S/PV.1005 Security Council

In accordance with the Council's previous deeision, if there is no objection 1 shaH invite the representatives of Syria and Israel to take seats at the Counci! table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sâlah El Dine Tarazi (Syrian Arab Republie) and Mr. Michael Comay (Israel) look seats at the Council table.

1 should like to draw the attention of members of the Counci! ta the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States [S/5110 and Corr.l] which has just been circulated.

The complaints consecutively lodged with this Council by the 8yrian Arab Republic and Israel, as contained in documents 8/5096 and S/5098. respectively, must be viewed against the background of the Palestine question. which has beeome an intractable problem before the United Nations and which continues ta bedevi! Middle Eastern politieal and economic activities. Therefore, in expressing the views of the delegatîon of Ghana on the issue before this Council, our main 4. It was indeed with great regret that my Government learned of the recent dangerous developments and sarry incidents in the area of Lake Tiberias which culminated in the attack by Israel armedforces against Syria ana which bave greatly intensifled the tensions tbat bave prevailed around the frontiers of Israel and in the Middle East generally. 5. Our regret is much deepened by the cITcumstance that my cOÜDtry, Ghana, 18 linked with bath countries by bounds of friendsmp which we do not regard as mutually exclusive, and by the fact that, as the President of Ghana stated in relation ta the Middle Eastern situation in his address ta the General Assembly on 23 September 1960: It ••• we ... have a vested interest in international peace and security and we view with considerable concern problems in any part of the world likely ta affect such peace and security".li Furthermore. President Nkrumah said in relation to the Middle East: "It is my view that the lime has come for a supreme effort ta be made at the international levei ta reduce the fever and heat of tension in this part of the world, and 1 would propose that the United Nations should consider as a matter of urgency inviting the various States in the Middle East ta provIde a just and permanent solution to these problems."Y 6. After thus expressing his concern about the burning issue of Arab-Israel relations and the continulng gravity of the situation in the Middle East, the President of Ghana ooncluded by saying: "This is one of the thorniest problems facing this world Organization, and unless a permanent and realistic solution is found, the danger of its development into an armed confiict still remains. The solution of the Middle East question lies in the recognition of the political realities there. In thé 11ght of this, 1 submit that the United Nations should set up a committee to study and evolve a machinery in which it will be impossible either for Israel to attack any of the Arab States or for the Arab States to attack Israel, and ta make some sart of. arrangement ta keep the cold war out of the Middle East."1f My President, were he here this afternoon ta speak., would reiterate his prophesy of 1960. 7. The immediate objectiveofcontainingandlowering tensions in the area has been the responsibility of 9. Whete the incidents of the night of 16-17 Maroh are concerned, the main facts seem quite clear. According ta the communiquê issued by the Israel Defence Forces: "Shortly before midnight, a unit of the Israe! Defence Forces assaulted Syrian positions north of Nuqueib, occupied the posts and destroyed the fortifications." [S/5102. para. 22.) préparée truire d'où souvent dent a analogues, la était par Il. militaire quablement médiats la délégation les mars. événements coups valles confirmatiop. qui 10. Although the representative of Israel has questioned the accuracy of the statement of the Chief of staff that nO Syrian fortified position was seen as existing or destroyed in the demilitarized zone. the basic character of the incident is clear from the report of the Chief of Staff. It was, of Course, not in the nature of a frontier incident; it was a deliberately planned military operation which, according ta Israel, was meant to destroy certain positions ln Syrlan territary from which Israel fishermen and boats had often been attacked. It is not the first incident of this kind and besides, the 8ecurity Council has clearly laid down on previous similar occasions that military action in breach of the Israel-syrian General Armistice Agreement.il is not permissible, whether or not undertaken by way of retaliation. 11. My delegation, therefore, has no alternative but ta deplore the Israel military action which, in our opinion, was bound ta antagonize further Israel's immediate neighbours and was, in fact, in violation of the General Armistice Agreement. While doing so, my delegation cannat fail to take into account the events leading up to the incident of 16-17 March. The evidence on· these events is indeed not conclusive. The firing incidents themselves were sporadic and infrequent. This ls substantiated ln the report, in which the Chief of Staff says: "Between 8 and 16 March, neither in conversations with Israel representatives relating ta the tension between Israel and syria Dor in the message which 1 was asked ta transmit ta Damascus was there any reference ta incidents in other areas or ta other causes of friction." [S/5102~ para. 21.J 12. We also note in regard ta the incident of 8 March that, as the Chief of Staff stated in his report: ". .. the statements of the Syrian witnesses do not 12. l'incident d'état-major ~ SUPPlément '·11 1 .1, 13. My delegation is not, of course, arguing that these incidents canstitute sufficient justification for the Israel military action, nor indeed do we seek to equate the earlier incidents with that of 16-17 March. However, having said that, rny delegation must insist that they were provocative in nature and that in the prevailing political atmosphere in the area they acquired greater significance than rnight seern to be warranted. Such incidents aIl tao often lead ta a kind of chain reaction which can anly lead ta regrettable explosions. :'i ! 