A/78/PV.69 General Assembly

Let me start by saying that Austria aligns itself with the statement made on behalf of the European Union (see A/78/PV.68). While it is always positive and a fantastic opportunity to have a discussion here in the General Assembly Hall, it is regrettable that we have to gather today because a permanent member of the Security Council, the Russian Federation, blocked Council action with a veto (see S/PV.9591). As members know, two weeks ago, the Russian Federation vetoed a draft resolution which would have extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) for another year. While we appreciate the opportunity to hold Security Council members accountable for their voting behaviour in the General Assembly, it is unfortunate that these debates have to happen so often. They are a result of the fact that Security Council members put their own interests above those of the international community. That has happened recently in relation to conflict situations in Ukraine, Syria, Mali and just earlier this week regarding Gaza. It has happened, and it is happening much too often. The recent veto is also unfortunate because it affected a file that benefited from consensus in the Security Council over the past 15 years. Since its establishment in 2006, the Panel of Experts assisted the sanctions committee on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in carrying out its mandate through independent and objective information-gathering and analysis. Its mandate was extended unanimously every year, and while the arms embargo and the non-proliferation regime remain firmly in place, Member States will have a much more difficult time receiving the same level of background information that they are used to receiving through the Panel of Experts. That weakens our global non-proliferation efforts. At a time when the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime is already under extreme pressure, the international community cannot stand idly by. Let us not forget the persistent violations of binding Security Council resolutions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Its actions are already undermining security in the region, and since we are talking about nuclear weapons, this has clear impact on security globally. This is a blow for the international community and the efforts we undertake as a whole. The Charter of the United Nations has conferred upon the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council is supposed to act on behalf of the Member States. Permanent Council members, as we all know, have a right to veto, but that right to veto puts a special responsibility on the Council’s five permanent members. It should not lead to a situation in which the mechanisms of the Council are, in fact, hindered in fulfilling their duties effectively, and last week’s veto unfortunately leads to exactly such a situation. The use of the veto out of national interest is a grave concern. In these situations, we need to seriously consider enhancing the role of the General Assembly. As we know, the responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of peace and security is not exclusive. When the Council is unable to act, the General Assembly has put itself in the driver’s seat and taken over responsibility, in accordance with Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Charter. There is no legal impediment for the General Assembly to assume such an operational role through complementary action. In our view, it is even the responsibility of the General Assembly to step up to the plate in cases in which the Security Council is unable to act effectively. We therefore call on the Council to reconsider its decision and find a way for the Panel of Experts to continue its work. With regard to the General Assembly, we should for our part closely monitor the impact of the Council’s inaction on the file and reserve our right to return to the issue at a later stage to discuss possible ways in which the General Assembly could assist. Finally, let me briefly express our great appreciation for the work undertaken by the Panel of Experts. It provided fact-based, objective, independent assessments, analysis and recommendations bearing on the implementation of the non-proliferation regime on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Panel reports are a critical source of information for all United Nations Member States. Its professionalism was confirmed most recently during the briefing on its latest report (see S/2024/215). Let me stress one point in relation to an argument that we have sometimes heard in regard to the Panel. Yes, it is true that the Panel is part of a mechanism that was instituted against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea  — but for a good reason. The Panel is part of a mechanism, an effective tool of the international community to react to threats to international peace and security. The arms embargo and non-proliferation regime were introduced by Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) as a reaction to the nuclear-test and ballistic- missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We regret that recent violation activities remain an obstacle to the full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. It is regrettable that the global non-proliferation architecture has been weakened due to the use of the veto by a permanent member of the Security Council. That undermines United Nations efforts to address the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and reduces global security. Let me reiterate our call on the Security Council to reconsider its decision and provide the 1718 Committee with the necessary support from the Panel of Experts. Otherwise, the General Assembly should revert to this issue and consider alternative avenues. We cannot afford insecurity on this file of nuclear weapons, either in the region or globally.

Brazil regrets that the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) failed to be renewed due to yet another veto at the Security Council (see S/PV.9591). While imperfect, as most panels can be, the 1718 Committee`s Panel of Experts played a crucial role in gathering information about the notoriously opaque file. Its work was especially valuable because it was balanced, bringing in the views of a wide range of experts, and because of the decreasing number of sources of information on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in recent years. Without the Panel, we fear our sources of information will become narrower and more one-sided. As a consequence, our picture of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will become more incomplete and prone to biases. That is a net loss for everyone, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Panel`s regular reports on the humanitarian situation and the impact of sanctions were a constant reminder of the need to improve the sanctions regime in order to make it more effective and less burdensome on the civilian population and economy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. That is a particularly negative loss for all. There is still time before the termination of the Panel of Expert`s mandate on 30 April. We urge Council members to use that time productively in another attempt at a much-needed compromise. Compromise is difficult. It can seem unfair, unreasonable or simply politically untenable. Yet the Council and in fact diplomacy at large are built on compromise. And they are built that way for the simple reason that compromise is still better than the alternative, which is a file in which there is no shared document and no shared facts. When it comes to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, that is a prospect that promises to make a difficult file impossible, which will reflect on the Council and the entire United Nations. It is a prospect we must make every effort to avoid.

