S/PV.1003 Security Council

ln accordance with the decision previously hken by the Couneil, and if there are no objections, 1 shall invite the representatives of Syria and Israel to talte places at the Council table. '",' Comay (Israel) took places at the Councll table. 2. Ml'. HSUEH (China): What happened durjng the 81ght of 16-17 March 1962 on the eastern shore of j At the invitation of the President, Mr. SalahEl Dine Tarazi (Syrian Arab Republic) and MT. Michael l 2. rapport réponses qui que de suffisamment la du n'y faits nous ',', Security Council [1001st meeting, annex], and also by the statements by the representatives of Syria and Israel during this debate. It appears ta my delegation that there is little room for dispute so far Lake Tiberias has been sufficiently made clear by the report of General von Horn [S/5102 and Add.l1, by his answers ta the questions put ta him in the l ~ lssued by the spokesman of the Israel Defence Forces 1: 1 ~ as the facts relating to that incident are concerned. li ~he central facts are summarized in the communiqué 3. In the view of my delegation, the question whether fortified positions existed or were destroyed does not change the essential character of this incident. 4. The facts concerning the other incidents, both preceding the main incident to which 1have just refer_ red and following the cease-fire, may not have been equally clear. They have been somewhat obscured because the United Nations observation posts were unable to observe them at the time when they occurred or, in some cases, because they left no clear physical evidence, and also because the Mixed Armistice Commission was not functioning. But, with these reservations, one can also have a fairly clear picture of these incidents from the circumstantial evidence and whatever physical evidence was available, as reported by General von Horn. 5. What the Chief of Staff calls "events leading up to the fighting on the night of 16-17 March" mainly consisted. of firing incidents, in which Israel boats were fi:r:ed at and, in One case, an Israel police boat was damaged and two policemen were wounded. There was also return fire resulting in the death of a Syrian girl. Following the cease-fire, therehavebeenfurther firing incidents and aerial engagements resulting in more casualties and damage to property. These latter incidents were obviously caused by what General von Horn calls the aftermath of tension left by the Israel military action. 6. My delegation has been able to ciraw some conclu- sions based on these facts. At the risk of over- simplification, 1 may say that, while it seems that the law might have been on Israel's side before the military action, it ceased to be so wh~n Israel took too law ioto her own hands. 7. 1 do not think that the Security Conncil can just brush asiœ the firing incidents on Lake Tiberias which had occurred before the Israel military action. While they may be small in scale and sporadic in nature, theyare, nonetheless, violations ofthelsrael- Syrian General Armistice Agreement.U Moreover, they could lead to serious consequences. We can easily imagine how uneasy a fisherman feels about his life when he goes out in the morning to set his net in Lake Tiberias but is not sure whether he will return home saiely with his catch in the evening. This kind of uneasy lite naturally produces tension. In stressing the serious nature of the firing incidents, 1 can do no better than quote what the 1ate Secretary- General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, said in his report of 9 May 1956: "As incidents continued and their frequency in- creased this, together with the strained political atmosphere, tended to give the indivtdual occur- rences wider implications than certainly in most cases i,vere justified. The development led to ex- 8. Therefore, my delegation feels that the firing incidents leading up to the main incident are de- plorable. The auth.orities who failed ta take measures to prevent or put a stop ta such incidents are not free of responsibility. 9. If the firing incidents are deplorable, even more so is the fighting on the night of 16-17 March 1962. It ia obvious from the Israel communiqué quoted in General von Horn' s report that the fighting had been planned and organized and was carried out by the regular armed forces of Israel. It was, therefore, a deliberate violation of the Armistice Agreement. The serious nature of this military action cannat be over-emphasized. It could h,we gotten out of control and developed into a wider conflict. In trying to destroy what are called the Syrian positions, the Israel armed forces could very weIl have destroyed the foundation of the Armistict:! Agreement. My delegation therefore deeply deplores this military action. 