A/73/PV.64 General Assembly

I give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation to introduce draft resolution A/73/L.70.

The Russian Federation is submitting for the General Assembly’s consideration draft resolution A/73/L.70 in support of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, also known as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This year is the thirtieth anniversary of the INF Treaty’s entry into force. There has never been any doubt that this multilateral agreement, to which five Member States are party, has made a substantial contribution to strengthening international security and stability. The Treaty also marked an important step on the path to nuclear disarmament and remains highly relevant today. In practical terms, the INF Treaty enabled States not only to entirely eliminate from their arsenals two classes of nuclear weapons  — land-based intermediate- and shorter-range ballistic and cruise missiles — but also the related missile launchers, other support structures and equipment, and operational bases. We have come to what amounts to a critical point today on our agenda, in which the future of the Treaty hangs in the balance. A threat to its existence emerged in October, when the United States, publicly and at the highest level, declared its intention to withdraw from the Treaty. In December, with the support of its allies in the NATO military bloc, it even announced a date, 2 February 2019, for the suspension of its obligations under the Treaty. In practical terms, that means that Washington has made a unilateral decision to withdraw from a legally binding document completely banning the production and deployment of the missile systems prohibited by the Treaty, including their nuclear warheads. The United States has thereby de facto openly declared its intention to deploy categories of weapons prohibited under the Treaty in various parts of the world, particularly the Asia-Pacific region. In other words, we are looking at the start of a full-fledged arms race whose serious consequences pose a threat to the entire international community. I would like to assure the Assembly that Russia has done everything it can to keep the INF Treaty in force right from the start. We have had concerns about the fulfilment by the United States of its obligations under the Treaty for more than 20 years, but we have never viewed them as a reason to break the Treaty, in the clear understanding that that would destroy one of the pillars of our arms-control architecture, which eventually enabled us to draft and conclude the New START Treaty, and that it would result in a new reality promising a further deterioration in international security. Nevertheless, in seeking to withdraw from the Treaty as quickly as possible, the United States has done everything it can, without any grounds, to blame my country for violating it. This has to do with the much-talked-about 9M729 missile, about which the United States had concerns that we learned of only in November 2017. Incidentally, that is directly confirmed in a letter signed by Mrs. Nikki Haley, the Permanent Representative of the United States, which members all received yesterday and which specifically confirms that there was no way that Russia could have reasonably responded to the concerns of the United States before that, since we did not know they existed. After the necessary information emerged, we provided concrete facts and data to show that the missile did not come under the INF Treaty’s purview. We were willing to hold further consultations, but Washington simply decided to issue an ultimatum that we could not fulfil, and nor will we, since the Treaty does not provide for these sorts of communication. I invite the Assembly to read it and draw its own conclusions. We believe that this course of events does not correspond to the interests of the international community or to the purposes and principles of general and complete disarmament. The main aim of the draft resolution we are introducing is to give the General Assembly an opportunity to express its recommendation to the parties to the INF Treaty, in accordance with Article 11 of the Charter of the United Nations, that they should maintain and continue their comprehensive fulfilment of their obligations under the Treaty. We should point out that during our interaction on the draft resolution with delegations, including in the informal consultations, no substantive objections to it have been raised. The only arguments we have heard against it have been strictly political and expressed only by NATO military allies of the United States that evidently support Washington’s withdrawal from the Treaty’s ban on the production and deployment of intermediate- and shorter-range missile systems, including nuclear warheads. However, the reasons those countries give as a basis for supporting that step do not stand up to examination. Essentially, the Russian Federation is guilty of consistently denying any violations of the INF Treaty and repeatedly expressing its willingness to engage in a dialogue, including at the technical expert level, in a situation in which we were not privy to information on the very subject of the concerns of the United States, which would not name the missile about which it had doubts. It is shocking, however, that Washington apparently thinks that the interaction on this issue should take the form of an interrogation. There is no other way to explain the complaint that we responded to the accusations of the United States by asking specifying questions. We have no idea how else we could have genuinely attempted to get to the bottom of the problem. For my part, I would like to remind the Assembly of a joint statement adopted on 11 June by the Foreign Ministers of the States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which include three of the five parties to the INF Treaty. It expresses a collective concern about military programmes that the United States is implementing without taking due account of its obligations under the Treaty, and contains an urgent call for every effort to be made to resolve the problematic issues. We believe that the suspension by a nuclear- weapon State of its obligations under the INF Treaty not only undermines the implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but also represents a clear step towards a new nuclear arms race. In that context, we welcome the initiative in Mrs. Haley’s letter to include our proposed draft resolution in the category of important General Assembly questions, in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter, the result of her call for a two-thirds majority of Member States to be required for the adoption of the draft resolution. Of course it is a pity that for our hypocritical colleagues from the United States this is all just a procedural trick that they hope will help them prevent the draft resolution’s adoption. And they have something to worry about. The number of countries that share our concerns is growing daily. We urge all delegations preparing to press the red button when voting on our draft resolution to keep in mind that the button for launching a nuclear strike is also red. I therefore urge them to make the better choice, for dialogue and diplomacy, by pressing the green button in support of our draft resolution. It says nothing about who is right and who is wrong in this situation. It does not contain a single anti-American or anti-NATO provision. Its only aim is to express the collective support of the States Members of the United Nations for diplomatic efforts to solve the problems that have emerged, since the consequences of leaving them unresolved could affect issues related to the security and national interests of every Member State without exception. We hope that the Assembly will make the right and responsible decision by voting in favour of our draft resolution.

