S/PV.10079 Security Council

The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor on a point of order.

We must take the floor on a point of order owing to the attempts by some delegations to push the Security Council into committing a gross violation of its decisions and procedures. Our Western colleagues are trying to pass today’s meeting off as a regular biannual discussion under the “Non-proliferation” agenda item to consider the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and discuss the relevant report of the Secretary-General (S/2025/814). The Russian Federation categorically rejects such approaches. For those who are particularly forgetful, we would like to recall that all provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) ceased to be in effect on 18 October, 10 years after the date of the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. On that day, the Security Council stopped its consideration of Iran’s nuclear programme, and the “Non-proliferation” agenda item was taken off the list of matters covered by the Security Council. These consensus-based decisions were enshrined in the text of resolution 2231 (2015). References to procedures for removing items from the agenda of the Council, as set out in note by the President S/2017/507, are not relevant here. Along with the expiration of the validity of resolution 2231 (2015), logically, note by the President S/2016/44 has also lost its relevance. According to that note, the Secretary-General was to prepare reports on the implementation of the resolution every six months, and the Security Council was to meet to discuss it. Accordingly, neither the Secretariat nor the Security Council has relevant mandates any longer. Western Council members are trying in vain to create the illusion that today’s meeting is routine in nature, which is clearly evidenced by the fact that the current presidency did not dare seek to include the meeting in the Security Council’s approved programme of work for December. The convening of this meeting by the United Kingdom, France and their backers in the Security Council has nothing to do with the Council’s mandated reporting cycle. Such a step is nothing more than a futile attempt to convince the international community that the European trio in the Council has harnessed the mechanism for reinstating anti-Iranian Security Council resolutions — the so-called “snapback” — and that resolution 2231 (2015) allegedly remains in effect. In their quest to push forward their agenda, they are prepared to deepen the divide within the Security Council, not only on political issues but also on legal and procedural matters. In this context, it is disappointing that our Slovenian colleagues have been unable to impartially uphold their presidential obligations and prevent the Security Council from holding a meeting on a non-existent agenda item. Their willingness to follow the lead of those who initiated today’s discussion is a flagrant violation of the Council’s earlier decisions and only undermines its credibility.

The representative of China has asked for the floor on a point of order.

China supports Russia’s position. I wish to point out that the E3’s assertion of triggering the “snapback” mechanism is legally and procedurally flawed and that the Security Council has not reached consensus on whether the E3 have the right to trigger the mechanism. Resolution 2231 (2015) expired on 18 October, and the Council has concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue. The Secretary-General should cease the submission of further reports on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The fact that countries are forcing the Security Council to convene meetings under an agenda item that has already been concluded will only undermine the authority of Security Council resolutions, damage the Council’s unity and exacerbate tensions and divisions. China expresses serious concern about that. China calls on Council members to earnestly implement the Termination Day measures of resolution 2231 (2015), uphold the authority of the Council and the credibility of multilateral diplomacy and create favourable conditions for a political resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue.

The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor on a point of order.

We reject the points made just now by the representatives of Russia and China. Today’s meeting is fully in line with the decisions and procedure of the Council. The United Kingdom, alongside France and Germany, triggered the snapback procedure in full accordance with resolution 2231 (2015). We did so because of Iran’s significant non-performance of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. As the representatives of Russia and China know, the snapback process completed on 28 December, and, as a result, resolution 2231 (2015) remains in force, and non-proliferation remains an agenda item for the Council. In addition, we note that six Security Council resolutions and United Nations sanctions have come back into force following the snapback. It is essential that Iran and all United Nations Member States comply with Security Council decisions. We call for continuing with today’s meeting.

The representative of France has asked for the floor on a point of order.

Almost three months ago, the Council completed the snapback procedure to reimpose international sanctions against Iran owing to the repeated violation of Iran’s commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This procedure extended the application of resolution 2231 (2015), which was intended to expire only if the Iranian nuclear issue could be considered resolved. This procedure was conducted in accordance with paragraph 11 of resolution 2231 (2015). On 28 August, France, with its E3 partners, notified the Security Council of Iran’s persistent non-performance of its commitments, recalling the diplomatic efforts undertaken by the E3 since 2020 to remedy the situation. Within 30 days of this notification, the Council rejected, by a vote that cannot be contested, a draft resolution on the permanent lifting of sanctions (see S/PV.10001). This procedure led to the reinstatement, on 28 September, of the six resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 to constrain the Iranian nuclear programme. The snapback procedure also prevented the permanent termination of the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). It should be recalled that the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) were intended to expire only if assurances had been obtained as to the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. Resolution 2231 (2015) remains in force. France is in favour of the Security Council continuing the established practice of holding biannual meetings. Given the ongoing risk of proliferation, the Iranian nuclear issue continues to warrant the Council’s sustained attention and should remain on its agenda.

I take note of the points raised by the representatives of the Russian Federation, China, the United Kingdom and France. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I also invite Mrs. Hedda Samson of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2025/814, which contains the twentieth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). I now give the floor to Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo. Ms. DiCarlo: I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). As the Secretary-General noted in the report before Council members (S/2025/814), despite intensified diplomatic efforts during the second half of 2025, there was no agreement on the way forward regarding the Iran nuclear programme. On 28 August, France, Germany and the United Kingdom — referred to as the E3 States — notified the Council of their intention to trigger the snapback mechanism of resolution 2231 (2015). They attributed their decision to what they described as the significant non-performance by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In accordance with the snapback procedure, as the Council did not adopt a resolution to continue the termination of measures within 30 days from the E3 letter, the previously existing sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran were reapplied on 27 September. This entailed reinstating the website of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and the corresponding sanctions list. Several member States rejected the validity and effect of the snapback process. Specifically, some members asserted that the process was procedurally and legally flawed. Member States also expressed differing viewpoints regarding the status of the resolution in the aftermath of 27 September. In the latest report, of 12 November, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recalled that the Islamic Republic of Iran had stopped implementing its nuclear related commitments under the JCPOA as of 23 February 2021. The Agency was nevertheless still able to verify and monitor some of those commitments through activities implemented pursuant to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Specifically, the Agency has verified that, during this period, Iran has exceeded the limits of its nuclear programme, as stipulated in the JCPOA. On 18 October, the Agency reported that it had no information on the status of the stockpiles of enriched uranium in Iran. The IAEA concluded that a commonly agreed framework with the support of countries concerned was necessary to ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme was exclusively peaceful. The Agency also noted the readiness of its Director General to engage with Iran at the earliest opportunity to work constructively to this end. Turning to the remaining restrictive measures set out in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), namely those pertaining to nuclear activities and transfers, the Secretariat did not receive any allegations of violations of those provisions during this reporting period. Furthermore, no new proposals have been submitted through the procurement channel during the reporting period. The Security Council did, however, receive six notifications regarding the nuclear-related restrictive measures for certain activities consistent with the JCPOA. Notwithstanding the significant differences between the relevant parties on the way forward regarding resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA, all of them have continued to emphasize the importance of a diplomatic solution and expressed overall readiness to engage with each other for this purpose. Indeed, as the Secretary-General has stated, a negotiated settlement that would secure the overall objectives of ensuring a peaceful Iranian nuclear programme and providing sanctions relief is the best option available to the international community. The Secretariat remains at full disposal of the parties in the pursuit of these objectives.

I thank Ms. DiCarlo for her briefing. I shall now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements.