1 1, .'1j 1 1! 14. The incidents of 16-17 March, we learned from the report, have left "an aftermath of tension and the present cease-fire is an Wleasy one" [ibid., para. 32]. There have been further incidents, but their analysis ls again made difficult by the inadequacy of the facts. However, thbugh they are not by themselves such as ta cause grave concern, my delegation urges the two parties ta ensure that the cease-fire is strictly compUed with and that their full co-operation is extended to the truce supervision authorities. 15. My delegation would earnestly urgeIsraeltohave fuller respect for, and ta place greater reliance on, the United Nations machinery and arrangements for maintenance of peace in the area than on the use of force. This plea acquires special force when 1t is considered that Israel, so ta speak, is the creation of our Organization. My delegation appreciates that these incidents are OnlY a reflection of the larger problems of the Middle East, but full compliance with the armistice agreements is indispensable for progress on the main issues. 16. Meanwhile, my dele~tion would emphasize the importance of increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization by reactivating the Mixed Armistice Commission. Bath Syria and Israel should appreciate the wisdom, in their own interests, of affording United Nations observers aIl possible freedom of movement. As General von Horn has stated: "Freedom of movement la necessary not only to enable United NatiOns observers ta observe reported violations and to assist the parties in re-establishing the cease-fire; it is also an important factor in allaying mutual suspicions. If bath parties are awarethatUnitedNationsobservers are moving freely in the areas of their responsibility, their suspicions as ta the other' s intentions are correspondingly lessened." [1001st meeting, annex.) 18. Furthermore, we strongly believe that the procedures of 'the Mixed Armistice Commission, with the opportunities it offers forface-ta-facediscussion, represent a very important element in the local United Nations machinery. It should, therefore, be resuscitated. If necessary, its composition or sorne of its procedures may be varied, after consultations and agreement between the two parties Wlder the auspices of the Secretary-General. 19. Finally, sinee the effectiveness ofthesearrangements depends on the complete and whole-hearted co-operation of the two parties, the Council is in dutY bOWld ta requeat that auch co-operation should be made available. 20. These considerations will form the basis of my delegation's attitude ta the drait resolutions at present before the Council and ta any others that may be submitted.

1 wish ta speak brefly now to eÀ-plain the drait resolution which has been introduced by the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States (8/5110 and Corr.l], which was referred to yesterday by Sir Patrick Dean. 22. 1 believe that the preamble is self-explanatory, and 1 therefore propose to discuss on1y the operative paragraphs. 23. Operative paragraph 1 deplores the hostile exchanges between Syria and Israel which started on 8 March 1962 and caUs upon them ta comply with their obligations under Art1cle 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter by refraining from the threat as weIl as the use of force. This paragraph deplores the excha;1ges without assessing blame because the United Nations Truce Supervision organization was lU1able ta detlôlrmine who initiated the firing on any of the occasions prior ta the attack of 16 March. This is in large part due ta the fact that the parties, particularly Israel, have placed obstacles in the way of effective circulation and observation by the United Nations. It does, however, appear from the report that whatever initial firing there may have been with smaU arms and whoever started it, the level of me engagement was raised by Syria, starting on 8 Ma4"ch, ta that of artillery fire, apparently of 80 mm guns. It also appears from the report that artillery and mortars were used by both parties on subsequent occasions. Whatever the origin of the events, it is therefore obvious that artillery weapons were placed in a defensive area in violation of the Armistice Agreement and that they were used against Israelcontrolléd territory on 8 March and subsequently. 24. The prospects of escalation of minaI' incidents when artillery is employed are ooly tao obvious. This sort of mil1tary action cannot be condoned when 25. In addition to deploring these hostile exchanges and the use of sllah weapons, the paragraph aIsD reminds the Governments concerned of their obligations under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. Bath parties bave ou tille occasionusedforcecontrary to that article. In addition there were provooative statements by each party which, at the very least, were not calcu1ated to assure the other of it8 peaceful intentions. We appeal to bath Governments ta malte every effort ta restore peace and security in the area and ta use the utmost caution in their pronOUIlcements and statements. 