S/PV.1011 Security Council

ln accordance with the previous decisions taken by the Council, 1shaH, with the consent of the members, take it for granted that we wish ta haVE! the participation of the representatives of Pakistan and India in our deliberations this afternoon. At the invitation of the President. Mr. Muhamma.d Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) and Mr. Krishna. Menon (Indla) took seats at the Council table. fr

1 give the floar ta the representative of Pakistan ta continue his statement. 2. la suivre 3. glais]:

1 was dealing '=~ ~lh the quesllon on whlch the Defence Minisler of 1 4. 1 have already drawn the attention of the Security Couneil ta the relevant portion of Lord Mountbatten's letter ta the Maharajah and the statement made on 6 February 1948 befare the Securfty Couneil by the late Ml'. Gopalaswami Ayyangar. 5, The Defenee Minister said that Kashmir i8 as much a part of India as Gujarat. and he named one or two other States in Inclia. 6. 1 shaH nOW draw the attention of the Security Couneil ta the statement made in the Iudian Parliament on 26 June 1952 by the Prime Minister of India. 1 would also beg the Council to observe, not only the text of the statement, but the date on which it was made, 26 June 1952-four-and-a-halfyears afterthese Occurrences had taken place and the so-called accession had been made, and nearly four years after the 13 August 1948 resolution: " ••• When we say that the people of Kashmir will decide, that does not lilT'it the accession inany way. We put itonhighergrounds. If, after a proper plebiscite, the people of Kashmir said, 'We do not want to be with India', we are committed ta accept that. We will accept it though it might pain us. We will not send an army against them. We will accept that, however hurt we might feel about it we "'i11 change the Constitution, if necessary. India is a great country and Kashmir i5 almost in the heart of Asia. There is an enormous difference, not only geographica11y but in a11 kinds of factors there. Do you think you are dealing with a part of U.P. or Bihar or Gujarat?" J t 7. Now, the Prime Minister here not only mG.kes the position quite clear, but he makes a clear distinction between the States that were part of India and Kashmir, with regard ta which there was an international commitment that the people will decide through a plebiscite. 8. Then, in its advisory opinion, the Permanent Court of International Justice, in the case of the "Treatment of Polish nationals and other persons of Polish origin or speech in th.e Danzig territory", handed down on 4 February 19321!J had said this: "It should however be observed that, while on the one band, accordingto genera11y acceptedprinciples, aState cannot rely, as against another state, on the provisions of the latter's Constitution, but only on international law and international obligations duly accepted, on the other hand and convei'~ely, aState cannot adduce as against another State its own !J Pennanent COurt of International Justice, series AIB, No. 44, Advisory Opinion, February 4th, 1932, p, 24. "Every State has the dutY to carry out in good faith its obligations arising f~~om treaties and other souroes of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution orits laws as an excuse for failure to perform this dutY." ses tution 10. Now, ta go on to another topic. The Defence Minister of India appearedto attribute to me the statement, or the claim, or the argument, that because Kashmir has a majority of Muslims in its population, the:refore it should belong ta Pakistan. To the best of my recollectian, l have never, throughout the course of these discussions, advanced this argument Or this claim. and this applies ta my last submission to the Council also. It is true that we have, among other facts, drawn attention ta the composition of the population. We have stated that culturally the people of Kashmir are much mOre akin ta Pakistan than to India. We have stated that Kashmir's Hnes of oommunication, as they existed at the time of the partition of the sub continent. all went into Pakistan-the railway Imes. the three rivers, the main road which was open aIl the year round; that economically Kashmir's integration was with Pakistan; and that, on the basis of aIl these factors, we could have urged that Kashmir should accede to Pakistan, but that we did not do so; that it is a matter which must be decided by the people of Kashmir. So if there is any doubt with regard to any statements made on behalf of Pakistan before the Security Council on that point, 1 clear it up here and now. This is OUI' stand, that we have an international obligation and we think that on its merits-and also as a question of prînciple, since it is right in itself-this question should be decided through the freely expressed wishes of the people of Kashmir, and the method for that free expression of wishes has also been agreed upon by the parties. 10. que la lesquels, est devrait souvienne, qui cette dernière attiré position de coup lignes existaient vers des cable économiques Cachemire ces tachement ne question mire doute nom ce est et de devrait ment de des ll, On the other hand, il was lndia that raised the ' question of the composition of the population. We do not say they did not raise it properly, but they raîsed tJhe qudhestion in connexion with the accession of unaga. 