S/PV.1002 Security Council

Before giving the floor ta the speakers on my list, 1 should like, on behalf of the Council, ta thank General von Horn for his important replies to the questions put to hirn. These replies have been included in the verbatim record of the 1001st meeting in the form of an anDex.

1 was under the impression that we had decided yesterday that General von Horn'Is answers shou1d be produced as a document. Apparently 1 was wrong. May 1 ~ United Arab Republic that at yesterday's meeting "11 1 made a proposaI which the Couneil accepted without objection, that General von Horn's replies should , be inciuded in the verbatiro record of the Counoil; -1 this was done, by attaching them as an annex. 1 hope , this reply will satisfy the representative of the United l Arab Republic. _'1 5. Mr. BERARD (France) (translated from French): In the course of our meeting on 28 March [999th ",i meetingJ, both the Syrian representative and the representative of Israel referred in support of their 'l arguments to the position taken by the French dele- .j gation in the previous debate in the Council, in _. January 1956, on incidents which had occurred on the 1 shore of Lake Tiberias. 1 am very flattered that -; they should have done 50 and 1 thank them. The 1 Press has also attributed to me certain very specifie 1 intentions and by this, too, 1 am flattered. Neverj theless, 1 am inclined to think, though1 may be wrong, j that it is rather for me ta express my delegation's 'j views, and accordingly 1 should like to explainwithout further delay what was in fact my Government's position foliowing the incidents of December 1955, e.nd what is the position it finds it necessary to adopt today, after the incidents of last month. 6. It was with the deepest regret that my Government and ::uy country learnt of the incidents of February and March 1962 whichhaveagainprovokedadangerous state of tension between Byria and Israel. France has for many years been bound to both countries by ties of friendship and i.t believes that these ties are not, and should not be, mutually exclusive. The people of France and the people of Syria have been closely connected for centuries. 7. During the debates of January 1956, the French delegation condemned the repri.sals to which, in answer to Syrian provocations, the Israel forces had resorted. However, my delegation also expressed equal disapproval of the provocations. 8. Now, once again, there have been provocations and reprisaIs. Let us see what they consisted of. 9. First of aU, 1 cannot bllt remark thatthe incidents of 8, 15 and 16 March 1962 occurred abortiy after the letter of 2 March [S/5084] in which "the SYrian Government expressed its annoyance at the Israel Government's plar,~ ta use part of the waters of Lake Tiberias to lrrigate the ~T,ggev desert. The tone and content of this letter show that the Syrian authorities were particulpT'iy 011 edge at the time at which the incidents of 8, 15 and 16 March took place. 10. Our Syrian coUeague, Mr. Chehlaoui, has reported to us that on those three days Israel motor launches attacked Syrian fortified posts near the north-eRst shore of the lake. 1 have re-read his testimony and his explanations very carefully. l must confess that it hardiy seems ta me logical or 11. The report dated 15 December 1955 by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization lJ is quite different from that of 26 March 1962 [S/5102 and Add.1J. The whole of its first part is devoted ta a detailed description of the military operation launched by Israel against Syrian territory on 12 December 1955. and it does no more than rnentioil in the second part much earlier incidents of 15 March and 30 June 1954, that is ta say of more than a year before, and ta a more recent incident which had taken place on 10 December 1955, i.e., on the ,eve of the reprisaI operations undertaken by Israel. 12. The report of 26 March 1962 describes a much more closely related series of events than those of 1955. and as these events unfold, responsibility would seem to rest now with one party, now with the other. In fact, its first part is entitled "Events leading up ta the fighting on the night of 16-17 March 1962". This heading is in itself an indication that if the incidents of 8. 15 and 16 March had not taken place, the events of the night of 16-17 March would doubtless not have taken place either. 1 have already had occasion to express my views onthe responsibility for the incidents of 8. 15 and 16 March. 