S/PV.1010 Security Council

In accordance with the previous decision taken by this Council,Ishall,withthe consent of the members, invite the representatives of Pakistan and India to participate in our consideration of this matter. ~afruJla Khan (Pakistan) andMr. Krishna Menon (India) took seats at the COUDoi! table. 2. Ml'. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- lies) (translated from Russian): Gentlemen, after al- most five years, the Security COUDai! is once again obliged, on the initiative of Pakistan, ta examine the so-aalled question of Kashmir. As early as thebegin- ning of this year, as you know, attemptswere made to secure urgent consideration of this question in the ~: t~:;~~~~r&ni~~~nf~:~~~~~t~~J:~i~~~~e~~ni~~;:~ rightly observed that there \Vas no need ta call a meet- ing of the Security Council on the Kashmir question. t ; 4. Now, after hearing out the six-hour speech made by the repressfltative of Pakistan, those who listened to him and studied the textafhis statement objectively will note first of a11 that in spite of Hs length, this speech contains no new circumstanceS to supplement those which representatives of that country have re- ' ferred to during the discussions which have occupied nearly a hundred meetings of the Security CouncŒde- voted in various years, starting in 1948andcontinuing until 1957, to the consideration of this question. Now, as then, there are no grounds for accusing India of creating a threat to peace and security in the Kashmir , region. J 5. If wa cast our minds backovertheperiod separat- 1 ing us from the last discussion of the Kashmir question in the Security Council four and a haU years ago, we j shall find that the main, the basic fact, is the continuing ~ occupation of one third of the territory of Kashmir by · Pakistan forces. On the other hand, not one objective o investigator can adduce, in respect of that period, a ~ ISingle f,act to .indthicalte th.at India hasused,or proposes 0 use, oree ln a reglOn. 6. If we are ta speakofnewfacts relating ta the period mentioned, these new facts consist in the situation's definite normalization, which is evident in that con- siderable part of Kashmir which is Wlder the juris- diction of India. J1 ~ 7. One cannot avoid noting, in this cqnnexion, certain indisputable facts which bear witness to the undoubted progreSS achieved by the people of Kashmir in that part of the territory since the cessation of military acUviUes. We venture to refer ta certain data drawn from the document which the delegation of Inma yester- day asked should be distributed here as an official document.YWe shaIl mention sorne of the factswhich have not yet been refer~ed ta here. Here axe a few figures characterizing, in very spare andunvarnished terms, the real situation now obtaining in that part of the territory which i8 under the direct administration of India. i 8. Total capital investmentin the economyofKashmir has increased more than twofold: per caput income has increased by 20 pel' cent: food production has increased from 300.000 to 500.000 tons; the amoWlt of electric power produced has increased almost four times; the number of industrial undertakings has iner·eased al- most threefold: per caput expenditure on public hea1th . services has inereased sixtimes;thenumberofhospi- taIs and other medical establishments has increased ' J/ See l009th meeting, annex. 10. Having said this, Ishoul'.lremarkthatsomeof you may think or say that it wouId he more appropriate ta put forward faets of tbis kind, not in the Security CoUDoil Chamber, but in the neighbouring Economie and Social Couneil Chamber which i8 a more suitable place for statements showing improvements in the standards of living and economies of individual caun- tries. 11. These new facts do, of course, meritt~eattention of the Economie and Social COlUleil. But it is quite de- liberately that we mention them on the present r oooasion; for ',','e wish to show with a11 the emphasis at our command that, when the gl'oundless assertion is made over and over again that the people of Kashmir has not exercised its right to national self-determina- tian, these data, together with the fact that the popula- tion of Kashmir has durîngtheperfodinquestion more than once expressed its willthroughgeneralelections, have not only economic and social but, above aIl, political significance. Therefore, from our point of view, the document submitted here by the Indiandele- gation is quite rlghtly headed: "Jammu and Kashmir- Development in Freedom." ' 12. We cannot fail to observe that in the light of these . real facts a note of definite discord was sounded by the , assertion made in the speech of the representative of [ Pakistan [1007th and 1008th meetings], who, as ifpur- posely, attempted to paint the present situation in the region of Kashmir in sombre eolours. An obvious dis- card, or, as the representative of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, said here [1009th meeting], the shadow of a threat was contained in this assertion by the Pakistan representative. 