I give the floor to the representative of the United States, who has asked to speak on a point of order.

The adoption of draft resolution A/73/L.70 requires a two- thirds majority of those present and voting. Under Article 18 of the Charter of the United Nations, “Decisions on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security”. This draft resolution, which addresses nuclear non-proliferation, is quintessentially a draft resolution addressing the maintenance of international peace and security, and the two-thirds requirement therefore applies to it.

If there are no objections to the proposal by the representative of the United States for the requirement of a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting to adopt draft resolution A/73/L.70, may I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly that a two-thirds majority of members present and voting be required to adopt draft resolution A/73/L.70?

We shall now proceed to consider draft resolution A/73/L.70. Before giving the floor to speakers in explanation of vote before the voting, I would like to remind delegations that explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

I am delivering this explanation of vote on behalf of the United States on the draft resolution entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty” (A/73/L.70). The United States will vote against the draft resolution because it is disingenuous for Russia  — a State that is in material breach of its obligations under the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, also known as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty — to put forward a draft resolution that calls for the preservation of and compliance with an arms-control treaty that Russia is violating. Russia has developed, produced, flight-tested and fielded the SSC-8 missile system, which has a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometres and is prohibited by the INF Treaty. Russia has continued to press forward, and as of late 2018 has fielded multiple battalions of the 9M729 missiles. While the draft resolution calls for continued consultations between the United States and Russia on this issue, the fact is that the United States repeatedly engaged with Russia between 2013 and 2018 in order to bring Russia back into verifiable compliance with the Treaty. We raised the issue of Russia’s non-compliance on more than 30 occasions at all levels of the Russian Government and convened five meetings of technical experts in an effort to resolve the issue. Russia’s response during that time has been consistently negative. It has denied any wrongdoing, demanded more information and issued baseless counter-accusations. For more than four years, Moscow pretended that it did not know which missile the United States was talking about, even after we provided extensive information about the missile’s characteristics and testing history. It was not until November 2017, when we chose to publicize the Russian name of the missile, 9M729, that Russia finally acknowledged its existence, changing its cover story from saying that the missile did not exist to saying that that it existed but was compliant with the Treaty. Russia’s SSC-8 missile system poses a significant military threat to global security. As a violation, the missile system threatens the viability not only of the INF Treaty but of arms-control efforts the world over. As a result of Russia’s continued violation, the United States Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, announced in Brussels on 4 December that Russia was in material breach of the Treaty. In order to remedy Russia’s violation, our intention is to suspend our obligations under the Treaty, effective 60 days from 4 December, unless Russia returns to full and verifiable compliance. If Russia had intended to preserve the INF Treaty, it could have returned to verifiable compliance at any point during the past five years. It refused to do so. We must make it clear that arms-control compliance matters and violations of arms-control agreements have consequences. Supporting this draft resolution would send the opposite signal. We ask all United Nations members that support meaningful arms control to vote no on this draft resolution.

I am taking the floor on behalf of Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and my own country, Poland. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, also known as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, has been crucial to European and global security for more than 30 years. Under the INF Treaty, almost 3,000 missiles have been removed and verifiably destroyed. It has also made a tangible contribution to disarmament in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. On 4 December, NATO allies confirmed that Russia had developed and fielded a missile system — the SSC-8, also known the 9M729 — that violates the INF Treaty and poses a significant threat to Euro-Atlantic security. We have raised our concerns with the Russian Federation for more than five years. In particular, the United States opened a dialogue within the established framework of the INF Treaty. We strongly support the findings of the United States that Russia is in material breach of its obligations under the Treaty. The Russian Federation has yet to address those concerns in a constructive and credible manner. While the United States has remained in full compliance with its obligations under the INF Treaty, we recognize that no Treaty is sustainable when only one side respects it. While we remain fully committed to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty erodes the foundations of effective arms control and is part of a broader pattern of behaviour intended to weaken Euro-Atlantic security in general. It is the Russian Federation’s responsibility to return to full and verifiable compliance and end its attempts to evade its responsibilities through such means as draft resolution A/73/L.70. We emphasize that introducing symbolic draft resolutions calling for “full and strict” compliance with the INF Treaty while at the same time violating it does not represent a contribution to preserving the international arms control architecture. Rather, it risks undermining the credibility of a proponent’s commitment to credible and verifiable nuclear arms control. In the light of that, our countries cannot support the draft resolution entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty”, submitted by the Russian Federation on 14 December. We call on Russia to return to full and verifiable compliance with the Treaty as soon as possible. We remain open to and ready for constructive dialogue with Russia, provided that Russia’s actions make that possible.