1 shaH draw attention only ta two documents in that connexion, although there are severaI. 11. la Non l'a Je qu'il 12, ln his telegram No. 251, dated 22September 1947, the Governor-General of India communicated with the r Governor-General of Pakistan. After setting out how his Government looked upon the unilateral action of Pakistan in accepting the accession of Junagadh, he ~ot 00 to say, 12. du du avoir considérait accepté ces We are not objecting that this question was raised. It la a relevant question, because here the telegram said that the Government of India considered Pakistan'8 action in this matter as being in utter violation of the princlples upon which partition was agreed and effected. Everybody knows that it was effected on the basis of the majority areas of one community and the majority araas of the other community. 13. But we have -not made that claim in regard to Kashmir. Our claim ie that the people should decide. in a free world. 14. Then, in his telegram of 8 November 1947, the Prime Minister of India saidth1s ta the Prime Minister of Pa.kistan: " ••• but it ls essential. in order to restore good reletions between the two Dominions, that there should be acceptance of the principle that, where the ruler of aState does not belong to the commt!.nity ta which the majority of his subjects belong, andwhere the State has not acceded ta that Dominion whose rnajority community is the same as the State's, the question whether the State should finally accede ta one or the other Dominions should be ascertained by reference te the wU1 of the people." 15. Now 1 go on ta the question of the plebiscite. It was, 1 think, stated by the Defence Minister of India that the Prime Minister of India had never committed himself to a plebiscite. 1 think he said the Prime Minister had neve"r used the ward "plebiscite", but at any rate he had never committed himseIf to a plebiscite. He introduced this topicbysayingthatthe plebiscite i8 in any case not a very satisfactory manner of dealing with such questions. 1 shaH not enter into an argument aoout this matter, but 1 will remind the Councll that with regard to two portions of the subcontinent, that ls to say what used ln those days to he known as the North-West FrontierProvinceand,inthe northeast, the District of Sylket, the provision in the Partition Agreement was that their inclusion in Pakistan or in India should be decided by means of a referendum. And it was sa decided in each case. The referendum was held and the decision was takan in accordance with its result. So that the idea of a referendum between the two Dominions. especially with regard ta partition, was neither foreign nor considered clumsy or impractical. It was resorted to and effect was gîven ta it. 16. Now, we come ta the question as ta whether the Prime Minister of India bas or has not committed himself to a plebiscite in Kashmir. In his telegram of 21 November 1947 ta the Prime Minister of Pakistan, the Prime Minister of India first set out the principles on which the question of the accession of Kashmir could be decided, and then said: 17. The late Ml'. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, when address"ing the Security Council on 15 January 1948, said: "In accepting the aocession they"-the Government of India-"refused to take advantage oftheimmediate peril in which the Btate found itselfandinformed the Ruler that the accession ahould finally be settled by plebiscite as saon as peaoe had been restored. They had subsequently made it quite clear that they are agreeable te. the plebiscite being conductedünecassary under international auspices."Y J Again. on 3 February 1948, speaking before the Security Council, Ml'. Ayyangar said: "As the Security Council i8 aware, the Government of India is fully committed to the view that. after peace is restored and aIl people belonging to the Btate have returned there, a free plebisoite should be taken and the people should decide whether they wisb ta remain with India, ta go over ta Pakistan or ta remain independent, if they choose to do so."U 1would also draw the atte_ntion of theSeourity Council ta the words "or ta remain independent, ifthey choose to do sa ". The ward is "remain". they have not ta beoome independent. Where is paramountoy-'?- 18, The Prime Minister of India. addressing the Constituent Assembly of India, as it then was, on 5 March 1948 said this: "Even at the moment of accession we went out of our way to make a unilateral decla;:-ation that we would abide by the will of the people of Kashmir as declared in a plebiscite or referendum. We insisted further that the Government of Kashmir must immediately become a populer Government. We have adhered ta that position throughout and we are prepared to have a plebiscite. with every protectionfor fair voting, and to abide by the decision of the people of' Kashmir." f 1l J 1 ~/lbid.. Nos. 1_15. 239th meeting. pp, 328_329, 20. 1 should like ta be permitted to quote an extract from The Statesman, a well-recognized paper of long and respectable standing. 