S/PV.1009 Security Council

In accordance with the previous decisions taken by this COWlcîl, 1 shaH, with the consent of the members, invite the representatives of Pakistan and India to participate in our consideration of this matter. 1. ment et représentant h h At the invitation of the President, Mr. Muhammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan), and Mr. Krishna Menon (!ndia). took seats at the COWlciI ·table.

The Counci! will now continue its discussion of the India-Pakistan question. 2, va 3. The first speaker on my list is the representative of India, ta whom 1 now give the floor. 3, l'Inde, 5. We are met here at the request of the Government of Pakistan. We have taken no initiative incalling tbis meeting. The request was made sometimeago;.a oonsiderable amount ofnegotiationorexchangeofopinions \Vith various people took place. and ultimately this date was decided upon. 1 regret 1 was uot here at the earlier meetings when Sir Muhammad spoke, and 1 convey to bim that it was not by way of discourtesy, but because my commîtments in my own country do not permit me ta leave India for more thau a few days. 1 am in the position that 1 have ta return tomorrow evening. But sa far as we are concerned, we sha11 try to make aH our observations this afternoon in reply to Sir Muhammad's statement and also in regard ta the newer facts which have not been adduced in his speech but which are taking place in India currently in connexion with this problem. We are prepared to sit into a11 hours of the night, if necessary, but 50 far as my delegation is concerned it will he impossible for us ta participate in this debate after tarriorrow. This is in no way a discourtesy to the COUDcil, because the nleeting was fixed for a particular day, and it is assumed that when Governmentsarerepresentedfr.om such distant places, those proceedings will be continuous, for none of us can forsake his duties at home in order ta participate in proceedings over here. My Government is auxious to assist the Council, toassist itself and indeed the Government of Pakistan; to have a view of this problem as it îs. 1 proceed ta the subject- 6. Now, having said this, matter. 7. We are met here as a result of a letter dated 11 January 1962 [S/5058], sent by the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the President of the Security Council in which it is pointed out that the efforts for a "just and amicable settlement of the dispute, 'have failed to open a way towards such sèttlement". 1 suppose this means that the Pakistan Government has come to the conclusion that there was nothing to be gained by what they ca11ed "direct negotiations". If by negotiations you mean exchange of views, the Government of India is always open to this. But ever since 1949 we have said that there cannot be negotiations on the substance of sovereignty. 8. But their letter would indicate that the Pakistan Government had come ta the conclusions that there was then. no use. taking any other step than coming to the Security Council once again, and this is reinforced by the fact that my Government. my Prime Minister. invited the President of Pakistan to come ta Delhi. The Seeurity Counoil meeting was asked for and preeipitated while these exchanges were goingon. Naturally my Prime Min.Îster replied tu say that we cannot have this argued in two places: either you talk ta us or you talk to the Security Council. These passages here indicate to those people of good-will who are constantly talking ta us outside about bilateral 9. Then cames the second part of the letter wbich states: "Re;:;ent pronouncements by respOllsible personalities in India have emphasized that the situation is charged with the utmost gravityU. Ifthereis gravity ir. the situation, thecharginghasbeendoneby the Government of Pakistan, not by us. The very fact that the Council was called and is still going on in tbis lacka-· daisical manner and that there had been no great urgellcy is an indication that there is no grave urgency or crisis in relation ta this. We repeatedly înformed this C0uncîl-e.nd you, Mr. President, are familiar 9. "D souligné Si n'est nement ~tê moindre Nous Conseil au l'initiative cation paix nement ment l'emploi et vue de w~th this problem intimately-that we will take no initiative in the way of the use of force or of altering the situation in such a way as ta disturb the peace of our continent or of the world. The Governmentof India has alw~ys made the commitment that, however correct its position may he legally, morally, pcliticallyand Charter-wise, it is not prepared to alter t.I1at, even in the interests of justice, by the use of force. That is still our position. 10. dit a envers n'est relle Quatrième Haison et une ioi, cours rien américains cette l'Inde une 10. Then the letter goes on ta say that the Defence Minister of India said, li ••• we have not abjured violence in regard ta any country who violates our in·· terests". This is not a very correct quotation, but 1 do not \vant to quarrel with the words. This statement was made to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly in connexion with our position on colonialism, that ifanypartofourcoWltrybecame a victim of aggression, then there was a general feeling here that-the American newspapers calI it the "image of India" but we did not create that-we would in no circumstances use force. This is not a sensible view to take because India has an army, an air force and a navy, maintained at considerable cost ta the taxpayer and perhaps ta a certain eJden~-butonly ta a limited extent-through the retardatioD of our economic development. Therefore, as aState we are nota pacifist 8tate. And if we spoke truthfully, that is DO crime. When we said that we have not abjured the use of violence, that is because we have troubles on our frontiers. Pakistan itself knows that when it has probed our frontiers more than our patience would bear. we have tried ta teach it salutary lessons now and then. But that is what the statement means. peut~âtre son conséquent, avons nous la nous lui-même se excédé Il. que 11. The letter goes on to say that the statements made by us constitute "a grave tbreat to the maintenance of peace in that region". No country, either in the world 01' in OUr region, has contributep more to the lowering of tensions and the maintenance of peace in South-East Asia, and even those who are not politically in full agreement with us would be willing ta admit it at least in private. The letter furtber states that the Pakistan Government "feels that the Security COUDcil should he made cognizant of the situation at the earliest opportunityll 11. tion paix notre tribué dans ne posés dit donc cette 12. 1 have been at great pains, although l was not here on the first day, to read every Hne of what Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan said, and also ta listen ta the speech he made as far as it could be heard yester- 12. sir peine quée, 13. What has happened? One further faet: we meet, and 1 hope no one will discount this, and proposaIs are being made; we meet in the shadow of a threat m:Hi·~ by the representative of Pakistan in tms Conncil. Here is what he said: "If the Secu.rity COWlcil does notwant the elements in the State who-started the liberation battleto start it again< -if the Security COWlcil does not desire that the tribesmen should get out of hand and pour into Kashmir again, if the Security Council does not desire that the people of Pakistan sbould get out of hand and-if 1 may mix the metaphor-take the bit between their teeth and l'un away with the whole system of ordered government, and if the Security Council does not desire that powerful neighbouring States should plWlge into the vortex"-the vortex of war, 1 suppose he means-llwhen it starts again, the Security Council haà better take note oftherealities of the situation.1I (lOO7th meeting, para. 63.] 14. It is not for me ta comment on this statement in so far as it is addressed ta us. My Prime Minister has replied yesterday by saying that this argument by tbreats is not going to have the slightest effect on any decisions we are going to take, and no one knows it better than the Government of Pakistan. 15. Then it has been said that we have made certain offers in regard ta tbis. At various times we have suggested ways and means by which tensions could he lowered. We have at various times made sUtm:estions on this problem, as it is called, although Kashmir is not a problem but an integral part ofIndia, and you do not caU your country "a problemll i and the other day the Prime Minister said that we eould negotiate even without any previous changes being made beforehand, and that has been taken as though it were an offer of sorne kind. The Prime Minister saidtheotherday that various suggestions had been made in the course of the previous few years about the solution of the problem, and among them was one that the basis of ta1ks should be the existing position so as to have sorne reality about the ta1ks. What Pakistan had beeu doing was something Wlrelated ta the present position. He said that sinee the President of Pakistan had rejected that basia the question did not arise of raising, it again. Therefore, just beeause someone makes sometimes a reasonable proposition or suggests a way of meeting 16. This really means that when we left the Security Council in 1957 w~ left it in the position that what was ta happen was iliat Pakistan must vacate its aggression. We have twoaggressorsinJammuandKashInir-Pakistan and China. Sorne of you may have different feelings about the two countries, but as far as their position in Jammu and Kashmir is concerned, they are identical. And, as 1 shall show Iater on, they are not only identical but they seem sometimes to play with each other in order ta embarrass ùs. 17. Therefore, what we said in 1957 was that the aggression must be vacated. Aggression bas been established by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan; aggression is a fact which can be noticed any day; aggression is proved by the fact, again, that P.9.kistan has Hlegally atmexed this terr1- tory under the terms of its Constitution; aggression is also established by the factthattherehas been considerable augmentation of troops-without the knowledge of the Security Council in the first instance end afterwards, n.,;! with its connivance, but within the purview of Hs knowledge of what has been taking place in pakistan. That is by way of introduction. Now 1 proceed to deal with this matter. 17. devait Commission kistan; vée ce est ont de nivence introduction, 18. As 1 said a while ago, there is nothing new ln these statements. They are reiterations of what we would calI misstatements, or statements with paragraphs taken out of their contexts, and so on. Thus 1 think that you, Ml'. President, as an old member of the Counci!, will perhaps turn round and say, "Then why waste Ume? Cannot we go on?" Unfortunately, it 80 happens that theSecurity Counci! has new members, and, what is more, you have permitted these statements to be made-or, rather, these statements have been made-and they have ta be met in part. As 1 said just now, we shaIl try as far as possibleto avoid repetition, especially because, in the course of Sir Muhammad's six hours of speaking, there was no proof of any threats. There was no proof of anything whatsoever except the threat made by the representative of Pakistan himself, and if there are any changes in the conditions that exist they will be the changes to which 1 shaIl draw attention in the latter part of my observatians-changes which will be substantiated bythefacts as they exist today. 18. de Pakistan. lerai de vous, du "Pourquoi aller au plus, faites que l'ai répétitions. durant d'une menace est lui-même, changements, l'attention intervention pouvons 19. In the course of the statement madeby the representative of Pakistan very little, if any, referencewas made to the proceedings before the Security Council sinee 1953 or thereabouts; that is to say, the more recent proeeedings were totally ignored. The Government of India has no right ta expect that another country will either ignore or take cognizance of this, that or the other; but the fact does remain that in 1957, in the two long sittings which we had, the Government of India made Us position clear, correcting large numbers of misstatements that had cropped up; and that when Ml'. Gutmar Jarring came back from India and 19. kistan sont yî:i'Jn, totalement nement nement il longues nement nombre Jarring, 20. Sa we regret that no notice bas been taken of those matters because perhaps, if it bad been taken, Sir Muhammad-with bis verycons::'derable experience of the judiciary in India and afferwards of political affairs, and more recently of the highest judicial tribunal in the world, theInternatiobal Court ofJusticewould have been more objective, As 1 have said, no threats of this kind have been proved. 21. In this statement there is areferencetoa liberatian movement which wiU start aU over again, and that liberation movement cornes into play in the remainder of the speech also. My plan, in subrrùtting my observations, is to deal with any new points-if 1 can find any-in this statement, and give the Council as brief answers as possible to the repetition of the aUegations and arguments of previous times, to give cross references to the more elaborate statement made in 1957, wbich forms part of the proceedings of the Cauncil,H and refer ta what we caU the changed conditions and the concepts thatobtain in the continent, the new perspective that exists today on the roof of India in the Himalayan region with the intrusion oÎ China into our territory, and also ta deal with the findings on behalf of the 8ecurity COUDcil itself in the Jarring report. 22. Coming to the text of bis stutement, liane may so caU it, the thesis seems ta bethatthere was a liberation movement in Kashmir. That liberation movement was sought ta he suppressed by the Maharajah, and those who went in aiterwards in the form of raiders, and ultimately the Pakistan Army, were those who were supporting the liberation movement. Particularly with the large number of states here who have either achieved their liberty through liberation processes or who are interested-as we are an interested as Members of the United Nations-in national freedoms, this is a ward with which much play can he made. It is quite true that there was a liberation movement in Kashmir. Neither Pakistan nor its predecessor, the Moslem League in India, had had anything ta do with it. What is more, they have been opposed to lt. And 1 shall quote from Mr. Jinnah ta show that he was op- 23. Therefore, when we speak about the lîberation movement in Kashmir, to us it means one thing. 1 do not know what it means to Sir Muhammad, but from the way it is presented it apparently must mean somethîng else. The lîberation movement i.n Kashmir was the "Quit Kashmir" movement and was paraIlel to the "Quit India" movement in the restofIndiaitself. When Ghandi stal'ted the "Quit India" movement on 8 August 1940 that was notice to the Empire to go-that i5 to say, direct action against aIl the worksofthe Empire, as such, and large-soale resistance. A parallel movement grew up in Kashmir called the "Quit Kashmirlt movement, meaning thereby the removal ofthe Empire from Kashmir. It was not particularly aîmed at the instltutional monarch or princedom but was part of a national liberation in India. This was oppcsed by the Moslem League, whioh was the precursorofPakistan. It is difficult for some of you gentlemen, without a backgrmmd and knowledge of Indian development, to understand this. 23. libération représente-t-il mais, sentant même celui il mouvement reste 1940, eUt aotion que la Cachemire", fiait visait tionnelle du suivait Pakistan, certains ment de 24. quel mouvement selon quand 237 Cachemire. corroborer sonnes ll'a des massacre, parfaitement faveur rait ce prison. M. vous d'aujoUl'd'hui cient consultations prison. prison Cachemire" n'ayant kistan 25. Conseil Qu'ils "histoire": mais de un 24. Then, the next argument is that thi.s libel'ation movement was sought ta he suppressed by the Maharajah who, according to The Times of London, which is always very accurate in COilllting people, has somehow assessed that 237,000 people-riot 236,000 but 237,000 people--were k.illed in Kashmir. That is neither historioal nor factual. In the Second World War only 400,000 were ki11ed. But this fantastic report was put out. There was no auch mass killîng or anything of that character. It is quite true that the Maharajah was not in favour of the national movement; which Maharajah is? The British Maharajah was not in favour of the national movement. Sa the British Maharajah put aIl our people in prison. But the Briti$h have a. habitmy friend, Ml'. Boland, who is opposite here can confirll1 this-to consider the prisoners oftodaythe friends of tomorrow. They negotiate with them and what is more, even when they are in prison, it is conveniently arranged for them ta get together for consultations and things of that kind. AIl Maharajahs put people in prison in that way. And this ItQuit Kashmirlt movement, which was a real nationalist movement and had notJting ta do with Pakistan or tribal holdings l.n the country, waS put down. 25, Having said that, 1 would like to draw the attention of the COilllcil te a very small account of the history of Kashmir. 'len 1 say Ithistory", nobody need be alarmed. 1 -' not going to bring out books. But a11 these things are part of the backgroillld. This ia not a case of a no-man's-land somewhere, some country which one of these great Powers fOillld some- 26. During the decline of the Mogul Empire, Kashmir and Gîlgit whioh was part of the Maharajah' s suzerainty and whioh has now been absorbed by Pakistan illegally, oame under the rule of the Sikh ruler Rajit Singh, who was then fighting the Moslems, while Jammu and Ladakh and Baltistan were ruled by GulabSingh, whose name you have heard and whom Sir Muhammad conveniently interchanged with Sir Hari 8ingh on many occasions. 27. In 1846, as a result of the Anglo-SikhWar. Kaslunir and Gilgit \Vere ceded to the British, who, in turn, granted it ta Gulab Singh for a consideration. That ia where modern Kashmir begins. By the Treaty c~ LahOre these places went to the British; the British transferred them to Gulab Singh and the hegemony of Kashmir and all those territoriesunderthesuzerainty of the Maharajah begin from that time. Gulab Singh entered into a treaty with the British, acknowledging the supremacy of the British Government and thus subjecting bis sovereignty to the suzerainty or paramountcy of the CroWn. 28. The authority of the paramount power of the States exi:ended inter aUa to a field of defence in external affairs and, in certain aspects, in internaI affairs; that is to say, none of these princely States were independent in the international sense. There were a few territories under the British Crown which exercised this authority, not by the power of the United Kinc~r'lom or by the power of Britain, but by the fact that Britain was the ruling authority in what was then called British India. 29. However, the rights and obligations of the paramount power were not created or sustainec1 by treaties alone. They existed independently of suah treaties, overriding them ta a great extent. 1 want to make this point because the matter has been raised time and again that when the British went away, theysaid, "OUr obligations to the princes are over. lt Theycouldnot do anything else because they could not carry out those obligations. This was so because while those obligations rested in the British CT'own, the strength for carrying out those obliga~i(lns came by the fact of the Government of India. 30. In other words, paramountcy has two aspeets. Paramountcy has a kind of national aspe0t in the aame way as the leadership of aState rests in the Crown. 31. And sa, what happened? When the British left, the Crown remained for one more year. India being a Dominion, its King was the KingafIndiabut the Crown decided, under advice into the history ofwhichwe will nat go, ta tell the princes, "We cannat protect you any more. You cannat exercise any rights. Il This is very important. Because the reference i8 only ta right5. What the Crown said at that time \Vas that the States could not exercise any more right8 againsttheBritish Crown. Nothing was said about the obligations of the States. They could not exerci5e any rights against the British Crown because the British Crown was in a difficult position beeause if, after the British left, one of these States hadgotintoaconflicteither in Pakistan or India, they would have been involved. For that reason, they kept out. 32. Under the terrns of the Government of India Act 1935, to which India and Pakistan are equal partners, the India of today is a succession State ta Britain. Pakistan i5 not. It i5 aState carved out of parts of India that did not waut to remain with the l'est, by agreement. It i.s a new State, admitted to the United Nations as a new member. We were not admitted as a new Statej we were here. We have taken on aIl the obligations, the assets and the liabilitiesoftheBritish Government. We have a succession State, whether it be as ~ result of the Japanese Treatyor anything else. We were a succession State and, as $UCh, inherited the functions of paramountcy. That is to say, irrespective of the absence of the Crown, those things that were done by British India at that time had ta he done by others as weIl. ButtheTreaty certainlywas between the prinoe and the Crown. 