S/PV.1006 Security Council

ln accordance with the decision previously taken by the Council, and if there arEt no objections, 1 shaH invite the representatives of Syria and Israel to take places at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Ml". SalahEl Dine Tarazi (Syrian Arab Republic) andMl". Michael Cornay (Israel) took places at the CoUttci! table. 1. du 2. Mr. TARAZ! (Syrian AraD Republic) (translated from French): Thank you very much, Mr. President, for allowing me to speak again; 1 should have pre- ferred not ta do so but 1 have been left no alternative by the statements that have beeu made. 1 should also like, at this stage in the debate, ta explain my delegation's position on a number of points which may seem obscure. le accbrdé ne son aussi, de parartre 3. In the first place, 1 must refute the fallacious arguments and the false and inept reasoning used by the representative of Israel at the 1002nd meeting, on 5 April. Fortunately, my task is made easier by Mr. Comay's own attitude in contradicting those statements by General von Horn which were notto his liking. 3. fallacieux séance, trouve a 5. However, Mr. Cornay has forgotten that, whether he likes it or not, Urnes have changed. Israel was installed by the United Nations on territory taken from its rightful owners; instead of being grateful to the Organization, the henefactor to which it owes its existence, Israel shows it no respect; on the contrary, it behaves arrogantly towards representa- tives of the United Nations whoso essential task is to serve the cause ofpeace. Thetone which Mr. Cornay used to refute the statements of General von Horn is ample proof that Israel has no desire for peace. Why blame the other side when you know that your ambitions will not be satisfied until you have subju- gated aU the territory between the Nile and the Euphrates? Mr. Comay's statement reminded me of the speeches of Hitler and Goering. Hitler complained of what he called the "Diktat" ofVersailles. Mr. Cornay deplores the vicissitudes imposed on Israel by the armistice agreements, the application of which must not interfere with Israel's integrity and security. Why theo were these agreements signed if they were not ta he put ioto effect? j ! i -1 ! i J 6. Mr. Cornay is furious atseeinglsrael'sconcoction of lies demolished; he has gone on denying the truth and contradicting himself. These are tactics which rnay have helped Israel propaganda ta win over pubac opinion; unfortunately for the authors, such tactics are out of style. In the years immediately before and after the installation of Israel on Palestinian soil, Zionist propaganda directedtowards the socialist countries took the lioe that Israel would he the first people's democracy in the Middle East because the surrounding Arab countries were governed by feudal and reactionary cliques. At the sarne time, turning to the Western countries and the UnHed States of America in particular, the Zionists said that only Israel could be counted on to figbt communism in the Middle East. 7. 1 apologize to the Council for this digression. It seemed to me useful as showing the varied tactics of Israel propaganda, which has now lost its effective- ness. In point of fact, most of the countries to which it is addressed, particularly those in the socialist camp, know what the real situation is in this part of the world. 8. Nevertheless, Mr. Comay was faithful to bis people's traditions. His threats \Vere intended ta reach a sympathetic public and a tolerant Press, attaching relatively little importance to historical 10. Second, in speaking oftheSyrianmilita11'Position supposedly destroyed 1y the Israel forces, Mr. Cornay said again that it was in the demilîtarized zone. He i8 determined ta be right at any priee and ta put General von Horn in the wrong! 10. syrienne liennes, zone et 11. This attitude seems to us to be completely unacceptable, and, in 8aying this, 1 am thinking of the interests of the United Nations and of the respect that is due to the representative of the Secretary- General. Gnly to accept the conclusions of the Chief of Staff ta the extent that they do not affect Israel's interests and security is ta abandon the rule of law and enter the jungle. 11. disant et N',accepter dans ne pour 12. In point of fact, the Israel offensive was intended to destroy the Syrian post of Tel-el-Nerab. This post is in Syrian territory and not in the demilitarized zone. The Israelis withdrew after being fired upon by Syrian artillery, but the battle took place in Syrian territory. 12. objectif Ce dans retirés syrienne, ritoire 13. Mr. Cornay tried to minimize the act of aggres- sion committed on the night of 16-17 March. He said the nsmall Israel force ... was immediately with- drawn". Why then did it proceed ta the bombardment of EI-Hamma in the demilitarized zone and of Fiq in Syria itself? 13. commis que immédiatement". au litarisée, 14. What seemS to me even more serions is Mr. Comay's refusaI of any future co-operation with the Chief of Staff and the United Nations observers. In this way, the Armistice Agreement will become inoperative. 14. M. avec Nations viendra 15. It is not my intention ta refute Mr. Comay's arguments regarding the status of the demilitarized zone. A great many documents have already been written on the subject of the demilitarized zone. The Armistice Agreement is there ta contradict the Israel allegations, and 1 shall merely mention sorne of its provisions. 15. arguments de ont Convention allégations peler 16. First, according to article V of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and SyriaY and Mr. Buuche's comment thereon, which is quoted in the Council's resolution of 18 May 1951,11 no question of sovereignty arises in the demilitarized zone. Consequently Israel is not entitled to claim any right of sovereignty over the demilitarized zone. Ta say that the demilitarized zone is situated in 16. d'armistice mentaire du litarisée, Par droit Affirmer Supplêmem Conseil. année. li OffIcial Records of the Security Council. Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 2. . Y For the text of this resolution. adopted at the S47th meeting of the Council. see Officia! Records of the Security Council. Sixth Yeaf, 546th meeting. para. 2. 17. Secondly, the jurisdiction of the MixedArmistice Commission extends to the demilitarized zone. In fact, article VII, paragraph 1, of the Agreement provldes: ?l'The execution of the provisions ofthis Agreement shaH he supervised by a Mixed Armistice Com- mission composed of five memhers, of whom each Party ta this Agreement shaH designate.two, and whose Chairman shaU he the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer from the observer personnel ... designated by him foHowing consultation with both Parties to this Agreement. n Thus article VII of the Armistice Agreement places no limitation on the jurisdiction oftIle MÎXed Armistice Commission. Moreover, paragraph 8 of that same article runs as follows: nWhere interpretation of the meaning of a par- ticular provision of this Agreement, other than the preamble and articles 1 and II, is at issue, the Commissiori's interpretation shaH prevail. The Commission, in its discretion and as the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the Parties modifications in the provisions of this Agreement." 18. Thus, Ml'. Comay's argument is completely destroyed. The Mixed Armistice Commission is competent to rule on complaints conneeted with the demilitarized zone, since the restriction imposed on the interpre!ation of the provisions ofthe Armistice Agreement affects only articles 1and li. Theprovisions relating to the status of the demilitarized zone are in article V of the Armistice Agreement. Conse- quently, a representative cannot come here and argue that his country will not respect the decisions made by the Mixed Armistice Commission in dealing with disputes affecting the demilitarized zone. The provisions relating to the demilitarized zone cannot he separated from the other elements oftheArmistice Agreement. Only articles 1 and II are not subject to interpretation by the Mixed Armistice Commission. 19. I think that the situation is now clear and that Mr. Cornay, in refusing to recognize the jurisdiction of the Mixed Armistice Commission over the de- militarized zone, is rejectIng the Armistice Agree- ment. Thus, the armistice is being obstructed by Israel's capricious interpretation of the Agreement. This interpretation may be in keeping with Israel's conception of its security, but it does not conform to the provisions of the ArmistIce Agreement. 20. It foIiows from what 1 have said that Israel has cOl,.:"')i.tted a serious aet of aggression which must not go unpunished. When the General Assembly decided in its resolution 273 (III) of 11 May 1949 to admit Israel to membership in the United Nations, it made the application of the previous resolutions on Palestine a condition of that admission. Thus, 21. This decision was taken in 1949. It is DOW 1962, and we are confronted with a deplorable situation. Israel still intenrls ta shirk its obligations. It believes that its friends will remain indulgent and will help it out of Us difficulties. Perhaps it ts not mistaken. Have we not, however, reached the point where the Security Couneil should seriously consirler recom- mending the General Assembly ta expel Israel in accordance with Article 6 of the United Nations Charter? 22. Unfortunately the Council is far from adopting this solution. The Syrian Arab Republic, which has repulsed a flagrant act of aggression, has turned to the Security Council in order to draw its attention to the serious consequences that may result from that act. consequently, my country cannot permit itself ta be criticized withoutfoundation. The incidents which preceded the attacks were provoked by th~ Israelis. They should have borne the consequences. In fact, it was not the Syrians but the Israelis who attacked, and the Syrians were fully justified in exercising theîr rîght of self-defence. Logic is certainly not one of Israel's weaponS. 23. With regard to the draft resolution of the United Kingdom and the United States now before the Council IS/5110 and Corr.1}, my delegation considers that its evaluation of the facts and of their inescapable consequences is inadequate. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the Syrian Arab Republic is not a member of the Council and was invited ta take a place at this table in arder ta state its' case, 1 shall leave it ta the members of the Council ta discuss that draft resolution in an atmosphere of calm and ta take the necessary action. et du en s'imposent 24. My delegation wishes, however, to draw the Council's attention once more to the events which occurred on the night of 16-17 March and to the Possible implications of those events. There have been many statements in the world Press concerning the Israel attack. The representative of Israel, in a statement before the Council last week, told you that Israel meant ta proceed with its planned development projects. As 1 have said before, Israel alone cannot carry out any projects involving the waters of the Jordan and Lake Tiberias. In fact, the Armistice Agreement provided, in article II, paragraph 1, that no military or political advantage should be gained under the truce ordered by the Security Council. That principle was recognized by bath parties. The implementation ofthoseprojects, therefore, would violate the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. 24. tention ments mars ments. nombreuses lienne. allocution devant continuer futur. les du IsratH au militaire la principe conséquent, ces 25. Thus the Council has been given the full facts about the question and its hidden implications. It will never he possible to reproach Syria and the Arab countries with not having brought the Council face to face with its responsibilities in the matter. 25. tion On pays rité _-j submitted by the United Kingdom and the United ~] States. In doing so 1 shall refrain from entering _:,1 into any polemics with the representative of Syria. 