1 should like ta quote from it a statement of the Defence Minister of India himself, dated 2 August 1951. Mr. Krishna Menon said: liNo one is more devoted to peace at the present time than our Prime Minister. It is notthe intention of the Government of India ta go back on any commitment ithas made. We adhere strictly to our p1edge of plebiscite in Kashmir-a pledge made to the people of Kashmir because they believe in democratic government ••• We do not regard Kashmir as a commodity to be trafficked in." 21. Then. in a joint Press communiqué issued by the Prime Minister of India and the Prime Minister of Pakistan on 20 August 1953, it was stated: "The Kashmir dispute was specially discussed at sorne length. It was their firm opinion"-that is, the opinion of the two Prime Ministers-"that this should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State with a view to promoting thei::- weB-being and causing the least disturbance to the IHe of the people of the State. The most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by fair and impartial plebiscite." 22. 1 now come to the question ta which the Defence Minister was pleased ta devote a good deal of time, that of aggression, and he took ît up in two parts: aggression by the tribesmen and aggression by the Pakistan regular Army units going into the "Azad" Kashmir area. With regard ta what isknown as the incursion of the tribesmen, 1 think it is only fair that one should keep in mind the baf'-kground of conditions prevailing at that time over the greater part of the subcontinent, especially in the northwest. The conditions were that so far as Pakistan was concerned, even the civil administration was not yet in proper running order. The situation was that India took over the buildings, the machinery, the offices and sa on. It was done by agreement; 1 am not mentioning this as a grievance, it was part of the circumstance then; but India did take over a running machine. Pakistan, so far as the setting up of a Central Government was concerned, had ta start from scratch. Everything had ta be provided and the state of public order, unfortunately, both on the Indian and on the Pakistan sides of that region was such that two of the special trains bringing y Ibid.. Sixth Year, Special Supplement Ne. 2, annex 3, para. 4. 23. On the other side, the army which could be the principal instrument ofcontrolling this kind of eruption that took place, was still being sorted out. There was an Indian Army to whieh referenee was also made by the Defenee Minister of India yesterday witb regardto the difficulty of getting together units for them when they decided ta go to the 2.ssistance of the State. He said that they were still being sorted out, sorne wer6 ta go ta Pakistan, sorne were to remain in India. Much more so was the condition on the Pakistan side of those units that were based there, Sometimes even small units were composedin sucha \Vay ofboth communities that they had ta sort them out and send part of the personnel to one side and part of the personnel ta the other side. That was the situation. j 24. In addition, as our very first written representatian to the Security Council in January 1948.& would show, because that was one of the problems which Pakistan raised before the Security Council, we had not received our share of arms, ammunition and equipment for the army. The whole thing was in a helpless condition of confusion. 25, Then, as 1 have said, the happenings in West Pakistan and along its borders on the other sirie-and again 1 want to make it quite clear that what happened in those days was a disgrace ta humanity-showed that no distinction could be made. People seemed to have sunk below the level of beasts, Excesses of every type \Vere committed on both sides, with noble examples shining out in the intense darkness of people putting their own lives in danger, and sometimes laying down those lives, in order to protect the members of the other community. 26. Sa there was courage also, there was heroism, there was devotion to friendship, to human relationships or to principles of humanity. But, by and large, it became a raging sea of beastliness. In Lahore the conditions were such that though there was a provincial government, it was helpless in dealing with the train upon train that came in loaded with refugees, with people, with corpses ofpeoplewhohadbeen killed whiIe in the train, people who were maimed, children with their hands cut off, their eyes gougedout, women with their breasts cut off and a11 that, What took place o.n both sides was to the shame and disgrace of a11 of "'. ! 1 1 1r l 27, In that condition, this tribal incursion was going on and, no doubt, during the trouble in question a11 those thfngs happ" "" "!, as the Defence Minister of India said yester··" , but he seemed to imply that somehow it was the Pakistan Government that was y Ibid.. Thlrd Year. Supplement for NovenÎber 1%8. document SI i _ liDO. "'" 6. m. î J j,, "We cannat let this season of greetings pas« without sending you a very affectionate remembrance from us aU with our prayers and every best wish for a very happy New Year and God's blessings on aU your undertakings. \Ve will never forget how you two brave girls of the Pakistan Voluntary Service risked your lives ta save us from Baramulla when the bombing and the machine-gunning from the air made our situation there dangerous and impossible." f J 1 i This bombing was uot by the tribesmen; this machinegunning was not by the tribesmen; the tribesmen had no aircraft of any kind. It may weU be understood by whom it was, but again 1 am not apportioning blame. Perhaps it was necessary, but anyway it constituted a danger. The letter goes on: "Be sure we shall never forget you and we waut ta come ta see you again. Wehavebeenso busy making c10thes for ourselves and working at war refugee camps."