13. The incidents of February and March 1962, which \Vere more frequent and disturbing than the isolated incident of December 1955, had created a state of tension and irritation which, as 1 see it, in part explains the events of the night of 16-l7 March. 14. Obviously, my delegation does not in any way countenance the action taken on that night by the Israel forces. It regrets that they saw fit to use such rnethods. and it also regrets thattheIsraelauthorities did not resort ta the procedure laid down in the Israel-Syrian General Armistice AgreementY after the incidents in question. We sincerely hope that in the future they will abide by those procedures. li OfficÜù Records of the Security COu'Ici1, Tenth Year. Supplement for Oclober, November and December 1955, document S/3516. y Ibid.• Fourth year. Special Supplement No. 2. 17. After this operation agaillst Nuqueib, Syrian batteries shelled and destroyed the Israel village of Ein Gev. This was followed ~y artillery and eVf'n aireraft duels, during which the Syrian posts to the north-east of Lake Tiherias were subjected ta Israel tire. 18. 1 cannot help fe·eling that, in tbis affair, in this series of events and incidents, the ",rongs were to a large extent on bath sides, and that the actions of bath sides were equally regrettable. 1 cannat-as one might be tempted to do on the Israel side-make light of the events of the night of 16-17 March, but on the other hand, 1 cannat overlook-as the 8yrian note does-the provocations which preceded them or the geographical location of Nuqueib, which the Israel commandos attacked, in the demilitarized zone. 19. The events of March 1962, therefore, are not altogether comparable, as far as responsibility is concerned, with those of 1955, and accordingly my delegation cannot apply the same conclusions to them. We strongly eondemn the military action taken on bath sides. We recaU the injunctions of the resolution of 19 January 1956.!f We calI upon bath sides ta eomply serupulously with the terms of the Armistice Agreement and ta take aIl necessary steps to prevent sueh incidents from recurring. We should also like to emphasize that if ever, through sorne mischance, such border incidents should oecur again, both parties are bound to rely exclusively, in seeking a settlement, on the methods and procedures specified in the Armistice Agreement. As for condemning either side unilaterally, we believe that the information available ta us on these most reeent events does not allow us to do sa. Unfortunately, these events are not an isolated occurrence; they are part of a long series with which our Couneil has had to deal on many occasions and they cannat y Ibid.. Eleventh Year. Supplement for Janllllry. FehrUQry andMaI'cb ~, document 5/3538. 20. 1 have told the Counci! how much my delegation 1V0uid like to see an atmosphere of peace reigning in these regions. 1 know very weil that the problems involved are particularly delicate. 1 realize there are sensitive areas and grievous situations; yet, a number of Arab States and the State of Israel which our Organization itself created do live there side by side. This is a facto Should it not be considered realistically by the Governments concerned? Is it not desirable that their relations should ultimately be peaceful? ln short, ought we not to welcome any step which might lead ta that end? 21. This is why we are partieularly grateful ta General von Horn for the action he took, on the spot, immediately after these events ta establish a ceasefire and ta induce bath sides ta respect it. We should thank him for the suggestions which he has already persuaded bath parties ta accept regarding the establishment of a new and, accordîng ta him, particularly useful observation post to the north~east of Lake Tiberias and frequent visits by United Nations observers ta the demilitarized zone and the so-called defensive areas. 22. The other suggestions in his replies, whieh were cireulated yesterday-the French text of which, 1 might note in passing, was only distributed to us this morning-will be studied by my delegation with all the attention they deserve. 23. These are the considerations which a careful, and as far as possible impartial, examination of the evidence has suggested to my delegation. My delegaUon undertook this examination without prejudice, being inspired, on the contrary, by feelings of friendship for bath sides and by a desire to help them overcome these present dtificulties and bring about a more favourable climate in their relations. a true climate of peace.