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU) and its member States. The candidate countries Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, as well as Georgia, align themselves with this statement. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, also known as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, has been a pillar of European security for the past three decades. Although not a single EU member State is party to it, they all benefit from the protection and stability that it provides. Thanks to the INF Treaty, almost 3,000 missiles with nuclear and conventional warheads have been removed and verifiably destroyed. Its preservation as a viable Treaty is of crucial importance to us. It has also constituted a tangible contribution by two nuclear- weapon States to the fulfilment of their disarmament obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The EU stands firmly for preserving and complying with the INF Treaty. For that, constructive dialogue between the United States and the Russian Federation is necessary if compliance concerns are to be addressed substantively and transparently. Draft resolution A/73/L.70 does not help to preserve the INF Treaty but rather diverts attention from the real issue at stake. The EU and its member States are therefore not in a position to support it and have repeatedly raised concerns about Russia’s compliance with the Treaty. This year alone, during the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT in April, as well as during the First Committee’s thematic debate on the nuclear weapons cluster in October (see A/C.1/73/ PV.11), we noted that a Russian missile system has raised serious concerns regarding Russia’s compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and we urged Russia to address those concerns in a substantive and transparent way. We understand that Russia has yet to offer a credible response. Once again, we call for the preservation of the INF Treaty and for ensuring its full and verifiable implementation. Russia must demonstrate its compliance with the Treaty, not by introducing draft resolutions such as the one before us but in a substantive, transparent way, and must engage in constructive dialogue with the United States — again, not via the General Assembly, but through the dialogue platform that the Treaty itself provides and by applying the necessary verification measures. The erosion of the INF Treaty would have serious consequences not just for the security of its States parties and Europe, but for the whole world. The two nuclear-weapon States with the biggest nuclear arsenals bear a special responsibility when it comes to nuclear arms control and disarmament.

Belarus considers the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter- Range Missiles, also known as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, to be one of the most important elements of our modern international security architecture and one that has made a significant contribution to reducing tensions in Europe. As a State party, Belarus has strictly fulfilled all of its international obligations under the INF Treaty. We support draft resolution A/73/L.70, under consideration today, which seeks to preserve this important instrument, whose integrity affects the security situation globally as well as regionally. The General Assembly should send a clear signal in support of the INF Treaty. We emphasize that the States parties to the Treaty should refrain from any hasty actions that could have serious consequences for the entire international community, and should address any differences regarding the Treaty’s implementation through a dialogue within the framework of its mechanisms, including its Special Verification Commission. We want to point out that at the end of the thirty-first session of the Commission in Geneva in December 2017, at the initiative of the Belarusian delegation, the delegations of the States parties expressed the shared view that “the INF Treaty continues to play an important role in the existing system of international security, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and that they will work to preserve and strengthen it”. One important step for preserving the Treaty could be the initiation of discussions on involving other States in the INF Treaty in order to make it more universal. Belarus stands ready to contribute to any additional measures aimed at reducing tensions and differences of opinion.

I am taking the floor to express Ukraine’s concern about the submission of draft resolution A/73/L.70. Along with many others in this Hall, we are concerned about the fact that the main sponsor of the draft resolution has a problem with its own compliance with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, also known as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, as it also has with a number of other international documents and treaties. Furthermore, Russia’s development and deployment of specific missile systems is not only a violation of the Treaty itself, but also poses significant risks to regional and international peace and security. The Russian delegation knows better than most that the best way to preserve the INF Treaty is to return to full and verifiable compliance with it. For those reasons, my delegation is not in a position to support draft resolution A/73/L.70, submitted by Russia, and will vote against it.

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty is an important arms control and disarmament Treaty that was agreed during the Cold War between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. It has played an important historical role in facilitating international relations and advancing the process of nuclear disarmament and thereby in maintaining global strategic balance and stability. Maintaining and preserving this bilateral Treaty is highly relevant today, not only for the United States and Russia but also for wider international peace and security. We hope that the States concerned will cherish the hard-won achievements that have been made over the years and that they will act in good faith, honour their commitments and address relevant issues through dialogue and consultation in order to effectively preserve the validity of the Treaty. China opposes any unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty. We also object to the multilateralization of the Treaty and the transference of responsibility. We believe that the multilateralization of the Treaty would entail a host of complex, political, military and legal issues. Many other States have additional concerns in that regard and do not support the Treaty’s multilateralization. China pursues a national defence policy that is defensive in nature and always exercises maximum restraint in developing its nuclear stockpiles. Our efforts to strengthen our national defence forces are reasonable and fully justified, based on the necessity of deterring war threats and safeguarding national security, and they pose no threats to other countries. For the aforementioned reasons, China will vote in favour of draft resolution A/73/L.70, submitted by the Russian Federation.

We have heard the last speaker in explanation of vote before the voting. The Assembly will now take a decision on draft resolution A/73/L.70, entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty”. I now give the floor to the representative of the Secretariat.

I should like to announce that, since the submission of the draft resolution, in addition to those delegations listed in the document, the following countries have become sponsors of draft resolution A/73/L.70: Angola, Belarus, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe.

I now put to the vote draft resolution A/73/L.70. A recorded vote has been requested.

Before giving the floor to representatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote on draft resolution A/73/L.70, may I remind delegations that explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Draft resolution A/73/L.70 addresses a highly relevant and urgent matter that goes to the heart of security in Europe. Switzerland is concerned about the status of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the implications of a possible disintegration of that key agreement. We call on both parties to preserve the Treaty. On many occasions, we have expressed our concerns regarding compliance with the Treaty in relevant bilateral discussions. Over the past months and years, the extent of the violations of certain important provisions under the Treaty has become increasingly evident. We urge the relevant party to return to compliance with the Treaty. Recent events and announcements have added a new and alarming prospect, indicating that the matter has become an additional political dispute between the two parties to the agreement. Switzerland calls on the good sense and wisdom of both parties to preserve this landmark instrument. We hope that both sides will implement concrete measures to respond in practical terms to the serious concerns raised about non-compliance with the Treaty. Effective dispute resolution could not only contribute to restoring a certain level of trust between the parties but also pave the way for the strengthening of the INF Treaty by extending it to other States in possession of weapons that fall within the provisions of the agreement. While we are of the view that diplomatic efforts, including within the United Nations system, are necessary to resolve this issue, we do not believe that the introduction of this draft resolution serves to improve the current situation. We also note that the draft resolution does not sufficiently take into account the serious allegations regarding the issue of non-compliance with the INF Treaty, which is the principal cause of its current fragility. In that context, Switzerland abstained in the voting on the draft resolution.

