S/PV.1001 Security Council

Wednesday, April 4, 1962 — Session 17, Meeting 1001 — New York — UN Document ↗ OCR ✓ 2 unattributed speechs
This meeting at a glance
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Security Council deliberations Syrian conflict and attacks Israeli–Palestinian conflict General statements and positions

DE Ol'I'ICIELS CONSEIL DOCUMENTS

NEW YORK
The agenda was adopted.
The President unattributed #117208
If there is no objection, 1 shaH now invite the representatives of Syria and Israel ta take plac:e at the Council table, in accordance with the decision previously taken by the Council. At the inVitation of the President. Mr. SalahEl Dine Tarazi. representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. and Mr. Michael Comay. representative Of Israel. took places at the Council table. 1. ment Comay
The President unattributed #117211
May l draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/5109, which contains a letter from the representative of Israel submitting a draftresolution. 2. permets sur laquelle de 3. msme de posées d'J;rier. reproduites 3. General von Horn, Chief of staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, bas prepared replies to the questions asked by members of the , Council at yesterday's meeting. To facilitate our 1 worfk f , these replies have been repr~uced.in ;an ! una icial document which metnbel:s will find on their 1 4. 1 prop,?se, subject. to the CauncBls approval, to request that the replies of General von Horn should he included in the verbatim record of this meeting. ft was sa decided. 5. The PRESDENT (translated from Spanish): The Couneil will note that we are in an unusual situation. 1 have no speakers on my Hst, probably because members wish to see General von Harnls replies before they speak. 6. 1 have intended to give members of the COUDoil hall an hour or sa to study the document 1 have just mentioned, but as it has only been distributed in English, 1 douht very much if such an adjournment would make it easier for members to take part in the present debate. 7. 1 have consulted as many of the members as 1 could about this matter and there is a general feeling that we should adjourn today's meeting and resume the discussion tomorrow. If there is no objection, 1 propose that this suggestion should be adopted and tbat tœ CoWlCil sbould meet again at 10.30 a.m. tomorrow. 8. 1 hear no objection and take it that my proposaI is generally acceptable. The meeting rose at 3.45 p.m. ~ ANSWERS SY MAJOR-GENERAL CARL VON HORN, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION IN PALESTINE. TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE lOOOTH MEETING OF THE SECURlïY COUNCIL, ON 3 APRIL 1962 1. Questicln from the represenratlve of Syria: Was any Syrian post or fortified position occupied or demoyed ln the fighting of 16-])' March 19621 [1000th meeting, para. 48.] Answer: On the basis of reports by United Nations military observers w~ed the demilitarized ;>:one On three occasions since 17 March" the Olairman of the MilCed Armistice Commission reported that he Will satisfied that there were none. No fortified polltion was seen as •existing or destroyed-• 2. Question from the representative of the United Arab Republic: Does General VOn Horn consider it neceasary for the good functioning of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization thatthe MixedAnnistice Commission should meet and reswne lts workandcarry out its responsibilities? [lli!!.. para. 77.] Answer: 'The General Armistice Agreement!!! (article Vil, para_ graph 7) provides for a procedure, that of the Mixed Armistice Commission. 50 long as this procedure is in abeyance, the Chainnan of the Mixed Armistice Commission and the Chief of Staff are compelled tO deal separately with each of the parties in order to obtain compliance with the terms of the General Ar'lnistice Agreement. The procedure of the M1xed Armistice Commissioo. face-to-face discussion between the parties under a United Nations Chairman, caonot be replaced. This procedure, which also provides for the possibility of heaZ"ing Witnesses or expens, can help in finding an "equitable and mutuaHy satisfactory settlemeot" of claims or complaints. If the discussion in the Mixed Armistice Commission does not lead te a settlement, it usually throws some light 00 mootpoints, for instance, theorigin of an incident. Nothing Answer: A fuil anSW<ilr to tlùs questionwouldcall for a lengtby report. 1 can do no more now than bring ont sorne sallent points. But f~r those members of the Council wbo wish to sIudy the backg.