The Couneil has before 1t the letter ofthe Syrian delegation rS/5096] and the letter of the Israel delegation 18/50981. The Council has heard the statement of the Syrian representative and the statement of the Israel rep::esentative. We have examined the report of 26 March by the Chief of Staffof the United Nations Truce Supervision organization to the Secretary- General [S/5102 and Add.1]. The Chief of staff has himself come to the COilllcil table to assist us. Members wishing to pose questions ta him have done sa, and his written answers were submitted ta us yesterday. 1 feel that we are now in possession of aU the ava'llable facts and 1 would like to state now the views of my delegation. bres les nous disponibles vues . _.- .. cf 1i, 26. 8hortly hefore midnight on 16 March 1962, a sudden armed attack by Israel, in which its air, land and sea forces \Vere employed, \Vas launched on the Syrian villages near Lake Tiberias. The attack was resisted and the Chief of Staff of the T'nited Nations Truce Supervision Organization was able to arrange a cease-fire early in the morning of the next day. 1 1 -1i 27. The Israelis stated that this attack was preceded by a series of incidents said to have taken place on 8, 15 and 16 March. When it \Vas suggested that the Syrian complaint and the Israel counter-complaint be examined by the Council simultaneously, my delegation . made no objection. In fact, our feeling was that such a procedure would give the Couneil a better opportunity to see the merits of the original Syrian complaint. , j j 28. The Couneil did not need to investigate the Israel attack with mortars on the Syrian village of Nuqueib, nor the midnight firing by sorne forty Israel armoured patrol boats on the neighbouring Syrian villages, nor the bombardment at dawn of the Syrian villages of El-Al, Fiq and Zaki. The report of the Chief of Staff gives us a text of the so-called "first communiqué" by the spokesman of the Israel armed forces which stated: "Shortiy before midnight, a unit of the Israel Defence Forces assaulted Syrian positions north of Nuqueib, occupied the posts and destroyed the fortifications." [S/5102, para. 22.] 29. The aggression was committed. The Syrian representatives ·told us what articles of the General Armistice Agreement and of the United Nations Charter were violated. The world knows what human values were betrayed. The Council was expected quickly ta condemn Israel again, as it had done in January 1956 for a similar night attack on Syria. The Council was expected to recall its stern warning to Israel at that time and to consider how it could make it8 warnings meaningful now. 30. We welcomed, however, the examination of the Israel complaints. We welcomed the presence of the Chief of Staff. We said that we were not afraid of the facts. We said we wanted to have aU the facts. 31, Now we know from the testimony available that: "Between 1 January and 8 March 1962 there had been one verbal Israel complaint, on25 February .••" [ibid., para. 11]. Everything seemed ta be quiet in 32. The Syrians had quite auather story. But let us l'estate the Israel reaction, which is indeed remarkable, as the representative of Israel himself noted. First, the senior Israel delegate requested an urgent meeting with the Chairman ofthe MixedArmistice Commission "in view of the seriousness of the situation caused by the latest Syrian attack on Lake !Gnneret" [ibid., para. 101. 1 presume that L·ake Kinneret is Lake Tiberias. The senior -Israel delegate, in the meeting that took place on the same afternoon, and 1 quote from General von Horn's report, "referred to the present dangerous situation". 'l'here had been no incident during that year, except for the one on 25 February. The senior Israel delegate "referred to the present dangerous situation which, in his view, might deteriorate to the state that existed in 1955, when the Jsrael Army attacked Syrian positions east of the lake" [ibid.l. 33. That is the aggression referred to that took 'place on the night of 11-12 December 1955, the aggression that the Council examined, heard that it was a punitive action in retaliation for a provocation committed by Syria on 10 December of the same year, and decided, on 19 January 1956: "The Security Council, "... "l. Holds that this interferenceinnowayjustifies the Israel action; "2. Reminds the Government of Israel that the Council has already condemned military action in breach of the general armistice agreements, whether or not undertaken by way of retaliation, and has called upon Israel to take effective measures to preveut such actions; 113. Condemns the attack of 11 December 1955 as a flagrant violation of the cease-fire provisions of its resolution of 15 July 1948, of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement hetween Israel and Syria, and of Israel's obligations under the Charter; "4. Expresses its grave concern at the failure of the Government of Israel to comply with its obligations; "S. Calls upon the Government of Israel to do so in the future, in default of which the Comcil will have ta consider what further measures under the Charter are required to maintain or restore the