New Zealand voted against the draft resolution entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty” (A/73/L.70). That is categorically not because we disagree with the importance of the Treaty but rather because we think the draft resolution sidesteps issues that are now critical to the Treaty’s future. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has for more than 30 years provided an important pillar in the security architecture of Europe and globally. It has advanced the object and purpose of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The INF Treaty is a prime example of negotiations that lead to real and significant reductions in nuclear weapons and shape the international security environment for the better. It is therefore with regret that New Zealand witnesses the current situation regarding the Treaty. New Zealand supports the concerns expressed by other States regarding Russia’s compliance with the Treaty. We acknowledge that Russia has raised its own concerns about compliance. What is required now is maximum effort to resolve all compliance concerns through bilateral discussions  — not through a draft resolution that fails to address critical issues. New Zealand strongly urges Russia to take urgent steps to resolve the concerns over its compliance with the INF Treaty and calls on both parties to work together to save this important agreement.

Liechtenstein takes the floor to explain its vote on the draft resolution entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty” (A/73/L.70). The draft resolution addresses a very relevant and urgent matter that goes to the heart of Europe’s security. Liechtenstein is concerned at the status of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the implications of the possible disintegration of a Treaty that has been an important pillar of Europe’s security architecture for more than 30 years. The INF Treaty has provided the legal framework for one of the most successful nuclear disarmament exercises ever conducted, freeing the European mainland of short and mid-range nuclear missiles. The INF Treaty thus represents one of the few concrete steps to implement obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). While the INF Treaty is, in its current form, a bilateral agreement, its significance extends far beyond the two parties. Our concern about the status of the INF Treaty is not new but dates from the first serious warning signals, beginning in 2014, that the Treaty’s provisions were being violated by the development and testing of new types of missiles, in particular the SSC-8. Of course, recent events have added a new and alarming prospect — that the States parties to the INF Treaty might prefer to sacrifice the Treaty altogether rather than make a serious effort to resolve their disputes within the framework of the Treaty. In the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, which represents, more than any other document, the commitment of the international community to strengthening the rule of law and peacefully resolving disputes, Liechtenstein hopes for constructive signals and concrete steps to address in practical terms the serious concerns raised about non-compliance with the Treaty. Successful dispute resolution could not only contribute to much-needed confidence-building between the parties but also pave the way for the INF Treaty to be extended to other States in possession of weapons that fall under the Treaty’s provisions. The INF Treaty’s potential to thereby contribute to a broader nuclear disarmament effort should not be cast away lightly, given that the overwhelming majority of the international community is frustrated at the lack of implementation of the NPT obligations by nuclear- weapon States and convinced of the illegality of nuclear weapons. Upgrading and modernizing nuclear arsenals already adds significantly to global insecurity. Nuclear rearmament in Europe with a previously outlawed category of weapons is a prospect that is hardly reconcilable with the security interests of our continent — nor is the further increase in geopolitical tensions, of which non-compliance with the INF Treaty is a cause and not a symptom. Unfortunately, the draft resolution does not sufficiently account for the serious allegations of non-compliance with the INF Treaty as the root cause of the Treaty’s current precarious status. Liechtenstein therefore abstained in the voting on the draft resolution, while acknowledging that the matter at hand touches on a core interest of the international community and the European continent in particular, and that the General Assembly is therefore the appropriate body in which to discuss the matter.

My country abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/73/L.70, entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty”. Argentina recognizes the importance of the Treaty for international security and strongly supports all bilateral and multilateral instruments aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament. However, given the bilateral nature of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Argentina believes that dialogue aimed at preserving it and/or ensuring full compliance with it should first and foremost take place between the contractual parties and through the mechanisms provided for under the Treaty itself.

One of Canada’s core foreign policy priorities is to uphold the rules- based international order, which has endured the past seven decades, by working with our partners to promote peace, security and prosperity in the world. An important part of that order is the work that we undertake to advance non-proliferation and disarmament. Arms control and disarmament efforts are essential for increasing transparency, facilitating accountability and strengthening the norms for responsible behaviour that enhances global stability and security. Those efforts include dialogue and engagement. The credibility of arms control and disarmament instruments and processes hinges on respect — that is, States must abide by the obligations that they have assumed. It is our view that the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The United States has engaged in sustained and deliberate dialogue with Russia to seek transparency and explanations about its prohibited missile systems. No such transparency or explanations have been forthcoming. For more than five years, Russia has failed to address its non-compliance with the INF Treaty. Indeed, Russia’s behaviour with regard to the INF Treaty is consistent with its lack of respect for other security agreements and its aggressive actions in neighbouring countries and beyond. While Russia evinces concern for international stability in the draft resolution, its track record of undermining regional and global security makes that effort ring hollow. On that basis, we cannot accept that the Russian Federation has chosen to bring this draft resolution forward in good faith. For that reason, Canada voted against the draft resolution. If Russia truly believes that the INF Treaty is essential to international security, then there is an alternative to purely symbolic and insincere resolutions; it can take immediate, concrete action to redress its violation of the INF Treaty. The solution does not lie here at the United Nations, but in Russia’s hands. Russia  — and Russia alone  — has the power to take the necessary actions to save the INF Treaty by dismantling the offending missile systems without delay. Canada therefore strongly urges Russia to urgently return to verifiable compliance in order to preserve this important Treaty.

