S/PV.10035 Security Council

In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Ms. Inger Andersen, Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme; Mr. Charles C. Jalloh, Professor at the University of Miami Law School and Member of the International Law Commission; and Ms. Maranatha Dinat, World Relief Haiti. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2025/687, which contains the text of a letter dated 28 October 2025 from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary- General, transmitting a concept note on the item under consideration. I now give the floor to Ms. Andersen. Ms. Andersen: I thank the Government of Sierra Leone for convening this timely discussion. Twenty-four years ago, the United Nations General Assembly invited entities of the United Nations system and other international and regional organizations to observe 6 November each year as the International Day for Preventing the Exploitation of the Environment in War and Armed Conflict. In doing so, Member States recalled that damage to the environment in times of armed conflict impairs ecosystems and natural resources long beyond the period of conflict and often extends beyond the limits of national territories and the present generation. My first point this morning is that environmental damage caused by conflicts continues to push people into hunger, disease and displacement, thereby increasing insecurity. Conflicts lead to pollution, waste and the destruction of critical ecosystems, with long-term implications for food security, water security, economies and human health. In the Gaza Strip, for example, we have seen, since 2023, the loss of 97 per cent of its tree crops, 95 per cent of its shrubland and 82 per cent of its annual crops. Freshwater and marine ecosystems are polluted by munitions, untreated sewage and other contaminants. More than 61 million tons of debris must now be cleared, sensitively, to avoid further contamination. Conflicts elsewhere lead to pollution and damage to water infrastructure, either accidental or deliberate. In countries such as Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, 180 instances of the deliberate targeting of water infrastructure were recorded during the 2010s. In Haiti, the conflict that we have seen has worsened soil and water contamination in lowland slum areas, dramatically increasing the risks of disasters such as flash floods and infectious diseases. In many conflicts, internally displaced persons have sought refuge in ecologically fragile areas. People My second point this morning is that climate change exacerbates tensions and, under some conditions, contributes to conflicts. While conflicts rarely have a single cause and climate-conflict pathways are complex, climate change is not infrequently one of the peels of the onion, with other peels often reflecting conflicts over resources such as water and land, ethnic conflict, religious conflict and so on. But somewhere in the mix, there is often also the added driver of climate change. Climate change, therefore, accompanied by other challenges, can contribute to a dangerous downwards spiral. As the Secretary-General noted in a previous address to the Council, “[b]oth climate disasters and conflict inflame inequalities, imperil livelihoods and force people from their homes” (see S/PV.9547). Climate change has an especially disruptive impact in regions in which people are already vulnerable and depend heavily on agriculture or natural resources. In this context, it is important to note the powerful influence exerted by climate change on the water cycle — the hydrological cycle — making it more erratic and more extreme. In the past six years, only about one third of the global river catchment area has seen normal discharge conditions compared to the 1991–2020 average, as the World Meteorological Organization informs us. People are suffering the cascading impacts of either too much or too little water. Dry areas have also been devastated by these disruptions to the water cycle. Across a broad region between Mauritania in the west and Afghanistan in the east, with the Mediterranean at its centre, temperatures have been increasing faster than the global average, and rainfall has become more erratic. Exposure to climate-related hazards has increased because of population growth and the expansion of irrigated agriculture. Vulnerability has also increased, especially where conflicts have undermined communities’ and countries’ ability to cope with drought. We are witnessing the consequences now in Syria, where, following an exceptionally dry winter and high summer temperatures, much of the wheat harvest has failed. Syria has also suffered devastating forest fires in 2025, further diminishing the economic safety net provided by critical ecosystems. Syria’s Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management has issued an urgent call for the Government, international partners and local actors to work together “to protect livelihoods and strengthen our preparedness for the future”. On the basis of this, therefore, there is growing evidence that droughts and high temperatures increase the risks of various forms of conflict. In this context, it is worth noticing that the World Bank, in research published in 2024, found that most contexts affected by fragility and conflict also experience consistently drier and more severe drought periods. The countries that were chronically unstable during the first two decades of this century also experienced more severe droughts on average during the same period. There is of course no simple causal chain  — increased rainfall can also make violent conflict more likely in certain settings, for example, through the targeting of rich agricultural areas by armed groups or States. I wish to highlight three priorities that would enhance environmental support to conflict-affected counties. Priority number one is to rebuild national capacity for environmental management, supported by science-based assessments and tools. Local and national governance institutions are often weakened during periods of conflict. Rebuilding national environmental governance capacities enables Governments to manage their natural resources for sustainable development, economic recovery and climate adaptation, thus reducing poverty, hunger and dependency. Here, the United Nations system can help to rebuild national capacity by acting as a trusted knowledge facilitator, providing high-level and technical advice, supporting peer exchange and helping Governments navigate complex policy trade-offs in ways that are independent, technically sound and normatively grounded. Conflict-related environmental assessments can help stakeholders to understand immediate and longer-term risks, providing an essential basis for priority-setting during the recovery. Here, tools such as remote sensing can, when used correctly, show changes in environmental status to facilitate remediation action. Modelling can also help decision-makers to understand environmental policy options and trade-offs, and frameworks for managing conflict-related debris can lower contamination risks and reduce the financial and environmental costs of reconstruction. There is also substantial evidence that empowering women to manage natural resources in conflict-affected settings contributes to enhanced environmental management, conflict resolution and community stability. The second priority that I would like to highlight this morning is facilitating and enabling work across sectors and across actors. At the national level and internationally, the management of natural resources, including water, rangelands and forests, requires cooperation between and among ministries and sectors, including the private sector and, in some cases, security actors. The United Nations system must also ensure seamless coordination among environmental, humanitarian, peace and security, human rights and development entities. Deploying expert advisers to engage with all relevant stakeholders helps us to identify viable environmental solutions, enabling prompt recovery. We at the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) deployed our first adviser to a United Nations integrated peacebuilding mission in 2010 to support Sierra Leone’s transition and ensure that environmental dimensions were incorporated fully into the recovery process. The integration of environmental and climate security advisers into United Nations peace operations has now been scaled up via the establishment of the Climate Security Mechanism  — a joint United Nations effort that addresses the links between climate, peace and security. Environmental advisers, working at the national and regional levels, provide a light-footprint, flexible contribution to building peace and accelerating recovery. The third priority that I would like to highlight is to increase investments in climate adaptation in conflict-affected countries. In 2025, in the United Nations Environment Programme’s Adaptation Gap Report, which we issued just a couple of days ago, on 29 October, we highlight a yawning gap in adaptation finance for developing countries. This adaptation gap is putting lives, livelihoods and entire economies at risk. For conflict-affected countries, the adaptation gap is even greater. Between 2014 and 2021, people living in severely affected countries received just $2 per capita in climate finance compared to $162 per capita in more stable countries. As we head to Belém for the thirtieth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, high ambition is therefore needed in terms of both adaptation and mitigation. Every fraction of a degree matters, and every fraction of a degree avoided means fewer losses for people and ecosystems and greater opportunities for peace and prosperity.