peace;" " ,, "9. CaUs upon bath parties ••• in particular to make full use of the Mixed ArmisticeCommission's machinery in the interpretation and application of ; its provislOllS. Il 1 34. After thIS most regrettable hut most interesting Israel prophecy that the attack of December 1955 35. Four days later the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations was apparently instructed by his Government ta express to the Secretary-General his concern about the incident of 8 March-aU fuis because of the incident 1 described, because fîre either began or was returned from a civilian post on an Israel patrol ship or police boat on the lake. 36. Another incident was reported on 15 March. Three Israel armoured lighters came ta within 80 metres of the Syrian post of El-Hassel. Fire was exchanged. The Syrian delegation alone asked the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for an investigation. The United Nations observer in the observation Post east of the mouth of the Jordan saw three' Israel craft. This is interesting in the light of the statement made by the Israel representative here [999th meeting] that aU that Israel has on the lake are two second-hand boats. 37. The Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a message ta the Secretary-General stating that this situation could not be allowed to continue. The next day, 16 March, another incident was said to have occurred. The Foreign Minister asked the Secretary-General, in a message, "if this .•. was the Syrian answer ta the representations of the United Nations" [ibid., para. 20]. Then, not waiting for a reply and apparently disgusted with the said United Nations, the so-called punitive preventive action-the attaek in the dark, the enlarged edition of the assault that was condenmed in no uncertain terms by the Councilon 19 January 1956-was launched on the village of Nuqueib and the other previously named villages of Syria by the air, land and sea armed forces of the Israel authorities, whoapparently lost their patience after three allegedborder incidents during the whole yearof 1962,andlosttheir confidence in the United Nations, its Truce Supervision Organization, Us Mixed Armistic'e Commission, Us Secretary-General, its Security Couneil, and so on. The Israel armed forces proudly deelared in the morning, in a communiqué numbered one, that a unit of their defence forces had assaulted the positions, occupied the posts, and destroyed the fortifications. 38. A similar dec1aration was made before this Council. On 16 March, we were told, an offensive was aimed against a Syrian military position "encroaching into the demilitarized zone". The ISrael armed forces, again as we were told, first occupied and then destroyed this encroaching position. "Answer: On the basis of reports by United Nations military observers who visited the demilitarized zone on three occasions sinee 17 March, the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission reported that he \Vas satisfîed that there were none. No fortified position was seen as 'existing or destroyed'." [IOOlst meeting, annex.] 40. 1 asked General von Horn how many days he thought would he necessary for the preparation of an attack sllch as the one launched by Israel on 16-17 March. It was difficult to give a reply. 1 would guess, however, that to get these forces across the demilitarized zone would take at least a few days. 1 wonder whether this attack, which was premeditated and planned, was really planned before or after 8 March. 1 suggest that, as regards the Israel representative and his conversation with the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, it was not because of any special powers of prophesy that he was able to speak about an attack similar to the attack of December 1955. It was because of knowledge. It was because the attack on 16-17 March 1962 00 Syria was really plaoned and, as part of the planning for it, the series of attacks on 8, 15 and 16 Marcb bad been provoked. 41. This may seem unjust, but what can we do? Such border incidents would have naturally been dealt with by the Mixed Armistice Commission. Its report would have been before us now and on the strength of it we could have taken a more positive position. 42. When we remember that oruy nine montbs after the Security Council's resolution of 19 January 1956 condemning Israel in the terms 1 just quoted, Israel, without considering that strong resolution, launched its attack on Egypt, we are hopeful that the resemblance between 1956 and 1962 will be stopped here in tbis Counci!. 1 hope it will be stopped by our adopting at least a resolution similarto ifnot stronger than the one which the Council adopted in 1956. 