When Canada served as Chair of the Angola Sanctions Committee in 1999, which emanated from the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning Angola, one of my predecessors Ambassador Robert Fowler worked with his counterparts on the Security Council to establish the first-ever Panel of Experts for a United Nations sanctions regime. The Panel provided Council members with credible, independent assessments and made recommendations to end the conflict. The model was then used to support United Nations sanctions in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Over time, the Council and the whole United Nations system have relied on panels of experts to enhance the effectiveness of their sanctions. They have been and remain important tools— not only for the Council but also for the wider membership of the United Nations. They provide us with critical information to ensure compliance with Security Council sanctions, which reinforces our ability to comply with Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, namely, to carry out the Council’s decisions. And yet we now find ourselves in a situation where one permanent member of the Council, the Russian Federation, has seen fit to undermine and eliminate those tools. The latest example is Russia’s abuse of its right to the veto (see S/PV.9591) to terminate the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. As described by so many speakers from this rostrum over the past couple of days, that veto was completely and utterly irresponsible. It is at odds with Russia’s own responsibilities under the Charter and is richly deserving of our shared concern and condemnation, as well as our urging of the Council to deal with the issue in a way that will ensure that the Panel of Experts can return to its work. Russia’s actions will undermine the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions imposed against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — sanctions that Russia itself has supported for almost 20 years. The international community will no longer receive the credible, independent information and recommendations that the Panel has provided for more than 15 years. But there are other issues as well. The global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture will suffer, with a key element of the United Nations sanctions regime being dismantled before our eyes. It is important to remind ourselves, given the terrible irony of today’s discussion, that the Soviet Union was not only present at the creation of the United Nations itself but has also been part and parcel of the creation of whatever fragile architecture we have to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. Slowly but steadily, we built institutions and signed treaties to stop nuclear testing in the atmosphere in order to deal with the potential for nuclear proliferation and its terrible consequences, all of which were carefully negotiated with the former Soviet Union and later Russia and in all of which Russia itself has been deeply implicated in pressing for, from this rostrum, from all the platforms around the world, in all treaty negotiations at our conferences held in New York and Geneva. Russia was an architect of that structure. And now we find ourselves in the ironic position in which Russia has decided unilaterally to take steps to end it. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will be emboldened to continue to expand its unlawful weapons of mass destruction programme and its ballistic missile programmes. We urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to cease the activities that are generating revenue for its unlawful weapons programmes, including the malicious cyberactivities that the Panel itself has exposed. Perhaps  — and this is something we must understand — that is precisely the point of Russia’s truly reckless decision. The Panel’s termination comes amid unprecedented cooperation between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — a troubling relationship reported on by the Panel and many other credible sources. Ballistic missiles and other material provided by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to Russia in violation of Council sanctions are sustaining Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which, incidentally, the Assembly has condemned on many occasions. Furthermore, that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is violating international law is not in dispute. Sanctions by the Council are a direct response to the serious threat posed to international peace and security by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s weapons programme. The threat has not dissipated. In fact, it has intensified, which is why the sanctions remain in force. What has changed? Well, I will tell Assembly members what has changed. One State now needs those very weapons to prosecute its illegal war, and so it chose to weaken Council action and to provide cover for its own violations. Therefore, let us call that veto what it is: a backroom deal, pure and simple. Russia gets the weapons it needs to destroy Ukraine and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea gets Russia’s protection in the Security Council. It is a weapons-for-protection racket — nothing more, nothing less. Corruption was never so cynical. (spoke in French) The inhabitants of the Korean Peninsula and East Asia, who, day and night, live under the threat of an aggressive Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, are now less safe. The Ukrainians who are enduring but resisting Russia’s imperialist ambitions are now less safe. We are all less safe. And I must add that Canada is also disappointed by China’s abstention on the issue. It raises the question as to how the neighbouring country of a nuclear proliferator can publicly declare its support for the Sanctions Committee and the Panel of Experts but not bring itself to vote in favour of a draft resolution (S/2024/255) that would have ensured that they function properly. Russia should also have abstained from voting in accordance with Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations. Instead, it used its veto to stand in the way of an essential tool at our disposal and to undermine our collective capacity to ensure compliance with the Charter of the United Nations. That is not the first time Russia has so acted. Russia obstructed the work of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic. Russia imposed its unilateral veto on the Panel of Experts on Mali established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) (see S/PV.9408). In both instances, who had perpetrated or backed the violations reported by the Panels of Experts? Who? Russia. Where will it end? Are we going to continue to allow a country to harm the institutions and tools that we have crafted together? That is not a rhetorical question. I will provide the answer: no, absolutely not. The General Assembly cannot allow business to continue as usual. (spoke in English) Russia may believe that by vetoing the mandate of the Panel on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, somehow it will shield itself and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from scrutiny. As we say in Canada, fat chance. Russia is mistaken. Canada will continue to fully comply with United Nations sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which remain in effect and are legally binding. We call on all Member States to do exactly the same. We will continue to monitor and to respond to the evasion of United Nations sanctions and to hold the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea accountable. Independent monitoring of compliance with a sanctions regime is now more important than ever. We call on all Member States to do the same. And Canada stands ready to work with all partners to respond to Russia’s veto, including through action by the Assembly. And here, I would like to say, in closing, we associate ourselves entirely with the comments of both of those who have spoken this afternoon  — my colleague from Austria and my colleague from Brazil. My colleague from Brazil has pleaded with the Council to get back to work, to find a compromise and to do what it has to do to make sure that the Panel of Experts is not undermined and is allowed to continue. But as my colleague from Austria has said, if that does not work, the General Assembly is not going away. Over the past several years, the Assembly has taken it upon itself to respond when the Security Council is stuck, when the Security Council is frozen, when the Security Council is undermined. That is precisely what we are seeing now. And if, after the deadline of 30 April, we find ourselves in a position where the Council has not acted, we shall certainly be joining Austria and many others to find a way for the Assembly to do its job, to protect the security of the world, to ensure that the architecture on non-proliferation is advanced and not undermined, and to assure ourselves, to put it quite simply, that those two countries — Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — do not get away with it.

For close to 18 years, the sanctions regime established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) has been a key element in the international community’s important challenge of halting the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s quest for weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and has constituted an essential response to the regime’s hazardous conduct. Time and time again, since its establishment, we have witnessed how vital the 1718 sanctions regime is in the light of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s unlawful activities on all fronts — the hostile ballistic missile launchers and outer space manoeuvres in blatant contradiction with Security Council resolutions; the regime’s reckless regional behaviour, which threatens its neighbours; and its involvement in the proliferation of arms and their supply to terrorist groups worldwide, specifically in the Middle East, including into the hands of Hamas, which used those weapons to attack Israel. Alongside that, the world has also been witnessing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s global, criminal and malicious deeds in the fields of cyberattacks and cryptocurrency theft. Those actions and more have been a source of grave international concern for years. Furthermore, events in recent months show a growing trend in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s embargo-violation behaviour, with reports on new arms and technology exchanges between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Russia in violation of Security Council resolutions. It is clearer now, more than ever, that if we want the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to be stopped, the 1718 regime is vital and absolutely necessary to maintain. Since 2009, the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) has been an integral part of the 1718 regime and an essential part of that Committee, by providing independent assessments on the implementation of Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It acted with transparency and neutrality and was fact-orientated. It provided Member States with the ability to understand where the 1718 regime was working well and where there were gaps. The reports have been important in calling out the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea when it evaded its obligations, in understanding how it did so and in underscoring who assisted it to that end and how. The Panel’s work and reports have been crucial in raising important questions regarding the efficiency of the sanctions regime, questions such as those in the latest annual report (see S/2024/215) as to how Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-made weapons were used by Hamas in the 7 October 2023 massacre against Israel or how they became part of the war in Ukraine. Blocking the Panel’s activity is a blow to the Security Council’s efforts to protect peace and security. Blocking its activity seeks to provide the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with impunity. Blocking the mandate and stopping the Panel is an attempt to withdraw transparency and silence the truth. Blocking the Panel weakens the Security Council’s ability to act. Israel regrets Russia’s attempt to weaken the 1718 regime and silence its Panel of Experts. Security Council resolution sanction regimes should be strengthened, not weakened. That is the case for all Security Council sanction regimes, be it vis-à-vis the military expansion of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons and malicious regional activities with ongoing violations of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) or regarding the systematic transfer of arms by Iran to Hizbullah in violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and the violations of Security Council resolution 2216 (2015) by Iran, which by arming the Houthis risks the security of maritime routes in the Red Sea. Experience has taught us that rogue regimes and terror organizations can be stopped only when presented with an uncompromising shield of actions, including an iron fist of sanctions. Israel supports strong Security Council resolution sanction regimes and their important work, including by their panels of experts. We call for an immediate resumption of the 1718 Panel of Experts and for a mandate that allows it to perform its vital duties swiftly and within a mandate that is long-term and has as wide a scope as possible. If we do not act to protect our Security Council resolution sanction regimes when they are intentionally weakened, we should not be surprised later when they are not there to protect us.

