S/PV.1007 Security Council

ln accordance with the decisiontakenbytheCouncilat its 990th meeting, if there isnoobjectionIshall i.nvite the representatives of Pakistan and India to take places at the Council table. 1 ] i At the invitation of the President, MT. Muhammad Zafrul1a Khan (Pakistan) and Mr. C. S. Jha (Jndia) took places at the Counci! table.

The members of the Counci! will recall that we began our discussion of the item before us at the 990th meeting, held on 1 February 1962. At that meeting, the Council agreed to postpone the discussion of the item until after 1 March, on the understanding that it would be resumed after consultation between the members of the Council andthe interestedparties. This afternoon's meeting has been convened in accordance with that decision. S. Mr. ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan): Before lunch this forenoon, my friend, Ambassador Jha, the representative of India, honoured me by conveying ta me a message from the Defence Minister of India. He told me that the Defence Minister much regretted that, having regard to his heavy responsibilities and manifold preoccupations, he had not been able to reach New York in time ta be present here this afternoon and that he hoped 1 would not consider this as any lack of courtesy on his part. Far from considering that the Defence Minister of India has in any way been lacking in courtesy, 1 would have considered it impertinent on my part to feel that he was under any obligation to be present here this afternoon or at any other time when it was not convenient for him. And 1 conveyed these sentiments to Mr. Jha. 1 further assured him that if the Defence Minister had any feeling of ernbarrass- 9. 1 had the honour ta make, havîng regard ta the complicated nature of this prablern, what 1 rnight describe as a somewhat surnmary presentation to the Council on 1 February [990th meeting). 1 much feared that on this occasion, when the adjourned discussion has ta be resumed, 1 would be under the necessity of going into sorne detail at least on certain aspects of the problern which are crucial for the proper understanding of the differences that have arisen between India and Pakistan over this question. 1 did, 1 believe, make a brief reference to the position of the lndian States as distinguished from BritishIndiaattheadvent of independence in the summer of 1947. 10. The Security Council has heard a good deal and will hear a great deal more about the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir ta India or Pakistan which is in question, but at this stage it is necessary to say something on this subject ofaccessionitself. Whatwas the origin of this idea? So far as the Indian Independenoe Act'of 1947. an enactment of the British Parliament, is concerned, it makes no reference to the accession of States ta Olle Dominion or the other, as hoth India and Pakistan were ta be at the start of lndepend_ ence. AIl that the Act says in that connexion is contained in section 7. which provides in effectthat on the appointed date-that is ta say, on the date of independenoe-the suzerainty exercised by the British Crown over these States and aIl treaties and engagements which subsisted between the British Crown and the rulers of these States would come ta an end. convient. du Il Act par à encore dance. dans qu'à suzeraineté Etats sistaient 1l. What would then be the position? The Act does not define it and there are few precedents in constitutional history of any comparable situation which may have arisen before; as a matteroffact. there are hardly any. One clear indication that we have is from MI'. Ayyangar, the representative of India, when he addressed the Security Councn, in the early days of the dispute, as ta what wouldbethepositionwith regard tQ the Indian States after they had become, as it were, independent under the Indian Independence Act. 1 will come ta that in a moment. 11. alors? probable peu comparaison. avons indiens devenus Act, M. les parole un 12. 1 should have said that there is acIear indication in the White Paper issued by the Government of India on 10 August 1948, which states: "'The Government of India are firmly of the view that whatever sovereign rights reverted ta these States on the lapse of paramountcy (that is ta say, when British sovereignty ceasedto operate) they vest 12. nette publié ', torical constitutional situation that arose, we start with i the idea that thesovereignrightsthatrevertedto these j States on the displacement of British paramountcy, J vested in the people. j J 1 M 14. Now, how did the idea of accession come iota the d picture? The ideaofaccession,inasense,already held J the field. As members of theSecurityCouncilmay re- ) calI, if they are famillar ..vith theconstitutionalhistory 1 of India previous to the Indian IndependenceAct, there H hadbeen variousattemptsatsettlementofthisquestion } between the main political parties on the one hand, and ~ the British ontheother.Andtheimmediatelypreceding i attempt to the one that culminated in the Indian Indej l PBe~dtenhcec Ab?t, tWMa~ n;ade. bYthWhat was lm,o.,',n asThthe 1'1 IS a me Iss10n ln e summer 0 46. e Cabinet Mission was sent ta India br Prime Minister A Attlee, and was composed ofthreedistinguishedmembers of the British Cabinet, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, '. who was Secretary of State for India; the brilliant statesman and politician, Sir Stafford Cripps, who, 1 believe, was either Lord Privy Sealor Lord President of the Counail at the time; and MI'. A. V. Alexander, who was First Lord of the Admiralty. 15. It is not necessary to detail their achievement, which was indeed a very notable one. They brought about a settlement by agreement between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League which was accepted by both, as a resuIt of which the political unity of Jndia could have been preserved. That is a matter of history. But when they studied the problem, they were also faced with a question of what would happen to the IndianStates under the scheme which they put forward and which was immediately accepted.' 16. The memorandum of the Cabinet Mission on the question of IndianStates, dated 12 May 1946,1/ set forth this idea of acpession. Itsaidthatthe position of states would be strengthened during this formulative period if the various Governments which hadnotalreadydone so were to take active steps to place themselves in close and constant touch with public opinion in their States by means ofrepresentative institutions. Further on the memorandum stated that this roeant that the rights of States which flowed from their relationship to the Crown would no longer exist and that aIl rights which had been surrendered by the States tothe paramount Power would return to the States. The memorandum concluded: "Political arrangements between the States on the one side and the British Crown and British India on the other will thus be brought to an end. The void will have to be filled either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successor government or governments in British India, or failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it or them." 18. Thus far, then, according to the view firmly held by the Government of India, upon the lapse aI paramountcy, such sovereignty as reverted ta the States vested in the people and it was or is for the people to decide, in arder to fill that void, what re1ationship, in the words of the Cabinet Mission, should be established \Vith either of the two successor governments that emerged. 19, What were the principles which were ta be kept in mind by these States in deciding the question of accession? ln theory, each State was at liberty to accede ta one Dominion or the other, but certain compulsive considerations had ta be kept in mind. fonder à avec 20. These considerations were enunciated by Lord Mountbatten in an address ta the rulers of tbe States -and 1 shaH, at a later point in my remarks, reaù to the Council the declaration which he then made. He stated the sarne prÎncipleto the Maharajah of Jodhpur, and this is recounted by Mr. V. P. Menon in his book The Story of the Integration of the Indian States,Yon page 117, as foI1ows: mulées verains un principe exposé peut intitulé states IfLord Mountbatten made it clear thatfl'om a pure- Iy legal standpoint there was no objection te the ruler of Jodhpur acceding to Pakistan; but the Maharajah shouId, he stressed, consider seriously the consequences of doing sa. having regard to the fact that he himself was a Hiodu; tbat bis State was populated predominantly by Hindus andthat the same applied to the States surrounding Jodhpur. In the light of these considerations, if the Maharajar, were to accede to Pakistan, his action would surely be in conflict with the principle underlying thepartitionof India on the basis of Muslim andnon-Muslim majority areas; and serious communal trouble inside the State would he the inevitable consequence of such affiliation. If 21. He had, in a general manner, in addressing a special full meeting of the Chamber of Princes in New Delhi on 25 July 1947,li three weeks before the appointed date for independence, advised the princes as fo11ows: 21. des New la en manière "It was necessaryto set uptwo States Departments, one in each Government, because the States are theoretically free to link their futUre with whichever Dominion they may care. But when Isaythat they are at liberty tolinkupwitheitherofthe Dominions, may 1 point out that there are certain geographical compulsions ~!J.ich cannat be evaded•... "... 