43. In January 1959, Israel brought a complaint to this Counen, one not unsimilar ta its present complaints about the alleged incidents of 8, 15 and 16 March 1962. The memhers of the Couneil, aimost aU of them, were of the opinion that sucb a complaint shouid have been referred to tbe Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. The representative of Japan said the following: "We feel, therefore, that the Mixed Armistice ,Commission set up by the GeneralArmisticeAgreement should not be left paralysed. Wefeelespecially so because the incidents on the demarcation line in particular seem to be under the jurisdiction of the Mixed Armistiee Commission." [845th meeting, para. 102.] J,, 45. Israel just refused ta comply with these resolutions. We are now in the midst of April 1962 and this ls stiU the case. Because of that we are not able to rea11y know whether the incidents of 8, 15 and 16 March were, as Israel suggests, provocations, or whether they were provoked ta prepare for the assault of 16-17 Mareil. Since we are prevented from getting the faotl3, we have to make these speculations. 46. General VOIl Horn 8tated [10018t meeting,annex], in reply to Olle of my questions: "The General Armistice Agreement (article VII, paragraph 7) provides for a procedure. that of the Mixed Armistice Commission ... this procedure iB in abeyance ...n. Replying ta my question on the status of the demilital;ized zone, he said: "Israel .•• did not agree to discuss in the Mixed Armistice Commission anything pertaining to the demilitarized zone ... As a result. no ordinary meetings of the MiKed Armistice Commission have taken place since 1951." 47. Even if thesethreeincidentsof8, 15and 16 March had sa greatly irritated Israel, one would have hoped that thia would have made it ask for and attend a meeting of the MixedArmistice Commission todiscusa them and rench an acceptable solution instead of threatening and, alas, indeed inflicting such an aggression as the one which we nowhave under consideration. 48. In his answer to my question about the status of the demîlitarized zone, General von Horn also made it quite clear that this zone should be free from aU military and paramilitary activities and installations: but at present Israel doea not respect this provision. General questions about citizenship and sovereignty should not be raised, he said, with regard to such zones. It is obvious that Israel considers the zone as its own and its inhabitants as its citizens. 49. All tbis constitutes a "flagrant violation" of paragraph 5 (Q) of article V of the Armistice Agreement of which Israel must stand condemned. The total and final annexation of the demilitarized zone seems to be one of the îmmediate Israel objectives, and this must be resisted. 50. 1 should like to pause here and quote from the statement of the representative of Israel made on 28 March. He saidl "1 am authorized by my Govern- 'Y For the text of chis res~lution. adopted at the 547th meeting of the COUTI<:Ü. see Official Rec:oros of the 5e<:uriry Counci1. Sixth Year. 546th meeting. para. 2. ,, 1,,; 51. And if 50, cau it he possible that Israel intends to respect a11 the United Nations resolutions in which it lS concerned, or will it go on accepting whatever it Huds to be ta its benefit, rejecting whatever it deems ta be not ta its benefit? 52. 1 should like ta l'efer again ta the accusation of the representative of Israel that the 8yrians are trying ta establish de facto control on a portion of Lake Tiberias. Is this wrong? If so, Is it only wrong if Syria does It1 If Israel establishes de facto control on lands not aIlotted ta it bya United Nations resolution, if itestablishes de facto control indemilitarized zones in other al'eas, is it wrong1 Or is it only wrong when Syria does it and not wrong when Israel does it1 j lj ; ;. 53. Two draft resolutions, one submitted by Syria [S/5107J and the other by Israel [8/5109], have been circulated under rule 38 of our provisional rules of procedure. 1 should like first ta refer ta the Israel draft resolution because itbeginsbymentioning the Security Couneil resolution of 11 August 1949. This is indeed interesting. The Security Council thought then, in 1949, that the Armistice Agreements constituted a step toward peace. Sa Israel first defies the agreement, as we have shown, and, seeondly, between 1949 and now launches aIl its notorious attacks whenever it cano Now it launches another attack, another offensive of another nature, a peaee offensive. Israel does not desire peace. One would in aIl earnestness ask whether it ean afford peace. 1 think that an eminent Israel journalist, Moshe Brilliant, once touched upon this subject five years ago. Those who are familial' with semitic languages know the great differencél between "salam" and nistislam" between peace and surrender. j : ),, ~ 1 1J, 1, i• 1 , 54. It is not our intention, however, ta deviate from the question under our consideration, but in the light of the Israel draft 1'e801ution, one may ask whether these noto1'ious Israei attacks, ineluding the last attaek on Syria, eondemned as they stand, might not be a series of battles of intimidation to win the grC',atest of Israel's goals: the su1'render of îts adversaries and acceptance of its dictates. 1,,, 55. The Israel draft resolution tries to equate both parties in this aggression, the aggressor and the victim. We hardly expeet this Couneil to adopt sueh an attitude. Israel, not Syria, has been condemned 56. The Syrian delegation was content to submit a draft resolution in which this Council would yet once more repeat its condemnation, reaffirm it8 resolution of 19 January 1956 and demand that Israel cease obstructing the United Nations truce supervision machinery, and that it accept the proposaIs made to strengtlten that machinery. That draft resolution is before us in document S/5107. 