We regret the use of the veto in the annual renewal of the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) (see S/PV.9591). We know from experience the importance of the Panel of Experts for the proper functioning of the Committee. Spain, along with the vast majority of the international community, has among its priorities the defence and strengthening of the international architecture of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, which are fundamental for international peace and security. For that reason, we condemn the nuclear and missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which constitute a threat to international peace and security, and we demand the implementation of Security Council resolutions, including the strict implementation of the sanctions provided for therein. Russia’s veto of the renewal of the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) is yet another demonstration of Russia’s disregard for international lawfulness and its attempts to undermine the foundations of the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. The veto will hinder the work of the Committee to make progress towards the denuclearization of North Korea. Despite that unacceptable decision by Russia, the message remains clear: North Korea will never be recognized as a nuclear State by the international community. As long as there is no progress towards a diplomatic process leading to its complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization, the international community will remain united in the rigorous application of the agreed sanctions, and Russia will remain isolated in its defiance of the Security Council resolutions. Similarly, its veto of the continuity of the Panel of Experts is nothing more than a clear attempt to hide the supply of weapons it receives from a country sanctioned by the United Nations, which are also used in its continuing attacks against civilian targets and energy infrastructure in Ukraine, worsening the suffering of the civilian population in Ukraine in clear violation of international humanitarian law. In that context, Spain once again reiterates its most categorical condemnation of Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine and demands the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all its armed forces from the entire territory of Ukraine. Spain condemns the technical and military assistance that Russia is providing to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in exchange for the supply of arms. That transfer of technology by Russia is being used by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to develop its ballistic and nuclear programme. We demand the immediate cessation of those illicit activities which are escalating tensions, with the continued launching of ballistic missiles coupled with disturbing warmongering rhetoric, which poses a serious threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region. Spain reaffirms its full support for the United Nations sanctions regime, of which the 1718 Committee, responsible for its implementation, is a key component and will continue to support the processes and initiatives aimed at the complete denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Malaysia appreciates the convening of today’s plenary meeting of the General Assembly, following the use of the veto at the meeting of the Security Council held on 28 March, under the agenda item “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (see S/PV.9591). In the context of the broader United Nations reform process, debates of this nature are a means of increasing accountability, pending further regulation of the use of the veto and its ultimate abolition. My delegation reiterates that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of such abhorrent instruments of war and destruction. As regards the Korean Peninsula, Malaysia is gravely concerned about developments relating to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and their impact on international peace and security. We condemn the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s pursuit of those programmes, which exacerbates tensions and instability and hinders the prospects of lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. Malaysia strongly urges the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to refrain from any further provocative and illegal acts, abide by its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions and its international commitments and immediately cease its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. We also reaffirm the imperative of self-restraint by all concerned parties. The need for the resumption of dialogue in realizing the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula cannot be overstated, particularly against a backdrop of heightened strains on the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. Concerted action is urgently required on the part of the Security Council, which must, in discharging its mandate, accord due weight to genuine humanitarian considerations. Malaysia regrets the lack of consensus in the Security Council in relation to the renewal of the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006). It is our hope that members of the Security Council will intensify diplomatic efforts to reach convergence on this important issue, taking into account the legitimate concerns of all parties.

Czechia aligns itself with the statement of the European Union and its member States (see A/78/PV.68). I would like to add some remarks in my national capacity. We deeply regret that the veto cast by the Russian Federation (see S/PV.9591) prevented the Security Council from extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We welcome today’s debate under agenda item 63, “Use of the veto”, which increases accountability and transparency in the use of the veto power in general and in this specific case that we are discussing. Russia has justified its blocking of the important work of the fact-finding Panel of Experts by claiming that the situation has changed. That is something we can actually agree on  — the situation has indeed changed since the time when Russia used to support the adoption of a series of Security Council resolutions that condemned the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s development of ballistic missiles and its nuclear programme. Today Russia can no longer afford to be concerned with North Korea’s nuclear build-up because it needs massive ammunition shipments from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to sustain its military aggression against Ukraine. No rhetorical fig leaf or spin placed by Russia can hide that reality. The Panel of Experts has had a crucial role in monitoring the implementation of United Nations sanctions imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It was not a political body — it has been an important tool for the Security Council in addressing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s destabilizing actions, and that is why Czechia has supported its work. The Security Council is entrusted with the responsibility to maintain peace and security on behalf of the international community and should do so in our collective interest. Security Council resolutions concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — namely, resolutions 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2270 (2016) — have been adopted under Chapter VII, which makes them legally binding on both Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as well as on all other Member States. Therefore, the weapon transfers that are taking place now are in clear contravention of those resolutions. We reiterate our strong call on both Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to immediately cease such activities. Discussing this issue today in the General Assembly gives the international community an excellent opportunity to express its resolve to maintain the sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which are still in force. There can be no doubt that allowing further build-up of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear capability is detrimental to global security. It is a matter that goes far beyond regional affairs. We therefore hope that today we can collectively urge the countries mentioned to behave and act responsibly.