1 want to give two quotations from the statement of the répresentative of Pakistan, because they seem to me important for an explanation of the position now assumed by the Pakistan delegation on this question in the Security Couneil.Y "H the Security Council does not want the elements in the State who started the Ilberation battle to start again, if the Security Council does not desire that the tribesmen should get out of hand and pour into Kash- f mir again, if th~ Security Council does not desire that the people of Pakistan should get out of hand and-if 1 May mix the metaphor-takethebitbetween their teeth and run away with the whole system of r ~ ordered government. and tl the Security Counèil does ; not deslre that powerful neighbouring States should f "i plunge into the vortex when it starts again, the : SeeUrity COunei! had better take note ofthe realities ) of the situation." fl007th meeting, para. 63.] :; And:Aurth~rf on, we read: b ,'; ud 1 it boUs up again, it will not then e con- ~ fined to where it was confined in those days-a local f. struggle in the State of Jammu andKashmiro" [Ibid., li para. 64.) ~" 13. Here, gentlemen, every ward is a threat to use j al'med force-and not only a threat to use it in the ; Kashmir region, but infactathreattodraw practically l ~e whole world into an armed conflict. Nobody, of y Paragraphs quoted in English by t!;e speaker. , 3 H. We sht\.lI mere!y recall-and this perhaps might prove useful-that the invn.sion o[ the territory of Kashmir by Pakistan forces is noted, in objective yet extremely definite terms, in the resolution adoptedon 1:3 August 194811 by the United Nations Commission for Iudia and Pakistan-a resolution which was Iater confirmed by the Security Coullcil, a resoîuUon which \Vas not rejected by Pakistan at the time. 15. References have· iilre;dy been made here to this lçey document, and further references will be made- a1\1..5 ·.dth justification. J ask .vou ta forgive mE for not, in m,)' turn, being able to avoid quoting certain vital or material provisions of this document. Forexample, in part II, section A, pal'agl'aph 1, we read: "1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the Statl" of Jammu and Kashmirconsti- tutes (l. material change in the situation since it was l'epresented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Govel'nment of Pakistan agrees to withdraw Hs troops from that State." 1 would draw attention ta the last phrase: "••• the Government of Paltists.n agrees to withd.raw its troops from that state. Il 16. And 1 quote paragraph 2; "The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withd.rawal l'rom the State of Jammu and. Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the pm'pose of figl1ting." Here in sorne sort-rather lyrically told, and J would have said rather toned down-is the story of the picture which the representative of India drewyester- de.y in the Council. HeI'e it mentions that they "entered the State for the purpose of fighting". Here are the calm and quite objective Unes confirming the fact of armed aggression against Kashmir. Jt is known, how- ever. that this decision for the withdrawal of the Pakistan troops, tbis provision of the resolution, has oevel' been implemented. And now, here at a meeting of the Security Council, beÎore the eyes of the whole world, as we became convinced in listening to the statp.rnent of the representative of Pakistan, they again openly threaten to repeat the invasion of Kashmir, and.. moreover, on an even larger scale. 17. One thinks involuntarily, gentlemen, of the con- nexion between the new and. bellicose statements- made after a longinterval-and these feverish military preparations and the flow of foreign arms into cOWltries y Qt-,}cial Records of the Securit}' Council, Third year, Supplement ior M\'ember 1948, document S/llOO, para. ïS. \ 20. Gentlemen, a comparison of the two statements which we have heard, those of Pakistan and In.lia, needs no oon"lment. On the one hand we hear warlike sabre-rattling and see the continuing occupation by foroe of part of the territory of Kashmir while the other side displays extreme restraint, patience and a love of peace in keeping with the general line of the neutral and peaceful policy followed by India. 21, It seems hardly necessary to return in any detail to the discussions which have taken place in previous years in the Security COWloil on the Kashmir question. It is impossible to analyse in any detail the dozens of different references and quotations contained in the last statement of the representative of Pakistan. Indeed it would be impossible with any regardfor seriousness ta oaloulate, as the distinguished Muhammad ZafrulIa Khan tried ta do, how many of the young people in the territory of Kashmir cried "Long live Pakistan" or "Long live India" in the public places, and how the local police reacted ta these cries; .or enter upon a disoussion of dozens and dozens of triflingandirrele- vant facts out of which an attempt was none the less made here, as with tiny stones foramosaic, ta create rl '. evidently still sorne force in the ancient saying: "He . who proves too much proves nothing." . an unreal pioture of the present situation in Kashmir. t In this connexiOn, we can only suggest that there is l 22. However, from amongst the matters connected with the history of the Kashmir question and the J previous discussion of this question in meetings of r the Security Council, l should like ta deal with two reaUy important issues whioh were raised at the , '~' earIier discussions and which have already been touched upon in the course of the debate at the Council's present meeting. We wiU confine ourselves to these two questions, dealing with them very briefly. 