1 think that a few corrections might be made to reflect previous decisions of the Couneil. 57. The first paragraph of the preamble might be changed to read: "Taking note of the complaints contained in documents S/5092 and 8/5098". 58. To the second paragraph of the preamble might be added: "and the answers he subsequently made to questions put to him by several members of the Council lT • 59. The third paragraph of the preamble might be changed to read: "Recalling and reaffirming its resolution of 19 January 1956". 60. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble, the date 12 November 1953 should be changed to 24 November 1953, and the date 11 January 1956 should be changed to 19 January 1956. 61. Tbe beginning of operative paragraph 2 might be changed to read: "Again warns •••". 62. Should the Syrian delegation wish to make these minor changes 1 would ask you, Mr. President, under rule 38 of our provisional rules of procedure, to put the Syrian draft resolution, with tbese corrections, to the vote at the appropriate Ume. 63. Mr. COl\lIAY (Israel): Since the answers given by General von Horn yesterday so direetly concern Israel, it is necessary for me to put on record some observations about them. 64. It may be well at the outset to state in general terms how we see the relationship between the Israel authorities and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization regarding the Implementation of the General Armistice Agreement. This Agreement is an international treaty between two States-Israel and 8yria-and the basic task of the United Nations observers is to assist the parties to the Agreement J d i ' , ' 65. rité propre culi1:lre les dont et fronti1:lres ser souveraineté tence. de à déplorable ciale la notre 65. The two factors 1 have mentioned-national security and undisputed jurisdiction over our own territory-are peculiarly relevant to Israel's situation. Israel is, as the members of the Council are aware, a very smaU country, not more than ten miles wide at its centre, and surrounded by hostile States on aIl its land borders. Moreover, our neighbours refuse to recognize our legitimate statehood and sovereignty, or even our right to exist at aIl. That is the spirit in which two representatives of 8yria have now addressed the Council on this present item. These lamentable conditions oblige us to give special attention to the ~wo factors which 1 have mentioned: national security and undisputed jurisdiction over our territory. 66. A case in point is thequestionofa United Nations patrol boat on Lake Tiberias, to which General von Horn has referred. In his report of 26 March 1962 [8/5102] the Chief of Staff says that he mentioned this matter to the Israel Minister of Foreign Affairs and found that we had "strong objections" to it. This is correct. The importance of this body of water, its proximity to the frontier, the Syrian encroachments on it, and the refusaI of Syria ta aclmowledge Israel's severeignty over it, indicate the wisdom of leaving the lake under our exclusive jurisdiction and control. It is significant that Syria has pressed in the past for a United Nations boat under a United Nations flag on Lake Tiberias, and it does so again in operative paragraph 3 of its draft resolution [S/5107]. a dans la de trent notre significatif 67. serait que les Il de 67. In our judgement, permitting this to be done weuld not be helpful, as it weuld only encourage Syrian designs on the lake. 1 must confess that our view h.as, if anything, been strengthened by General von Harn's answers yesterday. He refers, not ta Israel's rights with regard to Lake Tiberias, but to what he calls its "claims and position", which is an odd way ta refer ta our waters withir'. our own country. The fact that pleasure craft may move freely on the lake is quite irrelevant to this problem. ~ security reasonslll • li 69. No sllch undertaking, in fact, exista, although -;:i it \Vas suggested many years aga, as a purely ~ voluntary and unilateral policy by Israel, provided i the Syrians ceased ail trespassing on, or interference -1 with, the lake-which, unfortunately, did not happen. l In any case, any supervisory function over our 1 boats, such as that implied in this answer, would ~i be _unacceptable to my Government. If the Chief of ;> Statl has any practical problems or need for obser- ,:~ vation facilities, which can be met in a way ta which :1 we have less serious objections, 1 am sure my -, Government would be willing to diseuss this with '~ him. - ' 70. Similarly, the question of freedom of movement ~ for United Natiç,ns obs,~rvers cannot be laid down ~J as an abstraet principle but can only be discussed i in a pragmatie way with the Israel authorities, i having regard to the naeds of the observers' tasks as well as our own security considerations. We i have noted the observation of General von Horn to 4 the effeet that on the Syrian side the United Nations ) observers are subjected to most stringent limitations on their movements. In effect, these limitations i cripple their effectiveness. The General omits to 1 state that no comparable limitations are imposed :~ on the Israel side. ' i 71. 