- this was withîn Pakistan_ "We hope ta go back ta Baramulla soon. Otherwise 1 think \Ve shall aIl jOînthe Hazara Kashmir forces." The Hazara Kashmir forces were notthe Indianforces; they were on the"Azad" Kashrnir side. Here is a lady who, it was said, was subjected, with those under her proteotion and contrC'l, to conditions of a1l kinds that were created it is implied by Pakistan. But here they are writing from Pakistan ta two Pakistani WO:inen. Their wish was ta go back to Baramu1la at once, and if they could not go they wouldjoin the Hazara Kashmir forces. Their letter conc1uded: n L "Please accept a very Uny present we have made for you as a sign of our gratitude and remembrance of you both. Yours affectionately, Mary Philippa." 29. There were these instances also. Here are these two women from Pakistan who were trying, .like sa many others, ta assuage the dbtress, the rnisery and the suffering that was brought abc·'ltby these conditions aIl over. 30. 1 referred last time 1 spoke ta the happenings in some of the Indian States. As a matter of fact, with regard to Patiala, there was so much excitement among the tribesmen themselves that many of thE:ffi, knowing 31. Then what did Pakistan try to do anyhow? Did we do nothing at aU? This is what we tried ta do. On 4 November 1947, in a telegram ta the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the Prime Minister of Pakistan set out the steps proposed by Pakistan ta deal with this situation. There was at Lahore. on l November, a meeting of the Joint Defence Council of bath sides, to which Lord Mountbatten came from Delhi and Mr. Jinnah had come from Karachi. At that meeting certain proposaIs \Vere submitted ta Lord Mountbatten, who agreed to put them ta his Government. These are the proposaIs that were made ta deal with that situation: i 1 "1. Ta put an immediate stop ta fighting the two Governors-General sllould be authorizect and vested with full powers by both Dominion Governments ta issue a proclamation forthwith, giving forty-eight hours' notice ta the two opposing forces ta cease fire. The Governor-General of Pakistan had no control over the forces of the Provisional Government of Kashmir or tribesmen engaged in thefighting, but he will warn them in the clearest terms that if they do not obey the arder ta cease Ure immediately the forces of both Dominions"-that is ta say, Pakistan and India-"will maire war on them; , 32. When, for t\\'o clays, no reply was received from Delhi, the Prime Minister of Pakistan sent a telegram direct to the Prime Minister of India in wh10h he repeated thesB proposaIs and remindedhimthathehad sent them. In brief, the action tl1at was suggested was tlmt the two Governors-General should be authorized by their respective Governments to act jointly in this matter. They would calI upon both sides who were fighting for an immediate cease fire, and they would warn them that if, within forty-eight hours, there \Vas 110t a cease fire the t\\'o armies-the army of India and the army of Pakistan-would drive the tribesmen out. And, after that !lad been done under the authority of the two· Governments, the two Governors-General would hold a plebiscite. ,, 33. What could be fairer, and what more could be expected.in the circumstances? But there was no reply from the Government of India. 1 ! 34. Then we come to the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948,§J which both sides accepted. That resolution: IICalls unon bath the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan ta take immediately aU measures within their power (including public appeals to their peoplel calculated to improve the situation, and ta refrain from makingany statements and from doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation; IlAnd further requests eachof those Governments ta inform the Council immediately of any material change in the situation which occurs or appears ta either of them ta he about to occur while the matter is under consideration by the Council, and consult with the Council thereon." 35. It may be recalled that the Council started the hearings of this question on 15 January. Two days later it passed this resolution addressed to both sides. By that time the Council must have realized that the debate would continue for a long time and that the members would have to take time for consideration and then propose some settlement of the dispute. In any case, the Council passed this resolution for the interim purpose of ensuring that things should more or less stay as they were or, at any rate, should get no worse. And it was part of that interim arran€,:ement that while the matter was under consideration by the Council, the Council was to be notified and directions sought from it if any changes of that character took place. Bath sides accepted this resolution. 36. Now, what happened? 1 think a couple of minutes will be necessary in arder to tell you. 1 will not take any more time than is necessary. 