I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting on resolution 2231 (2015), and I thank Under-Secretary- General DiCarlo for her briefing. The Security Council is, and should remain, seized of the non-proliferation issue, especially with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is clear, as demonstrated by the issuance of the Secretary-General’s recent report on resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2025/814), that with the exception of paragraphs 7, 8 and 16 to 20, this resolution and its related practical arrangements remain in effect. Additionally, pursuant to the snapback process outlined in resolution 2231 (2015), the Council decided to reinstate resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008) and 1929 (2010). These resolutions are not arbitrary or punitive but rather narrowly scoped to address a nuclear programme that seeks to operate out of view of the international community and in continued non-compliance with its Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons-mandated comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as reaffirmed last month by the IAEA Board. The reimposition of these proliferation-focused measures reflects the Council’s long-standing concern, reaffirmed in its 19 September vote to restore these resolutions (see S/PV.10001), about the Iranian nuclear file. As noted on the United Nations website, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) was immediately re-established, concurrent with the reinstatement of these resolutions. The United States will continue to work to ensure that this Committee is a fully functioning, active body. The United States continues to prefer a negotiated solution to this matter. Absent that solution, the Council must operationalize the 1737 (2006) Committee. Moreover, these resolutions, if implemented by Member States in good faith, can constrain the space for potential escalation and uncertainty. The United States therefore urges its fellow members to support the expeditious implementation of the reinstated Security Council resolutions to realize their potential as a bulwark against insecurity.

Let me also thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo for her briefing. As we have persistently underlined, Iran must never develop or acquire nuclear weapons. We have repeatedly expressed our concerns about Iran’s nuclear trajectory and the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is unable to provide assurances that the Iranian nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. We are also gravely concerned by Iran curtailing cooperation with the IAEA, which has lost continuity of knowledge and has, for six months now, been unable to provide information on the status or whereabouts of the enriched uranium stockpiles in Iran. This is deeply alarming. We see no credible civilian justification, neither for hiding nor accumulating highly enriched uranium stockpiles. Denmark considers that Iran has been in non-compliance with its obligations since 2019. Numerous IAEA reports document this fact. As of 13 June, Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile was nearly 50 times the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action limit. Iran had more than 450 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 per cent. No other country without a nuclear weapons programme enriches uranium to such levels and at such scale. Over the years, the E3 have vigorously worked for a diplomatic solution. Before the activation of the snapback, Iran was offered the opportunity to extend the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), provided that Iran took steps to address three immediate concerns: first, to show commitment to resuming political negotiations; secondly, to resume cooperation with the IAEA; and thirdly, to address issues relating to uranium enrichment and storage. Such steps from the Iranian side would have demonstrated willingness to comply with their obligations and to find a diplomatic solution. It would also have contributed to assuring the international community that Iran’s nuclear programme is entirely peaceful. Iran unfortunately did not choose this path. Therefore, the E3’s activation of the snapback was a last resort, which Denmark fully supported. Consequently, we call on Iran and all Member States to fully comply with the six reinstated Security Council resolutions. We do not consider the snapback of sanctions and nuclear restrictions to be the end of diplomacy; on the contrary, we believe that it brings us closer to the only durable solution to the Iran nuclear issue, which is one reached through diplomacy and dialogue. Denmark calls on Iran to return to the negotiating table and work towards an agreement that addresses the serious doubts about the nature of its nuclear programme. Such negotiations will have to be based on reliable and impartial information on the status of Iran’s nuclear programme. We strongly urge Iran to return to full compliance with its legally binding safeguards obligations. To conclude, Denmark remains fully committed to achieving a durable, long- term negotiated solution to address the Iranian nuclear issue, with the IAEA playing a vital role. We have supported efforts towards this goal, and we will continue to do so in the future.

I thank the Under-Secretary- General, Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, for her briefing on the biannual report of the Secretary-General on resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2025/814). Against the backdrop of our work in September and the Security Council’s implementation of the snapback process, we take note of the elements of this report related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), and we welcome the fact that no member of the Council has formally objected to its presentation, which is important for the Security Council to continue its work. I also welcome the participation in this meeting of the European Union, coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear programme, and the representatives of Iran and Germany. I will make two points. First, Iran’s failure to implement its international obligations related to its nuclear programme constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security. In addition to Iran’s increasingly flagrant violation since 2019 of all the limitations aimed at ensuring that its nuclear programme remains peaceful, Iran has drastically limited International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to the nuclear facilities on its territory. For the past six months, the IAEA has had no access to the most sensitive sites of Iran’s nuclear programme and has no means of verifying the status of the 450 kilograms of 60 per cent high enriched uranium held by Iran. If enriched to military levels, this stockpile, let us recall, would be sufficient to produce 10 nuclear explosive devices. Iran is also the only non-nuclear-weapon State to enrich to such levels. The Agency has therefore now stated that it has lost continuity of knowledge on key aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme and is therefore no longer able to guarantee its peaceful nature. While the IAEA Board of Governors decided in November to renew the Agency’s verification mandate in Iran under the resolutions reimposed after the snapback, we call on Iran to implement its safeguards obligations and to cooperate fully with the IAEA. Secondly, the reimposition of sanctions in no way means the end of efforts to find a diplomatic solution. The decision to trigger the snapback procedure was taken as a last resort, after more than five years of diplomatic efforts aimed at bringing Iran back into compliance with its commitments, including a proposal to extend the snapback deadline, which Iran rejected. The expiry of this procedure entails the re- entry into force of the Council’s resolutions on Iran, which, among other measures, provide for an embargo on arms to and from Iran and Iran’s suspension of its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities. All States have a duty to contribute to the fulfilment of these obligations, in line with the Charter of the United Nations. We also hope to see the prompt designation of a Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), which is tasked with ensuring that these measures are duly implemented, and the swift appointment of members of the relevant Panel of Experts. While we are resolved to implement the resolutions that have been reimposed, we remain fully committed to a negotiated solution. The position of France and its E3 partners has been consistent for more than 20 years: only a diplomatic solution will be able to provide a viable response to the Iranian nuclear issue. Accordingly, we continue to call on Iran to recommit to earnest, good-faith negotiations with a view to concluding a lasting and verifiable agreement that affords the international community guarantees that Iran will never possess a nuclear weapon.

I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting, and I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo for her briefing. I would also like to welcome the presence of the representatives of the European Union, Germany and Iran at the meeting. Allow me to highlight the following points. First, Greece once again reiterates its unwavering commitment to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as its indispensable institutional cornerstones. Preserving and strengthening this regime are the only way forward for the region and the world. We therefore urge all States to comply fully with their obligations under the NPT. Secondly, we express serious concern regarding the findings of the IAEA Board of Governors’ most recent report, of 12 November, and the resolution adopted on 20 November. They made clear that the implementation of safeguards activities in Iran in accordance with the NPT safeguards agreement is indispensable and urgent and cannot be suspended under any circumstances. Echoing the IAEA, we urge Iran to extend full and prompt cooperation to the Agency, including by providing the necessary information and access. Of equal concern are the steady increase in Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium and the fact that its whereabouts are currently unknown. As of early summer, Iran’s total stockpile had exceeded 9,200 kilograms in total, including more than 450 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 per cent. There is no credible civilian justification for such a quantity of uranium enriched to this level. The international community must be reassured of the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. In this regard, we note with deep concern the IAEA’s assessment that unless and until Iran assists the Agency in resolving the outstanding issues, the Agency will not be in a position to provide such assurance. Thirdly, Greece continues to view a diplomatic solution based on the principles of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as the best way to ensure that Iran can exercise its right to a nuclear programme, while guaranteeing that this programme remains exclusively peaceful. It also remains the only viable pathway to sanctions relief, economic development and regional de-escalation. It is in this spirit that we urge the initial parties to the JCPOA to resume talks without delay. With the credibility of the global non-proliferation architecture at stake and growing uncertainty threatening the stability of the Middle East, the time has long come for responsible action from all sides. We therefore call on all parties to demonstrate political will, engage meaningfully and reaffirm their commitment to dialogue, diplomacy and respect for international law, including their non- proliferation obligations. Greece will continue to advocate for de-escalation and for the doors of diplomacy and dialogue to remain open. The stakes are otherwise too high for regional and international peace and security.