26. Qperative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution concern the Israel assault of the night of 16-17 March, an assaillt the nature and origin of which are not eontested. Aeeording ta the annoUIlcement made by the Israel Defenee Forces themselves, Israel on tbat night assal.Ùted Syrian positions north of Nuqueib. This was clearly a reversion to a policy of armed and large-seale retaliation repeatedly condenmed by the COUIloil in 1955 and 1956. Inasmuch as there is an impartial and long-established alternative to sueh action through the machinery of the United Nations, there can be no justification for a policy of retaliation. The Seourity COUIlcil bas consistent!y eondemned suoh attacks, even when prior but less serious violations by the other party bave been eonfirmed by the Chief of Staff. 27. In the light of tbis situation, paragraph 3 determines that the Israel attackof 16_17 Marchconstituted a flagrant violation of the Security Council resolution of 19 January 1956 ~ which condemned Israel retaliatory action of this sort, This attack was of the same order as previous attacks, and bas been so dealt with in the drait resolution we bave submitted. The fact -Chat the attack of 16 March was a largescale operation is apparentnotonly from the annOUIlcement made of it from Israel military sources themselves, but also from the nur.1ber of men involved and the number cf lives and ai'moured vehicles lost. There is no indication tbat the grOlUld attack carried into Syria proper f but Israel planes apparentlybombed Syrian territory, and the annoUIlcement by the Israel Defence Fore,,; gave no indication that the operation was intended ta be resiric~~ed ta the dentilitarized ZOne. This action wae ,'il mOs,t serious breach of the Armistice Agreeme'r,t. and a flagrant violation of paragraph 2 of the resolution of 19 January 1956, in which the Cotulcil condemned retaliatory raids. Israel should be called on scrupulously to refrain from such actions in the future. The Council's position on that point must be absolutely clear if the peace of the area is ta he preserved. ÉJ Ibid•• ElevenÙl Year. Supplement for Januan', February andMarch ~ dOCur.lent Sf3538. \ ) 29. We could perhaps be accused, if there were no alternative, of adopting an attitude of unreality in opposing retaliatory military action in the light of the inherent right of self-defence enjoyed by sovereign nations. Howevèr, there is an alternative, and an alternative which nowhere 111 the world is more readily available than on the horders between Israel and its Arab neighbours. This alternative is the peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations. This machinery has not been employed sufficiently and thoroughly enough in the present and in past instances. Not only has the United Nations machinery in the area been hampered in obtaining the faciliUes and freedom of operation which would have made both detection and deterrence of the events between 8 March and 16 March more effective, but the retaliatory action of 16 March was taken entirelywithout prior recourse either ta the Mixed Armistice Commission machinery or the Security COWlcil, the poliUcal bodies charged with responsibility for the peace. The capabilities of this machinery and, equally, the political intention ta use it need ta be improved ta prevent such situations in the future. , j 30. The rest of the draft resolution, therefore, deals with what should be done in order to strengthen that machinery. In particular, we would urge Israel, which feels that it was provoke<f in the present situation, to extend its full co-operation to the United Nations Truce Slipervision Organization and to the United Nations military observers. so tbat they may, in the future, readily detect and report ta the world on the origin of incidents and-as is even more to be hoped-by their presence deter them from starting in the first instance. We would urge Israel in the most stringent terrns to resort to the Mixed Armistice Commission and to the Security COWlcil, in accordanae with its obligations under the Charter, instead of resorting to the use of force. j 31. In cormexîon ",ith the irnprovement of United Nations capabilities in the area, 1 should like" to commend General von Horn and bis able colleagues on their excellent performance of duties on behalf of the United Nations UIlder unusually difficult circwnstances. The Chief of Staffls presence during our deliberations has been of considerable assistance ta the COlUlCil in its consideration of the complex factors involved. General von Horn and his entire staff deserve the gratitude and the unstinting support of the Members of the United Nations, and most of all that of Israel and its Arab neighbours. 1 ) 33. It i8 the sincere hope of my Government that the Israel and Syrian authorities will co-operate whole-heartedly with the Chief of staff in working out the further arrangements he has recommended. Certainly it is necessary that the Truce Supervision Organization observers be permitted to move freely and rapidly anywhere in the defensive area, and we endorse the mobile observation arrangements which the Chief of staff has proposed, believing that they CM be particularly valuable. _1, 34. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization's machinery was sorely tested by the events of mid-March. The Chief of Staff has informed us of gaps in his organization revealed by these sudden demands. The United States urgesthatthedeficiencies noted by General von Horn be made up at once and that the 'parties move quickly to comply with his .::eQuests for gr~ater co-operation. i,, 35. In the light of such factors, the draft resolution endorses the measures reeommended by the Chief of Staff, both in his first report and in his supplementary report ta the Council. It calls on the Israel and Syrian authorities ta assist bim in their implementation. Any additional measur.es which the parties may recommend and which the Chief of staff thinks would be useful would, of course, also be welcome. 36. The draft resolution also calls for strict observance of the provisions of theArmistice Agreement concerning the demilitarized zone and the defensive area. For many years there have been violations of 'these provisions, sorne major, some minor; explicit adharance to the Agreement by bath sides would remove the danger of confiict in the area, and we urge both Syria and Israel to co-operate in eliminating any violations. 37. Finally, we have included aparagraphwh1cbcalls upon bQth parties ta co-operate Mly witb, the Chief of Staff in carrying out his responsibilities, and which urges that aU necessary steps be taken for reactivating the Mixed Armistice Commission and for making full use of its machinery. Particul.arly we believe that Israel should return to the Mixed Arn;ristice Commission, inwhichithasnotparticipated since 1951, and that it should make full use of the Commission' s producers whenever it faels that provocations have occurred. 38. If the parties co-operate fully with the United Nations bodies in the area and with the security COUDcil, we are confident that peaceful conditions

1 have no more speakers on my list. 1 should like to consult the COWlcil on the situation that has arisen. 40. Mr. MOROZOV· (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): 1 should like to make sorne remarks which relate ta the substance of the question, and not to its postponement. 1 assmne that 1 may make these remarks now. l 41, The Security Council is' approacmngthe conclusion of its discussion of this matter and has before lt two draft resolutions which may be formally put ta the vote in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure. First, there is the draft resolution submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic (S/5107/Rev.l] and supported by the United Arab Republic in accordance with the rules of procedure; this draft has therefore been submitted to us in accordance with the rules by which-the security Council shotùd be guided in its work. Secondly, there is the draft resolution on which the United States representative has just oommented [8/5110 and Corr.l]. \ ) 42. The res1Ùts of the discussion show that the factual analysis of the circumstances which the USSRdelegatian gave in its original statement was not the product of our imagination, since it was hased on the faots of the case as. they were set forth in the relevant report submitted ta the Council and as they were presented even in the explanations given by the state of Israel, which is accused of an act of aggression of the night of 16-17 March 1962. On the basis of these data, we concluded at the very first meeting on this subject [999th meetingJ that there was irrefutable proot of an act of armed aggression committed by Israel against Syria on the night of 16-17 March, accompanied by violation of the territory and air space of Syria. 43. Binee then, nearly aIl the members oftheCouncil have spoken, and this irrefutable fact was accepted as such in aIl their statements, ta a greater or lesser degree, and with different reactions or qualifications. Accordingly, we now have no doubts whatsoever concerning t~e factual side of the case. Even if sllch doubts did exist at the very beginning of the nrst meeting, when we embarked upon the examination of this qll.estion, we can consider now that the factual sida has been tncontrovertibly established, and this. of course. ls very important. Basing ourselves on an analysls of the facts, we can now take the correct decision. 44. Accordingly. there are na differences of determination, so to speak, concerning what happened on the night of 16-17 March. However, sorne say -as my delegation does, and 1 believe this to be correct-that these operations should be described as an act of armed aggression, waileo others exwess themselves more delicatèly and caU them a vIolation of the Armistice Agreement. Of course, this in no Way affects the substance of the matter. ,1 i 1 j, 1 ,j j 1 1,, 47. We therefore believe the version which is based on the testimony of witnesses and the material evidence referred ta in the report submitted to the COWlcil and which lays the blame for these relatively minor incidents also on Israel. and not on Syria. 48. These are the facts of the case. We migbt add tbat at the time of the events we are now investigating, Israel systematically violated at least three lines which represent a guarantee of the observance of peace in this area. These three lines are quite clearly markeg on the map which all members of the Council have..21 The line on the extreme left of the map, wbich I am showing you now, Mr. President, is the line beyond which the entry of any. armed forces is absolutely prohibited, since it indicates the demilitarized zone. It has been proved that Israel forces were nevertheless introduced into the demil1tarized zone, remained there illegally, weremassed there, ta use a military term, and when enough of them had been massed, it was from this place, from this zone, that an armed attack was launched on Syrian territory and an armed incursion made into Syrian air space. 