33. The British Government succeeded to the paramount power over India, which was possessed de jure and de facto by the Mogul Emperor and aoquired de facto by the East India Company and finally assumed by the East India Company de jure by the disappearance of the Emperor. The Crown was now in India what the Emperor had been, a completely sovereign power, predominant over aIl others and clairning allegiance. 34. The tone adopted by Canning i5 explicable only if one understands that the Crown had succeeded to the whole authority of the Empire in sa far as it ohose to exert it, and the Crown, unlike the Emperor, had means fully adequate to make activeuseofits powers. 35. It is thus an establishedfactthattheBritish Crown itself did not acquire paramountcy rights-this ls the point 1 want to make-by an express grant, cession Or transfer. In this context a declaration issued by the Crown terminating its relationship with the States cOlÙd determine only the Crown's ownfutl1rerelationsbip with the States. It cOlÙd not have the efiect of divesting the succession Government of its status vis-à.-vis the States and its rights and obligations in relation ta them inhering in the supreme power in India. 36. 1 say aIl tills not in order to raise a legal problem. But, judging by the \Vay things are spoken about, as l said, it would look as though this is some island in some unknown sea and that we are both quarrelling about it. We are dealing with an integral part of Ir.dia, historically-not only in ancient times but in the continuance of the transfer of power-this is one of those things which it i8 very diffioult for thosewho have not been acquainted with the Britishsystemofgovernment to appreciate and understand. 37. With the coming iuto force ofthelndianIndependence Act on 15 August 1947, the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapsed. We admit that. Suzerainty is nothing unless it is exercised-but the fWldamentals on which it rested remained. The essential difference in the security r8quirements of the country and the comptùsions of geography did not cease ta be operative with the end of British rule in India. If anything, in the context of world event8, they have become more imperative. The central Government of India, which succeeded the British, was Ullquestionably the paramount power in India. And here, if 1 may interpolate, if we abdicated or resigned from this position, bath we and Britain wOlÙd be in a difficult way, because we took over a considerableamount of liabilities in the same way as we took over the assets. Unquestionably the paramowlt power in India, both de facto and de jure, the Government alone was the only competent independent sovereign in India, that is, the de facto sovereign Government of British India. j j , 1 1 1 1 38. There was a special responsibility on the part of this Government ta protect aIl the territories in India from external aggression. The withdrawal of the Crown makes no difference. ThatiswhytheMaharajah of Kashmir appealed to the Viceroy, to the Governor- General, because it is the dutY of the British Government ta go ta their protection from external aggression. It was not the Viceroy' s business to go there to protect his subjects against a feudal ruler. And that was why there was no interference in British India in regard to the "Quit Kashmir" movement. But when foreign irrvaders came in, and when information \Vas received by the Maharajah in that way, on the One 39. That is the backgroWld of this question. 1 think it was the representative of Pakistan himself who referred yesterday to the fact that India is always insisting that the positions of Pakistan and India are not the sam!;l in relation to Kashmîr. That is true in more than one respect. It is true in the respect that pakistan has no locus standi there. And it is true ur another respect: the armies of the Union of India are in Kashmir because Kashmir is part oftheUnion. The armies of Pakistan are in India because they are a conquering. an aggressor, army, And therefore our position. is that we will not be treated like two peas in a pcct in tbis matter, And there cau be no question of any intervention, any good offices or anytlùng. And 1 say this with aU the responsibility that rests on me as a member of the Government of India, We will never consideI'- this question on the basis of equality between Pakistan and India-a fact which has been recognized by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan times without number. Even with regard ta the siill-born plebiscite administratorshîp, there was no question of Pakistan's having anything ta do with tbis matter. 40. Then, the next lot of things that have been dealt with is the question of accession. The President is aware-for he was at that meeting-that 1 dealt with tbis matter at great length on the last oocasion, and in the proceedings of the Security Camcil there are references to the law and the facts in relation ta H. 41. Accession of Indian States ta India is not anything that even started with independence. It was provided for by the British Parliament as early as 1935, when the dawn of independence became known ta the practioal British people and they did not want ta leave India with a oongeries of States warring one against another, whatever their differences withus might have been. The wiser among the statesmen in England, and Parliament as a whole, recognized that the unitYof India was necessary bath for the Indian people and for the world. And therefore, as early as 1935, twelve years before our independence, the British parliament provided in the 1935 Act for these States to come into sorne sort of mion, And sa the idea of accession and the whole machinery, the whole mechanism, the architecture of accession, was provided in the 1935 Act. And that remained mchanged. It is not as though for the purposes of Kashmir, or because the Britishwere going away, or because paramomtcy lapsed, a new machinery was provided, That accession machinery is provided for in the Act of Parliament. 42. Afterward, when the British left Iudia, what was the position in regard ta what were then called th~ Indian States-aU 561 of them, not one ortwo but 561'1 They were aIl nsovereign and independent" but none with either an international status or a capacity ta defend themselves or a capacity ta maintain their 43. Sa the accession question, on the one band, is an old question. It assumed a new complexion when the the British withdrew fromlndia, from undividedlndiaand, in the course of 1946,1947 and 1948, many changes took place. Before independence was actually established, for sorne Ume our Constituent Assembly. our constitutional discussions. were on the baais of a confederation in whichthe present territory KnO',vn as Pakistan would also have been partofIndia. 1 refer ta this because there are moving and dynamic factors in the matter. 44. Accession is provided for by law. What is required is that the acceding State have a particular form in which to make an application for accession, and when that application is mad~, that application is accepted, on behalf of the Government of India in the beginning, but later on behalf of the Dominion to which accession is asked for by the Head ofthat State. If you take an analog-j in muniCipal law, there must be an offer and an acceptance; that makes a contract. That is, the acceding State makes an application, and it is also laid down-and particularly for those who have a republican tradition it is necessary ta say this-under the law that application has to be made by the Head of the State. Whether the Head ofthe State is the Maharajah, whether he is thefeudatory. orwhatever, makes no difference. He was the Head of the State; no other accession would be legal. That is provided for in the Act itself: that the application for accession has to be made by the Head of the State. Therefore, in the case of these 561States-not only Kashmir-the applications for accession were made by the princes, chieftains. feuctatories-whatever they were; and they were accepted. so far as the States that acceded to us were concerned-and the vast majority of them did-by the Government of India in the person of the Governor- General, who was the Head of the 8tate on this side. 45. That takes us to the question of this particular accession. 1 will not at th1s moment go lUtO the background of the few days prior to the accession. 1 will not avoid it; 1 will come back to it. But let us get l'id of this particular factor. 46. The Maharajah sent a letter to the Governor- General that his State desired to accede to India-he made this choice, for whatever reasons-and Lord Mountbatten, the Governor-General, wrote at the bottom "We accept the accession", or whatever the words were. 1 forget just what they were, but they were the prescribed words. Therefore, taking the analogy of municipal law 1 the offer by the state and the acceptance by the other side made a completed contract, and it is not possible, any mare than with a civil contract, to alter it by any other înstrwnent. There is no provision whatsoever-and the representative of the United Kingdom and his advisers will be familial' with this-in the enactments of Parliament for IIde-accession" or conditional accessions or pro- 47. Jammu était par loi gagner de modification donné consentement d'autres ger l'Inde, 47. Therefore, the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, on 27 October 1947, was a full and fmal accession. The ouly way that any change could take place in this is by consent. It is laid down in the Act of Parliament-and in arder ta save the Cmll1cil's Ume 1 will not read itout-thatanychanges, any modifications, in the termS of accession must be asked for by the acceding party and agreed ta by the Dominion concerned. In other words, they could not change1t by themselves. Once in, you cannat get out. 48. Now while the Soviet spokesman may not agree with us-he may evenfeelthatwe are rather backward, or that we are rather forward, or whatever it is-aU the others aroillld here, and more particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, would have ta agree, with aIl the emphasis possible, that there cannat be any question ofany part ofa federal State breakmg away at will. The United States waged the most sanguinary of aIl wars in human history where more people died than in the First World War, in arder ta maintain the right ofthe Union. In the case of the United Kingdom the question has not arisen in thatway. But 1 believe there was an attempt madeby one of the states of Australia, Western Australia-Australia is a federatian; 1t is called a Commonwealth-to secede. Their Constitution provides for a system of referendumthey do not caU it a plebiscite-on certain parts of legislation. They held a referendum. In that referendum, Western Australia, speaking in rough figures, by sorne 136,000 ta 76,000, voted in favour of withdrawing from the Commonwealth. This matter was immediately referred by the dissenting party ta the supreme tribilllal in the British Commonwealth. Itwas before the Statute of Westminster and therefore It was not possible for any Dominion ta have any legislation of this kind introduced, except in the British Parliament. It went to the House of Lords and the House of Lords held that it was not possible, that it was not permissible, that it wasultra vires for anyone 10 secede. There is no way in our system of government for people ta get out 11ke that. What is more, if there is ta be a reference to the people, it cannot be a reference to a particular part. It mustbe a reference 10 aIl of the Union. It is conceivable that if the whole of Australia-not Western Australia alone, but the whole of Australia-had said by majority vote, "Let Western Aastralia get out", even though the legal position might be the same, the moral and political position might have been different. 48. ne même arriérés, mais plus Royaume.:.Uni, expresse, de volonté. sanguinaire que les s'est Uni. l'Australie sion. un de applicable référendum s'est contre par monwealth trêe cor.séquent d'introduire devant renvoyée que vait conque. pas façon. c'est être population. entière séparation wealth, point sous 49. tation s'adresser et Etat 49. So when people speak about plebiscites, about reference ta public opinion, it is not as though you take any particular area and say: What about it? In tbis case no State would be able to remain entire. 1 had not intended to developthisal'gumentatthis stage, j , i 50. Therefore, when people speak about conditional accession, they may be speaking loose language, but there is no such thing as conditional accession. Once an accession is accepted, it is oomplete. Now the argument in favour of this has been that Lord Mountbatten-and it mustbe presumed that as a constitutional Governor-General he was acting with the consent of bis advisers, his ministers or members ofhis council at that time; 1 do not know who they were, but let us asswne that-wrote a letter in which it was said that there would be consultation as regards the wishes of the people, or whatever it was. , 51. 1 do not want to labour the point about" simple futurity" or make a determination about "sha11" and "will" and "wish" or "desire" or anythingofthat kind. 1 maintain, and 1 maintained in 1957, that the act of accession is complete. And this letter stands separately and its only meaning at that tim(;; '.Vas that India, having evolved out of a strong nationalist revolution, peaceful as it was, and what is more, unlike its neighbour, having adopted democratic traditions and democratic institutions, was anxious that tlJ.is accession should not me merely rubber-stamped by the Maharajah, who was not popular, but should also have the moral consent of the people. That is a11 it meant. It required a further moral reinforcement on the part of the people; and a moral reinforcement was sought not only in regard to Kashrnir but in rega.cd to a nurnber of other States. There were states, small or large in the then undivided India, the then free independent India, which were perhaps-we cannotcompareevilsbut which were perhaps far more autocratioa1Iy governed than, shaH we say, Kashmir itself. In each case we made every attempt we could to obtain an assessment of opinion, and the onlywaytodo it-and here we have good preoedent-was to do it the way the British did it. The British did not convene a constitutent assembIy. They did not ask for a plebiscite. They did not ask for oiroulation of the Independence Act in order to elicit public opinion. They negotiated with the main political party, as a great national movement, and the entire settlement of India was not on thebasis ofwhat we are accustomed to hear in these halls, of self- 52. As a national rnovement we were parallel to the National Conference in Kashmir, which had begun as a communal movement; in fact in India the earlier national movement was not necessarily as broad as it was later on. We consulted them; we consu1ted not just one individual, for it is always wrong to put up individuals and say that their opinions have changed. The whole of the nationalist movement was consulted, so we did not find ourselves in the position where we became the allies to the Maharajah against the popular movement. And that was the purpose of this phrase. 53. Then large numbers of statements havebeen made about what Ml'. Gopalaswami Ayyanger stated, about what the Prime Minister said, aboutwhatSirB. N. Rau said and sa on, and 1 hope Sir Muhammad will do us the honour, if 1 may say so, to accept the fact that not one statement is as good as another. Ml'. Gopalswami Ayyangar can be quoted in support of provisional accession, as it was called, or conditional accession. Let me quote what Ml'. Ayyanger said in sorne other statement. Ml'. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, who preceded me here, and who was the Minister of State at that tîme, has been quoted times without number, and it is possible to do that because no member ofthe Security Council, with aU the troubles They have in their own countries and in other countries, can be expected to read aIl this. He was quoted yesterday as having said that the accession was provisional. But at the 242nd meeting of the Security Council-not on Kashmir; on Kashmir we have not held 200 meetings as yeti we have passed the hundredth meeting though Ml'. Gopalaswami Ayyangar said the foUowing: était ment de propre relire roles provisoire. sécurité mire encore M. "The instrument of accession is a document complete in itself. To the best of my memory, the instrument, in the case of Kashmir, does not contain any condition"-and you can examine the instrument; it is one application and then at the bottom of it we find the name "Mountbatten" written-"It does not state that the accession is provisional. The commitment which the Government of India made for themselves on the question ofascertaining the wishes of the people was contained in a letter accompanying the accepted instrument of accession. The Government of India is certainly bound by its commitment, but it wou!d be wrong to call the accession itself a provisional accession."!1 54. 1 shall deal Iater with the question of what is binding and what is a commitment, butIwant to establish here and now that the one person from our side who has been quoted against us, Mr. Ayyangar, has made it very clear at various times what took place. At the 285th meetingoftheSecurityCouncilof 19 April 1948, Ml'. Ayyangar stated: 54. constitue gagement, M. contre le de jj Nos jj ibid.. Third year, Nos, 16_35, p. 31, nit has been fo11owed up by India in the discharge of a11 the obligations that her acceptance of the accession has imposed upon her. She has saved the Jammu and Kashmir State from disintegration."lV 55. That is another point altogether. That is ta say, it is not as if there was a contract written on paper, signed, sealed and delivered ô by performance wehave acted as a party ta the accession. From the date of receipt of accession, we bave been responsible-and we have spent a lot of treasure in doing this-for protecting Kashmir from external aggressicnandwehave discharged the obligation of a sovereign Power. It is not as if there was merely an offer of acceptance ta no purpose; this contract has been performed to the full although it is wrong ta speak about contracts bath in regard ta marriages and in regard to these relations, because status has been acquired, the status of Jammu and Kashmir in the Union of India in that it is one cf the many States in India, as integral a part of India as any of the other States or any part of Indtai it ie as Integral a part of the Union as anything else and the Union will resist anyattemptatdisintegration. It will do this for Us awn sake and also in the interests of aH the States of Asia and the worldô we will not countenance the disintegration of our country. 56. India, therefore, defends Jammu and Kashmir's status of integration. Who went there when she was attacked by the tribesmen, when, in the name of religion, those of the same religion were attacked and killed, as we sha11 show later, when the territory was being made the victim of rape, arson, 100tand murder? It was the Indian Army, the Indian people and the Kashmir people who joined in repelling the attack. India is DOW resisting those who are attacking her integrity today. Mr. Ayyangar added: "She is protecting the State's large population from the unfriendly attentions of raiders from outside. The accession therefore subsists today and will subsist even after the fighting ceases and peace and arder have been restored.".21 57. It has been said that once the raiders go, then we will do something. It did not mean once the raiders go; in fact the raiders have not gone, they are still there. The fact that they are called the army of a country which ought ta be our friend does not stop them being raiders; they are raiders into our country and they still remain there. It could not be said of them, as was said of the British Empire, that they came in a fit of absent-mindedness and stayed; theycamehere deliberately and that is that. Ëf Ibid., Third Year, ~, • Al. p. 13. Qi .Ibid. 59. Then we come ta what ia called the question of sovereignty. 1 myself would not like this ward sovereignty ta be bandied about very much because it is undefinable. It varies within the context of things, but broadly speaking, in the context of the United Nations, 1 will give you some idea of what it is. SO far as the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir is concerned, it has become the sovereignty of the Indian Union by the act of accession, by the treaty of the Maharajah with the British Crown. Both by the functional aspects of paramountcy and by the fact of accession, sovereignty resided in the Union of India, and sa when we speak of the sovereignty of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the sovereignty of the Unlon, they are interchangeable terms. The exercise of sovereignty in certain spheres would be within the State according to our Constitution, and this sovereignty has never been questioned by the United Nations. On the contrary, it has been admitted in many places, asIshall point out. It has been admitted in the assurances given by the Commission [UNCIPJ to the Prime Minister and the Government of India, and two things at least make it clearer. One is the responsibility for the security of the State. ResponsibiIity for the security of the State rests with India, and 1 wouId like ta ask the Council how, under international law or in the practice of civilized nations a country can take upon itself the responsibility for security and defence unless she is sovereign over the territory or, in the case of a Trust Territory or something like that, the responsibility has been placed upon it by international authority. 