10. It is true that the background of this military action and the general context in which it was taken, as explained by the representative of Israel, deS<2rve the serious attention of the Security Council. But ft cannat he said that they justiiy the military action. From the facts reported by General VOD Horn, it is clear that the Israel action cannat be considered as an act of self-defence within the meaningofArticle 51 of the Charter of the United Nations; nor do the events leading up to the fighting on the night of 16-17 March, deplorable as they are, justify the fighting itself. On a number of occasions in the past, the Security Council has beeu consistent and unequivocal in its pronouncement that military action in breach of the General Armistice Agreement, whether or Dot under- taken by way of retaliation, is not permissible. The fighting which occurred on the night of 16-17 March must be viewed in the light of this interpretation of the Armistice Agreement by the Security Council. ! If 11. It is comforting to note that the two parties, with the help of the Chief of Staff, quickly arranged a cease-fire. Although incidents have again occurred after the cease-fire, there have been no disturbing developments since the Council first met last week. It is hoped that the two parties will eusure strict compliance with the cease-fire and that the situation in the Lake Tiberias area will soon return to normaL 12. Under the circumstances, 1 believe it is more important for the Security Council to look ta the future than to review the past. It is more important to consider what practical and constructive steps can now he taken ta strengthen the structure of the armistice thau to pass judgement on what has hap- pened. y Ibid" Eleventh Year. Supplement for April. May and June 1956, 14. 1 can readily agree with the representative of Israel that the Israel-Syrian armistice demarcation line is of a sensitive and inflammable nature. The situation along the line is further complicated by the proximity of Lake Tiberias. The lake. with such precious commodities as water and fish in it, is only 10 metres away froma large sector ofthe demarcation line. The problems of water and fish. always a great source of trouble hatween nations, are particularly troublesome _in that part of the world where water is not in great abundance.Asolutionofthese problems will no doubt contribute to the maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the eastern shore of Lake Tibel'ias. But 1 also wish to say that, on the other band, the recurrence of inciclents such as those we are now discussing will only render the solution of, these problems more difficult. 15. Thus there i8 a close interrelationship between the incidents we are now considering and the larger problems in the background. From the long-range point of view, the Security Council and the General Assembly have a duty to help and to encourage the parties concerned ta reach a satisfactory solution of those larger problems. The parties concerned, in their own interests, should also strive for an early solution of those problems. But before sucb asolution is reached the Security Council must insist on full compliance with the Armistice Agreement. In this respect 1 wish ta recaU the view ofthe late Secretary- General, which the Security Council endorsed in its resolution of 4 June 1956, that "the re-establishment of full compliance with the armistice agreements represents a stage whlch has to he passed in order to make progress possible on the main issues between the parties".Y 16. What happened last month on the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias shows not ouly that there bas !Jeen a serious wealrening in the status of compltance with the Al"mistice Agreement, but also that there ls an urgent necessity to tighten up the m6asures for the supervision of the armistice. During this debate the representatives of both Syria and Israel have reas- sured the Council that it is the policy of tbeir respec- tive Governments to abide by their obligations under the Armistice Agreement, provided the ether party does the same. 1 think the Security Council should take note of' these statements and accept tbem as a new point of departure for the re-establishment of full compliance with the Armistice Agreement. The Councn may also wish to remind the parties of the assurances they gave to the late secretary- General in 1956 that they accept the cease-fire clause , 17. As to the measures for strengthening the super- vision of the armistice, the work of the Couneil has beeu considerably facilitated by the efforts of General von Horn, to whom l wish to extend the thanks of my delegation. My delegation believes that the Chief of staff more than anybody else is fully acquainted with the local situation. The measures he has proposed in his report and in his answers to questions are based on his intimate knowledge and impartial assessment of the situation. We have no doubt that they will prove to be practical, desirable and effective. My delegation therefore supports these measures. It may be noted in particular that General von Horn lays special emphasis on the importance of the continuous functioning of the Mixed Armistice Commission and on the necessity of freedom of movement for the United Nations rnilitary observers. My delegation is of the view that the Security Council should endorse these rneasures and request the parties concerned to carry them out.