49. According ta biblical legend, Christ waUœd on the waters of tbis biblical lake. Let those who wish ta beiieve this do so, we have no objection; but it 1s impossible to beiieve that heavy Israel tanks could perform the same.feat as the Lord did nearly 2,000 years aga. if fuis in fact happened. 50. Accordingly, it took sorne time to deliver these tanks and other beavy equipment ta this spot. Although General von Horn in bis answer drew only on what was known ta hirn and, only stating facts, dld not tell us how rnany days were needed for such preparations, it ls clear ta aIl of us who have any experience in evaluating the course of .miUtary conflicts and events and, specifically, !'lxperience in the work of the Security Council, that several days would be needed for tbis and that the avents of 16-17 March were therefore the result of a well 52. This ls the pieture which we are DOW called upon to evaluate politically. We have before us tw'o proposais containing sueh political evaluations. 53. The first proposaI, that of the Syrian Arab Republic, pl'Ovides that Israel sbOuld be condemned for the wanton attack which was carrled out against Syrian territory on the night of 16-17 March 1962, in violation of the Security Council' s resolution of 15 JuIy 1948,11 of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement between Syria and Israel and of Israel's obligatlons under the Charter of the United Nations. \ 54, From what we have just said, and sinee the facts of the case are absolutely clear, it is perfectIy obvious that this first operative paragraphrepresents the bare minimum of what the Counc1l shouId adapt if it wishes to prevent the reeurrence of such incidents in the future. 55. In COlU1exion with the possibility of recurrenee, 1 should 11ke to pOint out that when the Security Council recentIy held !ts 1000th meeting, someone with time on bis bands calcuIated that about 200 of the COill1ci}ls meetings-I cannot vouch for the accuracy of these figures, as 1 have not checked them a.'1d am only citing a press report-have been devoted to violations by Israel against the Arab States-acts of aggression committed by Israel against these States. Hence attempts ta arouse our sympathy, as the Israel representatlve tried ta do by saying that bis COWltry is only ten miles wide, are bOWld ta fail, since nearly 20 pel' cent, or one-fifth, of the entire work of the Security Council throughout the existence of the United Nations has been devoted ta incidents similar to those we are n(\w dlscussing. Even the United States representative in bis recent statement acknowledged that these incidents are very similar ta those with which we have deaIt in the past, in particular in 1956. Aecordingly, üwe really want ta prevent the possible recurrence of armed attacks by Israel against Syria and other Arab States. if we teally want to put an end to such behaviour, our purpose would be served bythewording-verymodest, in my opinion-of operative paragraph 2 of the Syrian draft resolution, which states that the COWlcil again warns Israel of its resolve to call for appropriate sanctions against Israel, should it resort once more in the future ta sllch aggressive acts. It would seem that the question of applylng appropriate sanctions might be raised even now, since it is almost the two hundredth time that we have met here ta cansider the same subject. That ls why 1 felt justified in describing this Syrian proposaI as modest. ce est contre fois Il l'application que pour j'ai proposition SupPlément 57. That 1s why 1 faU ta understand why certain delegations-including the United States and United Kingdom delegations, which have sponsored the second draft resolution-although agreeing with us on what happened on the night of 16-17 March, are not prepared to support tlùs extremely modest draft resolution, which is directIy based on the facts of the case and represents, 1 should say, a minimum programme of what the COUDcil can and should,do. 1 would stress and reiterate that the draft does not even caU for the immediate application of sanctions, although there would be every groWld for such a demand. in view of the tragic situation which we are now obl~ed ta examine and investigate. . 58. The USSR delegation therefore asks that this statement should be regarded as an explanation of its vote in favour of the Syrian draft resplution. 59. Nevertheless, since we have two documents before us, we feel obUged to comment also on the second draft, resolution [S/5110 and Corr.1]. 60. This text contains two categories of provisions. In the first place, it contains provisions which, although they are sornewhat lenient and inadequate, we uûght on the whole support, especially if they were carried ta their logical conclusion. 1 have in mind such provisions as operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution. UIÛortunately, 1 do not yet have the Russian text ofthis document, paragraphs 2 and 3 of which reads as foUows: "Reaffirms the Security Council resolution of 19 January 1956 whîch condenmed Israel military action in breach of the General Armistice Agreement, whether or not Wldertaken by way of retaliation; "Determines that the Israel attack of 16-17March 1962 constitutes aflagrantviolation ofthat resolution and calls upon Israel sCrupulously to refrain from such action· in the future")J 61. Generally speaking, tlùs follows the same line as the Syrian draft resolution, but the terms used seem to us to be Wlduly weak, andwe therefore cannat give our preference ta these provisions, althOUgh they correspond ta SOrne of those setforth in the Syrian draft, because they do not express the faets clearlyand aceurafely enough. We therefore consider that the wording proposed by the SyrianArabRepublic la more satisfacta~'. 