The delegation of Uruguay expresses its appreciation to the President of the General Assembly for convening members in accordance with resolution 76/262 with regard to the Security Council meeting held on 28 March (see S/PV.9591), wherein a veto was cast against the renewal of the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) concerning the sanctions imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. As a fervent defender of peace and stability in the region, Uruguay emphasizes the importance of strict compliance with Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In that regard, it is imperative that all Member States adhere to the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and work collectively to maintain peace and security in the region. With regard to the mandate of the 1718 Committee Panel of Experts, Uruguay emphasizes the importance of its continued functioning. The Committee plays a crucial role in monitoring the sanctions imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ensuring compliance with Security Council resolutions and advising Member States on how to implement those measures effectively. We urge all Member States to support the renewal of the Committee’s mandate and to provide the necessary resources for its effective functioning. Furthermore, Uruguay reiterates its firm position against the use of the veto power in situations in which it hinders the collective will of the international community. The veto is a privilege that must be exercised with the utmost responsibility and in line with the principles of equity, transparency and accountability. It is imperative that all Member States maintain a spirit of cooperation and commitment in the pursuit of common objectives, especially on matters related to international peace and security. In conclusion, Uruguay reaffirms its commitment to the maintenance of international peace and security and calls on the Security Council to work to address the challenges posed by the actions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and to renew the mandate of the Group of Experts. We remain steadfast in our support for multilateralism and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations in our collective quest for a safer world.

I would like to thank the President of the General Assembly for convening this debate in accordance with resolution 76/262. The United Nations emerged from the ashes of the Second World War with the aim of preventing such a catastrophe from ever happening again. Since then, unfortunately, many events have occurred that have had a negative impact on the institutions intended to prevent the risk of a nuclear war, the consequences of which remain unimaginable. As a State Member of the United Nations, we have a special and immense responsibility to face up to the existential threats facing our world and to commit ourselves collectively, as an international community, to respect our commitments to nuclear disarmament, to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to demilitarization, rather than competition, confrontation and conflict. I wish to reaffirm that any threat or use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction would have catastrophic human consequences. Today threats of the use of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction are on the increase. No State could cope with the immediate or long-term consequences of the use of a nuclear weapon. Our world cannot afford a global crisis resulting from the use of nuclear weapons. The Kingdom of Morocco remains resolutely convinced that nuclear weapons are neither a guarantee of security nor an assurance of regional and international stability. Accordingly, it has made its commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation a strategic choice that illustrates its firm commitment to international peace and security, as well as its attachment to the cardinal principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes. Morocco plays an active role in promoting multilateral initiatives aimed at nuclear non-proliferation, notably by hosting the Proliferation Security Initiative African Political Meeting and Outreach Event on countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which was held in Marrakech, Morocco, on 31 January. In the same vein, we consider that panels of experts play a key role in facilitating the implementation of Security Council resolutions and in providing up- to-date and essential reports for their respective Committees. Indeed, Morocco has always maintained close cooperation with the Security Council’s sanctions committees and believes that their work represents added value in achieving the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons.

Slovenia aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union (see A/78/PV.68), to which I wish to add some remarks in my national capacity. We deeply regret the veto cast by Russia (see S/PV.9591) preventing the mandate renewal of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006). Countries like Slovenia rely heavily on the independent and professional monitoring and assessment of sanctions implementation provided by the Panel. The insights we gain on sanctions contravention techniques employed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, such as financing its weapons of mass destruction programme through malicious cyberactivities, are invaluable. It is crucial that the broader United Nations membership have access to professional and objective assessments that guide the Council’s activities on the sanctions regime. Only a fully functioning Panel of Experts is able to provide that. Sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exist for a reason. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea must promptly ensure the full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, with the objective of dismantling all its nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and ceasing all related activities. Until then, we will continue calling on all States to fully and effectively implement the existing sanctions. It is concerning that Russia vetoed a technical draft resolution (S/2024/255) precisely when the Panel commenced investigating emerging evidence of Russia’s procurement from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of arms, especially missiles. That constitutes a serious violation of multiple Security Council resolutions and requires urgent action. I emphasize once again that that underscores the need for independent analysis and assessment, which only the Panel can provide. As a non-permanent member of the Security Council, Slovenia engaged in negotiations on the draft resolution in good faith and made difficult concessions with the goal of ensuring the continuation of the good work carried out by the Panel of Experts in supporting the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and the Council. We remain committed to constructive engagement, and we call on Russia to do the same.

Albania aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union (see A/78/PV.68). In my national capacity, I would like to make the following brief points. First, the use of the veto by the Russian Federation on the mandate renewal of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is regrettable and unjustified. That veto is a licence to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea regime to continue with its illicit and unlawful weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile and nuclear programmes. Furthermore, we express our disappointment that the Russian Federation did not heed the call of a wide majority of States Members of the United Nations for a smooth adoption of the mandate renewal of the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Secondly, we regret that the Russian Federation, instead of promoting the preservation of and compliance with multilateral non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control agreements and commitments, including obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by exercising its veto power against the Panel of Experts, has granted the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea more opportunities to act against Security Council resolutions, thereby exposing the people of the Korean Peninsula and the international community to more nuclear, ballistic and nuclear threats. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, for two consecutive years, has launched countless ballistic missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the Security Council has yet to react. Thirdly, Albania deplores the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s transfers of arms to Moscow and their use during the Russian aggression in Ukraine. Russia should abide by the Security Council resolutions that clearly prohibit any arms exports or imports involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Fourthly, we encourage the members of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to work together towards strengthening the Committee’s work, including through fulfilling its technical mandate as foreseen in Security Council resolution 2375 (2017), but also to find ways to address the cyberthreats coming from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Albania is deeply concerned by the nuclear, ballistic and weapons of mass destruction activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The brazen violations of Security Council resolutions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea must not be encouraged by anyone, including the permanent members of the Security Council. In the past three years, three vetoes by two countries have been cast in support of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, while Pyongyang only disregards the Council and its decisions. That is not a way forward for the Council, which should act responsibly and address the threats to regional and global peace coming from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In conclusion, let me reaffirm Albania’s support for a diplomatic solution to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programme. We continue to support all genuine efforts to address the threats posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea through preventive diplomacy, in addition to efforts aimed at ensuring that the regime ends fully, transparently, comprehensively and irreversibly its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic and nuclear programmes.