It is sorne years now since the Security Council la",;;t had to direct its attention to the border between Israel and Syria. The United Kingdom Government is particularly concerned that the Council should now have to meet again in circumstances not very dissimilar to those whi::.-h obtained in December 1955 and January 1956. It is as if the parties principaIly concerned find themselves unable to learn from the mistakes of the pasto Once again, there has been a sudden intensification of the uneasy conditions on the frontier. Once again, provocation, threats and incidents have been allowed to run uncurbed. And once again, this sorry process has culminated in a deliberate attack by Israel armed forces against Syria. 19. Now we aIl know that this is but a part of a much larger problem. While the Palestine question remains unresolved, there will inevitably he the risk of trouble in the area. It would clearly be far better were it possible for the Council to address itself to the root of the problem instead of grappling merely with some of its consequences, tragic though these may be in terms of lives lost. 20. The United Kingdom Governrnent has worked very hard, both inside the United Nations and outside it, to try to bring about a lasting settlement between Israel and hel' Arab neighbours. We shall continue to do so. But we have to req,ognize that to reach a settlement, or even to create the proper atmosphere in which fruitful negotiations can possibly begin, there must first of aIl he a lowering of tension on the borders of Israel. 21, This aim of lowering tension is one of the essential tasks entrusted to the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. And here 1 should like on behalf" of my delegation to pay a warm tribute to the vital work of General 22. Those of us who share that aim of keeping the peace in this high..ly e."<plosive part of the world must give our unstinted support to the work of the -Chief of staff. Even more, 1 think, we must give full weight ta any recommendations he makes for increasing the effectiveness of the role he ls called upon to play. r r 1 1L 23. In the light of these general considerations 1 now turn to consider the particular complaints which are before the Council today. 24. My delegation has listened with care to the statements that have been made here bythe representatives of Syria and Israel, and we have studied the various letters which they addressed last month ta the President of the Council. We have also examined the report on the incidents in question which was drawn up by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization [S/5102 and Add.1]j and we have had the benefit of General von Horn's presence here in New York, andtherevealinganswers he has been able ta give to the questions put to him by the members of the Council. 25. The first thing that strikes us is the miserable paucity of hard facts on which to base a complete and Just assesSment of where the balance of right and wrong lies. This, of course, is absolutely no fauU of the Truce Supervision Organization, which has been severely handicapped in the exercise of Us proper functions. 1 shall retura to this aspect of the matter later on. But certain firm conclusions can he drawn from the evidence which has been presented and from what is generallyknown of the circumst;:<.nces immediately prior to these incidents. ! 1 26. First 1 would refer to the verbal threats uBed by Syria against Israel. The representative of Israel quoted sorne of these in his letter of 19 March 1962 {S/5093] and others in his speech ta the Council on 28. March [999th meeting]. Whether or not these threats constitute provocation-and that is something which per:llaps can only he judged by the party t.:J whom they were directed-they seem to my delegation ta he contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter. 27. Then came the sudden incident on the morning of 8 March. It is impossible from the 9vidence we have to determine the origin of this. AUwe have to go on are the statements ta United Nations officiaIs in the area of Syrian and Israel witnesses. These statements inevitably are contradictory. The only positive fact we have is the Chief of Staff's own comment in his report that "the statements of the Syrian witnesses do not explain the damage done to the Israel police boat" [S/5102, para. 9]. From this report we can also infer that both sides probably had brought into the defensive area weapons of calibre in excess of the limita laid down in annex IV 29. Now whatever may have beeu the true origin or nature of these three incidents, they cannat justify what followed on the night of 16-17 March when a unit of the Israel Defence Forces assaulted Syrian posi- tions north of Nuqueib, occupied the posts and destroyed the fortifications. The description of this incident which 1 have just given is. as the Couneil must he aware, not my OWD; it cornes from the Israel communiqué issued in the early hours of 17 March. 29. nature justifier 16 israéliennes au les donner Conseil communiqué de 30. The Government of Israel has made no attempt ta conceal that this \Vas in effect a miIitary operation directed against Syria, and as such it must he judged. It was Dot a shooting incident, a sudden nare-up between frontier posts, or anything like that-. It was a military operation, undertaken deliberately in clear violation of IsraePs international commitments. 30. 14. militaire nous de frontière, d'une délibéré nationaux 31. Nor is this the first occasion on which Israel has thus taken the law into its own hands. Israel will argue that tbere was just callse-indeed the repre- sentative of Israel has urged this consideration upon us. But no cause, no pretext, can justify military action of this nature, whether or not itwas Ulidertaken by way of retaliation. 