I take the floor to explain the position of my delegation with respect to the draft resolution entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty”, as contained in document A/73/L.70. My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution, based on a series of principled assumptions and positions. Although from a legal point of view the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is a bilateral agreement, no one can deny its implications for international peace and security  — an issue that is related to the security concerns and interests of all States. Accordingly and taking into account the final document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD-I) — according to which all nations have a vital interest in the success of disarmament efforts and consequently have a duty to contribute to such measures — it is both the right and duty of each and every State to express its views on the preservation, relevance, validity and implementation of such an important disarmament agreement as the INF Treaty. In addition, all States have that right and duty because the fate of the INF Treaty has a direct bearing on their national security — a concept that has also been acknowledged in the SSOD-I final document (resolution S-10/2). Even though, according to the SSOD-I final document, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, that does not exclude but rather confirms the rights and duties and the security concerns and interests of other States. In a nutshell, no countries are legally a party to the INF Treaty except the United States and Russia. Nevertheless, practically speaking, all States — including the United States and Russia  — have rights, duties, concerns and interests with respect to the INF Treaty’s implementation and implications. Moreover, the draft resolution calls for the preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). That is in line with the principled position of my country regarding all politically or legally binding instruments on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Similarly, the draft resolution makes reference to the obligations of States parties to the NPT under its article VI and welcomes efforts aimed at fulfilling such obligations. Again, calling for the implementation of article VI of the NPT is our constant and well-known position. Furthermore, the draft resolution follows a principled approach with respect to compliance with the INF Treaty. It does not make any judgments about one or both of its States parties’ compliance with the Treaty’s provisions, but simply calls for the compliance of its States parties and it does not therefore take the side of either of the parties to the Treaty. That is a principled position that enjoys our support. We have another reason to support the draft resolution in the light of the deadline identified by the United States for its withdrawal from the INF Treaty, which is related to our objection regarding the destructive doctrine of withdrawal from international instruments and institutions by the current United States Administration. In our view, such a doctrine is a clear call for lawlessness at the international level. It undermines multilateral instruments and institutions and would only lead to international disorder. That would negatively affect the security concerns and interests of almost all of us. Therefore, we must stand against such an approach. More importantly, this is not the first time that the United States has tried to undermine international instruments. I wish to recall its decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and, very recently, its unlawful withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Ironically, they not only violated resolution 2231 (2015) of the Security Council, which endorsed the JCPOA, but also forced others to violate it or face punishment. That shameful practice has taken place for the first time in the history of the Security Council. Putting an end to such destructive policies and practices that undermine the very foundations of the rule of law at the international level is a common responsibility. We should not allow our work to be governed by power instead of law. That is the reasoning that justifies our support for this draft resolution. Last but not least, it is entirely ironic, paradoxical and hypocritical that a country that is the sponsor of a draft resolution entitled “Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments” has now voted against a draft resolution of which the very essence and substance is to call for the preservation of, and compliance with, a related Treaty. Worse still, it openly invites other States to follow suit, which indicates how deceptive and irresponsible the behaviour, policies and practices of that country are, brazenly trying to preach to others on almost every occasion. But actions always speak louder than words. The Assembly will recall the withdrawal of the United States from the various non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements, including its non-compliance with the NPT, in particular its article VI; its non-compliance with other obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; and its violations of relevant Security Council resolutions, the latest of which is resolution 2231 (2015).

My delegation wishes to take the floor to provide an explanation of vote on draft resolution A/73/L.70, entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty”. Peru is a country that advocates disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation  with the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. In that regard, we will continue to support and promote all necessary measures aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of distribution. However, my delegation abstained in the voting because we believe this matter to be of a bilateral nature, concerning only two parties  — the same two that should resolve their differences through the corresponding channels, without ignoring Peru’s concerns about the negative consequences that a withdrawal from the aforementioned Treaty could have on international peace and security. In that context, we call on the relevant parties to continue consultations on fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty, as well as to resume constructive dialogue on strategic issues based on openness, mutual trust and real opportunities for cooperation, which is of paramount importance, especially amid a changing security environment. We hope that such dialogue will be conducive to furthering progress in the reduction of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of international security and stability.

I take the floor to explain my delegation’s vote on the draft resolution entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty”, contained in document A/73/L.70. Our support for that draft resolution arises from our consistent position that States parties to any international treaty or agreement, whether bilateral or multilateral, including those dealing with non-proliferation and arms control, should fully abide by their respective obligations. The full implementation of and compliance with such treaties help to build confidence and contribute to peace, security and global stability. While Pakistan  — a responsible member of the international community — supports the preservation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, it is solely the responsibility of the States parties to the Treaty to safeguard its inviolability. To that end, we would like to encourage the States parties to the Treaty to make efforts to resolve all respective concerns, including on compliance, by means that are consistent with the Treaty. While we voted in favour of the draft resolution, we would still like to highlight that the unique and specific characteristics of each region warrant different approaches and should be taken into account while negotiating treaties such as this. Models negotiated and adopted in one particular situation cannot be simply replicated elsewhere without taking into account the different security attributes of each region. Regional and global approaches to arms control and disarmament complement each other and promote regional and international peace and security.