11 .l! Supplément annexe .!2r !anuary, Februar)' and March 1957. document S/PV.762/Add.1. annex IV, sect.2. ·:1 22. Under tbis generai principle and in application of i this general principle to a particular case, ae 1 have ,1 already informed the COlmeil, Lord Mountbatten î pointed out to the Maharajah of Jodhpur that. as the 1 majority of his subjects were Hindus and as the princii pie of the. partition of India was that contiguous majori- 1 ty areas of one religious communitywouldformone of the independent states andcontiguous majority areas of .1 the other community would form the other state, if he 11 acted contrary ta that principle-although in theory he was free to do whatever he chose ta do-it would be j contrary ta the baais on which the partition had taken :1 place, and he would run iuto serious trouble. , .11 j 23. That, in brief, is the basic situation with regard )1' to this question of accession. With the Councills induigence. 1 shaH return to this a little later, with re- 1 gard ta its application ta Kashmir. However. two matters are clear: first, that it is for the people to ] decide; and, second, that if a decision is taken contrary .' ta the wishes of the people, then serious trouble will 1 result. As a matter of fact, the principle was later d taken further by the GovernmentofIndia:thatany such action would not be vaUd, wouldnotberecognized, and would have no op~ration. 1 shall come to that a little later. . A J 24. At tbis stage, 1 would wish briefly ta refer to the conditions under which the Kashmir question arose. For that, also, 1 am under the regrettable necessity of making a reference-I hope to make it very brief-to sorne of tbe extremely tragic happenings that accompanied the birth of India and Pakistan into independence. 1 am not seeking to lay blame; 1 am not seeking to excavate things which had better lie buried now. But, in order ta understand the background of the question, a brief reference Is necessary. 25. In some of the Indian States-I shall name three: Bharatpur, Patiala and Kapurthala-a serious attempt was made by the rulers to exterminate altogether the community to which the ruler himself did not belong. ln two of them, it succeeded ta a very large extent; and, in the third, il succeededcompletely. The third one was Kapurthala, which also had fuese two special features of significance-: first, that Kapurthala was contiguous ta Muslim majority areas in the north-west: second, that in Kapurthala the majority of the population were Muslims. The Maharajah's action was so effective that within a few days only two Muslims were left alive in the Kapurthala 8tate, in which they had formed a majority of the pOPulation. 26. That is part of the background. 1 am making no grievance. As 1 said, itis notmy purpose to lay blame. But it is a direct introduction ta the question of Kashmir. As you will see presently, these three States were named as having cau"sed the apprehension which lad ta the disturbances in the 8tate of Jammu and "Two hundred and thirty-seven thousand Muslims were systematicaIly exterminated, unless they escaped to Pakistan along the border, by aIl the forces of the Dogra State headed by the Maharajah in persan." 28. Ii was this campaign ofthe Maharajah, undertaken by the ruler against his own people, in order to get rid of the majority of his people, or to reduce them to a state of insignificance, or at least to a state of abject ten'or, that started the whole of this trouble. The people rose, as they were bound to do, because thnt part of the State where this campaign was Undertak~n-it then used to be known as Poonch-was inhabited by people a very large preponderance of whom were veterans of the Second World War, They werenot like the people of the valley itself, whahavebeen unaccU3- tomed to bearing arms. These people had borne arms valiantly and were acc't.lstomed to their use. vaillamment comment 29. So a tiheration mcvement started in the State as a reaction to this very drastic action undertakenby the ruler of the State against his own people, whom he was there ta defend and to proteet, and for whose welfare he had to make provision. That is based on testimony which is incontrovertible. But that this kind of thing, together with what had happened in other IndianStates -notably in the three that 1have named-was the cause of an this trouble is borne out by the testimony of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, who, however much today he Olay be out of favour-and 1 m@y have to revert to that aspect also later, in another part of my addresswas at that time regarded by the Prime Minister of India, and by Ml'. Ayyangar, who addressedthe Security CouDcil on behalf of rndia, as the lUldïsputed poIitical leader of the people of Kashmir. 29. naissance montrée dont et témoignages ainsi l'Inde soient la Abdullah il question à l'Inde devant comme du 30. Sheikh Abdullah, ---"'0 had been in considerable prominence in Kashm;' ,nce the early nineteen thirties, had, a few yeaT:;; ~ oelieve before independence, through his political organization the Jammu and Kashmir Nationai Conference, set in motion a movement against the Maharajah. It was caUed "Quit 30. rôle quelques par la le 1 ,i 1 , J j , f 31. The people who started the liberation movement drove out the State forces from the portions of the territory in which the movement had been started, and almost aU Muslim personnel of the Stateforcesjoined them, so that the situation, so far as the State and the Maharajah were concerned, began to be precarious. Then the incursion of the tribesmen took place on 22 October. Within three days, that is to say, by 25 October. the Maharajah'a position in Srinagar be~ came, from the point ofviewofsecurity,open to grave danger. He left the capital and went to Jammu. 33. Now,Mr. V. P. Menon, who was thenwhat 1 might describe as the political secretary of the Government of India in charge of its relationships with the Indian States, has given an account of the happenings from then onwards. Ml'. Menon had tirst gane ta Srinagar to meet the Maharajah while the Maharajah was still there. He returned to New Delhi to make his report and to hold consultations; and even then he reported that unless India was ready to helptheMaharajah with troops, the Maharajah's authority and rule over the State would soon be brought to an end. He then went ta Jammu when the Maharajah had arrived there and held consultations with him. The Maharajah no doubt expressed the desire that he should have military aid from India. Ml'. Menon explained to him that the aid could be given ta him only if he acceded ta India. The Maharajah then wrote the application for accession and accompanied it with a long letter in the course of whioh he mentioned that, as he couldnot obtain military aid from India otherwise, he was offering accession to India. 34. Ml'. Menon 's account describes the -situation. 1 have already given a reference to The Story of the Integration of the Indian States. 1quote frompages 399 and 400: "We left Srinagar in the first light of the morning of 26 Dctaher andimmediatelyonmyarrivalin Delhi 1 went stl'aight to a meeting of the Defence Committee. 1 reported my impressions of the situation and pointed out the supreme necessityofsavingKashmir from the raiders, Lord Mountbatten said that it would be improper ta move Indian troops into what was at the moment an independent country, as Kashmir had not yet decided ta accede to either India or Pakistan. If it were true that the Maharajah was now anxious to accede to India, then Jammu and Kashmir wouldbecome pa.rt of Indian territory. This was the only basis on which Indian troops could be sent to the rescue of the State from further piIlaging by the aggressors. He further expressed thestrongopinion that in view of the composition of the population accession should be conditionai on the will of the people being ascertained by a plebiscite." l shaIl repeat that: "accession should be conditional"; this is the aCCOlll1t given by the seniorpolitical officer of the Government of India who took part on behalf of the Government of India in these negotiations. He reports that Lord Mountbatten, the Governor-Generalof lndia, made it clear that accession shouldbe conditional on the will of the pe?ple being ascertainedby a plebiscite, Je il rapport vernement dont lord cisa la "... after the raiders had been driven out of the State and law and arder had beenrestored. This was 1 of the accession "should be conditional on the will of i the people being ascertained by a plebiscite after the j raiders had beeu driven out of the State n and that this -1 was Ureadily agreep. to by Nel'.ruandother Ministers". 