1 think it wiU not be denied that India made an effort to have the Council §j Ibid•• Third Year, Nos. 1_15, 'l29th meeting. pp. 121_125. 37. By the time that this latter resolution had beeu passed and that phase of the proceedings before the Security Counoi! had come to an end, the application of this resolution had alsa come ta an end, because the period had passed whi!e the matter was under consideration by the Security Counci!. 38. India had made up its mind to achieve a military solution of the problem. 1 shall quote the statement of no less a persan than the then Defence Minister of lndia on 15 March 1948. 1 beIieve he was speaking in the lndian Constituent Assembly. He announced there that the Indian Army would clear out al! resistanoe from Kashmir's soil in the next two or three months. Now, what did that indicate? That roeant that a major miIitary offensive was in the course of beingprepared. The Times of 13 April 1948 reported from its speoial correspondent: • !. l[- "The Indian Army has worked extremely hard during the winter months and its position has beeu much improved. In spite of snow-storms and rain and the resulting drifts, mud and landslips, it has doggedly moved up supplies and reinforoements, improved roads and airhelds and intensified the training of its troops. Logistically, it has won a notable victory. but even now in April, traditionally the month for a spring offensive, this necessary phase has not been completed. The roac', between Jammu and Srinagar, whioh winds over the Banihal Pass, is still snow-covered and convoyS are often snowbound. To improve communications a daily air service has been organized although weather conditionS will make flying unsafe for at least two or three weeks, But the force has been considerably strengthened and it should saon be ready for a limited offensive. Already sorne units have advanced from Rajauri in Jammu andfrom Uri and sorne small successes have been reported, Fighting is bloody. Few prisoners are taken and aots ofbarbarism have been commÎti..ed by bath sides. Many Pathans have been deoapitated by Sikh troops." rr 39, Again, 1 am not making acomplaint.lam drawing attention to the situation that actually existed at thJ.t Ume. At that time, a week after this report in The 1• 1~ U Ibid., Third Year, Supplement for April i 948, document S/726. 40. He also raised the question of the security of Pakistan itself. 1 will read only a brief passage of General Gracey's report: IIRecommendations: 7. If Pakistan is not to face another serious refugee problem with about 2,750,000 people uprooted from their homes: if India 1s not ta be allowed to sit on the daorsteps of Pakistan to the rear and on the Hank at liberty to enter at its will and pleasure; if civilian and military morale is not ta he affectedto a dangl"rous extent; andif subversive political forces are not ta be encouraged and let loose within Pakistan itself, it is imperativethatthe Indian Army is not allowed ta advance beyond the generalline Uri_Poonch_Naushera." 41. When the question i,va~ raised in the Security Council-it had been raised onceortwice, but! thought 1 had better reply to it-I made a statement to the Security Council on 8 February 1950, in whichI stated: "1 put it ta the representatives on the Security Councn that if they, in their respective spheres, were charged \Vith the respansibility of the defence and the security of their own countries, and they received this report from their Commander-in- Chief-and in this case it was not a Pakistan national who had made the report; the Commander-in-Chief was and 1s General Sir Dougl8s E. Gracey, a distinguished British officer-if they had received this report which everything else reinforced and supported: the reports of foreign observers ta their newspapers, the speeches of Indian statesmen and their Defence Minister both in public and in the Constituent Assembly, and if they were convinced that this was the situation, what is the very least that they would have done in the circumstances? Pakistan did that very least and no more. It sent in its troops ta hold that line.".§j 1 said a great deal more, but 1 need not repeat that to the Council here, since 1 am going to summarize it in my next observation. 42. Then it was said, t1\Vhy did you not, under the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948, which places upon you the obligation ta report any change of this chara0~er while the matter is under consideration by the Council, consult with them thereon? Il The Coun~ cil had, by thattime, concluded its consideration of the case, had set up the Commission and the matter had y Ibid•• Fiftll YeQ'. No. 6. 464th meeting. p. 29. 43. We, did however, do something else. The resolutian setting up the United Nations Commission for Indla and Pakistan was passed on 21 April. The Commission was organized in May and as saon as it \Vas organized in Geneva, it studied the documents and determined the procedure that it would follow. Wehad no intimation of what its programme would be, except that a few clays before its arrivali in Karachi on 7 July, they asked ta oall on me on 8 Juî~' in arder ta make a courtesy visit. The moment they arrh 3d, 1 presented the entire situation ta them. 44. The Defence Minister said yesterday that 1 did this lOin confidence". There was no question of doing it in oonfidence. 