I thank Ms. Andersen for her briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Jalloh. Mr. Jalloh: I begin by congratulating Sierra Leone on assuming the presidency of the Council, and I thank the presidency for the invitation to provide a briefing on this subject on which I have engaged extensively, as both a practitioner and a regular teacher of international environmental law, within and outside of the International Law Commission (ILC). At its most recent quinquennium, the International Law Commission considered several environment-related topics, including the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts, the protection of the atmosphere and sea level rise in relation to international law. I am therefore deeply honoured to participate in today’s thematic briefing on “Climate and security: environmental impact of armed conflict and climate-driven security risks”, on this important international day. Specifically, I will focus on the potential for a coherent legal framework to foster international cooperation and accountability, taking into account that armed conflict causes significant harm to the environment. In this regard, I wish to limit my intervention to four main observations. My first observation is a contextual one. For several decades now, going back to the Gulf War in the early 1990s, discussions have taken place at the international level on the need for a coherent legal framework to better protect the environment during armed conflict. Under current international law, several bodies of international law bear directly or indirectly on the protection of the environment. Major treaties in the areas of international humanitarian law, international criminal law, international environmental law, international human rights law and the law of the sea contain provisions upon which States and the international community may draw to strengthen the legal protection of the environment during times of peace as well as during armed conflict. Some of the rules are so prevalent in State practice that they also form part of customary international law. The challenge is that much of the current international legal framework serves more as a patchwork of norms, instead of as a coherent legal architecture. Two international instruments are worth highlighting in this regard: the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, called the ENMOD Convention, adopted in 1976, which was followed by Protocol Additional I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, adopted in 1977. These two instruments added binding obligations on States to better protect the environment. Specifically, articles 35 and 55 of Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions prohibit employing “methods or means of warfare, which are intended or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment”. Similarly, not only does article 55 provide that care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage, but the provision also prohibits reprisals by way of attacks against the natural environment. Part of the challenge that the international community faces in implementing articles 35 and 55 of Protocol Additional I is the difficulty of demonstrating fulfilment of the cumulative three-part criteria of widespread, long- Building on those prohibitions in Protocol Additional I, article 8, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) prohibits, as a war crime, intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment that will be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated. This means that attacking the environment could give rise to State responsibility for the parties to the conflict, but it would also result in criminal liability for persons who engage in such acts. The attacks, at least when of a certain gravity, could be subject to investigation and prosecution by the ICC or, under the complementarity principle, by the national courts of any of the 125 States parties to the ICC. While it is of course significant that current international law provides some protection to the environment in the context of armed conflicts, effective protection of the environment remains elusive. This is because much of the existing provisions enshrined in key international instruments, such as the Geneva Conventions and Protocol Additional I, are designed for classic inter-State wars, that is, international armed conflicts, and therefore do not necessarily apply to civil wars or non-international armed conflicts. The latter, of course, are the majority of armed conflicts in the world today. As the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) concluded in a seminal study from November 2009, this legal vacuum is a major obstacle for preventing the often serious environmental damage inflicted during internal conflicts. My second observation gives me hope. Significant efforts have been made to strengthen the international legal framework to protect the environment. In this regard, while there is not yet a single binding universal treaty to regulate the protection of the environment in armed conflicts, there are several so-called “soft law” instruments that have made significant contributions to clarifying and strengthening international law. Owing to time limitations, I will focus on the two most important ones. First, in 1994, with the support of the General Assembly, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) adopted the Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict. Those Guidelines identified legal rules, derived from the law of armed conflict, for inclusion into military manuals and instructions for armies at the national level. To consider developments at the international level, both in terms of treaties and customary international law since 1994, the ICRC updated its guidelines on the protection of the environment in armed conflict in 2020 in order to facilitate the adoption of concrete measures to reduce the environmental impact of armed conflict. Divided into four parts, the guidelines cover a range of issues in 32 rules concerning general and specific applications of the law of armed conflict and the means and methods of warfare. In addition to the ICRC Guidelines, the International Law Commission — which Executive Director Andersen mentioned and where I have had the privilege of serving for the past nine years — completed a set of 27 principles on protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts, which, along with a preamble and commentaries, were adopted upon final reading in 2022. The principles, rooted in the law of armed conflict, international environmental law and international human rights law, sought to strengthen the protection of the environment before, during and after armed conflict, including in situations of occupation. The purpose of the ILC principles is to encourage States to take robust measures to prevent, mitigate and remediate harm to the environment. The principles, which largely constitute a codification of existing law, seek to be comprehensive. They are further significant Among the key principles is principle 7, which is directly relevant to the mandate of the Security Council and provides that: “States and international organizations involved in peace operations established in relation to armed conflicts shall consider the impact of such operations on the environment and take, as appropriate, measures to prevent, mitigate and remediate the harm to the environment resulting from those operations.” Given the ongoing conflicts, mostly in Africa, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, on which I wish to focus, we have seen not only significant loss of life but also, according to UNEP, “unprecedented levels of environmental damage in the Gaza Strip, damage to its soils, freshwater supplies and coastline”. Part 4 of the principles contains three key norms on the general obligations of an occupying Power, which could be relevant in the context of Gaza and the occupied Palestinian territory. It addresses the sustainable use of natural resources of any occupied territory under article 55 of the Hague Regulations, which is part and parcel of customary international law, and further recalls the duty of any occupier to take measures to ensure that activities in the occupied territory do not cause significant harm to the environment, including that of other States, or areas beyond national jurisdiction. The final six ILC principles will also be relevant given the current ceasefire, since they address issues relating to post-conflict restoration and protection of the environment damaged as a consequence of conflict. While these principles do not have normative status, the specific aspects that I have flagged are grounded in the law of armed conflict and are therefore applicable to that extent. Both instruments, that is, the 2020 ICRC Guidelines and the 2022 ILC principles, provide detailed guidance on how better to protect the environment in the context of armed conflicts. The two documents, while overlapping to some extent, complement each other well. Overall, they add greater clarity to existing international law, and, to the extent that they are embraced and implemented by States, incorporated into their national laws and implemented in the field, they should, over time, strengthen the protection of the environment in the numerous armed conflicts around the world. Since this is an important issue of concern to the Council and a focus of discussion, let me add that the spirit of those ILC and ICRC instruments also aligns with the broader findings of the International Court of Justice requiring all States and the United Nations to take lawful measures not to recognize or aid in the denial of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including by infringing their right to permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. That last comment brings me to my third and final observation, which is the proposal of four concrete and actionable recommendations for what States, including those in the Security Council, could do. First, the Security Council could encourage States to take note of the ICRC Guidelines and the ILC principles and perhaps even consider reflecting them in their national legislation, including in military manuals and instructions to armed forces and personnel in the field. The General Assembly, for its part, has already taken note of the ILC principles in resolution 77/104, of 7 December 2022, the text of which was annexed to the resolution and brought to the attention of States and international organizations. On 1 March 2024, the United Nations Environment Assembly likewise adopted resolution 6/12 on environmental assistance and recovery in areas affected by armed conflicts, in which Member States recalled the ILC principles on the protection of the environment and, in operative paragraph 2, invited States to Secondly, severe environmental damage, especially damage that might contribute to the commission of international crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity, should be prohibited as a crime under international and national laws. I had the privilege of serving on the international expert panel that advanced the legal definition of the crime of ecocide, which has been considered for future inclusion in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It is encouraging that the definitions we developed and variants thereof have already been included in the national laws of various States. Thirdly, in addition to encouraging States to better implement existing international law relating to the environment, especially the law of armed conflict, UNEP itself has been recommending for several years now that a new legal instrument is needed to provide further protection for the environment. In the African region, for instance, several treaties already prohibit the illicit exploitation of natural resources, which is exacerbated in the context of armed conflict. It is important that, against that wider context, States establish what UNEP has described as place-based protection of critical natural resources and areas of ecological importance during armed conflicts. This is vital. As the International Court of Justice aptly explained in its 1996 advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (A/51/218, annex), “the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn.” Thus, the need for the protection of the environment in times both of war and of peace remains a fundamental imperative. Finally, as there are many conflicts around the world in which environmental damage continues to occur, the Security Council could consider the establishment of a mechanism to monitor environmental damage in armed conflicts. Such a mechanism would also address claims for compensation in relation to damage caused to the environment, irrespective of the classification of the conflict as international or non-international in character. Such actions would fall within the Council’s mandate, under the Charter of the United Nations, of maintaining international peace and security, given the links that it has itself drawn between environmental degradation and armed conflicts.

