S/2020/1258 Security Council

I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the briefings provided by Ambassador Philippe Kridelka, Permanent Representative of Belgium, Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992), concerning Somalia, and Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict; Ambassador Dian Triansyah Djani, Permanent Representative of Indonesia, Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) and Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004); Ambassador Christoph Heusgen, Permanent Representative of Germany, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006); Ambassador Günter Sautter, Deputy Permanent Representative of Germany, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya; Ambassador José Singer Weisinger, Special Envoy of the Dominican Republic to the Security Council, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali; and by Ambassador Jerry Matthews Matjila, Permanent Representative of South Africa and Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, in connection with the video- teleconference “Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council”, convened on Wednesday, 16 December 2020. In accordance with the procedure set out in the letter dated 7 May 2020 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council (S/2020/372), which was agreed in the light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the coronavirus disease pandemic, the briefing and statements will be issued as an official document of the Security Council.

In recent months, I have had the honour to serve as Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992), on Somalia, and Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), on Iran. Belgium has had the privilege to serve those three bodies for two years, and I thank the Council for giving me the opportunity to share my observations on that mandate as we prepare to welcome and hand over to new incoming members. It has been an honour to serve as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). In carrying out that task, I was able to draw, first, on the excellent work done by the Netherlands, which was followed by Belgium as Facilitator and, secondly, on the unwavering support of the Secretariat. During my term, my aim was to support and improve the implementation of the resolution on behalf of the Security Council, in line with the three guidelines inherited from my Dutch predecessor: first, facilitating dialogue among the parties; secondly, transparency in our work; and, thirdly, promoting trade within the supply chain. We are all aware of the current difficult context of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and resolution 2231 (2015) — the United States withdrawal, Iran’s successive disengagements and the United States position on the former resolutions of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) with regard to Iran. In those circumstances, Belgium has done its best to play its role as an honest broker among the various parties. I am convinced that maintaining the framework intact paves the way for diplomacy. As I leave this role, I am more convinced than ever that we need the Council’s common response to issues of international peace and security, and the Plan of Action is one such flagship response and one of the great success stories of nuclear non-proliferation, dialogue and diplomacy. It is a cornerstone of multilateralism, peace and international security. I can therefore only encourage all Member States and regional and international organizations to take appropriate action to support and strengthen its implementation. Belgium also chaired the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. I have built on the work of my predecessor, Sweden, to pursue a proactive and ambitious work plan. The continued undermining of international humanitarian law is deeply worrisome, and children are the first victims. That is unacceptable, and we share the responsibility to address it urgently. The unity of the Security Council and its strong support for the mandate of the Working Group have been a constant encouragement. Over the past two years, we have adopted resolutions on almost all country situations, including those where the Council itself remains divided, such as Myanmar and Syria. With two presidential statements — S/PRST/2020/3, adopted in February in the presence of the King and Queen of Belgium, and S/PRST/2020/8, adopted in S/2020/1258 September under the Nigerien presidency of the Council, we have strengthened the focus on attacks on schools and the protection of children in mediation processes. We must continue to improve the impact of the Working Group. A closer follow-up of the resolutions, both in New York and in the countries concerned, at the initiative of our bilateral embassies for example, remains necessary. Similarly, the direct engagement of the Working Group with the country task forces and the authorities of the countries concerned should, in my view, be maintained and further developed. The same applies to regular country visits, such as the one we organized to Mali in December 2019, and to raising the awareness of civil society. We must also preserve the integrity and impartiality of the listing mechanism. The mandate on children and armed conflict cannot be limited to the Working Group alone and the Council must continue to mainstream child protection throughout its work by ensuring a dedicated capacity in United Nations missions and by emphasizing child protection during meetings and country visits. I thank all members of the Council for their commitment to the work on children and armed conflict. I would like to express my particular gratitude to the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, led with dedication and wisdom by Mrs. Virginia Gamba de Potgieter, as well as UNICEF, the Department of Peace Operations and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for their valuable and close collaboration. Together, they represent what I would call the United Nations and the Security Council at their best. I will disseminate a more detailed overview of lessons learned and recommendations later, through the President of the Council. Finally, over the past two years, we have seen the progress regarding sanctions on Somalia. For example, the partial lifting of the