S/PV.1008 Security Council

It is my pleasure and honour ta express the thanks of the Council to the representative of Chile, Mr. Schweitzer, who during the month of April served as President of this Counci! with great dignity,. courtesy and wisdom. 1 only wish that circumstances could reake it possible for hire ta continue ta preside, sa that the Council could solve the problems DOW on its agenda. 1. moi remerciements M. il. de constances mêmes probl~mes

1 should like to thank the President for bis friendly and generous words, which are imbued with the kindness that he has always shown ta an bis colleagues. 2. Je généreuses veillance il. 3. He himself fulfils an that he said about me, now that he is President of thus august organ of the United Nations. He has our best wishes and we are sure that in carrying out his duties he will give us fresh procf of his great intellectual qualities. 1 am certain that Mr. Tsiang will conduct our proceedings with the brilliance that characterizes all hisstatements.lwish bim success in his task. 3. exaucé cet adressons fois impriment Je fonctions ventions, tâche Adoption of the agenda Securit~- Council (5/5060 and Corr.l); LI~tter doted 29 Jonuary 1962 trom the Permanent Repre- sentative of Pakistan oddressed ta the President of the Security Council (515068)

1 should like tonotefirstthat, in accordance with the reo_uest of one of the interested parties in the question befnre us, consultations have been held with the members of the COlmeil during which itwas ascertained that itwas generally agreeable for this meeting to be held this afternoon, rather than tomorrow morning as we had decided at our last meeting. 5. In accordance with the decision taken at the 990th meeting, and with the COnsent of the Council, 1 invite the representatives of India and Pakistan ta take seats at the Council table and ta participate in our consideration of the item on the agenda. J ! At the invitation of the President. Mr. Muhammad Zafrt.tlla Khan (Pakistan) and Mr. Krishna Menon (!na'ia) took plaoes at the Counoil table• !

The representative of Pakistan indicated at our last meeting tbat he had not yet concluded his opening statement, and therefore Inowgive him the floor.

Withreference ta what the President said concerningthe change in the date and time of this meeting, certain impressions have been conveyed to me with regard towhich 1 would beg the indUlgence of the Council ta make a brief statement. 8. 1 have been informed from three or four quarters that it is 10 the minds of some, including one member of the Council, that 1 deliberately refused to comply with a suggestion made by the representative of India that a meeting might be beld earlier sa as to m€et the convenience of the Defence Minister of India. In this connexion, it has been said that this request was conveyed ta me on Saturday morning last and that 1 had purposely and deliberately stalled on it and refused ta agree to an earlier meeting. This is not correct. No such request or suggestion was conveyed to me on Saturday at any time, morning, noon or afternoon. 9. 1 oame te know that the representative of India, Ambassader Jha, my friend, bad made efforts ta get in touch with me and had not been successful and that he had in mind making this suggestion ta me. 1 got in touch with Mr. Jha on Monday morning shortly after 1 reached my office. He was not tben in his office but his secretary, who spoke, said that themessagewould be conveyed ta him and he would speak ta me as saon as possible. Within a few minutes he very kindly rang me baok and told me what was desired. i told him that 1 had had in mind at the beg,inning of Ollr meeting last Friday that 1 would work on Saturday, Sunday and Monday up ta mid-day on the remaining portion of my statement ta the Security Council fl-nd that in case 10. Later the sarne morning, when Mr. Jha and! met in the Secretary-General' s offices to pay our humble tribute ta one of the great heroes of space, Major Titov, he renewed bis reauest. On making every possible calculation, 1 told him that the earliest 1 could be ready would be this afternoon. 1 can assure the members of the Council that 1 worked up to the last moment today, until 1 had to come here, leaving it to my colleagues afterwards even ta coUect the papers and ta bring them along sa tbat 1 could start my statement. 1 could not possibly have been ready earlier. , 11. 1 apologize to the Defence Minister of India if any inconvenience has been occasioned ta him, but 1 also want ta assure him that 1 c01Ùd not, in the circumstances having regard to the earrier decision of the Counoil that the meeting would be on Thursday morning, have been ready anyearlier. 12. This afternoon, as 1 have already conveyed to the President, 1 had hoped that if the Council could be called to arder punctually at 3 o'clock-though 1 am making no grievance on that point at aIl, 1 have no business to-I could continue until, say, two hours after five o'clock, and if there was a break of a few minutes, 1 w01Ùd finish my statement, say, around 7 o'clock-perhaps a little later, perhaps a little earlter. We are starting nearly haU an hour late, but nevertheless my intention ia that 1 should conclude this evening, though it may he later than 7 o'clock. so that the net result sh01Ùd be the same as if the Council had held the first meeting this morning and the second meeting fuis afternoon, lisuggestion which was rather emphatically made ta me by the representative of India and to which l, with great regret, could not agree. 13. 1 shall now proceed to resume the statement which 1 was in the course of making at the previous meeting when 1 stopped because 1 had not my further papers in order at that time. 14. The TI. ,_.1 thesis on which 1 was engaged during the greater part of last Friday aiternoon was that Pakistan and India had undertaken the obligation that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or to Pakistan would be settled only through a free and impartial plebiscite. 1 had said that in this connexion various expressions had been used, aIl of them quite clear and leaving no doubt that that was the understanding. They were used unilaterally by Iodia at. a certain stage. Then they were used as a part of the obligation entered into by the two parties. It was ::3tated thatitwas the consistent policy of the Government of India that where the 111j l -~ 1 1"']j :j 1!, ;j-,, 1 15. 1 will this afternoon, just ta conclude thatportion of my submission, draw the attention of the Council ta two more declarations in that respect. The first is that of the revered Prime Minister ofIndia again, who said: "Kashmir is not the property of either India or Pakistan. It belonga to the Kashmir people. When Kashmir acceded to India, we made it clear ta the leaders of the Kashmir people that we would ultimately abide by the verdict of their plebiscite. If they tell us ta walk out, 1would have no hesitation in quitting Kashmir ... "We have taken the issue to the United Nations and given our ward of honour for a peaceful solution. As a great nation, we cannot go back onit. We have left the question for final solution ta the people of Kashmir and we are determined ta abide by their decision." That quotation is takenfromtheAmritaBazar Patrika, of Calcutta, dated 2 January 1952. 16. Then before the Security Council, on 7 February 1950, Sir Benegal N. Rau, speaking on behalf of India. said, in referring ta the admission of representatives of Kashmir to the Indian Constituent Asaembly: "It is therefore clear that the admission of representatives from any particular state into the Indian Constituent Assembly did not necessarily imply accession. As 1 have said, Kashmir had this right ta representation ever sinceAprilI947;"-long before independence-"it acceded, tentatively, in October 1947, so that the accession came after the grant of the right and not the other \Vay round." [463rd meeting, p. 20.] 18. Towards the close of my submissions on FridayI indicated that, at the next meeting of the Security Council, 1 would go on ta comment on certain questions which had beeu raised either as presenting an objection ta proceeding \Vith the implementatioll of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for Iodia and Pakistan, or in order ta show that the plebiscite was no longer necessary. 19. Out of these questions three conneeted matters of accession, sovereignty and aggression have often been put before the Security Counon, and in public declarations. It is sought ta draw certain conclusions against progress being made with regard to the implementation of the two resolutions ofthe Commission which both parties accepted. In brief the argument is: The State acceded through the Maharajah to India. Therefore, the territory of the whole State became a portion of Indian territory. India has sovereignty in respect of the whole State of Kashmir. Cons,el~uently, the presence of Pakistani troops, and earlier perhaps also the tribesmen-I mean, this might be the argument-constitutes aggression by Pakistan against India, and as long as that aggression is not vacated there can be no progress towards a plebiscite. ) 1 j 20. 1 have two main Hnes of argument in reply. The first is that an examination of the situation would show, as 1 submitted Friday afternoon, that though the accession established a de facto position, no doubt, the accession is the very question in dispute and, therefore, it cannot be accepted-and certainly Pakistan does not accept it-as an accomplished legal fact or an accomplished legal reality. Consequently, the theory ofsovereignty and the allegations with regard ta aggression are matters in disputej they cannotlead 10 legal consequences binding upon the parties. 1J 21. My second line of argument will bethat, whatever may be the merit of that part of the controversy-on one side, the claimj on the other side, the deniai of it-it wa~ after the sa-called aggressian, whether it related to the situation created by the incursion of the tribesmen in October 1947. whether it WflS the entry of the regular forces of Pakistan into 1JAzad" Kashmir in the first week of May 1948, whatever may he the situation with regard to that, it was long after these 000 dates that the Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 JJ and 5 January 19491/ were accepted by the two Governments. These matters were not decided by the Commission-it could not decide themi it had no authority to decide them-the decision had to be made through the plebiscite. But the Commission taok into account India' s allegations or arguments or representations on aIl these questions. These j J J 1 1/ Official. Records of the Security councii, l'hirel Year, Supplement for November 1948, document 5/1100, para. 75. 1/ Ibid•• Fourth yeer. Supplement for Jenuary 1949.documentS/1196. pare. 15. 1 ing ta its language. its meaning and its spirit. 23. With regard to accession, as 1 shall presently / show or at least remind the Council, India's own stand ,l is-and it Is uot just a theoretical declaration, it was ' 1 a deliberate statement made before the Security Council at its 264th meeting on 8 March 1948-that where there is no dispute between the ruler and the ruled, the ruler can go ahead and oifer accession, on the basis of the agreement between his subjects and bimself regarding which cf the then two Dominions the State should accede tOi however, thatwhenthere is a dispute-as undoubtedly there was in tbis case-the wishes of the people are to be ascertained and it is only in accordance with the wishes of the people that accession can take place. , j ,, i, i j 1• 24. 1 sha11 ,quote Ml'. Gopalaswami Ayyangar in the Security Council on 8 March 1948: j "No doubt the Ruler, as the head of State, has to take action in respect of accession. When he and his people are in agreement as to the Dominion to which they should accede, he applies for accession to that Dominion. However, when he takes one view and his people take another view, the wishes of the people have to be ascertained. When so ascertained, the Ruler has to take action in accorriance with the verdict of the people. That is our position,u [264th meeting, p. 50.p.J \ Well, according to that position, the accession basnot yet taken plllce. Because, "when so ascertained"-and it has not yet been ascerta1ned-"the Ruler has to take action in accordance with the verdict of the people." There has as yet been no compliance with that procedUre. 25. The Security Council already has a picture of the circwnstances at the time when the form regarding accession was fi11ed in and when the letter accompanying il: was written ta Lord Mountbatten. There had been an armed revoit against the Maharajah and his authority. 1 would very respectfully submit that the Maharajah had already forfeited the a11egiance of bis subjects, by putting himself at the head of his forces for the projeet of exterminating or seridusly reducing the nwnber of those who were likeiy to question bis authority to accede at bis own will. 1cited a statement from The Times of London, 1 believe of 10 Getober 1947. that the Maharajah had put bimself at the head of bis own forces for this extermination project and 237,000 of bis subjects had already been killed. As a reaction to the Maharajah's designs against bis own subjects, and in sheer desperation, an armed revoIt had started and had begun to spread and the Maharajah's forces had had to retreat from parts of the .1J Ibid... Third Year. Nos. 36_51 (261st_276th meetings). itOn 24 August 1947 large and highly excited mobs collected in the west of Bagh tehsil andon 25 August disregarding aIl efforts to persuade them to disperse, marched on to Bagh town in the vicinity where they reached the number of some 5, 000 which swelled considerably during thenexttwodays. These mobs were armed with fire-arms of various patterns, axes, spears and other weapons. Il J 80 that, already in September, this revoIt against the Maharajah's authority had started. 27. 1 wish to remind the Council of the statement 8heikh Abdullah made at Delhi on 21 October 1947- also before the tribal incursion-during the ûourse of which he said that the present trouble in Poonch was caused by the illlwise policy adopted by the 8tate. The people of Poonch, who suffered Imder their local ruler and under the Maharajah, the overlord of the ruler, had started a people' s movement for redres!'! of their grievances. It was not communal. Kashmir sent its troops and there was panic in Poonch. But most of the adult population of Poonch, he explained, were exservicemen in the Indlan Army with close connexions • with the people in Jhelum and-Rawalpindi, that is to say, the neighbOuring districts of WestPakïstan. They evacuated theirwomen and children, took them from the state into Pakistan, crossed the frontier R"ld returned with arma supplied to them by willing. people. The position then was that the Kashmir State forces were forced to withdraw in certam areas. 28. The result was that the situation at that stagebefore the tribal incursion into the state-was that the Maharajah' s people had risen against him, his forces had had ta retreat from certain parts of the State, and, after the tribal incursion, the Maharajah had to leave the capUal and arrived at Jammu. 29. The Maharajah left Srinagar, the capital, on 25 Dctober. Then, on 26 October, whilehewas at Jammu, Mr. V. P. Menon, the then Political Secretary of the Government of India, who was in charge of these affairs, brought him the assurance from Delhi that Iodia would come to bis rescue-these are the wordsprovided he wouId sign the form for accession, which the Maharajah did. j 30. The Maharajah's accomp~,nying letter of 26 October containa a very inter.esting statement. He said in that letter, which, of course, was addressed ta Lord Mountbatten, Governor-General of India: "1 have to ir ,. -m Your Excellency that a grave , emergency ha' dsen in my State and request the . Immediate assistance of your Government. As Your 1 ~~~éllency ls aware, the State of Jammu and L Bhrnir haB not acceded to e!ther the Dominion of 7 J , 1, J,, nWith the conditions obtaining at present in my State and the great emergency of the situation as it exista, 1 have no option but ta ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannat sendthehelp asked for by me without my State acceding ta the Dominion of India. 1 have accordingly decided ta do 50, and 1 attach the instrument of accession for acceptance by your Government. The other li lternalive is to leave my State and the people tû 1reebooters. On this basis no civilized GOvernment can exist or be maintained. Tbis alternative 1 willnever allow ta happen sa long as 1 am the ruler of the State and 1 have Iife to defend my country. "If my State is ta be saved, irnmediate assistance must be available at Srinagar. Ml'. V. P. Menon is ! fully aware of the gravity of the situation and wHl explain it to you, if further explanation is needed. Il _ 31. Here there is no mention of the condition of ascertaining th.ewishes of the people and, inaccordance with the wishes of the people so ascertained, the Maharajah having full authority then to proceed with the accession. Here it is an appeal, ad misericordiam almost, to the Government of India to come and save bis rule over the State. By that time this rule had practically been repudiated altogether, as appears very clearly from Ml'. Menanls account, to which 1 drew the attention of the Security Council at the previous meeting. The acco1U1t said that, before going ta sleep in Jammu after his all-night journey across the two high m01U1tain passes fromSrinagar, the Maharajah had givendirections tothis effect: "IfMr. Menon comes back. then you need not wake me up, because 1 can sleep in peace, and help will be coming from India: but, if Ml'. Menon does not come back, shoot me, because aIl is l08t." "1 may alsa infarm Yom Excellency's Government that it is my intention at once ta set up an interim government and to ask Sheikh Abdullah ta carry the responsibililies in this emergency with my Prime Minister. 