1 now come to two interrelated problems which bave been raised by these questions and answers: the status of the demilitarized zone and the functioning of the Mixed Armistice Commission. 72. It is well to bear in mind under what circumstances the demilitarized zones came into existence. During the fighting of 1948, Syrian troops at certain points crossed their ownfrontier and illegally occupied strips of territory on the Israel side of that frontier. In 1949, Syria's ·Withdrawal from these occupied areas beyond her international frontier was made a condition for th" conclusion of the Armistice Agreement. It was agreed that these evacuated areas, together with adjacent areas controlledbylsraelforces, should eonstitute demilitarized zones. It has beeu the consistent view of the Government of Israel thatthese zones are part of the sovereign territory of the State of Israel, but that is nnt the questionbefore the Conncil at this moment. What is clear from the Agreement is that the exclusion of Syria from the demilitarizeà zone was complete and definite. This has a direct bearing on the rURson why the Mixed Armistice Commission has not functioned in a regular way Bince 1951, 73. The Israel position was fully set out in a memorandum of 27 December 1954, which is attached as an annex to the report by the Chief of Staff of 6 January 1955. Perhaps 1 rnay be permitted to quote simply a few sentences from that memorandum: "Lieutenant-General W. E. Riley, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision ûrganization, declared at the 62nd meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission, with reference to a Syrian complaint against alleged Israel violations of provisions of article v; n'The Chairrnan assumes general supervision of the demilitarized zone; therefore it is the Chairman and not the Mixed Armistice Commission which deals with this yroblem'. "... "The aforesaid principle has beeu followed in practice throughout the years, exceptwhen otherwise agreed to by Israel (as for instance in a number of Mixed Armistice Commission discussions held before 1951). The Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed ArIhistice Commission have taken up and settled numerous questions concerning the demilitarized zone directly with Israel representatives ..• " "Syria, however, persists in attemps to create for itself a position which would entitle itto intervene in a territory that lies outside its State boundaries, and in several instances questions concerning. the demilitarized zone have appeared at its insistence on the agenda of the Mixed Armistice Commission. It is evident that Israel cannot acquiesce in these attempts by Syria to usurp rights which are not its own and is bound to remain consistent in upholding the basic tenet of the Armistice Agreement-the exclusion of Syria from any rights within the demilitarized zone •. •".2L 74. Be that as it may, it is the Syrian attempt to regain a fOO:-'lOld in the demilitarized zone, through the Mixed Armistice Commissioü, and not the Israel attitude, which has caused the suspension of these formai meetings for over eleven years. If Syria would Dot insist 6n the MjxedA.rmisticeCommission's dealing with demilitarized zone matters, there would be no obstacle to Israel's full participation in the Commission. 75. 1 would add one further observation on this point. It is suggested that under its general interpretative function the Mixed Armistice Commission 1 is entitled to assume jurisdiction in any matter if n 'JJ OffICIai Records of the Secunty Counell, Tenth Y;oar, Supplement r~fDr january, February and Marcll1955, documen. 5/3343, annex B, j paras. 3, S, Band 9. 76. It does Dot follow that the absence of formaI meetings of the Commission prevents the United Nations Truce Supervision ürganization staff from effectively carrying out theïr duues. Here, if! may say sa, General von Horn does his own organization less than justice. The United Nations observers do in fact conduct investigations of complaints and regularly submit reports of their findings and conclusions to the Chief of Staff. In the process of these investigations they bear the views of the parties, they examine wibesses and perform whatever functions may be required. Since in any eventthe deciding vote in the Mixed Armistice Commission would be that of the United Nations Chairman, there is on the working level not much difference between this more flexible and informaI method of functioning and the formaI proceedings of the Mixed Armistice Commission. 77. Lastly, 1 would refer to the first and briefest of General von Horn's ans\vers yesterday, which is also the most startling. In reply ta the representative of Syria, he finds that no Syrian fortified position was occupied or destroyed. If so, what is aU the fuss about? If this answeI' implies that no Israel troops attacked any position in Syrian territory, it is a correct answer. It is not alleged by the Syrians themselves that such an attack took place, nor is there any such finding in the United Nations observers' report. 