60. Responsibility for the security of the State vests in India, the Commission told us, according to the resolution of 13 August 1948. TheCommissionfurther stated that the sovereignty of the Jammu andKashmir Government over the entire territory oftheStateshall not be brought into question. This was when the question of the evacuation of Pakistan troops and local authbrities and so on wasbeingdiscussed.Assurances were given on behalf of the Commission that the sovereignty would not be brought into question. Itwas also stated that there should be no recognition of the socalled "Azad" Government, which is spokenof here as if it were another Government. It is part of the decision of the Security COUTICi! that there shaH beno recogni- 61. Thus the Government of India maintained garrisons to prevent the incursion of the tribesmen and ta guard the main trade routes, This relates to the territory now occupied by Pakistan, over which the Commission said on numerous occasions Pakistan had no authority, and in which the Government of India was ta maintain garrisons to pI-event the incursions of trihesmen-because Pakistan is not the only country with which we have a frontier; we have other international frontiers and therefore it was our responsibility to rnaintain the outer perimeter of India, The outer perimeter of India is our responsibility and aIl that lies behind that perimeter becomes our territory, 63. Sir Muhammad goes on to deal with aggression, and much ta my surprise he says it is an academic question. 1 do not know whether he had in mind the debate that goes on year after year in the Sixth Committee trying to define aggression. It rnay be that 64. This is what Sir Muhammad said: "My second Hne of argument will be that, whatever may be the merit of that part of the controversy-on one side, the claimj on the other side, the denial of it-it was after the so-caIledaggression ..." [1008th meeting, para. 21]. But with thousands of miles ofterritoryoccupiedwith, according to SOrne people, forty battalions, according to others, twenty-two battalions-they need tbousands and thousands of Pakistan troopsj they are part of the regular army of Pakistan, todaymodernized, thanks to their military allies-with aIl this, you cannot call it academic. It is almost like saying, when two people are having a fight and one man has bis hand gripping the other man's throat, "Why are you worried about this? We are together". 65. 1 continue ta quote: "... it was after theso-calledaggression, whether it be re1ated to the situation created by the incursion of the tribesmen in Oatober 1947, whether itwas the entry of the regular forces of Pakistah into 'Azad' Kashmir ... whatever may he the situation with regard ta that, it was long after these two dates that the Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 were accepted by the two Governments." [Ibid.] 66. 1 am prepared to agree with this. Butif that were sa, then why cloes Sir Muhammad l'aise the question of accession?-because accession is adrnitted in the resolutions, sovereignty is admitted in the resolutions; he cannot have it both ways. 67. Let us take it from the resolution of 13 August 1948. Whether the provisions of this resolution are capable of implementation we shaIl see later. But if the resolution of 13 August 1948 is thebeginning, then we are to examine what the position ia in relation to that resolution. On 13 August the Pakistan Government ctid not inform the Security Council-and 1 do not waut to use strong language-but withheld from it theinformation in regard to their own military position in the area Pakistan is now occupying. At the time of the 13 August resolution the Commission told us that the Pakistan GOvernment had no authority, that their troops were DOt functioning, that they were not in functional, de facto possession of the northern areas. On 13 August Pakistan had notillegall.y annexed, under the terms of ita ownConstitution, any part of the Union of India, and therefore, since 13 August and 5 January -the two resolutions must be taken together-if that ie the position, certain other things have taken place. Therefore, if for a moment they dismiss the idea-let us not quarrel about the tribesmen, and this, that, and the other-what has happened? After aIl, there are only three resolutions that the Government of India 68. l would submit that sillce the resolution of 13 August 1948 also, aggression has taken place and aggression is continuing today-I sh..1.11 deal with that in a later part of my observations. That is my main purpose in participating. There has been the occupation of the northern areasj there has been the receiving of the so-called accession from the rulers of Hunza and Nagarj there has been the occupation of Gilgit; there has been the annexation of Baltistanj there has been the taking-in of various territories even apart from the continuaI infringement, or attempt at infringement, of our borders, to which 1shall refer in a moment. Therefore the aggresclion is a cominuing aggression. 69. Sa Pakistan, in this case, begin", to look almost like a colonial Power of the nineteenth century seeking an expanding frontier and, in arder to protect one frontier, it seeks a frontier beyond that, and then to protect that frontier, it seeks a frontier further on. We had a Viceroy in India called Lord Curzon, who enunciated tbis policy of the expanding frontier until he found himself in Afghanistan, much to the discomfiture of our friends of the present time. Therefore aggression to us is not academic. 70. 1 shall have ta deal with this question of aggression again, because when 1 come to make our submission to the Security Council we shan not merely turn to Pakistan, because we do not regard ourselves as on the same plane, or the same level, with it in this matter. We shan have ta ask theSecurity Counci! where it stands in this matter. The Security Counci! has given certain assurances. The Security Council has not repudiated the Conunission. It is no concern of ours whether the Commission sent a copy of the letter to the other side or not, to Pakistan or notj that is a matter between the Commission and the Security Counci!. When that Commission-a commission appointed by the Security Council so composed that there was one nominee of the Pakistan Government, the former Government of Argentina with which at that time they had intimate connexions, and two others not nominated by either of us-when that Commission gives u"· an assurance, that assurance is given on behalf of the Security Council, otherwise these men have no position, no locus standi, and there is no need for them to come ta Indi.a or to do anything of that character. 71. Now therefore, the question of aggression as it eJdsts today is not academic. Ii ls reaI. But perhaps this may be an occasloll to dismiss thewhole question of aggression at this time. The Conncilwill remember what 1 said a whileago about the question of the liberation movement in NorthBurma. Whatactual1yhappened 72. There again, let me dispose of this issue. It has been said here that there is sorne theory somewhere that because the population of Kashmir is, in the majority, .Muslim in its religion, therefore they should accede, by sorne written or unwritten right, to Pakistan. We do not acoept this. We are not a theocratic State; we are a secular state. In our country. in our Union and under the law of civilized nations it is not religion that qualifies people for citizenslùp. New. it may be said that that is what we agreed to. We never agreed ta anything of this kind, and if anyone quotes British statesmen or parliamentary enactments, 1 would like the Council ta look at the entire text of what is being quoted. Theparliamentaryenactment. in relation to the transfer of power in India, as the representative of the United Kingdom will, if necessary, inform you later, did not concern itself with the Indian States at all.lnfact.it definitely stated that the Act had no relation whatsoever ta Indian ::;tates; it concerned only British India. Lord Mountbatten has been quoted as having told the princes somewhere, "Although you may accede toanybodyyou choose, you must take into account geographical considerations and communal representatiOlis. n 73. 1 want to say to you with the fact of authority behind me that he made no such sta~ement. What bas been quoted is what somebody said Lord Mountbatten had said. The text of his speech is in the archives of India. What he said wast that while it is true that each of you is entiUed to' accede to one or the other 00- mînion, the question of your sovereign independence, that is impractical, or your acceding ta any body YOll lîke does not arise, because you have to take into acco1U1t geographical contiguity. Not a word was said about comm1U1al composition in the address to the 74. We are a secular state. Religion is not a qualification or a disqualification in our country, and we stand by this as fast as we cano In fact, Kashmir is one of the acid tests of this. The introduction of this argument is so facile and people who do not know the in's and ou1's of this thing are at least delighted to accept it. There has been no statement on behalf of the Government of India, either by my Prime Minister or any member of the Government or by the Governor-General who was then the Head of the state, to any authority saying that communal composition was one -that is, the religious composition-of the factors in accession. What was said was "geographical oompulsions ". 75. Sa far as Kasl.mir is concerned, the State of Jammu and Kashmir-we must not forget that it is not Kashmir but Jammu and Kashmir, it is one-is oontinguous to the Union of India, it has a frontier with Pakistan, it has a frontier with Afghanistan and a frontier with China. 1 have not heard any arguments in this Council-there may be elsewhere-that parts of Kashmir should accede either ta Afghanistan or to China. But as far as Pakistan and we ourselves are concerned. they are nearer to us than to them. It ls the factor ofgeographical contiguity that is really relevant because the accession has taken place. Jammu is practicaUy part of the extension of the mainland of India, and aIl the communications and things of that character ilre taken from India. So even in regard to geographical contiguity, if you want to be very liberai on the other side, you might at least say that they are equal. But they are not. 76. In fact, it is not merely mileage that covers it, it is the whole set-up of things. So the argument that three-fourths of the population of Kashmir are Moslems and that therefore they should accede to Pakistan-is groundless for then what would happen ta the 60 million Muslims inside the Union? India today ls the third largest Muslim populated State in the world. Only Indonesia and Pakistan have more than we have. There are 63 million Muslims living in om country who are content with a secular State, who are accustomed to the habits of democracy, who are as loyally affiliated andpatriotic as a Christian, a Jew, a Buddhist, a Hindu, an Animist or anyone else in our country. How can we betray the faith that is vested in the country by our compatriots who are of another religion than the Mohammedan religion? Religionplays no part in the adherence of our people to our State. Therefore, 1 speak with sorne feeling on fuis because this is one of those things that has been put over, surprisingly enough, among Western communities which ought to be turning their faces against them. This seems ta make someappealofsomekind because there has been, in international connexions, talk of the Islamic belt and the Islamic brotherhood and this and that and the other. This sort of thing has happened in the world sa many Urnes. Today nationalism and 77. Sa there 1s no special claim in regardto Kashmir except that there could be only geographical contiguity or accession. If the Maharajah had acceded to Pakistan, we wO!1ld have accepted it because we have a large enough country andwe have large enoughtroubles of our own. That is why we said from the housetops in regard to another matter: whatever our troubles are with Pakistan, whatever Pakistan 's internaI difiiculties, whatever some foolish people may say, we have no 'desire, in spite of our past connexions, for any part of Pakistan to come into our country because we have troubles enough of our own, and, therefore, we leave it at that. So then we come ta this question of accession. 1 dispose of it in this way. probant territoire 78. What happened? Saon after the British left, the leaders of the l'eal liberatlol1 movement were imprisoned. 1 believe that at that time sorne of them were released. 1 do not quite know. One of the people whom the State authorities \Vere seeking to arrest at that time was the present Prime MinisterofKashmlÎ'. He certainly was not a liberationist sent by Pakistan. One of the people imprisoned by the Maharajah for association with the liberation movement just before independence was Pandit Nehru, who is nowthePrime lVIinister of India. So all these people are interested. At that time there came into Jammu and Kashmir, fishing in troubled waters, numbers of people who have been spoken of as raiders, whatever that means. We have no evidence to think that they came to steal a couple of caUle or go away, or somethir g of that kind. They were people who, we were told, were tl'ibesmen. 1 have not been able to find out what that h:.eans. If it is meant that they came from Trans-Pakistan, from the territory beyond the Durand Line, there is no evidence of it. But let us assume there is. If they came from beyond the Durand Line, what right has a civilized State, which was in existence either as a resuIt of an agreement between its neighbour, the British parliament and itself, to permit its territory, its fuel, its food, its communications to be used in order to permit aggression 011 a neighbouring State. That is not a practice of civilized nations. They have the right to give them sanctuary, if they want ta, but they have no right to allow them ta pass over their territory. At that time the then Prime Minister, who a few days beiore was still a citizen of India, said: "What cau we do, they are our co-religionists?", and this idea of religion was raised again. And sa people came day after day. permettre temps, 79. l have no desire to repeat what 1 said before. If YOU refer to the proceedings, to the key which 1 have circulated, you will find entries in his diary of a i1 -1 .i... ",, ,j 80. The Kashmir Government protested by telegram to the West Punjab Government against armed Moslems from the Rawalpindi District infiltrating iuto the State. Protests were also made ta the Deputy Commissioner. If you know the conditions that existed there you have got ta think back fifteen years. We were the sarne country and a few people would came over this way by mistake or far the purpose of stealing cattle or for some other reason. This sort of thing happened. Anyway, protests were made. 81. Then on 6 Septembertherewasarnarkedincrease in the activities of the Pakistan troops on the main road. A patroi visited Ali Beg tweive miles south of Bhimbar. Major-General O. deT.Lovett,commanding the 7th Infantry Division, was informed. On13 September 1947 a Pc.kistan Army patrol visited Ali Beg and J Rtlai, fourteen miles soutp. of Bhimbar, bath in the State territory. 82. 1 could read from Major-General Scott's diaries further entries showing how the rate of strength increased, and by about 18 September the r8.ilway service between Sialkot and Jammu-Sialkot is in Pakistan, Jammu is with us-was suspended by the Pakistan authorities. 1 will tell you why they should not have done H. It was suspended by the Pakistan authorities without any reason and in contravention of the standstill agreement. Armed e;angs entered these places, including Poonch, on the &~ateborder. On 28 September hundreds of armed men with service rifles, automatics and spears, attacked aState patrol near Chak Aldm. Hundreds of armed Pathans entered State territory on 30 September. The Jammu and Kashmir Government protested on 3 October telegraphically to the Pakistan Government that hundreds of armed people from Muxree bills in Pakistan were operating in Poonch; they were also protesting the lack of essential supplies, including petrol, rice, salt and cloth, which were being withheld. llThe fighting broke out with renewed activity by armed men in the Chirala area, near the Jhelum River. There was fighting hetween raiders and State forces." State forces went into operation. Whatever may be the opinion of the Maharajah and his Government, he had the responsibility of protecting his State against raids from outside. "Pakistan has eut off from Kashnùr her supplies of petrol, etc.n 83. The economic boycott, again, is a violation of an agreement. The Maharajah. in his wisdom or lack of it, instead of acceding to one Dominion or the ather -which would have been better for him, for better or worse-asked for what is called a stand-still agreè- ment. Until he could make up his mind ta accede to anybody, he wanted both India and Pakistan ta maintain the normal amenities of life, such as, post office communications, and sa on. Kashmir regards salt as a very essential requirement-salt, petrol and things of that kind; trade relations, post office communications, and aIl those things. 84. 1 notice that it is implied in Sir Muhammad's observations that this stand-still agreement constitutes some recognition of Pakistan's sovereignty or paramountcy, or something of that kind. The fact that the Jammu Government asked for a stand-still agreement with regard to posts and telegraphs simply means that there was one postal and telegraphsystemfor the whole Union before partition, for the whole of what is called the sub-continent. Sorne letters go this way. sorne go that way. They had the same arrangement with us. They asked India for a stand-still agreement• We said, nWe are prepared ta discuss any agreement with you. Come over and talk about it." But by the time they could come over andtalkaboutit, the standstill agreement had beeu made with Pakistan, it had beeu violated, and an economic boycott was imposed by Pakistan. And an economic boycott in these essen- Ual commodities of life is very hard on a population such as that of Jammu and Kashmir. 85. So it was violated, and these raids had come through over hundreds of miles of Pakistan territory. They were weIl organized and weIl disciplined, and no one in the world who knows anything about these things could say that these were all raiders coming to 11ft cattle. They were Led by Pakistan officers. It is quite true that there were some guerrillas among them, as Pakistan Îs discovering now, but they were properly led. They were officered by the Pakistan Army.There appeared on the scene a general called General Tarig. It sounds like a Phillips Oppenheîm story, or something like that. General Tarig was none other than a commissioned general of the Pakistan Army who afterwards was dismissed-probably because he was tao enthusiastic-but he is coming back through the rear door. Anyway. there was a General Akber Khan. who aiso was operating in the area. By that time these raiders had reached a very large number and had taken on the aspect of a large army. 87. Then, later, Lord Mountbattenadvised Mr. Jinnah of the strength of the Indian foroes at Srinagar and of their likely build-up in the next few days. That is ta say, the Indian Army, havingentered andhavingpushed baok the tide of invasion almost within a few hours of its approaoh ta and possible saoking ofSrinagar_they were turned back at the airfield-Lord Mountbatten advised them of the large build-up. He told him that he oonsidered the prospect of the tribesmen entering Srinagar in any force was now remote. This led Mr. Jinnah to make his first general proposaI, which was that both sides-he had placed himself on a plane of equality by then-meaning Pakistan and ourselves, should withdraw at once and sirnultaneously. Then Lord Mountbatten asked him to explain MW the tril:esmen could be induced to removethernselves,hehaving told us before that he had no influence. His reply was, "If you do this, 1 will caU the whole thing off." They were the people over whom he had no influence. We at least suggest that the public propaganda line that the invasion was wholly beyond Pakistan 's control was not true. 88. On 22 December, protE1sts having failed to bear fruit. the Government of lndia formaUy asked the Government of Pakistan to deny the raiders all access to the use of Pakistan territory in operations against Kashmir-"all mi1J:t<"iry and other supplies, an other kinds of aid that might tend to pralong the present struggle". lt was a normal request for a Government to make. Even today, if a ilnited States airplane_or a United Kingdom airplane, for that m~tter-wants to fly over our territory, they ask our permission and we give it. They do not justwalkthrough anywhere, sa to speak. That is a normal custorn. And if the airplane is 10aded with any goods of a military character and touches down and, if we sa wish, we go and inspect it. The sarne applies ta us. That is normal international practioe. Sa we asked them ta deny aid, and as the Prime Minister has said in one of the letters that was read the other day, it was easy for Pakistan ta stop these troops because they had to come by bridges which' could either have been very easily defended or obstructed, or could have been blown up. Therefore, 89. This was an undeclared war against our country, in regard to the facts of which this Council was deceived by the Pakistan Government and its representatives. On 30 December 1947 the Prime Minister of Pakistan said: "As regards the charges of aid and assistance ta the invaders by the Pakistan Government, we emphatically repudiate them. On the contrary •.. , the Pakistan Government have continued ta do al! in their power to discourage the tribal movements by all means short of war." If that is the position, how does Pakistan clairn a position in Kashmir, in this territory it has occupied, and then talk about the tribesrnen and things of that character? 