32. This accession was not offered in accordance with the principle that the Government of India's representative himself presented to the Security Council: that the ruler can go ahead with accession when there i8 agreement betweenhimandhissubjects, but not when there is a dispute. Here there was not only a dispute, but the Maharajah's authority had been altogether repudiated. Tiûs was the end, sa far as the Maharajah was concerned. AlI was lost for him. He was not acting in aCcordance with the wishes of the people. The wishes of the people were turned about, and he said ta the GOvernment of India: "If you can send any help, send it immediately, because it is the ooly way that the State can be saved" -meaning that it was the only way in which bis own_ authc:'ity could be • ~.,b,~~~~~~~-,---,---,--~-,--~8 ! • j 1l This was the decision of the Securïty Council. in pursuance of which the United Nations Commissionfor IIïdia and J?akistan was appointed, and the Commission went over 1ater-in July-to perform fuis task. 35, Then the resolution of the Commission itself of 13 August 1948, part III, which both Governments e.ccepted, states: "The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shallbe determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon aoceptance ofthetruoeagreementll-whioh the earHer portion of the resolution had provided for-"both Governments agreeto enter intoconsultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby sueh free expression will be a~&ured.1t 1 j 1j !llbid., Third Year. Supplement for AprJl1948, document 5/726. "The United Nations Conunission for Indla and Pakistan, IIHaving received from the Governments of India and Pakistan, in communications dated 23 December and 25 December 1948, respectively, "their acceptance of the following principles whleh are supplementary ta the Commission'8 resolution of 13 August 1948: "1. The question of the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir ta India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. h 37. That was the agreement: uThe question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmil" to India or Pakistan will be deoided through the demooratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite." It has not yet been decided. It has ta be deoided, and it will be decided in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people. It has been said: But the word used here is "will" be decided, which indieates simple futurity. AH right, it indicates simple futurity. Thatstillmeans it has not yet been decided. It has ta be decided simply in the future. 1 suppose the suggestion is that simple futurity means that there was no binding obligation undertaken. But 1 submit that the language is quite clear, that a binding obligation was being undertaken. In any case, li "will" and "shaH" make sa much differenee in these documents, part III of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, whieh 1 have already recited, had provided that: uThe Government of India and the Government ofPakistanreaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shaH be determined in aCGordance with the will of the people and to that end ..." 38. But 1 would submit very respectfully that the Commission was not even conseious of the fact that the use of "wiIl" and "shaU" in one eontext or the other would make any difference or would lead to different interpretations. It was setting down its meaning that tbis was the method of deciding the dispute between the parties. In the resolution of 13 August 1948, the Commission used the expression "shaH" be decided. When it had obtained th<3 agreement of the parties ta both the resolutions, on 5 January 1949, it used the expression "will" bedeeided. But whether it was "shalln be decided or uwilpr be decided, it has still ta be decided. 39. That was the silliation with regard ta the resolution. 1 might submit ta the Security Council that several resolutions of the Council itself, which 1 need not read out, have laid down the same principle. There is the resolutian of 2 December 1957,.§I which ,~>J~'"~"~'t' ~T~W~'~"~<h;o;;Y~';;'~c~, dS~"~PP~'~'m"",",'..!!I'CC--"O'''"'~"'"'"' -,N"O""m""b,.,--,,,,,,d Qecember 1957, document 5/3922. 40. That ls the whole essence of thedispute~to whom shaH the Staie aecede? That question shaIl be decided through the freely ascertained wishes of the people. Therefore, that question has not been decided. It has l' not been decided obviously because that question is in dispute. Consequently, it cannot lead to any legalconsequences e.xcept ta the extent to which the de facto l, situation makes it compulsory. 41. Now we shall deal withthe question ofaggression. The question of aggression was raisedin the very first letter of the Government of India addressed to the Security Counoil. id How did the Security Connci! deal with the question of aggression? It was raised, it was · argued and it was repeatedly urged, and as a matter of fact towards the end of the first round of discussions in the SecurHYCouncilitbecametheinsistenceof India that the Security Connci! should only eon:Jern itself to get the i:erritory of the State vacated by whosoever had entered from the outsidefor the purposeof fighting Jthere, and that the resolutioll of the problem, the as- · eertaining of the freely expressed wishes ofthe people and sa on, would be carried out by the Goverilment of India. The Security Connail firmly and consistently l refused to accept that position. 'l 42. The statement of Ml'. Warren Austin on 10 February 1948 in the Security Counci! will make that · quite clear. He said that: ' · n ••• She1kh Abdullah made a statement that indi- 1 cated that wliat he desired-and this was ratified by '1 the representative ofIndiaimmediatelyafterwardsas a trend in the Security CoUilcil tmvards the terl' mination of hostilities, was that the Securlty Counci! should take up a position which wouldamount to that of an ally in ,:1 war, and shouId pull off Pakistan and allow India to finish the job by force l against the tribesmen. That i5 the very lastposition which the Security Council ought ta take." Then he went on a little later to say the following: , 1 n." No party coming here to diseuss a case like this can expect trends in the Security Council towards the application of force, or towards a solution whieh would ally the United Nations with one side sa that ît eould be successful in a military attack or defence. ft 1 1 1 1 1 A little later on he said: "... 1 think that there ls no confusion at aIl about the fact that the trend ofour opinion, which 1s not yet in the form of a resolutlon, is towards a pacifie settiement of this matter-an arrangement with terms of such character that they command the respect and the conÎldence of the parties to the dispute. As 1 have said, there seemstobe no other way of bringing peace to that part of the world than this specific method of agreement betwE:;e;'l the parcies, which involves such management and such control of !lIlbid.. Third Yeu, Supplement for November 1~. document S/1100, annex 2B. "1 hope that when the Indian delegation returns ta its country it will make very plain the faet that the United Nations is not engaged in promoting war, and that the Security Council's business i5 just the opposite-namely. trying ta find a pacifie solution of tbis problem." [243rd meeting, pp. 75 and 76.] li ~11 j,j, 1,, j 1 43. Then, the next day, on 11 February 1948, Mr. Arce, the representative of Argentina said the following: " ... the cause of the present war is the rehellion of the Kashmir people against their Ruler, and the only remedy is to look to the will of these people;... it ls absolutely necessary to settle the matter of the plebiscite, first of aU, as the oil.ly wayto stop war.u [245th meeting, p. 118.] 44. The fact of the matter is thattherewas insistence on the part of India throughout the Securlty Council discussi0ns, as there has been since, on the so-callerl aggression. The Security Council refused firmly tabe drawn into any discussion of it. They said the plain fact is thatthese people have risen againstthe authority of their ruler on the question ofaccession and the only way to deal with the situation is to assure them, and subsequently to carry out that assurance, that what they desire ta obtain by force ca."'l be obtained through peaceful methods, and their will ultimately'will prevaU. This matter of aggression was rigorously pursued by India before the Commission. The Commission certainly, as it was bound to do, took note of.India's submissions on the various points before formlÙating the terms of its resolution of 13 August 1948; its first interim report makes that quite clear: "When the Commission was officially apprised of an ,element in the situation which had not been explicitly stated in its original terms of reference"- that ls ta say, in the meantime, in the firat week of May 1948, regular Pakistani forces had entered the "Azad!' Kashmir area-"it was forced to choose between two alternatives: either ta informtheSecurity Council of this rnaterial change, requesting new instructions, or to proceed ta exert Us mediatary influence in search of ways and means ta correct those conditions. The Commission, after thorough consideration of the implications involved in referring the caSe backto the Security Council, decitled to use Us good offices to encl.eavour to obtain the cessation of hostilities and ta create a peaceful and friendly atmosphere deemed essential for a final settlement. "The Commission, as can be appreciated from the historical account of its proceedings. inquired extensively into the possibilities of înstituting a cease- :lI Ibid., l'hirel YeaJ:'. Nos. 16-35 (24lst-260th meetings). nIn order ta link the cease-fire ta the preparation for a final settlement, which was the desire of Pakistan, and yet provide for the withdrawal of Pakistan forces and tribesmem. as India requested, the Commission proposed, as part Il of its resolutian of 13 August, a truce agreement based on principles which it deemed fair and equitable, the details of which were to be worked out immediately following the cease-fire order. "These principles were:" 1 repeat agam, these were the principles on which a truce agreement and truce scheme were to be based. .. (~ Withdrawal of the Pakistan forces from the state of Jammu and Kashmiri "(!;?) Withdrawal of t:ribesmen and other Pakistari nationals not normally resident in Jammu and Kashmir, and who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting. "The above provisions were designed to satisfy India's demands. "üther principles were: "(Q) Temporary administration by local authorities ("Azad" Kashmir) of terrîtory evacuated by Pakistan troops: "(9.) Withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces from Jammu and Kashmiri "(§:) Temporary retention of such minimum of the Indian forces as might he required for ·the maintenance of law and arder: "ID Official assurances as ta safeguarding of people, law and arder, as weIl as aIl human and political rights. "These proposaIs were' thought hythe Commission ta satisfy pakistan's demands. "Finally, ta complete its proposaIs, the Commission requested the two contending Governmen:' ta reaffirm their prevtously expressed desire that the people of Kashmir he permitted ta determine their future political status, a principle which had been accepted by both India and Pakistan. "In general, the Commission considered tbat the principles of the truce agreement constituted a balance which could not but meet with the approval of both India and Pakistan, and which, upon acceptance and implementation, would promptly clear the way for both Governments ta enter into active 46. The following statements appear in asummaryof the meeting of representatives of the GOvernment of India with the members of the Conunission: JJ " ••• the Prime Minister proceeded to commenton various other proposaIs under part II, feeling that the COmmission might like ta have the Government of India ts views thereon. The formulation of paragraph 1 under section A, he said. constituted 'rather a feeble and complicated way of saying sornething very simple'." The COmmission had said that a material change in the situation had taken place as a result of the entry of Pakistan, and the Prime Minister asked why it did not say that they bad conunitted aggression. He said that the Commission's formulation was a rather feeble and complicated way of saying something very simple. 1 continue ta quote: "On that same point, Ml'. Ayyangar said that the Government of India readily accepted the prtnciple that Pakistan troops should he withdrawn, but that it was not in accord with the reasons given in support of that principle. y Ibid., document 5/1100. paras. 134_142. :tJ Ibid.. document 5/1100. annex 12. cern itself with the juridical questions involved but on that point had followed the Ime adopted in the 8ecurity Council resolution of 21 April." 47. The Commission, therefore, without pronouncing itself on these matters, tried to bring about a situation where whatevel' was complained of from both sides would be eliminated, sa far at least as the freedom of the plebiscite was concerned, so that a free plebiscite could beheld. From that moment, when the two Governments accepted those principles as embodied in the resolution of 13 August 1948 and the resolution of 5 January 1949, those questions became academic. They had been taken care of, and the resulting agreement was binding on the two Governments. From then onwards, therefore, the sole questionwastheimplementation of the resolutions. The implementation might l'aise questions of Interpretation. One side might say that this means X and the other that it means Y. Nevertheless, the question was of implementation first, correct Interpretation. then implementation. No further question of aggression, or sovereignty or validity of the accession èould arise. 48. The letter of the Prime Minister of India of 20 August 1948 !QI accepting the reso!ution of 13 August 1948 makes that very clear. The second paragraph of the letter says: Il During the several conferences that we had with the Commission when it first came ta Delhi, we placed before it what we considered the basic fact of the situation which had led to the conflict in Kashmir. This fact was the unwarranted aggression, at first indirect and subsequently direct, of the Pakistan Government on Indian Dominion territory in Kashmir.•. tI The conflict actually was between the people and the Maharajah and sa on, but 1 will not go into that. So, after having pointed out that and certain other facts, the Prime Minister goes on: j "Since our meeting of 18 August"-that was for the purpose of discussing with the Commission the implications of the various paragraphs of the resolution, the clarifications, the assurances, and so on-"we have given the Commission's resolution our most earnest thought. There are many parts of it which we should have preferred ta he otherwise and more in keeping with the fundamental facts of the situation, especially the flagrant aggression of. the Pakistan Government on Indian Union territory. We recognize, however, that, if a successful effort is to be made to create satisfactory conditions for a solution of the Kashmir problem without further bloodshed, we should concentrate on certain essentials only at present and seek safeguards in regard to them. It was in this spirit that 1 placed the following considerations • ~. Il j 49. The resolution, the Prime Minister said t in sorne respects was fOWld by them ta beunsatisfactory; they would have wished certain things ta be expressed differently, certain other things to havebeenincluded, and the Commission should have pronounced itself on certain matters, and so on. But after having considered everything and aiter having made their point of view with regard totheresolutionclear, they finally accepted Hj they accepted it in view of everything-the flagrant agg'ression, according ta them, and so on. 50. On 16 December 1952, 1 made a statementbefore the Security COWlcil which summed up the situation as 1 would desire to sum it up now on this matter, and that will do it perhaps more briefly than 1 couldthis afternoon. 1 shall therefore quote it, with the permission of the COWlcilj 1 said: rtThe question is today really academic. Thi~ question of the validity of the accession, of the alleged aggressions by one side or the other-these matters have long been left behind." 1 might say that the case was not 50 one-sided even in being pressed before the Security Council. The Pakistan Government had repudiated the validity of the accession, had never admitted its validity, had not accepted the sovereignty of India over Kashmir, had charged India with aggression against Pakistan and in Kashmir. AlI these questiŒls were being argued by bath sides. 