36. 1 continue to quote: ~Soon after the meeting of the Defence Committee 1 flew to Jammu, accompanied by Mahajan. "-a retired judge of the PWljab High Court, who had been appointed by the Maharajah as lUs Prime Minister at that time-nOn arrivaI at the palace Hound it in a state of utter turmoil with valuable articles strewn aU over the place. The Maharajah was asleep; he had left Srinagar the previous evening and had been driving ail night. 1 woke mm up and told him of what had taken place at the Defence Committee meeting. He was ready to accede at once. He then composed a letter to the Governor-General describing the pitiable plight of the State and reiterating his request for military help. He further informed the Governor- General that it was his intention to set up an interim government at once and to ask Sheîkh Abdullah ta carry the responsibilities in this emergency with Mehr Chaud Mahajan, hts Prime Minister." i, 'l ,] This is the sarne Sheikh Abdullah who had previously been sentencedto seven years' rigorous imprisonment, and, as we shall see later, has now been undergoing a so-called trial for over three andahalfyears, and the trial is nowhere near taking place yet. As a resuIt of this action by the Maharajah, Sheikh Abdullah would be associated with the Prime Minister and an assurance was to be carried to the Government of India, and principally to the Prime Minister of India, that the Maharajah was now surrendering authority to the representative of the people. 1 continue to quote: nHe concluded by saying that if the State was to be saved, immediate assistance must be available at Srinagar.1f 37. Before 1 continue toquotefurther,Iwantto stress this. The Maharajah's authority, in effect,hadnotonly been repudiated in theory but was hanging by a very slender thread even at Jammu. He had aIreadyevacuated Srinagar. There are two very signific2.nt factors in this account itself which confirm that. One was the condition in which Mr. Menon found the palace at Jammu when he arrived, with valuables strewn allover the place, a state of utter confusion, obviously indicating that preparations were being made for flight. But here is another not only very signifie.ant but rather poignant factor in the situation-again 1 quote: -j, l, i, 1J "He aIse signed the Instrument of Accession. Just as 1 was leaving he told me that before he went to sleep, he had left instructions with his ADe that, if 1 came back from Delhi, he was not to be disturbed as it would mean that the Government of India had ~' ~ ' That was the value of his remaining authority at that Ume. 38. 1 continue to quote: "With the Instrument of Accession in the Maharajah's letter 1 flew back at once to Delhi. Sardar1!- meaning Sardar Patel, who was then Minister in Charge of Indian States-"was waiting at the aerodrame and we bath went straight to a meeting of the Defenee Committee which was arranged for that evening. There was a long discussion, at the end of which it was decided that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir should be accepted, subject to the proviso "-previously, it was "conditional upon". Here it is "subject totheproviso"-Ilthataplebiscite would be held in the State when the law and order situation allowed. It was further decided that an infantry battalîon should be flOWll ta Srinagar the next day." 39. Now, that was the situation in whichtheso-called accession took place. The intimation of accession having been accepted was conveyed ta the Maharajah by Lord Mountbatten, as Governor-General; and he wrote a letter also ta the Maharajah, which is not only relevant to the context upan willch 1 am engaged Ri the moment, but is also significant. It reads as fallows: 39. le en Maharajah ment, a ne extrait: "Your Highness's letter dated 26 October 1947 has been delivered ta me by Mr. V. P. Menon. In the special circumstances mentioned by your Highness, my Government have decided ta acceptthe accession of Kashmir State ta the Dominion af India. In consistence with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute,I'- Et nous l'Etat Maharajah. dàns de ment And here :'lOt only the issue ofaccessionwas the subject of disp·,lte, the State hact well-nigh got Tid of the Maharajah altogether. Sa here is the Governor- General, in a solemn 8tate document, setting forth the policy of his Government, which is that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of disputeli ••• the question of accession should bedecidedin accordance with the wishes ofthepeopleofthe State, it is my Government!s wish that, as saon as lawand arder have been restored in Kashmir and Hs soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State 's accession should he settled by a reference ta the people." \\'hat could be more solemn, more binding, than that? Fut-il celui-là? 40. dans entendre, de désire" de bien 40, 1 was told-and since then, 1 have confirmedit by looking at the record-that it has been suggested, on behalf of India, that this was no undertaking of an obligation. "It is my Government's wish"-it was observed that this was the expression of a wish; and, Unfortunately, Ihany wishes remain unfulfilled. 41, lA, 41. With aIl respect, 1 will say that this i8, to say the least. treating a very saleron matter with a Iack of .11 as 1 have perforee ta do at the moment, might be regarded as uncalled for~ there 18 no needfor that; there j is no room for any other interpretation. But even if it is the wish of the Government, the wishof the Government is being conveyed in a solemn document by the head of the Government, the Goveroor-General, when he 18 accepting accession, provlsionally and condltionally-as the expressions have been used-and he lays it down that the final decision can be made only through the plebiscite. 1 would reitefate:nothingcould be more saleron that that; nothing could be more serious than that. How could anybody, anybody responsible for such anassurance,subsequentlyseek,as it were, to wipe it away or to explain it away by saying, "After aH, itwas only the expressionof a wish; and how sad it is, in this life, that sa many wishes remain unfulfilled. "? 1 1 1 11 11 1 42. 1 continue ta quote from Lord Mountbatten's letter: "Meanwhile, in response to your Highness 's appeal for military aid, action has been taken today to send troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir,!t-they wère already there before this letter was signed-to help your own forces ta defend your territory and ta protect the lives, property and honour of your people. My Government and 1 note withsatisfaction thatyour Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form an interim Government ta work withyour Prime Minister. " 1 lay stress upon that also because subsequently, socal1ed elections have been repeatedly rigged and it is argued that the matter should now be considered as concluded. 43. We shaH have ta Come to COnsider whether the matter can be conc1uded, even if the elections were free. and what was the character of those electlons. ln that connexion, it would be relevant to invite a compartson with regard to the administration of justice in fuis State, to see a solemnprocess in which the Government is never supposed ta Interfere, and then to decide how a political operation like an electlon, which can often be rigged-not only in the Indian States, or ln India or Pakistan or other places, but even in the much more advanced countries-can be regarded as having disposed of the question. Even a free election could not have disposed of the question, under the obligations of the parties. SA then, accession havîng taken place, troops having been sent ta the Maharajah's aid, they cleared the terrîtory of the State of the invaders and of the raiders and thosepeoplewho were in rebellion against the authorîty ofthe Maharajah-up to a certain point. Then, as this process began ta appear to be a very lengthy one, the Government of India brought the whole question tothe SecuritYCouncîl on 1 January 1948. 45. In his telegram of 27 October 1947, the Prime Minister of India Md already conveyed the foHowing assurance ta the Prime Minister of Pakistan: , tll sbould like ta make it clear that the question of aiding Kasbmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the 8tate ta accede to Tnma. ll That was one Prime Minister ta the other; it is aState dOCUment. Naturally. Pakistan was perturbed at the developments tbat had taken place and that were then taking place, and tbis was the assurancethat the Prime Minister of India conveyed to the Prime Minister of pakistan. 