arms embargo on the Somali authorities has been extended. As for the terms of the embargo, they have been clarified and consolidated into the single resolution 2551 (2020). In addition, following the recommendations of the Panel of Experts, the Council also decided to place under embargo certain products used for the manufacture of explosives, for which an implementation assistance note has been drawn up and is available to all Member States on the Committee’s website. The Committee met informally on 10 occasions under the Belgian presidency, including meetings by video-teleconference, and dealt with more than 50 notifications. The Committee held two dialogues with the Somali authorities, not to mention the working visit to Mogadishu organized by the presidency in January 2020. It should be noted that the Committee has become more interested in the financing capacities of Al-Shabaab, and ways to reduce them, because of the excellent investigative and analytical work of the Panel of Experts. The relationship between the Panel of Experts and the Somali Federal Government has been a focus of attention throughout our mandate. We have all contributed to strengthening this mutually beneficial working relationship. It is my hope that this cooperation will continue and grow even stronger. As sensitive issues are sometimes addressed, I would like to commend the commitment shown by the Somali Federal Government in its dialogue with the Committee and the Panel on these issues. I would like to stress one final point. The term “sanctions regime” is unfortunate. It should be recalled that the Council does not sanction Somalia, but rather sanctions those who pose a threat to peace and security in Somalia — that is a crucial difference. Moreover, the sanctions regime is also evolving to adapt to current threats. In conclusion, it is a tool to support peace and security in Somalia.It can only be improved with the cooperation of all with a view to achieving its objectives more quickly. Lastly, I would like to make two more general remarks and one more specific one. First, throughout its mandate, Belgium has attached particular importance to respect for procedural guarantees — “due process” — in the context of the implementation of the various Security Council sanctions regimes. In that regard, we hope that the members of the Council can commit themselves to continuing to make United Nations sanctions more effective by examining ways to have fairer and more transparent procedures. Secondly, it is worth noting the heavy workload involved in chairing a subsidiary body, especially for missions with smaller teams. Belgium therefore advocates a more equitable distribution of the chairmanships of subsidiary bodies among elected and permanent members of the Council. Thirdly, and more specifically, Belgium has chaired on an interim basis another subsidiary body, the United Nations Compensation Committee (UNCC), which addresses the reparations owed by Iraq to Kuwait since the war between those two States. It is a subsidiary body of the Council that is unfortunately often somewhat neglected because it is located in Geneva and is a claims commission of an actuarial nature. However, I would like to mention it today, because it is likely that the next Chair will oversee the final payment of said reparations and, consequently, the termination of the UNCC, which will undoubtedly require an ad hoc resolution of the Security Council. In conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude for the dedication and professionalism of the Secretariat colleagues, whose support has been crucial. I wish my successors every success. We will ensure, through close cooperation, a smooth transition of our mandates and remain at their disposal during this phase and beyond. Finally, let me draw the Security Council’s attention to the best practices guide for Chairs and members of United Nations Sanctions Committees, prepared by Belgium and other Member States. We hope that this guide will be a useful tool for preparing future Chairs and their teams.

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for having organized this briefing to allow me to share some of my personal reflections as the Chair of three of the Council’s subsidiary bodies, namely, the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Two years ago, my predecessors, Ambassador Umarov, Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan, and Ambassador Sacha Sergio Llorentty Solíz, Permanent Representative of Bolivia, reminded us of some criticism that the subsidiary Committees usually received from Member States about the lack of transparency, fairness and accountability in the work of the Committees. We took such views seriously. In response, I tried to be frank, transparent and fair, and closely upheld the Committees’ rules and procedures. Our track record proves that we went the extra mile in political consultations to find common ground in reaching consensus in order to bridge various views to ensure the effective functioning of the regimes, from deciding on the status of a meeting during the pandemic to the process of listing individual decisions, for example. That said, I am happy to report that the 1267 Committee was the first Sanctions Committee that managed to convene a video-teleconference meeting during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. Following consultations and based on our creative problem-solving and collective decision-making, and without compromising our rules and guidelines, the committee members agreed to meet virtually to discuss several issues related to our mandate implementation, including the reports of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, the Ombudsperson, as well as the global threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Al-Qaida. Furthermore, with regard to the 1267 Committee, during 2019 and 2020, we also successfully concluded our sanctions list review to keep it up-to-date with the latest and most reliable information. I am proud to report that this year we received a record-breaking number of responses, thanks to the continued support and contributions of Member States. As for the 1988 Committee, one of its main goals, as the Council is aware, is to support the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan. We contribute to that end not only by listing