1 continue to quote: "The Crux of the matter, as the representative of India put it the other day, is the implementation of the two resolutions which constitute the agreement between the two Governments on this matter. Since those resolutions were accepted by the two Governmerrts during the last week of December 1948, long after aIl these matters had happened and had been debated and had been clarified between the Commission and the two Governments, these questions, as 1 have said, have long been academic. The events in Kashmir in August, September, October, November and December of 1947, the action taken by the Government of Pakistan on 8 May 1948-these aIl happened long before these two resolutions were even propounded by the Commission, let alone before they were accepted by the twoparties. Iwould therefore beg the Security Council to remember that, although they are repeatedly raised, they have really now become a farm of abuse in which the Government of India chooses to indulge against the Government of Pakistan. "Normally, it w:"\'lld be most unjustifiable on my part te take sO'''lch of the time of the Security Council to go ovelthe same ground again. But the If It wants this matter to be dealt with rightly. 1 de décider 5ubmit that, at the timewhen the Government of Iudia qu'elle , agreed ta the resolutlOns, aH these events had tiens 1 occurred, had been debated, had been mentioned ta accepté J " the commission, had been considered by the Comdéjà mission, had been taken iuto account by it; clarifila connaissance cations had been sought from the Commission on discutés , various aspects of its resolutions touching upon avait those matters, and the result had been an agreeces " ment which is embodied in these two resolutions. 1I avait l [609th meeting, paras. 67 and 68.] dans \ ~ ~68.] On ne peut Yon cannat today go behind Them. 51. Now, under those resolutions whataretheobligatians of the parties? Thatistheagreementwhich holds the field, as has been repeatedly said by my friends on the other side also. The resolution of 13 August 1948 provides as foUows: 5!. Quelles obligations ainsi amis 1948 se "La et le "The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, "Having given careful consideration to the points of view expressed by the representatives ofIndia and Pakistan regarding the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and"-it included àu these questions- "Ayant exprimés Pakistan Jammu ces questions "Estimant Gouvernements un règlement mettre situation paix "Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation of hostilities and the correction of conditions the continuance of which is likely ta endanger international peace and security are essential to implementation of its endeavours ta assist the Governments oflndia and Pakistan in effecting a final settlement of the situation, "Décide nements "Resolves to submit simultaneously ta the Governments of lndia and Pakistan the following proposaI: suivante~ ! "S~spension "A. The Governments of Indiaand Pakistan agree that their respective High Commands will issue separately and simultaneously a cease-fire orderto apply to aIl forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashrnir as of the earliest practicable date or dates to be mutually agreed uponwithin four days after these proposaIs have been accepted by both Governments. "A. conviennent pectifs ordre les forces de Jammu possible commun l'acceptation deux "B. 1tInde toutes tiel dans llB. The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistan fOrces agree to refrain from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the forces under their control in the StateofJammu and Kashmir. J "(Aux "forces les forces, participent "(For the purpose of these proposaIs 'forces under their control' shaH be considered to include aU forces, organized and LUlOrganized, fighting or participatîng in hostilities on their respective side.) "C. l'Inde discuter actuelles d'armes. "C. The Commanders-in-Chief of·the forces of India and Pakistan shaU promptly confer regarding any necessary local changes in present dispositions which may facilitate the cease-fire. liE. The Government of India and theGovernment of Pakistan agree to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favoura.ble to the promotion of further negotiations." Subject to sorne comments that 1 shaH have to make later to the Council on two of these aspects, because they have been raised repeatedly by the representa- lives of India, the l'est of it bas already beeu com- plied with, and therefore, \Vith the exception of those two matters, we are no longer concerned with them. 1 now continue to quote: "Part II "Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposai for the immediate cessation ofhostilities as outlined in part l, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shaH be worked out in discussion between their representatives and the Commission. "A "1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in-the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir con- stitutes a material change in the c:ituation since it was r"presented by the Government of Pakistan hefore the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from the State." This is the paragraph on which the comment of the Prime Minister of India was that it says in too many words what could have been said very simply. Now continuing: "2. The Government of Pakistan will u<;e its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the state of Jammu and Kashn!.ir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting. ".3. Pending a final solution, the territory 8va- cuated by the Pakistan ttoops willbe administeredby the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission. "B lOI. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmenand Pakistan nationals referred to in part II, A, 2 hereof have withctrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that Pakistan forces are beingwithdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Govern- ment of Iodia agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of îts forces from that State in stages ta be agreed upon with the Commission. Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the Hnes existing at the moment of the cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces of its Army which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist localauthorities in the observance of law and arder. The Commission will have obserVGrs stationed where it deems necessary. "3. The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will take aU measures withinitspower to make it publicly known that peace, law and arder will be safeguarded and that aIl human and politieal rights will be guaranteed. "c "1. Upon signature, the full text of the truce agreement or a communiqué containing the princi- ples thereof as agreed upon between the two Govern- meuts and the Commission, will be made public." 52. Here 1 would make just one comment because this is the portion which has caused the greatest contro- versy, blocking progress towards Implementation. These are the principles in A and B upon which the truce agreement would be based. One thing which is clear, and it has become clearer still if further clarification were necessary, is that it was meant that the truce agreement should be agreed upon and drawn up and even published-before any of these things could be done. It is perfectly obvious that if you are going to draw up a truce agreement containing cer- tain principles, it cannot be the meaningand it can- not be expected that something which is to form part of the agreement must be done before the-agreement is reaohed or arrived at. That is one of the principal matters that has held up further progress. ! [ i, 53. Then there is part III of the resolution, which 1 have already read out to the Council [see para. 35J. 54. These were the obligations undertaken by the two sides, and the second resolution is certainly supplementary. Somehow it has been said that the reso- lution of 5 January 1949 was ouly supplementary, as if it did not itself contain provisions binding on the two parties. It relates to the stageafterwhat has been provided for in the 13 August resolution has been accomplished. 55. But only one comment is necessary on the pro- visions of the second resolution-it is not necessary to read it out-and it is this: the Council will have realized that the demilitarization so far envisaged in the 13 August resolutlon is the withdrawal froll'). the "Azad" Kashmir side of the entire regular farces of Pakistan, and of the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals who had gone in for fighting; from thelndian-occupied side, of the bulk of the Indian forces. What would this leave behind? This would leave behind the "Azad" Kashmir forces-there could be no question of their withdrawing because they were the people of that 56. These were two stages of demilitarization, one contained in the resolution ofl3Augustl948, the other contailled in the resolution of 5 January 1949. We have not reached the latter stage yet, but 1 have drawn attention ta it because, later, beforetheUnitedNations Representative, it became Inclia's position that India would not withclraw the bulk of its forces from tlle State on its side of occupied Kaehnrir unlees there was also a large-scale diSbandment of the "Azad" Kashmir forces. Therefore, as we shall see as we go along, the United Nations Representative felt himself justified in making proposaIs which would combine the n'Jo operations. Accordingto thesetheproposals, with- drawal should, on the one side, not only make pro- vision for the withdrawal of the regular Pakistan forces, but should also make provision for the dis- bandment, a large-scale disbandment, of the local forces; and, on the other side aiso, the withdrawal, the demilitarization, should be carried to a point that would leave the minimum for the United Nations Plebiscite Administrator to dispose of when he took over. 57. 1 sha11 now carry on to the questions which have caused so much trouble. Il has been said on the other side trat assurances and clarifications were given by the Commission. They weregiventobothsides, and 1 state here categorically that assurances and clarifi- cations given by the Commission are accepted com- pletely by the Pakistan Government. 1 have no doubt that they will be accepted completely by the Indian Government also. We were sa anxious while these exchanges were going on-and we were aware that certain assurances were given to us; it was perfectly natural and normal th"t certain assurances must have been given ta the other sideaiso-thatweinsisted with the Commission that the assurances given to us should be communicatecl to the Government of India and that any assurances that were given to the Government of India should b~ communicated tous, so thatif we came to agreement on the resolutions we could agree ta something in the same sense, understood by both sides in the same manner. This was my statement to the Commission. 59. Therefore, it has never been the position of the Government of Pakistan that it will not accept the assurances given ta the Government of India by the Commission. We accept 0.11 the aSSUl"ances givenby the Commission ta the Government of India on any point with regard to the resolutions whichhave been brought to our notice, and anything ta that effect contained in the reports of the Commission and its proceedings we accept as having been brought to OUI' notice. 60. Then 1 made a statement ta the Chairrnan of the Commission on 8 February 1949. ill 1 said that the Pakistan GOvernment "did not consider itself to be bound in any \Vay by any clarifications or elucidations that might have been given by the Commission ta the Government of India"-meaning if they had not been camrnunicated ta the Government of Pakistan and accepted by us. Ml'. Lozano replied that "thisposition was fully appreciated by the Commission". We were extremely anxious that nothing should be left in dispute lest trouble should arise subsequently. But unfor- tlmately trcuble has now arisen. 61, Then the Prime Minister of India made a state- ment in his Assembly on 7 8eptember 1948with regard ta the acceptance of the resolution. He said: "The Commission told us that these proposaIs stood as a whole and while they were prepared ta discuss any matter gladly, it was difficult-in fact, it was not possible for them-to accept conditional aoceptances, because if we made sorne conditionS and Pakistan naturally mad-e other conditions, '.vhat exactly was accepted and by whom? SA theysaid that these proposaIs were to be accepted as they were, and if there were conditions attached ta them, it was not an acceptance but a rejection.l! 1 matter. Clarification means, "This iswhat the resolu- tian means". A condition mellllS. "We accept thls, but subject ta the condition which the resolution does Ilot contain". J , 63. Now 1 anproach the main question \',Ih1ch has held up prog'ress \Vith regard ta the implementation of the J resolutions, and that main question 15 thia. Iudia oon- \ tends that no progress \Vith further implementation of these resolutions can be made unless Pakistan with- draws its troops before anything else happens, and that Pakistan is under an obligation to do sa. That is their simple position. The equaily simple position of Pakistan is that Pakistan is under an obligation to with- draw its troops in accordance with the conditions on which the truce agreement is to be based, as soon as the truce agreement has been reached. But there is no obligation with regard to the withdrawal of troops, no obligation with regard to the implementation of any- thing that is to be contained in the truce agreement before the truce agreement bas been arrived at. il•! 64. That is the crux of the difference on this matter. OUr position is that the Commission's scheme meant that, first, there should be an agreement. Lateron the Conm1ission made it clear what it meant by agree- ment, and 1 shail dra\\! the attention of this Council to that also. We had at one time said that there should be an agreement through a process of discussion be- tween a11 three parties, but theCommissionsaid, "No, that was not our meaning", and we accepted that. The Commission said, ItWe shall discuss with Pakistan the question of how and in what mauner and through what stages its forces are to bewithdrawn. We shall discuss with India separately-not with Pakistan taking part in the discussion-how the bulk of its forces is to be with- drawn, but we shall make ourselves responsible for seeing that the agreement which we make and which will then become the truce agreement shall provide that the whole process will be synchronized. Pakistan will begin the withdrawal of its forces. Then India will begin the withdrawal of the btùk of its forces. Then the process will be a synchronized process of withdrawal of both sides, and we shall seeto it that at no time shaH there he any advantage ta one side or the other. In other words, no side shaH be placed at any disadvantage." At one Ume they even said. "Neither side will he placed in a position where the other side could attack Un. J•, 65. That is, again, the essence of the difference, and 1 submit that this was the position. 1proceed to estab- Hsh ît. Paragraph 10 of the reply of 27 August 1948, W from the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, says: "In accordance with part II, B, 1 of the resoluUon. the Indian Government, when apprised that the Qi' Ibid.• Third Year. Supplement for November 1948, documenr S/UOO, anneX 27, appendix. What could be clearer? l1Synchronization of the with- drawal of the armed forces of the twa Governments will he arranged hetween the respective Rigil Com- mands and the Commission." The Commission sub- sequently explabect-and 1 said we accepted the ex- planation although we had anather înterpretation-that tbis did not mean that the Commission would arrange the synchronization between thethree ofthem togetl:er. but that one High Command and the Commission and the other High Command and the Commission would diseuss the matter and then the arrangement wouldbe that withdrawal would he synchronized. 66. Then, in its letter of 16 April 1949,!1I this is what the Commission said: "As stated in paragraph 10 of the appendix to the letter of the Commission to the Government of Pakistan of August 1948, synchronization of the withdrawal of the armed forces of the two Govern- ments will be arranged betweell the respective High Commands and the Commission." 67. In another letter, dated 28 April 1949,.!.§J the Commission said: "~) With respect to sectioll II [of the resolutioll of 13 August 1948], it is desired to emphasize to the Government of Pakistan that the schedules of with- drawals of the Pakistan troops and the bulk of the Indian forces will be faitlûul to the Commission' s resolution of 13 August 1948 and represent a co- ordination of tinùng which in the view of the Com- mission will constitute a synchronized action." 6~. In the third interim report of the Commission it is stated: "... The Commission also reiterated its statement (8/1100, annex 27) that synchronization of the with- drawals would be arranged between the respective High Commands and the Commission. Il !i!J 1, And 1 have already drawn the attention of the CoUDcil tosection C·of the -xesolution itself, which obviously visualizes that the two processes would be synolù'Oni- zed. The truce agreement was to be published in ad- vance of the implementation. Now, howcanyoupublish an agreement in advance of implementation and then msist that the implementation by one side should he before the agreement has even been reached? In section C, the publication of the truce agreement is provided for. !.il Ibid.. Fourrh Year, Special 5upplement'No. 7. document 5/143o/ Add.l, annex 19. .!.