23. These questions are the withdrawal of troops from ; the territory of Kashmir, and theso-calledplebiscite. ', Not only objective analysts ofthewealthofdocumenta- . tion ou this subject, but even the representatives of Pakistan cannat deny that the plebiscite, which was unquestionably a compromise measure, waS oon- . templated and oould have taken place fourteen years IlA plebiscite will he held when it shall be found by the Commission that the cease-fire and truce arrangements set forth in parts 1 and II of the Com- mission's resolution of 13 August 1948 have been .::arried out ... Il 25. And what are the provisions in part II of the resa- lution of 13 August 1948 which are mentioned? 26. If we turn topartIIofsectionB of that resolution, we read in paragraph 1: IIWhen the Commission shaH have notified the ('.overnment of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals r!3ferred to in part II, A, 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being with- drawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees ta begin to withdrawthe bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission. Il 27. We have already said that the conditions, accord- ing to which the Pakistan troops shouldhave been with- drawn from the principality of Jammu and Kashmir, have not been complied with. Therefore we agreethat, in accordance with the text of the l'esolutions men- tioned, and also in accol'dance with the generally accepted principles of internationallaw, to which Ml'. Krishna Menon rightly referred here yesterday, the question of holding a plebiscite has lapsed, sinee the provisions which were a condition for holding it have never been fulfilled. 28. In order ta justify the failure to comply with the obligations regardingthe withdrawal of Pakistan tl'oops from the territory of Kashmir, as you know, gentle- men, assertions which were advanced many years aga are not being repeated anew, in the same-and also in slightly altered-form, claiming that the resolution of 13 August 1948 provided for the simultaneous witb- drawal of both Pakistan and Indian tl'oops. 29. It must be said that at times this opinion bas been put forward in completely undisguised form. Let us take, for example, the Graham report of 31 March 1958. In this document we read: "They [the GOvernment of Pakistan] informed me furtber that they were prepared to withdraw the Pakistan troops from the State of Jammu and Kashmir simultaneously with the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces from the State••." .Y 30. In other cases, the same statement has been made in somewhat different form. They have spoken, and V Ibid., Fourth Year. 5upplemem for Janua.ry 1949, document 5/1196. para. 15. » Ibid.. Thirteenth Year. 5upplemenrfor lanuary. February and Marcb ~ document 5/3984. para. 22. r, 31. It is hardly worth wasting time or effort in proving that references of such a kind contradict the text of the resolution of 13 August 1948, since this resolution provides c1early that Pakistan must first withdrawaIl its forces from the entire territory of Kashmir. 32. That is why the present new attempts, after the passing of fourteen years, to make India responsible for the collapse of the plan to hold a·plebiscite in Kasbrnir at that titRe are groundless. 33. We have made this small historiCll1 excursion in arder to demonstratefurtherthatthe plebiscite-which in the given conditions of 1948 could have had a defi- nite rneaning if the key condition mentioned by us, the withdrawal in the first place of aIl Pakistan forces from the whole territory of Kashmir, had been observed-has now fourteen years later, in the lightof entirely different circumstances, and because life has not stoud still but has moved forward, lost any signifi- canee whatsoever. 34. As we shall show presently, and as has already been shawn here in the convincing statement ofthe dis- tinguished representative of India, the people of Kashmir, in the years since that time, has been able to express its will in a sufficiently definite manner. Let us look at sorne facts. It is known that the Indian ïndependence Act passed by the British Parliamenton 18 June 1947 ended British ruIe in India on 15 August 1947. This Act provided for the creation, as from that date, of a new State-Pakistan-through the detachingof certain regions in the north-west and east of British IndiG.. 