and de-listing activities, but also through the process of granting exemptions to enable listed individuals to engage in peace and reconciliation activities. Accordingly, there are now 14 listed individuals who are exempted from S/2020/1258 S/2020/1258 the travel ban to participate in peace talks in a range of countries until January next year. We believe that the continued collaboration and unity of the Committee are a prerequisite for further development of our important work. I commend the members of the Committees for their efforts to preserve the credibility and sanctity of the Committee. We need the Committees to be united once again to support our common endeavour to increase transparency, fairness and the effectiveness of our Sanctions Committees, which is currently being negotiated by our experts. This will be our common achievement and an important milestone for the Committees. With regard to the 1540 Committee, my chairmanship started at a unique time leading up to the comprehensive review and mandate renewal deadline in April 2021. Therefore, I set three priorities, namely: to increase reporting by States, to raise awareness and the comprehensive review process itself. We have gone the extra mile for those priorities. In almost all my bilateral meetings, I raised 1540-related issues. I attended strategic 1540-related events and sent video messages to ensure that the 1540 cause was heard. We also facilitated discussions for early adoption of comprehensive review-related documents. So far, we have seen positive feedback. Among others, we have reduced the number of non- reporting States from 11 to 9 and significantly increased the number of submissions from States, as well as international organizations. In the past two years, the Committee received 58 updated national reports, 66 responses on the Committee’s matrices, 12 views on the comprehensive review, as well as a 20 per cent increase of points of contact. Those are among the highest submission numbers that the Committee has ever received. On the comprehensive review, the preparation and work began last year with the adoption of the modalities paper and planned activities. In October 2019, the Committee held its first open consultation with States and international organizations. Despite the postponement and challenges due to COVID-19, we have done our best to put the incoming Chair, as well as the Committee, in a good position to continue the work in 2021. The Committee has finalized the majority of the update of the national implementation matrix and, to ensure a smooth transition, held discussions to provide the incoming members our institutional memories. With regard to housekeeping issues, I am pleased to inform that during our chairmanship we have facilitated a transparent process in the Group of Experts of the 1540 Committee and its coordinator selection process. I am also pleased to inform that the Committee has adopted streamlined procedures and templates, particularly to process correspondence, towards greater efficiency and faster response by the Committee. I must acknowledge just how much COVID-19 has affected the work of the Committee. Just to give a glimpse, based on the data to date, the Committee dispatched 489 internal notes and 82 letters in 2020, compared to 760 internal notes and 351 letters in 2019. However, we maintained consistency in the figures of notes verbales sent by the Committee — 626 notes verbales in 2019 and 667 notes verbales in 2019. We also recorded a decrease in our participation in external events, from 59 in 2019 to 19 in 2020, primarily because the majority of the planned events were cancelled by the host and our experts were unable to travel. However, we have done our best to ensure that the Committee can exercise its mandate. At the beginning of the pandemic, we did everything in writing, including my annual briefing as Chair of the Committee to the Council, to meet the S/2020/1258 deadline requirement of the resolution. We also held numerous video-teleconference meetings. Eventually, when the situation permitted and following strict health and safety protocols, the 1540 Committee was the first subsidiary body to hold an in- person meeting in October 2020. On the subject of recommendations, like my Belgian colleagues, we share the need for an equitable division of labour in chairing the Committees. All members of the Council, including the permanent members, should chair Committees and share the responsibility and burden. That is an important point that I would like to underline. I would also like to recommend that the guidelines of the Committees and subsidiary Committees be renewed, as time has passed since they were discussed and they have not been adapted to the current challenge. The Council and its subsidiaries must avoid being criticized by non-members of the Council. It is time for us to renew ourselves; it is time for us to join the modern age. On behalf of my delegation, I would like to thank the Coordinator and members of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, the Ombudsperson and members of his Office, and the 1540 Group of Experts for their support and cooperation. I also would like to thank the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and other members of the Secretariat for their support of the Committee. I would also like to thank the members of the Committee, and through them, the ambassadors. I ask them to convey my deepest appreciation to all their experts in the Committees who have been influential in ensuring that the Committees are able to undertake their mandates. Allow me also in my national capacity to thank all of the outgoing Chairs of the subsidiary bodies, as well as the Facilitator, for their leadership in the past two years. I also wish the next Chairs of the Committees and the incoming members the best for their future work in the Committees. Lastly, I would like to pay tribute to my experts in the Indonesian mission in charge of those Committees, Rayyanul Muniah Sangadji and Haryo Budi Nugroho, who have worked diligently to ensure that we could undertake our mandates as Chair in the best way possible. We always try to have a consensus, and we always try ensure that we have done our duties. Like the saying goes, all good things must come to an end. I bow away humbly and wish that the incoming Chair may do better.