I take the floor to explain my delegation’s position on draft resolution A/73/L.70, on which the Assembly has just voted. Guyana wishes to affirm the important contribution that the full implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty makes to international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts and to international peace and security as a whole. My delegation is therefore highly concerned by any attempts to compromise the Treaty and its effectiveness, as any such actions could create more fissures in an already volatile international security environment. Accordingly, we appeal to the States parties to the Treaty to recommit to the aims of the Treaty and comply fully with their obligations thereunder. We have heard the very serious concerns expressed by the parties to the Treaty with respect to its implementation, and we are of the view that the parties should act in good faith to address these concerns in a transparent and mutually respectful manner. In this regard, my delegation underscores the need for sustained dialogue between the parties, with a view to taking effective and concrete actions to address the concerns on both sides. My delegation acknowledges the merits of the draft resolution just introduced, and we note that the provisions were quite neutral. Guyana chose to abstain, however, based on the conviction that at this stage a recourse to the General Assembly would perhaps not have the desired end and could potentially jeopardize any prospect for dialogue going forward. Guyana urges stronger and genuine efforts by all parties to the Treaty to jointly address the concerns ventilated, with a view to preserving and strengthening the Treaty.

My delegation wishes to explain its position on the vote on draft resolution A/73/L.70, entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty”. We voted in favour of the draft resolution, in accordance with our principled position in support of measures to maintain and strengthen international peace, security and disarmament, especially those aimed at preventing nuclear war and promoting nuclear disarmament. We are of the view that issues related to international treaties should be implemented in accordance with the relevant principles of international law. It is our wish that the parties concerned enter into dialogue for a settlement of the issues in order to actively contribute to peace, security and disarmament.

Malaysia takes the floor to deliver its explanation of vote after the voting on draft resolution A/73/L.70, entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty”. Malaysia concurs with the general consensus on the importance of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty as a vital component of the global disarmament architecture. Since its entry into force in June 1988, the INF Treaty has played an undisputed key role in preserving international peace, security and stability. Malaysia is concerned that the INF Treaty now faces dire uncertainty owing to divergent views among key players and parties to the Treaty. We are closely following the latest developments on this issue and fervently hope that common ground and agreement will be established soon. At this juncture, Malaysia is in no position to decide if the alleged violations of the provisions of the INF Treaty have indeed occurred, but strongly reaffirms the importance of constructive dialogue, engagement and trust-building between the parties concerned towards the preservation and strengthening of the Treaty. Malaysia is of the view that such advancement is crucial if we are to attain general and complete disarmament, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In view of the complexity of this issue and the care with which it must be handled, particularly to avoid the further polarization of the positions of key players, Malaysia decided to abstain in the voting on the draft resolution. Nevertheless, Malaysia implores all parties to work towards the immediate resolution of this matter in the collective interest of international peace and security.

The Philippines views the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty as an important component of the international community’s disarmament agenda that would contribute to the preservation of disarmament gains and the prevention of an arms race. We appreciate Russia’s efforts to craft a draft resolution to achieve such an objective, and in broad terms we are supportive of the substance of draft resolution A/73/L.70. While no fault may be found in the formulation of the draft resolution, the context is overshadowed by an element of deep mistrust among the key Member States involved. The Philippines would welcome instead a draft resolution that would unite rather than divide the international community on the issue of the INF Treaty. In this regard, the Philippines abstained in the voting on the draft resolution on the preservation of and compliance with the INF Treaty.

We have heard the last speaker in explanation of vote after the voting. The General Assembly has thus concluded this stage of its consideration of agenda item 101.

Members will recall that, in accordance with paragraphs 4 (a) to (e) of resolution 60/180 of 20 December 2005, the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission shall comprise the following: seven members of the Security Council, including five permanent members; seven members of the Economic and Social Council, elected from regional groups; five top providers of assessed contributions to United Nations budgets and of voluntary contributions to United Nations funds, programmes and agencies, including a standing peacebuilding fund; five top providers of military personnel and civilian police to United Nations missions; and seven additional members elected by the General Assembly, giving due consideration to representation from all regional groups in the overall composition of the Committee. Members will also recall that at its seventy- first session, the Assembly elected Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya and Mexico as members of the Organizational Committee for a two-year term of office, beginning on 1 January 2017, and that at its seventy-second session, the Assembly elected the Czech Republic and El Salvador as members of the Organizational Committee for a two-year term of office, beginning on 1 January 2018. By a note verbale dated 20 December 2018, addressed to the President of the General Assembly, the President was informed by the facilitator of the group of the leading financial contributors that, as decided by the financial contributors, Canada, Germany, Japan, Norway and Sweden will serve a full two-year term from 2019 to 2020. The note verbale will be issued as document A/73/663. In addition, by a letter dated 28 November 2018, contained in document A/73/603, addressed to the President of the General Assembly, the President was informed by the facilitator of the group of troop- contributing countries of the group’s decision that Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan and Rwanda will serve from the troop-countries category of membership for a term of office beginning on 1 January 2019 and ending on 31 December 2020. May I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to take note of the information contained in documents A/73/603 and A/73/663?