35. We may recaIl that, in accordance with the Act" sorne 565 Indian states, which up tothattime had bee, directIy governed by Indian princes and rulers, became free ta link their future with whichever of the two Dominions they chose. The provisions applying in particular to the procedure for the adherence oflndian States to the Union of India were contained in the Con- stitution of India, which entered into force on 15 August 1947. ( 36. This provision stated that an Indian State shouldbe deemed ta be accepted into the Dominion if the Gov- ernor-General had recognized the agreement on asso- ciation drawn up by the :l'uler. r 37. The Constitution also provided that the Indian States which had associated tbemselves in this way became an integral part of the Union of India. We would further recall that almost aU the States joined either Iodia or Pakistan at different times after 15 August 1947. In each case the agreement on association was signed by the ruler. !lS required by law, 38. On 260ctobe' . J7,ashasalreadybeenmentioned here. the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir drew up an agreement on association with India, in strict aocord- ance with the oonstitutional form and prooedure which we have just recalled. The Governor-Generaloflndia, 41. However, the matter did DOt end there. Il' 1%1, 1957 and 1962, elections were heid within the haine- work of the Constitution of India, including general elections in 1957 and 1962, in which an overwhelming majority of the population of Kashmir very clearly expressed its will. J 42. Statements have been made here-and may be made again-as ta the need to effect new studies and 1 investigations of sorne sort, ta adopt arbitration pro- cedure, v:ith a view to establishing the circumstances , and reasons which have made ït impossible, upto now, to regard the position throughout Kashmir as havi.ng been normalized. 43. The Soviet delegation considers that in the light of the analysis of the circumstances which have been adduced here during the meetings of the Council, in the light of the circumstances which wehavejuststated to the Council, in the light of therealsituation which has developed in the course of recent years in the region under discussion, sllch measures or proposaIs could only exacerbate the Kashmir question and increase the temperature and tension. The adoption of sllch deci- sions could not, in our opinion, serve the cause of the strengthening of international peace and security. Such decisions would be calculated only, as before, to create an atmosphere of uncertainty and anxiety, to calI in question the indisputable fact that Kashmir is an inte- gral part of India. 44. That is why the Soviet delegation, in the light of aIl the circumstances just described, cannot allow the adoption of such proposaIs. The position of the Soviet Union on the Kashmir question has been stated on numerons occasions at meetings of theSecurityCoun- cil. It is clear and precise to the highest degree. "!'he question of Kashmir, which is one of the States of the Republic of India and forms an integral part of India, has been decided by the people of Kashmir itseli. The people of Kashmir has decided this matter in accord- ance with the principles of democracy and in the interests of strengthening friendly relations between the peoples of tbis region. 45. As Mr. N. S. Khrushchev pointed out in 1955, the population of Kashmir does not want Kashmir to be- come a toy in the hands of imperialist forces. And a policy based on the principle of "divide and rule" un- dOubtedly conflicts with the vital interests of the peoples of both India and Pakistan. This was weIl understood at the time, and still is understood, by the people of Kashmir. 46. That is why attempts to set passions alight about religions differences between certain peoples of India could never be in the int€rests of those peoples. Such attempts can profit only those whose desire j~ is to see the peoples of ABia divided-those, in particular. who J' 48. In our opinion. the members of the Security Coun- cil can note with satisfaction the statement of the Government of India that India will never take the initiative in starting milîtary action in the Kashmir region. This formaI statement constitutes a guarantee given by India. ln our view, the Governmentof Pakistan should give a simîlar guarantee, if it is also really trying to achieve peace. 49. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Pakistan has expressed his wish ta exercise the right of reply and 1 now caU on him for that purpose. 50. Ml'. ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan): The speechof the Defence Minister yesterday ranged over a wl.de field, and tbis mu:crdng we have hadthe good fortune ta lîsten ta the views that the representative ofthe USSR has expressed on behalf of his Government. In bath of those statements there are certain elements which, if left unchallenged or unexplained, might constitute a misunderstanding of the position of Pakistan. 1 have therefore ventured to request, Mr. President, tbatyou kindly give me the floor to give such explanaJ.:ions as are called for, and 1 thank you fûr acceding to my re- quest. 51. Before 1 take up the specüic matiers that have been raised with reference ta the merits 0:1' the case, whether it is by the Defence Ministeroflndia or by the representative of the USSR, 1want ta isolate one matter mentioned by bath representatives. It does not relate ta the merits of the case andithas certainly this morning been put in the forefront of the observations of the representative of the USSR and was referred taby the Defence Minister yesterday afternoon. 