I extend my gratitude to Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo for her briefing. In the light of the continued operation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the corresponding note by the President (S/2016/44), the Republic of Korea has joined today’s meeting, called for the Council to receive a briefing on the Secretary- General’s report (S/2025/814). We also believe that resolution 2231 (2015) clearly demonstrates that the Iranian nuclear issue remains on the Security Council’s agenda. Allow me to briefly highlight the three priorities that we believe should guide the Council’s work, going forward. First, sustained dialogue and consultations within the Council are essential. Differences should be addressed through discussions in the Council and its subsidiary bodies. The Secretariat has announced the resumption of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), following the reinstatement of resolution 1737 (2006). We hope that an agreement on the appointment of the Chair will be reached promptly, enabling the Committee to carry out its mandate effectively. Secondly, renewed diplomatic engagement is needed within and beyond the Council to achieve tangible progress. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was the product of years of diplomacy. While there are still few signs of breakthroughs in the current impasse, we call on all stakeholders to intensify their efforts to re-engage and pursue dialogue towards a peaceful and diplomatic resolution. Thirdly, the IAEA plays a central and indispensable role in verification and monitoring under the global non-proliferation regime. Its work on Iran’s nuclear programme is essential for confidence-building and for any future political and diplomatic solution. As the international community’s concern over Iran’s accumulation of its enriched uranium continues to grow, we urge Iran to resume full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that its nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. At a time when dialogue and negotiations are essential to safeguarding the global non-proliferation regime, we regret that stalemate and confrontation persist. Reiterating entrenched positions without dialogue cannot be the solution. Security Council discussions should serve as a facilitator for overcoming the current impasse. We urge all parties to renew efforts to identify common ground and advance meaningful progress. Before I w conclude, I would like to by reaffirming our steadfast support for a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.

I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo for her briefing. We welcome the participation of the representatives of Iran, Germany and the European Union in today’s meeting. Today, I will focus first on the need for Iran to provide access to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), then on our continued commitment to a diplomatic solution and thirdly, on the need for all Member States to comply fully with Security Council resolutions. First, as has been reported today, Iran has restricted access for the International Atomic Energy Agency for more than six months, including at the sites of greatest proliferation concern. This is despite the IAEA making clear that there is no technical or equipment-related reason preventing it from returning to the damaged sites. Iran’s restrictions mean that the IAEA is unable to verify the location of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile. This includes more than 400 kilograms of high enriched uranium, for which there is no credible civilian justification. We call on Iran urgently to lift its restrictions and to fully cooperate with the IAEA in line with its legal obligations under the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Secondly, the United Kingdom remains committed to a diplomatic solution to address international concerns with Iran’s nuclear programme. We urge Iran to engage in direct talks with the United States. The United Kingdom, alongside its E3 partners, stands ready to support a diplomatic solution. We are engaging with all interlocutors and continue to encourage both sides to return to the negotiating table. Future sanctions relief remains possible should Iran take concrete, verifiable and durable steps to address international concern with its nuclear programme. Thirdly, we call on Iran and all Member States to comply fully with Security Council decisions on Iran’s nuclear programme. As a result of Iran’s significant non-performance of its Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action commitments, the United Kingdom, alongside France and Germany, triggered the snapback process in full accordance with resolution 2231 (2015). This process completed on 28 September. As a result, resolution 2231 (2015) remains in force, and the provisions of the six resolutions previously lifted have come back into effect. All Member States should fully comply with the provisions of the relevant resolutions. We are particularly concerned by the suggestion from certain permanent Council members that they will not do so. We reiterate the importance that all members of the Council seek to maintain international peace and security.