I thank Mr. Jalloh for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ms. Dinat. Ms. Dinat: I thank you, Madam President, for the opportunity to draw attention to Haiti, a country where the combined impacts of environmental degradation, climate change and social and political instability reinforce one another, undermining peace, security and sustainable development. Haiti is facing a profound environmental crisis. Nearly 98 per cent of its original forest cover has disappeared, leading to accelerated soil erosion, a loss of biodiversity and a sharp decline in agricultural productivity. This degradation is undermining the livelihood of already vulnerable rural communities and is fuelling internal displacement and tensions over natural resources, in particular water and arable land. At the same time, climate change is intensifying these pressures. Stronger hurricanes, recurring floods and prolonged droughts continue to destroy infrastructure, exacerbate food and nutrition insecurity and disrupt social stability. In a country where much of the population depends on subsistence agriculture, every climate shock becomes both a humanitarian emergency and a driver of instability. These environmental and climate pressures are further compounded by widespread Environmental degradation is also forcing many families to migrate from rural areas to already fragile urban zones, where limited infrastructure and scarce economic opportunity heighten social tensions and strengthen the territorial control of armed groups. Imagine a mother living in one of the most vulnerable neighbourhoods of the capital. Her home, already weakened by erosion, is flooded after heavy rains. She is forced to flee with her children, crossing gang-controlled areas and unsafe roads to reach an improvised camp. This is the reality for thousands of Haitian families. Each journey becomes perilous, and each destination uncertain. This is not only a matter of displacement; it is a question of safe mobility — the mobility to move without fear, to access essential services and to rebuild one’s life with dignity. This crisis affects everyone: women and men, girls and boys, youth and elders. Young people, in particular, are compelled to leave degraded and impoverished rural areas, only to find themselves in urban neighbourhoods marked by violence, unemployment and social exclusion. Many face the risk of gang recruitment, while women and girls confront heightened threats of gender-based violence and the loss of livelihoods. Men and boys, often without work or social support, fall into cycles of vulnerability and exploitation. The environmental and security crisis in Haiti spares no one. It erodes the dignity, safety and cohesion of the entire society. The climate dimension further aggravates this crisis of mobility and insecurity. When hurricanes tear off roofs, when rising waters flood the plains, or when droughts dry out the hills, it is always the same displaced or marginalized families that pay the highest price. Informal settlements in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince lack proper infrastructure. Roads are fragile, drainage systems are insufficient, and access to basic services remains severely limited. These environmental vulnerabilities, compounded by urban violence, make evacuation routes dangerous and expose civilians to shooting or being caught in the crossfire, looting and sexual violence. This intersection of forced mobility, extreme climate and armed conflict creates a vicious cycle. Insecurity drives displacement, displacement exposes people to new climate risks and climate shocks, in turn, deepen social tensions and competition for scarce resources. Without an integrated response, we risk not only broken lives but the complete fragmentation of Haiti’s social and urban fabric. In the face of these challenges, it is essential that the international community recognize that Haiti’s environmental crisis is, at its core, also a human and security crisis. As such, it is urgent to strengthen the links between humanitarian action, climate adaptation and peacebuilding. In Haiti, interventions must be rooted in community-based and ecological approaches, such as restoring ecosystems and nature-based solutions, thereby promoting the sustainable management of natural resources, reducing risks and reinforcing local governance. These actions do more than protect the environment. They build resilience, foster social cohesion and lay the foundations for lasting stability.

I thank Ms. Dinat for her briefing. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Sierra Leone. I thank Under-Secretary-General Inger Andersen, Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP); Professor Charles Chernor Jalloh, Member of the International Law Commission; and Ms. Maranatha Dinat, World Relief Haiti, for their deeply informative and thought-provoking briefings. Only 20 years ago, United Nations assessments warned starkly about biodiversity loss and environmental decline in Sierra Leone. Today, by contrast, we can point to hopeful signs. In 2025, UNESCO recognized Tiwai island and Gola forest as UNESCO World Heritage Sites, the first in Sierra Leone and a triumph of conservation and nurture that underscores how environmental restoration, when integrated into peacebuilding, can yield lasting stability. Our experience is regrettably not unique. From scorched-earth tactics to the long-term consequences of nuclear testing and the widespread use of explosive weapons in urban areas, history records the severe environmental toll of warfare. International law has progressively acknowledged these realities. Jurisprudence and advisory opinions have recognized environmental considerations in the conduct of hostilities and post-conflict responsibility, while contemporary cases have addressed remediation and compensation for environmental harm. Today, multiple international bodies are clarifying and further developing the applicable rules. The International Law Commission’s principles on the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts provide practical guidance across the conflict cycle. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the International Court of Justice have illuminated States’ obligations relevant to environmental protection, in particular sea-level rise and climate-change. The United Nations General Assembly observes 6 November as the International Day for Preventing the Exploitation of the Environment in War and Armed Conflict. Resolutions of the United Nations Environment Assembly and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework reinforce the imperative of prevention, remediation and resilient recovery. Incidentally, the Security Council has also acknowledged climate- and environment-related security risks across several dossiers and thematic discussions, encouraging risk assessment and mitigation consistent with international humanitarian and human rights law. Across regions, we regrettably see patterns of harm to the environment in ongoing conflicts, despite the aforementioned efforts by international bodies. Conflicts contaminate air, water and soil; destroy agricultural land and ecosystems; and erode governance. The remnants of war, such as mines, unexploded ordnance and toxic debris, compound risk, while climate change magnifies vulnerability. These dynamics intensify fragility, drive displacement and heighten food insecurity from the Sahel and the Great Lakes to the Sudan, and to Ukraine’s damaged industrial and agricultural landscapes, warranting attention by the Security Council. UNEP assessments and those of other bodies indicate that, since 7 October 2023, the escalation in Gaza has driven severe, wide-ranging environmental degradation. Water systems have collapsed, allowing raw sewage to contaminate land and the coastal aquifer. Soil compaction and millions of tons of hazardous rubble have left vast areas infertile. Air quality has deteriorated owing to the burning of waste and debris, and solid-waste management has effectively ceased. Gaza’s biodiversity and vegetation have been decimated, and tree crops, shrublands and food-producing land have been destroyed, heightening the risk of long- term desertification. These shocks are intensifying the humanitarian crisis, fuelling waterborne disease, deepening food insecurity and compromising public health. In the light of that, what more can the Council do? Sierra Leone offers the following points. First, on mainstreaming risk in Council practice, the Security Council should systematically integrate conflict-linked environmental and climate risks into mandates, reports of the Secretary-General, political guidance and mission planning. This includes environmental risk analysis, mine action linked to agricultural recovery and nature-based stabilization. Early-warning and climate-security assessments should identify hotspots, such as the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, where environmental pressures threaten to ignite or prolong conflict. Secondly, on ensuring a coherent international architecture, we recognize that United Nations Climate Change Conferences meet to measure progress and negotiate multilateral responses to climate change. The Conference of the Parties processes address political and financing dimensions of climate action. Complementing these, courts and tribunals, including the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, have clarified State obligations with environmental implications, while the International Law Commission has codified and progressively developed norms through the principles on protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts. The Security Council must play its part in the security-related aspects, ensuring a multidimensional and effective response that bridges peace and security, humanitarian action, development and the rule of law. Thirdly, on protecting the natural environment under international law, including international humanitarian law, parties to conflicts must be reminded of their obligations to protect the natural environment. We underline the robust legal framework, customary and conventional international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the progressive guidance in the principles on protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts, applicable before, during and after armed conflict. We encourage the Council to promote predeployment environmental training for peacekeepers, operational guidelines that minimize ecological harm and context-specific environmental management plans for missions. Fourthly, on implementation and accountability, Sierra Leone supports enhanced cooperation to monitor, document and remediate environmental damage, including capacity-building for data collection, environmental forensics and transparent reporting. We note emerging discussions on recognizing ecocide as a serious international crime and encourage continued reflection on accountability pathways consistent with international law. The implementation of international humanitarian law and the principles on protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts should be mainstreamed through training, reporting and information-sharing across the United Nations system and field presences. Fifthly, on moving from debris to resilient recovery, safe debris management, hazardous waste handling and resilient reconstruction are critical to public health and environmental recovery after conflict. The United Nations system and partners should help conflict-affected countries to adopt the minimum standards for debris and waste, water and sanitation and urban reconstruction, aligned with disaster risk reduction frameworks and the relevant United Nations Environment Assembly resolutions. Investment in local technologies and community-driven approaches strengthens sustainability and ownership. Alongside these tracks, we wish to highlight practical actions, including investing in national adaptation and mitigation strategies that safeguard livelihoods and natural resources, providing support for climate-resilient and regenerative agriculture backed by robust early-warning systems and fully mainstreaming environmental considerations into United Nations conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, so that peace agreements and political processes address resource-based drivers of insecurity and foster local dialogue and cooperation among communities competing for scarce land and water. Strengthening the United Nations Climate Security Mechanism and regional frameworks and expanding the deployment of climate security advisers to missions where climate and security risks intersect will enable tailored, context-specific interventions. In closing, Sierra Leone emphasizes that protecting the environment during armed conflict is not an optional act of goodwill; it is a legal, moral and strategic imperative. Environmental protection is not peripheral to peace; it is central to sustaining it. The Security Council has an essential role in ensuring that conflict- related environmental risks are addressed within prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates. Our capacity to act decisively and coherently across the humanitarian, development and security pillars will determine whether we bequeath a more stable and sustainable world. I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