§J lli2.-, document S/1430/Add.l, annex 23. .!QI ~., document 5/1430, para. 235. "The Commission did take iuto accountPakistau's concern that the withdr::";val should he synchronized. It repeatedly assured the Pakistan Government that fuis would be evident in the agreement itself, and il; must be noted that the terms were to be published in full immediately upon the acceptance of the two Governments. The withdrawal plan for the Indian forces, a part of that agreement, was consequently to be published in advance of implementation by either side." ID 70. Could anything he clearer? Here a grievance is made: these people insist upon our cartying on with the 000 resolutions whose implementation they have themselves blockedj they blocked it because theY-Md not withdrawn their forces; therefore, we are not obliged to withdraw our forces until the truce agree- ment is publîshed. No such truce agreement has been reached, let alone published. On this point, we can get into a vicious circle for which the Commission did not provide. As a matter of fact, this matter has been referred to by everyone on the other side, from the lowest to the highest authority, inc1uding the very revered-and 1 use that expression not merely as .11Jili.!!., document 5/1430. paras. 242_244. 71. It i5 true that the Commissionrejected our inter- pretation that we could take part in the discussion of the terms of that agreement between the Government of Iudia and the Commission, and that that shouId oceur with our cousent. They said, "No; aH that you are entitled to-but you are entitled to that-is that the agreement which the Commission shaH come ta with the Government of India should provide for a synchro- nized withdrawal, which shaH at notimeplaceanybody at a disadvantage nor bring about a situation under which one side or the other could resumehostilities." 72. That has not beeu done. Mr. Josef Korbel was a member of the Commission. The Commission, as the Security Counci! will recaU, was composed of five members, one nominated by each party. India nanrinated Czechoslovakia, Pakistannominated Argen- tina, two members, Belgiurn and Colombia were nominated by the Security Conncil and one member, the United States, was agreed upon by the latter two. Mr. Karbel of Czechoslovakia who hadbeennominated by India, made a statement on the question on 4 March 1957 which was published in the New Leader of New York. He was the Chairman of the Commission at one of the moat crucial times when aU these assurances were given ta bath sides. His statement was as follows: "According to the Indian delegate, Pakistan pre- vented implementation of the section of the United Nations Commission resalutian dealingwith a plebis- oite by refusing to carry out the ather part recom- mending demilitarization of Kashmir. This is not true: Pakistan was not expected to withdraw her forces from Kashmir as long as there was no agreed- upon plan for simultaneous Indian withdrawal ..." It \Vas perfectIy clear that withdrawalwas always sub- ject to that condition, of course; that once agreement was reached, Pakistan was towithdraw and, whenIndia had been notified of a partial withdrawaI, then it was ta begin its withdrawal. The restwould ensue naturally. This was the agreement that was reached. What happened? 73. Mr. President, perhaps you would like to break off here for about ten minutes, as 1think yOu intended. The meeting was suspended at 5 p.m. and resumed at 5.15 p.rn. l 1 1 Jj 76. Now, what happened with regard to the actual implementation? On 2 March 1949, the Commission wrote a letter to the two Governments, inviting the representatives of the two Governments to presentfor discussion proposaIs for the implementation of partH of the resolution of 13 August 1948. 1 shaH presently read out that Ietter, and itwill be quite clear from that letter, 1 venture ta submit, that at that date the Com- mission put the same interpretation upon how the truce agreement was to be reached that we put upon H and subsequently presented to the Commission. By that time, the negotiations \Vith the Government of India on that point of the truce agreement had come ta a deadlock. ThE? Commission-and 1 pay a tribute ta it-very ingeniously reinterpreted its resolution so as to meet the Indian point of view and yet perhaps ob- tain the same result in substance. As 1 have said, our interpretation was that there were ta be joint dis- cussions; that India was ta know what our proposaIs were, and we were to know whattheirproposals were; and both sides were to know what the agreement reached by each side was, in the normal way of reaching an agreement. But later on, as will be seen, India laid down the condition that the proposaIs that India submitted to the Commission should notbe com- municated ta the Government of Pakistan and, not only that, but should not even be communicated to the Security Councîl-so that up to now even the Security CowlCil does not know what were the proposaIs made by India with regard to thewithdrawal of the bulk of its forces from the 8tate of Jammu and Kashmir. J i 77. 1 shaH now read out the letter of 2 March 1949 W from the Chairman of the Commission: "On behalf of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan 1 have the honour to inform you that the Commission bas been gratiiied to note that since the cease fire came inta effect, the·Govern- ments of bath India and Pakistan have oontinued to take action on certain matters on which agreement was reached under part II of the Commission' s resolution of 13 August 1948. It has learned with interest that the Commanders-in-Chief of India and Pakistan met on 15 January 1949 and di~­ cussed in detail matters relating ta the cease tire, as weIl as certain aspects of the truce."-I repeat that: not only the cease fire, but also cer- tain aspects of the truce-II Further, the Commission . understands that the tribesmen have nowwithdrawn, !!V~.. document S/1430/Add.L annex 9. "The Conunission considers that the implementa- tion of the truce is the most urgent matter noW awaiting action by the two Governments. ln the desire ta offer sllch assistance as it may •••":"'accor- ding to them, the agreement has ta be reached by the nvo Governments, but the Commission will offer assistance-Uthe Commission invites the Govern- ment of India and the Government of Pakistan to send their civil and militaryrepresentativestomeet with its Truce Sub-Committee and its Military Adviser." They are bath invited to come to New Delhi. If the subsequent Interpretation adopted by the Commission had been the correct original interpretation, they would have met with the Indian representatives inNew Delhi and with the Pakistan representatives inKarachi. But theywere both invited ta New Delhi, in these words: "The Commission trusts that Monday, 7 March 1949, at 4 p.m. will be a convenient time and the official temporary headquarters of the Commission at Baroda House. New Delhi, a convenient place for its first meetings. l'The Commission suggests that, in order to ad- vance the work as quickly as possible and to build upon discussions previously held, the representa- tives of your Government be prepared ta inform the Sub-Committee of the measures already taken by your Government with respect to the truce agree- ment and ta present for discussion proposaIs for the further implementation of part II of the Com- mission's resolution of 13 August 1948." 78. These proposaIs were to be presented at the meeting of the two Governments with the Commission on the date that was suggested. Whathappened actuallY was that the Pakistan representatives, whohadtakena scheme for the truce agreement with therp, presented it to the Commission orto the Truce Sub-Committee of the Commission. When the representatives of India were asked to present their proposaIs, they did not abject and say that they could not present them in the presence of the Pakistan representatives or to the Truce Sub-Committee when they were considering the other side's proposaIs aiso or that separate meetings shouId be arranged. They said that they were ready with their proposaIs, but inasmuch as the Commander- in-Chief was absent from Delhi they needed afew days more so that he couId work on the propol:lals before they could be put before the Commission. So the meeting was adjourned. At the adjourned meetingthey said that the proposaIs had been seen by the Com- mander-in-Chief, but as the Prime Minister was out of Delhi and wasexpectedbackwithinafew days, there wouid he a delay of two or three days. Then that delay took place. Finally, when they did present their pro- posaIs to the Conunission, under the seal of secrecy, they laid down as a condition thattheCommission was not to disclose those proposaIs to the Pakistan repre- 79. That is where the implementation of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 came ta a hait. But the Commission proceetled with part of the implementa- tian, that is to say, ta lay down the cease-fire line on the ground-which was achieved, 1 believe, SOrne time in JuIy. And the Commission, in a sense, certified, affirmed, tbatpartI ofthe resolution had beeu complied with. In its memorandum of 26 August 1949.l1I it stated: "The Commission subsequently decided to seek to bring about agreement on a cease-fire line through meetings of the military representatives of the two Governments. The Commission is higlùy gratified that these meetings, held in Karachi from 18 to 28 July 1949, resulted in the definition of an agreed cease-fire line, thus completing the implementation of part 1 of the resolution of 13 August 1948." 80. But complaints still gO on, on the Indian side: How can you approach even the questionoftheimplementa- tion of part II, because part 1 has not yet been imple- mented? But p.ere is the finding of the Commission. There is also the Press release issued by the Com- mission on 22 September 1949,W which readsinpart as follows: "When the Commission in February 1949 returned to the subcontinent the cease fire \Vas in effect, and in so far as part 1 of the 13 August resolution was concerned there remained only the demarcation of the line on the ground. The Commission was hopeful that this would be expeditiouslyachievedand that a prompt implementation of thetruceunderpart II might take place. " Il ... It invited the two Governments ta send military representatives to a meeting in Karachi with the Commission's Truce Sub-Committee on 18 July 1949. Agreement was reached on 28 July on the entire cease-fire line, and was ratified without delay by bath Governments." 81, Sa that in actual fact part 1 of the resolution was deemed to have already been implemented, and thatis why they wanted to continue with part II. The same finding was made by the United Nations Representa- tive for India and Pakistan in his third report, in which he says: 121 Ibid., document Sj1430jAdd.l, annex 35. :lS!J Ibid.. document Sj1430jAdd.l, annex 41, "Therefore, part 1 of the resolution of 13 August 1948 can be considered implemented. li W 82. The sarne was later reaffirmed by the United Nations Representative. For 1ns~anoe, in the same report, he says: "From the above it appears that sinee the resolu- tian of 13 August 1948 was agreed upon, and since the suspension of hostilities came into effect on 1 January 1949, there has been a considerable reduc- tion in the foroes on eachsideofthe cease-fire line. "Therefore part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 has to a considerable extent, already been im- plemented." W 83. It was not that you could not approach the im- plementation of part II. Actually certain sections of that part had already been implemented, for instance, the withdrawal of the tribesmen: as soonashostilities oeased, the tribesmen saw no reason to remain and they therefore left. But the main implementation of part II was blocked by the failure to come to an agree- ment with regard ta a scheme to withdraw the bulk of the Indian forces from Kashmir. 84. As 1 said earlier, in connexion with part l, two points have occasionally been raised, one, the non- augmentation of the armed forces, and the other, the efforts of the Governments to paeify public opinion. It has been said that Pakistan has been in default with regard to these two, that we have not observed the non-augmentation of the forces on the cense-fire line on our side and we have not made any effort to pacify public opinion. Non-augmentation 1s a passive element and would, to a large extent, be affected by the actual situation. For instance, through the passage of time it might become necessary to make different dispositions and so on. If by non-augmentation you, mean no appreoiable inerease in numbers, then the faet 1s there has been no increase in numbers on our side. As a matter of fact, the contrary has taken place; there has been a decrease in numbers. During the fourteen or fifteen years that have passed-I am not a military expert so 1 will not takeuponmyselfthe responsibility of saying that the rnilitary potential has not been effected in any sense-the military potential has been affected on both sides. Certain improvements must have been made in equipment and so on, on the Indian side, and certain improvements must have been made in equipment, on the Pakistan side. How can you de- lU Ibid" 5eventh Year, Special Supplement No. 2, document 5/2611 and Corr.l. paras. 28_29. 2:1J ~" document S/2611 and Corr.l. paras. 35-36. 85. With regard to the pacification of public opinion, public opinion does sometimes become excited over events wh);h happen outside the areas concerned and which exacerbate it. Then fuis question is dragged in. This is a thing whichnobody can prevent. There can be nO guarantee, and neither Government gave a guaran- tee, that public opinion would never became excited. The Governments were to gO on making efforts, and 1 would urge that this was an obligation taken by both sides. If 1 am told of concrete measures taken by India in this respect, 1 shaIl he able to match them measure for measure on the Pakistan side. If there bas been any teclmical failure in regard to making appeals for pacification on the one side, there has been a failure on the other side too. But that isnotmy case. My case is that this is an imponderable obligation. The Govern- ments have done what they could. Were 1 making debating points, 1 would say that India has faiied in that respect, and has not tried to pacify public opinion. Public opinion does get excited, and dming the last year there have been unfortunate cases in different parts of India. 1 understand that today there has un- fortunately been a repercussion on the Pakistan side. Tlûs is the kind of thing which nobody can prevent. The Government has tried to keep the situation under control, but it is not always able to do so. 86. Therefore, both according to the Commission's flndings and aocording to the findings of the United Nations Representative, Mr. Graham, part 1 has been implemented. The implementation ofpartII,according to us, has been blocked by a failure to reach agree- ment with regard ta the scheme of withdrawal of the troops, and this has been due ta the fact that the Commission was not satisfied that the scheme pre- sented by India was balanced according to the resolu- tions. 87. With regard to these questions of non-augmenta- tion and failure to pacify, perhaps 1 may draw the attention of the Council ta two statements made in previous meetings of the Security Coupcil. At the 797th meeting, on 25 October 1957, the representative of the United Kingdom made the following statement: " ..• In this paragraph [paragraph B of part lof the resolutionl, both High Commands agree to refrain from taking any measures that might augment their military potentia!. This is clearly an important preliminary to the next stage-the stage of the with- drawal of the troops of Pakistan and the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces, to which bath sides stand engaged. Clearly, there isaconnexionbetween augmentation and the removal or reduction offorces. Augmentation makes removal or reduction more "It was originslly contemplated that the three parts of the resolution of 13 August 1948 shauld be implemented in quick succession; and, as earlyas 1949, the Commission for India and Pakistan was painting out the difficulties arising from delay. Undoubtedly the passage of time has added ta the diffieulties about the implementation of paragraph B. In the further eight years sinee 1949, new difficulties have arisen. Armies have become more efficient; old equipment has been replacedi new roads have been built on bothsides." [797thmeeting, paras. 