31. essaie soutenir cet avec prétexte, cette représailles. 32. My delegation must repeat what we have been obliged ta say before, and what this Council has formaily declared in earlier resolutions: the whole principle of armed retaliation is Wl"Ong, morally and politically. 32. a lui-même lutions sailles politiquement. 33. Israel must heed this injunction; and indeed it is in its own interests to do so. The represtlntative of Israel has spoken of the vital interest which his country has in maintaining peace in the area. My ae1egation believes him. But this policy of violence which his country apparently pursues will not win the peace. It will merely weaken the armistice, arouse even bitterer feelings and open the way ta still more conflict. 33. i! sentant pour Ma politique ne l'armistice, amers 34. My delegation would most seriously urge Israel ta consider that the United Nations is a stronger defence of peace in the Middle East, and of Israel's indepêndence, than its own armed forces. 34. pour sont de pendance 35. le à un l'avenir. 35. SA much for the pasto 1 agree with what the representative of China has just said: that the aim of the Council at the conclusion of this debate cannot be just ta try t. lree on an attitude ta these past events, but ta laC' ) the future. 36. c'est le 36. The surest foundation for the future is ta keep the area at peace and thus, with the passage of time, ta give some chance for tl~e tensions there ta diminish. 37. My delegation wishes to drawparticularattention to the various measures suggested· by General von Horn for strengthening the United Nation.;:. Truce SUpervision Organization. We are indeed glaci '0 note that some of these have been put ioto effect already. There is now an added observation post overlooking the area of these incidents. We hope that the co- operation of the Syrian Government which made the establishment of this post possible will set the pattern for the future. Bath parties, furthermore, agreed to the proposaI for visits by United Nations officials to the demilitarized zone and the defensive areas. We should like ta see such visits being made regularly in the future. 1 j î Jj j 38. As l say, a start bas been made. But clearly there is much more that can and should be done to assist the Truce Supervision Organization in its work. l am going to mention three of the necessary improvements ta which our attention has been drawn. 39. First, the need for a special United Nations Doat on Lake Tiberias. It would he unarmed. It would act as a sort of mobile observation post and in particular could keep a sharp eye On the north-east corner of the lake, where trouble is so liable to arise. Its very presence may he expected to have a calming influence there. This proposaI is a reasonable one and is obvious good sense and we urge the Israel Govern- ment to accept it. As General von Horn has pointed out in an answer to one of the questions put by the representative of the United States, the presence of this boat on the lake would in no way affect the well- known claims and positiOn of Israel with regard to Lake Tiberias. 1 ] ! 40·, Then tbere is this matter offreedom ofmovement for United Nations observers. Again and again in the answers provided by General von Horn on 4 April we were made aware hmy the restrictions which are placed on the freedom of movement of the United Nations observers make a mockery of the whole idea and purpose of having these observers. This is some- thing which my delegation believes can no longer he tolerated. Both the Governments concerned must he prepared ta co-operate fully in this with the Chief of Staff. It is after aIl in their own interests. As General von Horn says in bis answers: "Freedom of movement is necessary not only ta enable United Nations observersto observe reported violations and ta assistthe parties in re-establishing the cease-fire; it is also an impo"'rtant factor in allaying mutual suspicions. If both parties are aware k~------------------ 42. It will be clear that in tbese exam.ples 1 have quoted of ways of enabling the Truce Supervision Organization to perform the duties it was meant to do, the first requisite is the full andunstinted co-operation of the ïsrael and Syrian Governments. This Couneil, whith the responsibilities it has for peace in the area, has both a right and a duty ta demand that co-operation. 43. The Palestine question has bedevilled inter- national relations for a.. great many years. More than once it has erupted in armed conflict in the area, and on occasion opened up the prospect of even wider hostilities. If we are honest we know that this Council cannot hope in the immediate future to settle all the problems involved. The final solution must wait. But what we can do now Is first to make clear to those concerned that flagrant violations of the peace cannot and will not he tolerated. We should suggest some practical measures for lowering tension in the area so that the people of these two countries, Syria and Israel, can at least begin to free themselves of the fear of each other. 44. It is with these aims in mind that my delegation is joining the delegation of the United States in preparing a draft resolution, which we hope topresent to the Council shortly.~ This is, of course, not intended to imply any disregard of the Syrian or Israel draft resolutions contained in documents S/5107 and S/5109. We have studied both those cirait resolu- tions attentively but have concluded that neither of them fully meets present requirements in present circumstances. 45. In the view of my delegation the ciraft which we propose to sponsor is better adjustedto these require- ments than either of the other two which 1 have just mentioned. We are certain that its adoption by tbis Council would serve the best interests of bath Syria and Israel.