1 am also ready to believe that the Syrians did not bring the United Nations investigators to the position which was actually attacked, for the simple reason that this position was outside Syrian territory and within the demilitarized zone where it bad no business ta be at aIl. P 78. But this laconic answer by the Chief of Staff has more serious implications, with which 1 am compelled to deal with complete frankness. The decision by the Israel Government to take the action of 16-17 March was reluctantly reached, and only because this action was regarded as a painful necessity. The IsraelGovernmenthas taken public responsibility for this action, both to the people of Israel and here before the United Nations. We have put on record what occurred and why. But when a United Nations official appears ta throw doubt on the factual veracity of my Government's position, it is for us a very serious matter. 79. 1 wish here at the Council table ta state, On the full authority of my Government, that we reject any inference of doubt which may he contained in General von Horn's statement yesterday. 1 would Mso categorioally reaffirm what 1 said on 28 Mareil. before the Council, in the following words: 1 not only wish to reaffirm that statement here now but, in view of the answer by the Chief of Staff, to which 1 have referred, 1 wish nowtoamplify the above statement in certain respects. 80. First, the existence of this Syrian military position encroaching into the dernilitarized zone was weil known to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. Our own represent.atives have from Ume to time drawn their attentiontoitand as recently aS 1960, we were assured that our complaints would be taken up with the authorities in Damascus. These complaints produced no results. 81. Secondly, we can assist the Truce Supervision Organization in identuying the locality in question, and 1 am able to state that its exact map referenee is 21090-24615. 82. Thirdly, we can supply the Truce Supervision Organization, if it wishes, with a list of the military weapons and equipment found in this fortified position during the Israel action of 16-17 March. These weapons include an 82 mm recoilless gun of the B.I0 type, whieh was used in the attacks on our police patrol boats on 8, 15 and 16 March; alsoheavy machine-guns of the Gorianov type of 7.62 mm calibre, and light machine-guns of the RPD type. 83. Fourthly, this position was oecupied, when we reached it, by regular troops of the Syrian Army belonging to the Third Batialion of the Second Syrian Brigade. One of them, Gunnel' Husein Ahmed Abdel Hamid Yihya, was interrogated by our MHita:ry Intelligence and was subsequently retl!rned to Syria through the United NationS observers. He corroborates the facts as 1 have put them before the Counoil. ~ 84. Fifthly, the small Israel force that was invoh'ed in the action of 16-17 March, and which included no tanks, was immediately withdrawn the sarne night. The Israel Army maintains no forces and no military positions inside the demilitarized zone. ~ 1 85. 1 must express the strong regret of my Government at the misleading nature of ·-,he answer on tbis point given yesterday by the United Na.ions Chief of Staff. -·-.i ; 86. In conclusion, 1 would once again stress the willingness of the Israel authorities to assist and eo-operate with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and, more specifically, to consider i what measures might properly be taken to improve l the functioning of the United Nations machinery in l: cth~'enSltive Lake Tiberias area. Members of lhe 17 . 87. My statement has been confined to obsBrvations on General von Horn's answers; 1 reserve an opportunity to intervene, if necessary, in arder to comment on the statements made in the debate and on the proposaIs before the Council.

In view of the late hour, the speakers on my list will be called uponthis afternoon. However, the representative of the United Arab Republic would like ta make a brief reply immediately and 1 give him the floar.

1 merely want to say that a great service has just been done bath to the Syrian case and ta a better understanding by the members of the Council ofthe problem with which we are dealing. Tt is plain now that Israel's immediate objective is the outright annexation of aIl the demilitarized zones; other objectives will materialize. We expect tbem; we have to. And we must be prepared for them, even if it means less money for our schools, hospitals and social welfare. What otb""r course can we take, after hearing the final ane menacing language which we have just heard1 90. We have also Doted that what 1 said this morning is now corroborated. The Israel authorities will always be ready to depend on the United Nations when it suits them. They will always refuse ta allow The meeiî.ng rose at 1.5 p.rn. 1 1 J ~L 19 CYPRUS/CHVPRE: PAN 10 Ale..nae, lM G,o.t Sheot, .1 ' AFRICA/AFRIQUE C.l.MEROQN/CAMERDUN: L,aRAIRIE DU PeuPLE AFRICAIN L. o...,.n'o, 8. P. 1197. 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