52. It was said, and has been repeated this morning, that 1 voiced a threat, ta the Security Council, of the use of armed force for the purpose of resolving this dispute, and 1 asked the Security Council ta take note of it. Now, in the tirst place, the context in which 1 used the words that have been quoted was that the Security CowiCil, when the matter was first brought before itby India, took the viewthatthey are to concen- trate, not upon determining the legality or otherwise of certain positions or attitudes or questions that had been raised, but, tiret, onbringingabout;'tceeeation of the hostilities that were in progress, and, next, on reaching a solution of the dispute between the parties. 1r 1 ïrr 53, In the context of their tirst urgent concern-that is to say. ta bring about the cessation of hostîlities- they took up the position: "Why is the fighting going on?" And they came ta the conclusion-anditwas per- feetly obvious-that the fighting was going on as the people of Kashmir desired to come ta a decision with regard ta the accession, through the exercise of their OWn choice and not the Maharajah's. Therefore, once they were assured that thei:r desire, their wish, their objective would be fulfilled completely throughpeace- ~ 54. No\\', that portion of my submission on Friday [1007th meeting} said it was on thefaithof that assur- ance, those promises. and subsequently the obligation undertaken by both sides, that this question will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. that eventually the Commission succeeded in bringing about a cessation of hostilities. 55. 1 said that this matter hadbeenpendingfor a long Ume. Frustration \Vas being feIt \Vith regard ta the pursuit of peaceful methods for Hs setUement, because no visible progress wasbeingmade. Therefore,people felt that, perhaps in the end, no solutiOn would be found through peaceful methods. 1 expressed an apprehen- sion, in the words that have been quoted, that, if the Security CotUlcil does notwish the people ofPakistan to get out of control, as a resultofthis sense of frustra- tion, and that the people of "Azad" Kashmir should again have recourse ta tbeir batUe for liberation-the President of "Azad" Kashmir has a1ready used that expression in public and Press statements wbichhave been reported in the newspapers here and which some of the members of the 8ecurity Council mayhave seen -that the tribesmen sbOuld wish ta plunge into the business again and that. as a result there would he chaos in that region-and in that case. it might not be possible for neighbouring Governments ta keep out of the situation that would thus be broùght about, and not to plunge inie tbe "vortex"-then, the 8ecurityCouncil had better add-ress itself to promoting the settlement of the question through peaoeful means. 56. 1 held out no threatwhatever,ofanykind. 1 repre- sent here the Government of Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan is anxious ta prooeed towardsettlementof tbis question on the basis ofthe obligations undertaken by bath sides. i hàve made it quite olear more than once-I may have to make it again later-that,if there is a difference with regard to what those obligations are, as there appears to be, not only between India and Pakistan, but also with regardta atleast one mem- ber of the Security Counoil who has spoken this ffi':>rning, it is useless to conclude, "Let it be; it is finished". No dispute is decided by, ilLet it be; it is finlshed". It is an old adage: not only justice must be done, but it must be seen ta be done. It is not enough- 1 am saying this for the sake of argument-that the interpretation that India puts on certain parts of the resolutions accepted by bath sides, and the interpreta- tians put on sorne parts of them tbis morning by the representative of the USSR, might turn out to be correct on a fair and impartial determination; it is possible; a determination can go either way. Ifthatshouldhappen, 1 have said that Pakistan would atoncerectify any de- fauIt in respect of it that it might have committed. ] 1, i 1 i ) 1 57. Let me give an illustration. 1 will come to this question of interpretation and determination later. It r 58. And what threat was there in it? Was there a threat tbat, if something did not happen by a partîcu- lar date, the Pakistan Government would lead Hs troops into Kashmir, înto theoccupiedpartofKashmir and renew the fighting? The Pakistan Government has set a record in this case of seeking a seUlement through peaceful methods, arecordofwhîch the repre- sentative of the Soviet Union appears already to be tired. Perhaps sorne other members of the Security Counoi! are tired also and are thinking why go on? Why go on knocking at a door which seems difficult to open? But wa must continue to go on knooking at the door, however difficult it May be to open, because if the door does not open there is no alternative left but for things ta go on accumulating till an explosion oc- ours somewhere or other. However, this does not mean-and 1 repeat tbis again-that the Pakistan Gov- ernment has at any tîme had any intention of seeking a solution of this dispute through the use of force. r 1 [ 1f 1 r 1 59. 