In two weeks, I will complete my mandate as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Let me start with a warning. The media coverage of the threat posed by the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to international peace and security has not garnered the same public attention in recent years, but the absence of bad news is not good news. We have not seen a nuclear test conducted by North Korea since 2017. The last ballistic missile launch was in the spring. Yet Pyongyang continues to build a nuclear arsenal that poses a threat to its neighbours and could have devastating global consequences. The ballistic missile programme continues in full force. Only two months ago, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea showcased a new intercontinental ballistic missile during a military parade in Pyongyang. When it comes to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, North Korea remains the most dangerous global threat. Germany’s position concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been steadfast throughout our time on the Council. We have pushed for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to fulfil its obligation for the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes. That pressure on Pyongyang must continue. My presentation today is a rare opportunity for the wider United Nations membership and the public at large to get a glimpse of the work of the 1718 Committee and the Security Council, as meetings on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are traditionally held behind closed doors. There are good arguments for doing it that way, as closed meetings allow Security Council members to engage in a more open and informal manner which would not be possible if the meetings were public. I only mention that because I would not want the closed setting to be inferred as a lack of awareness of the magnitude of the threat posed by North Korea and its blatant and egregious human rights violations. In the past two years, the way Pyongyang has navigated the geopolitical landscape has changed, but its intentions have not. The absence of major provocations does not mean that we are closer to a political solution. The Government of Kim Jong Un refuses to engage meaningfully. And unless that changes, there is no justification for the Security Council to change current sanctions measures. Today I would like to make three main points. First, I will report on the work of the Committee over the past two years. I will then offer observations on the way in which the Security Council and its sanctions committees conduct business in general. And, thirdly, I will share my thoughts on what changes are needed to improve the sanctions system down the line. Taking stock of the Committee’s work, the balance sheet shows mixed results. We have been able to uphold the current sanctions system, but the Committee has not been able to reach consensus on adding new persons or entities to the sanctions list despite ample evidence that individuals and private companies continue to circumvent sanctions.Since 2017, a large number of raw materials, industrial machinery and other items that could be used for illicit nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes remain barred from being shipped to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Given the small number of countries that have reported on the repatriation of nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who are exploited as cheap labourers abroad, I would like to remind all Member States of that obligation. An overview of Security Council resolutions that require national reporting by Member States can be found on the website of the Committee. The import of refined petroleum products remains limited to 500,000 barrels per year. This issue has been a major sticking point in the work of the Committee, but I will get back to that a bit later. The Panel of Experts that assists the 1718 sanctions Committee publishes reports twice a year. The reports contain recommendations on who and what should be added to the sanctions list. For example, there is widespread evidence of ship- to-ship transfers of gasoline, diesel and other petroleum products on the high seas. The vessel on the receiving end then travels to a North Korean port, often Nampo, and unloads its illegal cargo. We know the names of these vessels, the names of the individuals and the companies that own these ships, but there are still members of the Committee who are preventing us from taking action. This calls into serious question a key rule governing the work of committees — that is, the principle that decisions are made by consensus. Members may have heard criticism to the effect that the Committee does not care enough about human suffering in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The opposite is true. The Committee has gone to great lengths to ensure that humanitarian aid reaches the women, men and children who are deprived of basic necessities. Since mid-2018, we the Committee have managed to grant more than 75 different humanitarian exemptions in support of a wide range of United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations. But, as we learned from those familiar with the situation on the ground, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, goods that are earmarked for humanitarian purposes pile up on the border between China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea because Pyongyang does not allow them through, citing the coronavirus disease as the reason. So while the Committee has done its part to ensure that aid reaches the people of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the responsibility now lies with the Government. At the end of my tenure, we simplified and improved the mechanism for humanitarian actors to obtain exemptions to the sanctions on humanitarian grounds. With the updated Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7, the Committee grants humanitarian actors longer standard exemption periods — nine months compared with six months, among other things. This