1 repeat: "1 should like ta make it clear that the question of aiding Ka8hmir in this emergency"-thatis ta say. ta get l'id of the tribesmen and of the people that were in rebellion, and ta put down the rebellion- "is not designed in any way ta influence the State ta accede to India. Our view, which we have repeatedly made publie, is that the question of accession in any disputed territory or State musthe decided in accordance with the wi8hes of the people. and we adhere ta this view. '1 46. Then. in a telegram of 31 October 1947,from the prime Minister of India ta the Prime Minister of Pakistan. it was siated: "Our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from Kashmir as soon as peace and arder are restored "-nothing could be clearer- "and leave the decision regarding the future of the 8tatetothe people of the State is not merely a promise to your Government"-not that it is not a promise ta that Government, butrather that it i8 more than a promise ta that Ciovernmentl'but also to the people of Kashmir and ta the worId." Today it is a "wish'l, and it IS said. "unfortunately so many wishes remain unfulfilled.!l But here the words used are: "Our assurance that we shaH withdraw our troops from Kashmir as saon as peace and arder are restored and leave the decision"-not the affirmation, but the decision- "regarding the future of the State to the people of the State. isnotmerelya promise to your Government out also to the people of Kashmir and to the world". d~s d'une son votre 47. Then, in his broadcast over the All-India Radio on 2 November 1947, the Prime Minister said: 47. AII-India Ministre llWe have declared that the fateofKashmki8 ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge"- there was the assurance, therewas the promise; now there is the pledge- "we have given not only ta the people of Kashmir but ta the world. We will not and cannat back out of H...We are anxious not ta finalize anything in a moment ofcrisis, andwithout the fullest In other words. "We accept. provided that ... Il 48. Binee then therepresentativeoftheGovernmentof India here has said: nI have looked at the Instrument of Accession. 1 find on It only IAccepted. Mowltbatten'. 1 do ndt find there anyproviso". ls notthe Prime Minister of India ta he believed with regard to the actual transaction which took place and its legal interpretation, as against bis own representative speakinghere, however great may be the latter 's position in that Government? The proviso was containedin the letter of the Governor-General. It must he read alongwith,and as a part of, the Instrument of Accession. The Instrument of Accession is a formai document, drawn op and Printed, and it has gaps onlyhere andthere Which have te be filled in; therestofthewording is already there. But there was a letter accompanying it from the Maharajah and there was a letter accompanying the acceptance from Lord Mountbattenwhichcontainedthe proviso. Bath must be read together. Under anycanon of interpretation, the two dOCuments must be taken together. 49. On 8 November 1947, in a telegram to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Nehru said: tilt will thus be seen that our proposais, which we have repeatedly stated, are (1) that the Governmentof Pakistan should publicly undertake tel do their utmost ta compel the raiders ta withdraw from Kashmirj (2) that the Government of India should repeat their declaration that they will withdrawtheir troopsfrom Kashmir IS sail as soon as the raiders have withdrawn and law and order are restored; (3) thatthe Gov~rn­ ments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to UNO to undertake a plebiscite inKashmir at the earliest possible date." 50. Theo the Ia.te Mr. Gopalaswami AyyangllX,before the Security Council on 15 January 1948, in bis very tirst address to the COUDcil stated this: "In accepting the accession they"-the Government of India-"refused ta take advantage ofthe immediate peril in which the state found itself andinformed the RuIer that the accession should finally be settled by plebiscite as saon as peace had been restored. They have subsequently made it quite clear that they are agreeable te the plebiscite being conductedifnecessary under international a-uapices.n [227th meeting, JI . p.20.] . ItBut 1 make bold ta say that the conduct of my Government has beeu entirely above board in this matter. It was not until the Ruler of Kashmir and the popu,lar leader of Kashmirn-that means Sheikh Abdullah-"approached the Indian Government for assistance in the extrernity which 1 have described, that the Indian Government stated-and 1 submit, rightly stated-that it could not interfere in the matter of Kashmir 11.\1.1ess the State was a part of Indian territory. which couId come about only if Kashmir acceded ta the Indian Union. On that understanding, in the peril in which it fOlUld itself. Kashmir offered ta accede to the Indian Union-not ooly the Ruler, but also the popular leader. The Indian Government was carefuI, even though the l'equest came from bath, ta stipulaten-there is the assurance, there is the pledge, there is theproviso, now it is the stipulation-nthat it was acceptîng the accession only on the condition"- This is the Attorney-General of Indiaspeaking,notthe Attorney-General at that time, but a man certainly possessi.ng authority on behalf of his Government because he carne with credentials to speak tothe Security Council. He is now the Attorney-General, a very eminent lawyer. 1 have had the honour of Jrnowing him for a number of years and 1 had not, during my six years of office, which 1 had the honourto hold in India as judge of what is today the Supreme Court of India, heard anybody abler than Mr. Setalvad address the Court. He says that the Indian Government was careful, even though the request came from bath, to stipulate that it was accepting the accession only on the conditionu••• that later, when peace had been restored, the expression of the popular will should be ascertained in a proper manner. Itwason thatcondition, and that condition alone, that the IndianGovernmentaccepted accession. n [234th meeting, p. 217.] On that condition and that condition alone. Today it is lithe expression of a wish, and it is much to be regretted that so many human wishes go unfulfîlledn. A Et seulement heureusement 52. Even with regard ta the argument that the Maharajah had the sole authority,inlaw,andthat when he had acceded and the Governor-General had said ltAccepted," there was an énd of the business ,and that aIl the rest is the expression of a wish and it does not matter if' it has or has not been fulfilled, this is what Mr. Ayyangar stated ta the Security COWlcil on 8 March 1948: 52. rajah le ment l'affaire d'un avait M. "No doubt the Ruler, as the head of State, has to take action in respect of accession.n Obviously it is not the whole population of any State that can sign the instrument of accession: somebody has to do H. who is to act as the instrument on behaU of the real authorHy. BIen par soit l'autorité That has not yet happened. 53. Here again, it la perfectIy clear that the Government of India takes, the position that no doubt the ruler will sign the instrument of accession and no doubt a sort of de facto position will arise therefrom. but once a dispute with regard to accession has arisen, when the ruler takes One view and his peopletakes another view, the wishes of the people have ta be ascertained. Now here 1 must try to draw this distinction. It does not mean merely "subsequentIy ascertained and then sorne modification to be madell , as it is now argued that the whole thing was complete. It ts sa~d: "Oh, yes, yes, if the people had expressed a wish tà the contrary, weIl, perhaps constitutional matters could have been gone through and Kashmir could have been unlinked" and so on. Nothing of the kind. The wishes of the people have to be ascertained; and "When so ascertained, the Ruler has to take action in accordance with the yerdict of the people". That is aIl. If there is no dispute, the action that the ruler takes iscomplete. When there is a dispute, the ruler must perforce take some action but the action is not complete, it ia incomplete. It leads to certain consequences as a de facto position, but in arder to be legally complete and validandbinding, the wishes of the people have to he ascertained and when so ascertained, "the Ruler has ta take action in accordance with the verdict of the people". This is in the record of the Security Council. 1 11 1 1 11 j ( 1 ! 1 1, i 54. Curiously, even theapplicationoftheseprinciples was însisted upon by India in a contrary case. A contrary case had arisen in the State of Junagadh, where agaîn the position was that the ruler belonged ta one community and the majority of the people belonged to the other community. The ruler acceded ta Pakistan, but at a time when there was no dispute nor any expression of wishes on the part of his people regarding which of the two Dominions he should accede ta. But let that go. Later there was adisputejwhen his people came ta know of it, quite a substantialnumber of them apparently did not like it. SA a difference arase and therefore the question was disputed. Whatwas the position taken up by the Government of India on that? The GOvernor-General of India in a telegram dated 22 September 1947, addressed to the Governor-Generalof Pakistan, said the following: "The Pakistan Government have unilaterally proceeded to action which itwasffif:èdeplainthe Government of Iodia could never and does not acquiesce in." First, kindly consider the implication that, in such a case, action should not have been unilateral-not unilateral in the sense that Pakistan declared that such and such aState had acceded ta us witheut the consent of the ruler: the ruler had offered accession and accession had been accn.