12 and 13.J 88. This kind of thing is bOWld to go on. At the same meeting, on 25 October 1957, the representative of Iraq said: "We wonder, therefore, if the new stand of the Government of India regarding the non-implementa- tion of part 1 of the resolution of 13 August 1948 is not on the one hand an afterthought, and on the other. an attempt to reopen issues which have long been c1osed. In this respect it should be asked: if Pakistan has not implemented part 1, why did India enter into negotiations for the implementation of part II, the truce agreement? It was in January 1949 that India should have raised this matter. In fact, the negotia- tions conducted by the Commission for India and Pakistan and the United Nations representativeswere aIl directed towards finding a basis fortheformula- tion of the truce agreement." [Ibid., para. 67.J 89. Part l, paragraph E, stipulated that both parties should appeal to their respective peoples to maintain an atmosphere favourable for negotiation. India pro- duces arguments and information ta show that Pakistan has not orily failed to make such appeals but has also indulged in what they calI hostile propaganda. On the other hand, there are statements coming from the Indian side that can be interpreted as showing a hostile attitude towards the settlement of the dispute. The dispute has dragged on for such a long time, during which there have been so many events and dec1arations that it is bareUy possible to make sllcb statements a legal issUe sa as ta black the possibility of proceeding to a settlement. 90. As a matter of facto these are both strong con- siderations in favour of proceeding with the imple- mentation sa that the matter can progress towards a seUlement. If there has been augmentation-I do not admit that there has been, but assuming it for one moment as a matter of argument-then in the first place, let somebody who has had the opportunity of observing these things say whether there has been an ~ugmentation, and we shall ~dertakeat once ta reduce 1 It. In the second place, even Ifthere has been augmen- t,Uon, the remedy ie demilitari,.tion, That will take 91. Assuming that there has been an improvement in the condition and effectiveness of any part of the brces, it applies ta both sides. We believe that the crux of the problem is the passage of time without progress towards the objectives of the resolution. It was accepted that the implementation of part 1 would be followed immediately by the truce agreement, and the Implementation of the truce agreement under part II to sorne degree has already taken place. The con- clusion of the Commission with regard ta its efforts at arrivillg at a truce agreement, and which appears in its third interim report, was this: "In replying to the Commission's truce terms of 28 April, (annex 21) the Government of India did not specifically deal with the question of withdrawals, but in a further reply to the truce terros dated 17 June (annex 50) the Indian Government presented its own scheme for the withdrawal of its forces, reaffirming its reference to the interdependence of. the phasing of the withdrawal of Indian forces and the progress made with the disbanding and dis- arming of the 'Azad t Kashmir forces, ••". The Government of India then wanted ta jump from the first resolution to the second resolution and bring the two processes together, whereas the second pro- cess had to be carried out by the Plebiscite Adminis- trator aft8r he was inducted into office. Now con_ tinuing: "India asked that its scheme not be communicated to the Government of Pakistan until a truce agree- ment had been arrived at. The Indian plan was, in the opinion of the Commission, far from a fulfil- ment of India's undertaking under the terms of the 13 August resolution." W The Commission "'_'as under the obligation not to dis- close the Indianscheme, butthis was the Commission's conclusion, that the plan submitted to the Commission was, in the opinion of the Commission, "far from a fulfilment of lndia 's undertaking ulJder the terms of thA 13 August resolution".-And the CO!'1mission adds this: "As has been seen from the discussion of the 'Azad' problem, and from the foregoing discussiOn on withdrawals, fudia is not prepared to withdraw such part of her forces in Kashmir as might be characterized as the 'bulk', whether measured quantitatively or qualitCl :.<:lely, unless agreement with Pakistan on the large-seale disbanding and ms- arming of the 'Azad' forces is reaehed."W 1V Ibid., Fourth Vear. Special Supplement No. 7, document S/1430, para. 23'>. ]Y ~. dOcllInenl 5/1430, para. 245. 93. The efforts of the United Nations Representative to efbct demilitarization or even a summary of thase efforts would take considerable time, andIamalready behind in my schedule; rather, 1 would he up to my sohedule if my expectation with regard to the time available had beeu fulfîlled. However, 1 would draw attention to the conclusions that were reached by Mr. Graham, the United Nations Representative: that at various tîmes he made various proposaIs, thathe tried to bring about a demilitarization in strict accordance with the 1'e80lution8; that he then tried to bring about demilitarization in accordance with Iodia's demand that the two processes laid down separately in the two resolutions should be combined. It might be said gener- ally that, with regard ta his main proposaIs, Pakistan was willing to accept, India \Vas not willing to accept. If necessary, if this position is questioned, 1 will be able to confirm \Vhat 1 h2.ve stated from the actual reports. 1 have the documents here, but out of con- siderations of time 1 will not quote from them at this moment. 94. The final position, 1 believe, was as follows. In the process of this attempt at dem:ilitarization, on 16 July and 2 September 1952, Mr. Graham suggested the retention of a minimum force of6,OOO "Azad" Kashmir troops on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line, and of 18,000 on the Inillan side-or of braokets of 3,000 ta 6,000 on the Pakistan side and 12,000 ta 18,000 on the Inâian side; that is tosay, these brackets ta be brought ta a definite figure by agreement. First the brackets should be accepted, then negotiations could take place. 95. While Pakistan observed that this proposalleft tao many soldiers in the state, it declared itself, subject ta that observation, prepared ta aoceptthe pro- posaIs of the United Nations Representative. India, on the contrary, maintained that it was impossible to re- duce the abso1ute minimum figure of 21,000, that the militia on the Indian side would in no ciroumstances be included in these calculations, ,and that this minimum on the Indian side would obtain only on a complete disbanding and disarmament of the • Azad" Kashmir forces, and that there would be no question of further disposaI bY way of withdrawal or reduction of the Indian forces bythe Plebiscite Ac1ministrator:in other words, there must be at 1east 21,000 on their side, plus the militia; but the"Azad" Kashmir forces should be completely disbanded, ta be replaced by a civilian police force. ·1 -:! 97. Now, another matter that is raised is: what a long time has elapsed. It is said that a long time has elapsed and, therefore, we should look at the situation as it stands today and more or less accept that situa- tion, subject ta sorne adjustments. \Vith regard ta the lapse of time, surely the crucial question is: Ta what has the delay been due, and upon whom does the main responsibility for the delay fall? Otherwise you will find, in international agreements, that ifonesidefinds it awkward ta carry out the agreement it has entered into, it will find aIl sorts of excuses not to carry it out, and after sorne time has elapsed-not even a long j time~and its tacUcs have successfully averted the fulfilment of its agreement, it will say: liA longtime bas elapsed. Nownothingneedbedone. Let us be satis- fied with the situation". But the whole question is, what is the delay due to? 98. Again 1 state that if Pakistan has deliberately blocked the implementation of the resolutions and if, this fact having been determined and pointed out ta H, U refuses ta reotify its defaultin the speediest manner and at the earliest opportunity, then Pakistan is not entitled ta oome to the Security Council and ta ask the Council ta take measures towards the implementation of the resolutions. Then ft is not entitled ta do sa be- cause of its default, because it is delaying matiers, beoause a long time has passed. But if it should be found that it is -not the fault of Pakistan, then how does it result therefrom that whatever the situation is it should be accepted. Subject ta the over-aH considera- tion aIl the time that, although, as Ishall later submit, the parties to the dispute here are Pakistan and India, the people affected are the people of Kashmir. How does Pakistan's default or delay-assuming that such has taken place-deprive the people of Kashmir of the right ta determine ta whioh State they shaH accede? That 1 shall come to later. 100. That cannot be based on any moral principle, on any principle of international morality, on any principle of internationallaw, on any principle of domestic law that might apply to it. How can the passage of time, which is not due ta the default of the other party, affect the other party prejudîcially? How can the passage of time which may be due, if it is so found, to the default of the party which is pleading the passage of time, put it in a position to say, "We are no longer bound by the obligations that we took". That is the crux of the prob- lem that the Security Council has to face. 101. In view of the repeated efforts made by UNCIP and the United Nations Representative and of India's rejection more than once of their proposaIs, which Pakistan was willing to proceed upon, it cannot be said that the delay in the implementaUonofthe UNCIP resolutions and in progress towards aplebiscitecould be charged to Pakistan. Surely a party cannot take advantage of its own default. Curiously enough. sorne- thing like tbis was raised before the Commission. The Commission itself had at one stage said, "If the Plebiscite Administrator should find it impracticable ta carry out the plebiscite, he might have recourse ta sorne other means to ascertain the wishes of the people in respect of accession." This question was raîsed before the Commission. The Commission had made a statement ta Inma which is point 30n aide_ memoire l, dated 21 December 1948,M.I embodying the substance of the discussion on 20 December 1948 between the Prime Minister of India and Mr. Lozano, who represented the Commission. 1 quote:. "... As regards the third point, he [Mr. Lozano] said that the Commission wished the possibility of a plebiscite ta be exploredfirst. Should the Plebiscite Administrator, however. find a plebiscite ta be impracticable, the way would be open ta consider other methods for ensuring a free expression by the pfJople of Jammu and Kashmir of their wish re- garding the future status of the State." W Ibid., Founh year, Supplement for January 1949, document 5/1190, annex 4. 'j If there is lack of co-o1leration, ho\V can you then turn around and say, "0h, well, so long as it has not beeu carried out, let it l'est, it cannot be carried outil. -j l1, , 1 i cl ,,, ':; 103. 1 quote from point 1 of the aide-memoireW handed ta Ml'. Bajpai by Ml'. Lozano, the Colombian representative, and the Chairman of the Commission. It was a statement ta Ml'. Bajpai. It sa'd: "It was not intended at that stage to dehne what might cOllstitute a 'technical orpracticalreason'for not holding a plebiscite. It is true that a lack of co- operation from either side could create obstacles which, in fact, might make the organization and holding of a plebiscite extremely difficult, if not impossible. However, the Commission feels thatthe principles embodied in the resolution of 5 January are not only binding on both Governments but are based on and caU for their fullest co-operation. Therefore, the Commission dOes not envisage a situation in which either side will withhold its co- operation. "It would seem that a lack of co-operation, should it occur, would be considered not a 'practical reasOn' but a breach of commitments formally under- takeu by the Governments of India and Pakistan. In this event, the Plebiscite Administrator would pre- sumably then report to the Security Council, through the Commission, not that the holding ofthe plebiscite \Vas impossIble for 'practical or têchnicalreasons', but rather that the lack of co-operation of either of the parties had rendered it impracticable.· This would be a breach of the obligation. It cannat he said that this cannot be done now. 104. , The next topic that 1will take up is the foUowing. It has often been urged, and 1 have heard it said also by sorne members of the Security Council, that in principle or in effect the people of Kashmir have ex_ pressed their wishes freely concerning the question of accession in the elections that have been held in Kashmir and that therefore a plebiscit'e is no longer necessary. Certainly, that is the case of India and certain members may have mentioned it; well, tfiat is what has been said. Possibly it has sorne appeal to themj that 1 do not kno\V.ltisa matter, therefore, that requires being looked into. 1ÉJ Ibid., Founh Year-, special supplement No. 7. document S/1430/ Add.l. annex l, aide-mêmoire NO.l. ili.!!:!!!!., document S/1430/Add.l. annex B. In the tirst place, 1 did not on any oocasion on Friday say that the Prime Minister of India has said that the people would he consLÙted. r said each time that the Prime Minister of India had said that they had given a pledge, tbat they had giv8n assurances, that tl1ey had made promiseS, and today 1 quoted something \Vhieh said that they were bound in hOflour, to have this question settled through a free andimpartial plebiscite, in accordance \Vith the freely expressed wishes of the people, not that the people would be consulted in this respect. That is a different thing altogether. 106. l would again draw attention to statements of Sir Benegal N. Rau as representative of India before the Security Council on 9 March 1951 and on 29 March 1951. In his first statement he said: "... Accordingly, provision was made in the Indian Constitution for a constituent assembly for settling the details of the Kashmir constitution..."-that is with regard to the reality of this process of con- sultation or the process of the peoples' expressing their wishes on the question of accession-"Will that assembly decide the question of accession? My Government's view is that, while the constituent assembly may, if it so desires, express an opinion on this question, it can take no decision on H." I536th meeting, p. 8.J 107. And, as 1 have said, Sir Benegal Rau \Vas not only a distinguished representative of India before the Security CouncU but a very distinguished lawyer and a constitutional1awyer of the highest standing, bothin India and in Pakistan before partition. And, taking both countries together, 1 do not think that even today 1 know anybody who has the standing in constitutional law that Sir Benegal Rau had. 108. Then, on 29 March, he said: "... Sorne members of the Counci} appear to fear that in the process the Kashmir constituent assem- bly might express its opinion on the question of accession. The constituent assembly cannot he physically prevented from expressing Hs opinion On this qUestion if it sa chooses. But this opinion will not bind my Government or prejudice the position of this Counci!." [538th meeting, p. 3.1 < Qf course, these statements were made when this matter was brought ta the notioe of the Security Council. 109. The Security Cauncil adopted in this connexion il resolution on 30 March 1951, ID and this is the relevant portion: ID The [~lI:t of mis resolution is the sameas mat of the draft resoiu_ tion adopted without change at the 539th meeting of the Council. See OfficIal Records of the SecurirY Council, Sixth Year, Supplement foc- January, February and March 1951, document Sj20i7jRev.1, I!Affirming tl1at the convening of a constituent assembly as recommended by the General COUIloil of the 'All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference'. and any action that Assembly might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part thereof would not oonstitute a disposition of the 8tate in aooordanoe with the above principle". 1 1 So the Seourity CounoD \Vas quite clear. It said, "You may set up a constituent assembly but any action it takes in respeot of the acoession v.'ill have no effeot at aIl. 11 J 110. 1 am reminded that Sir Benegal Rau had been oonstitutional adviser ta the Indian Constituent Assembly before he \Vas appointedlnma's representa'- tive ta the United Nations. 111. There was a telegram sent by the President of the Security Council ta the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan on 29 May 1951 W wl1ich puts tbis matter absolutely beyond doubt. It states: " lIMembers of the Security Council, at its 548th meeting on 29 May 1951, have heard withsatisfaction the assurances of the representative of India that any constituent assembly that may be established in Srinagar is not intended to prejudice the issues befare the Security Council, or ta come in Hs way. "On the other hand, the two communications to me as President of the Council from the representatives of Pakistan set forth in documents 8/2119 and 8/2145, cOntain reports which, if they are correct, indicate that steps are being taken by the Yuvaraja of Jammu and Kashmir to convoke a constituent assembly, one function of which,'accordingtoSheikh Abdulla, would be a 'decision on the future shape and affiliation Of Kashmir'. "lt is the sense of the Security Council that these reports, if correct, would involve procedures wbioil are in confliot with the commitments of the parties to determine the future accession of the State by a fair and impartial plebiscite conducted under United Nations auspices. J!1J Offidal Records oftheSecurity Council, Sixth Year, 548th meeting, paras. 