-ound ln detail. 1 sMuld like to refer te the reportro the Security Conncil of 11 January 1955 by my predecessor. General E. L, Mo Burns.w me repon: 01 the late 5ecretary_General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, dated 9 May 1956,SI and in particuler armex VII tO that report, and also my own report of 16 February 1960.!!l The basiC provisions governing the zone are con_ tained in article V of theGeneralArmisticeAgreemem, One of the main points of mat article is that the area belWeen rhe old Syrian-Palestine frontier and rhe armistice demarcation line establisbed in 1949 was 10 be designated as a demîlitarizedzone. Paragraph2 of article V states that borh the demarcation line and the demiHtarized zone have been defined "with a view toward separating me armed forces of rhe IwO Parties in sucb manDer as ta minimize the possibility of friction and incident, while providing for rhe gradua! restoration of normal civilian life in rhe area of the demilitarized zone, without prejudice to me uldmate sernement". Under paragraph 5 W of article V, the armeli forces of both parties 'shali be totaUy excludedvfrom thedemilitarizedzoneand "no activities by m!litary or paramilitary forces shall bepermitted" mere. Paragraph 5 U:!) states rhat: "Any advance by rhe armed forces. milirary or para_ military, of either Party into any part of the demilitarized zone, when confirmed by me United Nations representatives referred ta in the following sub-paragraph, shaH constitute a flagrant violation of rhis Agreement", Paragraph 5 (~foresees "rhe returnofcivilians ta villages and settlements in me demilitarized zone andrheemployment of limited numbers of locally recruited civilian police in the zone for internai security purposes". 1, i: i li Wirh regard to civilian life in rhe demilitarized zOne, 1would refer to cile "authorilative comment" ofMr. Buncheonarticle V of me General Armistice Agreement agreed to by borh parties and incorporated ver_ batim in rhe resolution of the 5ecurity Council of 18 May 1951.Y '1 ,1 'i, An important point in me "authoritative comment" is rhat civil administl'ation in me demîlîtarized zone, including me policing, was ta be on a local basis under the general supervision of rhe Chairrnan 01 rhe Mixed Armistice Commission and "without raising general questions of administration. Jurisdiction, citizenship, and sovereignry". Paragraph 1 of article V states: Olt is emphas;zed rhat the following arrangements for the armistice demarcatlon line belWeen the lsreeli and Syrian forces and for rhe der"i1irarized zone are not ta be interprered as having aoy relation whatsoeve. to ultimate territorial arrangements affecting rhe two Parties ta mis Agreement." J-1 ,, '\ ~ ) The demilitarized zone has been the scene of numerous incidents whicb are referred to in me reports 1 have mentioned. One of me main causes of tension has been the question of .Iand ownership in the zone. 1 should iike to qUOle paragraph ios ofmy report ta the Security Council of 16 February 1960: "If disputes about land ceased, there would be no motive for Israel ta send into the demilitarized ZOne border police in armoured vellicles, no motive eimerforSyria ta send national guards or other personnel. This would mean that the provisions of article V, paragraph 5 (~), ancl of Dt'. Buncbe's aumoritative comment relating la rhe employment of locally recruited civilian police would be applied i, \,,., ii j -! i '1 1, :j, 1 1 l 1j i1, The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice COmmission is empowered under paragraph 5 (~ of article V to authorize the return of clvilians to villages and settlements ln the demilltarized zone and the "employ_ ment of lImited numbers of locally recrulted clvillan pollce ln the Zone for internaI security purposes". Successive Chiefs of Staff beginning w1th General Riley have taken the position thaUt was the Mixed Armis_ tice Commission itself which, under article VU, paragrnph 8. Was competent to interpret the meaningoftheGeneralArmistice Agreement. The Israel Government, however. did not agree to discuss in the Mixed Armistice Commission anything pertaining to the demilitari2ed zOne or to submit tO the Com:nission the interpretation of article V of the General A!"mistice Agreement for a decision as to its competence or as ta the competence of the Chairmaninmatters concerning the demili_ tarized zone. As a result. no ord1nary meetings of the Mixed ArmIstice Commission have taken place sioce 1951. l 1,, ! ln my report of 16 