We are glad to see you presiding over this meeting, Madam President, and I would like to thank you for your important statement. I would also like to thank the briefers for their thorough and insightful remarks, and we take good note of the recommendations that were presented. The human and environmental toll of armed conflict is evident. Warfare destroys not only infrastructure and lives; it tears apart the natural systems that sustain societies. The impacts of widespread damage, millions of tons of rubble, explosive remnants of war, contaminated water, degraded soils, deforestation, scorched-earth policies and their impact and ecosystem destruction linger long after the guns fall silent. Such harm erodes governance, fuels displacement and deepens humanitarian crises, particularly in regions already under climate stress. We also recognize that beyond armed conflict, the impacts of climate change, in particular sea level rise, pose a serious existential risk to many countries, in particular small island developing States. Of even greater concern is the deliberate weaponization of shared natural resources, and a textbook example is the unilateral suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty by India earlier this year. For more than six decades, the Treaty has stood as a model of cooperation, ensuring the equitable and predictable sharing of the Indus basin’s waters between Pakistan and India, even in times of war. India’s unlawful unilateral decision to suspend this framework undermines the letter and spirit of this Treaty, threatens ecosystems, disrupts data-sharing and endangers the lives of the millions who depend on the Indus River water system for food and energy security In order to address the environmental impacts of armed conflict and climate-driven security risks, we must, first, focus on the prevention and the early resolution of conflicts. The Security Council must fulfil its Charter responsibility to address threats to international peace and security at their very inception. Secondly, environmental considerations could be integrated into United Nations peace operations and political missions, where relevant. Pakistan has done so in practice. In the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, our engineering contingents have built 80 kilometres of life-saving dikes in Bentiu, protecting hundreds of thousands from floodwaters. In the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, our peacekeepers have facilitated transhumance dialogues to prevent resource-based tensions. We welcome the growing attention to making peacekeeping greener. These actions should be embedded in planning, budgeting and mandate design. Thirdly, we must uphold international law, especially international humanitarian law. This includes the obligations of parties to distinguish between civilian and military objectives, to take constant care to spare the civilian population and to avoid methods of warfare expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment. Fourthly, we must promote United Nations system coherence. Greater coordination among United Nations country teams, the Department of Peace Operations and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, together with regional organizations and international financial institutions, is essential to align activities for environmental recovery and post-conflict stabilization, ensuring that financing, technical assistance and field operations are mutually reinforcing. Fifthly, we must provide climate and biodiversity finance that is new, additional, predictable and grant-based. The thirtieth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, held in Belém, offers an opportunity to deliver on this, including by adequately capitalizing the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage, scaling up adaptation finance and agreeing on a clear path towards implementing the new collective, quantified goal on climate finance. However, we stress that such finance must not be debt-creating, nor should it be double-counted as development, humanitarian or peace and security finance. While recognizing that environmental damage in conflict not just is collateral damage but can also be a multiplier of insecurity, it is Pakistan’s firm belief that comprehensive measures to address and combat the pernicious phenomenon of climate change can be best pursued through universal platforms under a cooperative approach based on the cardinal principle of common but differentiated responsibility and the legal obligations and commitments of parties. Pakistan stands ready to work with all partners at all relevant forums to uphold international law, advance environmental recovery in conflict-affected areas and ensure that shared natural resources serve as avenues for cooperation and not contention. Armed conflicts bring about lasting damage to the environment, which sustains the fundamental human rights to life and health. The depletion of water resources, the degradation of land and the erosion of livelihoods dismantle this natural foundation of stability, leaving entire communities vulnerable to unmitigated disasters and perpetuating a cycle of fragility and violence. The security risks driven by these environmental harms are not abstract concepts. Unfortunately, for millions, they are a lived reality. Fully recognizing the gravity of these risks, the Republic of Korea has always been a strong advocate for a more holistic approach in the Council’s deliberations. Taking this important opportunity, I would like to highlight three key points. First, the Council must spare no efforts in condemning and preventing attacks on water-related infrastructure and other essential resources that are indispensable for survival. The Council has already adopted a number of resolutions affirming the protection of civilian infrastructure. In particular, resolution 2573 (2021) strongly condemns attacks depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival as a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and underscores the imperative to put an end to such practices. Yet, we continue to witness a different picture. The persistent targeting of water reservoirs and wastewater treatment plants and the disruption of access to clean water, as is the case in the Sudan by the Rapid Support Forces, stands as a stark violation of our collective resolution. In this regard, the Council needs to strengthen compliance through credible monitoring and accountability. Establishing mechanisms for documentation, monitoring and reporting would further help to ensure timely and effective responses. Secondly, we must embed the early restoration of essential services and their sustainable management into long-term peacebuilding and stabilization strategies. As reflected in numerous reports of the Secretary-General, competition over water and land is both a consequence and a driver of local and regional tensions. In such conflict-affected areas, it is therefore essential to reverse environmental decline as a vital entry point for restoring trust and rebuilding resilient communities. In this spirit, the Republic of Korea is deepening its commitment to turning disruption into opportunity. Together with the United Nations Development Programme, we recently launched a new global initiative called REVIVE  — Relief, Employment and Vital Infrastructure for the Vulnerable in Emergencies — to jump-start early recovery and resilience in conflict-affected communities. The REVIVE initiative will support local recovery in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gaza, Syria and Ukraine, among others, to help to restore critical infrastructure, create emergency jobs and establish essential services such as access to clean water, energy, healthcare and waste management. Thirdly, while minimizing the environmental effects of armed conflicts, we must continue our efforts to integrate context-specific climate risk considerations into mission mandates and reporting. From the Sahel and the Great Lakes region to South Sudan and Afghanistan, the Council has heard repeatedly how climate change has intensified droughts, floods and land degradation and is, in turn, exacerbating and even triggering conflicts. These risks of climate change have now become an integral part of the security landscape. Peace operations must therefore adapt, integrating seasonal forecasts into early warning systems, adopting climate-sensitive logistical planning and anticipating climate-induced displacement. At a time when enhancing the effectiveness of United Nations operations is a shared priority, we firmly believe that integrating context- and region-specific climate risk analysis In this regard, we will continue to support the work of the United Nations Climate Security Mechanism and the climate, peace and security advisers on the ground who bring a valuable climate-sensitive lens to missions and key stakeholders. The Republic of Korea reaffirms its steadfast commitment to systematically addressing all the risks that threaten international peace and security, including those from environmental impact and climate change. We will continue working with Council members and partners to transform the cycle of conflict and degradation into one of resilience and renewal.

