for a fissile material cut-off treaty. There is a continuing need to remain vigilant in looking for clandestine nuclear-weapon programmes. Two States continue to test the non-proliferation regime, and they, of course, are the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Iraq. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s recent admission that it is developing a uranium- enrichment programme for nuclear weapons, clearly in breach of its obligations under the NPT and the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, is of grave concern. As a party to the NPT, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has an unconditional obligation to comply with its NPT safeguards agreement with the Agency. It must move quickly to comply with its non-proliferation obligations, including full cooperation with the Agency. The international community must send a strong and unified message to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that its nuclear-weapon activities are totally unacceptable and have no international support. Australia welcomes the Agency’s efforts pertaining to Iraq and expresses its deep concern over Iraq’s continued non-compliance with Security Council resolutions requiring it to provide the Agency with the access and cooperation necessary to implement its Security Council mandate in Iraq. Australia strongly supports the resumption of inspections and looks to Iraq to cooperate fully with IAEA inspectors and those of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) in achieving the complete implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions. The Agency has a central role to play in responding to the threats of nuclear terrorism. We commend the Agency for responding quickly to this threat, including through projects funded by the newly created Nuclear Security Fund. As a contributor, Australia urges those member States that have not already done so to contribute to the Fund, financially and through in-kind measures. The security of nuclear and radioactive materials must be a priority for all countries. We welcome the Agency’s progress in strengthening the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. There is an obvious need to further improve the control of high-activity sources to protect against the risk of radiological terrorism. Australia supports the work of the Agency to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We call on all delegations participating in this process to work constructively to achieve a consensus on outstanding issues. The Agency has an essential role in establishing a global nuclear safety culture. Australia has contributed to regional and international efforts to enhance the understanding of how a safety culture can be implemented in nuclear organizations. A particular focus for Australia is the promotion of improvements in the international safety regime for research reactors. Australia also continues to promote constructive dialogue between shipping and coastal States on the safe transport of radioactive material. We are honoured to have been invited by the Director General to chair the International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material, to be held in Vienna in July next year. It is gratifying to see the very strong level of support for technical cooperation across the Agency’s membership. Australia is pleased to have been able to increase to $1.995 million (Australian) its voluntary contribution to the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) for 2003, which is well above the 2003 rate of attainment of 90 per cent. Australia has been pleased to contribute to the IAEA’s technical cooperation activities. We also contribute significantly to activities funded through our extrabudgetary project entitled “The Application of Radioisotope Technology to Sustainable Development in Asia and the Pacific”. We continue to provide strong support to the Agency’s Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Asia-Pacific region. Mr. ElBaradei has highlighted the Agency’s role in promoting sustainable development through the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy in such a way that all nations benefit. At this critical point in history, member States must maintain the momentum for the Agency’s work on strengthened safeguards and other verification activity. We will continue to strongly support the Agency as it implements its programmes and adapts to meet new challenges.