The situation created durlng the past few weeks in the Middle East as a result of the conflict hetween syria and Israel is a matter of justifiable concern to world public opinion and in parlicular to the countries near the area. My country, which lies close to the Middle East, is bound by traditional economic and diplomatie ties to the countries of the region and has fÇ)llowed with anxiety the development '§J Subsequently cü'culated as document S/5UO and COrr.i. 48. As i5 weIl known, the original request for a meeting of the security Couneil came from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. By a letter dated 20 March 1962 [8/5096], that Government requested consideration of the situation arising from the attack On 8yrian territory by armed forces of Israel during the night of 16-17 March 1962. ! 49. As is apparent from the documents before the Council, during the night of 16-17 March 1962, Israel armed forces staged a prepared attack upon 8yrian territory with commando units, armoured lighters, artillery ap.d aviation. The attack resulted in the death of soldiers and civilians and caused substantial material damage. 50. On 21 March, on the instructions of his Government, the representative of Israel requested a meeting of the Security Council to cOnsider "repeated acts of aggression committed by 8yrian armed forces against citizens ... of Israel" and "threats against its territorial integrity". It should he borne in mind that, both in the letter of 21 March [S/5098] and in the earlier letter of 19 March [S/50931, the Israel Government refers solely to events which preceded or followed the attack of the night of 16-17 March. But if we analyse the documents submitted by the two parties, and the report of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, we see that aU the events which preceded 16 March were of minor importance and local character, for the parties make mutual accusations and the actual situation and evidence are difficult to establish. , j cl 1 1i j 51. As is apparent from the report submitted by the Chief of 8taff, the incidents which preceded the armed attack of 16-17 March did not create a situation that could be regarded as a threat to peace in the area and therefore as requiring a meeting of the 8ecurity Council. They were mere frontier incidents and could have beeu settled locally with the assistance of the Truce Supervision Organization, which was created for that very purpose. General von Horn himself states in his report that " ... while the 8 March 1962 incident was grave, it had not beeu precedéd by a progressively deteriorating situation in the Lake Tiberias area" [8/5102, para. 111. 52. For the above reasons, the Romanian delegation holds that incidents of this nature are not pertinent to our analysis of the issue. 54. My delegation therefore considers that in view of the nature and political significance of these incidents, they cannat constitute the main abject of our debate. 