Once again, Mr. President, we would like to express our regret that you did not summon the courage to approach your obligations impartially or refuse to act at the behest of those who insisted on holding this Security Council meeting on a non-existent agenda item. We categorically reject and condemn such actions by the Slovenian presidency, which undermine the Security Council’s authority and violate the Council’s earlier decisions. Another gross violation would be a statement by a representative of the European Union (EU) in its capacity as coordinator of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Joint Commission. This Commission no longer exists. The EU is therefore no longer its coordinator and should not be allowed to brief the Security Council in that capacity. At the same time, Mr. President, it is telling that, neither in your capacity as President of the Security Council nor as Security Council Facilitator on implementing resolution 2231 (2015), a position you held until 18 October, you did not even attempt to initiate work on negotiating the coordinator’s biannual report or hold a customary informal expert meeting of the Security Council in the 2231 format. We view that as a testament to the fact that our Slovenian colleagues, despite their blatant bloc solidarity, are in fact well aware of the undeniable inconsistency of the arguments for continuing resolution 2231 (2015). Alas, today’s briefing by Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo has once again demonstrated that the Secretariat’s leadership is not far behind Slovenia, as it has taken a biased and legally shaky position regarding discussions in the Security Council on Iran’s nuclear programme. With resolution 2231 (2015) being no longer in force, the Secretary- General’s mandate to monitor its implementation is no longer pertinent either, which we have repeatedly pointed out. Against this backdrop, the Secretary-General’s unwarranted decision to prepare and publish the relevant report (S/2025/814) does not hold water. In this context, we are also disappointed by other steps taken by the Secretariat, such as informing Member States about the so-called “restoration” of anti-Iran Council resolutions that were in force until 2015, as well as recreating the website of the long-defunct Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and reinstating its sanctions list. Such an encroachment on the exclusive prerogatives of the Security Council and playing into the hands of its Western members are nothing but gross violations of the Charter of the United Nations — in particular, Article 100, which states that: “In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other authority external to the Organization.” Moreover, all the aforementioned actions by the Secretariat’s leadership undermine not only the authority of the United Nations but also international efforts to settle the situation regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, in which the Secretary-General, according to his own assurances, is keenly interested. We consider such self-initiated activity unacceptable. In 2025, Western countries finally cast off their masks of alleged champions of a political and diplomatic solution to the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme. If anyone still had doubts as to their true position, it has now been revealed once and for all. At the beginning of this year, many of us pinned great hopes on resumed mediated contacts between Iran and the United States on nuclear issues. There were five rounds of indirect talks, and the parties agreed to meet for the sixth round. However, two days before the meeting was due to take place, Israel opted for a military escalation and struck Iranian territory, including civilian nuclear facilities that were under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. A week later, West Jerusalem was joined by Washington in this misadventure. Not only did these actions jeopardize the security of the entire Middle East region, but they also de facto wiped out any chance of reaching any agreement. Given this, the steps taken by the European trio of the JCPOA — the United Kingdom, France and Germany — were nothing but the height of hypocrisy. Despite their previous statements about the inadmissibility of a military solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, these countries simply turned on a dime and supported strikes against a sovereign State. I would like to quote what my United Kingdom colleague said in the Chamber at the emergency Council meeting on 22 June: “military action alone cannot bring a durable solution to concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme” (see S/PV.9941, p.8). In other words, London was prepared to view military strikes and threats as a lever to resolve the crisis regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, thereby fundamentally changing its position in just a few hours, only to please its “big brother”. I ask colleagues to have a think: this was an attack not only on Iran but also on the entire Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) architecture and the IAEA safeguards system underpinning it. Moreover, the E3, the United States and other Western countries went so far as to directly distort the content of the IAEA Director General’s reports on Iran’s nuclear programme, which never and in no context mentioned converting material for military purposes. Any attempts to blame Tehran for its defensive steps in the nuclear sphere are doomed to failure and can impress only amateurs; all these steps were taken purely in response to the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear “deal” in 2018 and to the obstruction by the E3 of the deal’s implementation. Anyone who knows the slightest bit about this matter perfectly understands that neither the NPT nor the comprehensive safeguards agreement impose any restrictions on the parties to the Treaty on enriching uranium, provided that all material is used solely for peaceful purposes. Over the past few months, it has become perfectly clear that the E3 were also completely non-viable as participants in the negotiation process on Iran. Initially, these countries sought to play the “snapback” card. But they did not succeed: their plans were thwarted when our country, along with several other Member States, presented to the international community their convincing legal analysis, explaining that, owing to their numerous violations of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015), the E3 forfeited their right to use the instruments stipulated therein. Furthermore, the so-called notification of the launch of the snapback mechanism was sent by our British, French and German colleagues, in circumvention of the procedures provided for in the JCPOA, in particular not invoking or exhausting the dispute resolution mechanism. Therefore, as any conscientious lawyer will confirm, no assertions by the former European participants in the JCPOA can replace the reality in which there has been no restoration of the anti-Iranian Security Council resolutions whatsoever. Then the E3 demonstrated its utter inability to act and make decisions independently. The interim solution agreed on by Iran and European countries on the sidelines of the high- level week of the General Assembly came up against the position of the United States, which nullified the initial parameters advanced by the E3. However, the E3 just pretended that nothing happened. Even after this humiliation, the Europeans did not summon the courage to support the depoliticized Russian-Chinese draft resolution on a technical extension of resolution 2231 (2015) (see S/PV.10006), which would have given additional time to find a negotiated solution without creating a legal vacuum following the expiration of the JCPOA. Given this powerlessness, we are not surprised by the attempts of the United Kingdom, France and Germany, with renewed vigor, to convince everyone around them that the snapback has indeed been triggered. However, for all the attempts of our Western colleagues to create their own “parallel reality”, the actual situation leaves them no chance of doing so. The Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2015 have not been reinstated. Resolution 2231 (2015) expired on 18 October. The Iranian nuclear programme has been removed from the Security Council’s agenda. Let us not forget that the objectives of the Council’s previous sanctions resolutions concerning Iran have long been achieved, which is documented by the IAEA. Under the current circumstances, the previous restrictions are not viable and cannot be applied to address the current problems having to do with the Agency’s monitoring activities in Iran, especially since those problems arose not because of Tehran, but because of United States-Israeli acts of aggression. All these things further underscore the unviability of any intentions to re-establish the sanctions regime. We would urge our American and European colleagues, as well as the United Nations Secretariat, to stop living in a world of illusions and to rectify their unlawful and deeply erroneous course. The Russian Federation will continue to quell any attempts to further undermine the normal work of the Security Council or to call into question its earlier decisions and mislead the international community. If the United States, European countries and their allies really want to eradicate any doubts they themselves have vis-à-vis the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, they must abandon their biased, politicized attitudes towards Iran and, instead of trying to exert “maximum pressure” on Iran, they need to engage in real dialogue with the country. Tehran has repeatedly demonstrated its readiness to have a fair and balanced discussion and has outlined the parameters for such a conversation that would be agreeable to it. Russia remains ready to assist any genuine attempts at finding a political and diplomatic solution to this issue. We would urge everyone to focus on these very attempts rather than building castles in the sky and indulging in phantom limb pains over resolution 2231 (2015).

At the outset, we would like to thank Under-Secretary- General DiCarlo for her comprehensive briefing. We also welcome to this meeting the Permanent Representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Germany, as well as the representative of the European Union. My delegation takes note of the divergent perspectives among Council members regarding the causes of the current impasse. We underscore the primacy of the Charter of the United Nations and international law and encourage constructive good faith engagement to preserve the Council’s unity. My delegation believes that a balanced approach that addresses the concerns of all parties is essential to resolving the current situation. Somalia urges all stakeholders to recommit to dialogue and restraint and to refrain from actions that could escalate tensions or foreclose diplomatic space. We support the Secretary-General’s call to revitalize results- oriented diplomacy, including practical confidence-building measures, that reduce mistrust, de-escalate tensions and create the necessary conditions for sustained negotiations. My delegation reaffirms its firm commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, we reiterate the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with their obligations under the Treaty. We once again call upon all relevant parties to engage constructively, refrain from actions that may undermine dialogue and support mechanisms that facilitate practical, mutually acceptable solutions. In conclusion, the international community must remain united in its effort to achieve peaceful resolutions to disputes and the preservation of the non-proliferation regime. We call on all parties to redouble their diplomatic efforts, to address outstanding issues in good faith and to work collectively towards a peaceful and sustained solution that enhances security for the region and the world. Somalia stands ready to support initiatives that strengthen regional and global stability, uphold international law and advance our shared objective of peace, security and mutual respect.

I thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo for presenting the twentieth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2025/814). I also welcome the participation of the representatives of Iran, Germany and the European Union in today’s meeting. The Council’s consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue this year has been of a complex and sensitive nature. There were moments of hope and moments of deadlock on the way forward. Unfortunately, the latter emerged stronger, as the Council failed to agree on viable next steps. Guyana regrets that the concerned parties were unable to reach a negotiated agreement, despite their stated commitment to finding a diplomatic solution. To this end, we continue to urge all parties to return to the negotiating table and to engage constructively and in good faith to find a sustainable solution. Guyana acknowledges the latest report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We took note of the divergent views of concerned parties regarding the triggering of the snapback mechanism and the reimposition of sanctions on Iran. Guyana also acknowledges the recent report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the Safeguards Agreement of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this regard, we regret the termination of the Cairo agreement signed between the IAEA and Iran on 9 September. This could have made critical steps towards facilitating safeguards implementation and ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. There is no substitute for a world free of nuclear weapons. This conviction underscores Guyana’s commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and our advocacy for the universalization of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We view the proliferation of nuclear capabilities in any form as a fundamental threat to global peace and security. We implore all parties involved in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to prioritize diplomatic re-engagement. The questions surrounding the re-imposition of sanctions on Iran should be addressed in a comprehensive manner. There should be no humanitarian consequences for the population and a clear path leading back to the negotiating table. In conclusion, Guyana encourages dialogue among all concerned parties, continued cooperation between the IAEA and Iran and the Council’s prudent consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue. We believe that these efforts are vital for rebuilding confidence and trust and for delivering a solution that is acceptable to all parties.

I thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo for the briefing. The Security Council last met on this issue in September in the wake of unfortunate developments concerning the snapback mechanism of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (see S/PV.10006). Pakistan did not support the precipitated move to reimpose sanctions and cautioned against hasty action. Our position was grounded in the firm belief that all issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme must be resolved through dialogue. More time should be provided for diplomacy to succeed, avoiding confrontation and preserving the framework of the JCPOA until a successor arrangement is reached. It is deeply regrettable that in recent months divisions in the Council and beyond have widened, taking us further away from the resolution of the issue. The situation had already become more complicated owing to unilateral actions involving the use of force and violations of the Charter of the United Nations, and later, owing to the differing interpretations concerning invocation of the snapback mechanism. Our position on this matter remains unchanged. We strongly believe that diplomacy and dialogue should be the guiding principles for the resolution of all outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme, in accordance with its rights and obligations and the responsibilities of all the parties concerned. We continue to believe that coercive measures would not help to bring the parties closer and would only exacerbate the trust deficit. Sanctions directly hurt ordinary people the most, and they affect trade and economic development and diminish the prospects for regional connectivity. Pakistan has therefore consistently advocated the primacy of diplomatic engagement and the imperative of avoiding confrontation and conflict. Even though the JCPOA was not implemented as intended, the fact remains that it provided an essential framework for the resolution of the issue, one that is based on international law, mutual respect and acceptance. The essence and basic framework of the JCPOA could still prove useful if there is a mutual desire to move forward in a spirit of compromise and accommodation. There is a need to revive the spirit of the JCPOA once more. The divisions on this issue could be overcome if we stick to the principle of bringing together all parties in a spirit of conciliation towards a solution-oriented approach. Most importantly, the trust and confidence in diplomatic engagement that was damaged in the past few months must be meticulously restored. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency remains critically important as the international institution responsible for verifying compliance with the respective nuclear safeguards obligations of Member States. The Agency should fulfil this mandate in an objective, credible and impartial manner, consistent with its technical nature, without any other consideration. Constructive efforts should be undertaken, including through the Security Council, to bring the parties together for a compromise acceptable to all. There is no alternative to continued diplomacy and dialogue for the peaceful resolution of disputes.

I thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo for her comprehensive briefing. We also welcome the participation of the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Germany and the European Union in this meeting. We acknowledge the work and the recommendations of the Secretary-General’s report (S/2025/814), the updates provided by the facilitator and the activities of the Joint Commission. We view them as essential components in preserving the integrity of the resolution and in advancing efforts towards a peaceful and rules-based resolution of the issue under review. Sierra Leone reiterates its principled commitment to the global non-proliferation regime and to the peaceful settlement of disputes. The continued implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as endorsed by resolution 2231 (2015), remains an important benchmark for regional stability and international confidence in the non- proliferation architecture. We underscore the importance of full and verifiable compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the associated safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These are vital to ensuring transparency, restoring trust and preventing further erosion of the security framework within the region and beyond. We remain concerned by reported activities inconsistent with the commitments under the JCPOA. While mindful of the complex security dynamics and the broader geopolitical context, Sierra Leone believes that cooperative verification, transparency of enrichment levels and restoration of monitoring mechanisms are indispensable. We welcome the 9 September 2025 agreement between Iran and the IAEA, facilitated by the Arab Republic of Egypt, as a constructive signal towards renewed cooperation. We encourage its full and effective implementation and urge all parties to support the IAEA’s operational independence and unhindered access to sites, as required by its mandate. We also take careful note of the recent deliberations of the Security Council in September 2025, including action on two draft resolutions (S/2025/539 and S/2025/561). Sierra Leone values the engagement of all delegations involved and acknowledges the genuine efforts made to explore pathways to work under the framework of resolution 2231 (2015). We continue to view such engagements as a positive expression of the Council’s responsibility to seek balanced, lawful and peaceful outcomes. While recognizing the different views expressed during those consultations, Sierra Leone reiterates that diplomacy, dialogue and good faith negotiations must remain the preferred means of advancing compliance and reinforcing regional stability. Any alternative approaches, including punitive measures, should be treated with caution and reserved only as a matter of last resort and strictly in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. At the same time, we acknowledge the prevailing restraint of the parties concerned and the absence of further escalatory development since those discussions. These conditions, though fragile, represent an opportunity to reinvigorate efforts towards peaceful settlement. Sierra Leone underscores the importance of preserving and building upon this window, however narrow, to pursue sustained, results-oriented diplomacy. We urge all parties to refrain from provocative rhetoric or actions that may jeopardize the current opening of engagements and reiterate the need for constructive dialogue that leads to time-bound, verifiable and mutually reinforcing commitments. We commend the continued efforts of the IAEA in carrying out its mandate under the most challenging of circumstances. We call on all Member States to support the Agency, including through political and technical cooperation and prompt implementation of safeguards agreements. Sierra Leone further reaffirms the importance of preserving the space for all levels of diplomacy. We strongly encourage all parties to take concrete reciprocal steps to de-escalate tensions, re-establish confidence and return to the full implementation of agreed commitments. These steps must be based on measurable timelines, verifiable actions and mutual respect for obligations undertaken. To conclude, Sierra Leone will continue to engage constructively with all Council members and stakeholders to support a credible and balanced process under resolution 2231 (2015). We remain committed to upholding the authority of the Security Council, strengthening the global non-proliferation regime and contributing to international peace and security through diplomacy and cooperation.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was once an important product of multilateral diplomacy, endorsed by a Security Council resolution. As a model for dispute resolution through dialogue and consultation, balancing the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful use, it has played a key role in maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East. However, in 2018, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the agreement, imposed unilateral sanctions on Iran, exerted maximum pressure and, this June, along with Israel, brazenly attacked Iranian nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and monitoring, pushing the Iranian nuclear issue into a deep crisis. After the United States withdrawal, the E3 also imposed unilateral sanctions on Iran, failing to fulfil its obligations under the agreement or exhausting the dispute resolution mechanism, and triggered the snapback mechanism after the attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, resulting in the repeated escalation of tensions and confrontation between the parties. The current situation in Iran is not what any party wishes to see. If allowed to fester, it will further undermine the authority and effectiveness of the international non- proliferation regime and jeopardize peace and stability in the Middle East. China calls on all parties concerned to act with a greater sense of urgency, demonstrate a sense of responsibility, resume the negotiation process as soon as possible, strive to reach consensus and achieve results. I would like to make the following points. First, a political solution is the only viable path. Force and confrontation cannot resolve the issue. All parties should remain calm and exercise restraint, properly manage differences through diplomacy and dialogue and avoid a return to the vicious cycle of sanctions, pressure and escalation. The United States should fully fulfil its responsibilities, demonstrate political sincerity, clearly commit to not using force against Iran and take the initiative to resume negotiations with Iran. The E3 should refrain from microphone diplomacy, play a positive role in easing tensions and bridging differences and honour its commitment to a diplomatic solution. Secondly, upholding fairness and justice is a basic principle. Despite suffering unfair treatment, Iran has repeatedly reaffirmed the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, emphasized that it has no intention of developing nuclear weapons and has actively engaged with all parties to seek solutions. The experience of the JCPOA proves that the Iranian nuclear issue can be properly resolved through comprehensive and stringent safeguards and monitoring. China calls on the countries concerned to view the difficulties Iran faces in restoring safeguards and verification in an objective manner and to value Iran’s good-faith, positive efforts rather than making one-sided accusations, exerting pressure and causing disruption. Thirdly, dialogue on an equal footing is the fundamental way forward. Any solution must fully respect Iran’s legitimate rights as a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and ensure the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. The parties concerned should respect each other’s legitimate security concerns, ease tensions and build mutual trust through dialogue on an equal footing and find a prompt solution that meets the expectations of the international community. A certain country should refrain from using the Iranian nuclear talks to advance its geopolitical agenda or from linking the Iranian nuclear issue with other issues, as doing so will only disrupt the negotiation process and undermine diplomatic efforts. Fourthly, fostering a favourable atmosphere is essential. Recently, countries of the region have been actively promoting the resumption of talks. China supports all efforts to restart negotiations and believes this is also the position of the vast majority of Council members. The Council should play a constructive role to allow time and space for diplomatic efforts and create a positive atmosphere for restarting negotiations. The relevant countries should stop escalating sanctions and inciting confrontation and stop abusing the Council to impose unilateral punishment on Iran. As a permanent member of the Council and a party to the JCPOA, China has always played a constructive role on the Iranian nuclear issue, actively promoting peace through dialogue. For some time now, China has maintained close communication at various levels with all the parties concerned and has repeatedly sent letters to the United Nations and the IAEA to clarify its position, calling for the maintenance of the political and diplomatic process. Together with Russia, China has proposed a draft resolution on the technical rollover of resolution 2231 (2015). China will continue to work with all parties to promote a prompt resumption of negotiations, advance a political solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, uphold the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and promote peace and stability in the Middle East.