~.<~ed, the same as in the case of Kashmir, although r~is happened much earlier; but & Ibid.• Third Year. Nos. 36_51, 26111t-276th meetings. Bere ·the accession offered by the Maharajah ofKashmir, whose authority had been repudiated overalmost the enUre 8tate, even if provisionaIly accepted, makes Kashmir the territory of India. In a contrary case also where Pakistan accepted the acoession offered by a ruler of his State, the territorybelongs tolndia. If you win, you win; if you lose, '.\'ou win. / li ••~nd is inconsistent with the friendly relations that should exist between the two Dominions. This action of Pakistan is oonsidered by the Government of India to be a clear attempt to cause disruption in the integrity of India by extending the influence and boundaries of the Dominion of Pakistan, inutter violation of the principles on whichpartitionwas agreed upon and effected." "In utter violation of the principles on which partition was agreed upon and effectedl! -what were those principIes? That contiguous majority areas ofone community were to COnstitute Pakistan and the oontiguous majority areas of the other oommunity were ta constitute India. On that test alone, put forward by the Government of India itself, Kashmir is a oontiguous Muslim majority area, oontiguous to Pakîstan-a Muslim area. The matter does not require further consideration, even with regard to whose sovereignty and whose territory is involved. 1 oontinue the quotation: "The possibility of Junagadh's accession to Pakistan dominion, in the teeth of opposition from its Bindu population of over 80 per cent, has given rise to serious concern and apprehension on the parts of the local population and aIl surroundingStateswhich have acceded ta the Indian dominion. Il Curiously, even the proportions in the poptùation are almost the sarne. In Junagadh there was a Hindu majority of about 80 per cent and in the composite State of Jammu and Kashmir there is a Muslim majority of 79 per cent. l'Etat "Large-scale military preparations in Junagadh and the supply of arms and ammunition to its Muslim subjects, with obvious intention of terrorizing the people of the State as weIl as the surrOlUlding states, acoentuated the uneasiness and the Government of India received appeals for suitable action, bothfrom the people and these states, TheGovernmentofIndia have therefore sent a small force fo troops to the1r own areas as a very natural counter-measure, particularly as most of our acceding States in affected areas have no arms oÏ their own." 56. When the questionwas takenupon 15January 1948 in the Security CouneU, the President of the Counoi! was Mr. Langenhove of Belgium. He observed on 22 January 1948: "... both parties have admitted in principle that the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be decided by plebiscite. The communication from the Government of lndia ta the President ofthe Council, dated 1 January, states that, in the final analysis, the people will be free to decide their future by the recognized democratic method of a plebiscite or referendum, which might be heldunder international auspices in arder ta ensure itscompleteimpartiality. That declaration was confirmed in a statementby the representative of India on 15 January before the Council [227th meeting]. The same principle maybe noted in the Pakistan representative's communication of 15 January ta the Secretary-General. J 1 1 J1 "Such is the basis upon which the SecurityCouncil is ta carry out the mission invested in it by the Charter in the matter that has been brought before it." [231st meeting, p. 165.] 57. Efforts were also made aD behalf of Indiata persuade the Security Council that it sho\l.ld take action to have the raiders witbdraw and the rebellion put down and ta leave the rest to India. That is the position which, as willbe shawn, theSecurity Council repudiated entirely. 58. On 24 January 1948, Mr. Warren Austin said in the Council: tilt seems to me, in determiningwhetherthereis a situation which, if it were ta continue, might lead ta a dispute or ta war, that we have before us an opportunity ta make progress in the right direction, through the continuation of the entirely friendly and informaI conferences under the gUidance of the President of the Security Council. My country thinks that these conferences should be continued in the real spirit that animates India and Pakistan here, and that they should not be interfered with here by the necessary presentation of charges, countercharges, claims and sa on that have ta go into the record. • " ... It seems ta me that our advice ta the two parties shouldbe-and that is whatthey are asking for when they come here-that they proceed with the Kashuùr matter, without prejudice to the other ques- 59. Mr. Noel-Baker, sinee then a recipient of the Nobel Prize for Peace and at that time Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, representing the United Kingdom during the discussion of this question before the same meeting of the Security Council, said: "Having heard the parties, Iwant, with equal understanding, with equal friendship, and, if theywill aUow me to say so, with equal love for both, as a member of the Security CO\Ulcil, sharing our collective responsibility to mankind, to ask the question: What ought the Security Council DOW to do? 1 hope we shaH fasten our attention on the constructive parts ofwhat our colleagues from India and Pakistan have said. , Il ••• The representative of Pakistan last week and again today, and the representative of India when he opened the matter and again yesterday, gave us their acCOtmts of how the commtmal troubles happened over the last two years. 1 do not intend to discuss the tragic features to which they drew attention. To my mind the process of causation is still wrapped in mystery. No doubt these troubles came out ofhistory, and 1 hope theywill soon disappear inta history again. The interest of everyone is to forget the past and ta concentrate on the future. " ft... Bath parties have told us that theywantpeace with justice. Both have iold us they want the will of the people of Kashmir to prevaiL The representative of India stated this yesterday, and the representative of Pakistan stated it today. OUr taskis ta formulate a plan by which that can bedone. Let us press fOI'Ward with that work." [Ibid., pp. 256 and 259.] 60. Mr. de la Tournelle, the representative of France said at the same meeting: avait ftI think that the Commission' s first task should be to organize a plebiscite as saon as possible. In that connexion, 1 think that the speediestprocedure would be ta continue consultations between the two parties, under the President's auspices, in order to establish the conditions in which that plebiscite should take place. ftpersonally. 1 would suggest three conditions: ftl. The withdrawal of foreign troops from the State of Kashmir. 61. On 28 January 1948, Mr. Noel-Baker said in the Council: "The cause which is now in dispute here, the cause of the fighting in Kashmir, is the question: To which of the two Governments, Inma or Pakistan, shaH Kashmir accede? ln my conception, infinitelythehest way ta stop the fighting ls to assure those who are engaged in it that a fair seUlementwillbe arrived at under which their rights will he assured. In other words, as 1 remarked to the representative of India in ourfirsttalkafterhisarrival,inmy profound conviction, a settlement arrived at quickly in theSecurity Council is the real way ta stop the fighting. The whole thing, from the preliminary measures as ta the fighting, rightuptotheconduetofthE'~lebiscitein the end, ia aIl one problem. Only when the combatants know what the future holds for them, will they agree to stop." [236th meeting, p. 283.] 62. Mr. Warren Austin, speaking before the Security Conncil on 4 February 1948 said: "In the first place, 1 should like to observe that the Security Council does not try, under the Charter, and is not now trying, ta decide between litigants, opponents, or parties ta a situation or difficulty ... , "It is my opinion that, il and when the Security Counci! deals with this problem, it must consider it as a whole, because unless it doea, there cannat be a cessation of hostilities. How is it possible ta induce the tribesmen ta retire from Jammu and Kaahmir without warfare and without driving them out? That ia the only way it can be done, unless the tribesmen are satisfied that there ia ta be a fair plebiscite assured through an interim governmentthat is in fact, and that has the appearance of being, non-partisan. Only by that method could one hope ta have that retirement on a peacefu1 basis. "We know very weIl that the alternative is force, and force which has not necessarily been successful when the frontier ia reached. -The paSl3age of the tribesmen across the frontier does not mean that hostilities have been ended. On the contrary, 1 tlùnk that reason indicates that hostilities will have ouly just began if an attempt is made ta reach a separate solution of this matter and to have the troops get out of Jammu and Kashmir merely because we say so, without our having said to them that we are going to consider aU sides of the question and that the plan involves not merely a retirementhut also a plebiscite by which the people will register their own choice in the main issue, that plebiscite tabe guaranteed to be impartial and just. Nothing short of that ia conceivable as a peaceful means of accomplishing the with- 63. 