1 did not, like the Indian representatives in 1949, lay any embargo upon the Commission. 1 did not say: "1 give you this information, but do not disclose it to anybody." 1 told them that tilis was the situation. In the meantime a change had occurred; we did not natify the Security Counoil because the Counci! had concluded its consideration of the case, and we had been waiting for the Commission ta come. The Commission in its reporthas said thatithad organized itself by a certain date, perhaps in Mayor June, implying-they do not say sa in express words, but implying-that they could have been ilÛormed earlier. We did not know that they hadorganizedthemselves in Geneva and we did not know what time they would be coming. We did not know theirprogramme. But, in any case, as soon as they arrived, the fullest possible information was given to them. 1 think 1 had the maps ready, and everything else, and ft took me over an hour to explain the situation to them. [ 45. 1 repeat that twice the Defence Minister yesterday said "in confidence". Whère he takes that from, 1 do not know. 1 did not give them any ilÛormation in confidence. 1 informed them, as representatives of the Security Council who were dealing with this question, of the material change that had taken place in the situation, and 1 did not suggest, in word or gesture or tone, that it was only for their information. 1 knew that anything placed before the Commission was placed before them to consider in the context of the whole matter. Let me add that the Commander-in-Chief,Sir Douglas Gracey, gave them a military appraisal of the whole situation. J 46. The Defence Minister said that the Permanent Representative of Pakistan had stated that he would accept the determination of either side's default in the implementation of the resolutions as made by any outstanding authority, any fair and impartial authority. And then he quoted what Sir Owen" Dîxon s~id in his report to the Security Council. 1!1 48. The Defenee Minister of Jndia quoted Sir Owen nixon-and started his quotation in the middle of the sentence. He quoted from he1'e: " •.. 1was prepared to adopt the view that when the frontiel" •.. ". But the whole sentence l'uns likethis: "Itook up the positions," -when this matter was raised before him- Ilfirst that the Security COUDoil had not made Bueh a declaration; "_a declaration that Pakistan was anaggressor- "secondly that 1 had neitller been commissioned to make nor had 1 made any judicial investigation of the issue;"-and he was held up as a great judicial authority who had come to this conclusion, and it is part of the same sentence which was quoted- "but thirdly that, without going into the causes or reasons why it happened, which presumably formed part of the historyof the subcontinent. 1 was prepared ta adopt the view"- that is, for the purpose of going on with the discussions with the Government of India- "that when the frontier of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was crossed, on 1 believe 20 October 1947, by hostile elements, it was contrary ta internationallaw't-and that the entry of Pakistan troops was contrary ta internationallaw. But that is a hypothetical opinion; it is not a finding. And he said: "1 therefore proposed that the first step in demilitarization should consist in the withdrawal of the Pakistan regular forces comm".!ncing ou a named day. After a significant number of days from the named day, then other operations ou each side ofthe ceasefire line should take place and as far as practicable, concurrently. What number of day" should be fixed as significant was a matter of detail for them to settle. "21 49. This was not accepted by India. 50. Then, in one of the concluding paragraphs of his report, Sir Owen Dixon said: t'The question whether Pakistanhadorhadnotbeen an aggressor had, ta my mind, nothingto do with the resu1ts of a partition and the fai.rness and freedom of a partial plebiscite. To agree that Pakistan should take under a partition part of the State must be to agree that, independently of any such question, it took not merely an interest in but sovereignty ûf the territory. Again. as l saw the matter, to agree that the territory not immediately divided between India and Pakistan should pass ta one or the other according to the vote of the inhabitants at a plebiscite conducted by the United Nations must be to agree to a text involving an equal interestinbothcountries in the reBull. Further it is ta agree ta the ascertainment of the will of the people by an independent 'ij Ibid.. Firth Year. Supp1ememfor Septemberthrough December 1950, document 5/1791. paras. 21, 22. 51. His general conclusion with regard to his conversations with the Prime Minister of Iodla was: "In the end 1 became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form, or ta provisions governingthe period of the plebiscite of any such character. as would in my opinion permit of the p~ebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled. ".!lI That i5 his Huding. 