It is our pleasure to commend Rosemary DiCarlo for her briefing on the Secretary-General’s report (S/2025/814). We welcome Ms. Hedda Samson, Chargé d’affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, and the representatives of those countries honouring us with their participation. The Secretary-General’s twentieth report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) provides us with a summary of recent events that, against a backdrop of rising geopolitical tensions surrounding the development of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear programme, underscore the need to maintain a constructive and sustained dialogue on the subject. It is worth noting that approximately 20 years of negotiations culminated in what, at the time, was one of the foremost achievements of diplomacy: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, followed by resolution 2231 (2015). That notwithstanding, there is still some way to go before an agreement can be reached on security for all States. The lesson that we can learn is that perfect agreements do not exist. However, the purpose of diplomatic stewardship is to create the space necessary to foster lasting consensus. The Republic of Panama is of the firm view that, in our globalized reality, multilateralism is the appropriate tool for reaching consensus that serves the international system. Moreover, we believe that the Security Council should play a proactive and unifying role in this situation. We underscore that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of this system, which, through verification, guarantees international trust and stability. It is therefore essential to advocate for the Treaty to be fully protected duly implemented and strengthened. We convey our concern about the point made in the Secretary-General’s report that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that, as at 18 October, it had no information on the status of low- and high-enriched uranium stocks in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In that connection, emphasis was placed on the need to move towards a commonly agreed framework with the support of the countries concerned in order to ensure that its nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. In this regard, we reiterate our respectful call for Iran to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify and inspect all its nuclear facilities, in accordance with its international obligations, and to immediately declare the status and location of its enriched uranium reserves, which continue to represent a considerable security concern, and to do so without jeopardizing their security. It is essential to resolve outstanding safeguards issues without delay through effective cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency so as to allow the necessary access, the provision of clear information and the implementation of the relevant verification mechanisms. As long as the IAEA is not in a position to provide assurances about the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme and the status and oversight of enriched uranium stockpiles, the relevant international obligations assumed cannot be considered to have been fully met. Our system is confronting significant challenges. Nonetheless, it is our responsibility to address them so that the mutual interest in security and stability prevails. We face the real and profound challenge of a gradual erosion of the multilateral collective security system, whereby the dilution of regulatory frameworks, a loss of trust and non-compliance with international law are threatening to undermine collective efforts for peace. The Council, in discharging its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, must foster a common understanding that would help to reduce the risks of escalation, promote regional stability and bolster the international non- proliferation regime. We call upon all States to engage in genuine diplomatic efforts devoid of pressure, with a view to moving towards a robust and lasting agreement and ensuring proper oversight by the competent international bodies. Furthermore, we request States to use the influence available to them to facilitate and support this process. The events of this year make clear that there are no military shortcuts to stability. Only a genuine, inclusive and sustained dialogue can provide a solution, which is why we are here today.

At the outset, I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo for her briefing. We also take note of the twentieth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2025/814). We have listened carefully to the points of order raised, which highlight legal and procedural issues regarding the holding of this meeting. These points, if left unaddressed, could compromise the integrity of the Council’s decisions, its unity and its authority over a very complex file. Algeria has long advocated for the pacific settlement of disputes, for respect for international law and for the primacy of dialogue over coercion. Guided by these principles, we have always recognized the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a landmark achievement of multilateral diplomacy. Anchored in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and strongly supporting the essential and independent verification role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA effectively balance two complementary principles. Algeria firmly upholds an unwavering commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and the inalienable right of States to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Regrettably, today, we witness this historic achievement being endangered by a troubling cycle of actions and reactions. While the framework established by resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA had already endured severe setbacks over the years, the situation was dramatically aggravated by the targeting in June of several Iranian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. This episode was followed by intense diplomatic pressure, which triggered the snapback mechanism. Consequently, the diplomatic path and the spirit of compromise that led to the Council’s endorsement of the JCPOA in 2015 now appear more distant than ever. In September, Algeria called for more space and time to be provided for diplomacy and urged all parties to avoid any escalatory measures that could lead to unpredictable consequences in a region already tormented by so many tragedies. We believed then, as we believe now, that diplomacy and dialogue remain the only viable path to resolving this complex dossier. Our position has not changed. In this regard, Algeria wishes to highlight the following points. First, regarding the conflicting views of resolution 2231 (2015), the Council could consider drawing upon the United Nations established legal mechanisms to provide an interpretation of the disputed provisions. Clarifying legal and procedural parameters could remove unnecessary layers of complexity from this dossier and avert a looming deadlock. Secondly, the commitment of all participants to a diplomatic solution is encouraging and must remain the sole foundation upon which any diplomatic solution must be built. To give substance to this commitment, we call on all parties to uphold the principles of good- faith negotiations, mutual respect and strict adherence to international obligations. Lastly, Algeria calls for a renewed diplomatic approach that not only maintains open channels of communication but actively explores all possible and complementary pathways, including impartial mediation, to translate the parties’ commitment to diplomacy into tangible reality. In conclusion, the path forward lies not in the entrenchment of positions but in a shared political will to restore trust and fulfil the commitments needed to achieve the comprehensive, long-term and proper solution the Council originally endorsed.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Slovenia. I wish to thank Under-Secretary General DiCarlo for her briefing. Ten years ago, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) established a robust regime that comprehensively addressed a pressing international security challenge. Unfortunately, this mutually beneficial arrangement suffered serious setbacks throughout the years. Slovenia regretted the United States withdrawal and Iran’s subsequent implementation of the so-called remedial measures. We have consistently called out Iran’s unacceptable disregard for its obligations under the JCPOA. Slovenia remains concerned about the scope and transparency of Iran’s nuclear programme. In its latest report, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that since mid-October, it has had no information on the status of the low- and high-enriched uranium stockpiles nor on whether nuclear material in Iran is being used exclusively for peaceful purposes. This situation undermines Iran’s obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We call on Iran to fully implement its non-proliferation obligations and urge it to re-establish its cooperation with the IAEA, including by granting access to all nuclear sites and facilities. With the snapback reinstating sanctions on Iran in September, an era has come to a close. If we take a look at the 10 years of JCPOA implementation, we must acknowledge that it did not deliver the desired results. Nevertheless, it provided 10 years of enhanced transparency, 10 years of relief from United Nations sanctions and ten years of multifaceted diplomatic and technical cooperation. In spite of all the hurdles that the JCPOA faced, it delivered tangible results. The Iran nuclear deal remains one of the most significant diplomatic achievements of the past decade. It was a major accomplishment for the participants and a powerful demonstration of true multilateralism at work. Iran’s nuclear programme has, since its inception, carried significant implications for peace and security across the region; so would any new military interventions. In this regard, we urge all parties to show maximum restraint and we recall that nuclear facilities should never be attacked. Iran, the wider region and the international community need a long-term diplomatic solution with clearly defined objectives, obligations and timelines. We therefore call on all sides to engage seriously and without preconditions in negotiating a solution that meaningfully restores the JCPOA’s overall objectives. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I give the floor to the representative of Germany.