The United States appreciates the opportunity to join this debate on Russia’s use of the veto, in order to promote transparency and accountability for all permanent members of the Security Council. On 28 March, Russia vetoed a draft resolution (S/2024/255) to renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006). The 1718 Panel of Experts has been one of the gold standards for independent and objective investigations into violations of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-related resolutions. That is information that was provided for the benefit of all Member States. And unfortunately, at Russia’s hands, that will no longer be the case. The Panel had enjoyed 15 years of unanimous support. We need to ask ourselves what changed this year. Russia, and China in its explanation of vote as it abstained, tried to justify this action (see S/PV.9591) by making this an issue with the ongoing United Nations sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s unlawful pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. It is the height of absurdity to suggest undermining that important sanctions regime when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s provocations are only growing more reckless and destabilizing. But that was also beside the point, as the mandate renewal draft resolution was not a draft resolution focused on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea sanctions, or frankly any of the political aspects of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea file. China and Russia have had ample opportunities to discuss the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea sanctions in the Council, including through multiple resolutions, presidential statements, press statements and even press elements proposed over the past two years. They spare no opportunity to remind us of their draft resolution to reduce sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, for which they have not held consultations in more than two years. We also heard baseless allegations that this vote, after six weeks of negotiations and two delays in the adoption vote, was somehow rushed. As penholder, we sought a deliberate, transparent, inclusive and flexible approach. Indeed, that can be seen in the text itself, which for the first time in years was not sent for a vote as a technical rollover. But Members should not just take our word for it  — they can ask the other Council members. There is no question for us what has happened here. Russia gave Council members an ultimatum that sought one of two outcomes. Either it sought to silence the Panel’s investigations and reporting into Russian non-compliance with United Nations sanctions, including its procurement of arms and ballistic missiles from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for use in its war of aggression against Ukraine — which is a blatant violation of Security Council resolutions — or it sought to get rid of all United Nations sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, sanctions that Russia has demonstrated to not care about enforcing. Neither of those should have been acceptable outcomes. Russia’s veto  — with China’s complicit approval — defied the support of 13 of the 15 Security Council members, including the Republic of Korea and Japan, who are under a very serious and constant threat from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The latest veto deprives every Member State of the Panel’s fact-based, independent assessments, analysis and recommendations bearing on the implementation of United Nations sanctions on one of the Security Council’s most pressing issues  — the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula. The result  — a result that Russia and China own — is a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea regime bolstered by the political backing of its friends, emboldened to actions that will further jeopardize stability and security on the Peninsula and beyond. That outcome not only weakens all Member States’ ability to address a persistent proliferation threat, but it also undermines the peace and security architecture of this institution. This was Russia’s second veto in the past year of a mandate related to a United Nations sanctions regime. It may not be its last. Indeed, Russia is already threatening to terminate more United Nations sanctions mandates — mandates that help the Security Council to monitor and take action to deter threats to international peace and security. That is why it is so critical for all of us to raise our voices today in support of the non-proliferation regime and, in opposition to the attempts to silence information, we need to uphold our obligations. The United States looks forward to working with all Member States to further those objectives and to working in good faith in the Security Council to renew and revise sanctions mandates, where appropriate, in order to advance peace.

The convening of this plenary meeting pursuant to resolution 76/262 perfectly reflects the willingness of the Member States of the United Nations to address and find ways to respond to threats to international peace and security, in addition to encouraging the permanent members of the Security Council to take greater accountability for their actions. Vetoes are a measure of last resort, and when permanent members of the Council exercise the veto, they are expected to fully clarify their reasons for doing so. Providing such an explanation to the General Assembly does not undermine the Council’s authority; on the contrary, it reinforces the complementary relationship that both organs should have, which ultimately strengthens the United Nations and adds to its credibility. The use of the veto affects both the work of the Security Council and that of the Organization as a whole. The Council therefore has a legal, political and moral responsibility to act appropriately and responsibly in that regard. That is why my country stresses the importance of abolishing the veto, or at least limiting its use. Let me be clear: Argentina believes that the use of the veto not only jeopardizes the effectiveness of the Charter of the United Nations but also threatens the very future of our Organization. Moreover, the veto reflects a reality and a context that are largely outdated. For those reasons, the Republic of Argentina has consistently opposed the use of the veto, a position that it has expressed in several forums, including the General Assembly, in particular in the debates on the reform of the Security Council, and in the Security Council itself, when my country was a non-permanent member. Argentina values the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) in ensuring the implementation of the sanctions regime on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. That is why my delegation has stressed the importance of renewing the mandate of the Committee’s Panel of Experts, given that its work, through the high-quality reports it produces, is essential in maintaining the authority of the institutional non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament architecture. I therefore reiterate that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its nuclear and ballistic programme — which operates outside of all multilateral control and safeguards systems — is a threat to international peace and security. In that context, the technical assistance provided by the Panel of Experts to the 1718 Committee is of crucial importance for the full implementation of the sanctions regime. In that regard, Argentina regrets that once again one of the permanent members of the Security Council exercised the veto on a highly sensitive issue for the international community such as the issue of the development of weapons of mass destruction (see S/PV.9591). Finally, Argentina once again calls on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council, to return to compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear weapon State and to return to compliance with the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

North Macedonia deeply regrets that the Security Council failed to adopt a draft resolution (S/2024/255) to renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Russia vetoed a draft resolution that would have extended the Panel of Experts’ mandate for a year (see S/PV.9591). China abstained in the voting on the draft resolution but provided an explanation in support of Russia’s position. Russia’s veto will disband the Panel of Experts on 30 April, ending the United Nations public reporting to all Member States on the implementation of the United Nations sanctions on the Democratic People Republic of Korea. For 15 years, the 1718 Committee Panel of Experts has provided fact- based, objective and independent assessments, analysis and recommendations bearing on the implementation of the United Nations sanctions on the Democratic People Republic of Korea. Last year, Russia also vetoed the draft resolution (S/2023/638) to renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Mali established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017). The point is that those actions dramatically weaken the United Nations peace and security architecture. The Democratic People Republic of Korea’s unlawful weapons programmes threaten all United Nations Member States and undermine the global non-proliferation regime. Russia’s decision to veto draft resolution S/2024/255 prevents all Member States from receiving critical information about previous regime status. Every Member State benefits from the reporting of the Panel of Experts, and without it, Member States will be less equipped to implement United Nations sanctions. The Democratic People Republic of Korea’s humanitarian crisis, on the other hand, is the result of its decision to divert scarce resources from its humanitarian and economic needs towards its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes and not towards the implementation of the United Nations resolutions. Those actions dramatically undermine United Nations efforts to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and they make us all less secure. Those activities of course also undermine the global non-proliferation regime, and all Member States therefore have a right and a responsibility to speak out against them. The veto on draft resolution S/2024/255 should definitely be of concern to all Member States. For some countries, such as my own, which do not have other available mechanisms and sources to track the implementation of United Nations resolutions on non-proliferation, the process has become less transparent. We are all being increasingly exposed to political propaganda tools from all sides, resulting in a more unstable and dangerous situation. That is why we strongly condemn the use of the veto by Russia, which blocked the adoption of the draft resolution, and we demand an end to obstructionism in the Security Council and call for a more responsible protection of international peace and security.