1 27. At the outset, permit me ta say that we were impressed by the fair and restrained spirit in which a number of members of the Council addressed themseIves to the difUcult matter on its agenda. We regret that they have been unable ta endorse the compelling reasons for the action taken by the Israel Government; yet we also note that they have shawn sorne understanding ofthose reasons. It is unnecessary for me ta specify ta which representatives 1 refer; the record speaks for itself. :1 'J1 j .1 28. This spirit of objectivity has stood in sharp contrast ta the tone of certain statements we have heard, particularly those of the representative of the Soviet Union. He endorses the preposterous story that our police launches sailed up to fortified Syrian artillery positions and opened Ure on them. If the Syrians saw forty nOn-existent tanks, then the representative of the Soviet Union talks of forty non-existent tanks. His version of the facts is simply the Syrian version of the faets, downtothe last detail. Whatever the reasons may be for this attitude, those reasons will not he found in General von HOrn's report. 29. The same bias is evident in the statement made by Mr. Morozov on 6 April 1962 that: "... sorneone with time on his hands calculated that about 200 of the Council's meetings ... have been devoted ta ... acts of aggression committed by Israel against {the Arab] States.... nearly 20 per cent, or one-firth, of the entire work of the Security Council throughout the existence of the United Nations has been devoted ta incidents similar to those we are now discussing ... It would seem that the question of applying appropriate sanctions might he raised even now, since it is almost the two hundredth time thatwe have methereto consider the same subject ... " [1005th meeting, para. 55.] 30. It is a grave matter to threaten any Member State with sanctions; but it is unpardonable to do BO on the basis of a gross factual misstatement. Let us examine this misstatemenJ;, not merely in order ta put the record straight, but because it may throw a great deal of 11ght on the issue before us and the problem that the Council faces in dealing with such an issue on its merits. 3:' From a quick check of the records by my delegation, it appears that before the present agenda item, the Council had held 206 meetings from 1948 onwards, under the now obsolete heading of "The Palestine question". Some eighty of these meetings took place in 1948-1949. They arase out of the Arab 32, Even aftar the armistice agreements were signed in 1949, a great cleal of the security Council's time and attention were devoted to specifie aspects of Arah bemgerency. 1 need merely n'iention, among these themes, the Egyptian blockade of the Suez canal, the attempt by syria to prevent by force the drainage of the Huleh marshes, the use of Syrian armed force to stop a project in the demilitarized zone, and SQ on. AIl these problems, as weIl as the actions taken by Israel to protectitself, are symptoms of the same basic malady. That malady will 'be cured only when the Arab States accept what the eminent president of Ghana has termed !rpolitical realities", when they reconcile themselves to the existence of Israel as a permanent feature of the Middle East landscape, and when they are willing to negotiate an over-all peace settlement with Israel, as bath the Security Council and the General Assembly have called upon them to do. 33. In 1948, during the eighty meetings to which 1 have referred, the Soviet countries had no difficulty in deciding who was the aggressor. On 21 May 1948, Mr. Gromyko, speaking before the Security couneil, charged that the Arab states had "resorted to such action as sending their troops into Palestine and carrying out military operations aîmed at the sup- pression of the national liberation movement in palestine" ..!! On 28 May 1948, the representative of the Ukrainian SSR added: "1 wouId point out, in the first place, that we do not know of a single case of the invasion of the territory of another State by the armed forces of Israel, except in self-defence, where they had to. beat off attacks by' the armed forces of other States on Israel territory. That was self-defence in the full sense of the word.".!! 34. A few years later, the Soviet Union's approach to these problems started changing. On 22 January 1954, the Security Counci} voted on a resolution concerning the Jordan water scheme in the demili- tarized zone. Because that resolution took sorne account of Israel's legitimate interests, it was UTI- acceptable ta syria and, although it received the Support of the majority of the Councit, it was vetoep by the Soviet Union. This was the first time tht Soviet Union had used its veto power al~ an instrument of lts Middle East policy, and this was described by the United Kingdom representative, Sir Gladwyn Jehb, as lia sinister occasion". 36. That veto power was DOW established as a crucial element in a11 further dealings by this Couneil with the Israel-Arab conflict, It meant, in bInnt terrnR. that when Israel sought redress from the COUL"'Ü and tried to iuvoke the protection and authority of the Council against Arab belligerence, no remedial action could be taken because the Soviet Union had placed its veto power at the disposaI of one of the two parties to the dispute. We can only draw attention ta this fact, however unpalatable it may be. -l ! 