90. On 1 January 1948 India camE! to the Security Council and requested it tocan upon Pakistanta put an end immediately to the giving of suchassistance-that is to the raiders-"which is an act of aggression against India." Sorne doubt has been expressed-unfortunatelY by people who oughtto knowbetter-whether we have ever complained about aggression. Tt is quite true that we came here under Chapter VIof the Charter, and not under Chapter VII. largely because, as 1 have said, fifteen years ago we had been, only a few days before the complaint, members of the sarne nation and the sarne country. Conditions were different. But we said that it was aggression even then. It was an act of aggression against India. 1 am sarry ta say that the gentleman who sits oppasitelfl-e, on 15 January 1948, tald this Council solemnly: "•.. the Pakistan Government emphatically dl;1ny that they are giving aid and assistance ta the socalled invaders or have committed any act of aggression against India. On the contrary, and solely with the object of maintaining frienctly relations between the two Dominions, the Pakistan Qovernment have continued ta do all in their power ta discourage the tribal movement by ail means short ofwar. "The allegation made by the Indian Government that the Pakistan Government is affording aid and assistance ta 'Azad' Kasbmir forces, or that these forces have bases in Pakistan territory. or thatthese forces are being trained by Pakistfl,n officers orare being supplied with arms or material bY the Pakistan Government is utterly unfounded."lQj 1 submit that this is contr~ryta the facto What is more, it was either @.t that ~ime or a mUe beiore pr after, J!Y Ibid., ThJrd year. Supplement for November 1948. document SjllüO, alinel( 6. A in-Chief-we have evidence of this and we will show it i to you if you want-inspected the troops, and egged 1 them on to fight; but in any case here was the Govt ernor-General giving orders ta his Chief of Staff ta i wage war against India. ,j t j 91. At the 229th meeting, held on 17 January 1948- l,j which is an important date bec3use at that time the Security Counci! passed a resolution which was oneof 1 the few resolutions they accepted-Sir Muhammad ! Zafrulla Khan, then Pakistan's Foreign Minister, who, , 1 therefore assume, spoke with authority and knowl- ] edge, solemnly stated in the Security Council: J "One matter to which attention is drawn in the lndian statement is that the tribesmen, when they captured Baramulla, committed certain atrocities, including atrocities against the inmates of the local couvent there. 1 have no knowledge and my Government has no knowledge with regard ta what has actuaUy been happening inside the Kashmil:" State, except sa far as reEorts have appeared or communtcations have been directly addressed ta my Government. nl!/ ,, , f, , 1, , , And these are the raiders against whom armoured cars and aIl the panoply of force of the Indian Armywithin the short time available to us after receiving aIl the applications for accession-had to be used, and it took us four months before the Indian Army roHed back the tide of invasion. It was no joke. 92. Sir Muhammad knew ail about this because, according to Father Shanks, the Roman Catholic Father of St. Joseph's Convent, GeneraI Cunningham, who was the Governor of the North-West Province of Pakistan -unhappily no longer in existence, a!'!.d not bya plebiscite-sent troops to Baramulla to rescue Father Shanks. In a statement made as late as June 1958, Father Shanks said: "At the end of Mass, there was a thunderous knock at the door of the ward, and we thought that the end had come. It happened to be our rescue convoy, sent by Sir George Cunningham, Governor of the northwestern frontier province of West Pakistan. And the rest of that day was spent in getting our belongings together in preparation for the trek out of Kashmir under the protection of a Mahsud officer and sorne non-commissioned men belonging to the regular army." 93. 1 shall have something to say about these individuals later. Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, who represented India at that time, also informed this Couneil on 19 April 1948, before Sir Muhammadmade his admission in confidence to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan at Karachi on 8 May that: !1' Ibid.• Third Year, Nos. 1_15; p, llS. We had been observing the action at one of these fronts. At a subsequent meeting of the Security Council, ending in the adoption of itsresolutionon 21 April 1948, Sir Zafrulla Khan did not deny this. 94. There is other evidence. A gentlemen called Lord Birdwood, who is very weIl known tothe United Kingdom delegation, though he is no friend of ours as he does .not apprOve of us very much, has written a book on Kashmir.!1fHe says: "Once again 1 draw attention to the obscurity surrounding the first use of Pakistan regulars in the war." General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, in so far as they are prepared to discuss the matter, assured us that no regular unit was moved before May. That is the date when Sir Zafrulla Khan admitted that armies had gone. A battery of mountain guns with infantry escort were in action in an unsuccessful attack on Poonch on 17 March. Again on 21 March, General Kalwant Singh of the Indian Army had ta abandon an attempt to land on the Poonchairstrip, since it was under artillery tire. The tribesmen had no artillery. Hewas, however, able ta arrange for the landing of 25-pounder guns of the Indian Army, which were effective in saving Poonch for the Indians. On the Indian side, General Russell believed that regular troops were involved. He accordinglY asked to be relieved of his commando That is to say, it was one of the unwritten la.ws of the Government of India that they would oot ask British personnel ta engage in any combat where Pakistaois were involved. We did oot waJ.;lt British officers to he involved in this trouble. General Russell had opted ta serve India. He was in command and,underthoseconditions, he withdrew. 95. The Foreign Minister, 8ir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan. informed the members of the Commission-in confidence-that the Pakistan armies had at thattime, on 8 May, three brigades ofregular :troops in Kashmir, that troops had been sent into the State during the Brst half of May. Sir Muhammad stated that these measures had been taken as a result of the spring offensive of the Indian Army. 96. The Indian Army had a right to be in Kashmir. It was sent there to protect that territory against invaders. And if any other army came to push them back, then from that point of time they became allies of the raiders. Sir Muhammad went on to say that the three main reasons-as is stated in the United Nations Commission IS tirst report-which had motivated the !Y Ibid., No. 60, 285t11 meeting, p. 10. 1lI Christopher 8romhead Birdwood, A Continent Decides. (L<lndon, Robert Haie Ltd.. 1953). :1, c'l l1 --j,, ·1, -1 i 97. The United Nations Commission in the same report states: IIThe statement of the Foreign Minister of Pakistant to the effect that Pakistan 'troops had entered the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. and later bis reply to a Commission questionnaire that aIl forces fighting onthe 'Aza:d' side were 'under the over-all command and tactical direction of the Pakistan Army', confronted the Gommission with an unforeseen and entirely new situation. "According to the Security Council's resolution of 17 January, the Government of P~kistan was requested to inform the Security Council immediately of any material change in the situation. In a letter addressed to the Security Council, the Pakistan Government agreed ta comply with this request. The Government of Pakistan had, however, not informed the Security Couneil about the presence of Pakistan troops in the Stat.e of Jammu and Kashmir. Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan explained that, sinee the Commission had been charged to deal with the problems related to the India-Pakistan question, bis Government thought that the information should instead be given to it by the CommissionfI_it was so confidential- "but he had been unable to do tbis previously because of the delay in its arrivaI on the sub-continent".ill But he had not had any difficulty in communicating other matters ta the Security Council and, althoughon the one hand they denied it, on the other hand they were bound by the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948, and subsequently the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan himself admitted that the Azad forces were under the over-aH command of the Pakistan Army. They glibly told UNCIP that they had been there since 8 May because if they had not gone there, India would have gone there, 98. The view of the Commission on this matter is important. In paragraph 4 of the appendix to Annex 27 of the Commission's report they stated: "The Security Couneil resolution of 21 April 1948 1 which sets forth the terms of reference ofthe Commission, was adopted with cognizance of the presence of Indian troops in the state of Jammu and Kashmir ..•" In other words, the Security Council could not be expected to abet a crime. They passed this resolution and asked that nobody else come in, knowing that the Indian Army was there. There was no secret about it; "The presence of Pakistan troops in Jammu and Kashmir, however, constitutes a material change in the situation inasmuch as the Security Council did not contemplate the presence af such troops in that State, nor was it apprised thereofbytheGovernment of Pakistan. Il 99. A member of the Commission, writing later, on 7 July-Mr. Korbel, who, l must say in fairness, was our nominee on the Commission, but still he was a member of the Commission and did not always take the view that we did-wrote as follows: "Bir Zafrulla gave the Commission a three-hour discourse on his concept of the background of the Kashmir conflict."-rather a short one-"His tone was calm, his language precise, and, following the best traditions ofhis English schooling, his narration was broken by good staries. Then came the tirst bombshelI. Bir Zafrulla Khan informed the Commission that three Pakistan brigades had been in Kashmir territary since May. He explained the measure as an aet of self-defence •.. "The Commission explained to the Pakistanis that the movement of these troops into foreign territory without the invitation of that territory 's Government was a vi.olation of internationallaw." 100. l wanf you ta ponder this. It is one of severa! statement8 that l am going to cite in which representatives of the Security Council have said, asthey have done on repeated occasions, that internationallawhas been violated by acts of aggression. That i8 the first one. Then later, in May of 1949, Sir Owen Dixon, a rnember of the Australian judiciary, who can by no rneans be regarded as a partisan of India-his country i8 a military ally of Paki8tan-said: "... l was prepared to adopt the view that when the frontier of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was crossed, on l beIieve 20 October 1947, "_that is before the accession-"by hostile elements, it was contrary ta international law, and that when, in May 1948, as l believe, units of the regular Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the State, that too was inconsistent with inter:naUonal law." 101. l am inforrned by my staff that the President would like ta have a recess.

l should merely like to ask whether the representative of India would prefer to have a littte recess now or whetherhe would prefer••.• 103. Mr. Krishna MENON (India): li the Council wants to have a recess, l have no objection. It does not inconvenience me. 106. Now we come ta this other matter. As 1 said, much has been made of the kînship in religion, which is the aUeged basis of the "claims n that Kashmir should be part of Pakistan-right or wrong. First of aIl, it was said that this is a liberation movement of the Kashmir people, mainly Moslems suppressed bya Hindu Maharajah. 1 gave aU the facts in connexion with it, and our views and sentiments on the matter are weIl known. 107. But now let it also be stated here that a great many atrocities were committed, atrocities of which Sir Muhammad had no knowledge; it is a great pity that the Foreign IVIinister of a neighbouring country had no knowledge of the atrocities that went on, while fanciful atrocities are known. Therefore, 1 want to deal with the first phase of this invasion, not in order ta purvey the so-called atrocities, being accustomed to much cruelty in the world, but in arder to refute the argument that this was a Muslim rescue opel'ation or Muslim and Hindu domination. 108. The people who died in Kashmir were, by a large majority, people of the Islamic faith-men, women and children. The people against whom the worst at:l:"ocitles were practised were not Hindus merely, but Christian missionaries. And the evidence on this does not come from the Government of India but from others, such as United States journalists, who have been by no means friendly to Inclia in the discussion of this problem, and certainly not ta me. Therefore, we can take that as moreorless impartial evidence. There is photographic evidence taken by an Associated Press photographer at that time, presum.. ably an AmeriC<L, who flew ovet' a sectionof Kashmir and saw villages in flames. The villages, in an area of ten miles long by ten mil~s wide, had apparently been set on fire by the inv~'-\ers, who were scouring the valley and moving in the direction of Srinagar. 109. So there was no question of a frontier loot. It was a well_planned attack on the capital city, of Srinagar-because he who dominates Srinagar domi- 110. Then, on 10 November, a few days after the entry of the Indian Army, therewas a report by Robert Trumbull, The New York Times correspondent. And here 1 want to say that while 1 am obliged to quote a newspaper report, 1 will not. quote their opinions. 1 am quoting oilly a description of facts. Now Trumbull has written a great deal against the Government of India, about our shortcomings and that sort of idea. He lived in India for five or six or seven years. 1 was in Jar.'ln at the time, 1 believe. He said the following. under dateline of Baramulla is a town of sorne thirty miles from Srinagar, where roost of the atrocities took place. Now he said: IIThe city had been stripped ofits wealthand young wornen before the tribesmen fled in terror at midnight Friday beiore the advancing lndian Army. Surviving residents estim!ite that 3,000 of their fellow townsmen, including four European nuns and a retired British Army officer known oruy as Colonel Dykes and his pregnant wile, were slain. When the raiders rushed into town on 26 Cctober, witnesses said one party of Mahsud tribesrnen immediately scaled the walls of Saint Joseph's Franciscan Convent compound and stormed the convent hospital and little church. Four nuns and Colonel Dykes and his wife were shot immediately. The raiders' greed sometimes triurnphed over their blood lust. A former town official said the raiders forced350 local Hindus into a house with the intention of burning it down. The group ofIfJO raiders is said to be holding another 500 as hostages on a high mountain barely visible from the town. Today, twenty-four hours after the Indian Army entered Baramulla, only 1,000 were left out of a normal population of about 14,000." 111. 1 hope you will forgive me if 1 say that at Baramulla lies buried the flower of the Indian Army. Not one of the personnel who weQt out ta combat these pt:ople returned alive to his home. Commanding them was a Muslim officer. AlI lie dead. burled in that sail and our country, if nothing else, owes a debt of gratitude to these people who defended our territory at that time. 112. Here lS another account from Father Shanks, one of the Christian missionaries working inthe areanot in the pay of the Government. It is a story that Father Shanks would never tell in the beginning. He describes the attack on the convent, without givinghis own name, as follows: t'The tribesmen-great wild, black beasts they were-came shooting their way down from the hills on both sides of the town. They climbed over the hospital walls from all sidRs. The first group burst into a ward, firing at the patients. Atwenty-year-old Indian nurse. Philomena, tried to protect a Muslim j 1 1l '11 1, j -! Here cornes a story wherein, irrespective of other considerations, one likes to paya tribute to the young man: "As the tribesmen raised their rifles, a young Afridi officer, who once studied in a convent sohool at Peshawar, rushed in and stopped them. ft At least there are living characters with humanqualities in these incidents. nHe had been told his men were raiding a convent and had run aU the way from town. That saved a11 our lives for a few seconds. Il 1 should be wanting in decency if 1 did not express the appreciation of our people fur thecourageous conduct of this young man who, although he was on the other side-he was a Pakistan officer-did not fear the Afridi tribesmen. "We did not find Mrs. Dykes until the following day. She had been thrown down a weIl." 113. Another report: "A Pakistan Army convoy was sent ta rescue us. On the way from Baramulla westoppedatthe village of Boniyar to seek the staffoftheWorld-Wide Evangelistic Crusade Mission. At Baramulla the townspeople told me of a ymmg Muslim shop-keeper who had sacrificed his life rather than recant in bis creed of religious tolerance. His martyrdom had taken place almost under the shadow of the convent walls, and in the memory of the devoted Kashmiris he was fast assuming the stature of a saint." 114. Here we have a report, again from a distinguished American photographie journalist, Margaret Bourke-Whîte, and 1 will quote a little from her l:!ook HaIf-way to Freedom W: "He, Mir Maqbool Sherwani, must have been a sort of Robin Hood character from the stories the townspeople told me, championing peasants who § Margal'et BOllI'ke-White• .!:!alfwayto Freedom, New York. Simon and Schuster, 1949. 115. This is perhaps the occasion here to say, in reference to the Indian Army and to the pushing back at Baramulla and sa on that, as a matter of historical fact, the first resistance to the trîbesmen, to the raiders, to the Pakistanis who came in, did not come from the Indian Army. They were a long tUne in coming because the accession had not taken place and when it did they hadtobeshippedover. But the unclad, half-starved men, women and children of Kashmir, with nothing to help them but bare arms and bamboo sticks-they were the people who feIt the call of their soil and rallied ta the defence of their country and their fellow beings. They were the people who offered the first resistance, sa that when people speak of liberation or co-religionism, or whatever it i8, let us remember that they were the people who offered the first resistance ta theferooious invasion that came along. Soon afterwards oame the Army of India, at a time when partition had divided praotically every unit. There was not a single unbroken unit in the'Army of India at that time, because the soldiers had been allowed to opt for one 8tate or the other. Gandhi was alive at that time. 1 saythisbecauseit Is now fashionable to speak about the image of Jodia, and even if you beat us black and blue we shall take it. Gandhi was alive at that time, and the Prime Minister records that ln the anguish of his heart at the fact that sa saon after independenoe his country should be involved in war, he went to him for counsel. Gandhi, than whom no greater man of peace evel' lived. said: "your duty is ta repel the invasion"; and the Army went in. We are not relying on the authority of a great man who is no longer with us, but this should be known to the world. qui, ces hisseurs, cipe, tance d'eux. alors Du noncer une à alors de jusqu'au sibilité." et de temps oonseîl. aient repousser n'avons llautorité réponse monde 116. 1 have no desire ta recount atrocitîes in this way. but in the whole tale of the invasion of Kashrnir, until it became more or less a regular war, it was the forces of India-not by superiority of numbers or even by superiority of equipment, because we had the same, what the British left us-which rolled back the invasion and-after coming ta the Security Couneil here, not under compulsion as sorne people think, but because of the desire of the Government and the people of India-whioh stopped the bloodshed. 