is a small success but adequately addresses concerns within the humanitarian community. One issue that I alluded to earlier has haunted the Committee for more than two years. The restrictions on the delivery of gasoline, diesel, heating oil and other refined petroleum products to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have been largely ineffective since they were unanimously adopted by the Council. in December 2017. Resolution 2397 (2017) limits the delivery of such products to 500,000 barrels per year. It is the duty of all Member States, together with the Secretariat, to ensure that that number is not exceeded. One would think that this was simple. Member States report their planned deliveries in the measurement used by the resolution — barrels. The Secretariat counts them and gives notice to the international community before the oil cap is about to be reached.But in practice, some Member States insist on reporting in tons, not barrels. That would not be a problem if they would agree to allow the Secretariat to make the conversion — nothing more than simple math. Yet those Council members argue that finding a conversion rate is very complex. In effect, those States have consistently circumvented the resolution to which they agreed. The Committee held several meetings dedicated to resolving this issue. We even brought it into the Council twice, where again we found no solution. In a last-ditch effort, I invited the key Ambassadors to a meeting to resolve the issue. But two of the Ambassadors declined to join me in finding a solution. We even offered to use simple corporate conversion tables, like that of Gazprom or British Petroleum, but those proposals were also declined. It seems inconceivable that a country that sent the first satellite into orbit more than 60 years ago and another that celebrated a moon landing just two weeks ago would not be able to perform that simple calculation. This matter can be resolved if there is political will. I would urge my successor, whoever that will be, to continue pressing this important matter. It is our duty to make this work, as is the case with the implementation of all other sanctions, and the Council’s credibility is on the line. I can only tell my successor not to give up even if personally attacked. We as the 10 elected members have been voted into the Security Council to defend international law and the United Nations. We have to take a stand to implement what the Security Council has decided. Secondly, allow me a few words on the way in which the Council conducts business with regard to sanctions. Committees are vital to ensuring that the Council can address threats to international peace and security. Sanctions may not always be popular, but they remain an indispensable tool for guiding Governments and other political actors towards peacefully resolving disputes that may impact the security of entire regions and beyond. Chairing a sanctions committee requires stamina and determination. The elected 10 members shoulder a heavy burden in that regard. I commend all Chairs and their teams, who are instrumental to the success of the work of the Security Council. Two years ago my predecessor, Ambassador Karel van Oosterom of the Netherlands, as Chair of the 1718 Committee, raised the issue of burden-sharing in his parting remarks. I echo his sentiments. It is time that the non-elected members of this Council assume their fair share. It may not be suitable for a permanent member to chair the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea sanctions Committee, but this is not the case for other sanctions committees. My team and I are liaising with representatives of the incoming five members to make sure that whoever my successor may be is prepared when they take over as Chair on 1 January. At this point, I would like to thank our Senior Committee Secretary, Davey McNab, and his outstanding team at the Security Council Affairs Division, who supported my mission every day. They have been great partners for the entire team at the German mission. We are grateful for their professionalism and profound expertise. My third point is what needs to change within United Nations sanctions system. Two years on the Council is not very long, but it is long enough to observe the deficiencies. One obvious shortcoming is the working conditions of the members of the Panels of Experts. They play an indispensable role in the functioning of the Security Council sanctions system, but when it comes to remuneration, benefits, travel arrangements and other aspects of the job, they are treated as second-class to permanent United Nations staff. That needs to change.Although not a part of the North Korea sanctions committee, I would be remiss if I did not call out the situation regarding the Ombudsperson for the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. The Ombudsperson works under the same conditions as the experts mentioned earlier. But his reliance on others to carry out his work — including deciding when to travel and where to hear witnesses — could be seen to compromise his independence. What is more, as things stand now, there is a real risk that courts will refuse to enforce sanctions in their jurisdictions. The Council needs to strengthen the institution of the Ombudsperson and take it as a model for comparable safeguards and ways of redress in all United Nations sanctions regimes. During the outreach we made to the wider United Nations membership, it became clear that many countries were either unaware or felt put upon by the obligations imposed on them under Security Council sanctions. I would encourage the United Nations to provide information and training so that all Member States are aware of and able to fulfil their obligations. I would like to close by thanking my team: Lila Del Colle of the Netherlands, whom we were lucky to get after she had served in a similar position under my predecessor and who has been an excellent addition to our team, and Christoph Braner of the German Mission, who has supported me in my work every step of the way. This way was a difficult one.

As Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya, I would like to make three points. I would like to talk about what we should have achieved, what we have achieved and what we could achieve. I will start with the first point. As members of the Security Council, we now have a unique opportunity to help make peace in Libya. We all know that one of the most important contributions of the Council is to ensure the full implementation of the arms embargo. As Chair of the Libya sanctions Committee, I have therefore used every opportunity to call upon members of the Committee and the Council as well as the broader United Nations membership to live up to this obligation. Our success has been limited. Despite the commitments made during the Berlin Conference in January and enshrined in resolution 2510 (2020), blatant violations of the arms embargo continue to this day. The Panel of Experts’ reporting on the presence of the Wagner Group and Syrian mercenaries as well as arms from Turkey or the United Arab Emirates illustrates this. My key message today therefore continues to be that everybody must implement the arms embargo. All foreign fighters and mercenaries must leave Libya. My second point concerns what we have achieved. This is much more down to earth. We have indeed come a long way, although a lot remains to be done. Still, we have made concrete progress on several points. The monitoring of the arms embargo was our key priority. We have organized briefings of the Committee on the implementation of the arms embargo; we have encouraged the Panel of Experts to frequently update Committee members; and we have engaged the United Nations Support Mission in Libya to provide us in New York with situational updates. On the travel ban, we have closely monitored cases of non-compliance and initiated an unprecedented exemption for humanitarian reasons. On the assets freeze, we have engaged on a number of complex implementation issues with Member States. The Committee has very closely followed an attempt to illicitly export petroleum and has contributed to safeguarding Libya’s natural resources. That has indeed made a difference. We initiated the update of the Implementation Notice on the travel ban and have worked on a draft Implementation Assistance Notice covering the oil sanctions. I have further initiated the process for an update of the Committee’s guidelines, which still reflect the status of the regime in 2011. That work is still ongoing, and I hope that we will soon be able to reach a consensus. The Committee is currently deliberating the listing of violators of international law and human rights. If that is approved, the Committee will have sanctioned individuals for the first time since 2018. Here, too, I am still hoping for consensus in the Council. As Chair, I convened two meetings of the sanctions Committee on the implementation of the sanctions measures, with the participation of several Member States of the region and regional organizations. We also held a joint meeting with two other sanctions committees on cross-cutting issues last year and have engaged the Libyan Investment Authority to discuss the implementation of the asset freeze measure on two occasions. Germany has also contributed in its national capacity as co-penholder of the Libya sanctions file.My third and last set of points are on what we could achieve. Here please allow me to be a bit more general in my remarks. My first remark is on outreach. To have effect beyond political messaging, sanctions need to be implemented. Implementation across the United Nations membership is highly diverse — strict in some places, non-existent in others. Outreach on sanctions implementation must therefore be a key part of the Committee’s work in order to assist those who are willing but unable to implement and to encourage those who are able but unwilling. We still have not tapped the full potential of reaching out to the broader membership. I find it good news that there is general agreement on this within the Council. My second remark is on transparency. Sanctions always have a political dimension. Naming and shaming is an essential part of any set of sanctions. It is therefore vital to create transparency. This must include transparency on the violation of sanctions established by the Security Council. Unlike in other sanctions regimes, the rules of procedure of the Libya sanctions Committee do not foresee that all reports of the Sanctions Panel of Experts on Libya be published. All members of the Committee should muster the courage to correct this. My third point is on decision-making. Cooperation with colleagues on the Committee has been excellent. Still, in many cases, the Committee has not been able to live up to its responsibility. I believe a key reason for this has been that all decisions can be taken only in unanimity. The work of the Committee would increase significantly if majority decisions could at least be applied on procedural questions. My fourth point is on coherence. The Secretariat and the Panel of Experts of the 1970 Committee are doing an outstanding job. Still, the institutional setup with which the United Nations deals with sanctions is simply not adequate. The Security Council needs one single sanctions secretariat in charge of all sanctions regimes. This is even more important than outreach concerning sanctions implementation. It is essential to make sure that follow-up on the implementation of sanctions imposed by the Security Council is effective efficient, coherent and professional. Let me say a word on the humanitarian dimension. We have had heated debates in the Security Council on the humanitarian impact of sanctions. One thing should be beyond doubt — sanctions committees must ensure that existing humanitarian exemptions be granted swiftly and reliably. When this is not the case, the Council’s legitimacy on sanctions is damaged. It is therefore good news that the Committee has made substantial progress in this regard. In this era of the coronavirus disease pandemic, this has been particularly important. My last remark is on responsibility. As members of the Security Council, we share a responsibility to learn such lessons. We all know that this is not a technical matter. This implies that we need to engage again and again in serious debate on these issues, even if it may be painful at times. I firmly believe that provoking this debate, even if it is agonizing, is a key responsibility of the Chair. In closing, on my own behalf and on behalf of my predecessor, Ambassador Juergen Schulz, and my team, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Panel of Experts for its outstanding work. The Panel needs to be able to count on the cooperation of Member States. Following the arrest of a former Committee member, I have continuously emphasized the need for Member States to respect the privileges and immunities of experts on mission. I would also like to thank Ms. Sana Khan and her team at the Security Council Affairs Division for their fantastic support. A very special thanks goes to Ms. Tiffany Jenkins and Ms. Agapi Nehring from the German Mission to the United Nations, our two Libya sanctions gurus. They are the best.Although my successor at this time has not yet been determined, I would like to assure the next Chair of the Committee of my support in the seamless handing over of tasks.