At the outset, my delegation would like to commend Mr. ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and his staff for the dedication and commitment with which they continue to discharge their responsibilities. The Republic of Korea attaches great importance to all areas of the Agency’s work and is strongly committed to the Agency’s objectives. Over the past 46 years, the IAEA has played a crucial role in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy, particularly through its technical cooperation projects and its normative work in strengthening global nuclear safety standards. The Agency also plays an indispensable role in the maintenance of international peace and security by virtue of the mandates entrusted to it by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Security Council and regional non-proliferation agreements. The effectiveness of the Agency’s safeguards system is central to the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy by fostering confidence in the compliance of the States parties with their obligations to the NPT or other non-proliferation arrangements. My delegation believes that the potential nuclear power holds for sustainable development should receive the wide recognition that it deserves. In this regard, my Government commends the secretariat of the IAEA for its efforts to promote the use of nuclear power for development at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, held at Johannesburg last September. My country currently has 17 nuclear-power reactors in operation that account for over 40 per cent of our total electric power supply. If the same amount of electricity were generated by coal-fired power plants, our greenhouse gas emissions would be 20 per cent higher than the levels reflected in current statistics. As such, nuclear power offers a realistic option for meeting growing energy requirements in a manner consistent with the goals of the Framework Convention on Climate Change. Thanks to the constant evolution of nuclear technology, the new generation of nuclear reactors under development will be equipped with enhanced safety features and be more economically competitive. The crucial importance of nuclear safety cannot be overemphasized. The IAEA has made great strides in this field, including with regard to the measures taken to prepare for the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. We should build on these achievements and draw from them to more effectively address public concerns about the safety of nuclear power. We also commend the secretariat of the IAEA for taking prompt action in mobilizing international cooperation against possible nuclear terrorism in the wake of 11 September. When it comes to nuclear safety in general and nuclear terrorism specifically, the primary responsibility for safety and security concerns rests with the individual countries in which nuclear installations are located. The Agency, however, has an important role to play in coordinating international efforts and in providing technical assistance to those in need of it. It is also important to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In that regard, my Government looks forward to a speedy conclusion of negotiations on the amendment of the Convention. The Republic of Korea has been a strong supporter of the Agency’s efforts to strengthen its safeguards system. We believe that the Model Additional Protocol, adopted in 1997, offers the best hope for effectively dealing with new challenges on the safeguards front. We also welcome the completion of the conceptual framework for the integrated safeguards system. All of these achievements in the normative areas are imperative for nuclear non-proliferation. Nevertheless, no matter how intrusive a safeguards system may be, it may not always be effective enough to deter determined States from developing nuclear weapons. The political will and commitment of states to nuclear transparency and non-proliferation objectives is therefore important, too. The long-standing North Korean nuclear issue has recently taken a drastic turn for the worse. The Republic of Korea is gravely concerned about the revelations about North Korea’s clandestine nuclear programme, which is based on highly enriched uranium. Such a programme constitutes a clear violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), North Korea’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the 1992 South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It also poses a serious threat to the peace and security of the Korean peninsula and beyond. North Korea should dismantle its nuclear programme in a prompt and verifiable manner and come into full compliance with all of its bilateral and international non-proliferation commitments without further delay. Full compliance by North Korea is not only in its best interests, but also essential for the viability of the inter-Korean peace process. Before concluding, I would like to draw the attention of the Assembly to the resolution, adopted at the forty-third session of the General Conference of the IAEA, to amend article VI of the Agency’s Statute, which deals with the enlargement of the IAEA Board of Governors. We call upon all member States that have not yet done so to ratify the amendment promptly so that it can come into effect at the earliest possible date.

I would like, on behalf of my Government, to thank Mr. ElBaradei for his introduction to the General Assembly of the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is an excellent report. We see in this year’s report a clear escalation of demands on the Agency. That is not a new phenomenon. In the face of new challenges and expanding needs over the past two decades, the IAEA has repeatedly been called upon to do more — more on nuclear safety, more on safeguards and, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, more on nuclear security. There are many reasons why the international community turns to the IAEA as a means to address difficult problems. The Agency has a unique international charter and a proven track record of excellence. Time and again it has responded quickly, effectively and comprehensively to new challenges. It has deservedly earned a reputation as one of the most effective and well-managed of all the international organizations. Today, the IAEA is confronted with some of the most difficult problems facing our world. These include the critical need to address non-compliance by Iraq and North Korea with the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other non-proliferation commitments, the urgency of preventing acts of nuclear terrorism, and the continuing need to strengthen the international safeguards system. States long ago realized that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would gravely undermine their security. For