February 1960, 1 <irew attention to the following paragraph of the SecurJty COllncil's resolution of 18 May 1951 in whîch the Council considered ·that it is inconsistant wlth the objectives and intent of the Armistice Agreement to refuse to participate ln meetings of the Mixed Armistice CommiSSion or tO fail ta respect requests of the Chainnan of the Mixed Armistice Commission as they relate to his obligations umler article V. and calls upon the Parties te be represented at aU meetings called bythe Chairmanofthe COmmission and tO respect such requests". , ln view of the dispute over the powers of the Ghafrman and in the absence of meetings of the Mixed Armistice CommiSSion. the authorlty of the Truce Supervision Drgsnization ln the demilitarized zone bas been greatly weakened. 4. Question from the representative ~[the United Arab Repubilc: Al:'e there at present any mllitary or paramilitary forces or any positions of a military character in the demUitarized zone? If so. do they, ln the opinion of General von Horn, violate paragraph 5 (li and U2) of article V of the General Armistice Agreement? [!!!!2:. para. ?9.] J Answer: Elements of mllitary and psramilitary fun:es, as weil as fortifications. have been observed in the demilitarlzed zone. These are violations of paragraph 5 (!> and (El of article V. An inspection :lf both the demilitarlzed zone and the defensive areas was carried Out on 29 and 30 March 1962. Certain violations were noted whjçh existed in 1960 and were reterred to in my report of 16 February 1960. The existence of these violations has been brought to the attention of the parties concerned, 1 belleve that my answers tothe preceding questions have glven a sufflcient indication of ~1e dangerous situation in the d.... militarized zone and the difficulties faced by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice COmmission in deal1ng with them. 5, Question from the representative of the United Arab RepubUc: ln the ligbt of the messages referred to in the report of the Chief of Staff, is there now any reason to expect another attack on Syrian terrltory by Israel armet! forces? [!!!!2:. para, 80,] Answer: 1 hope that the members of the Security Council will not eJtpect me tO speculate orundertakepredîctions. Wein the Truce Super_ vision Organization are constantly doing aIl that we can tO avoid resort to force by elther side. 8ll~since 1 do not have enough information to do so, However, lt should be remembered that the competence of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organizatlon, even with the fullest co-operation of the parties under the General Armistice Agreement, is limited to the armistice demarcation line ltself. and to the demilitarized zOne and the adjollÙng defens1ve areas. The Truce Supervision Orgamzation h~s naver asked for the rigllt tG obSel:'Ve or Investigate in territories other than those speciflcally placed under the provisions of the g!i'Dera.l armistice agreements. 1 believe that if it had the full co-operation of both parties with regard to chese specified areas, violations of the General Armistice Agreement and of the cease-fire order of the Security council couldbegreatly minimized, ifnotaltogether eliminated. ol. gênéral, dite nisme droit aID:quels d'armistice la ces et rêduites. 1 l 7. pourrait_il d'armistice soit la mars prévenir 1. Question from the representative of Ghana: Would Geners! von Horn indicate to the Council in what way the terms of the General Armistice Agreement of 20 July 1949 have been violated by either Syria or Israel within thepast sixmonths.andparticularlywithin the period immediately preceding the events which took place on 16 and 17 March 19621 Also, whSI has the Truce Supervision Organization done to prevent such violations. if any? [Ibid.. para, 83.] naturedës observateurs forces tarisée 16 ne deux Answer: ln reply to previous questions 1 indicated the nature of the principal violations. known and confirmed by United Nations milJtary observers: the Presence of mi!itary and paramilita.ry forces and positions in the demilitarized zone, and the shooting incidents sucb as those which le<! up to the fighting of 16-17 March. In addition there are nurnerous complaints, which, however. cannot be confirmed or verified except through the co-operation of both parties• • 1 il comme pour de enquêtes la mixte des dans mixte de enquête faites ln the absence of regullU' meetings of the Mixed Armistice COmmission it is Impossible 10 determine which of mese complaints could be considered as violations of the