Romania aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union (see A/78/PV.68), and I would like to make the following remarks in my national capacity. Since 2009, the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) has fulfilled the crucial role of providing fact- based independent monitoring and recommendations on the implementation of the Council’s resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The reports produced by the Committee have been vital to all Member States in impartially and accurately assessing compliance with the obligations set under the Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Romania commends the invaluable work done by the 1718 Committee Panel of Experts and deeply regrets that the Security Council failed to renew its mandate (see S/PV.9591) after 14 years of continued unanimous support. We strongly condemn the use of the veto by the Russian Federation, silencing the Committee’s independent and objective investigations into and reporting on violations of Security Council resolutions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We fail to understand that veto, other than as an attempt to conceal illegal arms transfers between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Russia for use in the latter’s unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine. We reiterate the strong calls on both Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to immediately cease those activities, which violate the Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which Russia itself, as a permanent member of the Security Council, has supported so far. The consequences of terminating the activity of the 1718 Committee Panel of Experts seriously undermine effective multilateralism and risk jeopardizing international peace and security. The United Nations sanctions regime itself remains in place. However, the ability of all Member States to implement the Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and address destabilizing actions will be severely affected. They also undermine the global non-proliferation architecture and may embolden unlawful activities and the evasion of sanctions. We recall that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea must comply immediately with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions and abandon all its nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile and nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and cease all related activities. In conclusion, we recall the importance of effective multilateralism and expect the Security Council to fulfil its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security and effectively oversee the implementation of its resolutions. Romania remains committed to supporting the faithful implementation of Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the activity of the 1718 Committee.

I would like to express my appreciation for the convening of this plenary meeting on the use of the veto following the veto cast by one permanent member of the Security Council on 28 March under the agenda item entitled “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (see S/PV.9591). My country fully and strongly aligns itself with the statement delivered earlier by the European Union (see A/78/PV.68) and wishes to add the following remarks in its national capacity. Greece regrets that, on 28 March, the Security Council failed to adopt a draft resolution on the annual renewal of the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In an era in which our collective security mechanisms are under duress, that failure was another step leading towards the further undermining of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. Greece calls for an in-depth and comprehensive discussion within the Security Council about ways to avoid a further use of the veto in future. In that vein, decisive steps should be taken to improve the working methods of the Council in order to enhance its efficiency, transparency, effectiveness and accountability. Resolution 76/262 contributed substantially towards that aim by referring the issue of when a veto has been cast to the General Assembly, thereby allowing the broader membership to be better informed about the background and possibly about some of the rationale behind the casting of the veto. For the past 15 years, the Panel has provided fact- based, objective, independent assessments, analysis and recommendations bearing on the implementation of United Nations sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Throughout those 15 years, the Panel has examined evidence, exchanged views, found consensus and delivered objective and independent reports. The Panel’s reporting has been a critical source of information for all Member States and the greater public looking to better understand the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s sanctions evasion and violation activities so that they can help to prevent proliferation and implement the Security Council resolutions. Every Member State benefits from the Panel’s reporting, and without it, Member States will be less equipped to implement United Nations sanctions. Let us not forget that the analytical information contained in the latest reports of the Panel revealed illegal arms transfers that constitute a violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2270 (2016). In that regard, my country calls on all Member States to fully implement all those resolutions. In conclusion, rest assured that Greece, as a responsible member of the United Nations and a steadfast supporter of the implementation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations in its entirety, will continue to fully implement the sanctions regime, which remains in place.

I thank the President for convening this meeting. The purpose of resolution 76/262 is to increase accountability in the use of a negative vote by a permanent member of the Security Council, not to condemn it as we have so often done recently. There might be days when the veto is exercised to advance the responsibility to uphold international peace and security, but we are not responding to such an occasion today. The negative vote cast by the Russian Federation on 28 March (see S/PV.9591) halted the renewal of the mandate of the Panel of Experts aiding the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Without the Panel’s assessments, it becomes challenging, if not unfeasible, for all Member States to possess the necessary information to comply with the Council’s resolutions. That consequently undermines the crucial efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, posing significant threats to international peace and security. In recent weeks, we have also debated the United States’ use of the veto to block Security Council action in response to the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. A common thread in those recent debates is the Council’s growing incapacity to enforce its resolutions. A pivotal aspect of the Security Council’s mandate is that its decisions are binding, as stated in Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations. The risk that the 1718 Committee will lose access to its Panel of Experts’ insights diminishes the binding nature of the Council’s decisions. That is similarly true for resolution 2728 (2024), which called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza during Ramadan and was greeted with a wave of renewed hope in the United Nations globally, not least by the people of Kenya. Yet, immediately following the resolution’s adoption, a spokesperson for the United States asserted that it is non-binding (see S/PV.9586), effectively equating it with earlier General Assembly resolutions. The unwillingness to implement the Council’s resolutions, coupled with the erosion of the binding effects of its decisions, if left unchecked, threatens to permanently transform the Security Council into a shadow of its intended self, mirroring the General Assembly, not in scope, but in its diminished capacity to mandate action. Such a shift would render it a smaller, less democratic and less legitimate version of what it was designed to be, undermining its unique role and authority in international affairs and leaving critical conflicts, such as the war in Ukraine and the stagnant progress on the Palestinian issue, unresolved. Many Member States hold the view that a multipolar global order will promote balance and stability. However, that goal can be realized only if the major Powers — particularly those with the Security Council veto  — are prepared to accept difficult compromises and adhere to the Charter of the United Nations. Indeed, it was the hard-won wisdom at the Yalta Conference of 1945 recognizing compromise as the foundation of collective security that facilitated the establishment of the United Nations and its commitment to shielding all peoples from the ravages of war. Regrettably, at this rate, we are closer to a dystopian multipolar order, in which the veto and the failure to implement the Council’s decisions facilitate the spread of weapons of mass destruction, mass atrocities and violations of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. To prevent a relapse into the failures that befell the League of Nations, it is critical that the Pact for the Future initiates a re-evaluation of the veto’s use, ensuring it consistently supports the Security Council’s mandate. Meanwhile, it is incumbent upon the permanent members to meet the moment by identifying and pursuing cooperative ventures, particularly in affirming and protecting the binding nature of Council decisions. On that front, there is no better cause than preventing nuclear warfare. A good starting point would be to renegotiate the renewal of the mandate of the Panel of Experts for the 1718 Committee before its expiration on 30 April.