I thank you, Madam President, for bringing us together today, and I thank the briefers for their expert insights and testimonies. Since the first Security Council discussion on this topic in 2007 (see S/PV.5663), there has been real progress in tackling climate change, in tackling nature loss, in adapting to climate impacts and in integrating peace and security into those efforts. But there is still much more to be done. Climate change is accelerating, intensifying extreme weather events, disrupting ecosystems, threatening lives and livelihoods. We see this in all corners of the globe. These impacts bring extreme and slow-onset devastation and degradation, not just the droughts and floods that we see on the news, but long-term food insecurity, water scarcity and loss of homes, in turn driving displacement and fuelling tensions. These impacts are most severe in places that are already vulnerable, compounding and exacerbating existing fragilities and pushing communities into cycles of displacement and violence, with women and children often the most affected. As we heard today very clearly, conflict, in turn, compounds the climate crisis, destroying ecosystems and infrastructure, weakening institutions and diverting resources away from climate resilience. Just as the challenges are interrelated, so too are the responses. That requires three priority actions. First, analytics and early warning systems must be strengthened to better anticipate climate-conflict risks, where they contribute meaningfully to peace and security outcomes. This is why the United Kingdom is supporting initiatives such as the United Nations Complex Risk Analytics Fund. Secondly, the United Nations must integrate climate risk assessments and environmental stewardship into its operations on the ground, especially in peacekeeping missions. The United Kingdom welcomes the role of the Climate Security Mechanism in supporting the United Nations system in driving these efforts forward. We also welcome the efforts of some peacekeeping missions to use renewable energy, limit their environmental footprint and strengthen local resilience, which in turn empowers local communities and equips them for the future. Thirdly, funding must be mobilized from all sources to address climate and nature risks to build sustainable peace. Since 2011, the United Kingdom’s international climate finance has not just helped reduce emissions, it has also supported 137 million people in order to cope with the effects of climate change, given 89 million people improved access to clean energy, improved the resilience of 33 million people and provided technical assistance to many more. By doing so, it has helped to address the drivers of conflict around the world.

I also want to thank our briefers, Executive Director Andersen, Professor Jalloh and Ms. Dinat, for their insightful remarks. Let me further commend Sierra Leone for taking the initiative in calling this meeting. I welcome the participation of Her Excellency, Deputy Foreign Minister Alghali. First, across the agenda of the Council, we see that the profound environmental scars of war threaten stability and human well-being. In Ukraine, Russia’s war has ravaged ecosystems, polluted water sources and devastated critical infrastructure, threatening livelihoods and long-term stability. This war has affected Ukraine’s ability to fulfil its traditional role as a major contributor to food security. In Gaza, two years of violence have severely worsened water scarcity, overwhelmed waste management systems and damaged agricultural lands. Despite the ceasefire, the devastating impact of the destruction will be felt by the Palestinians in Gaza for many years to come. The same is true for the Sudan, where conflict-related damage at oil refineries and other critical infrastructure has led to contamination, fires and environmental hazards that undermine recovery efforts. These examples demonstrate that environmental degradation is both a consequence and a driver of insecurity. It is an issue that clearly cuts across agendas and silos, and one that requires a similarly integrated and comprehensive response. In this regard, Denmark supports the principles on the protection of environment in relation to armed conflict. These are principles that establish accountability frameworks crucial for safeguarding environmental integrity during warfare. Secondly, addressing these issues requires recognition of the inherent links between climate, peace and security. To put it simply, war accelerates climate change and exacerbates environmental vulnerabilities, as we heard this morning from Executive Director Andersen. Conflict damages infrastructure, releases greenhouse gases and diminishes natural carbon sinks, further fuelling climate change. The impact of these conflicts is often uneven, with disproportionate effects on countries already vulnerable to climate shocks, weakening their capacity to adapt and to respond. In the Sudan, the ongoing conflict has halted critical climate adaptation programmes, and the country has grappled with severe droughts, desertification and flooding. Displacement caused by conflict has intensified environmental pressures, leading to deforestation, water resource depletion and pollution. Meanwhile, humanitarian funding remains insufficient to address these connected crises. In the Sudan, and in conflicts around the world, strengthening international humanitarian law and international human rights law, safeguarding ecosystems, mitigating environmental harm and ensuring post-conflict environmental restoration are vital components of a comprehensive peacebuilding approach. They must be central to any response during and after conflict. Thirdly, the rule of law, human rights and preventive action are essential. Indigenous Peoples’ land rights are not just legal obligations, they are vital for peace and protection of the environment. Furthermore, integrating climate and environmental risk assessments into all phases of conflict response is critical. Denmark, as co-coordinator of the joint pledgers group on climate, peace and security with Sierra Leone, will continue to support the inclusion, retention and strengthening of language related to environmental and climate change in United Nations mission mandates. We also support United Nations peace operations and country teams, including through the support of the Climate Security Mechanism, in continuing to work closely with regional organizations in this regard. In closing, the scale of environmental devastation caused by conflicts accelerates humanitarian crises and ecological collapse. These impacts deepen vulnerability to the climate crisis, erode community resilience and threaten human security. Denmark’s view is clear: addressing these threats falls squarely within the mandate

First of all, I would like to thank Sierra Leone for taking the initiative to organize this important meeting. I would also like to thank the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme, Ms. Andersen, as well as Mr. Jalloh and Ms. Dinat, for their contributions to our work. The environmental impact of armed conflict is not only an ecological tragedy; it is also an aggravating factor of fragility, displacement and instability. From burned forests to contaminated groundwater, devastated farmland to destroyed energy infrastructure, conflicts leave behind scarred landscapes and vulnerable societies. This destruction compromises food security, public health and governance, which are all essential conditions for lasting peace. As we celebrate this year the tenth anniversary of the Paris Agreement, it must be recalled that climate change and armed conflict are closely interconnected. As we know, climate change increases pressure on natural resources and can contribute to the emergence or intensification of human, economic and political tensions. Similarly, the destruction of natural habitats, pollution and increased emissions caused by conflicts have direct consequences on the natural environment and, in the long term, could contribute to certain effects of climate change. In this context, we must implement the provisions of the Paris Agreement in its various dimensions. I would like to convey three messages at this meeting. First, conflict-related environmental damage that poses major security risks must be the focus of accurate assessments and of recommendations for action to the Security Council. The environmental impacts of armed conflicts fuel humanitarian crises, undermine the resilience of States and can feed new cycles of violence. The Council must be provided with detailed information about the impact of climate and environmental crises in the most vulnerable regions. We therefore call on the Special Representatives who have mandates in this field to provide us with accurate information in their briefings but also to present recommendations for targeted action in specific areas, drawing on lessons learned from crisis contexts as diverse as, for example, the Sahel, South Sudan and Ukraine. Secondly, we must make better use of the tools at our disposal to prevent, monitor and repair environmental damage during and after conflicts. These tools must be fully integrated into political, humanitarian, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development responses. The climate, peace and security advisers deployed within United Nations missions play a key role in this regard. They help countries to strengthen their capacity for risk assessment and management and work to reinforce partnerships with local and regional actors. We see a concrete illustration of this in the work of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa. France and several of its European partners are fully committed to providing concrete support for this work. We call on our other partners in the Security Council to support this effort. We also encourage the United Nations, in cooperation with troop-contributing countries, to continue to implement environmental strategies within the peacekeeping operations themselves, including through mobilizing renewable energy, as illustrated by the efforts made by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon in southern Lebanon. Lastly, the Peacebuilding Fund’s investments in climate and environmental security are a valuable tool for addressing concerns in this field. Thirdly, we must strengthen synergies within the United Nations system and promote close partnerships with regional organizations and international financial institutions. Such coherence is essential to aligning funding for remediation, In conclusion, 10 years after the Paris Agreement, the time has come to turn our commitments into action. Preventing conflict also means protecting ecosystems. Rebuilding peace also means restoring the environment. And taking action for the climate means strengthening international security. We must therefore act together and without delay. The planet will not wait for us.