62. We will not tauch upon the preamble ta the draft resolution subuûtted by the United States and the United Klngdom. which contains a number of general and, so ta speak. pious remarks wh1ch add Uttle ta the substance of the matter, but we feel obliged ta dwell on oertain provisions of tlùs draft resolution which are in absolute Contradiction with thefactual y Tex!: quOted ln English by the speaker; 63. We have already said that allah tendencies were discernible in the statement made by Mr. stevenson. the United Sb.tes representative, at the 999thmeetîng, and when we spoke after him, we said that we couId Dot follow bis logic. where, on the one band, it is admitted that Israel is responsible for an armed incursion into Syrian territory, and, on the other hand, high-minded appeals are addressed not only ta the aggressor, but also ta the victimof aggression, thus creating the impression that no only Israel but Syria also is somehow at fault, 64. For example, this tendency is manifested in operative paragraph 1 ofthe drait resolution submitted by' the United States and the United Kingdom, which asserts that Syria and Israel are equally responsible for the hostilities which started on 8 March 1962. We cannat agree with this point of view, because that evaluation is contrary ta the facts and ta the evidence and data submitted to the Comcil. 65. Let us go further. The very same line is followed ln other provisions of the drait resolution, That Une consists in placing syria and Israel on -an equal footing, as States bearing an equal responsibility for the situation that has arisen. Inoperativeparagraph 6, for instance, where reference is made ta violations of the provision excluding armed forces from the demilitarized zone and the provision which sets limits on forces in the defensive area, it is stated that bath Governments, that of Israel and tbat of the Syrian Arab Republic, are called upon to cooperate with the Chief of Staff in eliminating such violations. 66. We consider this tendency to be absolutely incorrect and, moreover, contrary ta the facts, for, as we have already pointed out, the tanks which miraculously appearea in the demilitarized zonewere Israel and not Syrian tanks. No docwnents, data or evidence have beeu submitted ta show that Syria also violated the régime established for the defensive area and particularly for the demilitarized zone, and no one has even tried t'o prove that this is sa, 67, We would thereiore ask Why the appeal to observe the régime laid down for these areas is addressed, not to Israel, whose violation of it has been proved by aH the facts, but also to Syria, which has committed no such violation. Sorne other provisions of tms drait resolution also contain appeals bath ta Syria and to Israel. We have already said that those provisions contradict operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the same draft resolution, which 1 have just quoted. 68. Accordingly, we do not considerthattheapproach to the solution of this problem used in the draft resolution suhmitted by the United States and the United Kingdom is sufficiently consistent or, 1 would say, sufficiently based on principle, because, although it is impossible to deny the facts regarding the incidents of the night of 16-17 March, whichare already clear to the whole world, and although they are acknowledged in operative paragraph 3, an attempt 70. We consider it the elementarydutyoftheCowlCil, not ta appease the aggressor, not ta inventwording liable in sorne way ta sweeten for the aggressor the bitter pill of the wliversal censure and blame wlûch, although to a slight degree, areexpressedinoperative paragraph 3 of the drait resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom, but to let the aggressor feel the full responsibility for the violation of international peace and security which he bas commitied. This attempt also ta include something ta please Israel-clearly a political trend, wlûch can° easily be traced throughout this text-is harmful, since it encourages the aggressor State and creates the illusion tbat in the future alsa it can rely on a lenient attitude towards it if it tries yet againyet again, 1 repeat-to violate the obligations wlùch it Wldertook, first, Wlder the United Nations Charter. and secondly, Wlder aIl the other international agreements on which Israel's signature appears together with Syria1s. L 71. We consider that thls approach is wrbng, harmfuI and weak and that it diverts attention from putting an end ta· acts of aggression in this important and troubled part of the world. 72. For these reasons, when we define our position in voting on the draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom. we shan base ourselves on the Considerations which we have just adduced and shall take into accoWlt aIl the circumstances, including the fact tbat ourparticipation in any vote on drafts submitted here will in no way mean any change of prlnciple in the position taken by the Soviet Union with regard ta the so-called armed forces of the United Nations. 73. At this decisive moment, we appeal ta members of the Security COWlcil resolutely ta lay aside any preconceived ideas they may have on this question and resolutely ta support the modest, laconic and. at the same time, sufficiently explicit draft resolution submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic, a draft resolution wlûch will serve the cause of peace.