89_99. Now it is contended: "That first election and then the two subsequent elecUons to the Assembly in Kashmir have been instruments for the free expression of the will of the people of Kashmir. What more is needed?" 112. Then again, on 24 January 1957, the Seourity Council adopted a resolutionW in the courseofwhioh it said: "Reminding the Governments and authorities con- cerned of the principle embodied in Hs resolutions of 21 April 1948, 3 June 1948, 14 March 1950 and 30 March 1951, and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 Augu.st 1948 and 5 January 1949, that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accor- dance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, "1. Reaffirms the affirmation in its resolution of 30 March 1951 and declares that the convening of a Constituent Assembly as recommended by the Gen- eral COlmcil of the'AIl Jammu and Kashmir National Conference' and any action that Assembly may have taken or might attempt ta take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or al1Y part thereof, or action by the parties concerned in support of any such actionby the Assembly, would not constitute a disposition ofthe State in accordance with the above principle." How many times has an affirmation to be affirmed to be understood as being effective? 113. At a press conference reported in the Hindustan Times of New Delhi on 14 March 1951 the Prime Minister cf India said this: "During the last three years or so, we have naturally thought of giving sorne kind of organized expression to the Government there"_that is, in Kashmir-"some popular legislature or something. Because of the troubles in the State, that could not be done. Ultimately, the state Government decided, quite rightly, they should have elected representa- tives out of whom a Cabinet might be chosen and which could decide also many other questions. li your question is whether this cornes in the way of the Security COUDcil or allY decision, then it does not oome in the way. We have said that quite clearly. W Ibid.. 1Welfth Yeu, 5~pplementfor January, February and March ~, documenr 5/3779. 114. Then the Prime Minister made â statement on 4 April 1951, at Srinagar, in the heart of Kashmir, which is aiso reported in the Hindustan Times as follows: "1 do not understand the objections of certain countries to the holding of elections to the proposed constituent assembly in Kashmir. It has been re- peatedly made clear that it is an internaI matter." 115. On 10 November 1951, at the 566t11 meeting of the Security Council, Sir Gladwyn Jebb quoted the following statement of the Prime Minister of India: "We have made it perfectly clear in our state- ment in the Security Council that the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, so far as we are concerned, does not come in the way of a decision by the Security COWlcil: that stands completely." 116. In the Statesman of New Delhi of 22 June 1952 the following was said, and this also is a statement by the Prime Minister: "When the Constituent Assembly lof Kashmir] met, it was convened in consultation with us and with the goodwill of the Government of India. We did not look upon it naturally as something that will settle the problem which is before the United Nations. We have given an assurance to the United Nations that we will abide by it. "When the Security Council asked us about it, we made it clear ta them again that the Kashmir Government had every right to have the Constituent Assembly frame the internaI constitution, but sofar as we were concerned, we would not be bOWld by their decision on the question before the Seourity COWlcil. "Observe the words, 'we were concerned'. We have given an assurance ta the United Nations about, let us say, a plebiscite or whatever it is. We stand by it. We cannat get out of it because a third party does something. But that does not pre- vent the third party from doing something. "When the Constituent Assembly met in Kashmir for the tirst time, 1 might inform you, it was their intention ta pass a resolution forthwith confirming the accession ta India. We asked them not to do it so as not to be embarrassed before the United Nations. Simply because of that, we told them, the fact of accession is there and, naturally, you will have ta face it in the course of your constitution. But why do something which might be interpretedby 1 l 1 will not say that it was at the Government of India's instance that they passed that resolution subsequently. But supposing that they did it of their own voli.tion or at anybody eIse's suggestion, the principle is still the same. 117. Then, on 22 February 1954, the Prime Minister made a statement in the IndianParliament, asfollows: "This process (of the Constituent Assembly in Kashmir framing a constitution for the State) started t\\'o or three years aga. We made it clear then that it is perfectly right, it is perfectly open ta the people of Kashmir ta frame their Constitution ..•but tl1at sa far as our international commitments were concerned, i.e., India's-we naturally would houour them, unless something else happened. But the fact that the Constituent Assembly decidedsome- thing \Vas a fact, an important fact, because it represented the wishes of elected people in Kashmir. But it cannat come in the way of our absol'ving our- selves from our international commitments, in re- gard to a plebiscite, in regard ta anything. That was the position and that remains so. To ask me, as 1 have been asked by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, ta repudiate the tonstituent Assembly's decision, is manifestly, if 1 might use the ward \Vith aIl respect, quite absurdo There is no question ofmyrepudiating what the Constituent Assembly expresses as its wishes. But as 1 said, our international commit- ments remain, and we are gaing ta proceed with them, in due course, always in consultation with the Govel'nment of Kashmir." 1 did notmean anythingmore than this by "repudiation", but it does not matter-I am always talking "absurdi- Hes", As a matter of tact, it has been reported that yesterday, in the Upper House of the Indian Parliament, the Prime Minister was pleased to remark that my statement before the Security Council on Friday was a bundle of lies and was based on falsehoods. WeIl, 1 have always respected the Prime Minister of India; 1 shaH continue to respect him nevertheless. The only bunrHe 1 used was a bundle of his statements, which 1 quoted. If those are wrong, 1 was lying; but if those were right, then 1 was not uttering any lies. 118. Then, on 5 March 1954, the Prime Minister of India addressed a letter to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, as follows: "Ever since the Constituent Assembly came into being, more than two years aga, our position in regard to it has been perfectly clear and has been stated in the Security Council and elsewhere. We said then that the Constituent Assemblywas perfectly free to decide, as it liked, in regard to the State's accession or other matters, but, so far as we were concerned, we wO"..lld abide by our international commitments. " 1-119. In answeI' to a question in the Indian Parliament • : •... ~ on 25 Februery 1955, the Prime Mini,ter "id, Answer: "A question like this cannot be solved unilaterally. " There are other statements, but 1 do not think that it is necessary to bring in any other people. Surely the Prime Minister's own ward on beh"lf of his Govern- ment should be sufncient, 120. It has been said that there havebeenthree elec- tions in Kashmir; one in 1951, a second in 1957, a third in 1962. W_thout prejudice ta the argument which 1 have already submitied ta the Security Council on this point, 1 would invite it to examine what kind of elections they were, how free they were. How much can they be regarded as expressing the free wishes of the people of Kashmir with regard to accession, or with regard to any matter whatsoever? 121. This is what happened with regard to the 1951 elections. The official proclamation of the conveningof a constituent assembly in Kashmir was issued by the Head of State of Indian-occupied Kashmir on 30 April 1951, According ta this proclamation, the assembly would be summo!led in arder to frame a constitution for the State. The first elections to the assembly were to be held in the Kashmir Valley on 22 September 1951, Forty-five seats of the assembly were assigned to the Kashmir Valley. AlI the forty-five nominees of the National Conference for the forty-five constttu- encies in the Kashmir Valley and the Dogra were declared to have been returned unopposed, Not one constituency was opposed. Well, either the people of Kashmir have been trained to a degree higher than the people were at the best time ofthe free city states of Greece, sa that every one of them knows who is the best person to discharge a particular function and, when those persons were nominated, everyone said that he was perfect; or there was no freedom. Forly- five seats-not one contested. Therefore, no election. Wonderful! 122. People can sometimes overshoot the mark-and not only overshoot the mark, but overshoot it by 360 degrees. No polling took place on the dayfixed for the balloting. This was in contrast to the election of the State legislature which was held underthe Maharajah's opprlilssive system. He had an assembly tao andhe had a very oppressive government, And even under him, in January 1946, when as many as twelve parties con- tested the election, here the nominees of one party only were in every instance returned unopposed. Not that they succeeded; they simply were, returned un- opposed. Nobody stood in opposition. Andyet, nobody's nomination paper was declared valid, Even inJarpmu, while the polling had ta be held in October-tbis was the Kashmir Valley area-there were contests only in two constituencies out of thirty, where sorne independent candidates opposed the National Con- ference. 123. On 30 October 1951 The New York Times re- ported that, "even that opposition dropped down during the last moment". The net result was that "The National Conference won an absolute majority in the so-called Kashmir Constituent Assembly be- fore the 'election 1 had been held at aU. This almost farcical resuU"-why "almost"? Well, the British have always been known for theirunderstatements- "This almost farcical result of the introduction of adult suffrage in Sheikh Abdullah's- part of Kashmir cornes as no surprise to anyone who knows the country and the people. " ••• She"-India-"contends that the Security Council has no right to interfere in the internaI affairs of Kashmir by advocating the proposed 'National Convention' of Sheikh Abdullah's parti- sans planned for September; that Jndian troops are entitled ta remain in Kashmir because it is legally part of India; ..• The Security Councilinlndianeyes, is 'wilfuIly ignorant' or misled by the propaganda of Pakistan o:z>-fantastically-dominatedby a sinister 'Anglo-American ~' which is trying ta rnake Kashmir the base for a revived 'imperialism'. "They miss entirely the simple issue on which India 's present differences with the Security COWlcil really hing€;. It i6 of the essence of the undertakings that India gave ta the United Nations that the plebiscite shan be impartial and that neither side shall do anything to prejudice the free choice of the Kashmiri people. "In the light of this it is irrelevant to argue that Indian troops have a right to be in Kashmir while Pakistan troops have none; what matters is that the Kashmiri people shaH be freed from the pressnTe of bath occupying forces. Nor does it matter whether Sheikh Abdullah is entitled t0 summon a meeting of his supporters and cali if a National Convention; the important pOint is that if he does tbis.unùer the aegis of India before the plebiscite is held he will gain a political advantage that will affect the result. Even if the letter of India's past undertakings could be reconciled by legal ingenuity with her present attitude, their whole spirit cOntradicts it ••• " 125. Now, what happened in the elections of 1957? In March 1957, elections were again held ta the Assém- bly which was to succeed the Constituent Assembly. During these elections, 40 of 75 seats in the Assembly W;:.Cd secured by the National conference, without opposition. The pro-Pakistan elements in Kashmir boycotted the elections. Only 8 out of 45 seats for the Kashmir Valley and Ladakh were contested, with token opposition. Complaints we:re voiced in the Indian Press regarding the conciuct of these elections in Jammu in which the NationalConÏerencecandidates "Yere opposed by a Hindu opposition party. "This is not an 'election' in any sense of the word. The term 'election' means a choice. The Kashmiris have had none. "What happened is no credit to India, no refiection of sentiment among the Kashmiris and no contribu- tion to a solution of this thorny problem." 127. T1:.e Manchester Guardian of 28 March 1957: !lIf it was hoped that the elections in Kashmir might give the Government there a greater appear- ance of legality, the hope is fading. It does not look as if the elections are to be free. How could they be with Sheikh Abdullah a prisoner? If only eight of the forty-three seats from the Yale of Kashmir are being contested, the onlooker can draw his owncon- cIusions. " 128. The Eoonomist of 6 April 1957: liA painful contrast has been visible between India's splendid achievement in holding the biggest general elections in history in an atmosphere of freedom and fair play, and the deplorable way in whiph the subsequent elections in Indian-held Kashmir were rigged. "In Kashmir the 'victory' of Mr. Bakshi's candi- dates was a solemn farce. Before the voting began they had secured forty of seventy-five seats in the local assembly, thanks to the absence or dis- qualification of rival candidates, and wüh this safe majority in hand they have been cantering happily through the remaining contests. "The main opposition group, whose leaders, in- cluding the deposed State Premier, Sheikh Abdullah. are still imprisoned without trial, boycotted the elections; and it was in any case impossible for any candidate who challenged the finality of India's acquisition of Kashmir to stand. "••. Mr. Bakshi's blot in India's copybook is a reminder tbat the existing state cf affairs in Kashmir is also dangerous." 129. Next is ~he Organizer of 1 April 1957• This is a Hindu paper, issued from New Delhi. The writer certainly was not giving expression to any AIlril Fool's joke, though it sounds like one and, if it had happened on 1 April it certainly would have been one: "Just when the counting of the heaps started"- these are the heaps of ballots which had been placed on the tables-"lights went off, as by pre- vious arrangement. It ia po~sible that ballots from You could not put your ballot in, because the opening for the ballot was down. If you wanted to put it in, the officer shouted: "Don't tamper with the boxes". The report goes on: "When voters left their ballot papers on top of the upside-down boxes, the presiding officer put them into National Conference boxes. rtThousands of bOgus votes were cast for the National Conference, particularly after the scheduled c10sing time of 6 p.rn. When Parishad pollingagents challenged bogus voters, the presiding officers ignored the objections. Not a single impersonator was arrested. rt This is a paper issued in India-a Hindupaper. Pakistan had nothîng to do with ît. 130. We come now to the elections of 1962, the ones that have just been concluded. The third elections to the Assernbly in Indian-occupied Kashmir were held in Maroh 1962, The Plebiscite Front decided to boy- cott these elections. The Kashmir Political Conference refused to take part in these elections. Theresult was that thirty-four candidates of the National Conference were declared to have been elected unopposed in the Kashmir Valley and Ladakh, whioh have forty-five oonstituencies. This is according to the report of the Statesman, New Delhi, of 27 February 1962. For the remaining eleven seats in the Valley the opposition parties, even those which are pro-Indian, decided to boyeott the eleotions. This report is from the Indian Express, New Delhi, of 6 March 1962. In two con- stituenci6~ in the Kashmir Valley, where the National Conference nominees were opposed by independent oandidates, they were defeated. 131. Now, what was the press comment? First, The Times of London of 5 February 1962: ~- "Sheikh Abdullah 's Plebiscite Front Party has decided to boycott the Kashmir general election on 25 February. The party exeoutive passed a unani- mous resolution expressing the view that free and fair elections could not be expected in Kashmir unless political uncertainty was removed by a plebiscite. The resolution said there were no civil liberties in Kashmir. As aIl important opposition A ference. which advocates accession ta Pakistan, i8 also uat taking part in the forthcoming election. The field 18 thus left olear for politiea! supporters of Indla." 