1 was invited by the representative of the Sov' ~t Union, in this connexion, to give a guarantee similar to the one given by the Government ofIndia. 1 will say one or two words with regard ta the guarantee re- peatedly given by the Government of India before 1 express myself on that matter. 61. Now. it was said that in accession-again, 1 have to revert toitlater;lamheredealingwith the question of threats andthenon-resorttotheuseof force-it was said that in accession all that was neededwas that the ruler ShOlÙd sign the application form and the Head of state of one Dominion or the other to whom the form was addressedwould say, "l accept". Butwhathappened with regard 00 Junagadh? What happened subsequently in Junagadh? India occupied it by forceandis in occu- pation today. 62. No 8tate was under complÙsion ta accede to one side or the other. The Indian representative went on, before the Security Council, with regard to Kashmir- and that 1 will come to' later also-that they could chooae freely to accede to one side or the other or to remain independent. Hyderabad, with 14.millionpeople and an area as large as one of the principal States of Western Europe, did not wish ta accede to Pakistan, so there was no question of Pakistan's coming into the pioture. But they did not desire to accede to India either. They desired to enter into treaty relation8hîps with India, bringing about a situation parallel to what accession would bring about, but only by treaty. And what happened there? India led its forces in. Regarding Hyderabad, at any rate, 1 wouldnotenterinto any con- troversy. We are not concerned with it here; it is not a parallel case. But a solution was adopted involving the use of force; that is whathappened. L 63. WeIl, 1 am glad that nOW a categorical guarantee i8 given that India will not attempt the solution of this question through force. Statements have been made- statements which 1 quoted to the security Council in my first lett.er [S/5058] andperhaps even ininy second ~:;~~r ~/~~6~~bC:;~fo~~om~~~~~~~~~Yi~e~~~~~; [990th meetingj, which would showtoanybodydistinct- ly that threats were being uttered with regard to at- tempting the vacation ofthe so-called aggression inthe state of Jammu and Kashmir committed by Pakistan through the use of force. One of those statements, as __I_s_a_~~as by the President of the Congress ln lts 1 ' 64. That is the record on bath sides. Again l do not say that India may not have been justified, in the at- mosphere of doubt and suspicion that exists, in taking the precautions that ittook. On the other band, Pakistan was justified in apprehending that the use of force might eventually be resorted ta in the situation that had been created. That is how, as a matter of fact, the present discussions arose-not merely for the purpose of looking at the situation which had been created by these public q.eclarations and the massing of forces, but in arder that the 8ecurity COUDcil could address itself once more to finding a way towards the peaceful settlement of this dispute which cannat be settled merely by saying that there is nothing ta settle. The dispute exists. Itwillcontinuetoexist. The longer it exists the greater the apprehension that some- thing or other might lead to a sudden mounting of tensions, and then even Governments become power- less ta control the tensions. r 1l 1r f 65. So much about the threat. With regard ta the guarantee, as l have already said, the Pakistan Gov- ernment has no intention-and l mentioned that as a guarantee-to bring about a change in the situation through any except peaceful metbods. It will always have recourse ta peaceful methods for its settlement. But it ls bound ta warn the Security Council that the situation may not always continue to remain passive. Not that the Government itself will do sometbing to convert it into. a situation of tension. but tension might arise. That is not something which anybody should raiae his eyebrows over. How can Ithappen? It has happened. Governments are upset, new Govern- ments take their place and new Governments can change policies. People get out of band. There ls nothing extraordinary in what l have mentioned ta the Council. 1 have merely stresaed thatthis is a live dis- pute and no live dispute can be settled merely by covering it up--as 1 said last time. r fr ' jrr ,67. With regard ta the question of the relationship between what was British India, and subsequently be- came pakistan and India, and the princely states, i understood the Defence Minister of India ta have put _lorward a thes;,. 1 do not know whether 1 completely 66. l propose DOW ta address myself to sorne of the matters that were raised yesterday afternoon. Idonot intend ta take up every point that was raised, but mainly the points on which reliance was placed for the Security Connci! ta draw some conclusion or other which was not only relevant ta this dispute but also important in the context thereof. 