116. des de elle ce du que qui devant nous mais du sions 117. What about the cease-fire? It was not an army in retreat, but an army belonging to a oountry and a 117. n'est 118. That brings me to the next stage ofthe observations of Sir Muhammad. As we were told, the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 form a landmark to use as a starting point of the argument that under those resolutions we had made certain promises and given certain undertakings. and things of that character. Theo, It was once saidthat Pakistan \Vas Dot bound by international obligations. 1 was told at that time that Krishna Menon ls like the young man who said to his priest, "The Koran says do not go to prayer." 1 was told that I.had quoted only balf, and then the representative of Pakistan said that what the Koran really said was "Do nQt go ta prayer when you are in a state of drunkenness." 1 am rot a student of the Koran, but 1 happen to have sorne familiarity with it and so I1ookedupthepassage. \Vhat it said was, "Do not go ta prayer whenyou are in a state of drunkennessj wait until you have sobered down and have humility in your heart. Il '1 -i -, 119. Sa we come to these resolutions, andevenat the risk of tryingyourpatience, the resolutionof13 August 1948 was accepted by India longbeforeitwas accepted by Pakistan. It was discussed withus;obviouslyit was a compromise in the sense that any resolution we needed to accept was one calling upon Pakistan to vacate its aggression. In spite of that, we agreed to certain things, first of all 1 want to put to you the format of the resolution. It is in three parts, and of those three parts each follows from the other. Part 1 deals with the cease-fire and certain things that follow from it, then COmes part Uwith three sections, A, Band C, then cornes part III. j i, 120. Part 1 of the resolution. it is our subm-ission. has not been implemented. Sir Muhammad said yesterday that the Commission had said part 1 had been implemented; but 1 think it is necessary to look at the date when the Commission said this and at what happened afterwards. Part 1 of the resolution is this: "Cease-fire order "A. The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that their respective High Commands will issue separately and simultaneously a cease-fire arder to apply ta aIl forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as oftheearliestpracticable date or dates ta be mutually agreed uponwithin four days after these proposais have been accepted by both Governments." Now there is a cease-fire. We will not go into the question of who it was that fired first or lastj that does not matter. There is a cease-fire. Afterwards our officers went to Karachi and drew certain demarcations, and 50 forth, and the cease-fire had been established. That is to say, this is an elaboratioll of the Counai! resolution of 21 April 1948.ill When the Commission said that part 1 had been implemented, it was thinking in terms of the cease-fire being implemented, and at that time it was not aware that the augmentation of these forces was taking place. 1t is known on the evidence of Pakistan authorities thernselvesthat there was a considerable increase in the military potential, and not only in Jammu and Kashmir, There is evidence bath from their own sources and from elsewhere of the construction of additional military bases along the western border of Jammu and Kashmir-one at Kharian, buUt with United States mîlitary aid, where the Pakistan Armoured Division is stationed, and another, the eantonment at Domel, whieh was opened in September 1961; further construction and extension of airfields and airfield controls at Skardu, Gilgit and Askardas, south-west of Hunza, and one near Mangla; the construction of strategie roads and bridges ta ensure safe Hnes of communication; the constructionof an all-weather road from Swat to Gilgit. along the Indus, several sections ofwhichhave alreadybeencompleted. Important weapons have beeu procured by Pakistan, but 1 will not go into the details concerning them, for other reasons. 1 am, in a certain sense, ta a degree restrained; 1 do not want to spread this out further than need be. 122. In spite of the fact that India IS total area is nearly four times that of Pakistan, its population about five times that of Pakistan, with a land frontier of 8,500 miles and a coastlineof 3,500 miles, the proportion of defence expenditures ta bath the total revenue and the national income is much less than that of Pakistan. India's total defen::e expenditure, on bath revenue and capital accounts-I am not talkingaboutthis year; but Iast yearlsbudget-and that of the last six years-the budget is before Parliament now, sa 1cannat include this year-has beenonan average of 32 pel' ceut of .its total central revenues and about 18.6 pel' cent of the total central and states revenues, On the ather hand, Pakistan IS defence expenditures, including the cast of military equiprnent receivedthrough foreign military aid, during the same period, has beeu on the average 55.7 pel' cent of its total revenues and 35 pel' cent of internaI and states revenues. On the basis of the national incorne of the two countries also, it cau be seen that Pakistan has been spending, -in comparison to Indla, much more on defence. In 1960-1961 the national income of Pakistan was estimated at $4,520 million. The defence expenditure was $240 million, forming 4.6 pel' cent of the national incarne. In the same year the national incarne of India was estimated at $28,400 million and the defence expenditure at 123. 80 this ia the position regarding the military balance between the two countries. But we are not dealing \Vith that only. Saon after the cease-fire Pakistan occupied this area. As 1 said a while aga, Us armies \Vere reorganized. We hear about the "'Azad 1 forces", the "'Azad' battalions". the "over-all command"-in other \Vards, a general military occupation where the United Nations Commission had talked ouly about local authorities maintaîning law and arder and, where their forces were not sufficient. of callingupan the Indian Government ta pravide them. The United Nations resolution-I read it ta you-and the assurances given said that the Government of India was ta garrison and guard the routes in Gilgit and the northern areas. We were told by the Commission that there was no evidence of the Pakistan Army or of anybody else having any command cverthesenorthel'n areas, so-called; but now they are part of the tel'ritories of Pakistan by forceful occupation. i 1 1,, j 124. Now we come to paragraph E of part 1 of the resolution of 13 August: "E. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan agree to appeal to their respective peoples ta assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable ta the promotion of further negotiations. " 1 am free ta confess that there are newspapers in India-if you call them newspapers-though sometimes they are not as restrained as are some others. They are usually quoted by Pakistan and by certain others, but we do not read them very much in India. 1 get a free copy; a papel' usually attacks me, and therefol'e they send me a free copy. But duringthe whole of this period it was an article of faîth in Pakistan to indulge in what is called a "jehad", that is a holy war, against India, and that holy-war campaign went on over the radio, in the Press and everywhere else. Therefore, psychological warfare was going on at that time. But even aside from that tangible factor, the fact was that the position as a cease-fire on the basis of which the Council said that part 1 was implemented, did not obtain. We should have remembered whenseriouslydiscussing this that aIl ofthese arrangements were thought of in this connexion: a cease-fire today; in a few weeks' time, in a few days' time, maybe, a demarcation; a few days afterward, negotiations, a truce; andthenthe whole thing will be over in a year's tîme. 126. Section A, paragraph 1, states: "1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State ofJammuandKashmirti-these are not my words; they are the words of the resolution-~constitutes a material change in the situation since it \Vas represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Governll1ent of Pakistan agrees ta withdraw its troops from the Stat!'!.!! Is there anyone in Pakistan or anywhere else who would say that today the same troops are not there, after twelve years, and that they have not been augmented-not only that they have not been augmented, but that the quality of their equipment has not been improved? And there are other circumstances which will be dealt with later. 127. Paragraph 2 reads: 127. "2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting." Cette TItis also has not been implemented. 128. Paragraph 3 reads: 128. "3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission." First of aIl, the evacuation has not taken place; it is an occupied area. The local authorities 110 longer adminis1er in this area. There is the so-called "Azad" Government, which is under the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs in the Pakistan Government. The Secretary- General, or somebody. gives orders. This ia a kind of colony of the Pakistan Government. Therefore no local authorities entered into the concept at the time these resolutions were drafted. The sovereignty was that of the Union, and we simply agreed ta the local authority as a de facto matter; they were there, and when you want arder maintained you give them assist- Tout est nistrent "azad". affaires secrétaire sorte les choses élaborées: principe que "1 J i -~., Ill. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred ta in part n, A, 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India ta the Security Counci! •.• that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees ta begin ta withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages t6 be agreed upon with the Commission. Il 129. The next paragraph, paragraph 2, states that "the Indian Government will maintain within the lines II_and 1 will ask you to note the plural, there were Hnes of resistar.ce and tines of action and sa on-"existing at the moment of the cease-fire those forces of its Army which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary ta assist the local authorities in the observance of law and order ..•. " 130. Wnere in this is the sovereignty of Pakistan or any UUe of Pakistan to be in the territory of Kashmir? Then we are told that we have not implemented, that we have not withdrawn this, that or the other. Our submission, first of an, is that an of paragraph 1 has not been implemented. It has been unimplemented by the introduction of more forces, more airfields, by occupation, by keeping the îllegal accession of Hunza and Nagar and an these places, and, what is more by the generalization of thepositiollof "Azad" as a kind of State which, under the assurance that was givento us, ought never ta be. 131. If part 1 had been implemented and section A of part Il had been impIemented, thentheobligationwou1d have fallen upon the Government after notification by the Commission; but no commission has notifiedusso far that this has been done-how cou1d it? Then it is up to us ta withdraw the bulk of our troops. It states in part II, B. paragraph 1. that: "the Government of India agrees to begin ta withdraw the bu1k of its [orees from that State in stages 132. Then cames the part III of this resolution upon which a great deal of play has been made, alxmt a thing called the plebiscite. Part III states: "The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and ta that end, upon acceptance of the truce agreement, bath Governments agree ta enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fairandequitable conditions •.• " There is no question of our entering into consultations with them. If these two are implemented, then we will go ta the Commission and say, "What should he done about it? ". It is from tbis part III that the resolution of 5 January 1949 arises. Il tions dentes la faire que 133. 1 want to submit to you that ~he 5 January resolution is more a plan, that is ta say, that if aIl this has been implemented, and if after aIl consultations of the Commission something ha.;; to be done about it, then it was suggested that this should be tried. There has been no commitment at any time by the Government that it should be tried. There has been no comroitment at any Ume by the Government of India that they would hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. A plebiscite has been discussed, it is part of theplan. In any case, it would become operable after parts 1. II and III of the agreement had been implemented; but they have not been implemented. 133. lution si référé avec de marohe nullement mire. une nière première, qui 134. Now we come to this question of the plebiscite. First of aIl, 1 say that whateve::.- Lord Mountbatten might have written about the wishes of the people, what the Prime Minister has said, what other people have been quoted as saying', in part or in whole, they do not necessarily mean a plebiscite. Yet the plebiscite idea came into the forefront with the principle of self-determination during the First World War. At the Peace Conference of 1919 the Am-erican technical experts were: "almost without exception, opposed to the use of plebiscites, recognizing the weakness of any definite solution which they might recommend but believîng that it was better that the decîsion taken should be definite and immediate rather than involve the delay that would follow on a plebiscitel!. 134. biscite. batten lation, d'autres totalité les L'idée cours temps Conférence ricains l'organisation faiblesses recommander immédiate aux 135. The Italian delegation was very concernedabout this and they were anxious to avoid general acceptance of the plebiscite principle and this came out plainly in the peace negotiations. 135. cette ment générale "But H is seldom that an annexation plebiscite can be taken on sa sil._ple an issue. When the question is one of uniting several fragments of a nation in a single state, tbere must alwaysariseafurtherquestian of the constitution to he adoptedi and tbis can never be simple." This is from one of the official British Foreign Office Peace Handbooks. 137. Then we come to France. In regard ta the annexation of Avignon to France, Mattern states!1lthat Pope Pius VI sent a protest to the Catholic Powers of Europe, opposing the incorporation "as a manifest violation of the law of nations Il condemning the revolutionary charaeter of the theories involved in such plebiscites and expressing criticisrn of the resuIt of the votes. ,] .j 138. The United States of America, with aIl of its constitutional history, has. been one of the opponents of the plebiscite. In the United States the consent of the inhabitants of the territories annexed need not and has not been asked. The act of annexation derives Hs legal force "from the body which enacts it, and it would be an error to hold its legal force necessarily dependent upon a consent obtained from some other source •.. " There is, according to the sarne authority, no reason why Congress could not make an annexation dependent upon the consent of the population of the territory to be annexed-that is what may be stretched out in our case-"but this is not a matter of legal necessity. Nor i8 there any principle of public law, or general precedent from our own practicelt-thatis, of American practice-ltthat requires the consent of the population of an annexed territory ta be obtained. In none of the instances, except that of Texas, has the United States deemed tbis consent necessary". , i\,, J 1 139. The British Government's attitude in this question of popular consent is found in the statement made in the House of Lords by the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Marquis of Salisbury. The Marquis of Salisburysaidon19 June 1890: "The plebiscite is not among the traditions of the country. We have not taken a plebiscite, and 1 see no necessity for doing so ...• " 140. The international authority, Professor Mattern had said: "While the plebiscite has been considered in its international aspects by a long list of commentators, of advocates and opponents, the institution has, J1J Johannes Mattern, The employmenr of .he plebiscite in the de. termina.ion of sovereignty. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1920, 1 could read a great deal amut this. On the present Je position under constitutional law, ProfessaI' Mattern encore. had said: regard estime Cette général à ce HL nement mire ne Etats-Unis cette venir tiplier "No State can, at the present Ume, from the point of view of constitutional law recognize the right of secession founded upon the principle of selfdetermination •.• " This is not in opposition ta the general principle of self~determination, that is, of unîty inside aState. Professor Mattern continues: "By doing so it would invite its own destruction. For in every modern State there may be found, at one time or other, groups sufficiently dissatîsfied with the conduct of the majority or of a ruling minority to demandareleasefromtheiraIlegiance .•." 141. If the argument is that the Government of Pakistan does not think that the people of Kashmir want to be in the Union of India and, therefùre, cannot be, 1 would cite the instance of the United States as regards the annexation of Hawaii. The Japanese said, that they should not go there. That did not prevent Hawaii from becoming part of the United States. Instances of this kind can be rnultiplied. 142. tion Pakistan pense de plébiscite vêt née mentaires, accession démocratique. un et un un 142. Then we come to the whole questionofthe plebiscite idea. 1 hope Sir Muhammad will bear with me, 1 do not think that there is anything national or personal in this matter. The whole idea of the plebiscite -1 do not mean in that form-or consultationor whatever it was, arase from our own background of parliamentary institutions with aIl its limitations, andour entering a new form of democratic government. Here we are told by a country that has not known an election for twenty-five years that we should take a plebiscite. 1 will come to that in a minute. 143. But, over and above that, if ît had been taken then and there, if conditions could have bt::ea restored -that is if there could have been not only the withdl'awal of aIl these people but also the restoration of the composition of the population-and if various other economic and similar circumstances had entered into it, then there would have been something to say for ît. However, with the change ofcircumstances-and 1shan quote the authority for this afterwards-asituationhas 143. avait avait non de de et peut-être les sujet nouvelle dehors la nous risez-vous?" qui du aris'~,\ where this just is not so. That is to say, apart from aIl commitments which we deny, there is no question. Then you may weIl ask, "What consent have you got?" Our answer is that the only party that is preventing the assessment of the opinion of the Kashmiri people is the pakistan Government. St~v~;;s~n fuat not even in his country is there electoral machinery where the law and the constitution p:-ovide the safeguards against it. Our Electoral Commission is entirely outside the competence ofgovernment, and Kashmir is under the Electoral Commission. We have no more authority over the Electoral Commission than over a high cou:rt judge, andstep by step Kashmir is now under the Electoral COmmission. 145. A great deal of play was made-because it was thought other people would not have the facts probablyabout people being returned unopposed. If people were opposed then we would be told, "Oh, they got in on a split vote". If they are not opposed, then they say it is submission. As Gladstone said, if the people protest, that is bad; if the people do not protest then they are silent; and in either case the people are wrong. 146. Sa, what is the position? ln 1934, longbefore aIl this came about, elections ta the Assembly were held community-wise-that is ta say, by communal representation. We oall it in India Muslim seats and Muslim voters, and so on and so on. And then there is the Maharajah's Government. It reminds me of the kind of parliament we hact in India also-not completely responsible, but some sort ofrepresentative assembly. As 1 say, elections ta the Assembly were held community-wise in 1934, 7he Muslim Conference-that was the ancestor to the National Conference, which was based in the beginning on a kind cf Muslim nationalism-won nine seats without contest. It is ta be supposed that they were notrepresentative?And,mind you, this was the time when the Maha:rajah's Government was in existence-the G-o...ernment about whioh we hear a great deal the other way. In 1938 the same Muslim Conference won oîneteen seats out of twentyone Muslim seats and lost the other two only on technical grounds. 147. Then we come to thetime nearer independence- 1946. Bv t time the original kind of religious natiol"\<" .,<.(1 converted into national nationalism. The ,_~nce had become the National Conference. It .<ttCÎ heco.lle the parallei ta the Congress in"' India. The Muslîm Conference, as 1 say, was converted înta a National Conference representing all communities. The ruler-that is the Maharajah-swoope1 down on tbis new party, suppressed civil liberties and stages farcical elections. The NatioMI Conference boycotted them and appealed 10 the electorate not ta cast its votes. Only 8 per cent of the electorate voted. Are we ta say that tbat also was a kind of unconstitutional action where everybody was just being obedient because the national movement was able ta get a boycott established? 