132. The Manchester Guardian of 16 February 1962: , j i "The coming elections in Jammu andKaslunirwill once again provide no test of the popular will. Cand~dates belonging ta the ruling National Con- ference have beeu returned unopposed in thirty- three out of seventy-five State Assembly constitu- enales. Thirty-two of these are in the predominantly Moslem Kashmir Valley, with one in Jammu. The position has improved, however, since 1957, when forty seats were not contested. In the whole of India ooly thirteen other State Assembly seats are un- contested. " J, That i8 to say, in the l'est of India, out of all the Provincial Assemblîes, only thirteen seats were un- contested. "Opposition politicians allege that Kashtnir's surprising figures are due ta intimidation and even kidnapping of opposition candidates ta pre..:. vent them filing their papers. Official sources ex- plain, according to a report here, that lit is not considered odd for candidates in a mountainous terrain ta withdraw for want of adequate resources'. nA political commentator in a leadingIndianpaper states that the permit-licence-raj is more effective in the Kashmir Valley than elsewhere ineHminating opposition, meaning that those who oppose the governing party get no industrial licence or import permit. He adds: 'And there is the peace brigade to deal with recalcitrants '. Il 133. The Statesman of New Delhi, 3 January 1962: "The Chairman of the Praja Socia1ist Party, Ml'. Asoka Mehta, will visit Jammu on 6 ';anuary to inaugurate his party's elechon campaign in Kashmir. "The State PSP leader, Ml'. BaJraj Puri, in a state- ment today, alleged that Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, addressing a public meeting at Dartral in Poonch rî.:istrict, on Saturday, 'threatened to throw across the cease-fire Hne' anyone who dared to oppose his nominees in the elections."-This was the freedom of the elections-"He added: 'If the Election Com- mission is not able ta persuade Kashmir's rulers to show fair play it should decline ta be .'lssociated 134. The following 18 from the Statesman of New Delhi, dated 23 March 1962: "Mr. Balraj Puri, State Praia Socialist chief, who returned from Srinagar recently, said here today it was uniortunate that his request ta the Election Commission ta visU Kashmir Valley on the polling clay ta help avoid the 'repetition of Jammu irregu- larities', had oot beeu granted. "Mr, Puri alleged that apart from large-scale impersonation the ruling party had raised lînguistic and communal slogans and threatened voters with the cancellation of their ration cards if they voted against party candidates. ",.. "The Democratie National Conference has asked its defeated candidates not to file election petitions. nln a resolution released to the Press on Tuesclay the Democratie National Conference said that the filing of election petitions might have been useful if complaints had been inafewconstituencies, butwhen the whole election lis faIse', 'the filing of petitions has become ineffective'. ftAlleging many malpractices It demanded t~t the election in the State should be declared void and a fresh ell!ction ordered." 135, Here is an editorial in the Hindustan Times of 12 February 1962: "In an unusually large number of constituencies thirty-two out of forty-three in Kashmir there will he no work for the Election Commissioner. The ruling National Conference party candidates were without a challenge on nomination day ••. Here in India, even the Prime Minister has to cope with severaI opponents, though all of them know that they have not the slende~"estprospects ofsuccessagainst him. How then is Bakshi Ghulam Mohammnd able to achieve this happy state of affairs in Kashmir? Is it that the pollcies of his Government are so univer- sally accepted that we might as weB replace in his domain the process of election by a process of acclamation? ..• "Public confidence in the free and fair nature of the election in Jammu and Kashmir will remain badly shaken unless thère is a thorough-going in- vestigation inb the charges of m",lpractice which have been levelled by the opposl ·..>n against Bakshi Saheb's Government." 136. 1 shaH now quote from the Organizer of New Delhi of 12 March 1962: "When immediately following the nomination stage thirty-three candidates of the National Conference were returned to the State Assembly unopposed, misgivings were feebly voiced in sections of the 'Il ••• 'Il ••• we wonder how he can explain that on a day it had been snowing, the five stations of Bhadarwah should have recorded a cent per cent poIl, a phenomenal performance which the roost enlightened and politicaUy-conscious pollîng population of the United Kingdom itself would envy! Bhadarwah is no stray example. In almost every constituenoy where the fight between the National Conference and the Praja Parishad looked a marginal one we invariably find one or two such instances ofa 'remarkably high political enlïghtenment' of 90 to 95 per cent poUl "For us the issue is: how real is the Election Commission's jurisdiction over the elections in Jammu and Kashmir State? Does the writ af this august body on which our Constitution has enjained the sacred duty of preserving democracy in the country run as effectively in Jammu andKashmiras it does in the rest of India? ~ 'Il••• 'Il••• The least however that the Election Com- missioner must do is to order an immediate probe illtO the plethora of aUegations leveUed. 'Il••• "As in the 1957 elections, ballotpapersweregiven to the officiaIs before the polling began, ta be put in the boxes of National Conference candidates in àdvance." 137. Then there is the report which appeared in the Hindustan Times of 5 Apri11962: "... The oppositionparties are unanimous thattheir defeat was contrived not by legitimate means, but through open interference by the ruling party. " "The opposition SUspICIons were further proved correct when on the nomination day, the National COIÛerence secured unopposed thirty-three seats in the valley. The wholesaIe rejection of opposition papers in these constii:uencies intrigued many..What went beyond ordinary imagination was the fact that-in several constituencies where there were as many as Dix to seven nomination paperfl, as for instance in Mendhar, it was the National Conference nominee whose papers alone were found in order. "The opposition has also reject.ed the statement that in the constituencies that went unopposed to tlle "There are severa! allegations which only an impartial inquiry can olear up. But that force was used against the opposition candidates cannat he dellied sinee National Conference leaders have themselves claimed oredit for having rescued the opposition candidate from Khanyar in Srinagar. who was waylaid and mercîlessly beaten ueal' the court premises on the nomination day. "WhiIe the opposition was still recovering from this. there was yet auother shock in store for it. This came in the form of revelation of defective ballot boxes. "... "Moreover, in the mountainous interior, where besides bad weather the diffic.ulties of terrain would have contributed to the reduction in the over-all size of the polling, the percentage of votes polled could not be as high as 77.3 in Ramban, 77.4 in Kishtwar, 76.9 in Arnas and 70.7 in Bhalesa. According to Parishad sources, in the Kishtwar constituency at seve-ral polling booths where snow was as deep as four to five feet, and the voters had to cover long distances ta reach the polling booths, the polling figures were shown to have almost touched the 100 per cent mark! !! "The opposition also feels baffled that while in most of the noUy contested constituencies in the l'est of the country where the voter is more educated and conscious of his rights than in fuis State, the average poIl could not exceed 60 percent, in Jammu it went up ta nearly 80 pel' cent. In Bishnah it was 84.5, in Ranbirsinghpora 77.6, Miran-Sabib 74.3, Darhal 81.6, Poonch 75.3, Naoshera 61.7 and Samba 73.4. " 138. Now these elections wereheldunderthe authority of the Bakski régime, the National Conference, and with the country occupied heavily by Indian military forces. It might be saîd, "Oh weIl, it îs occupied by military forces, but the military forces never inter- fere with the elections". Anybody around this table can imagine what that means. With an Administration wedded to accession to India and a military force there for the purpose, among others, ofkeepingupthe pres- tige of this Administration, and with the instances that have been observed, what would betheeifect upon the voters? But anyway, here are sorne statements by Ml'. Arthur Lall before the General Assembly on 18 August 1958, ·as to what a foreign forcemigp.t mean in countries like Lebanon and Jordan, which Icanassure the Council are very different, with respect ta the freedom and independence of the population, from Kashmir. This is what Ml'. LaU said: "In our view, the whole situation will continue ta be full of danger and will continue to be explosive sa long as foreign forces remain on the sail of Lebanon and Jordan. There can be no settlement, and indeed no talk of an acceptable, workable and dignified settlement, and no return to normalcy until this element of foreign troops has been re- moved." W 139. Yet the Prime Minister had promised even as late as .;, June 1951, speaking in Srinagar ta the people of Kashmir as reported in the Hindu of Madras of 5 June 1951: "First of all 1 would like ta remind you of the fateful day of 1947 when 1 cametoSrinagar and gave a solemn assurance that the people of India would stand by Kashmir in her struggle, On that assur- ance, 1 shook Sheikh Abdullah's hand beiore theV'ast multitude that had gathered there. 1 want to repeat that the Government oflndia will standbythat pledge. whatever happens. That pledge itself stated that it is for the people of Kashmir ta decide their fate with- out external interference. That assurance also re- mains and wiU continue." 140. What about these elections? Are these elections even a shadow of what had been promised to the people? What were the cO"l1ditions in Kashmir? One amusing incident, were it not that it is also so tragic, might he quoted in that connexion from Mr. Josef Korbel's book Danger in Kashmir. W Mr. Korhel was a member of the Commission. andonpages 148-149 of his book the following incident is reported: "... The Commission went: from one place to an- other encircled by thé police and accompanied by thousands of wretehed people~,At oneplade a meeting was arranged and someone spoke. Groups of people among the crowd responded with 'India, KashmirJ Sheikh Abdullah, Zindabad: Long live the union between India and Kashmirl' Anyone who had lived in a totalitarian country immediately recognized that the methods oforganizing a 'spontaneous' expression of the masses were the same the totalitarian world over. nThis was a disturbing scene for the Commission, which had been assured that the people enjoyed political freedom in Kashm1r. It asked its host, the district commissioner, ta send for the man and to bring him before the Commission. A few minutes later a man appeared, but it was quite obviously not the young man who had spoken to us. When this fact was brought to the commissioner's attention, he in- sisted that it was the sameperson, butthe substitute himself disrupted the attempted deception. 'Yes',he said, 'I am somebody else. My friend is in prison, but it does r.ot matter; 1 can also tell you that we want to join Pakistan,.n 141. So much for freedom of expression. This is 50 far as the elections are concerned. Inacountry where even the administration of justice is controlled by the Administration, where the judges are subordinate ta the Administration's behest, how can anyone accept that the elections would be free? 1 will deal briefly, as an illustration, with Sheikh Abdul1ah's case. The Council is weIl aware of the position of Sheikh Abdullah as descri1:;;::G by Prime Minister Nehru and by Mr. Ayyang8.l. He appeared before the Security Council, and the President of the Council this month must re- member him very weIl. He made more than one speech before the Couneil. He was arrested on 9 August 1953 while still holding the office of Prime Minister of Kashmir and was put in jail. No charge was made against him. The imprisonment was carried out under the Security Act which dispensed with the legal necessity of charging a crime. On 8 Januar-.I' 1958 he was released. On 30 April 1958 he was rearrested. The press note issued by the State Government said that the action was taken because Sheikh Abdullah was IIplanning subversion and large-scale disorders" and was na hazard to public securityn. 142. On 23 October 1958 a complaint was filed against -Sheikh Abdullah stating that he nconspired ta overthrow the Government of Kashmir and ta facilitate its annexation by Pakistan". The date of this a11eged offence is interesting. It was given as "between 9 August 1953"-the day he was arrested and put in jail-lland 29 April 1958" when after a few weeks at liberty he had been put back in jail. 143. On 23 October 1958 the complaint was filed and under the procedure noW prevailing in India and Pakistan commitment proceedings before a magistrate started. That is to say, the evidence would be recorded and the magistrate weuld then have ta consider whether there was prima facie evidenceto commithim ta trial. This is a prelimînary to the triai itselfi it is a judicial procedure. That started on 23 October 1958 and went on until 25 January 1962. Irepeat, 23 October 1958 to 25 January 1962. Hewasthencommitted ta the sessions "for trial". He was chargedwith nconspiracy to overthrow the Jammu and Kashmir Goverriment and 144. Now, one would have expected that once these wearisome prcceedings before the committingmagis- trate were over and aIl the evidence produced against him was on record, the case would he sent ta the sessions court, whereupon the latter would im- mediately start a trial. That happened on 23 January, but on ~6 April tlie sessions judge ta whom the case had been committed transferred it ta another court. The trial has not yet begun. The complaint was fîled on 23 October 1958 andthe trial has not yet begun up ta today, unless it has begun during the last few days. Of this we have no knowledge and 1 do not believe that it has yet begun, on 2 May 1962. 145. The charge against him before the sessions court, as stated by the special magistrate is this: he was charged under sections 121 A of the State Penal Code and 120 B, read with rule 32 of the State Security Rules, for having conspired ta overthrow the State Government by criminal force andfacilitatingthe wrongful annexation of the State of Jammu andKashmir by Pakistan. He was further charged with creating among the people hate, contempt and disaffection against the State Government, creating communal ill- feeling and disharmony and disturbing peace and tran- quillity. If creating hatred, contempt and disaffection against the Government were an offence here, halfthe population of the United States would he in jail. The magistrate added that he and bis co-defendants had also been charged with committing other prejudicial acts, with the assistance of Pakistan, between 9 August 1953 and 29 April 1958 in collaboration with nioe abscooding accused. 146. 1 shall not press the matter further; we are oot trying Sheikh Abdullah here but where the adminis- tration of justice has that political complexion that if they do not like a man-so far as thE;;Y are concerned, let us say with good reason-this is the treatmeot ta which he is subjected. They claim that the people have freely expressed their wishes with regard ta accession and the matter is closed. 147. Now 1 come ta another matter, and 1 will deal with it briefly. It has so.metimes been said, "We can- nat accept Pakistan as an equal party in this dispute. As a matter of fact, Pakistan is not a party to the question of accession at alI. I' What would be the position of India in a case where the ruler, belonging to one community with the majority of the people belonging ta another community, acceded to a Dominion the majority of whose people were of the same com- munity as the ruler and not to the Domi;:klll the majority of whose people were of the same community as the majority of the people? This is the-case in Kashmir; and they say that the only Gcvernment con- cerned is the Government to which the ruler acceded, "The Pakistan Government have neither acknow- ledged receipt of our message nor repIied to this or our previous dispatches on the subject. Instead the Pakistan Government have unilaterallyproceeded ta action which, it was made plain the Government of India could never and does not acquiesce in. Such acceptance of accession by Pakistan cannat but be regarded by the Government of India as an en- croachment on India's sovereignty and territory and is inconsistent with the friencUy relations that should exist between the two Dominions. This action of Pakistan is considered by the Government of Indta ta he a clear attempt ta cause disruption in the integrity of India by extending the influence and boundaries of the Dominion of Pakistan, in utter violation of the principles on which partition was agreed upon and effected. In these circumst81ces, 1 hope that it will be possibleforyou to prevail upon the Government of Pakistan ta reconsider their attitude as regards the accession of Junagadhj hutU tile matter is not reconsidered, the responsibiIity for the consequences must, 1 am compelled to in- form you, l'est squarely on the shoulders of the Pakistan Government.":"'That was Lord Mountbatten speaking.--'''The Govemment of India are, however, still prepared to accept the verdict of the people of Junagadh, in the matter of accession, the plebiscite being carried out under the joint supervision of the Government of India"-and here one would exp~ct "and the Pakistan Government"j but no, itis- IIIndia and the Government of Junagadh. 1I Pakistan has nothing to do with it. 