68. Aithough 1 do not claim that 1 have a mastery of international law with regard particularly ta these aspects, 1 am unable ta recall any justification any- wbere, either in international law or with regard ta what actually happened in the transfer of aovereignty, for the propositionthat India inherited the paramoWltcy of the British any more than Pakistan inherited it. India and Pakistan were the two suceessor States-two Dominions created outofwhatwas BritishIndia. Pakis- tan chose a new name. India kept the old name in EngUsh, although in the vernacular the name of that larger successor Btate is Bharat. The mere fact that India chose ta retain the English name "India" did not make any difference ta the actual or constitutional position that there were two successor States, one a mucl\. larger one with a much larger pOpulation and largpr resources, and larger in the international setting, and sa on, certainly, and the other smaller in all those respects. But nevertheless they were two independent sovereign States, bath successor States. 69. It was said-perhaps as an illustration or even as an argument in support of India' s having inherited the paramOlUltcy in respect of aIl Indil.nBtates-that Pakis- tan had ta apply for memliership of the United Nations while India continued ta hold the old seat. But that was simply a matter of agreement between the two. It did not result from the position that one was a successor State and the other was just a charitable creation. It had ta be decided what should happen with respect to membershîp ofinternational organizations. Eitherbath should apply for membership of the United Nations- India already was a Member-or one should bold the seat that already belonged ta the suh-continent andthe other should dpply anew for membership. Part of the agreement of partition between the two was that India should continue to occupy tbat seat and Pakistan should apply for admission. It was not the result of any constitutional doctrine cr doctrine in internaUonallaw that one was a successor state and the other was not. 70. But assume for one moment that the theory put forward by the DefenceMinister oflndiahas any basis. Then why is it that on 26 October 1947, Mr. V. P. Menon had ta go to Delhi ta find out whether India uld d' t th d ed b hi "00 wo come, accor mg a e wor s us y m, the rescue of the Maharajah" by sending military forces?-H there was already suzerainty and para- mOWltcy, Indi. ",as Wlder obligation t0 do so,And why 71. However, there is further clearer proof of the position that 1 have stated. The partition statementY of 3 June 1947 authorized by His Majesty' s Govern- ment, which announced how the transfer of power from Britain to India would t9ke place, has, among other clauses, the fOllowing: r "16. Negotiations will have to be initiated as soon as possible on the administrative consequences of any partition that may have been decided Upon: "@) Between the representatives of the respective successor authorities about aIl subjects nOw dealt with by the Central Government including Defence, Finance and Communications; .. (g) Between different successar authorities and His Maje8ty' s Government for treaties in regard ta matters arising out of transfer of power."• •, Where is there a distinction that one of them i8 a successor State and the otheris, weIl, somethingelse? 72. Paragraph 17 of this same statement says: "17. Agreements with tribes of the North West Frontier of India"-they have been referred to in another cantext a good deal yesterday afternoon and also in this controversy-"will have to benegotiated by the appropriate successor authority." Who was "the appropriate successor autharity." The Government of Pakistan? 73. In addition, the preamble in Section 1 of the Indian Independence Act1J takes up the same position. The preamble says: "An Act ta make prOVIsIOn for the setting up in India of two independent Dominions, to substitute other provisions for certain provisions of the Gov- ernment of India Act, 1935, whichapplyoutsidethose Dominions, and to provide for other matters conse- quential on or connected with the setting up of those Dominions." No distinction here between India and Pakistan-there is one India. It continues: "Be it enacted by theKing'smostExcellentMajes- ty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this pre- f J!.J Cons[ilutional Laws of lndiaand Pakîs[an, Company Law Ins[ituee of J. '"t',~~~~p":',::" 17. 19". pp. B"d 9. Does that even it out on the question? 74. Then, IinaIly, Section 7. of the Act, which 1 have already read out and which is on record, provides quite clearly that from the appointed date a11 treaties, engagements, everything between His Majesty and the States will lapse. There is no question there with re- gard to ally suzerainty or paramoulltcy vested either in Olle Dominion or the ather. 