149. In 1957-and this was refer .0-twenty-three candidates were returned unopposed, ten candidates withdrew and the nomination papers of ten were rejected on technical grounds. That happens in India aIl the time because there are sa many formalities ta be complied with. The Eleotion Tribunal is very strict on the law, and ifyou do not sign in the proper place the paper goes out. Thirty-two seats, on the other hand, were contested, with ninety candidates in the field. We did Ilot hear about that-thirty-two seats contested, with ninety candidates in the field. Four political parties participated, and in addition there were twenty-four independent candidates. That does not look like a Hitlerian election, does it? What is more, there are fifty-four newspapers in the Indianadministered part of Kashmir, apart from all the other methods of propaganda. Sorne opposition candidates won against the ruling party's nominees. That also was not mentioned. 149. sont irrecevables tion nombre n'est est ont on cipé dats sans sieurs des de 150. Here is a comment from the Manchester Guardian-not a paper which ls very friendly to India. The Manchester Guardian published on 20 April 1957 said: 150. Guardian, bien son "... the Jammu elections are a great and quite a genuine victory for the National Conference. "Elections in Kashmir are over. In Jammu, the National Conference was given a tough fight by the Hindu Praja Parishad, and aIl but five of the seats were contested. After strenuous canvassing and election fever, equalled only in India's most advanced parts, the National Conference won t\vo-thirds of the seats .•• n••• over 70 per cp-nt of the electorate turned out, women, men and eIders, in spite of battering rains ••. 11 comme Soixante-dix rendus au oil Guardian There is no law for compdsory election in Kashmir, as in Australia. Seventy peI' cent turned out, and this is not peculial' to Kashmir. There are constituencies in India where every vote is polled. The newspaper continued: "ln the Kashmir valley elections are over taoexcept for two seats, one in the Buddhist Ladakh and the other in Deda. Of the eight seats that were contested the National Conference won seven and "What has surprised everyone in Iudla 1$ the large number of people who have taken part in the elections both in Jammu and in Kashmir • o." 1J 151. -Now \Ve come to 1961. Thirty-four candidates \Vere returned unopposed. That wa.s referred to by Sir Muhammad yesterday. But thirty-llîne seats \Vere contested. The total votes polled were 683,929. That 18 a very large proportion of the electorate in Kashmir, \Vhioh has a population of sorne 3.5 million and a voting population of somewhere about 1,250,000, speaking from rnemory. Seven political parties participated. There were thirty-five independent candidates. The National Conference won thirty-fourseats. Now no ruling party can have, as ît were, a command opposition. Is it part of its obligation to see that an opponent wins? That would be a funny kindof election, would it not? 1 \; ;J 1 ! , i 152. The opposition parties first demanded that the elections spould be concjucted sÎmultaneously with those in the l'est of Indla. The Election Commission agreed. There yon are. The Kashmir Government ruling party tells the Election Commission, "Have the election sorne other time", but the Election Commission decides otherwise; and that is the law. Subsequently the opposition parties changed theil' mind and asked for a postponement. The Election Commissionel' turned that down also. That is to say, he did not care about one party or the other. 153. On the eve of thepolling in Jammu the opposition party asked for postponement on the plea of having discovered defects in the ballot boxes. The ballot boxes had been supplied bythe ElectionCommissioner of Indla. Now these boxes that aceording to Sir Muhammad, are put upside down, did not come from Jammu. They had been supplied by the Election Commissioner himself-he has his own administrationand the state goverument had nothing to do with this. The Election Commissioner laid down procedures for triple safeguard of the ballot boxes and instructions were issued accordingly to all returningandpresiding officers. No complaints of non-compliance with those instructions or of tampering with ballot boxes wer-e received by the Election Commissioner. In spite ofan appeal issued by the Plebiscite Front-that is the Pakistan-sponsored party-for the boycott ofthe elections, there was heavy polling. As for unopposed returns, the National Conference has not sa far found any serious rival to its position and prestige. Sinee the introduction of popular government this party has been engaged in raising living standards by planned development, and so on. 154. So when we speak about fûY'cical elections in Ka~:hmir, we have to bear in mind, first of aIl, that these elections are conducted in the same way as in 155. It would not in any way be an argument to say that things are worse in Pakistan or anywhere else. because two WI'ongs can never make a right. But on the basis of the thing itself-andIhavepointed out how the eleetions are conducted-I would not have gone iuto 80 much detail except that statements have been made in the security Council which 1 cannot allow to pass unccntested. 156. On the other hand, aIl this argument regarding the ascertainment of opinion and electians would have substance only if the party demanding it believed in elections. A c1aimant must come ta a tribunal with clean hands. In the entire State of Pakistan, with a population of nearly 90 million, there are only 80,000 electors under the electoral law just promulgated by its President. There are only 80,000 eleetors who get their posts as a result of !ive years of indirect election. They have there what is called a basic democracy; we have in India a system ofdemocracy that lS basic-sorne slight difference. According to the Baltimore Sun the basic democracy system, personnes, promulguée Ces cinq régime dont tout système "... is a five-tiered structure of councils from the local level up to the provincial d,evelopment advisory councils, one for West Pakistan and one for East Pakistan. IrThe idea is based on the theory that the Pakistanis are not ready for fully representative demo-' cracy and need a system suited ta their gellius. 1I 157. May 1 say something here about the reference ta West Pakistan, East Pakistan and aIl that. We hear a great deal about the right of a population to choose the farm and structure of its government. One might welI ask how the North-West Province of Pakistan disappeared; what problems the tribesmen who are supposed ta be patriots have; were they absorbed intI,) the l'est of Pakistan with their consent? 157. sujet oriental peuple gouvernement. comment disparu tribus, absorbés tement? 158. Reference was made ta the people in gaol. There are today 20,000 Pakistanis in Pakistan gaols. There is no civil liberty in Pakistan. The people live under martiallaw. And who are they totell us about liberty? 158. d'hui I! sous nous 159. Pakistan expects unequivocal -··yport from the United States Government and its people on the vital question of Kashmir. There is no objection to expecting. "Our country consists of soldiers;" says the President of 'Azad' Kashmir, "all we need is money and weapons to turn Kashmir inta a new Aigeria". What a hope! 1 am not looking at Ml'. Stevenson when 1 say "money", but that is the usual thing ta do. He says: "Our country consists of soldiers; all we need 159. du question reprocher pays "et armes rie". M. 161. Said the President of Pakistan, according ta the Chicago Daily News on 16 April of this year: "My hope and prayer is that we can J."un without political parties". And the President of Pakistan is vf course a fervent believer in prayer. Tltilt is th(~ very same country whose representative tells us that only one party won in the election. 162. The Manchester Guardian, on 17 April of this year, said: "The more prudent among the 'opposition' candidates in West Pakistan do not think it wise to challenge the Government too fiercely during the first Parliament. They know that the President has them covered-not only by the arms he bas providedhimself within the Constitution but by the power of the army itself. It cau abolish the new Constitution as it abolished the last, and the President hirnself has mentioned this possibility.1l 163. When Baluchistan, whi~h is part of Pakistan wanted to become a part of India, we did not encourage it. The Manchester Guardian On 24 April 1962 said: "Baluchistan, this sometimes austerely beautiful country which politically is part of Pakistan, seems ta have been destined throughout the five thousand years or so of ·its history and prehistory to be a limbo. "This is one facet of the problem of Baluchistan and an important one. There is not just one minority, but there are many. Until recently there were still petty States. There was no democracy, as we know it, but a certain devolution of authority ta tribal sardars and from them to village headmen and the fact that these latter were fairly close ta their people gave the Khan of Kalat sorne reason to feel that he could speak with authority for that part .... Now aIl that is gone and something closely akin to British colonial rule has taken its place. However dedicated these commissioners. and the rest of the imposed hierarchy may be, they cannot, with only short periods of dutY in Baluchistan, be expected to identify themselves withthepeople ... TheadministratiOn i!;> typical of good colonial rule and there is a wide gulf between it and the people. Il Of'course, one cannot expect the Manchester Guardian to say that colonial rule is not good. "These freedoms, however, are becoming things of the past"-that is, in relation ta other part!;> of Pakistan-"and the law of Pakistan ... is replacing their triballaws. Triballaw was formerlyadministered by the sardars whose powers were .3eldom 164. 1 shan quote from the Globe and Mail of Toronto, Canada. ult must be said in fairness that Pakistan's own record i8 a dubious one. The tribal attack on Kashmir in 1947 was weIl organized and prepared beforehand by the arousal of tribal feeling by northwest frontier poliHoaI leaders. If the Pakistan Government did not prompt the invasion, which is open to question, it did nothing to prevent it. Today the Pakistan area known as 'Azad' (free) Kasbmir"- names do not mean anything; youcancalla man with a weak arm nArmstl'ong"-"is closed to visitors". WhY. there are 70.000 visitors a year in Srinagar. inc] :ding large numbers of nationals of countries ideologically opposed to each other, andperhapstous. "President Khurshid is the former secretary of the late Mohammed Ali Jinnah. He saidrecentlythat his forces would succeed in 'liberating every inch of Kashmir'. a threat that Indiacouldhardlyignore." This talk of war came from everywhere, from small people and big people alike. propos 165. The Civil and Military Gazette of Lahore stated: "The Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Manzur Qadir, expressed the view in Lahore yesterday, that a referendum on the new Constitution would have served no useful purpose because the masses, hav- îng an overwhelming percentage of illiteracy, were not in a position to give a correct verdict on an intricate problem like the Constitution." If it would serve no useful purpose, 1 should like ta know how a plebiscite in. "Azad" Kashmir can serve a useful purpose. 166. Then there was a statement in the MorningNews of Dacca on 6 April 1962, as follows: "We feel that if universal franchise is given, the Communists, or any other group hostile ta Pakistan, would find it much easier to exploit the ignoranoe of the masses to our disadvantage ...... par In other words, if you have a head, you are likely ta have a headaohej therefore. cut if off. 167. From the publication Dawn of 8 Apri11962: "President Mohammad Ayub Khan warned Pakistanis here today that a bloody revolution wou1d overtake the COWltry within six months if a parliamentary type of government was to be revived. "The President said this revolutionlt-meaninghis OWIl revolution- ".would not be like 'rny revolution', which he pointed out, had been 'noble, benign and bloodless' ... " , 1 am quoting this; 1 will l10t say it. uThe President said he thought the country should do without the luxury of politieal parties if it eould. '1 J i 168. In fue 28 April elections in Pakistan only80,000 people, out of a population of 90 million, were eligible to vote. The political parties were not allowed ta contest elections. as they have been banned. Latest reports state that no member of any of the minority commwlÎties has been aUe to win a seat. A Christian leader who contested aseatinaconstituencyin Lahore was hopelessly defeated. He secured less than half a dozen votes in a constituency of 609, No woman has been elected ta the National Assembly from a general seat, though six seats are reserved for women. No seats are reserved for minorities. 169. 1 read aIl this out not because 1 have any business ta comment on the system of government that they should have. That is their business. We do not eriticize that. But when it is said that this medicine is good for other people, when somebodyprescribes it, then we want to know what they thinkof it themselves. 170. What 1 am trying to submit is this: that this argument about plebiscites, about consultation of peoples, about freedom. about this. that and theother. is spurious; it has no reality; it is not substantiated by facts. And add ta this the question that, every time a President of so-called "Azad" Kashmir shows sorne independence, out he goes. There is no civil liberty of any kind in "Azad"Kasbmir, There are no meetings, no newspapers, no expression of opinion of any kind. 171. The Pakistan Government's systematic enslavement of the people in the Indian Union territory of Jammu and Kashmir, wh1ch is occupiedbyforce, is described in authentic terms by ilAzad"Kashmir leaders in a memorandum which was submitted to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly and which now forms partofthe Security Council records.ill 1 submitteditin 1957. According ta this document, there is no legislature, no independent judiciary, in this territory, and there are no civli liberties. 172. May 1 say in this connexion that sorne reference was made to the judiciary in Kashmir. 1 shall have ta talk about it later. But the judiciary in Kashmir is part of the judiciary of the Union, in the sense that it is, by and large, under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India. The rule of law apphes and, whatever changes there were in the transition period 18} Officiai Records of the Securlty Council, Twelfth Year, Supplement for January, February and March19S7,documentS/PV.762/Add.l, annex 1II. 173. sement sous L'administration le maintenant Président pourvu tion nécessaire de tout la gagements de prunts qui réorganisation, du 173. Newspapers in Pakistan testifyto the degradation to wllich the unfortunate people are being subjected by the puppet régime foisted upon them by Pakistan. The administration in "Azad" Kashmir is runbythe Minister of Kashmir Mfairs in Karachi-now in Rawalpindi. 1 suppose, The so-called President of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir i8 a puppet, with Uttle or no power to frame poliales. The sanction of the Minlstry of Kashnür Affairs i8 required for the legislation and enactment of statutory rules. AIl appointments, aIl questions of general policy, budget, internaI security, aIl matters involving financial commitments, alienation of State property, public debts, loans, fore st schemes, aIl important matters relating to civil supplies and rehabilitation-aIl have to have the consent of the official in Karachi. 1 will not read the l'est. 174. ment blics sérieux pour à l'histoire 174. From time to time, the disaffection of the people against the local administration of government has found violent expression. In the summer of 1954, when the Pakistan Minister of Kashmir Affairs was addressing a gathering, serious disturbances hroke out. That is old history; 1 won't go into that. 175. The following news express6d by independent observers throw a significant light on the wretched conditions in wllich the people live tL'lder the Pakistan bayonets; 175. émanent lumière vit kistanaises; "It is a slur on the forehead of Pakistan that, even after nine years, we have not been able to set up a model administration in 'Azad' Kashmir. It m-ight have saved us from hearing talll1ts across the border that 'You have chained the Kashmiris in poverty, slavery and ignorance'. Moreover, we are also witnesses to the efforts the Government of India has made to uplift the people of Kashmir. The situation prevailing generally in Pakistan, and particularly in 'Azad 1 Kashmir. would naturally l'aise doubts in the minds of a Kashmir Muslim that, when Pakistan has failed in 'Azad' Kashmir, how can she function better if the whole of Kashmir rejoin's her?" 176. That is a very normal question. It appears in a Pakistan paper in Lahore. It speaks weIl for the liberty that exists in Pakistan that this can be published. 1 do not know what happened to the editor afterward. 176. a qui Pakistan. du 177. "Pakistal11eaders have been using this issue as a means ta prolong their stay in power" said a leader in Pakistan-occupied KashmÎr in the inauguraladdress at the Muslim COlÛerence Convention. 177. de claré à partie 178. Another paper in Lahore says: 178. "'Azad' KashmJr îs on the cross-roads between dictatorship and democracy. intrigue and fair play. Not that there have been no changes in 'Azad1 "The decisions for the formation of aIl govern_ ments installed in 'Azad' Kashmir duringthe lastten years were taken in Karachi. They were ail undemocratic and were forced upon the masses from Karachi. These Governments were againsttlie claims of Pakistan that she wanted to achieve the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris ... 1' For "Karachi", we must now substitute "Rawalpindi". "The way democracy has been trampled underfoot for ten years in the area called IAzad' KasQInir has tarnished Pakistan IS reputation. and lAzadIKashmir is an area over which India has no control. India has neyel' placed hurdles in democratizing the administration in fuis l'egion, in forming a popular government, and in enabling the people ta exel'cise theil' right of self-determination. AIl this could be done by Pakistan." This, again, is one of their papers. 1 don't know-do you want me to read any more? There are many more expressions of opinion of this kind, mostly from their own people, on conditions that obtain. 1 will not tire the Counai! with reading any more of tbis. 179. Then we come to this question: It has been said that the Indian-administered area of Kashmir is exploited for the purposes of the Union, is governed by an army-and 1 tell you, with apersonalresponsibility for this, that the Indian Army does not interfere in the civil life of Kashmir. They are liked in the area. They have their own arrangements about residence. They do not interfere with the civillife. Our army does not interfere in our civillife. Civil government controIs the military side in our Constitution. Soldiers do not govern our country, 180. As against this, 1 want to give the position on the other side. It is a naturalquestion to ask: Howare things on the other side? As reported in the statement by Ayub Khan, itmaybe that these people are 50 underdeveloped that they calUlOt be developed; they cannot develop themselves. 181. 1 will not read the whole of this table. 1 beg your permission however to introduce this document* On the conditions in Indian-administered Kashmir as a Security CouncD document, and 1 will read part ri it. The figures given below indicate the progress m~de by Jammu and Kashmir in the two five-year plans. •See annex la chis meeting. Revenue: 5.5 million dollars-and, today, 23.5 million. Taxation is high in India. Next to the United Kingdom,1 suppose, we are thehigt-est-taxedpeople in the world. We pass on the benefits to Kashmir also. State income, in 1955-1956 priees: in 1951, 100 million dollars; today, 160 million. Food production: 300,000 tons, increased to 500,000 tons. Power potential: 4,360 kilowatts, increased to 16,000 kilowatts in ten years. Roads pel' 100 square miles: 2.5 miles in 1951, and 40 miles today, in every lOO-square-mile area. Number of pupils in primary schools: in 1951, 65,000; today, 197,000. Number of higher secondary schools: 52 in 1951, and 262 today. Literaoy was 6.6 percent, andis 12per cent today. In 1951, there were no students sent out of Kashmir for education, and today there are 3,179 students sent abroad-in the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and aIl sort of places. The pel' caput expenditure on public health was, in 1951,13 cents; and today, 76 cents. The number of hospitals and dispensaries was 89; today, 349. The average lite expectanoy at birth was 32 years in 1951, and 47 years today. 182. In other words, the Indian-administered area of Jammu and Kashmir isnot acolony.like "Azad" Kashmir. It keeps pace with development. 183. Although 1 have made more notes about other thingp, 1 propose to try to \Vind up this matter as quickly as possible. 