many years, the international community has laboured to create strong barriers to the further spread of nuclear weapons. Over time, a web of international treaties, verification systems, export controls and bilateral and multilateral commitments has been woven that collectively we refer to as the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The bedrock of that regime is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreements that it mandates. The commitments made by States to abide by the terms of the NPT and their safeguards agreements are binding international obligations. But commitments are without value if they are not backed by full compliance. Both Iraq and North Korea have accepted those commitments, and both are in serious violation of them. Additionally, the international community has concerns regarding the commitment of other States. Throughout the seven years of United Nations weapons inspections, Iraq lied about its nuclear capabilities and its programme to develop nuclear weapons. It continues to violate its international obligations by withholding experimental data, material account logs and other nuclear-related technical documents. Ongoing illicit procurement activity, including attempts to acquire thousands of high- strength aluminium tubes that can be used in gas centrifuges, suggests that Iraq is as intent as ever on attaining nuclear weapons and flouting its NPT requirements and Security Council mandates. From 1991 to 1998, the IAEA Action Team largely succeeded in dismantling Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme. Despite that achievement, Iraq’s nuclear potential was not completely eliminated. It still possesses the scientific and technical expertise needed to develop nuclear weapons and, in the four-year absence of inspectors, has had increased opportunity to do so. In partnership with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), the Action Team is now poised to resume inspections in Iraq. Its role is to ensure verifiably that Iraq has entirely eliminated its nuclear- weapons programme. Security Council resolution 1441 (2002), adopted last Friday, gives Iraq one final chance to comply. Failure to do so will lead to serious consequences. North Korea must also comply with its obligations. Let me be clear: North Korea has violated the NPT and its NPT safeguards agreement, violated the Agreed Framework and violated the Joint North- South Denuclearization Agreement. North Korea has been violating its NPT safeguards commitments since 1993. The 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea seemed to offer a means to address North Korean non-compliance. It would not provide a shield for North Korea’s continued violations of the NPT. Since 1994, the IAEA has maintained a continuous presence at North Korea’s nuclear centre at Yongbyon, monitoring the freeze of the North’s plutonium production capacity. But North Korea’s recently revealed uranium enrichment programme for nuclear weapons represents an outrageous act of bad faith on North Korea’s part. North Korea must completely and verifiably dismantle that programme. I am confident that the IAEA is prepared, as appropriate, to be part of resolving North Korea’s unquestionable breach of its non-proliferation commitments. Meanwhile, the world community must prevail in its fight against the heightened threat posed by international terrorism. Last March, the IAEA Board of Governors approved a comprehensive programme to strengthen nuclear material security worldwide. That programme is now under way, and the IAEA is providing valuable support to strengthen the ability of States to combat nuclear terrorism through better physical protection, better nuclear material accounting and control systems, and better control of other radioactive materials. The IAEA is helping to improve the regulatory structures and practices of States and to enhance emergency response capabilities. In these and many other ways, it is reducing the risks posed by terrorists and is benefiting us all. Regrettably, funding for this work, which comes almost exclusively from member States’ voluntary contributions, is not adequate. The United States has provided much of the funding for this work to date. I urge all IAEA members to support this work and to provide the necessary funding. The modest cost of this effort to thwart nuclear terrorism is an unparalleled bargain compared with the cost of nuclear terrorism. The discovery of Iraq’s secret nuclear weapons programme in the early 1990s touched off criticism of IAEA safeguards for failing to detect Iraq’s deception sooner. Based on lessons learned in Iraq, the IAEA has crafted an entirely new dimension to safeguards. Over the past 10 years, intensive efforts by the IAEA and its member States have led to the adoption of a new Model Additional Protocol. In States where Additional Protocols are in force, the IAEA has new safeguards tools and capabilities that strengthen its ability to detect secret or undeclared nuclear activities. States now have the opportunity to help strengthen international safeguards and, by doing so, to strengthen their own national security. My Government commends all those States that have already brought their Protocols into force and urges all others to do so as quickly as possible. In that connection, I am pleased to recall that President Bush transmitted the voluntary United States Protocol to our Senate for advice and consent to ratification on 9 May of this year. In conclusion, whether countering non- compliance, terrorism or gaps in safeguards, the IAEA brings commitment and competence to the tasks at hand. The men and women who make up the IAEA secretariat have consistently demonstrated noteworthy dedication and professionalism. But it is abundantly clear that the IAEA can continue to excel only if it receives the support it needs from its member States. And the facts are nothing short of alarming. The Director General has repeatedly warned that inadequate funding is bringing the safeguards system ever closer to the brink of failure. In 2002, the safeguards system is underfunded by tens of millions of dollars. States bent on pursuing nuclear weapons will have an ever easier time if safeguards become ineffective. The IAEA’s safeguards budget needs to be increased so that the IAEA can implement the effective safeguards we need. The IAEA’s programme to counter nuclear terrorism also falls short of the funding it needs for full implementation of the programme approved by the Board last March. In short, collectively we have put tremendous responsibilities on the IAEA’s shoulders. The key question is whether collectively we will provide the necessary support for it to handle those responsibilities now and in the future. Let us all ensure that the organization has the support it both needs and deserves.