The Assembly will now proceed to the election of five members of the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission. By its resolution 60/261 of 8 May 2006, the Assembly decided that the members of the Organizational Committee shall serve for renewable terms of two years, as applicable. Accordingly, Colombia, Egypt, Italy, Kenya and Mexico are eligible for immediate re-election. Regarding candidatures for the five vacant seats, I should like to inform members that for the two seats from among the African States, the Group has endorsed Egypt and Kenya; for the one seat from among the Asia-Pacific States, the Group has endorsed Nepal; for the two seats from among the Latin American and Caribbean States, two candidates have been communicated, namely, Guatemala and Mexico. Members will recall that by its resolution 60/261, the General Assembly decided that the rules of procedure and established practice of the Assembly for the election of members of its subsidiary bodies shall apply to its election of members of the Committee. For this election, rules 92 and 94 shall be applicable. Accordingly, the election shall be held by secret ballot. However, I should also like to recall paragraph 16 of decision 34/401, whereby the practice of dispensing with the secret ballot for elections to subsidiary organs when the number of candidates corresponds to the number of seats to be filled should become standard, unless a delegation specifically requests a vote on a given election. In the absence of such a request, may I take it that the Assembly decides to proceed to the election on that basis?

Since the number of candidates endorsed by the Group of African States and the Group of Asia-Pacific States and communicated by the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States is equal to the number of seats to be filled, may I take it that the General Assembly decides to elect Egypt, Guatemala, Kenya, Mexico and Nepal as members of the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission for a two-year term of office beginning on 1 January 2019?

I congratulate Egypt, Guatemala, Kenya, Mexico and Nepal on their election as members of the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission. May I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its consideration of sub-item (c) of agenda item 116?

As indicated in document A/73/805, as a result of the expiration of the term of office on 31 December 2019 of Ms. Keiko Kamioka of Japan, the General Assembly is required, during its current session, to appoint a person to serve as a member of the Joint Inspection Unit for a full term of office beginning on 1 January 2020 and expiring on 31 December 2024. In accordance with the procedures described in article 3, paragraph 1, of the statute of the Joint Inspection Unit, and having consulted the regional group concerned, the President of the General Assembly requested Japan to propose a candidate to fill the vacancy. I would like to remind members that, in accordance with resolution 59/267 of 23 December 2004, the candidate should have experience in at least one of the following fields: oversight, audit, inspection, investigation, evaluation, finance, project evaluation, programme evaluation, human resources management, management, public administration, monitoring and/or programme performance, as well as knowledge of the United Nations system and its role in international relations. As also indicated in document A/73/805, as a result of the consultations held in accordance with article 3, paragraph 2, of the statute of the Joint Inspection Unit, including consultations with the President of the Economic and Social Council and with the Secretary- General, in his capacity as Chair of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, the President of the General Assembly submits to the Assembly the candidature of Ms. Keiko Kamioka of Japan for reappointment as a member of the Joint Inspection Unit for a five-year term of office beginning on 1 January 2020 and expiring on 31 December 2024. May I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to reappoint the candidate?

May I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its consideration of sub-item (f) of agenda item 117.

As mentioned in the memorandum of the Secretary-General contained in document A/73/577, having considered the nominations for judges of the Mechanism received by the Secretary- General, the Security Council transmitted a list of 11 candidates to the General Assembly. In accordance with article 10, paragraph 1 (d), of the statute of the Mechanism, the list was formally conveyed to the President of the General Assembly by means of a letter dated 16 November 2018 from the President of the Security Council (A/73/578). The list of candidates is found in paragraph 11 of the memorandum of the Secretary-General (A/73/577). In this connection, I wish to refer to the communication received from the Legal Counsel of the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco, which the President of the General Assembly transmitted on 14 December 2018, informing of the withdrawal of the nomination of one of its candidates from the election, namely, Mr. Mohammed Benhammou of Morocco. The curricula vitae of the candidates are contained in document A/73/566. In this regard, may I bring to the Assembly’s attention the provision of article 9, paragraph 1, of the statute of the Mechanism, which stipulates that judges of the Mechanism shall be persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices. Particular account shall be taken of experience as judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. According to article 9, paragraph 2, of the statute, due account shall be taken in the composition of the Trial and Appeals Chambers of the experience of the judges in criminal law, international law, including international humanitarian law, and human rights law. The election of judges will take place in accordance with articles 9 and 10, paragraph 1, of the statute of the Mechanism. Members will recall that at the first election of judges to the Mechanism, held during the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly, the Secretary- General proposed that, given the similarities in the election of judges of the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, those precedents be followed and rule 151 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly be applied with regard to the election of the judges of the Mechanism. Accordingly, if the number of candidates who receive the required majority is greater than the number of seats available, the General Assembly will hold a new ballot with respect to all available seats, and all candidates will be eligible in that ballot. However, at the first election of 25 judges of the Mechanism, held during the 87th plenary meeting of the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly, on 16 December 2011, the Assembly decided that, in the event that more than 25 candidates obtained an absolute majority of votes, the 25 with the highest number of votes would be considered elected and, in the event of a tie vote for a remaining seat, there would be a restricted ballot limited to the candidates who had received an equal number of votes (see A/66/PV.87). Accordingly, the Assembly may wish to consider following the decision taken at the aforementioned plenary meeting with respect to the current election. May I take it that the Assembly agrees to that suggestion?