184. First of aIl, 1 submitted in 195. that, irrespeotive of what interpretations may be put on certain resolutions and certain phraseology-with the exoeption of trying to inform the Council of what my Prime Minister has actually saîd, because my Prime Minister said that the Pakistan case here was based on falsehood-which practically meant something-this is an international forum. While you are not a judicial tribunal and have no right to pronounce on the legality of one thing or another, we are governed by conditions of internationallaw in the world, and these conditions are governed by the well-known dootrine of rebus sic stantibus-that is to say, conditions having ohanged, you have to take another view of these things. déclaré i cil-the only party that is preventing the free expres- -1 sion of opinion in "Azad"KashmirisPakistan,because _j Wlder the Constitution of Kashmir those territories :1 have constituencies. The people are free toe1ecttheir .~,; representatives; and if they have ather decisians, why ., do they not elect them and sf;'lnd them ta the Kashmir <1 Assembly? They are entitled to elect them; they have , not been put out; those seats are kept vacant. But if "'11 they do not express an opinion, itisbecause there are - no e1ections. There is no expression of an opinion j there;and if anybody says anything, outhegoes. Mter 1 aU if the parent country is like that. how cou1d any- -'1 thing be different. :,! , 186. Therefore, conditions have changed in the sense of economic advance, industrial advance, and the COWltry being opened up in the way it is. with the spread of demc::racy in the institutions, the independence of our judiciary, the rule of law, finuncia1 control, and all these things happening in the Union territory and our sovereignty still subsisting. On this question of sovereignty there has been no chaUenge from the United Nations, and 1 think ft will be useful to quote the opinion expressed at that time, as submitted to the 8ecurity COUDCi! by the representative of the United States. 187. But over and above that, there nevel' has been a challenge from the United Nations on the question of sovereignty. The who1e of this resolution is based on the sovereignty of India because they make us responsible for security. You cannot make a country responsible for security when it has no authol'ity. Mr. Warren Austin, the repl'esentative of the United States said: ".•• we must face the 1egal situation. The external sovereignty of Jammu and Kashm-ir is no longer Wlder the control of the Maharajah. The external sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir is the sove·· reignty that is involved here ... with the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, this foreign sovereignty went over to India and is exercised by India, and that is how India happens to be here as a petitioner. Il!.21 This is not a statement of my delegation. 188. Then, at a meeting of UNCIP on 17 August 1948 with the Prime Minister of India, the Prime Minister inquired whether the 13 August 1948 resolution, the one to which 1 have been refel'ring: "... envisaged any change in ~ .1e status of the territory, or whether it recognized the jurisdiction of the Government of ,Jammu and Kashmir over that territory. Mr. Korbel remarked that that point incorporated the suggestion which the Prime Minister himself had advanced and that the phrase 'pending a final solution' was intended ta recognize the temporary nature of the administration by local authorities"- JJj Jbid•• Tllitd Year. No. 1_15; 240th meeting. p.371. IlSovereignty over the territory \Vas not ta be changed. "1!!J 189. In a letter dated 20 August 1948 fromthe Prime Minister of India ta the Chairman of the Commission, the Prime Minister maintained: "That, paragraph A, 3 of part II of the resolution" -which 1 read out· a while ago-"shouldnot be interpreted, or applied in practice, so as: "(g) Ta bring into question the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the portion of their territory evacuated by Pakistan troops; "Qi) To afford any recognition of the so-caEed 'Azad' Kashmir Government; or "(c) Ta enable this territory ta be consolidated in any way during the period of truce to the disadvantage of the State. Il That is what 1 said, that it was impossible to perform part II eve!l if part 1 had been performed, because the Pakistan Government 'had consolidated this area, bringing it u!lder the particular section of their Constitution; and they have annexed it, received accession, stationed armies, built airfields, andplaced them under the Kashmir territory altogether. The Prime Minister again inquired: "If 1 understood you correctly, paragraph A, 3 of part II of the resolution does not envisage the creation of any of the conditions to which we,have objected in paragraph 3 (1) of this letter. In fact, you made it clear that the Commission was not competent to recognize the sovereignty of any authority over the evacuated areas other than that of the Jammu and Kashmir Government. "l!! And as Ml'. Warren Austin pointed out, when the Maharajah disappears, that sovereigntY'goes to the Government of India. 190. In reply the Chairman said: "The Commission requests me to convey to Your Excellency its view that the interpretation of the resolution as expressed in paragraph 4 of your letter coincides with its own înterpretatian, it being understood that as regards point (1) <2) the local people of the evacuated territory will have freedom of legitimate political activity. In thîs connexion. the term evacuated territory refers to those territories in the State of Jammu and Kashmir which are at present under the effective controlofthe Pakistan Righ Commando IlJ1j 191. Then reference was made by Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan-I tbink it was yesterday or sorne time before that-to the fact that if any authority of the ,P;Y Ibid.! Third Year. Supplement for November 1948, document 5/1100, annex 12, p. 105. :El Ibid., document S/llOO, para. 78, suf>..paras. 3 (Il ;nd 4. W Ibid., para. 79. r "Surveillance of territories of the State of Jammu and Kashrnir ather than those now occupied by the Pakistan Army and forces und.er its control is not provided for in the resolution"-then whatrighthave they ta go into the llorthern areas?-"The administration of sllch areas remains under the jurisdiction of the Government of the State."~ 192. Now 1 come ta this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus: "It is a well established principle of international law that a treaty ceases ta be binding when the basic conditions upon which it is founded have essentially changed." This is the opinion given by the Attorney General of the United States on 28 JuIy 1941. No international tribunal has so far rej~cted the validity of this doctrina. Otherwise we would not have a dynamic international society. 193. The essence of this doctrine is that aIl treaties are concluded-and 1 am not for a moment saying it i5' a treaty; 1 am quite prepared to call it even an international agreement, a commitment, a resolùtion, or whatever you would like ta calI it, aIl those that would be binding on a much more rigid formaf agreementon the basis of a clause concerning vital change of circumstances. It lS inherent in the nature of law that performance is conditional, that no vital change of circumstance occurs; if they do, the State i5 not in a position ta perform them physically. This applies even to municipal law. For example, there is a rule about specifie performance and if it becomes incapable of performance, you cannot enforce it any more. 194. This faet can be justified according to SOrne writers ouly when the change of circumstances is sa essential that ta adhere ta it would threaten the very existence of the State. The fundamental right of the existence of a State-which is so vital and to which will refer later-is stronger than any ofits obligations. As Hegel said: "The relation of States is one of independent units which make stipulations, but at the same time stand above their stipulations." No State can be limited by its stipulation. If a stipulation limits aState, how will it become a stipulation? lt is almost like saying that Gad cannot be Almighty because then he can create something that he cannat destroy, and if he creates somethinghe cannat destroy, he cannot be Almighty. ?:'}j Ibid•• docWll"nt SllLOO, annex 27, appendix, para. 8. 196. In French law there is the doctrine of "force majeure ", where it is Dot possible to perform a cootract because of conditions which are beyond the control of the parties to the contract. 196. majeure, des cuter 197. ln Germanie Iaw, articles 323, 542, 605, 723, 775 of the German Civil Code also make the same provisions. 197. civil 198. sections Contracts traitent pas praticabilité et ne 198. In the iaw of the United States, Sections 454-496 oÏ the American Law Institute ts Restatement of the Law of Contracts,W deal with the same matter. The liestatement does not mean strict impossibility, but impracticability owing ta extreme and unreasonable difficulty. In that case the agreement cannat stand. 199. In Austrian law, article 936 of the Austrian Civil Code makes the same provision. 199. la 200. In English law there is a large number of cases in connexion with it. There is a case called Taylor v. Caldwell, ·one called Krell y. Henry and one callêd Jackson y. Union Marine Insurance Company (1874), the last, according to my memory, being the most telling case although unfortunately 1 have not been able to obtain the text of the judgement. In the first case Ml'. Justice Blackburn held: 200. grand affaires c, mes Malheureusement, jugement. a "In contracts in which performance depends on the continued existence of a given persan or thing a condition is implied that the impossibility of performance arising from the perismng of the person or thing shall excuse performance, though there is no express provision or stipulation thatthedestructian of the persan or thingshallexçusethe performance. But that excuse is apparent that the parties contracted on the basis of the continued existence of the particular persan or chattel. "The rule in this case has been extended ta contracts the perfcrmance of which was held ta have becorne impossible by the Don-existence or nonoccurrence of a particular state of things forming the basis on which the contract has been made." 201. What is happening in this case? The local authorities are no longer there. There are places where there i8 no Pakistan Army, and what i8 more there are other circumstances in regard ta which the conditions have changed. 201. resse? Dans naise conditions 202. Now we come to what Sir Muhammad has placed before this Council regarding the Prime Minister's statement. 1 am quite certain that the Prime Minister 's reputation or his own sense of integrity would not be ehallenged by any misquotation anybody mjght make, 202. sentant Premier cune le W American Law lnstitute Publishers, St, PalÙ, 1932. "I should like to make it clear that the question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India. Our view, which we have repeatedly made public, is that the question of accei>sion in any disputed territory or State must be decided in acco:::dance \vith the wishes of the peoples, and we adhere to this rule. 1I 203. This is what Sir Muhammad quoted yesterday. What was not quoted was what followed in the same telegram: HIt is quite clear, however, that no free expression of the will of the people of Kashmir is possible if external aggression succeeds in imperilling the integrity of its territory." 204. Now, what sense cau the first paragraph of the telegram have without the second? 1 am not for moment suggesting that the distinguished .representative opposite has been guilty of wilful suppression, but it m~y be that like.me he feels tired. 205. In his broadcast over the Ali-India Radio on 2 November 1947 the Prime Minister said: "We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given not only to the people of Kashmirbut ta the world." 206. Then follow a number of lines which we do not see in our copy of the text of the telegram as it \Vas quoted: "We are anxious not to finalize anything in moment of crisis and without the fullest opport.unaf ta be given to the people of Kashmir to havè their say. It is for them ultimately to decide. And let me make it clear that it has been our policy aH along that where there is a dispute about the accession of aState to either Dominion, the accession must be made by the people of that State. ft is in accordance with this policy that we have added a proviso to the Instrument of Accession of Kashmir." 207. There is another passage which we do not see quoted: "We talk about the invaders and raiders in Kashmir, and yet these men are fully-armed and welltrained and have competent leadership. Ali of these have come across and from Pakistan territory. We have a right to ask the Pakistan Government how and why these people could come across the Frontier Province or West Punjab, and how they have been armed so effeCtively. Is this not a violation of international law and an unfriendJ.y act towards neighbour country? Is the Pakistan Go\!ernment too weak to prevent armies marching across Hs territory to invade another country, or is it willing that this should happen? There is no third alternative." "Ml'. Nehru referred ta the President of 'Azad' Kashmir, -Mx. Khurshid's recent statement thatthey would resort to war 10 'liberate' the India..ll part of Kashmir and alsa to Mx. Zafrulla Khan's remarks in the 8ecurity Counoil that a second tribal invasion would take place if the Couneil failed ta find a suitable solution. 'NQw we have got deflnite information that for months past Pakistan authorities have been r6gistering names of tribesmen on a monthly salary of Rs. 54.' They were being invited first to function as sorne kind of levies. Nearly 5,000 men have offered their services in one area but actual recruitment has not taken place. Probably this was taking place elsewhere too. But w/len these persons were told that they had ta go ta Kashmir-and the.y were not at aIl anxious ta go there and perhaps realized they were likely ta meet the Indian Army-many of them had withdrawll their names. "Mr. Nehru said that Pakistan well knew that any sueh thing as tribal invasion happening would meaa 'aIl out war'. Still they indulged in threats and aIl th8ir strength lay in military aid they had got from the United States." Voilà 'aujourd This was said today. 209. question. de le ne comme certain point aspect. toire indien annexion. cette toire, et Cachemire. doivent 209. Now 1 want to deal with another matter. It is one whieh does not really eoncern the Security Couneil except in so far as Pakistan becomes involved. There have been certain changes in the relations between China, across our bord:,!r, andourselves. Chinaclaims certain territory as being part of 8inkiang Province at a certain border. Historically, the~~eis another side; I suppose China would say this territory isin dispute, but the Indian Government knows_ its territory and would not permit this annexation. That matter is not before the Security Council, but the fact is this: this territory is part of Jammu andKashmir,certainparts are along the border between China and Pakistan and 1think Pakistan's allies and the worId should know. 210. Although pakistan has been În unlawful occupation of a part of the Indian Union territory of Jammu and Kashmir and, as admitted by Sir Muhammad Zafrulla in his statement on 1 February 1962 [990th meetingJ. Pakistan îs committed ta the withdrawal of its forces from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan has nevertheless sought ta negotiate Kashmir 's border with Sinkiang with the Government of China. We say categorically that Pakistan has no authority ta barter away or negotiate any part of Indian territory and any agreements Pakistan may reach, or anybody else, would have no value in our eyes 210. une fait reconnu ration soit et cette province Chine. kistan du négociations, pays, yeux. 212. However 1 will quote a sta.tement by Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir, at a news conference on 24 May 1960; "Asked whether negotiations were stiU going on between China and Pakistan on demarcation of the border between the two countries,:Mr. Manzur Qadir said Pakistan had made a suggestion ta this effect but had not heard anything further on the subject." China is not here to answer and we have not brought this question before the Security Council. Mr. Qadir said that Pakistan had made a suggestion, but had heard nothing further on the subject. Everything Pakistan can do ta exploit this. it has done. 213. In an interview, Lt.-Gen. K. M. Shaikh, Food and Agriculture Minister, has said he knew of no Chînese infiltration along the small segment of Pakistan-held territory that adjoins Sinkiang. "About Pakistan's relations with China.the President said they were normal. Pakistan had no problems with China and had diplomatie relations with her. However, the border between Pakistan and China in certain areas was undefined and they had asked the Chinese Government ta define it. The President said indications were that the Chinese Government was willing to do so.!t That is to say, in a territory where they had no sovereignty, which they occupy illegally,inregardtowhich they have a dispute with another country-ta put it mildly-they are willing to barter away our freedom in order ta create embarrassmentfor us, irrespective of their professions in other directions. May 1say that in either case the common ideology is expansionism. 214. Here is an editorial in a Pakistan newspaper founded by Mr. Jinnah: "... the ruling elements in NewDelhi are evidently even more disturbed by the fact that, of all the nations who are close neighbours ofChina in this area, This is aU from aneditorial in Dawn, dated 20 January 1961. We are not dealing with China's o;ünions but with Pakistan's opinion on this question and the use Pakistan is making of it in arder ta embarrass us. Tout le nions question, nous 215. 1 now quote from Dawn of 21 January 1961: 215. Dawn "When asked if his Goverlllnent would accept Chinese or eastern bloc aid and arms,Mr. Khurshid said there was no reason not ta accept it in case it was given without political strings and helped in the cause of Kashmir's liberation. "He added: 'In fact we have always appreciated the correctness of the Chinese stand in regard ta accession' . "Mr. K. H. Khurshid welcomed reports that China had 'agreed ta a prûper damarcation of the Chinese border with northern areas of Pakistan through negotiations. Tndia, he pointed out, had faîled to maintain international borders with China ... ". Here 1 want ta say that we have no information that China has given any agreement of this kind referred to by Mr. Khurshid, the President of the so-called "Azad" Kaslunir. It was published.ÏD the paper, and Mr. "Khurshid is not supposed to speak withOut the Consent of the Pakistan Government. Je connaissance mentionnée Cachemire la déclaration nement "Asked àpout lndian Premier Nehru's reported contention ~ Parliament yesterday that Pakistan had no 8ueh rught, as she did Dot legally occupy the , territory in que,.stion, the President told newsmellat the Dacca Airpo'rt that Pakistan was in legaloccupation of the t~rritdry." \ 1 suppose the law, for d-ictators.means whatthey think. Now, continuing: '''Mr. ~ehru has the righttohave his own opinionl, he commen\ed." 217. Now, quoting from \pe Times of India, dated 23 February 1961: \ "In view of the internatilinal importance of the area and the danger of forei~ intervention in disturbed conditions, the Pakista!\9overnment sent a political agent in the middle of.~ovember,1947, ta provisionally take over the admim"tration, in arder to restore law and order and stabilize conditions ..." 218. 1 read now from an interview dt the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Mr. Manzur Qadir, irh.heHindustan Times dated 16 March 1961: \ - "Mr. Qadir said Pakistan had taken the\~itiatiVe to negotiate the boundary with China in themiddle of last year because of two reasons: first, th constitutional position of the northern areas in üs boundary was different from that of the other pa ts of Kashmirtl-Now, how does that square with t ~ previous statement? 1 do uot know-"and, secondly;-, Pakistan wanted ta be certain of the line beyond which Pakistanis should uot go and fix the line beyond which Chinese would not come. "China, Mr. Qadir said, had not responded immediately but had requested for Ume ta consider the matter." 219. 1 am not placing any commitment on the border of China because we have not heard from the Chinese in Peking; nothing has been written ta us, .there has been no exchange of notes. We have not heard, sa far as my papers say, that there has been any communication. But the faet remains that Pakistan has been negotiating and fishingin these troubledwaters. "Pakistàn, Il says the Washington Post of 9 Juiy 1961, no friend of India-"by considering India her number one enemyis embarking on aflirtation matchwithCommunistChina, India's number one enemy." WeIl, we did not say either one is our enemy. Pakistan is a friend of ours. 220. President Ayub, in an address ta the National Press Club in Washington on 14 July 1961. sald: "Pakistan will go ahead in negotiations with Communist China ta define the common border between ChinaIs SECURITY OFFICIAL RECORDS SEVENTEENTH 1009 th ME~TING: 3 MAY ème SEp..NCE: 3 DIX-SEPTIÈME DE CONSEIL DOCUMENTS CORRIGENDUM Replace page 62 by the following RECTIFlCATIF Remplacer la page 62 par Litho in U.N. 22645_November 1964-1.900 1 suppose the law. for dictutors', TI1':ouns what tl1ey think. Now, continuing: n'1'I1'. Nelu'lI has the right to have his OWIl opinion', he com:nented." 