1 intend-and 1 trust 1 will he able ta do lt when 1 come toward the close of my submission ta the Security Council-to stress one aspect which was stressed bere by the late Mr.WarrenAustin: thatnobody shollid deceive himself that, merely by covering over the question, it will be settled.IftheSecurityCouncil does not want the elements in the State who started the liberation battle to start it again, iftheSecurity COWlci! does not desire that the tribesmen should get out of band and pour into Kashmir again, if the Security Counci! does not desire that the people of Pakistan should get out ofbandand-iflmaymix the metaphortake the bit between their teeth and run away with the whole system ofordered government, and ifthe Security COUDCi! does not desire tbat powerful neighbouring states should plunge into the vortex when it starts again, the Security CO\Ulcil had better take note of the realities of the situation. 64. What can be done? The problemisthere.As 1 had the honour ta submit the last time 1 spoke before the Security COUDcil [990th meetingJ, sa much time has passed. Yes, fifteen years. But anybody who goes into Kashmir oil either side, on the side occupied by India or on the "Azad" Kashrnir side, ifhe were ta try ta get in touch with the people without any representative of the authorities being present or being within earshot, would come away convinced, as everybody who bas done that has come away convinced, that the question is as acute todayas it was in the faU of 1947 and the spring of 1948-indeed, throughout the year 1948 Wlti! the cease-tire was arranged on 1 January 1949. And if it boils upagain, itwillnotthen be confined to where it was confined in those days-a local struggle in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 65. This is by no means, 1 beg ta assure the Council, ahy kind of threat whatsoever. Pakistan, from the bottom of its heart, does not desire any such development. But Pakistan is convinced that, unless the question is set toward settlement at a fairly early date, that ia what is bound ta happen. 66. Mr. Arce, representative of Argentina, also speaking on 4 February 1948 before the Security Council said: "Now that the disputes between India and Pakistan have been submitted ta the jurisdietion ofthe Security Couneil, the delegation of Argentina will not be able ta vote in favour of any drait resolution which does not leave the solution of the problem ta be decided by a plebiscite, freely prepared, freely conducted and freely scrutinized Wlder the authorityoftheSecurity Council. " "Some discussion has taken place, in my opinion, mistakenly, on whether the arder for cessation of 67. Now 1 shan quote from the statementofMr. de la Tournelle of 5 February 1948: "At the time of drafting the reportofthe Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents and duringtheSecurity Council' s discussions of that report, the French delegation maintained thatthe establishment of responsibility for the Balkan disturbances was relatively unimportant. and that the Council's only dutywas toworkout a plan of pacification which would assure that part of Europe of a peaceful future. It seems ta methatthis wise attitude sbould be followed in our atudyoftheKashmir question, and that the Security Council sbould try to put bef\?re the parties concerned, for their voluntary acceptance, a suitable solution to end the dispute which separates them ... "My delegation thinks that the organization of a free plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir would be the most effective and possibly the only means of stopping hostillties in tbose States, as it V/ould give the population the assurance that they would be free to decide their ownfate. Our mai!!.D-l"eoccupation, tberefore, should be the organization of a plebiscite." [241st meeting, pp. 3 and 4.]§' 68. The late Mr. Faris EI-KhotU"i, representing Syria, said the following on 5 February 1948, at the same meeting: "It is quite clear, as 1 stated before. that recommendations with regard to the cessation of fighting al"e of no use if they arenotconnected with substantial assurances ta the parties whichwill satisfy them and place them inthe definite position of knowing that their demands will befulfilledandconsecratedbythe processes recommended by the Security Council." [~id., p. 14.] f1J Ibid.. Thi~d year, Nos. 16-35, 241st-260th meetings. 70. 1 would again beg the forgiveness of the COWlcil and of therepresentativesoflndiaforaskingif, in view of the declarations which 1 have read, you would no~ agree with me that itwould amount ta cheating the people of Kaslunir? Herewas member after member of the Security COUDcil-occupying the most responsible position in theinternational world which anybody can occupy today, representatives of elevenStates, representing thewhole ofhumanity-sittinghere and solemnly assuring these people, who,like their ancestors, had endured a tyranny of the worst type eve1" witnessed in any part of the world, Wlder which, as 1 beUeve 1 said on an earlier occasion, it was difficult fora Kashmiri to decide which was the greater misery, tabe aUve or dead. Having arisen under those conditions of misery ta seek a way out andnot ta continue ta be subjected to them any further, having had recourseto arms, having made aIl sacrliices, they brought the matter here. And here they were given solerrm assurance after saleron assurance. Theywere assured, nThe decision is in your bands". In placing the~r faith in those assurances, they stopped fighting. 1 say again, would you notagreewith me that. to say the very teast, it would he cheating those people ta say thatthose assurances today have no meaning at aIl, in view ofthe glosses, the excuses, the legal documents putforwarcl? AndIshall cometo themj 1 shaH deal with themj 1shaIl attempt ta give a reply to everything which has been broughttamynotice.I hope 1 can satisfy the Security COUDoil that they have no substance. 7i. But assume that Ifaî!, or assume thatI satisfy the Security Conncil or a majority ofthe SecurityCowtoil, but fail ta satisfy India, as appears likely ta be the case, what then i8 the dutY of the Security Council? It is to look into all factors, to seewhether they are vaUd, ta see whether they really are the cause of obstructing the path towards a settlement; and, li they are, to deterrnine whose fault it is. 1 say here and now, and 1 shaU repeat it later when 1 have dealt with those matters, 1 say with full responsibilitythatifa fair and impartial determination-it does not matterwhat shape it takes-is made by the Security COWlcil, ifthere is a pronolUlcement by the Security Connci!, or a determination and pronouncementby anyindividual of recognized international standing and integrity, or a pronouncement through a process of arbitration, or a pronouncement through judicial determination, ifthere is a pronoWlcement that in respect of the obligations undertaken by Pakistan, Pakistan is in default with regard to any matter, 1 have the authority of my Government to state that, in the speediest possible malUler and withîn the shortestpossible time, Pakistan will rectify that default. sothatthemattershall be dej cided in accordance with the wishes of the people. 1 shaU come to these matters one by one later, at least 73. The Security Council. haviIlg taken tbat view, eventually adopted a resolutionll at its 286thmeeting, on 21 April 1948. 1 say r1eventually" because first another text. in accordance withtheprinciples enunciated by the members representing the various coootries on the Security Cmmcîl, was presented. Mter the six sponsors bad spoken in support of it, the Indîan delegation tntimated to the Seourity Connoîl thatithad been asked ta return home for consultation and that it would come back after those consultations to continue to p"-rticipate in the discussions of the COUDcîl. So that for a period the dîscussions were interrupted. It is therefore not of much relevance to hark back to that draft resolution. Butthat draft resolutioncompliedwith every one of the conditions thathadbeen adumbrated in the staternents of the members. Later on a text considerably watered downwas presentedandwas adopted. That is the resolution wbich is now the subject matter of Implementation. ,, 0'"1 1-, 1 "1 :'j 1 -1 A 1 j 'j 74. Accordingly, sa far as tbeSecurity Council is concerned, on 21 April 1948 ît provided for the setting up of a Commission comprising !ive members. Twowere ta be nominated by theStates'Concerned,oneby Pakistan and one by India; two were to be nominated by the Security Conncîl: and one was to be nominated by the last two members nominated by the Security Conncil. So eventually the Commission was set up. India nominated Czechoslovakia, PakistannominatedArgentina, the Security Cou,cil nominated Colombia and Belgium, and Colombia and Belgium agreed upon the United States. That ia how the Commission was composed. .