'l'ne State to which accession was made, therefore, and thereason why this accession was accepted, wbuld have nothing to do with it. On this very basis, it could be said that India has nothing to do with the question of accession, with the question of the plebiscite in Kashmir. voir avec prêtendre tachement 149. It is argued too, on the other side, that pakistan i8 no party. Pakistan is no party? Look at the agenda vmich the Security Council approved only today: "The Indîa-Pakistan question". Look at the resolutions ofthe Security Council: "The dispute oetween India and Pakistan Il, "The situation between India and Pakistan It. Look at the réSolutions ofthe Cou.ncil; even with regard te the plebiscite they have said: "by the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan". And now it is 149. partie jour même? résolutions "du situation un prévoient 150. But the Pakistan locus standi with regard to the disposition of this state has been recognized from the very first; otherwise why an this series of messages ta us, assurances ta us, pledges to the Government of Pakistan with regard ta the disposition of this State: "This ois net mere1y a promise ta your Government but also ta the people of Kashmir and ta the world"? Here is a telegram dated 31 October 1947, addressed ta the Prime Minister of Pakistan by the Prime Minister of India: "Our assurance that we shaU withdraw our troops from Kashmir as saon as peace and arder are re- stored and leave the decision regarding the future of the state ta the people of the State is not merely a promise ta your Government but also to the people of Kashmir and ta the world". And now it is said: Pakistan has nolocus standi. What locus standi has Pakistan in this matter? 151. Then there was a statement by Mr. Ayyangar in the Security Council on 3 February 1948: "••• bath Pakistan and India have interests hi the question of accession, and therefore sorne agree- ment has ta be reached between them." [239th meeting, p. 330.] W Is there no locus standi? Are we not a party? 152. Earlier at the same meeting Mr. Ayyangar said this: "Before 1 proceed 1 might say that, apart from the stoppage of fighting the two parties inter-ested in.the Jammu and Kashmir question-each for its own reason-are the insurgents, who want responsible government, and Pakistan, which wants the question of accession ta be finally settled. As far as the insurgents are concerned, 1 have indicated what the Maharajah·la prepared tohave announcedinhis name as bis decision. As the Security Council is aware, the Government of Indi.a is fully committed ta the view that, after peace is restored and all people belonging ta the State have returned there, a free plebiscite shouid be taken and the people should decide whether they wis:, ta rpmain with India, to go over to Pakistan or ta remai" indellendent, if they choose to do sa." [Ibid•• pp. 328-329.) 153. Sa the parties before the Security Council certainly are India and Pakistan. But we agree-not only do we agreej we lay emphasis on the fact-that the crux of the matter is the right of the people of Kashmir ta decide freely and, in the words of the W Official ~onls of the Secul'Îty Councl1. TIlird Yellr. Nos. 1-15 :(226th~24Oth meetings). ' their right to make their free choice on the question ~ of accession. 1J 154. 1 hope 1 have said it properly in the Security ~ council, that thia queation of acce..ion, thia queation ii of aggression and this question of sovereignty \Vere ~ aIl taken ioto account by the" Commission, and it was ~ after aU of them had been raised. and repeatedIy ~ raised. before the Commissionthatthetworesolutions ~ were formtùated and were accepted by the two ~ Governments. 1 have already shown that they are ~ today really not relevanttotheimplementationofthese resolutions at all. But assuming only for the sake of ~ argument, but not conceding, that these questions ~ have to be determined, as the representative of t India keeps on insisting each time, how then can they be determined? ~ 155. Accession, aggression, the determination of the J parties' obligations and of any default committed in 155. gati.::ms fuite été La questions de tions recourir l'Inde été taient partie le Président Ministre un l'Inde de randum - pour arbitrage personne tachement l'arbitrage. d'hui. c'est la gations d'elles? déterminées ment ~ carrying them out, the passage of time-aU of the ~ questions that have been raised are susceptible of ~ determination. Most of them are questions of law, 1 some of them are questions of facto One method of 4 resolving a dispute of that character, involving I · questions of law and questions of fact, would be through arbitration. Efforts have been made to try to persuade India ta have them decided through arbitration, and arbitration of the then-existing dif- ferences on the interpretation of part TI of the ~ Commission's resohtion of 13 August 1948 was ~ suggested. This was endorsed by an appeal by the ~ President of the United States, Mr. Truman and the ~ Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Atlee, to the Prime Ministers of both India and Pakistan. Pakistan accepted this method of settling the differ- ences-the reference is ta the Commission's memor- andum of 27 August 1948 W -but India rejected it. India rejected il on the ground, 1 think it was stated, that they could not commit the fate of4 million people to arbitration. But nobody had suggested this; nobody had suggested that the questionof accessionta Pakistan or ta India should be submitted to arbitration. Nobody is suggesting it today. What was suggested was the question of what those paragraphs of the resolution Mean: what are the obligations of the parties? What has each to do? And these are questions which are susceptible of determination through arbitration or through judicial settlement. That was ail that was suggested. 156. But then it was also said: "But tllis would infringe upon our sovereignty". But there have been scores-I should say that if one looked into it, per- haps hundreds-of cases of international arbitration between sovereign States, where bath parties were sovereign States, where there were disputes and they were settled Ulrough arbitration. One reference will suffice. I will read out article 51 of the Indian Constitution itself. This article states: 156. empiliterait trage par exemple l'Inde "The State shall endeavour to- MI S/IlOO, W Iliid.. Third Year. Supplement for November 1948. documeot 5/1100, aonex 27. appeodix. "(2) Encourage settlement ofinternational disputes by arbitration." 1i i, l Not only is it not eontrary to sovereignty, it is one of the directives of State policy in the Constitution of India. 157. Operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Security Couneil resolution of 30 March 1951 suggested arbi- tration. The text reads as follows: nThe Seeurity Counci!, n••• "Instructs the United Nations Representative to report to the Seeurity Counei! within three months from the date of his arrivaI on the sub-continent; if, at the Ume of this report, he has not effected de- militarization in accordance withparagraph 3 above, or obtained the agreement of the parties to a plan for effecting such demilitarization, the United Nations Representative shaH report ta the Security Council those points of difference between the parties in regard ta the interpretation and execution of the agreed resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which he considers must be resolv;ed ta enable such demilitarization to he carried out; "Calls upon the parties, in the event of their discussions with the United Nations Representative failing in his opinion ta result in full agreement, ta accept arbitration upOn all outstanding points Of difference reported by the United Nations Repre- sentative in accordance with paragraph 5 above, such arbitration ta be carried out by an arbitrator. or a panel of arbitrators, to be appointed· by the President of the International Court of Justice after consultation with the parties. n That was in 1951. 1 might say, incidentally, that 1 was not tilen on the Court. The "fanatic", according ta the Defence Minister of India, was not yet a member of the Court. 158. India t'ejected it, Pakistan accepted it. Then in April 1957, Mr. Gunnar .Jarring1s proposal.av was that the lack of implementation of Pakistan alleged by ·1ndia might be deterrnined by somebody, and that what needed to be done ta rectify any alleged defaults that might be discovered might also be determined. That was accepted by Pakistan. The party that is charged with the default is eager to accept sorne method of determination. The party that charge::. default will not accept determination. Mr. Jarring's proposal was rejected by India. Year. "On the question of arbitration of the border dis- pute with Communist China, Mr. Nehru said: 'If the circumstances are proper and bath parties agree and suitable arbitrators are found, 1 will not rule it out l, IlAsked if this also held true for Kashmir, Mr. Nehru replied, 'In theory it applies toeveryplaoe'." That raises sorne hope. 160, The whole question was last considerej by the Security Counoil on 2 December 1957 [808th meeting] when it adopted the resolution of that date. W:Oütof consideration fortime, lwillnotreadoutto the CouncU the actual words of that resolution, but 1 hope that the members will check it up and will read it as part of my submission ta them. 161. In pursuance of this resolution, the United Nations Representative made a report dated 28 March 1958. El That report still awaits the considera- tion of the Councit. The recommendations made by the United Nations Representative in paragraph 20 of that report were accepted by the Government of Pakistan as set out in section V of the report and, for various reasons also set out in that section, were rejected by the Government of India. 162. In the first instance, itwouldbemostproper and fitting that the United Nations Representative, whohas laboured so hard to carry out the directives of the Security Council and to secure an agreement between the parties through the Implementation of the resolu- tions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan 50 that a settlement might be reached, as laid down by the Security COWlcil, through the demo- cratic method of a fair and impartial plebiscite, should be requested by the Council ta introduce his report formatly and make such comments and observations as he might consider necessary or desirable, more particularly having regard to the period of over four years which has elapsed sin(~e the date of his report. Thereafter, one way of proceeding would be to start with the recommendations made by the United Nations Representative in paragraph 20 of his report. That would necessarily involve the consideration and ex- amination of the reasons given by the Government of lndia for its refusaI ta accept the recommendations. 163. Surely it should not be beyond the resources of the Security Council to devise a method acceptable to the parties for such examination and consideration, which might ultimately lead .10 the recommendations of the United Nations Representative, or sorne reasonable and mutually accepted variation thereof, as the basis for further progress. We urge very earnestly and strongly that such an effort be undertaken. Should ~ Ibid.. Supplement for October, November and December 1957, document 5/3922. -ll/ Ibid., Thirteenth Yeu, Supplement for January, February and March 1958, document 5/3984, "It seems ta me, in determiningwhetherthereis a situation which, if it were to continue, might lead ta a dispute or to war, that we have before us an opportunity to make progress in the right direction, through the continuation of the entirely friendly and informaI conferences :lnder the guidance of the President of the Security Council. My countrythinks that these conferenc-es should be contiuued in the real spirit that animates Iudia and Pakistan here, and that they should not be interfered with here by the necessary presentation of charges, counter- charges, c1aims and so on that have to go into the record." [235th meeting, p. 261.} 164. 1 would respectfully submit that speeches in a public sitting of the Security COUDcil, thoughnecessary and useful for many purposes, cannot by themselves bring about a meeting of minds. As a matter of fact, they often lead to a drawing apart of minds. If the members of the Security Council were to desire the President ta get in touch with the parties with a view to making an effort ta bridge the differences between them, that might show a way out. 165. Pakistan is quite agreeable to any method that may be suggested for determining; lli) the obligations of L'le parties under the UNCIP resolutions; (12) what is holding up progress on their implementation; (Q) whether either of the parties is in default with regard to the fulfilment of its obligations and (9), what needs ta be done by either side to move the matter forward tawards implementation. 166. If a determination of (g) above, that is to say, whether either of the parties is in default with regard to the fulfi1ment of its obligations, should dîsclose that Pakistan is in default in any of these respects, the default would be rectified through the speediest method at the earliest possible moment, so that the way may he opened toward full implementation of the resolutions. This is an undertaking that 1 submit to the Security Counoil on behalf of the Pakistan Govern- ment. 1 do trust and hope that India would be prepared to agree to the same; that ls to say, in the event that a fair and impartial determination, upon the method of which agreement might be reached, should lead ta the conclusion that Pakistan is in default with regard ta A, Band C and that India is in default with regard to X, Y and Z, bath Governments-and 1 have given an assurance on behalf of my Government-will, in the shartest possible period and in the speediest possible manuel', rectify those defaùlts. 167. Now how could the determination take place? The United Nations Representative is available for making this determination. Nobady could be in a better position, as he has made a detailed study of the whole problem and knows it from A ta Z. Pakistan would, however, be qllite agreeable to any recognized inter- national figure of undoubted integrity carrying out the task. if India should have any hesitation in accepting a personality from among the great Powers or from qui 168. "Wa akhiro dawana anii hamdu lil lahi rahbil Alamin"- IfAnd the close of Our cry will be: praise he ta Gad, the cherisher and sustainer of the worlds." du délêgation main. n'était l'exposé sêcuritê qui y veaux faits gation lire la disposer convient la 169. Ml'. Krishna MENüN (India): We have heaxd a long statement by the representative of Pakistan. In normal circumstances my delegation would have been prepared to answer it tomorrow. However, a great part of the statement was not quite audible. \\'hile the bulk of it deals with matters that have beeu befare this COWlcil for many years and have beeu answered in full, out of courtesy ta the new members, and be- cause certain alleged facts have been set out, we shall answer it in full. It would be fair ta us and to the Council that 1 should read the text of the statement of the representative of Pakistan overnight, but itwill not be available before tomor..'ow and therefore, if it is agreeable to theCouncil, we ShDuldlike to answer tomorrow afternoon. envisagl!ie sur convoquée. période n'est beaucoup ment parai't D'autres vendredi après-midi je les où traités. pour pas d'adopter pas 170. ! should like ta submit also that, while the matter is of great importance, this meeting has not been called on our initiative. The date was fixed after a long period of negotiation, and it is not possible for the Government of lodia ta make availablethe services of a representative whom it considers suitable for a much longer time than was originally intended. 1 have other responsibilities, and 1 therefore have ta leave the country on Friday evening. Therefore, 1 would make a submission tomorrow afternoon and do my best ta confine it ta one meeting, if the Council would allow me the liberty of drawing attention ta the various paragraphs of previous statements in which alI these statements have been fully answered. To those who are hearing the discussion for the first time, it might appear as if there were no answer ta these questions. Therefore we shaH try ta adopt a method which may be more rational than a mere repetition. 171. If the Counoi! could meet punctuaHy at three o'clook it might be possible. ta finish it tomorrow afternnon as far as we are concerned. 171. ponctuellement faire

The suggestion has beenmade that the Counci! might meet tomorrow at three a 'clock. Is there any objection? 172. sentant demain 173. Mr. Krishna MENON (India): Just another point 1do not want to introduce into my statement tomorrow. The representative of Pakistan in thebeginning,!ls far as 1 heard him, said that sameane had suggested that he was stalling in regard to this speech. 1 hope that "someone n does not refer to us beoause while the actual fact of stalling may have taken place, we have not suggested that anybody stalled. 174. Mr. ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan': Ididnotmean that the delegation of India or anybody connected with it had said that 1had been stalIing, but 1 also repudiate at least the reflection contained in the Defence Minister's last observation that the actual fact of

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