Armistice Agreemem. TIùs is what the Mixed Armistice COmmission was establ.ished to do. The functlon of the Truce Supervision Organization is to investlgate complaints and 10 place the results of its investigations before the Mixed Armistice COmmission. It is then for the Mixed ArmisticeCommission to evaluate the results of the investigation. and to decide on sucb measures as it may consider necessary to rectify the situation. in the event that it finds a vioiation to have caken place. In the absence of meetings of the Mixed Armistice COmmission, the Truce SUpervision Organization cannot do more man take note of complaints and conduct an inquiry which often amounts (0 nothfng more than the taking of statements by witnesses produced by one side. ! 1 de ment intéressée nisme que vation. côté vient des As regards the measures whi,* the Truce Supervision Organlzatlo'. has adopted to prevent incidents from caking place. they are mainly of one type: observation of the area and notification to the party concerned when a violation is observed. lts efforts have been facil.itated by rhe co-operation of the parties in establîshing flxed observation POSts. 1 stated in my report that there were live on the Syrian side and four on me Israel side. Anewobservationp<lst has just been established on the Syrian side. making a total of ten fixed posts, ~ 1 l, de le..feu. pour liberté dans offrir puissent \'/hen an Incident OC(;UfS. the Truce Supervision Organlzation aets as rapidly as It can to re-establish the cease-fire, Preventive action would he faCilitated by the co-operation of the parties in ensuring full Ireedom of movement for United Nations mllitary observers along the armistice demarcation line, ln the demilltarized zones, and in the defensive areas, and fn extending to the observers ail necessary facilitles for movfng rapidly to any point where tension is reported as deve!op1ng. ~"r ( 1. (~ la the Unlted Nations Truce Supervision Organization IIfforded " the necessary freedorn of movement which ia essential to the per- 8, 8, Q.uestions from the representative of the United States of America: (!l Can General von Horn suggest ways in wltlch the United Nations Truce SupervisiOn Organization's effectiveness ·could be increased? l'efflcacitê de de trive @ Coldd General von Horn comment further, in addition to the remarks in his report, on the status of the Israel-Syrian Mb:ed Armistice Commission? [Ibid., paras. 85_88.] Answel"s: I sholdd Hke ta deal with these four questions as one question; they seem to me ta be related because they have to do with ways and means of increasing the effectiveness of the Truce Supervision Organization. 1 indicated in my answers to previous questions that the main instrument at the disposal of the Truce Supervision Organization is observation. Freedom of movement is an essentia! element in effective obseI:'Vation. Although the ten fixed observation posts now estahlished have been of considerable help. their usefldness on the Syrian side is diminished by the fact that the military obseI"Vers are not permiu:ed to move beyond 50 mettes !rom them withoutescort or liaison officers. This means that 1f fmng Is heard beyond a bill near an observation post. the obseI"Vel" cannot movefrom thepostto higher ground or around a bend to observe the firing, He must wait untll a Syrian officer joins him and accompanies him on his obseI:'Vation. By that time the firing may have ceased and there may be nothing to see. On the Israel side. the situation ia different but no beuer. As the recent firing on Lake Tiberlaa has shawn. it is d1fficult for United Nations observers ta observe adequately what is going on without sorne means of transportation on Lake TIberias haelf where the firing is alleged to have taken place and where many incidents lnvolving fishermen are said ta take place. ln 1955. my predecessor, General Burns, suggested the desirabilitY 01 providing the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization wlth boat which could be quickly dispatched to the scene of an Incident, Such a boat would in fact be a mobile observation post, It would enable the Truce Supervision Organization to assist the parties ln ensuring com_ pliance wlth the agreement reported by the Secretary_Genera! in paragraph 89 of his report of 9 May 1956 regarding Hslling of Lake TIberias and the undertaking by Israel to keep their police boats back from the eastern shore of the lake except when it is necessary te approach it "fOl" s"ecurity reasons·. ln hls report, the late Secretary_General stated