We thank Sierra Leone for convening this important briefing on climate and security. We also extend our appreciation to Ms. Andersen, Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme, Mr. Jalloh and Ms. Dinat for their insightful contributions to this subject. Today’s discussion highlights a fundamental truth  — climate change does not in itself cause conflicts. It acts as a threat multiplier. It exaggerates existing vulnerabilities, such as poverty, inequality and resource scarcity. If unaddressed, it can heighten instability. Our task is not only to respond to climate impacts but to strengthen resilience and address the root causes of fragility, which climate shocks exaggerate. Climate-related risks are increasingly shaping the global security landscape. These risks interact with local grievances and economic marginalization, often aggravating tensions over land, water and livelihoods. The Security Council’s discussion can therefore focus on prevention by helping States and communities to build the capacity to manage these pressures in a peaceful and sustainable manner. Africa continues to lead with practical and comparative responses. The African Union’s climate security and resilience framework and the common African position on climate, peace and security provide a foundation for integrating climate adaptation into peace and security strategies. Regional organizations are advanced early warning systems that integrate climate indicators into conflict prevention frameworks. These African-led efforts demonstrate that regional cooperation and local ownership are key to building peace and resilience. To move from recognition to action, my delegation proposes the following priorities. First, it is important to strengthen the capacity of developing countries to ensure coherent responses to climate-related risks and shocks that multiply existing conflicts. This involves providing support for early warning systems and national strategies that incorporate conflict-sensitive practices with a particular emphasis on community engagements and ownership. Secondly, it is necessary to establish predictable, long-term funding that supports nationally owned efforts in integrating sustainable resource management into peacebuilding and recovery efforts. International financial institutions should prioritize projects that foster regional cooperation and national ownership. Thirdly, it is essential to promote inclusive and locally owned sustainable development that addresses poverty, inequality and marginalization, while strengthening community resilience to climate shocks. Empowering communities In conclusion, it is essential to support global and African-led initiatives in order to strengthen partnerships, invest in resilience and transform risk into pathways towards peace, stability and shared prosperity.

I thank you, Madam President, Your Excellency Ms. Francess Piagie Alghali, and the Government of Sierra Leone for convening this important briefing. It enables us to build upon ongoing discussions within the Security Council on the intersection of climate and security by assessing the cumulative impact of armed conflict on the environment and exploring approaches to new mitigation measures. Last year, Guyana organized an open debate on the impact of climate change and food insecurity on the maintenance of international peace and security (see S/PV.9547). Together with Adelphi, we published a report, which captured, among other things, the main messages of Member States in the debate. What came out very clearly in the debate and the report were the interconnection between the climate crisis and international stability and a broad consensus that climate change, as it relates to global peace and security, does fall within the scope of the mandate of the Council. Today, as we examine another aspect of the climate-security nexus, I would like to thank our briefers, Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Inger Andersen, Mr. Charles Jalloh and Ms. Maranatha Dinat for setting out what is thus far known about the environmental impacts of armed conflict and how these can be addressed. Assessing the environmental impact of armed conflict is a complex task but should not be ignored. It involves examining not only damage resulting from active hostilities but also damage generated during the preparations for war. Beyond the destruction of infrastructure, conflicts disrupt ecosystems, deplete natural resources and pollute the environment. In Gaza, for example, and as Executive Director Andersen has reminded us, UNEP has estimated that the destruction of buildings, roads and other infrastructure generated more than 61 million tons of debris, some of which is contaminated with unexploded ordnance, asbestos and other hazardous substances. At the same time, peacetime military activities can be just as damaging. For instance, critical minerals integral to manufacturing advanced defence systems and equipment are often excavated in the most environmentally harmful ways to ensure an uninterrupted supply. We can see these instances in several contexts covered by the Council. Moreover, ecologically protected areas occupied by military bases are also at risk, while military training, including missile testing in the open sea, can result in irreversible environmental loss. Even with the lack of complete data due to underreporting, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change estimates that the world’s military forces are responsible for 5.5 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions. This figure does not account for emissions produced directly from actual war. To put this into perspective, global shipping is responsible for approximately 2 to 3 per cent of total global greenhouse gas emissions. The true impacts of actual conflict, as clearly detailed in the concept note for today’s debate (S/2025/687, annex), cannot be quantified or costed. As we have learned from Sierra Leone’s own experience, two decades after the conflict ended, the country still faces degraded water resources First, and in line with the recommendations that emanated from related Council debates, the Security Council should request relevant analyses from other United Nations bodies on the interlinkages between climate, peace and security, including in specific contexts being discussed in the Council. The Council’s engagement must be tailored to address the realities on the ground. Secondly, the Council must consider how political and stabilization missions can further integrate environmental considerations in their work. For instance, UNEP’s environmental assessment of the conflict in Gaza urged that the immediate contamination and pollution risks be addressed in humanitarian and conflict- related cleanup operations, including debris management, so as not to exacerbate environmental degradation further. More specifically, this cross-cutting consideration must include a focus on water and solid waste management to prevent a health crisis, and on hazardous waste-handling and resilient urban reconstruction efforts. Thirdly, improving reporting standards, especially in pre-conflict settings, must be encouraged to engineer more appropriate anticipatory and early warning measures. Strengthening compliance with environmental law, regulations and standards is critical to reducing military pollution and must be backed by investments in green and sustainable military technologies. Lastly, anchored in our response must be the importance of international humanitarian law, which prohibits indiscriminate attacks and attacks against civilian objects. Violations of international humanitarian law often catalyse environmental destruction. In this vein, Guyana calls for stronger enforcement measures to advance accountability for environmental crimes. Guyana stands ready to do its part.

We have closely listened to the speakers and studied the concept note. The importance of climate and environmental issues is beyond doubt, and they need to be addressed. But this should be done in formats designed specifically for this purpose, at a professional rather than a propaganda level. Russia has never recognized a generic linkage between climate change and peace and security issues, nor the need to discuss the idea in the Security Council. We have held this position since 2007, when the United Kingdom proposed singling out climate change as a separate threat to international peace and security. However, the climate-security nexus is not scientifically substantiated, as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change would suggest. If the problem of climate change is overemphasized, we might ignore such destabilizing factors, external and internal, as socioeconomic, political and historical aspects, not to mention interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States. All these factors place a heavy burden on countries that are unable to break free of the vicious cycle of underdevelopment and vulnerability to various kinds of shocks. Each country’s specific situation must be considered with due regard for all possible influences. Conversely, boiling down the causes of crises to climate or environmental problems essentially constitutes an improper narrowing of the Security Council’s work. We would like to reiterate that a path exists for the solution to climate problems in particularly vulnerable countries in the form of cooperation within the framework of existing international legal obligations and on the basis of mechanisms and intergovernmental decisions taken under the auspices of relevant global and regional conventions. The most universal instrument for responding to climate challenges is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and Brazil will soon host the thirtieth session of the Conference of the Parties thereto. We also expect constructive work on a unifying agenda at the upcoming seventh session of the United Nations Environment Assembly, to be held in Nairobi in December. Also noteworthy is cooperation under the Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, what are known as the chemical conventions and the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes. We support discussions on mobilizing additional funding for climate change adaptation in developing countries, including in African States. We would like to recall in this regard that the pledge to raise $100 billion annually remains unmet, adaptation spending has not yet reached 40 per cent of total climate aid and investment in infrastructure and technology transfer are bypassing most of the poorest countries. The readiness of developed countries to contribute to combatting climate change will be largely tested by their implementation of the decisions adopted under the UNFCCC on contributions to the Loss and Damage Fund. Finally, in his report to the Second Committee of the General Assembly this year, the United Nations Secretary-General acknowledged the detrimental impact of unilateral sanctions on the development and provision of humanitarian assistance by the United Nations. Addressing these issues is an important task for the international community. We will continue to pay special attention to this issue, including when designing our national projects to provide assistance to countries in need.