In accordance with article 10, paragraph 1 (d), of the statute of the Mechanism, the candidates who receive an absolute majority of the votes of the States Members of the United Nations and of the non-member States maintaining permanent observer missions at United Nations Headquarters shall be declared elected. Accordingly, the Holy See and the State of Palestine, as non-member States that maintain permanent observer missions at United Nations Headquarters, will participate in the election in the same manner as the States Members of the United Nations. The consistent practice of the United Nations has been to interpret the words “absolute majority” as meaning a majority of all electors, whether or not they vote or are allowed to vote. The electors in the General Assembly for current purposes are all 193 Member States, together with the two non-member States mentioned earlier. Accordingly, 98 votes will constitute an absolute majority in the Assembly for the purpose of the present election. Only those candidates whose names appear on the ballot papers are eligible for election. The electors will indicate the candidates for whom they wish to vote by placing crosses against their names on the ballot papers. Each elector may vote in the first ballot for no more than two candidates. Ballot papers on which more than two names are checked will be considered invalid. Votes may only be cast for those whose names appear on the ballot papers. If a ballot contains votes other than votes for the candidates listed on the ballot paper, those votes will not be counted. As just decided by the Assembly, if, in the first ballot, more than two candidates obtain an absolute majority, the two candidates obtaining the highest number of votes will be considered elected. If, in the first ballot, no candidate obtains an absolute majority or only one candidate obtains an absolute majority, a second ballot will be held for the remaining seat or remaining seats. In any second or subsequent ballot, each elector may vote for no more than two candidates if no candidate has obtained an absolute majority. If one candidate has already obtained an absolute majority, each elector may vote for no more than one candidate. In the event of a tie vote for a remaining seat, there will be a restricted ballot limited to the candidates who received an equal number of votes. Following the past practice, any second and subsequent balloting will be unrestricted. Votes may accordingly be cast in any second or subsequent ballot for any eligible candidate who has not yet been elected. Two candidates obtaining the required majority and the highest number of votes will be declared elected by the President of the General Assembly. May I take it that the Assembly agrees to the procedures I have just outlined?

I should like to remind representatives that, pursuant to rule 88 of the rules of procedure, “[a]fter the President has announced the beginning of voting, no representative shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual conduct of the voting”. Any announcements, including those concerning withdrawals of candidatures, should therefore be made prior to the commencement of the voting process, that is to say, before the announcement of the beginning of the voting process. I give the floor to the representative of Uganda on a point of order.

I agree that what has just been said was quite a mouthful, and I am not going to make it any easier. I just thought that, as a way of making proper use of our time, and for efficiency  — and I specifically wanted to say this before the beginning of the elections was announced, otherwise I would not be following the rules of procedure — whenever there is concurrent business taking place in the Assembly, and elections are a part of that, would it not be in order for ballots to be cast in such a way that while they are being counted the other concurrent business can also take place? In that way, we would be using our time very well. I saw that happen on Monday when we held elections for the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. We are now having elections for the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. So we could have voted earlier, and while we were waiting for the results, we could have done the business we had before us earlier, which would be an efficient way of using our time. Perhaps this message could be carried to Conference Affairs in the Secretariat, so that subsequent elections and other business are dealt with in this way.

I thank the representative of Uganda for his suggestion. His comment on how to make the best use of the time when the meeting is suspended while ballots are being counted has been duly noted by the Secretariat, and, following a careful consideration of the proposed change of procedure, a response will be provided. I call on the representative of Morocco.

For clarification, Morocco had originally nominated two judges and, as the Acting President kindly stated, it has withdrawn the candidature of Mr. Mohammed Benhammou. I wish to confirm that Morocco wishes to maintain the candidature of Mr. Mustapha El Baaj and withdraw the candidature of Mr. Mohammed Benhammou.

I thank the representative of Morocco for his clarification and wish to assure him that we will proceed in exactly that way. I call on the representative of Guinea.

For further clarification, Guinea had also originally nominated two judges. However, we wish to maintain only the candidature of Mr. Aboubacar Demba Camara. Although we had so informed the Secretariat, this information was unfortunately not reflected in the note by the Secretary-General (A/73/566).

I shall now suspend the meeting for five minutes in order to amend the ballot papers to reflect the information just provided by the representative of Guinea.

Before beginning the voting process, I wish to revert to the proposal of the representative of Uganda on making optimal use of the time available during the counting of the ballots. The Secretariat has concluded that the proposal is feasible and the procedure has been used before; however, since this is the last item for consideration on the morning’s agenda, there is no further business for the Assembly to take up during the counting of the ballots. We shall now begin the voting process. Ballot papers will now be distributed and will only be given to the delegate seated directly behind the country’s nameplate. Representatives are requested to use only the ballot papers that are being distributed. Only those candidates whose names appear on the ballot papers are eligible. Representatives will indicate the two candidates for whom they wish to vote by placing crosses in the boxes at the left of their names on the ballot papers. Ballot papers on which more than two names are checked will be considered invalid. Votes may be cast only for those whose names appear on the ballot papers. If a ballot contains votes other than votes for the candidates listed on the ballot paper, those votes will not be counted.

The result of the voting is as follows: Number of ballot papers: 192 Number of invalid ballots: 0 Number of valid ballots: 192 Abstentions: 2 Number of members present and voting: 190 Required absolute majority: 98 Number of votes obtained: Guénaël Mettraux (Switzerland) 69 Yusuf Aksar (Turkey) 67 Michael A. Newton (United States of America) 61 Mustapha El Baaj (Morocco) 58 Constant K. Hometowu (Ghana) 36 Mame Mandiaye Niang (Senegal) 36 Elyakim Rubinstein (Israel) 22 Hafiz Nasibov (Azerbaijan) 15 Aboubacar Demba Camara (Guinea) 10 Since no candidate has obtained an absolute majority, the Assembly will have to proceed to another ballot. Before adjourning, I would like to inform the Assembly that the other items listed in today’s Journal — namely, items 20 (g), 52, 72 (b), 74 (c), 82, 96, 104 and 128 (d) — will be taken up only when the Fifth Committee completes its work.