I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting on resolution 2231 (2015). Like other delegations, I would like to thank Under-Secretary- General Rosemary DiCarlo for presenting the report of the Secretary-General (S/2025/814) and for her valuable briefing today. In September, the Council sent an important signal — a signal that Iran is held accountable for its continued severe non-compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This underscored the unwavering resolve of the international community to uphold the integrity of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture and to enforce the nuclear safeguards of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Germany and the E3 remain committed to pursuing a diplomatic solution in order to resolve the strong concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities. Here I want to echo what my colleagues from France and the United Kingdom and many others have said today in this meeting and what my delegation has consistently said in many meetings in the Council on this matter: that our door remains open for dialogue. However, in the meantime, we must focus on three points. First, the Security Council has to agree on the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). The Panel of Experts must start working as soon as possible. The independent assessments are vital for transparency and effective monitoring of the reinstated restrictive measures which the Security Council has agreed upon. It is our conviction that the reinstated Security Council resolutions are not an end in themselves; they are a tool to encourage constructive engagement and to create conditions for meaningful progress. To that end, they need to be implemented comprehensively. Secondly, since the Council remains seized of the matter under resolution 2231 (2015), we need to ensure that this threat to peace and security receives the necessary collective attention. The Council should therefore retain its established practice of semi-annual meetings. Thirdly, we call on Iran to urgently resume full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. This is a legal requirement under the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. We further call on Iran to re-engage in diplomacy in order to address the international community’s concerns over its nuclear programme, because ultimately — and here I repeat what I said at the beginning — a comprehensive solution can be established only through dialogue. Germany, with its E3 partners France and the United Kingdom, has been engaged in diplomacy with Iran on its nuclear programme for more than 20 years. We will continue our diplomatic efforts to address all concerns associated with Iran’s nuclear programme, because it is and remains in all of our interests that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon.

I give the floor to Mrs. Samson. Mrs. Samson: I am honored to address the Council today on behalf of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Ms. Kaja Kallas. I would like to thank Secretary-General António Guterres, Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and the rest of the Secretariat for their work related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), as well as the delegation of Slovenia, for their efforts in carrying out the role of the facilitator of resolution 2231 (2015). We take note of the twentieth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2025/814). This meeting is taking place in the context of the reinstatement by the Council of its resolutions in force prior to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and thus of all nuclear-related United Nations sanctions and restrictions on Iran. This followed the invoking of the snapback mechanism by France, Germany and the United Kingdom which notified the Security Council on 28 August of Iran’s significant non-compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA. There should be no doubts about the validity of this process and the obligation for all United Nations Member States to fully implement the reinstated resolutions. However, the snapback of sanctions and nuclear restrictions must not be the end of diplomacy, quite the opposite. The European Union (EU) and its member States are convinced that a lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue can be achieved only through diplomacy. To this end, the European Union remains determined to continue to engage with all parties to find a negotiated and sustainable solution to the issue, in line with the reinstated Security Council resolutions. For the past 10 years, the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) established a framework that not only sought to ensure that the Iranian programme remained exclusively peaceful but also put in place an effective monitoring and verification system conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The JCPOA represented a key contribution to the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture, as well as an achievement of multilateralism and nuclear diplomacy. Amid increasing challenges, the successive EU High Representatives have spared no effort to preserve this framework in the interest of international peace and security. High Representative Kaja Kallas has pursued intense diplomatic contacts, including during the 30-day time frame foreseen in the snapback process, to avoid the situation we are currently facing. We welcome the efforts aimed at facilitating diplomacy of a number of other States. Ensuring that Iran does not acquire or develop a nuclear weapon remains a key security priority for the EU and all its member States, as it is for the entire international community. The EU reiterates its full support for the impartial role of the IAEA and for its Director General in their critical work to uphold the implementation of safeguards, nuclear safety and security and to provide clarity on Iran’s nuclear programme. In November, IAEA Director General Grossi reported that the Agency had lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the previously declared inventories of nuclear material in Iran, including low and highly enriched uranium. Iran’s implementation of its Safeguards Agreement cannot be suspended under any circumstances. This situation is very concerning. The European Union calls on Iran to return to full compliance with its legal obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its binding Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. It is critical and urgent that Iran provide the IAEA with up to date and verifiable declarations on the quantity and whereabouts of nuclear material and related activities and allow the resumption of inspections of all its nuclear facilities, including those affected by military strikes in June. It is the intention of the High Representative to remain engaged with all relevant parties, including Iran, in support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution.