that he found it necassary ta maintain the proposai for a United Nations boat. The presence of United Nations observers in an unarmed observation boat on Lake Tiberias would not in any way affect the daims and position of Israel wlth regard to Lake Tiberias. It would also help if. hoth in the case of the boat and of movement of mJlitary observers by jeep, both parties would permit United Nations obseI'Vers freedom of move~ ment without insisting that they be accompanied by liaison officers, ln principle, the request that United Nations observers be accompanied by a liaison officer of eimer side seems unobjectionable. ln practice, however, it often happens that St the very moment when it is essential for United Nations observers ta proceed quickly to the scene of an incident. no liaison officer is avaîlable and United Nations observers are immobilized untll one appears, ln tllis connexion, It may be recalled that in his repol"t of 9 May 1956, Mr. Hammarskjold stated in paragraph 91 "that in implementation of tlle recognition of the status and functions of the Chief of Staff and observer$, a specifie assurance should be given that the princlple of freedom of movement within the relevant areas should be freeiy recognized. Such assurances were given by Egypt. jordan. Syria and Lebanon. The position Of the Government of Israel is that they will continue to afford to United Nations observel"s the same degree of freedom of movemem inside Israel which ail residents or visitors to lsrael normally enjoy, ..•• It may he mentioned that pleasure craft owned by Israel residents move freely on Lake Tiberias unescorted by Israel liaison officers, Itis particularlyimportantthat United Nations The eifectiveness of the Truce Supervision Organization would be greally inCreased if both parties were to facilitate the movement of Ijnited Nations observers. For example, north of Lake TIbelias permission for Truce Supe.vision Orgllnization aircl'aft tO land at the Rosh Pina-Milhanayim Ilirfisld would rssulr in a considerable saving in lime, espedaUy in periods of crisis. Although domestic aidines are permi[[ed to land at that airpol't. requests of the Chief of Staff de facilitaient exemple, de mettrait crise. l'autorisation major cacaé la autorisés et naise 10 use the airfield have been denied, The organization's effectiveness would also be considerably increasecl if its aircraft were permi[[ed 10 use commerCial air corl'idors between jeruSlllem and Mahanayim, and from Mahanayim nOl"th to the Lebanese bordel' to join the Beirut- Damascus corridor. from lime to time in the pasto suggestions have been made that the effectiveness of the Tl'uce Supervision Organi2;ation would be increased by the use of a helicopter. This type of ail'craft has proved its useful_ ness at other Urùted Nations missions, 1 would regard it as a valuable addition tO the means available to the Truce Supervision OrgaIlÎzation Unies si démontré que nisme s'acquitter to carry out its functions. freedom of movement of United Nations obsel'vers wil! also enable the Cbail'man of the Mixed Al'mistice Commission to SI'range repeated visits 10 the demilltal'Jzed zone and defensive areas, Such visits would enable any deployment of forces prohibltecl under the General Armistice Agt'eement 10 be pl'Omptly bl'ought to the attention of the parties concerned, Urnes d'ol'ganiser dans rapidement forces Freedom of movement is necessary not oniy ta enable united Nations observers ta observe reponed violations and to aSSisr the parties in re_establishing the cease-fire; il is also an important factor in allaying mutuaI suspicions. If both parties Ill'e aWare that United Nations ohseners are moving freely in the areas of thair responsibility, their suspicions aS ta the other's intentions IIl'e cOI'l"espondingly lessened. pel'mettl"e Violations eUe Si déplacent quant blissement mixte général risêe SYl'ien. d'armistice, As 1 indicated in replI' to an earller question, the re-establishment of the procedures fol' handling pl'oblems through the Mixed Armistice Commission provided under the tel'ms of the General Armistice Agreement would help to normallze the situation in the demilitarized zone and along the ISl'ael~Syrian armistice demarcation line. In the absence of l'egular meetings of the Mixecl Al'mistice Commission, the authority of the Chairman remains in question, These are minimum suggestions which in my view would increase the effectiveness of the United Nations Truce Supel'vision Ol'ganization. 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