55. what is essential in the analysis of this question is, as we have shawn, the aggressive act committed by Israel armed forces during the night of 16-17 March, an act which was in no way justîfied by any exigencies and which \vas carried out in violation of provisions of the General Armistice Agreement and of the United Nations charter. By virtue of its gravity, it is that act_a real act which the representative of Israel himself did Dot deny in the statement he made to the Security Council-which endangered peace in that part of the world. 56. The attack was premeditated. This emerges clearly from the official communiqué issued on 17 March by the spokesman of Israel's armed forces, in which it was admitted that a unit of that country's armed forces had nassaulted Syrian positions north of Nuqueib, occupied the posts and destroyed the fortifications n, and in which an attempt was made ta justify the attack by claiming that it was nto eusure normal activitywithinIsrael's sovereign territory ... n [8/5102, para. 22]. But this argument can hardIy justüy Israel' s actions against Syria, particularly as in that region, as we know, there is a United Nations organ which was set up to supervise and maintain the peace and assist in the settlement of disputes. forces 57. It is apparent, therefore, that Israel tried, completely arbitl'arîly, ta resolve its differences with Syria by employing armed force, thereby violating, the provisions of articles II and V of the General Armistice Agreement. By so doing, Israel also violated the fundamental principles andexpress provisions of Articles 1 and 2 ofthe United Nations charter. 57. expresses 58. By using armed force against Syria, the Government of Israel has assumed a heavy responsibility before bath the Security Council and world public opinion. Its responsibility is the more serious if we bear in mind mat Israel has already been condemned by the Council in Connexion with similar actions in the pasto We have in mind here the Security Council resolutions of 24 November 1953,21 29 March 1955,2( 19 Januery 1956,Y. and others. AIl these resolutions condemning the unjustifiable acts oflsrael should have been for the State of Israel a serious 58. le que du a 1953.21, Toutes fiables année. S/3 Conseil. année. Supplément 60. In the draft resolution submitted a few days ago [S/5109], ISrael goes even further, requesting the Seeurity Couneil to condemn the victim of its agression. ûbviously this is a rather clumsy effort to spread confusion. It is an effort which should be rejeeted, the more sa as Israel has already resorted to these taetics many times in the pasto 61. In these circumstances the Romanian delegation considers that the seeurity Council should take note of· Israel's acts of aggression agalnst Syriaandshould once again condemn the violation by Israel of its obligations under the General Armistice Agreement and under the United Nations Charter. 62. The Seeurity Council should at the same time strongly reeommend measures to campel the State of Israel to respect its obligations in the future.