52. A reference was made to the so-called northern areas. In 50 far as thenorthern areas are concerned, 1 cau make this statement, whîch 1 think should satisfy the CouDei!: that there has been no change on the wAzad" Kashmir side of the cease-fire line. Those areas to which reference was made are aIl on the "Azad" Kashmir side of the cease-fire line, and, with regard to the cease-fire line, there has been an assurance given by the Commission ta Pakistan that no civil or military officer or personnel of the Maharajah's Government would be permitted to cross the Dease-fire !ine into the nAzadn Kashmirside.How can there be a grievance that their authority has been repudiated? The whole of that area has beenunder the authority of nAzadn Kashmir or of Pakistan. That is the situation. V'le have made no change sincethe ceasefire line was laid down. India never had any troops there. 53. 1 now come te a very important matter: the interpretation and the implementationofthe resolutions. 1 was very sorry to hear the representative of the USSR, in his statement this morning, attribute to me something which 1 had not said, and then put an interpretation upon the relevant portion ofthe resolution which it cannat bear. He said that 1 had been insisting that the withdrawal of Pakistan forces from the "Azadn Kashmir side, and ofthe Indian forces from the Indianoccupied side, should begin together. 1 have never said that, 1 have never asked for that. Each time, 1 have been carefuI ta say-and if afterward 1 have spoken generally, it is always under that provisothat the resolution provides , and therefore it obviously means, that, once a truce agreement has beenreached and has been published, then, sofar as this withdrawal is concerned, Pakistan i8 to beginthewithdrawal; and, when it has beennotifiedtotheotherside that Pakistan troops are being withdrawn, then the other side will begin the withdrawal of the bulk of their troops; but, from there onward, the whole operation will be synchronized. And that is exactly what the Commission has said, and the other side knew that -that was the position, !QI Ibid•• para. 87. 1lI Ibid., para. 52. 55. In my opening submission to the Security COUDOi! on this matter (1008th meetingI, 1submitted that in his fifth report. the United Nations Representative had made the statement that the first part had been complied \Vith; but in February 1953 he al.so stated further-and this i8 very important: "The representatives of Iodia and Pakistan, assuming that part 1 (Cease-tire order) of the UNCIP 13 August 1948 resolution had been implemented, began discussion of part lIe "!y 56. The representatives carne before the United Nations Representative. Both sides stated that part 1 has been implemented. He said: AIl right, let us begin with part II. Now the questiOll is raised that it has not been implemented. With regard to the portion upon which particular stress is laid in this respect and which relates to the augmentation of forces, that is a very technical matter, as l said yesterday. But there is a very easy way of determining whether augmentation has taken place. Ever since the cease-fire, United Nations observers have been posted along the ceasefire line. It is their bus iness to see that the conditions of the cease-fire are observed. Theil' Commander, General Nimmo, has been in charge for many years. He knows the who1e question inside out. The Security Council has only to request General Nimmo to report whether an augmentation of the forces on either side has or has not taken place. That is the report to be acted upon and that will show whether o:r not there has been compliance with that part of the resolution. 57. Now as to the question of synchronization, 1 wish to draw attention to a statement in the third report of United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan: "The Commission did take into account Pakistan 's concern that the withdrawal should be synchronizect" -this lS not my expression; they have used it in their report-"lt repeatedly assured the Pakistan Government that this WOllld be evident in the agreement itself, and ft must be noted that the terms were to be published in full immediately upon the a8ceptance of the two Governments." An agreement has to be drawn up. This morning 1 was told by the representative of the USSR that somehow Pakistan was in default because it insisted that a truce agreement should be drawn up. But the resolution lays that down clearly and this is what the Commission goes on to explain: "The withdrawal plan for the Indian forces, a part of that agreement, was consequently to be published in advance of implementation by either side."!dI W Ibid., Eighth Year. Special Supplement No. 1. para. 44. W Ibid•• Fourth Year. Special SUpplement No. 7. para. 244. 59. Theu the representative of the USSR went on to say that his reading 15 that Pakistan should withdraw its forces first from the whole of Kashmir. Where does he get it from? The same has been said by the Defence Minister of Lndia. And 1 have said: AlI right, if still there is a mystery about it, if the plain meaning of the words still eludes the members of the Security Council, if the explanations given by the Commissi.on are not clear, then let theSecurityCouncil appoint anybody of international standing and integrity to dete1'mine when the responsibility of Pakistan starts. If they say that it sta1'ts without the truce agreement, and that means to withdrawthe whole of the a1'my at once, 1 unde1'take, on behalf of my Gove1'nment, to do sa. 60. Now we say, and we contend, that words mean what words say. 1 am sarry to have to observe that, on the other side, the position is that words mean what the Government of India says. We say thatwords mean what the words say. They say the words mean what they say. And on that position one cannat agree on the meaning of any words at aIl. But this is not the first time it has happened. 