~ j c~ll 1 75. Tbe matter was men put inta the bands of the Commission, wh1ch went first ta Geneva 1D take preliminary measures and study the whole fairly complicated question, the resolution and the debate of the Security COWlcîl and everything else. Eventually, on 7 July 1948, the Commission arrived in Karachi. believe they had an interview with the Prime Minister of Pakistan on 8 July, and during their very first call on me 1 explained ta them the change that had taken place in the situation. Since the Security Counci! would not cotmtenance or encourage the Goverilment of India in its desire to reacb a military decision rather than ope in accordance with the resolution that had been passed here, the Government of India, after the matter had been adjourned in the Security COUDcil on 21 April 1948, had made preparations which were so complete that the report of the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief, General Gracey, was that an Indian Army offensive was imminent, threatening danger to Pakistan's system irrigation and security. 1 will not weary the Counc' J 1 j 11 Ibid.. Third Yeu, Supplement for April i 948, document S/726. 76. As soon as the Commission arrived in Karachi they were apprised of this situation, They have described that and have admitted that it was a serious change, or a new element, in the situation as compared \Vith what had been contemplated bytheSecurityCouncil. Indeed, after considering whether they should ask the Security COlOlcil for fresh directives or attempt ta deal \Vith the matter themselves, they decided ta deal with it themselves. They tra-velled back and forth between Delhi and Karachi and produced a draft resolution which subsequently became known as the resolution of 13 August 1948.Y The Government of India signified its acceptance of tbis resolution, although with sorne clarifications andprovisos. But the Government of Pakistan was not able to accept it because lt stopped half way to a plebiscite. It did not make any provision for the conditions of the plebiscite but only applied to demilitarization. 77. The Commission continued its activities and eventually produced a second resolution, which is technically dated 5 January 1949,.21 but it was communicated to the Governments late in December 1948. The Council was then sitting in Paris because the General Asssmbly's third session was taking place there and the Commission found it convenient to carry on its discussions with the representatives of the two Governments in Paris instead of having to travel each time to one capital or theother. Towards the end of December both Governments signified their acceptance of both the 13 August 1948 and the 5 January 1949 resolutions, and in consequence of the acceptance of those two resolutions dealing with demilitarization as weIl as the holding of a plebiscite it was possible to bring about a cease fire on 1 January 1949. 78. Later on, in March 1949,the Commission arrived in Delhi and began ta hold meetings designed to secure the implementation of the resolutions. The first task was the demilitarizationof-fue.st!!~e.Nowalthough India made repeated public declarations-n€1'e that it would be prepared to withdraw its armed forces and co-operate in the holding of a plebiscite under international auspices, it raised severa! questions. Again, 1 am not laying blamej various things were taken into account by the Security COUDCi! such as the question of accession, the question of sovereignty, the question of the so-called aggressions by pakistan, the actual situation in the State and aIl that, but the two resolutions were accepted by bath sides and are binding on bath sides. When the Commission arrived in Delhiandheld a meeting in March, it called upon representatives of both Governments in order to settle the question of demilitarization, that is to say, to get the armed forces of Pakistan in their entirety out of the IIAzadll Kashmir area. or away from the IIAzadll Kashmir side of the cease-fire line and, in accordance withtheresolution, y lbid., Thini Year,SupplementforNovember 1948,docwnent S/1100, para, 75. Ji Ibid., Fourth Year, Supplement for Januaryl949,document S/1l96. para. 15. 79. Each side was asked to propound a scheme, because obviously, as 1 shail show when 1 Come to gtve you the reactions of India, it was a condition of any withdrawal that there should first be a truce scheme according to which the withdrawal of the troops would take place. Pakistan submitted a scheme: India took little more time to submit one, but eventally when it submitted a scheme ta the Commission for the withdrawal of the bulk of its forces, it laid down a condition that the Commission was not to disclose that scheme even ta the Security Council and certainly not ta Pakistan. Naturally any agreement with Pakistan in accordance with the terms oftheresolutionwouldhave to be made public, but wedonotknow ta this date what the Indian scheme was. However, the Commission, in its third report,!Sli observedthat in its view, although it was not at liberty ta disclose what the scheme presented by India was, it did not conformeitber qualitatively or quantitatively with the requirements of the resolution. There ensued a longperiodofefforts by the Commission and then the Commission was replacedby the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, Sir Owen Dixon, and afterwards by Mr. Graham. These efforts were devoted to bringing about an agreement on a scheme for the withdrawal of troops from bath sides. At that time-I want to say this here and now, although 1 shall have to refer to it again lateron no occasion was any CJ.uestion raised that the essential preliminary of the resolution had not been complied with and that therefore no occasion arase for the withdrawal of troops oneither side. The essential preliminary was the cease-fire, and besides even the tribesmen had withdrawn as soon as the fighting had come ta an end. Why should they have continued? They went back to their homes; those who had Come in from Pakistan, apart from the regular forces, hact already gone out. The only question remainingwas the withdrawal of the reguiar troops. Scheme after scheme was presented, and 1 might say that, by and large, Pakistan was ready ta go forward. India was not. 1 repeat, India did not base its rejections on the ground that Pakistan had not complied with what it had ta do before withdrawal; it was only that the schemes were not acceptable ta it. 80. In between, certainother thingsweretried. Agam, 1 will not weary the Council by going into details. Sir Owen Dixon, after recording the Hnding, found that Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nelfru was not willing ta accept any conditions which, alone, would guarantee the freedom of the plebiscite. He had then ta try to carry out his alternative directive from the Security COWlcil-that is ta say, to explore the possibility of sorne other method of resohing the dispute. He said he found hfmself obstructed aIl the Ume by India; and that was the first time that the matter was seriously pressed on the insistence of the Prime Minister of India-that Pakistan must be declared ta he an agressor. l:.Q/lbid., Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 7. 82. But at that time the objective was ta remove 3011 the obstructions and difficulties in the way of getting an agreement upon the scheme of wîthdrawal. As a matter of fact, right until the end of the efforts of Mr. Graham, the UnitedNations Representative-or rather, until the last effort he made-that was the principal question. Certain general principles were formulated and were accepted by both sides; but on the proposais which related ta the concrete matter there could be no agreement. 1 shall mention one or two matters. 83. By this time, ît is quîte clear, 1 hope, that, with regard to the main armies of both sides in Kashmir, the agreement in the resolution was that, when the schemewas agreed upon-and 1 shaH show later that that ls the agreement-Pakistan should begin the withdrawal of its regular forces from the IlAzad" Kashmir side, and when a certain number of <lays had elapsed after that withdrawal had been commenced, India would begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces. Thereafter, the process was to continue onbothsides, in a synchronized fashion, so as not ta give any aclvantage, or cause anyfear, toeither side until the whole of the Pakistan armed forces and the bulk of the Indian forces were withdrawn. 