37. This brief look at the record, then, reveals a story which has no resemblance to what we heard from the Soviet representative. We must presume that the sponsors of draftresolutionSj511Û andCorr.1 had in mind the situation 1 have described. Even the present text, which as 1 shaH shortly show is a one- sided one, still does not escape Soviet objections, for instance, to operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution. in case it m1ght carry sorne implication of Syrian responsibility, and even to operative para- graph 6, because it asks both Governments toobserve the military restrictions provided in the Armistice Agreement for the demilitarized zone and the defensive area. 38. What has heen said about the capacity of the security Council to intervene on Israel's behalf has a bearing on certain remarks made by two other Council members. The representative of the United States, in his statement on 28 March [999th meeting] singled out what he called a "policy of retalîatory raids", as having contributed to the rapid rise in tensions in the Middle East during 1955 and 1956 and he referred to a "reversion" to this policy. l wish ta assure him that my Government did not have then, and does not have now, any policy of retaliatory raids. My Government has the same right and duty as any otherGovernment, to protect the country against attack. In any case, the cause of the tension at that time was an Arab belligerence emboldened and·made more menacing by a massive flow pf military aid. The United Nations failed to come to grips with this bellige:rence, but reacted quickly to censure any defensive action taken bYIsrael ta relieve the mounting pressures upon its security. To see the effect but not the cause is to take a lop-sided view of history. 39. After the situation had exploded in crisiEo, at the end of 1956, the United States Secretary of State, MI'. Dulles, said from the rostrum of the General Assembly, on 1 November 1956: "The United Nations may have been somewbat laggard, somewhat impotent, in dealing with many 40. The representative of the United Kingdom in this Couneil said on 5 April 1962: "My delegation would most seriously urge Israel to consider that the United Nations is a stronger defence of peace in the Middle East, and of Israel' s independence, than its own armed forces." [lDD3rd meeting, para. 34.] It would not be fruitful for me ta debatewith Sir Patrick what the relative raIes were of the United Nations and of our own armed iorees in defending our inde- pendence. We believe in the United Nations, and we long for the day when it will have developed the effective capacity to guarantee and protect the inde- pendence and security of aIl its Member States, as was visualîzed in the Charter. Wehavenoexpansionist ambitions and we do not covet a single inch of the territory of our neighbours. We abhor bloodshed, and we begrudge every-penny and man-hour diverted from the giant task of reclaiming our waste lands and resettling our people. But it is not our fault that the Charter of the United Nations is still as much a dream as a reality. 41. In the brief span of Israel' s modern statehood, we have twice had ta fight in orderto survive. Nobody knows better than the United Kingdom under what circumstances the Palestine mandate ended and the State of Israel was barn. Had we had ta rely not on our own strength and courage, but solely on the Charter, Israel would not have survived two weeks. Countries far stronger and more secure than Israel do not rest their national security on the counsel Sir Patrick has urged upon Israel, but upon main- taining their own armed strength. This is an outeome and a reflection of the grim and troubled WOrId in which we live. 42. 1 must make sorne 'Ûomment on the statement by the representative of Syria on 28 March 1962 concerning the fishing aspect of the issue before the CounciL He said: "... from Ume ta time, of course, there arediffi- culties and friction, but these always arise from Israel's refusa] to recognize the Syrians' right ta fish in the lake, as laid down in the Anglo-French Agreement of 7 March 1923,~ or even to cross the ID-metre strip peacefully ta draw water ..." [999th meeting, para. 4D.] id League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XXll. 1924. No. 565. 44. The General Armistice Agreement of1949, which is the only bilateral ag'reement concluded between Israel and Syria, prohibited any crossing of the armistice demarcation line by c1vilians, and made no exception for fishermen. This prohibition, as \Vas made clear in illY previous statement, was reaffirmed by the Mixed Armistice Commission on a number of occasions. In fact, at one stage the Syrian representative to the Mixed Armistice Com- mission not only accepted that their fishermen had no right to cross the lD-metre strip to the lake, but gave undertaldngs that steps \Vould be taken by the Syrian authorities to prevent them from doing so. For instance, at the 54th meeting of the Mixed Armistice commission, on 10 January 1951, the senior Syrian representative declared: ., nI do not think that it is necessary for the Syrian delegation to repeat their statement concerning the interdiction on fishing' in Lake Tiberias for Syrian civilians and refugees living along the laks. We have given very strict instructions to that effect ...n11 45. In 1955, the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, General BUrns, re- ported to the Council that the Israel Government \Vas \Villing ta enter into discussions on this question \Vith the Syrian Government, more specifically, that we were willing to consider a renewul of the Anglo- French Agreement of 1923, as between Syria and Israel, or alternatively, that we were willing to consider applications for licences from individual fishermen. General Burns stated~that these pro- posais had been rejected by the Syrians. They insisted that their Îishermen had the right simply ta cross the border and fish in Israel, without IsraePs per- mission, licensing or control. This would be a violation of the Armistice Agreement, aS 1 have said, as weIl as of the laws ofIsrael. Even Israel fishermen have no such rights. The failure of the Syrian autho- rities to put a stop ta such illegal trespassing 18 one the serious causes of friction in that locality. i { , 46. 1 shall nOw come to the drait resolution submitted hy the United Kingdom and the United States [S/5110 and Corr.11. The first three operative paragraphs deal with the recent incidents in the Lake Tiherias 11 1 , 11 Officiai Records of the SecurÎ[Y Council, Tenth Vaal."", Supplement fol."" Oetobel."", Novembel."" and Decembel."" 1955. document 513524, pan. 9. ~ Ibid•• document S/3516. para. 12. 