Ihave no more speakers on my list. Unless the Couneil abjects, we shaH therefore adjourn untH tomorrow at 10.30 a.m. 64. Before 1 adjourn the meeting, 1 should like to dr~w the attention of the Couneil to the revised text of the cIraft resolution submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic, which is eontained in document S/5107/ Rev.l. The meeting rose st 5 p.m. CYPRU5/tHYPRE, PAN 10 AI••ande. ,ne Gfe.' CZECHOSLOVAI<IA/TCHÉCOSlOVAQUIE: AFRICA/AFRIQUE <;M"EROON/<;AMEROUN: L'BRI\'RIE DU PEuPLE AfR'CAIN Lo G.,on'•. B. p. \197. Vaoondé. DIFfUSION INTERNIHIONALE CAMEROUNAISE OU L:VRE ET DE LA PRESSE. SonS"'.I,,,,a. CONGO (,oopo'dvlll.): INSTITUT POL:TIQUE CONGOLA,S. B. P. 2307, ,ooooldvdie. nH,OP'AdTHlOPIE: INTERNATIONAL PRESS AGENCY. P. O. Bo. 120. Add" Abab•. GHANA: UNIVERSITY BOOKSKOP Un".,.,l, ...'olle.o 01 Ghana. Le.on. Acc.a. I(ENYA: THE E.S.A. BOOI<SKOP Bo. 30167. Na..ob,. MOROCCO/MAROC: CENTRE oE DIffUSION OOCUMENTAIRE OU B.E.P.I. B. '00 M,ch.u.·Bell."•. l'labo'. SOUTH AFR\<;A/AFRIQUE DU SUD: VAN SCHAIK'S BOOK STORE (PH.), LTO. Chu<oh SI'••'. 80' 724, P"'o"a. SOUTt'ERN RHODESIA/RHODES'E DU SUD' TIiE BOOK CENTRE. F.." 5" •••. Sal"bory. UNITED ARAB REPUBLI<;/RÉPUBljQUE ARABE'UNIE' LIBRAIR'E "'LA RENAISSANCE D'ÉGYPTE" 9 Sh. Mly P.,h., C.lto. ~RTIA LTD.. 30.~ S"'e~'aoh, CESKOSLOVENSKY SPISOVATEL N4,odn' T'id' 9, P'Oha. DENMARKIDANEMARK: N.rre~.d~6. K~b.nhovn. FlNLAND/flNlANtlE, 2 K.,kU5~a'u. Hel.in",- FRANCE, EOmONS 13. ,ue Soulllo'. Pa", ~~~:,:.:gNi"~~~:~~L~~~~B~~~Éa:1~E R. EESENSCHMIOT SChwon'hol.r 5t'- 59. ELWERT UND MEURER Houpl<tra.,. lOI, Serhn·Schan.ber ALEXANDER KORN SpiegelQ'''e 9, W'.'bacleo. W. E. SAARBACH Ger.ruclon",...o 30. GREECE/GRÈCE' lIBRA1RIE 2S.•ue du S,"de. Alhenes. I<UNGARY/HONGRIE: P. O. Sa. 149. Budop ICELAND/ISLANoE, EYMUNDSSONAR 1-1_ Aus'u,,"aeli lB. Re",avlk. IRELANo/IRLANDE, STATIONERY OFFICE. ITAl Y/ITALIE' LlBRêRIA COMMISS'ONARIA V.. Cioo C.ppoo; 26. & Vie Poolo Mercun 19/5, LUXEMBOURG: LIBRAIRIE J. TRAUSCHSCHUMMER P'.ce du Th."tre. Lu,e",bOOrg. NETHERLANDS/PA1S·SAS: N. V. MARTINUS NIJHOH Lon.e Voarhou' 9. 's.G'Ov.nhe.e. NORWAY/NORVÈGE' Ka<l Johan'oa'o, 41. POLANU/POLOGNE, Wa"zaw•. PORTUGAL: LlVRARIA 186 Rua AUrea. l;.<boa. ROMIl.NIA/ROUMANIE, St'. "";",de B".nd U_,8. P. O. So. 134·135, B"cu'.~I'. SPAIN/ESPAGNE, LIBRERIA SOSCH Il Randa Un...r..dOd. USRERIII. MUNDI,PRENSA C..tello 37. Modn'd. SI'IEDEN/SUÈDE: C. KUNGL. IiDVSOKHANDEL F"d'8a1.n 2. S.aekholm. .. ASIA/ASIE BURMA/BIRMANIE, CURATOR, GOH. BOOK DEPOT. R.nsoon. CAMBOtlIA/CAMBODGE: ENTREPRISE KHMÈRE ~';;p~:~:~~R~Epopel..;., 5. ~ R. l .. Phnom.Penh. CEYLON/CEYlAN, LAKE HOUSE BOOKSHGP A"oc. Ne".paoe,. 01 Ce,Ion. P. O. So. 244. CalamM. CHINA/CHINE' THE WORLO BOOK COMPANY, liD. 99 Chung ~,n. Raad, 1" S.cw;". TOIoeh, Tai".n. TIiE COMMERCIAL PRESS. llO. 211 Honan Rood. Sh.ng~ai. HONG I<ONG/HONG_I(ONG: TI-IE SWINDON BOOK COMPANY 25 N.,hoo Raad, Kowloon . lNDIA/INDE, ORIENT lONCMANs Bomb", C.lcu"., Hyd.,.bod. M.dras & New D.lh;. 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ARGENTINA/Il.RGENTINE' SUDAMERICANA, S, 1I0LlVIA/OOLIVIE, C..,II. 972, La Paz. 1 1 1 O,d." and ,nO"'''.' lrom coun.co@swh.,. ,al•• 'RenÇ'.' ha.e na' 'le' boen S.I@. S@ctmn. Un,'ed NOhOn,. L.' command•• @. dem.nde. d. ,en'.iSn.m.nt, èm.nonl d. pays ou ;[ ONU, New YO'k (t.·U,), au li la Section Priee: $U.S. 0.35 (or equivalent Litho in U.N.