I would like to commend Sierra Leone for convening this timely meeting. Your presence, Madam President, underscores the importance of today’s discussion. On this International Day for Preventing the Exploitation of the Environment in War and Armed Conflict, the briefings we just heard from Ms. Andersen, Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme, Mr. Jalloh and Ms. Dinat, to whom we express our appreciation, remind us how closely environmental degradation, conflict and insecurity are intertwined. Undoubtedly, the climate crisis, with its systemic and cross-cutting impacts, already represents one of the main threats to short- and long-term socioeconomic stability and a major driver of global insecurity. It is therefore essential to adopt a broader understanding of the direct and indirect threats States must defend themselves against, one that fully incorporates climate security. The interplay between climate, peace and security has been debated at the United Nations since 2007, although to little effect. Even a 1°C rise in temperature can heighten risks of interpersonal and intergroup violence. However, according to science there is a strong chance of the increase in global temperature exceeding As the United Nations Secretary-General has rightly acknowledged, climate change might not be the source of all ills, but it has a multiplier effect and is an aggravating factor for instability, conflict and terrorism. In fragile regions, rising temperatures, drought, sea level rise and extreme weather events are undermining water and food security, threatening socioeconomic stability, hindering the full enjoyment of human rights and fuelling political tensions. There is no shortage of examples. In Syria, the 2006–2010 drought devastated agriculture and forced thousands of people to migrate to cities, a dynamic that may have added to the socioeconomic tensions preceding the 2011 civil war. In sub-Saharan Africa, competition over dwindling resources intensified clashes between nomadic herders and crop farmers. In Mozambique, recurring cyclones fuelled internal displacement and violence. Extreme weather events have destabilized fragile Governments, drained public funds and crippled essential services such as healthcare, education and security, creating a vicious cycle of poverty, mistrust and radicalization. Recognizing this, in addition to the United Nations climate security mechanism, many actors are linking climate security into their defence strategies. The European Union’s climate change and defence road map; NATO’s 2022 strategic concept and its Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence, launched in 2024; and the African Union Peace and Security Council’s Africa Climate Security Risk Assessment are key examples. Nevertheless, despite growing awareness of the climate peace and security nexus, implementation remains far behind ambition. The most glaring gap lies in financing. While political declarations multiply, resources remain limited. Investing in climate security means, among other things, reducing conflict and forced displacement, mitigating emissions, strengthening the resilience of vulnerable communities and supporting fragile countries to adapt and recover, by neutralizing threats at their roots. This requires mobilizing finance domestically and globally. However, the fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Seville in July 2025, showed how insufficient the global response remains. Declining development assistance for vulnerable countries demands urgent reflection on global priorities. Meanwhile, the United Nations system itself faces pressure at a moment when stronger multilateral coordination between the security, sustainable development and climate agendas is most needed. Recognizing that peace and security today extend well beyond the military dimension, encompassing climate, environmental, social and economic aspects, compels us to urgently redefine our national and collective priorities. This broader vision can guide us towards a renewed understanding of what security and peace mean today and how they can be achieved. In closing, to confront the interconnected challenges of our time, we must move beyond a narrow view of security. Only an integrated approach that recognizes climate change as a systemic threat to global stability can safeguard peace and prosperity for future generations.

I thank Inger Andersen, Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme, Mr. Charles Jalloh of the University of Miami and Ms. Maranatha Dinat of World Relief Haiti for their briefings. We also welcome Her Excellency Ms. Francess Piagie Alghali, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Sierra Leone, who honours us today by presiding over this meeting. We thank the presidency Panama identifies with the growing concern that environmental degradation constitutes a direct threat to peace, development and the stability of peoples. We understand that ecosystem degradation, pollution of water resources and biodiversity loss in contexts of armed conflict not only exacerbate humanitarian crises but also weaken governance and hinder the recovery of affected communities. In these cases, as underscored by Mr. Charles Jalloh in his interesting briefing on legal matters and as reflected by the President in her pertinent statement, serious environmental damage being used as a weapon of war opens the door to the consideration of a possible environmental crime that could be recognized as ecocide. Erosive environmental effects on life, livelihoods and food security generate mass displacement and aggravate cycles of fragility that intensify competition for already scarce resources, increasing the vulnerability of millions of people in conflict zones and fuelling already tense relations between various social groups. Panama therefore believes that it is necessary to systematically incorporate the assessment and management of environmental risks into the mandates of peace missions. We also support strengthening cooperation between agencies of the United Nations system and international institutions in order to mobilize stable and predictable resources for climate adaptation. Similarly, armed conflicts often directly and indirectly affect people’s access to water, essential sanitation services and critical food systems. The disruption of these services has devastating consequences on the lives of civilians, compromising public health and destroying livelihoods. Safeguarding water from armed conflict and protecting those who look after water sources are therefore indispensable components of humanitarian action. International regulations already offer tools to face these challenges. The Geneva Conventions and their Protocols Additional, the International Law Commission’s principles on protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts, the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, the Paris Agreement and other relevant United Nations resolutions establish a framework for prevention, mitigation and recovery. Recognizing that the environmental crisis is a security risk that aggravates humanitarian crises, undermines governance and generates potential conflicts is not a matter of political ideology or economic systems; it is a reality that we are hearing more and more from those who suffer the consequences of conflicts in situ and that is increasingly supported by the scientific community with data and evidence. The impacts of environmental crises transcend borders and demand a comprehensive approach that recognizes the nexus between peace, security and the threat posed by climate change and environmental degradation, transforming these challenges into opportunities to consolidate peace and promote a sustainable future for all.

I thank all the briefers for their briefings. Climate change poses a severe challenge to humanity. It has had, and will continue to have, a profound impact on the development of all nations and on people’s livelihoods and production activities. Global climate governance has never been as urgent and important as it is today. The thirtieth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is currently under way in Belém. It represents a crucial step in advancing the implementation of the Paris Agreement and will chart the course for global climate governance in the coming decade. China will, as always, play a constructive role and will work with all parties to support the Brazilian presidency towards positive outcomes and the full The link between climate change and development is well known, and its relationship with security is drawing increasing attention. In recent years, the Security Council has held multiple debates and deliberations on climate and security. China believes that the Security Council, in accordance with its responsibilities and mandate, can analyse the relationship between climate and security in the context of conflicts and hotspots on its existing agenda on a case-by-case basis and, where possible, utilize the resources and means at its disposal to provide support and assistance to the relevant countries in climate response and conflict prevention and resolution. In this regard, Africa’s unique natural environment and agriculture-based economic development model make it particularly vulnerable to climate change. Some African countries in conflict are very emblematic and have always been a focus of the Security Council. In this connection, I wish to make the following three points. First, in recent years, regions including the Sahel and Central Africa have been plagued by climate disasters. Floods and droughts have intensified the competition for resources, exacerbated hunger and displacement and amplified the risks of insecurity and instability in affected countries. The international community should pay adequate attention to the challenges that climate change poses to Africa’s sustainable development and the security risks it indirectly triggers and actively respond to the voices and concerns of the countries of the region. In particular, it must urge parties to conflict to reduce damage to the natural environment and infrastructure so as to prevent further intensifying risks of climate change. Secondly, preventing a security crisis driven by climate change ultimately requires enhancing resilience to climate change through sustainable development. Africa’s long suffering of brutal colonial plunder, North-South development disparities and the unequal distribution of resources are key reasons for its insufficient climate resistance. The historical responsibilities of developed countries in this regard should not be overlooked. The international community should provide adequate financial, technological and capacity-building support to African countries in climate response efforts and help them, on the basis of their national circumstances, to integrate climate response into their overall national development plans. Developed countries should fulfil their obligations by taking the lead in significantly reducing emissions, honouring their climate finance commitments and stepping up technology transfers. Thirdly, given the huge demand for green development worldwide, particularly in developing countries, the international community should strengthen cooperation on green technologies and industries, ensure the free flow of high-quality green products and, in particular, support Africa in advancing clean energy projects such as photovoltaic power, hydropower and wind power so as to bridge the green technology divide and accelerate the transition to a green, low-carbon economy. The United Nations system, including Security Council mandated peacekeeping and special political missions, should procure more high-quality and inexpensive green products and play a leading role in enhancing cost efficiency, promoting green and low-carbon practices and minimizing carbon footprints, while taking into account operational costs and performance. China has always been an active participant, an important contributor and a key trailblazer in global climate governance. In September, President Xi Jinping announced China’s new nationally determined contributions at the United Nations Climate Summit, demonstrating China’s proactive stance and firm resolve in advancing global climate governance. Last month, the fourth plenary session of the twentieth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China reviewed and