Since there are no more speakers on the lîst, 1 would ask the members of the Council and the invited representatives whether any of them wishes to speak.

1 should like briefly to explain my position on the time factor involved in the submission this afternoon of the draft resolution contained in document S/5110 and Corr.1. The text of that cirait resolution became available to my delegation only this afternoon. 1 have forwarded it to my Government; it has not yet reached my Government, much less been studied by it. Since we are, as 1 think aIl COWlcil members will agree, one of the interested partieS-in fact, the major part of this draft resolution appears to concern my Government very directIy, with regard both to the past and to the future-l wtJUld assume that the COUDcil would wish ta have the benefit of a considered statement on aIl the provisions of the draIt resolution on

1 had mtended 10 make a substantive speech on the question under discussion. We now have before us a request for -the adjournment of the debate so toot the_ representative of Israel can clarîfy his position. As the representative of a power invited to attend the Counoil's debate 1 shaH not discuss this procedural point, althoughmydelegation would be quite in favour of continuing the debate without interruption and voting on the texts which have been submitted ta the CouncU. However, that is a question for the Counci! itself. If it decides ta continue the debate, 1 am at the Council's disposaI to make a substantive statement and ta refute certain allegations. In tOOt case, 1 should also take the opportunity of clearly stating my delegation's position on the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United states. 1 therefore reserve the right to speak at a later stage when the Council has taken its decision on the POint that has just been raised.

The Council has heard the suggestion ofthe representative of Israel and the comments of the representative of syria. Are there any speakers?

It is very difficult for me ta abject when any member of the Counci! asks for a postponement-especially to consult bis Government. We aIl find ourselves in that situation, and we certainly find this a very legitimate request to make. However, in the case of the representative of a non-member of the Council. it would be very easy for him ta send a declaration, at any Ume, of what he wanted to say. He is not going ta participate in the vote anyhow. 79. 1 do not know if the Council would insist on hearing a statement before the voting. We have been dealing with this question since the Syrian delegation sent its letter a long...time ago; we have agreed to add to tbis letter the letter that came from the Israel delegation. We have been patiently discussing tbis matter; we adjourned to have the benefit of the presence of General von Horn with us. Ifeel the matter is too serious for any further postponement; 1 feel that those in Syria who look ta us to see whether or Dot they cao depend on the existence of the Security Council of the United Nations ta protect them rnay lose their patience while we are postponing a decision from one day to another and from oneweek ta another. i~ rules of procedure, any Member of the United Nations ~.,.l :~\ti~~ti~na~f~:t~f:3~i~~:::J::~t~~~~;:;~iC~~~ ., in the CowlCil's discussions ma" submit proposais :11 and draIt resolutions. These proposais and draft ~- resolutions may be put to a vote only at the request :~ of a representatlve on the Security CounciI. 1 :j 1 ll 82. In view of what the representative of Israel has said, wouId he be so good as ta explain whether his remarks constituted a proposai to adjourn the meeting and meet again on Monday?

1 sould like ta intervene before the representative ofIsrael speaks, merely to say that while 1 personally wouId have preferred to vote tonight, 1 think tbat-even though the representative of Israel is not a member of the Council and, therefore, wbatever he says here will not affect the draIt resolution-as a matter ofcourtesy, if he feels that he bas something else to say ta the Council and wants to do sa on Monday, we sbouId accord him this courtesy. Mypositionisthatwhenever 1 find someonebeing pushed ta thewall 1 have sympathy for him, and 1 have intervened merely ta appeal ta members of the COUDoil ta grant a courtesy which 1 think we should accord to someone who bas a stake in a matter like this and who wishes ta refer to bis Government, not because such a preference will affect the outcome of the decisions ta he taken by the Counoil but because he feels he has something else ta say which, Wlless there is an adjournment, he might be preve1lted from saying. 1 am not now making a formaI proposaI, but 1 am rather appealing to members to oonsider this as a matter of courtesy. ~t1 ~~

We shouId actually have preferred to vote on these draIt resolutians tonight. However, in view of the request of the representative of Israel and of the considerations which the representative ofGhana bas justput forward, we shouId not abject to a postponement until Monday.