217. Now, quoting from the Times of Indla, dated 23 Febrnary 1961: nIn view of the international importance of the area and the danger of foreign intervention in dis- turbed conditions, the Pakistan Governm8nt sent a political agent in the middIe of November 1947. to provisionally take over the administration, in order to restore law and order and stabilizeconditions ... " This action was not permitted by the United Nations resolution. In f~t, as 1 have said so muny tim~s this afternoon, this was a functLon which was placed squarely upon the shoulders of the.lndianGovermuent, to garrison thearea, protecl it-andstabiUze Conditions. 218. 1 read now from an interview of the Pa..Ldstan Foreign Minister, Mt'. Manzur Qadb.., in the Hindustan Times dated 16 IVIarch 1961: "r..'!r. Qadir said Pakistan had taken the initiative to negotiate the boundary \vith China in the middle of last year because of two reasons: first, the con- stitutLonal position oI the northern areas in this boundary was different from that of the other parts of Kashmir"-Now, how does that square \Vith thE: previous statement? 1 do not kno\\'- "and, e"econdly, Pakistan wanted to he certain of the linE: beyond which Pakistanis shoulcl not go and Iix the Une beyond which Chinese would not come. "China, Ml'. Qadir said, had not responded immc- diately but had requested for time to consider L:,~ matter. " 219. l am not placing any commitment on the border of China because W'e; have 20t heanl from the Chinese in Peking; nothing has been written ta us, there has been no exchange of notes. We have not heard, so far as my papers say, thatthere has been any communica- tion. But the fact rem:lins that Pakistan has been nego- tiating and fishing in these trûubled w::tters. "Pakistan, li says the Washington Post of 9 Juiy 1961, no fl'iend of India- "by considering India 1181' number one enemy is embarking on aflirtation miltch with Communist China, India's number one enemy." WeIl, we did not say either one is our enemy. Pakistan is a friend of ours. 220. President AYllb, in an address to the National Press Club in Washington on 14 July 1961, said: "Pa.1(i- stan will go ahead in negotiations with Communist China ta define the Common IJorder between China's 221. President Ayub was fUl'ther quoted, at his monthly Press conference as havingspokenasfollows. He said that Pakistan had conveyed to pekingher will- ingness to demarcate her border \Vith the latter. China had replied that she was examining the proposaI and when they \Vere ready they would let Pakistan know about H. Pretty cautious. Then later: Anlndiancorre- spondent had asked whether it would not create diffi- culties if Pakistan at this stage were ta negotiate border demarcation with China and whetherthatwould not weaken the cause of "democratic forces in Asia ft. President Ayub had l'eplied it would be very good for democracy if the causesoffrictionbetweenneighbour- ing countries were removed. This isfromthe Pakistan ~ of 4 October 1961. 221. rence dit était frontière étudiait elle quait ayant négociations fixer pas "forces répondu pays est 222. Ml'. Khurshid also announced that the Chinese Government representative was visiting South Kash- mir. He said: "In fact, my Government would welcame sueh a visit". There has been no announcement on the Chinese side on this question, however. 222. représentant mire serait dans 223. There are many more of these extri3.cts, but 1 do not propose to read thern. Now, Ml'. President, if 1may, 1 will finish in about fifteen minutes. 223. extraits. .Monsieur 224. First of aIl, we waut to say that these meetings have begun in the eontext of the threat of armed in- vasion being repeated aIl over the place. There have been these things going on, butonaceountof tl1€ short- ness of time 1 am not able ta recite before this Coun- cil the incursion into, the violations of our territory Ihat have taken place in recent Urnes. In the last five years there have been an average of ninety incidents every year inside Indian-administeredKashmirwhere bombs and other things have been exploded-intricate equipment that could come only from the Pakistan Arroy. Saboteurs have broken up bridges and terror- ized the population; in village clubs and schools and places of worship, in several cases mines and anti- personnel mines were used which were sent to our colleges of research and were revealed ta be of Paki- stan origin. There have been 400 cases of bomb explosions in Jammu and Kashmir and the usualstory is that the people of Jammu and Kashmir are discon- tented-all of which you must know about fl'om youx OIVn inferences, bath from the election l'esuUs and from the conditions of prosperity shown bythefigures which 1 read out to you. Inside Kashmir this degree of sabotage and subversion ls takingplace. We charged the Pakistan Government also, both publiely and in our communications with them, that their agents have been committing espionage in our territory. A paki- stan national, arrested in November 1959. disclosed how saboteurs were trainedin Rawalpindi, in Pakistan. They were given practice in the use of various weapons including sten-guns and hand-grenades, TNT slabs- which we have .had analysed in our laboratories- 224. qui sont nace, temps incursions se dernières du bombes ne ont et antipersonnel des cultes laboratoire a Quatre Jammu que Conseil que ditions subversion Nous kistanais, cationS espions nais, formait leur 225. Another Pakistan agent, Abdul Rashid, was 3.:'~rested in September 1957, and his interrogation brought out the fact that Pakistan intelligence \Vas preparing to organize subversion and sabotage in other parts of Iudia. 1 will not read the whole of that story. but 1 \Vant to tell the Caunoil something that concerns us deeply. Plans \Vere hatched in Pakistan for the purpose of assassinating the Prime Minister of Iudia and our important Indian leaders, The part played by Pakistan intelligence in sucb plans was revealed during the case of a man arrested in 1958. Pakistan intelligence officers had provided him with arms and ammunition and money and had given hirn intensive training with a view to the assassination of top-ranking leaders in India. He was asked to accom- pUsh his mission of assassinating the Prime Minister during his journey to Kulu in 1958. The Prime Min- ister had gone on a hoUday. This man, however, was arrested before he could carry out his plans. He was prosecuted for conspiracy to commit murder and sentenoed to seven years of rigorous imprisonment in 1961, along with three accomplices. Pakistan had placed ample funds - at his disposaI to aid him in carrying out his nefarious mission: Mn hand-grenades, twenty detonators, Olle revolver, one pistol and two sten-guns were found in his possession. 226. My distinguished colleague from Pakistan has referred to sorne other matters in a conspiracy trial that is now going on in Kashmir. 1 have not got the same liberty as he has. 1 am quite prepared ta over- look the fact and think that the acquaintance of Sir Muhammad with the Indian judiciary is somewhat remote-it is now about twenty years. 227. But it is not our practice ta be in contempt of our judiciary and we would be if we were to refer to matters that ar~ sub judice. These men have been cammitted ta sessions; they were tried, the trial lasted for years, not because anyane in the judiciary was preventing H, but because the accused, with the assistance of Pakistan, used obstruotive tactios. The prooess of l'lw has to be gone through, and it took time. They have been committed to trial. 1 believe that their defence counsel is coming from England. The trials are open, the proceedings are open, for anybady ta l'ead. 1 cannat comment on them because, both as a member of the Indian Bar and as a citizen of India, it would be regarded as extremely improper for me to dealwith matters that are before the judiciary. 228. In conclusion, our position is that, first, the accession to India, which has been challenged, is full and complete; there isnosuchthinginbur Constitution as provisional accession. Secondly, if that accession has to be altered, it has not only ta be the acceding side, but the receiving side that also has ta agree. 229. 1 want to say here again that the statements attributed to Lord Mountbatten on the one hand and to my Prime Minister on the ather are quotations in part and not in full; secondly. what it really means i8 that while the legal accession has taken place ta the Head of the State, and that is good enough for the purpose of law, we were not with our hostility ta feudal and al'bitrary rule on the one hand. our sym- pathies and our affiliations \Vith the national move- ment in Kashmir on the other, prepared ta regard that as sufficient: we wanted sorne moral support of it, and that moral support we gained immediately as best we could, in the same way as the British did in India, by consultations with the national movement. Thereafter, as saon as it was possible, not even wait- ing for th6 raiders of the Pakistan Army ta go, we established elections and the tirst elections were al- most simultaneous with the elections in India., Three general elections have taken place with a free Press, with anything from 50,000 to 70,000 visitors going into Kashmir without obstructions from anyone except for the normal procedures with regard ta visas and sa on. 230. Therefore, we are not prepared to change any of these questions, whatever might have been said at that time, or on one single ward or on a discussion of anything. Reference was made by Sir Muhammad about the discussions that wentonbetween Ml'. Bajpai. 1 think it was, and the United Nations people"with re- gard to what he called "the quantum of troops to be withdrawn" and sa on. 1 want ta say here and now that they were not negotiations, that they werediscussions ta the effect that if the truce came and if this was preparatory in that way-then such might be the case. 231. Therefore, our submission on the one hand is that the chaUe.lge ta the accession of Kashmir to India just gets nowhere. Secondly, the sovereignty of the Union over this territory has been admitted by the United Nations, by leading members of this Council who have not sided with us in condemning or taking action against Pakistan with regard ta aggression. 232. 1 say this, and 1 hope Governor Stevenson will excuse me; we fully and completely accept the sta''3- ments made by successive Presidents and statesmen in the United states thatthe military aid given ta Paki- stan is not intended by the United States ta be used against us. But equally the fact cannot be escaped that 233. So far as ourfrontiersare concerned.dangerous conditions exist, andwe cannotignore these conditions. Nor can we ignore the fact that in our troubles with China, like aU other things, we hOp8 they will be settled in due course and that wisdom will dawn alld that there Will be no new attempt to force issues. We cannot ignore eitber the fact that our neighbour , whose citizens were our nationals only a few years aga, should try ta fish in these troubled waters. AU these things are not facts which we can tolerate, which we can acquiesce in. Our submission, therefore, is that this matter has come before the United Nations and we have done everything we have to do. We have honoured the cease-fire line although it runs through the middle of our country. 1 have not had the time ta . tell you about these violations of the cease-fire Hne, and 1 am sorry to say that the balance has been very heavily tilted against us because Ill1der the rules 500 yards of this territory ls not to be occupied or entered into by armed"personnel. When Pakistan personnel in uniform who are armedcome through, the Commission tells us, "These are civilians. we cannot do anything about it." When the Kashmir police, not the Indian Army, take protective measures, they turnarolll1dand tell. us that it is against the cease-fire agreement. 234. 1 also wish ta say that there are certairl cîrcum- stances that 1 will not go lnto at the present time as regards the defence of our frontiers andourintegrity. If we are to accentuate the strength in the territory of the UniOn and in Jammu and Kashmir, not neces- sarily in relation to these resolutions, our handscan- not be tied behind our backs. 1 am quite sure that a majority of you understand our position in this matter. We are not going ta allow the cease-fire agreement or anything else which is as of now dead as a dodo, ta be pleaded in bar against the security of our land. If our border roads are ta be built, their base is in Kashmir. These territories are ta be opened up. That is our only position. Therefore, the circumstances having changed, there is only one submission we make, the one that we made in 1957, Then, one of my countrymen asked me why Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan was coming here. l told him not in jest, n'?t in ridicule. "After he has been ForeignMinisterofPaki- stan, after he has been a judge at the International Court, he has matured in years and, even more, he has come to understand all these matters. Itmay weIl be that the Pakistan Government is going to tell the Seeurity Couneil that it prop:lses ta vacate the aggres- sion". We did not hear anything of the kind. Aince Sir "Fight in the way of Allah against those who fight against you. but beginnothostilities. La! Allah loveth not aggressors." Another saying: j !l ! "And whoso committeth a delinquency or crime, then throweth [the blame] thereof upon the innocent, hath burdened himself with falsehood and a flagrant crime. Il Another saying: "Whoso doeththat through aggression and injustice, we sha11 not cast him into tire, and that is an ever easy way for Allah." 235. We have gane through very difficult times-and as the Minister of Defence 1 ought toknow-in the last twelve or eighteen months when not only probing ac- tions were taken but action of a character that it is only with a very great deal of restraint that we re- frained from using force. Parts of the territorywhich are even on this side of the cease-fire line have been sought to be occupied. On the international frontier where there is no cease-fire line-I am not now referring to other parts but to Jammu and Kashmir- there have been violations of this kind. Would it be wrong thinking to say that the limit of patience of any country in the lnterest of peace can be reached? 1 say before this Council, in spite of a11 that has happened, that the Government of India and the Union will not take the initiative in war action. That is the only pledge we make here. That does not mean that we shaH not defend our sovereignty, our integrity, the honour and the lives of our people with everythlng we have got, mîlitary allies or no militaryallies,armsorno arms. This is no threat, but it is a defensive statement. 1 j j 236. 1 am asked by my Governm(~ntto say that, irre- Bpective of our moral, our political and our legal rights, irrespective of aIl deception that has taken place with regard ta the Security COtmcil, lrrespec- tive of these great nations which have sat al'ound us aH these years not having raised a finger ta assÎst us in this m:ltter, not having addl'essed themselves to the question of aggression-irrespective of aIl this, the people, the UnÎon, the Government of the Union and the Prime Minister will never, any of them, take any initiative in war action. Durîng the last two or three years there have been-and l am not speaking fancifully-repeated attem;Jts by the Pakistan Govern- ment ta collect large numbers of unarmed cÎvilians and to release them in our territory. If they came without uniforms or they are put into concentration camps. They are fed, because in lndia we do not starve people; we do not need to do 50 now. But if our terri- tory 15 violated in comparatively smaU ways--these people com'3 and eut telegraph wll'es-under our law we can shoot them. However, we do not. We can do a lot of things, but we do not do them becausB these people are citizens of our land. Most of them come 237. Sa, while the Government of Iodia will exercise Hs patience and its liberal ouUaok in thts matter, we rely very largely Dn international public opinion. We are depressed, but we have not becom~~ eyutea!. We have nat 108t hop·e that this CouTIeil, after the passage of years, will realize what the basic question i8. Even if it \Vere argued for a moment that "le have no right to be in Kashmir 1 except wnat has come about at the invitation of a people that \Vas invaded. what right had the Pakistan Army to go the1'e at aH? Can the1'e by any sem))lance of any right of auy kind? Dtd anyb::dy aak them to go there? No. They have said that it 18 a liberation movement, but 1 havedealt with that. L 238. Therefore, 1 repeat this pledge that, in spite of our moral, our political and our legal rights, in spite of the serious difficulties we have in thatpart of India, we shall not try to force a solution by force of arms. We, as a country, are in friendly relations with the so-calleci East and the so-called West. Our relations with China were happy, and we ha[Je they will continue ta be happy in the time to come. But. as 1 say, in spite of all our difficulties we shaB Ilot try ta force a solu- tion by force of arms. But again lsay that the patience and restraint of a country. and Us conformitymth law, should not be interpreted as subservience. That is a mistake. Then, afterwards, they turn round and. tell us that "the image of India has been distorted". The dis- tortion does not come from our side, and therefore I will plead with this COUllCn not ta be stampeded into any action that will only make things worse. 239. This is the 104th meeting on this subject, 1 believe. You can hold 200 meetings. We will come here every timL3 you ask us, but on no condition shaH we trade our sovereignty. On no condition shall we sell our heritage. On no condition shall we open the door for the disruption and the disintegration of India, which would be a calamity not only for the In::lian people but for the whole of that part of the world. On no condition shaH we be forced by provocation of the kind that 1 have read out ta the Council-provocation coming from the head of a State-into a position of taking the short cut of a military feat for forcing the abdication of Pakistan. But we have Iaîth in the grow'~h of democracy in that country, which must come even after twenty-five years: in the growth of the people who are friendly ta us: and in th2 growth of public opinion, as well as in the conviction that will grow in this COl.lncil itself. What is more-and this isour main faith-we have confidence with regard tothe conditions of the people in the area that is part of the Union. Today there is prospel'ity in Kashmir. There is no un- employm3nt there. To::lay the people there are lUerate, and there is freedom of expression. There are, of course, frailties of administration. as in anyother part of lndia: we do not claim perfection. But the equili- brium will shift, and the people of Kashmjr, on bath

Although l have another speaker on my list, the representative of the Soviet Union. he has agreed ta speak at the beginning of our next meeting. 1 have another request for permission ta speak at the next meeting, sa perhaps we might adjollrn now and meet again tomorrow morning at 10.30. It was so decided. The meeting rose at 7.15 p.m. ANNEX Jammu and Kashmir. - Develapment in freedom [Document submitted by the Indian delegation] Before 1947. Kashmir was a pOOl' backward regian of India. The feudal régime under which the State had beeu ruled for centuries did not provide for any development. economic. social or political. ln October 1947, Kashmir acceded ta India and became a constitutent State of the Indian Union. Following the elections on the basis of adult suffrage, a Constituent Assembly met in 1951 andframed a democratic constitution which was inaugurated after another general election in 1957. 1!, l j Like other States in India, the Governmentof Jammu and Kashmir has already implemented two Five-Year plans of economic development (1951-56 and 1956-61) and i8 now executing a third (1961-1966), thetarget of investment of which is $150 million*. The figures given below indicate the progress made by Jammu and Kashmir State in the two Five-Year Plans: Pre-195I $25 million 1961 $67 million Investment ••..•.••• .1. 1 $5.5 million (1947) Revenue. , ••••••••. $23.5 million (1959-60) state income at $160 'million (1959-60) $110 million (1950-51) 1955~1956 priees ,f Pel' caput income at 1955-1956 priees •• $48 (1959-60) $38 (1950-51) J Food production. • • •• 300.000 tons 500.000 tons ,~ ·$21 equal Rs. 100 or ti.5. Roads pel' 100 sq. miles 2.5 miles 40 miles Tourists .......... 27,207 71,000 (1943-44 peak tourist year) r Number of pupils in Primary Schools•••• 65,000 197,000 Number of Higb and Higher Secondary Schools •••••••• 52 262 (1947~48) Literacy .......... 6.6% 12% (before 1947) Nurnbel' of trainees outside the State •••• Negligible 3,179 r Pel' caput expenditure on public health • • •• $0.13 $0.76 Number of hospitals and dispensaries. • •• 89 (1947-48) 47 years Average life expectancy 32 years '