84. Now, one thing which has always given a great deal of trouble is this: whatconstitutes "bulk"? "Bulk" is not a term of art; but whatever it constitutes, it does not constitute a given position: it does mean the major portion. On one occasion, getting tired of this cantroversy with regard to what daee or dOl2!8 not cQnstltute bulk, 1 decided to take the plunge on behali of my Governmellt; and from this table 1made an offer. 1 said: "This controversy has lasted long enough. What constitutes bulk? Bulk means the major portion. What the Indian Government says is the major portion, we do not know. The Commission says that whatthe Indian Government says is the major portion, which it is willing to withdraw, does not, qualitatively or quantitatively, conform ta the resolution. Here is the quandary. How is it to be resolved? The IndianGovernment says: 'We are willing to withdraw "X", because that constitutes the bulk; and we shaH leave behindonly "Y", because that is the lesser part.' 1 say, 'AlI right, let them withdraw "Y" and leave "X"; leave the bulk in, and withdraw the remainder and we will accept that as !!J Ibid.. Fifrh Year. 5uppleI!lent for 5eptember through December !2§Q, document 5/1791. -11 j 1 1 J 1 86. 1 said again: "1 make this offer; here and now, on behalf of my Government, 1 accept the proposaIs made by Mrs. Pandit, in so far as they relate ta the regular forces, the whole of thePakistanforces,goingout, and the bulk of the Inillan forces, which now had been defined-what they would take out from their side. With regard to the disbanding of the restand the disposaI of the l'est on the other side, let the United Nations Plebiscite Administrator, as saon as he takes over, take charge; it is his province, not our province. Il 87, The very next day, in the newspapers, the comments of Prime Minister Nehru appeared ta theeffect that my proposaI was fantastic. The thing did not go forward. 88, In his last report, made on 28 March1958,!lIMr. Graham, after summing up that no progress was possible, made the suggestion that the two Prime Ministers meet under hîs auspices toconsidercertain questions. That was acceptable to Pakistan. Itwasrejected by India. That meeting tao could not take place. That is where the matter rested at the end of March 1958-that is ta say, just over four years aga. 89. In the meantime, when the present régime came into power in Pakistan, the President of Pakistan-who was extremely anxious that whatever disputes there were between India and Pakistan should be spee dily settle-requested a meeting with the Prime Minister of India. He was flying from Karaohi ta Dacca, Dacca being the capital of East Pakistan. He tried ta ascertain in advance whether the Prime Minister would do him the honour of meeting him at the airport while he !li Ibid.. Thirteenth Year. Supplement for January. February and March 1958. document Sj39 P.• 90. That is where the matter resteduntilmyletter to the Presi.dent of the security CowlCil in January requesting another meeting. Then the question of negotiations between the parties was revived. 91. But that position still holds. On the one side there have been suggestions: "Let us negotiate "; though there had been a public statement that their poSition is that they would like to see the parties accept the present position and talk only of adjustment. And, on the other side, the position is: "There is no use in talking about adjustment in the present position. The present position is the consequence of the fighting that took place. It is a military position, and this is not a seUlement of the question in dispute." However, wearequitewilling at any time ta enter into negotîations and to discuss matters, provided we discuss the resolving of the dispute, that is ta say, the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to either Pakistan or India. 92. It seems that what has happened in this context is well known to the members of the Security Council. If the President and the members ofthe COlUlcilfeel that it has been a sufficient strain for them for one afternoon ta have had sO much placed before them-namely the history of the dispute-I would request an adjournment untîl some time next week which may be convenient ta the members ofthe Council, for 1 understand that, for one member, Monday may not be convenient, and for another member-as a matter of fact, the President for next month-Tuesday may not be convenient. As far as we are concerned, any day the Council may wish will be convenient. If Wednesday i5 convenient ta the Council, it is convenient ta us. 1 will then go, by way of iilustration, into the questions raised as 1 know them and so far as 1 know them, and 1 will select the principal ones on the other side-why progress cannat be made or could not be made on the hasis of the agreement subsisting between the parties. Mter 1 have dealt with those, 1will suggest one or two or three methods, any of which might possibly help ta move the matter towards a settlement. blème. l'historique pour soit qui je l'un plus mois à il ques.tions la taines fait aucun réalisé les trois contribuer règlement. 93. 1 will again repeat here that the desire of my Government, as 1 have said, is not to make debating points, is not to apportion blame, is not to raise 93. ment prêtant j li 1 1 i j ! 94. 1 bope that as a result of thé deliberations of the Security Council a settlement wiii ultimately be reached. 1 very much fear, however, in my own mind that this may be the last occasion when the Security Council may have that privilege. Again 1 hope that the Council wiU not feel it need be in a hUrry, that it will not feel that it must come to a deadlock or that it must caver the situation somehow or other andthen pretend that the matter has been settled. 1 hope rather that it will direct its wisdom and judgement and a1l the resources, intel1ectual ann philosophieal, that it commanda in such abundance, to the intricacies of th1s problem andtry ta bringthe parties together to face the reaI1ties of the situation and then try ta come ta settlement. 95. 1 hope that whatever time 1 have taken will be excused on the gronnd that it is justified by our extreme anxiety that aIl aspects of the problem should be properly realized. Any oversimplification, in this complicated matter, of any of the complexfactorsthat enter into it will not facilitate or stimulate a solution but will bar progress towards that end.

The Connci! has heard the Pakistan representative's suggestion that we should suspend our meeting today and continue it next week on a day which is convenient ta a11 the members of the Conncil and to the representatives whom we have invited ta attend this debate. \ 98. 1 therefore suggest that we should close our meeting today and meetagain, unlessthereis any objection, on Thursday, 3 May, at 10.30 a.m.

The question as ta when the Council will meet next is naturally for decision by members of the Council. My delegation would not wish ta influence its decision in this matter. 100. 1 would like to say, and as a matter of fact 1 have been asked by my Government to say, that now that the Council has taken up the discussion of this matter, it would like an expeditious conclusion of the discussions. 1 do not wish ta go into the causes of that. As a matter of fact, without commenting on what the representative of Pakistan has said today, since that comment is reserved for the Defence Minister of India who will take the opportunity of replying atthe earliestpossible moment to what has been said, that there are already indications "in the very grave situation", "the common danger" and the very rnany other similar epithets that he has used, that there is a very unsettling situation; l might assure the Counci} that in India there is none of that excitement that the representati,!e of Pakistan has sought to portray hefore the Council as existing in Pakistan. But 1 should not like to elaborate on aIl of that. Whatever date the COWlcil would like to hold a meeting is certainly entirely agreeable ta us. We should have preferred it to be on Wednesday. but if that is not possible, if it is unavoidable that the Council cannat meet on that day, then of course we have nothing to say about the meeting on Thursday. But we would express the hope that the Council thereafter should continue to meet continuous1y andbringthe discussion of this matter to a conclusion at an early date. That would be the wish that 1 shouldlike ta express to the Council. '" 101. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanishl: Ido not hear any objection and 1 therefore assume that the Councu approves my suggestion, namely that we close the meeting now and meet again on Thursday at 10.30 a.m. suggestion prochaine pas est The meeting rose at S.55 p.m. C'PIiUS/C~'!PRE' P"'N 10 ""e.ond.' ",. G'eat St'eet. Cl[CHOSLOVAKIA/TCHÊCOSLOV,\QUIE, AFRICA/AFRltlUE CAMtROON/CAMtROUN' LIIIRIl.IRIE DU PEUPLE AfRIC"'N La Ge••nte. 8. P. 1197. VOGond •• DIFFUSION INTERNATIONALE CAMERaUN.o.'SE OU liVRE ET DE LA PIIESSE, S.n~mehm•. CONGO (Lê.p.,dvlllo): ,NSTITUT POLITIQUE CONGOL...1S. Il. P. 2307. L~coold."I•. UHIOPIAiiTHIOPIE: INTERN.o.TIONAL PRESS "GENey, P. O. Il•• 120. Addi....~.~•• GHA"", UNivERSITY 1I001<,5HOP U"" ...'l. 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