I am grateful to South Africa, President of the Security Council and Vice- Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali, for allowing me to share some reflections on my experience in the course of my mandate as Chair of the 2374 (2017) Committee, in the hope that it will provide the incoming Chair and others with relevant information and guidance. First of all, I would like to duly acknowledge the important work carried out by the Security Council Affairs Division in support of the Chair and the members of the 2374 (2017) Committee so that it could be efficient in the conduct of its work, in the implementation of resolution 2374 (2017), both in procedural and substantive terms, including logistical matters, and in the transition processes that entail the induction of new members and experts. Furthermore, we duly recognize the essential role played by the Panel of Experts in supporting the Committee in carrying out the mandate specified in resolution 2374 (2017), primarily in providing the Committee with information relevant to the possible appointment of individuals in accordance with the established criteria, implementation of the agreed measures, and the updating of the persons on the sanctions list. In this regard, I would like to emphasize the importance of supporting the work of the Panel of Experts in assisting the Committee to fulfil its mandate, and by this we mean granting them the independence necessary for an objective analysis of the information collected, so that the Committee has a broad critical background that allows it to better undertake the tasks assigned to it. In directing the work of the Committee, the Dominican Republic focused on the full and effective implementation of its basic mandate, emphasizing transparency, the promotion of dialogue and relevant and inclusive participation, independent and objective analysis, and the appropriate handling of sensitive information. Undoubtedly, the Committee’s work in these and other areas can and should be further improved. With regard to improvements in transparency, the participation of interested Member States, in particular the countries of the region, in certain informal meetings of the Committee would contribute to confidence-building and a better understanding of and support for the sanctions regime, allowing for greater clarity and encouraging compliance with its obligations, while providing the Committee with additional information that would guarantee the highest level of objectivity and justice. In addition, the Chair of the Committee’s visits to Mali and the region — in my case from 16 to 18 October 2019 — provide a great opportunity — and one that should be prioritized in the work programme — to hold meetings with the main actors and obtain relevant information from primary sources, thereby promoting a better understanding of the sanctions, including the processes of listing and delisting. Unfortunately, the coronavirus disease pandemic has affected the modalities of work in all areas, including that of the Committee, limiting face-to-face meetings to a virtual format and requiring postponement of visits to the region until conditions S/2020/1258 permit, although the possibility of coordinating a visit in the short to medium term under this modality should be studied. Another important challenge is the impact of last August’s coup d’état in Mali, an event that is undermining the constitutional order and, taking place during a process of transition towards the restoration of democracy, risks delaying the implementation of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Mali and eroding the achievements made so far. Finally, I would like to thank all the members of the Committee, as well as the relevant United Nations bodies, including the leadership of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, for their exceptional work and support during my term of office, as a faithful demonstration of the commitment of each one of us to contributing to the peace, security and lasting stability of the country.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa is an important subsidiary body of the United Nations Security Council. As Chair, I am briefing the Council on the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group, in particular the activities it undertook in 2019 and 2020. The latter period was shortened owing to the negative impacts of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. With regard to the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group in 2019, its first substantive meeting took place on 29 May 2019 and focused on the issue of root causes of conflict in Africa, in particular the illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources as a key driver of conflict, what options exist for conflict prevention, as well as conflict management and resolution. The rationale for focusing on this theme was that many of the conflicts in Africa are fuelled by the proliferation of illicit trade of natural resources, with enormous implications for regional stability and arguably for international peace and security. The direct connection between the illicit exploitation of Africa’s natural resources and the trade therein has been covered in many studies, including studies by the United Nations. It is also recognized as one of the major root causes and drivers of most of the intractable conflicts on the African continent. Both briefers and participants, including representatives from the Member States, academia, the United Nations system and civil society, provided important policy recommendations and relevant proposals. The second meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group took place on 21 June 2019 and focused on the topic of security sector reform (SSR), in particular the role of local participation in and ownership of reform efforts. The rationale for focusing on this topic was predicated on the understanding that the United Nations and the African Union (AU) can draw on their comparative advantages to ensure they play a key role in supporting more effective conflict analysis in relation to security sector reform. The concept of inclusivity in SSR is essential; so too is overcoming the trust deficit between security forces and local communities. It is therefore important to develop dialogue mechanisms for rapprochement between