47. The Syrian complaint i5 given satisfaction in operative paragraphs 2 and 3, in terros more stringent than the cirCuffistances could possibly warrant. There is· no point in my discussing the language used, sinee 1 am instructed to reaffirm the position in principle of my Government, as set out in our statement to the Counoi! of 28 March 1962 [999th meeting). 48. But whatever vîew the CouDoil May choose to talœ concerning the Israel action, tllat iB only one side of the case. That action did not take place in a vacuum. As has already been pointed out by other speakers in the debate, the first part of the report by the Chief of Staff is headed "Events leading up the the fighti>1g on the night of 16-17 March 1962". As to the nature of these events, a common opinion emerges from the statements made by a number of the Council members. While making clear that they do not justify Israel's action, these members have shown their awareness of the Syrian attacks which so obviously preceded and provoked our reaction. 49. 1 would quote on th1s point only the etatement of the representative of the United States whose country ls one of the sponsors of the draft resolution. He said on 28 March: "It is apparent from even a preliminary study of the report of the Chief of Staff that there has been both provocation and retaliation. Both of these are contrary to the letter and spirit of the General Armistice Agreement and cannot he condoned." !999th meeting, para. 100.] 50. We have searched the text of the draft resolution in vain for a reference ta that Syrian provocation or for a finding that it ls contrary to the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreement and cannot he condoned. 51. There is a curious silence in the text concerning an additional point. At the meeting of the Council on Friday last, the United States representative said: nIt does, however, appear from the report that whatever initial firing there may have been with small arms and whoever started it, the level of the engagement was raised by Syria, starting on 8 March, ta that of art1llery tire, apparently of 80 mm gunS,1 {1005th meeting, para. 23.] A 11tt1e further on he comments: "The prospects of escalation of minor incidents when artillery is employed are only tao obvious." [Ibid., para. 24.] If that is the United States view, wel.U7e at a loss to understand why it should not he reflected at aH in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution. Such mention would no doubt be embarrassing to"<,;yrïa-bt:. does that justîfy its omission? 52. Why these elements of balance have vanished between 28 March and 6 April, when the draft reso- lution was submitted, it not for us to explain. My 53. Our judgement in this matter nows frcm much deeper considerations than textual equity. What my Gove1'nment seeks he1'e, above aB else, is compre- hension of the real nature of the problem. Against the tense and complex background, it is short-sighted to treat murderous attacks on our fishermen, our polîcemen and ourfarmers as mere "border incidents" and then to be alarmed and indignant when Israel reaets ta them. What makes an incident minor in character depends not only on the size of the forces involved, the calibre of the weapons, the number of casualties or the amount of damage. It depends first and foremost on the setting in which it occurs. 54. The representative of China has quotedapassag-e from the làte Secretary-General's report of 9 May 1956 which 1 might well repeat here. Ml'. Hammar- skjold said: "As incidents eontinued and their frequency in- creased, this, together with tbe strained politieal atmosphere, tended to give Ule individual occurrences wider implications than certainly in most cases were justified. The development led to explosions, sometimes of graat bitterness and causing great suffering. Thus, a chain of actions and reactions was created which, unless broken, is bound finally to constitute a threat ta peace and security"..21 By failing to reflect the Syrian provocations which create that chain of actions and reactions to which Ml'. Hammarskjold referred, the draft resolution bypasses ,vhat ts the essence of the problem. 55. By the second part of operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, the Council would calI "upon the two Governments concerned to comply with their obligations under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter ..." That paragraph of the Charter reads: "Ail Members shaH refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in an}' other manner inconsistent ,vith the Purposes of the United Nations." 56. My Government reaffirms its willingness ta comply with the obligations under Article 2, para- graph 4, in relation to Syria. It remains for the Syrian representative ta put on record here a similar declaration, on behalf of his own Government, in relation ta Israel. If he fails to do sa, the Security CouDcil will, 1 trust, draw the necessary conclusions. 2J Ibid•• Eleventh Year. Supplement for April. May and JUl1e 1956, doçument 5/3596, para. 12. 58. IncidentaIly, 1 was surprised to hear the repre- sèntative of the United States suggest, at the 1005th meeting, that my Government had made provocative statements. 1 am not aware of any such statements. 59. The remaining paragraphs of the drait resolution concern the functioning of the armistice machinery and my delegation would make three observations on them. 60. First, 1 cau assure the Council that no Govern- ment could have a deeper interest in maintainingpeace on Israel's borders than the Government of Israel itseIf. In seeking this essential '.>bjective of ourpolicy, our authorities are anxious to have aIl possible co-operation between the United Nations Truce Super- vision Orgauization and ourselves. We \Velcome any suggestions by the Chief of Staff; we will give them our earnest consideration and if they appear usefUl and acceptable, we will assist the Chief of Staff in their early implementation. In my statement to the Council on 5 April fl002nd meeting], arising out of General von Horn's answers ta questions, 1 explained ta the Council how we see the relationship. between the Israel Government and the Truce Supervision Organization regarding the implementation of the Armistice Agreement. The gist of that relationship is that the Chief of Staff has no independent authority concerning the national territory of the State con- cerned. He is always free to make recommendations or requests to the Government concerninghis require- ments. The Government must consider whether such recommendations would have security or political aspects and whether such aspects make anyparticular proposaI unacceptable. There is no reason why agood understanding on these matters should not be worked out, taking account of aIl the factors involved, and of the ultimate responsibility of the Government. 