I would like to begin by commending the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, on the comprehensive report on the work of the Agency and by pledging my Government’s full cooperation with the IAEA under his leadership in the years to come. From the earliest days of discovery and experimentation with nuclear science, nuclear and radioactive materials have held extraordinary potential — the potential for being of great benefit to humankind, as well as for causing devastating harm. We appreciate the important role that the International Atomic Energy Agency has been performing over the years to ensure that nuclear technologies and materials are used for peaceful purposes only. As a non-nuclear-weapon State signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Armenia assumed an obligation to place all its peaceful nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Shortly after its formal accession to the Treaty, Armenia concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which made it possible for us to reactivate our peaceful nuclear programme with the assistance of the IAEA and thus to alleviate the severe constraints on our electricity supply. Nuclear power, which currently supplies about one sixth of electricity globally, is a principal source that could provide electricity on a large scale, with practically no greenhouse gas emissions. Views on the future of nuclear power, however, are still mixed because of safety and non-proliferation concerns. In the light of the present international situation, enhancement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is of utmost importance. Armenia has consistently supported the role of the Agency in the effective maintenance and consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We fully share the objectives of the international community regarding promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation. Our commitment to non-proliferation is being additionally fulfilled through the establishment of an effective system of export control that has not hindered our capacity to continue cooperating in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While Armenia still maintains its reliance on the nuclear energy option, increased efforts are being made to utilize other energy sources efficiently. Armenia has come a long way in producing the legislative and regulatory framework for national nuclear regulation. The Government has put in place a stringent system of export controls to rule out the illicit diversion of material, equipment or technology in the nuclear field. The inter-agency process for submitting the Additional Protocol to the agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards has been completed and presented to the National Assembly for ratification. As soon as it is done, Armenia will submit to the Agency the initial declaration and our programmes for the coming l0-year period for development of the nuclear fuel cycle. In recent years, the Armenian authorities have continued the process of improving the legislative basis in order to comply with international standards and to reinforce its commitment to the regime of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Armenia’s National Assembly has adopted two essential laws in that regard: a law on the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and a law on licensing. Armenia has welcomed the entry into force on 18 June 2001 of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and will soon join that important Convention. Safety is primarily a national responsibility. We also recognize that it is an equally legitimate international concern. Like environmental practices, nuclear safety has implications that may far exceed national boundaries. Nuclear safety has always been a matter of the highest priority for the Government of Armenia. That priority is appropriately reflected in Armenia’s commitment to various international treaties and agreements. The issue of the safe operation of the Armenian nuclear power plant is under the constant attention of the President of Armenia. The IAEA has regularly inspected the Armenian nuclear power plant since its reactivation in 1995. Experts from various countries have rated highly the level of nuclear safety at Armenia’s nuclear power plant, and have proposed to initiate a new programme aimed at further upgrading the plant’s safety. During the past two years, the relevant Armenian authorities, in collaboration with the IAEA, have focused on technical cooperation projects in the areas of various nuclear applications. At present, Armenia is cooperating with the Agency in many national, regional and interregional technical projects. Nearly a dozen of the Agency’s technical cooperation projects are being implemented in Armenia at the national level in such fields as energy and nuclear power planning, radioactive waste management, ageing control, oncology, radiology safety and accident analysis, technical support and human-factor management. There are also several bilateral projects in the field of nuclear applications, and we greatly value the cooperation with countries providing technical, financial and institutional assistance in this field. Let me conclude by reiterating Armenia’s readiness for increased partnership with the Agency in carrying out its universal mission to meet the challenges posed by nuclear applications. I would also like to inform the Assembly that Armenia has joined the list of sponsors of draft resolution A/57/L.14.