the population and security institutions, making sure the former have input into the design and implementation of the SSR process. Local ownership has also emerged as part of the key contemporary reality for successful and effective SSR. The Ad Hoc Working Group convened a third meeting on 9 August 2019 to consider preparations for the thirteenth annual joint consultative meeting between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council. The importance of this meeting was underlined by the imperative of members of the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council to exchange ideas on common issues affecting the African continent, including developing joint recommendations and a shared approach to conflict prevention and resolution in order to address in particular the long-standing conflicts on the African continent. In accordance with the usual practice, the two Councils decided to hold two meetings in Addis Ababa, with the first day, 23 October 2019, set aside for the fourth informal seminar, wherein two topics were discussed: first, silencing the guns in Africa and, secondly, modalities for conducting missions on the continent. The S/2020/1258 S/2020/1258 second day, 24 October 2019, was set aside for the thirteenth annual joint consultative meeting, which focused on the situation in Libya, the situation in South Sudan, and the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic. Finally, the Ad Hoc Working Group also held important joint working sessions between the AU Peace and Security Council Committee of Experts and the Security Council’s own experts on 2 and 4 October 2019. This joint meeting was held in the context of the third workshop, which focused on the issues of silencing the guns in Africa by 2020, conflict prevention and mediation, peacebuilding and sustaining peace, counter-terrorism, climate change and support for AU peace operations. These exchanges between the AU Peace and Security Council Committee of Experts and the experts from the Security Council ensure that we share and familiarize the AU experts with the working methods of the Security Council, which is critical to enhancing cooperation and partnership between the two Councils in the area of peace and security. With regard to the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group in 2020, a number of the meetings were planned to consider important themes in line with its mandate. However, the Ad Hoc Working Group’s activities were not spared the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which forced the cancellation of a number of these plans. Nevertheless, the Ad Hoc Working Group did convene one important meeting, albeit virtually, to prepare for the fourteenth annual joint consultative meeting between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council. Subsequently, members of the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council held their fourteenth annual joint consultative meeting on 29 and 30 September 2020 on a virtual platform. In accordance with previous practice, the members of the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council discussed matters of peace and security in Africa. At the fifth joint informal seminar, held on 29 September 2020, members of the two Councils exchanged views on strengthening cooperation between the United Nations as it marks its seventy-fifth anniversary and the African Union marks its own fifty-seventh anniversary. Members of the two Councils also reflected on the salient topic of silencing the guns, in particular the ways to create conditions conducive to Africa’s development. On the occasion of the fourteenth joint consultative meeting, which was held on 30 September 2020, members of the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council reflected on two topics, namely, the situation in Somalia and the situation in Mali and the Sahel region. At the conclusion of this meeting, the two Councils adopted a communiqué to mark the occasion. In conclusion, the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group is very specific, namely, to play a critical role in assisting and advising the Security Council on approaches to preventing and resolving conflict in Africa. Additionally, the Ad Hoc Working Group provides a platform for engaging and discussing difficult issues. Further, it provides an opportunity for the Council to engage in open, transparent and non-confrontational consideration of important peace and security matters. During its tenure as the Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group, South Africa has sought to ensure that when the elected and permanent members of the Security Council engage in their collective task, they propose unique and innovative approaches towards preventing and resolving conflicts in Africa. I would like to thank all delegations for their support and active engagement in the work and activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa during my tenure as Chair. It is my hope that our successor will S/2020/1258 build on this solid work and on the good cooperation between the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Fatima Mohammed and her team at the Permanent Observer Mission of the African Union to the United Nations, Ms. Bintou Keita, the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, and her team, Ms. Bience Gawanas, and her successor, Ms Cristina Duarte, at the Office of the Special Advisor for Africa. I also thank the United Nations Secretariat for its support. I would also like to thank the Governments of Ethiopia and the Sudan for facilitating the Security Council’s visits to Addis Ababa and Juba, South Sudan, in 2019. I also thank the three African States members of the Security Council for 2019, namely, South Africa, Côte d’Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea, and the configuration for 2020 comprising the three African States members of the Council namely, South Africa, the Niger and Tunisia, as well as Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, which supported and provided unwavering solidarity on African issues. I would like to also thank the South Africa team led by Ambassador Xolisa Mfundiso Mabhongo, the Deputy Permanent Representative, Mr. Marthinus Van Schalkwyk, the Political Coordinator, and Ms. Kgaugelo Thermina Mogashoa, Deputy Political Coordinator.