At the outset, I thank you, Madam President, for convening this meeting on agenda item 63, pertaining to the use of the veto in the Security Council. This is the second meeting convened under that agenda item within four days only, highlighting the increased frequency of the use of the veto by a permanent member of the Council recently. Therefore, as we have previously mentioned, such meetings constitute an important opportunity for Member States to continue examining cases that require the use of the veto without contravening the Council’s primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. Those discussions are a tool to ensure transparency and keep the Council informed of the views of the wider United Nations membership, as it is on behalf of all Member States that the Council takes decisions when carrying out its primary responsibilities. The continued escalations by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea pose a clear threat to international peace and security, hence the need for the international community, and the Security Council in particular, to take decisive action on that critical issue. We therefore urge Council members to engage in constructive dialogue on that important file and to agree on upcoming steps while taking into account all legitimate concerns of all Member States and the will of the international community to maintain collective security. That issue is of urgent importance, as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continues to develop and test nuclear weapons and intercontinental capabilities at a most alarming rate. We therefore urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to stop its illegal, dangerous and provocative activities and to comply with Council resolutions and international law. We also call on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to establish a complete, verifiable and irreversible path to denuclearization, including a return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without delay, in order to ensure peace in the Korean Peninsula. Finally, we would like to emphasize the importance of dialogue and diplomacy between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and regional and international partners. That is the best way forward, particularly in view of the dire humanitarian conditions in the country, in order to return to dialogue with the United Nations and enable humanitarian organizations to return to the country as soon as possible.

Since the adoption of resolution 76/262, entitled “Standing mandate for a General Assembly debate when a veto is cast in the Security Council”, our delegation has insisted that the Security Council cannot limit itself to submitting special reports only in cases in which the veto was used. We reiterate our view that that would be a clearly restrictive and selective approach to what the Charter establishes in that regard in its Article 15, paragraph 1, and Article 24, paragraph 3. It is unfortunate that, in the Security Council, instead of addressing the concerns of non-member States of the Council, especially on issues of direct concern to them, forced action on draft resolutions continues to be taken when there are still significant differences as to their content and scope. The sanctions-based paradigm of the United States and its policy of maximum pressure are obstacles to the dialogue process on the situation on the Korean Peninsula and intensify the tensions and security problems in the region. We firmly condemn the unilateral coercive measures imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which have worsened its people’s economic and humanitarian situation. We once again call on all States to refrain from actions that do not contribute to the goal of denuclearization but rather further complicate the tense situation in the region. We support the cause of total denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, without foreign interference, in full respect for the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of the States involved and with strict adherence to the principle of refraining from the use or threat of use of force. We reaffirm Cuba’s commitment to peace and multilateralism. The only way to achieve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is by engaging in dialogue and negotiations aimed at a lasting political solution and taking into account the legitimate concerns of all the parties involved.

We gather here, united in our commitment to uphold the principles of the United Nations, especially in the face of challenges to the non-proliferation regime and the continued violations of Security Council resolutions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The recent veto by the Russian Federation of the Security Council draft resolution (S/2024/255) to renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, is a serious setback in our collective efforts to maintain the non-proliferation regime and address the continued violations of Security Council resolutions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The mandate of the Panel of Experts is crucial to monitor and document the efforts by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to evade sanctions and its non-compliance with Security Council resolutions. The Panel’s work has been instrumental in shedding light on the sophisticated means by which that country evades sanctions. By renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts, we demonstrated our commitment to enforce the sanctions regime and prevent the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from further developing its nuclear and missile programmes. The persistent violations of Security Council resolutions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, constitute a global and growing threat to international security and the non-proliferation regime. The actions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea not only undermine the authority of the Security Council, but also jeopardize the stability of the entire region. Moreover, the use of the veto by a permanent member of the Security Council that prevented the renewal of the mandate of the Panel of Experts is deeply troubling and undermines the Council’s credibility in enforcing compliance with its resolutions. Veto power should not be used to prioritize national interests over the collective responsible to maintain international peace and security. Such actions set a dangerous precedent and hinder the Council’s ability to effectively address proliferation crises. We call on others to insist on the renewal of the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. That is a crucial step in maintaining the non-proliferation regime and ensuring international peace and security. Let us work together to ensure that the United Nations remains a strong and effective platform for addressing global challenges. Let us renew the mandate of the Group of Experts of the 1718 Committee and send a clear message that the international community will not tolerate threats to peace and security, but will be guided instead by the collective pursuit of a safer world for all.

The General Assembly and, in particular, the Security Council, should play a constructive role in the process of seeking peaceful solutions to conflicts among States. Nicaragua believes that the United Nations must take actions to prevent the escalation of and de-escalate any situation that jeopardizes international peace and security. The Government of Reconciliation and National Unity of Nicaragua reiterates its vocation for peace, solidarity, respect for international law and the right of the peoples of the world to live in peace and development. As a peace-loving people who respect international law, we do not recognize or accept initiatives, mechanisms or other attempts to violate the sovereignty of States. In this case, we are referring to the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), whose work has been polarized and selective against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In that regard, we recognize the Russian Federation for its efforts and proposals presented in the Security Council to review our attitude towards restrictive measures. Those proposals were rejected by the West. We also appreciate Russia’s explanation on this matter, both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, emphasizing clearly that this Group of Experts has abandoned all standards of objectivity and impartiality that should be integral features of its mandate. It is clear that the West uses such groups and other mechanisms to continue applying its policy of aggression and selectivity against developing countries, applying unilateral coercive measures that do not contribute to efforts to resolve international conflicts and tensions. We point out that it is those Western countries that are responsible for undermining all efforts at good- faith negotiations in the Security Council, seriously imperilling the maintenance of international peace and security. We therefore acknowledge the resistance and fortitude of the people of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, who have been able to pursue life in all its expressions, despite the unjust siege of the unilateral, coercive and illegal measures or aggressions called sanctions. We also recognize the right to sovereignty, culture and life, in accordance with the freely chosen ways of all the countries and peoples of the world and the right of peoples to protect their security and defend peace. Our Government of National Reconciliation and Unity will continue to urge the parties involved to return to the path of dialogue and negotiation so as to de-escalate the situation and find a peaceful solution as soon as possible in order to promote the peace, stability, security, welfare, development and reunification of the greater Korean Peninsula.