61. These remarks apply in particular to the question of freedom of movement for the United Nations observers, which has been given much attention in General von Horn's answers and in the comments made by Councll members. 1 should Hke to inject a note of realism into the discussion on this point. 62. Our security situation, with which Council mem- bers are familial', might have suggested to us that rigid restrictions should he 1mposed on the move- ments of nationals of a score of different coWltries who pass freely back and forth across the border, some of whom live on the Arab side. The fact that they temporarily wear a United Nations armband does Dot automatically make themgoodsecurityrisks. ln the past 1 cannot say that every single member of the staff of the Truce Supervision Organization 64. There are many other ways in which our co- operation with the Truce Supervision Organization is expresse.d in practical terrns. 1 do not want to multiply examples but merely to remove the mistaken impression which may have arisen in the minds of Council members that Israel is unco-operative and denies the Truce Supervision Organization the neces- sary mobility required for its task. 65. Here again, may 1 suggest that the objective should be to avoid conflicts of principle and, instead, to maintain and strengthen the understandings which already exist on the level of day-to-day working relations. 66. Secondly, 1 am instructed to reaffirm that the Israel Government will abide scrupulously by the cease-fire of 17 March-provided, naturally, that the Syrian Government does the same. We bave reported to the Council, in my letter:':- of 21 and 22 March [S/5098 and S/5100], that there had been a number of aets of non-compliance with the cease- fire by Syrian armed forces. The most serious was that on 20 March when another police launch was fired upon, with the boat damaged and two members of its crew wounded. That was after the cease-fire. The Council's debate has served the useful purpose, at least, of showing that sueh attacks inflame tensiol'l. and endanger the peace and cannot be taken lightly. 67. Thirdly, regarding the reactivation of the Mixed Armistice Commission, 1 fully explained, in iny statement at the 1002nd meeting, what the obstacle was. If that obstacle were removed, my Government would find no further difficulty in the full functioning of the Corumission. However, thirteen years of experience have shown that there is dubious value in formaI Commission meetings in whicb the parties take up rigid positions and the Chairman must decide the issue by his casting vote. The object should not be to pile up verdicts, but to secure the maximum of agreement or at least to reduce friction. This has always been achieved either by the informaI 68. lu the resolution of 18 May 1951 which is recalled in the preamble of the present draft resolution, the Security Council declared "that in order to promote tlie return of permanent peace in Palestine, it is ossential that the Governmerits of Israel and Syria observe faithfully the General Armistice Agreement of 20 July 1949". In any case, the implementation of the Armistice Agreement in its entirety, both by Syria and by Israel, is the basic premise of the draft· resolution before us. It must be repeated firmly that Syrian obligations in the Lake Tiberias area under the Armistice Agreement include the foIlowing: first, to refrain from aIl further attacks upon or interference with Israel activities on Lake Tiberias, and secondly, to ensure that there should be ·no crossing of any kind from Syrian into Israel territory. 69. Any failure by Syria to observe these obligations, therefore, will be regarded by my Government as a violation of the Armistice Agreement, as weIl as of this draft resolution if it is adopted. 70. In conclusion, may l reiterate the profound hope of my Government that the relationship between Israel and its Arab neighbours may now, after aH these years, start moving forward from a brittle armistice to the tirmer foundation of peace. Several of the speakers in this debate, and notably the repre_ sentative of Ghana and you yourself, Mr. President, speaking as the representative of your country, have rightly pointed out that the underlying cause of these difficulties is the lack of peace. In the report by the late secretary-General, of May 1956, to which references have already been made, he said: "The target can be reached on two conditions: the first one being the re-establishment, as a starting point for a new development, of full com- pliance with the armistice agreements; the second being efforts towards an improvement ofthe generaI political relations between the parties concerned and, thereby, the creation ofaspiritofless distrust. In both these respects, the United Nations has a contribution to make ..."121 71. As was evident at the last session of the General Assembly, a growing number of Member States which have ties of friendship with both Israel and the Arab States are anxious to stimulate aprocess ofnegotiation as the realistie road towards improving general political relations. That objective was inherent ln the armistice régime, as is expressly stated in the text of the armistice agreements and in the resolution of the seeurity Couneil which welcomed those agree- ments as a transition stage to peace. At the end of the strained debate which is now concluding, the Government of Israel wishes to look beyond present tensions and difficulties towards a better future in 1Qj ~. para. 14.