75. The second question which 1 shaH ta1œ up is the question of the accession on which the thesis tilat 1 put forward \Vas ta sorne degree not questioned, but the position obtaining today \Vas questioned. It was said that an that \Vas needed for final, irrevocable, unal- terable accession was that the Ruler should offer accession and the Dominion ta whom he offered it should accept it and that thereafter no change in it could take place. That is what is being said today: Thereafter no change in it could take place; it is unalterable. In the first place, what meaning then is one to aUach to Lord Mountbatten's letter ta the Maharajah in which he says that in consistence \Vith the policy of his Government, where the question of accession is in dispute between the Ruler and bis subjects-I am giving the gist of that part from memol'Y, 1 am not quoting the letter that has been quoted-the decision must he made by the freely expl'essed wishes of the people and in accord \Vith that policy, it is the wish of his Government that when law and order has been restored the wish of the people in that behalf shaH be ascertained. What \Vas it? What meaning is to be attached ta it? It was the Governor- GeneraPs letter as the Head of the State. He was writing on behalf ofhis Government, it musthave sorne meaning. 76. Then, on 6 February 1948, before the Security Council, Ml'. Ayyanger repl'esentative of India stated fuis: "1 would pass on to theremarksofthe representa- tive of Pakistan as regards the question of accession. These remarks appear in bis speech ta the Security Counci! during the 240th meeting. The representative of Pakistan said: 'India's reply and India's stand throughout has been: We accepted Kashmir's acces- sion provisionally-for the moment-in order to deal with the emergenCY that !lad arisen; and once the emergency was out of theway, the question of Rcces·- sion would he decided bythepeoplethrougha plebis- cite'."§.! He does not accept that as beingquite accurate. He then goes on ta set out his own version of what the position of the Government of India was-and that is important. 77. He says that that is not quite an accurate descrip- tion of India's attitude. Now, here is the representative §J Official Reçorrls of the~' cllrio/ Council, Third Year, Nos. 16-35, 242nd meeting, p. 30-31. J "That attitude would be more correctIy described in the following words: 'We accepted Kashmir's offer of accession at a Ume wben she was in peril, in arder ta be able effectively ta save her from extinction. We will not, in tbe circumstances, hold her to this accession as an unalterable decision on ber part. When the emergency bas passed and normal condi- tions are restored, she will be free, by means of a plebiscite,' Il -and 1 emphasize "plebiscite" and will come back ta that later, because yesterday the Defence Minister said that his Prime Minister-and 1 suppose he meant his Government also-had never used the word "plebis- cite", had only used the expression "the will of the people" when that statement was made- r "'eitber to ratlly her accession to fudiaorto change her mind and accede to Pakistan or remain independ- ent. We shall not stand in the way if she elects to change her mind.' That"-he went on to say-"Itbink, is the proper description of India's attitude."§! 78. Ml'. President, if 1t is convenient to adjourn at this stage, 1 would be ready to proceed when the Security Council reconvenes after lunch.

1 think it would be best if we were to adjourn now and reconvene the meeting at 3 o'c1ock this afternoon. 80. Ml'. Krishna MENüN (India): Before we adjourn, 1 wish to say that 1 have no idea for how long Sir Muhammad proposes to ta1k about this. 81. As 1 communicated to the Council, as far as 1 am concerned, 1 must leave this evening. 1 do not intend to reply to aIl this because 1 have already done so. However, 1 must have an opportunity to make a statement before the Council, in view ofnew circumstances which have arisen. 82. The Government of India does not want ta be put in any position where she makes assurances to the Security Council and does not present those new circumstances when they subsequently arise. Therefore, 1 hope it will be possible ta ascertainfrom the representative of Pakistan for how long he intends ta continue. ûtherwise, perhaps his statement can he interrupted, 1 would answer it as far as it has gone, at a convenient time, and make tbe statement in behalf of my Government. 1r r 83. Ml'. ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan):1would be prepared ta follow any course that is convenient ta the Defence Minister of lndia. If he wishes to address the Security Council immediately after lunch, 1 am perfectly content that he do so. If the Chair wishes me ta interrupt my statement, if it is not finished, at a particular hour, 1 shall certainly do sa at that stage, so that he may speak. 85. This question has beenfullyarguedandanswered; the repetition goea on. Wecangoonfor ten claya. Certain nrlsstatements were made just DOW. 1shaH correct them very brief1y. New circumstances have arisen, regarding wh~ch we have to make a statement.

1 hope that the representative will correct me iflam wrong, hutU is my understanding that he would be able to conclude bis reply within about thirty or forty minutes.

1 would say in about an hour after we reconvene. J'

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