Croatia aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union on this issue, and I would like to add some remarks in my national capacity. At the outset, let me stress that Croatia strongly condemns the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s unlawful development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, in violation of numerous Security Council resolutions. It is necessary for the Security Council to be able to fulfil its mandate to effectively oversee the implementation of existing resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In that sense, the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and their public reports are an invaluable tool to follow the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s unlawful sanctions-evasion activities. Which is why Croatia regrets the decision of the Russian Federation to veto Security Council draft resolution S/2024/255, on the extension on the annual renewal of the mandate of the 1718 Committee Panel of Experts. That decision will end the 14-year independent, objective and fact-based reporting on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s activities and the implementation of the sanctions regime. Furthermore, it will set back the efforts of United Nations Member States to fulfil their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international law, which is the foundation of our mutual relations. In fact, this veto will impact the ability of all Member States to implement Security Council resolutions and to address the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s illegal and destabilizing actions, thereby jeopardizing peace and security in the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia and beyond. Russia’s decision to veto the extension of the mandate of the 1718 Committee Panel of Experts will not make the Korean Peninsula a safer place to live, nor will it contribute to improving the livelihood of the people of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Instead, it will further weaken the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime, which already faces a plethora of challenges. As such, this veto is both a threat to international peace and security and a concern to United Nations Member States. In conclusion, Croatia considers the non-extension of the mandate of the 1718 Committee Panel of Experts as a deeply regrettable step backwards in our joint pursuit of the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Government of Mali takes note of the veto cast by the Russian Federation (see S/PV.9591) on the extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. This veto helped end an international, not independent or impartial regime. Mali has an unfortunate experience in that regard, and we wish to reiterate our infinite gratitude to the Russian Federation for having ended the sanctions regime against our country in August of 2023 (see S/PV.9408). Beyond this timely measure, it is time for us to reconsider the question of sanctions regimes, as a whole. Sanctions are not ends in and of themselves. The time is ripe to reject unilateral, bellicose approaches. It is critical to continue to promote dialogue and consultation among the parties affected by the sanctions regime so as to ensure their full cooperation. Mali rejects the politicization and the instrumentalization of the question of sanctions. Sanctions should never undermine the sovereign equality, sovereignty or territorial integrity of States. Sanctions regimes should also not be used as pretexts for external interference in States’ domestic affairs, which runs counter to the Charter of the United Nations. Lastly, sanctions should not generate adverse humanitarian consequences for the populations of affected countries.

We have heard the last speaker in this debate. The exercise of the right of reply has been requested. May I remind members that statements in the exercise of the right of reply are limited to 10 minutes for the first intervention and to five minutes for the second intervention and should be made by delegations from their seats. I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

I am taking the floor to exercise the right of reply in response to the statement just made by the representative of Israel. I categorically reject the outrageous and unsubstantiated accusations made by the representative of the Israeli regime against my country. The Israeli regime is notorious for its atrocities and apartheid policies against the people of Palestine and the entire region and cannot conceal its ongoing brutalities in Palestine or divert attention away from its long-standing malign activities in the region by accusing others. As one of the original signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Islamic Republic of Iran has been, and continues to be, a staunch supporter of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In 1974, Iran proposed the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and, since then, has worked hard to realize that noble initiative. My country, like many countries in the Middle East, is gravely concerned about Israel’s dangerous policy of pursuing weapons of mass destruction’s capabilities and its direct involvement in terrorist activities in other countries. According to multiple reports, the regime’s nuclear arsenal comprises 400 warheads, including thermonuclear weapons. It has developed chemical and biological weapons and has access to all weapons of mass destruction delivery systems. It has often threatened nuclear annihilation against the countries in the region. The Israeli regime has refused to adhere to any weapons of mass destruction disarmament or control regimes and has rejected repeated international calls to join the NPT, accept the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement and submit its nuclear programmes to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. It is ironic that the representative of the Israeli regime misused this opportunity to shamelessly accuse others. In conclusion, I should emphasize that the weapons of mass destruction in the hands of that criminal regime are the true source of terror, insecurity and destruction putting regional peace and security at risk. We encourage the international community to condemn the Israeli regime and to force it to follow the international regimes banning weapons of mass destruction.

The General Assembly has thus concluded this stage of its consideration of agenda item 63.

I now invite the attention of the General Assembly to draft decision A/78/L.58, circulated under agenda item 17, entitled “Follow-up to and implementation of the outcomes of the International Conferences on Financing for Development”. Members will recall that the General Assembly concluded its consideration of agenda item 17 at its 50th plenary meeting on 22 December 2023 (see A/78/ PV.50). In order for the Assembly to take action on the draft resolution, it will be necessary to reopen consideration of agenda item 17. May I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to reopen consideration of agenda item 17?

Members will recall that, at its 2nd plenary meeting on 8 September 2023 (see A/78/PV.2), the General Assembly decided to allocate agenda item 17 to the Second Committee. To enable the Assembly to take action expeditiously on the document, may I take it that the Assembly wishes to consider agenda item 17 directly in plenary meeting and proceed immediately to its consideration? It was so decided (decision 78/504 B).

We shall now proceed to consider draft resolution A/78/L.58. I give the floor to the representative of the Secretariat.

The present statement, pertaining to operative paragraphs 1 (a) and 1 (b) of draft resolution A/78/L.58, is made in the context of rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. The present statement will also be distributed to Member States. The request contained in operative paragraphs 1 (a) and 1 (b) of the draft resolution would constitute an addition to the workload of the Department for General Assembly and Conference Management, the Department of Global Communications and the Office of Information and Communications Technology in 2025 and entails additional resource requirements in the amount of $392,600 in 2025. Detailed cost estimates and their underlying assumptions for the requirements are provided in the annex to this statement. Accordingly, should the General Assembly adopt draft resolution A/78/L.58, additional resource requirements estimated in the amount of $276,200 under section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management, $91,500 under section 28, Global communications, and $24,900 under section 29C, Office of Information and Communications Technology, would be included in the proposed programme budget for 2025 for the consideration of the General Assembly at its 79th session.

The Assembly will now take action on draft resolution A/78/L.58, entitled “Further modalities of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development”. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to adopt draft resolution A/78/L.58?

The General Assembly has thus concluded this stage of its consideration of agenda item 17.