My delegation has already requested the President to put to the vote the Syrian draft resolution [S/5107/ Rev.1] which was tabled last week. After that request had been made, a draft resolution [S/5110 andCorr.1] was submitted jointIy by the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom. 73. We have studied that draft resolution carefully and should like to make a few comments on it. Its operative paragraph 2 would reaffirm "the Security Counèil resolution of 19 January 1956 which condemned Israel mîlitary action in breach of the General Armistice Agreement, whether or not undertaken by way of retaliation"; and its operative paragraph 3 would determine "that the Israel attack of 16-17 March 1962 constitutes a flagrant violation of that resolution and caUs upon Israel scrupulously ta refrain from such action in the future". 74. My delegation is in full agreement with those two paragraphs of the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States. It also has no objection to operative paragraph 8. The other operative paragraphs. however, pose a problem for us. As the Soviet Union representative has noted, those paragraphs leave us with the impression that hoth the aggressor and his victim are treated equally. 75. The Syrian Government and delegation assure us that they respect their signatures on the Armistice Agreement, that they demand that the Agreement be fully respected, that they mean to see that the Agreement is respected. They ahide by the cease-fire arranged by the Chief of Staff; they have no objection in principle to agreeing to the measures.recommended by the Chief of Staff if they are mutually accepted; they have co-operated, andwill continue to co-operate, with the Chief of Staff, and they do not claim a right of veto on aIl his actions. 76. That is why we finditunfairandunjust to mention Syria, in operative paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7, on the same level as Israel. We abject not because of any refusaI on the part of Syria ta co-operate or ta adhere ta the Armistice Agreement; we abject because of the implication that bath parties, the aggressor and the victim, are ta be equated and treated on the same level. 77. We should therefore like ta ask for a separate vote on operative paragraphs 2, 3 and 8 of the draft resolution. My delegation will he able to vote for those paragraphs· as weIl as for the preamble of the draft resolution. 78. If our request for a separate vote ls accepted, my delegation will not iosist on asking for a vote on the Syrian draft resolution. 79. While 1 have the floor, 1 should like to draw the attention of the meniÎ "'TS of the Council to the resolution on navigation mrough the Suez Canal which has just been mentioned. 1 do not have the text of that 80. However, our position with regard to the implementation of aIl the United Nations resolutions on Palestine is lmown and does not need to be repeated. We do not intend to be diverted from a discussion of the specifie aggresslon with which we are now dealing. However, since a quotation has been made here from a statement in the General Assembly by the late United States secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, to the effect that many injustices had been committed in the Middle East and needed to be redressed, 1 must say that we fuIly agree with that statement. We have not stopped saying the same thing since 1948. But this is not the time to comment on that or to enlarge on it. 81. 1 should like to repeat my request for a separate vote on the preamble and operative paragraphs 2, 3 and 8 of the draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom,

The representative of the United Arab Republic has asked for a separate vote on the preamble and on paragraphs 2, 3 and 8 of the draftresolution which my delegation has had the honour ta ca-sponsor with the United States delegation. That draft resolution is very carefully worded to try ta take account, in as objective a manner as possible, of aIl the facts and considerations put before us by members of the Couneil and by the representatives of Syria and Israel. For that reason, it would be unfortunate if the Council were ta consider and vote upon certain paragraphs in isolation, since aU these paragraphs must be taken together and looked at as a whole. Therefore, with an respect to the representative of the UnitedArabRepublic, 1must, on behalf of myself and my United States colleague, whom J have consulted, exercise our right under rule 32 of the provisional rules of procedureto object to a separate vote on the operative paragraphs ln question and on the preamble. 1 should like to say that 1 very much regret on this occasion not to be able to accede to the request of the representative of the United Arab Republic in this respect.

J am very sorry that Sir Patrick Dean didnotfind it agreeable to accept a separate vote on this drait resolution. When the Council passed its resolution of 19 January 1956,.!!I it contained a warning of sanctions, and implications of possible sanctions in the future. When we came to the Council this time, we thought we were going to begin where we left off, that we were going to see that aggression cannot pay and cannot he left unpunished or uncensured. 84. If the representative of the- Soviet Union had just mentioned that, of course, he would have been !!Ilbid., Eleventh Year, Supplement for Jannary, FebruaryandMarcll ~ docwnent 5(353B. -~i and ours, tbis Ume-ta see that aggression will not ;1 recur. Our vote, therefore, is going to he in favanr of this cIraft resolution; but we did not want our vote to be construed to mean that we accept in any way the implication that Syria and Israel were accorded equal treatment in any paragraph of this draft resolution.

The Soviet delegation stated previously that it was prepared to vote for the draft resolution introduced by Syria and supported by the UnitedArabRepublie. Sinee, however, as the Counci! was preparing ta vote, the United States and the United Kingdom submitted the draft resolution in document S/5110 and Corr.l, and the representative of the United Arab Republic made the statement which we have just heard, the situation has changed and the Soviet delegation must define its position in the vote which the Couneil is about to take on this draft resolution. 1 1, 1 1,. 87. We did not express any views on the question of the separate vote requested by the delegation of the UnitedArab Republie. However, we whole-heartedly endorsed this request and had a separate vote been taken, we had intended to vote for the preamble and for paragraphs 2 and·3 of this draft res,~ution. -], , j 88. Sinee the sponsors have unfortunately availed themselves of their right to object ta this request, the Soviet delegation, HIre the delegation of the United Arab Republic, which has just explained its vote, must decide which are the key elements of this draft resolution and, in the light of the answer ta this question, what position the Soviet delegation should take in the vote. 89. The Soviet delegation considers that the key provisions of the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States are paragraphs 2 and 3, which, although in terms which are insufficiently categorical, nevertheless express the basic idea, namely, condemnation of the Government of Israel for the act of aggression against Syria which took place on the night of 16-17 March 1962. This idea is in general agreement with the political appraisal made by the Soviet delegation at the first meeting at which the security Council considered this item [999th meeting]. A number of the provisions of ibis draft resolution are not entirely satisfactory, and 1 refer the members of the Counoil to my stat6- ment which includes a detailed .analysis and criticism of those unsatisfactory provisions. However, being confronted with the question of which wouldcontribute more ta the maintenance of peace in the Near and Middle East-the adoption of paragraphs 2 and 3 together with sorne unsatisfactory provisions contained in this draft resolution, or the rejection of this draft resolution as a whole-my delegation is inclined to support the position taken a short time ago by the representative of the United Arab Republic. ~ j !i ! 4 j 90. For these reasons, and in view of the political significance which we attach ta paragraphs 2 and 3 92. The last point 1 think it necessary to make in explanation of my vote is that, in our view. the adoption of draft resolution S/5110 and Corr.1, including paragraphs 2 and 3, in the form in wMch it bas just been presented to us, shotùd serve as a serious warnmg from the security Council ta the Government of Israel concerning the inadmissibility of any future violation whatsoever of the Armistice Agreement and particularly of any actual armed invasion of Syrian territory, Syrian air space, or the territory of the other Arab countries, or violation of their territorial integrity and inviolability. 93. 1 think that the adoption of this draft resolution will serve as a serious warning and as an intimation that the Security Council as a whole, performing its functions under the Charter of the United Nations, demands that the Government of Israel should desist from acts of aggression and should strictly observe the Armistice Agreement, and that the security Council will keep a close watch for any violation by Israel of the Armistice Agreement and will take action if such violations are committed. 94. The Government of Israel should not criticize the Security Council if further violations should unfortunately make it necessary for the Council ta meet for the two hundred and seventh or perhaps two hundred and eighth time on the Palestine question and to adopt even more effective measures than the warning which it has again thought fit to address to the Government of Israel. 95. This categorical warning should be the last. If hereafter Israel should be gui1ty of violations of the Armistice Agreement or should commit ather aggressive acts, the Security Council will, if this tl11'eat to intern.ltional peaee and security resulting from the incessant aggressive actions of Israel in the Middle East again cornes before it, be obligedto apply the coercive measures which are contemplated in the Charter.