1 shouId like to assure the representative of Ghana that we have no desire whatsoever to push anybody to the wall. Our only desire is to push people ta behave weIl, that is aIl. If the CowlCil 50 desires, if the representative of Ghana so desires, we shall make no further objection to postponement until Monday.

It is my understanding from the discussion that has just taken place that the consensus is thatthe meeting should be adjourned now and that we shouid meet again On Monday. Ii 1 am wrong, 1 shouId like to be BO informed. 88. Mr, COMAY (Israel): 1 wculd like ta express my appreciation ta the representative of Ghana for the consideration and courtesy which he showed in the appeal that he made after my request. The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m. . AFRICAjAFRIQUE CYPRUS/CHYPRE' PAN 10 Alo••nd., 'h. G.e.1 St'.et, CZECHDSLOYAIUAiTCHÉCDSlOYAQUIE, C...MERODN/CAMEROUN: LIBRAIRIE DU PEUPLE AFRICAIN La Ge,on'o, B. P. 119'''. V.ouMé. DIFfUSION INTERNATIONALE CAMEROUNAISE OU liVRE ET DE L'" PRESSE,Songmehm•. CONGO (léopold.mel: INSTITUT POLITIQUE CONGOLAIS. B. P. 2307. to!opoI0",1I0. IETHIOPIA/ÉTHIOPIE, INTERNATIONAL PRESS AGEN CV. P. O. Bo< 120, ...dOi, Ab~ba. GH"'NA: UNIVERSITY BOOKS HOP Uni ,ty Collogo 01 Gh.na. L.gon. Acera. KENY : THE E.S.A. aOOKSHOP Box 30167, Naorob'. 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INDONESIA/IN[tONÉ~IE' PEMBANGUNAN, no. Gunung S.h~,; 84, Oj"."3. J ...P...N(J...PON, MARUlEN COMPANY, no. 6 TO'i·N;cheme, Nihonc••h Tokyo. KOREA (REP. OFI/CilRÉE (RÊP. DEl' Eut·YOO PUBUSH<NG CO.• LTo. S. 2·K"': Chonilno, S.oul. P...KIST...",: THE PAKISTAN CO·OPERATIVE BOOK SOCIETV O~cc'. E.st Pakist.n. PUBUSHERS UNITED. lTO.. L.ho,e. THOMAS &. THOMAS, K.,achi. l'NILIPPINES: AlEMAR'S BOOK STORE, 769 Riz~1 A••nue, Monll~. POPUlAR BOOKSTORE, 1573 Dorotoo Jo.o, M.nila. SING...PORE/SING...POUR: THE CITV BOOK STORE, LlO.. Collye' Qu.y. TH...IlANO/THA'il...NOE: PRAMUIl.N MiT. l TO. 55 Cnak<'w3t ROM, WOI Tul<. B.ngko~. NI60NOH &. CO•. LTD. New Ro.O. Si~.k Phyo S.i, B~n.l<ol<. SUKSAP'.N p...,nT M.n,ion 9. Rai.damne,n Il.venu•• Banilko•. ~1~~~~~.~~E:ET~~~Ê~uî~l~HU 185, 'o, Tu·do. B. P. 283, S.i.on. EUROPE "':USTRIA(... UTRICHE, ~~~OJ~tfR;~~:F~NY.(l,aben 31. Wien. l. Mar'u. S"".u,,',asse 10, S.lzbutil. GmRG FROMME & CO.• S~ong.'g~ ... 39, W;en. V. BElGIUIol!BElGtQ(lE, AGENCE ET MESSAGERIES DE lA PRESSE. S. A. 14·22. 'ue du Po.,;', B.u••lle•• Bl!lGAR1.../BULGAR1E: RAZtmùNOS 1. Tza, A•••n; Soh~. LATiN AMERICAj AMÉRIQUE LATINE , "'RGENTINM"'RGENTlNE: SUOAMER'CIlNA, S. A.. AI,lna BOLIVIA/II0LIVIE: lIBRERIA C~.dl~ 972. l. r>.z. D,de...nd Inquine. l,om counl"e, ,.he," ,.le. 8g.nOI.s ho.~ nol ,.1 bo"" .stabli.hed S.le. S.<:lon. UniteO N.tocn<. Pal... L•• oo",m~nde' .t dem.nd" d. ,.ns.ign.ment, ~m.".nt d. pay, 0" H n'e,i,l' ONU. N.w VO'. (~.·u.). ou à la Seclion des .en' Priee: $ V.S. 0.35 (or equiva1ent Litho in H.N.