At the outset, I wish to state clearly Iran’s position regarding the convening of this meeting. We associate ourselves with the positions of our Russian and Chinese colleagues and firmly object to the convening of this meeting. Resolution 2231 (2015) contains a clear, deliberate and self-executing termination clause. This resolution expired on 18 October. As of that date, it ceased to have any legal effect or operative mandate. Accordingly, the Security Council’s role under resolution 2231 (2015) came to a definitive end. There is therefore no mandate for the Secretary-General to submit any report, no mandate for the Council to hold discussions on it and no legal basis whatsoever to convene a meeting under the agenda item “Non-proliferation” in this context. Any attempt to convene such a meeting constitutes a clear violation of the Council’s rules of procedure. Likewise, any claim of the continued operation or implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) — whether by invoking note 44 of the President of the Council (S/2016/44) or by vague references to so-called established practice —is legally unfounded and misleading and amounts to a clear abuse of the Council’s authority and processes. I wish to express Iran’s appreciation to China and the Russian Federation for their principled position and their faithful commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) throughout its implementation. We also thank Algeria, Pakistan and other Council members who have taken principled and independent positions. What we are witnessing is not a legitimate disagreement over interpretation, but a calculated distortion of resolution 2231 (2015), the deliberate dissemination of disinformation regarding Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme and a cynical attempt to abuse the Council for narrow political interests. Against this backdrop, I wish to make four points. First, the root causes of the current situation are clear and did not emerge overnight or in isolation. They lie in the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA in 2018, the sustained and deliberate non-compliance of the three European countries with their commitments, and the subsequent military aggression by the United States and the Israeli regime against Iran’s peaceful, safeguarded nuclear facilities. The war of aggression launched by the United States and Israel, including deliberate attacks on facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, constitutes a blatant violation of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and the peremptory norm prohibiting the use of force and represents a direct assault on the international non-proliferation regime. The situation is further aggravated by the explicit and public admission of the President of the United States — a permanent member of the Security Council and a depository of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) — that Washington led, directed and coordinated this war of aggression. Any attempts to justify this unlawful act through a distorted interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter or by invoking a fabricated claim of imminent threat is legally unfounded, misleading and constitutes one of the most dangerous abuses of international law in recent history. Article 51 of the Charter permits self-defence only in response to an actual armed attack, not a speculative or hypothetical threat. Equally disturbing is the silence and in certain instances the implicit endorsement of the three European countries in response to this act of aggression. They have no credibility whatsoever to invoke non-proliferation norms or claim concern about the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. Secondly, Iran has been a faithful and responsible party to the NPT since 1970. Iran has consistently rejected weapons of mass destruction on legal, moral and doctrinal grounds — a position reaffirmed constantly at the highest levels. Despite unlawful sanctions, sabotage, assassinations of its nuclear scientists and armed attacks, Iran has never diverted its nuclear programme to military purposes. Iran’s programme remains exclusively peaceful and subject to the most extensive verification regime applied to any non-nuclear-weapon State. Yet the roles have been deliberately reversed: the victim is treated as the perpetrator. Iran is punished, and those who attack IAEA-safeguarded nuclear facilities enjoy complete impunity. This blatant double standard gravely undermines the integrity, credibility and authority of the global non-proliferation regime. Despite these circumstances and grave violations, Iran has acted in good faith and has continued to cooperate with the IAEA. On 9 September in Cairo, Iran’s Minister for Foreign Affairs signed a memorandum of understanding with the IAEA Director General — an initiative welcomed by the Agency and many States — as a constructive first step. Additional proposals were later presented here in New York by Iran’s Minister for Foreign Affairs. All were ignored. France and the United Kingdom chose escalation over diplomacy, acting in alignment with Washington instructions while blocking genuine diplomatic efforts, including the responsible initiative put forward by China and Russia. Furthermore, they acted in bad faith by ignoring Iran’s constructive cooperation with the IAEA, deliberately omitting key facts and submitting another politically motivated resolution at the IAEA Board of Governors in November, while pressuring members to support it. This was done to manufacture a crisis rather than resolve one, and it effectively ended both diplomacy and the Cairo agreement. Thirdly, regarding claims that the so-called “snapback” or “reinstatement” of terminated sanctions resolutions has been triggered, Iran’s position is clear, consistent and firmly on the record, including in its official communications to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council. This position has also been explicitly shared by other members, including China and Russia. The E3 have been in sustained and publicly acknowledged significant non-performance since 2018 and therefore lack any legal standing to invoke such a mechanism. Moreover, the Security Council’s procedural inaction in September neither validates nor remediates this fundamental defect. The Council made no determination that legal conditions for the so-called “snapback” were met. Under international law, defective or invalid procedures cannot create legal rights or obligations. Let me state, once again, Iran’s position in the clearest possible terms: resolution 2231 (2015) terminated definitively on 18 October. As of that date, all nuclear-related provisions, measures and restrictions were permanently terminated, the Security Council concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue, and the agenda item “Non-proliferation” was removed. Any attempt by any State or body to revive, reinterpret or enforce these terminated provisions is null and void, without legal effect and constitutes a clear abuse of the Council authority and processes. Fourthly, Iran remains fully committed to principled diplomacy and genuine negotiations. It will never submit to coercion, intimidation or political pressure. It is now incumbent upon France, the United Kingdom and the United States to reverse course and take concrete, credible steps to restore trust and confidence. The core principle of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action remains indisputable and valid — verifiable assurances that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful, in exchange for full recognition of Iran’s rights under the NPT, including the right to uranium enrichment, the lifting of all sanctions and the normalization of Iran’s economy and integration into the international trading system. These principles remain entirely applicable and can provide a solid foundation for a new agreement. The essential objective is unchanged: Iran’s nuclear programme must remain exclusively peaceful, and Iran stands ready to provide such assurances. If France and the United Kingdom are sincere in their declared commitment to diplomacy, they should press the United States to follow this path. If they instead continue to adopt Washington’s failed zero-enrichment policy and deny Iran’s inalienable right under the NPT, diplomacy will be effectively destroyed. The selective invocation of the Charter and the pursuit of the so-called “peace through strength” approach only undermines the rule of law, replacing it with the law of the jungle. In closing, I wish to thank the outgoing members of the Council — Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia — and to congratulate them on the successful completion of the two-year term. I would like to commend, in particular, Algeria and Guyana for their principled and independent conduct throughout their tenure.

I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the nice words addressed to the outgoing members of the Council. The representative of the United States of America has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

There are a couple things that I wanted to address in the statement made by the Iranian representative just now, especially, first, as it relates to resolution 2231 (2015) and if it is still active. The resolution did not expire with the conclusion of the snapback process or the original termination day of 18 October. However, the United States of America’s focus is on the more relevant and comprehensive restrictions that need to be reinstated in the outskirts. So, we wanted to make that clear on 2231 (2015). Also, since the representative decided to address the President of the United States, we would like to make it clear to the entire world that the United States remains available for formal talks with Iran, but only if Tehran is prepared for direct and meaningful dialogue. We are not going to negotiate in public — of course, not here. We have been clear, however, about certain expectations for any arrangement. Foremost, there can be no enrichment inside Iran, and that remains our principle. I have worked for President Trump in two Administrations now and I can tell you that, in both Administrations, President Trump extended the hand of diplomacy to Iran, but instead of taking that hand of diplomacy, Iran continues to put its hand in the fire. Iran must step away from the fire and take President Trump’s hand of diplomacy. It is extended.

The representative of France has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

I will be brief. I wanted to take the floor once again to recall three points. The first point has already been said but I want to repeat it nonetheless. It is very clear that given the voting in September in the Council, the item is still on the Security Council’s agenda and it is within the remit of the Security Council to continue to consider this question. My second point is that, listening to the statement by the representative of Iran, I was struck by two points. First, disinformation lies at the heart of what we have just heard. Also, there is no intention on the part of the United Kingdom, France and Germany to exert coercion against Iran. Once again, we have shown, both in the past and recently in September, our resolve to find a diplomatic negotiated solution. It is up to Iran to show the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, as called for repeatedly for some years now, and recently in the autumn, by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We are not reversing responsibilities, and we are not going above and beyond the request to cooperate with the Agency sustainably and in good faith. Furthermore, we expect Iran, in these meetings, to comment on a number of facts that are in the IAEA reports and that are taken up again in the Secretary General’s report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2025/814). I would like to say that France is disappointed to have heard no substantial responses regarding the facts contained in the Secretary General’s report.

The representative of Iran has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

I think that I have mentioned to the representative of the United States that we appreciate any fair and meaningful negotiation but that insisting on a zero-enrichment policy is contrary to our rights as a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It means that they are not pursuing fair negotiations. They want to dictate their predetermined intention concerning Iran. Iran will not bow down to any pressure and intimidation, and we are not going to be blackmailed by a body in the international field.

The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

I will be very brief, replying to what has been just said by the representative of France. I said it in my statement when I spoke, and I would like to repeat it. France failed miserably in its so-called diplomatic efforts to strike a deal on the nuclear issue with Iran, and it knows it.