1 think that, in my statement on 5 April [1002nd meeting], 1 clearly set out the position of my Government concerning the matter on which we are now about to vote. My Government believes that the res,onsibilîties are to some extent divided, and that the events of the night of 16-17 March were provoked by the serious incidents of 8, 15 and 16 Maroh, which preceded them. 5 nant nous bilités et ont 8, 97. 1 said that my delegation was not authorized ta vote for a text whieh did not allocate these various respansibilities in an equitable manner. L 97. h équitable

The debate on the item for whieh this meeting of the Seeurity Couneil was called is now closed and we will proceed to vote On the two draft resolutions before the Council. In accol'dance with rule 32 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security council, they will be put to the vote in the order of their submission. 100. The tirst is the draft resolution submitted by Syria [S/5l07/Rev.l] on which the representative of the United Arab Republic has requested a vote. The other is the ciraft resolution subnitted by the United States and the United Kingdom [S/5110 and Corr.l]. 101. The representative of the United Arab Republic has asked to speak. 1 shall give him the floor only on the vote which is about to take place.

It is my understanding that the Syrian delegation does not object to proceeding to the vote On the draft reso1ution contained in document S/5110 and Corr.1. Therefol'e, 1 will not insist on asking for a vote on the Syrian draft resolution.

The representative of Syria is asking for the floor, which presents me with a problem for, as we are apout to vote, 1 cannot meet his request except as an act of court~sy with which the Couneil ë.grees. 104. 1 hear no objection and, without setting a precedent, 1 propose ta give the floor to the representative of Syria sole1y, as 1 understand it, for the purpose of withdrawing the ciraft resolution on which we were about ta vote. 105. Ml'. TARAZI (Syrian Al'ab Republic) (translated from French): 1 thank you, Ml'. President, for giving me the floor at this stage of the debate. 1 have nothing ta sayat this time on the substance of the matter and should simply like to associate myself with the representative of the United Arab Republic, who has said that he would not insist on a vote on the draft resolution submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic. 1 therefore request, since my delegation has the right ta do so as sponsor of this draft resolution, that it should not he put ta the vote.

Since the draft resolution submitted by Syria has been withdrawn, neither the representative of that countTy nor the representative of the United Arab Republic desiring that it should be put ta the vote, the only draft resolution now before the Couneil is that submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom [S/5110 and Corr.l], which 1 now put ta the vote. Against: None. Abstaining: France. the draft resolution was adopl.ad by la votes ta none, with 1 abstention.

With the vote we have just taken, we have concluded our consideration of the question on our agenda. Before closing the meeting, 1 gi-ve the floor to the representative of Romania. 108. Ml'. HASEGANU (Romania) (translated frorn French): 1 should like toexplain myvote. In accordance with the statemeut 1 made sorne days ago, my vote should be interpreted as a vote in support of the preamble and of operative paragraphs 2, 3 and 8. My delegation has reservations concerning the other paragraphs, which tend to place the acts of Syria and Israel on an equal footing. The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m. AFRICA/AFRIQUE CTPRUS/CHYPRE: P"'N le "'Io..nd., 'h~ G,~at CZECHOSLOV...KIA/TCHÉCOSlOVAQUIE, C,lMEROONfCAMEROUN: '-'BIlA''''E ou PEUPLE AFRICAIN l. G.'~n'•. 8. P. 1197. vaoundè. DiffUSION INTERNATIONAlE CAMEROUNAISE OU liVRE ET DE lA PRESSE. S.nijmohm•. CONGO (lôop.'~';U.): INSTITUT POLITIQUE CONGOLAIS. B. P. 2307. L~ooo,""'''._ ElHIOPIA/ÊlHIDPIE, INTERNATIONAl PRESS "GENeY. P. i.-. 80.120. Add.. 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