We thank Sierra Leone for convening this important meeting, and we thank you, Madam President, for presiding over it, thus demonstrating the importance that your country attaches to this topic. We also thank the briefers for their contribution and recommendations. A common feature of all armed conflicts is that they scar not only people but also the planet. It is therefore vital that the link between environment, peace and security gains stronger traction in the work of the Council, as also called for by the briefers earlier. I have three messages today. My first message is on the devastating impact of environmental harm on civilians, which most hurts the most vulnerable among them. The harm is immediate, and the reverberating effects echo for generations. In Gaza, children are struggling every day to find clean water, exposed to disease as they drink from muddy reservoirs. As we heard from Under-Secretary-General Andersen, the recent conflict has led to the almost complete destruction of critical ecosystems and to pollution and waste. In Ukraine, farmers watched their fields drown after the destruction of the Kakhovka dam, facing not only the loss of harvests but also the long-term contamination of soil and livelihoods. In Lebanon, women are striving to rebuild their lives after years of hostilities, amid the ashes of wildfires that destroyed farmland and soil. And in Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen, generations of families strive to cultivate fields contaminated by unexploded remnants of war, risking their health and their lives with every planting season. These are just some of the stories that remind us that protecting the environment during war actually means protecting civilians. It also helps with faster post-conflict reconstruction. International humanitarian law is not optional. As explained very comprehensively by Mr. Jalloh today, it is an obligation erga omnes My second message is on freshwater resources. In conflict, water is often among the first victims. Lakes are poisoned, rivers diverted, and water infrastructure dismantled. Freshwater reserves become contaminated, and wetlands are destroyed. This is why Slovenia, together with its partners, launched the Global Alliance to Spare Water from Armed Conflicts, with a special focus on protecting water systems, which sustain life and peace. The Alliance, recognized as an example of good practice in the Secretary-General’s report on the protection of civilians (S/2025/271), has carried out extensive awareness-raising efforts, including an Arria formula meeting of the Council in May. But awareness among policymakers is only the first step. Armed forces must be properly trained to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law. The rules of war cannot be interpreted permissively. As co-Chair of the workstream on civilian infrastructure in the framework of the International Committee of the Red Cross’s global initiative on international humanitarian law, Slovenia strives to mobilize concrete action. My final message today is on prevention. We may be discussing environmental impacts, but there is so much more we are actually touching upon. It is about human We are living in the twenty-first century, an era defined by scientific progress and evidence-based understanding. We cannot disregard facts simply because they do not align with our preferred narratives. We must strive to do better, and the Security Council must do better in its response to the environmental impact of armed conflicts.

Allow me at the outset to thank you, Madam President, for convening this important briefing. I also thank Under-Secretary-General Andersen and Mr. Jalloh for their insightful briefings. I also listened with interest to the remarks by Ms. Maranatha Dinat. The Council tends to focus on the urgency to end conflicts that threaten international peace and security. However, today’s discussion urges us to address one often-neglected aspect: the environmental impact of conflicts. The environmental devastation caused by armed conflict has long-term implications for the world’s population as well as for their recovery and resilience. This includes, inter alia, deforestation, biodiversity loss, the destruction of critical infrastructure and the contamination of air, soil and water. These are not mere abstract impacts but a dark reality, felt daily in the poisoned freshwater and collapsed wastewater systems of Gaza, the shrinking of the Lake Chad basin and the tragic wildlife loss in many conflict areas, in particular in Africa. Algeria recognizes the significant impact of armed conflicts on the environment, as we fully understand that environmental issues can be a risk multiplier and an exacerbating factor for tensions and insecurity, especially in fragile contexts. Meanwhile, Algeria believes that addressing international peace and security requires a holistic approach towards multiple challenges. This underscores the need to, first, act diligently to stop hostilities and end conflicts; secondly, tackle the root causes of conflicts to avoid their resurgence; and, thirdly, mitigate the impact of conflicts to ensure recovery and resilience afterwards. In this regard, it is essential to raise the following questions. First, what is the Security Council’s role in this holistic approach? There is no doubt that the Council must focus on its core mandate: the maintenance of peace and security. It must act decisively and efficiently, making optimal use of its resources. At the same time, it is also important to identify how different actors and stakeholders, including relevant United Nations bodies, agencies and other stakeholders, as well as intergovernmental frameworks, can work together to address the root causes of conflicts and their devastating impact, such as environmental harm. Secondly, how can the ongoing efforts to ensure adaptation of United Nations peace operations effectively address the emerging dimensions of conflict, including environmental degradation? United Nations missions operate today in increasingly complex and volatile environments. The current reconfiguration of their mandates must reflect the evolving nature of threats to international peace and security. It is within this context, and through the collective engagement of Member States and relevant stakeholders, that the future role of United Nations peace operations must be shaped. Thirdly, what impact can the current financial context have on the new configuration of United Nations missions? The financial challenges facing the United Nations should not be seen as restrictions, but rather as a catalyst for reform. Algeria reaffirms its dedication to peace, environmental protection and multilateral collaboration. We support decisive action to prevent and address environmental harm in conflict situations, while maintaining the institutional clarity necessary for effective global governance and taking into consideration the principles of equity, common yet differentiated responsibilities and the inclusion of the voices of developing countries.

I thank you, Madam President, for convening this meeting, and I thank Executive Director Andersen, Mr. Jalloh and Ms. Dinat for their briefings. The United States remains committed to maintaining international peace and security as we focus on getting the United Nations back to basics. In the Council, that means prioritizing work that directly maintains international peace and security. Recognizing that challenges to peace and security can be influenced by many factors, I want to focus my remarks on a permanent member of the Council which, alone, is responsible for more than 26 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions. This country continues to gain unfair economic advantages by undercutting its economic competitors. It is able to do so through selectively enforced environmental policies and manipulated data, allowing dangerous air and water pollution. The Trump Administration withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement because it unduly and unfairly burdened the United States and other countries, while giving a pass to those that are a much bigger part of the problem. Without doing something about the world’s largest emitter, participating in such international agreements is meaningless and serves only to hamper the United States’ economic competitiveness. The Trump Administration has taken bold steps to restore American prosperity by unleashing our affordable and reliable energy and natural resources. Over decades, the United States has successfully demonstrated that sensible, forward- looking policies can lead to reduced air and water pollution and increased energy production, all while supporting economic growth, raising worker wages and freeing up private sector innovation and investment. We encourage all United Nations Member States to look to the United States’ successful track record of advancing both economic and environmental objectives as a model to be emulated.

The representative of China has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

Just now, in his statement, the United States representative referred to a permanent member of the Security Council accounting for 26 per cent of global emissions. I took note of his euphemism and indirectness. Given that he was so indirect, I would like to indirectly remind him that this permanent member of the Security Council has 1.4 billion people and its gross domestic product is second in the world. We annually contribute more than 30 per cent of global economic growth, and our per capita emissions are not among the highest in the world. This permanent member of the Security Council is recognized by the international community as one of the countries with the firmest will, the strongest actions and I also wish to indirectly point out that there is another permanent member of the Security Council whose cumulative historic greenhouse gas emissions are in first place in the world, and its per capita emissions are always number one in the world. This permanent member of the Security Council has turned back the tide of history by twice withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, severely undermining global climate governance efforts. China hopes that, when it comes to climate change, the international community can focus on science, cooperation and joint efforts to respond to this severe challenge facing all humankind.

The representative of the United States of America has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

Given China’s decision to take the floor again and its remarks directed at the United States, I think we can all conclude its defensiveness comes from knowing that it is the world’s largest carbon emitter. Moreover, I would underscore successful United States environmental policies to improve the environment, particularly to reduce pollution while increasing energy production. We look forward to contributing to a conversation around ways private sector investment can spur innovation and better environmental policies.

The representative of China has asked for the floor to make a further statement, which will be the final statement.

Since the representative of the United States was less subtle this time, I will not mince words either. China is indeed the biggest carbon emitter in the world today, and we are not hiding from this fact. That said, China is widely recognized by the international community as one of the countries with the strongest will, the most decisive action and the most remarkable results in fulfilling its emission reduction commitments. We have a population of 1.4 billion, the second-largest gross domestic product in the world, and our contribution to world economic growth is for all to see. By contrast, the United States claims that climate change is the greatest scam in human history, has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement twice and is the biggest obstacle to global cooperation on climate change. I therefore think that everyone can clearly see who is taking action, who is shirking responsibilities, who is promoting cooperation and who is disrupting cooperation regarding climate change. In conclusion, I would like to call again on the international community to promote cooperation and solidarity instead of pointing fingers or shirking responsibilities in the fight against climate change.