61. 1 say, with aIl responsibility, that the partition of India took place as a result of an attitude of that kind on their side. The Cabinet Mission's plans had been accepted in the summer of 1946. Thereafter, the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, was elected president of the Congress. Saon after his election, he made a public statement putting an interpretation on certain paragraphs of the Cabinet Mission 's plan which those paragraphs could not bear. As the authors subsequently also intimated, in their opinion that interpretation could not be val id. There were aH sorts of happenings in between, particularly the most regrettable happenings in Calcutta. 62. Thereafter, Lord Wavell, who was then Viceroy, requested Mr. Gandhi and Ml'. Nehru ta meetwith him. ln the course of that conversation-and 1 rely for this on The Last Days of the British Raj by Leonard Mosley,U!' page 42-he begged them to make a clear declaration that they accepted the Cabinet Mission plan, without any gloss upon it, or interpretation upon it. The conversation was somewhat prolonged. The book says the following: "Wavell put the question frankly to Gandhi and Nehru: 'Will you give me the guarantee the Muslim --- W Publishers: Harcourt. Brace and Wor/d, Inc" New yor\:, 1961. "'Give me a simple guarantee that you accept the Cabinet Mission Plan,' asked Wavell. "'We have a1ready said that we accept it,' replied Gandhi, 'but we are Dot prepared to guarantee that we accept it in the way that the Cabinet Mission set 1t out. We have our own Interpretations of what they propose.' - ~Said Wavell: 'Even if those interpretations differ from what the Cabinet Mission intended?' "Replied Gandhi: 'But of course. In any case, what the Cabinet Mission Plan really means is not what the Cabinet Mission thinks but what the interim Government thinks it means.'~ And tben the Conference went on. 63. It Is the same here; they say that this means something which the language ls not capable of meaning, which the Commission has expla;nedinacontrary sense and in the sense that they themselvesoriginally accepted. After aIl, they went to aU these meetings held ta discuss the plan of withdrawal so that a truce agreement might be reached and might be published. For years they did this. They attended thefirst meeting at the invitation of the Commission in Delhi, where our representatives also went and put in thelr plan. The other side's plan was not put in, 64. Subsequently, they forced the Commission to change the interpretation of the part we had accepted. AIl right; we did not insist on taklng part in aIl that discussion which consisted of being told during the discussions what the other side's plan was 50 that we might give our agreement to it. We said we would be satisfied if the Commission wouldguaranteethatthere would be a synchronized withdrawal, and if they were satisfied we would withdraw too. Very weIl; then they went on discussing H. 65. Now they say no, because aIl thatparagraphcomes first, aIl tha\; must be complied with before the subsequent paragraphs must be complied with. The Commission has explained quite clearly that these two paragraphs will take care of the complaint that India has made and the other paragraph will take care of apprehensions that Pakistan entertains, but the whole thing must form part of a truce agreement, You have to put some paragraphs first and some later even if the whole thing i5 to be sychronized. 67. Then with regard to the elections, andlhad better finish quickly now. It was said, weIl, it has happened before and what can you say, but one very amusing thing-if 1 may be forgiven for using the expressionone very amusing argument which slipped from the representative of India was this. He read out extraots from certain papers and said that he thought those papers were not of any importance. They inoluded the Hindustan Times and The Statesman of Delhi. He said they were not very friendly ta India. It was surprising to see how many papers were unfriendly towards India. And he has my sympathy on that. Thenhe said that one of the papers had stated that one of the opposition parties had alleged that when the voters went in they saw the ballot box was placed upside down and they could not put the ballots insidetheboxbut had ta leave them on the top. He says ,howcan that be? These boxes were devised by the Election Commission; how can it be said that the bottom was at the top and the top was at the bottom? It does not matter who devised the ballot boxes, it is the polling officer who sees how it is ta be placed. Their complaint was that the polling officer or whoever was in oharge had allowed the opposition boxes to be placed with the top down and the bottorn up and, therefore, the ballots could not be put inside and later they were aU put into the ruling party IS ballot boxes. Whether that was true or not 1 cannat say; what l am trying to say is that here are these allegations and the reply is that the boxes were devised by the Election Commission itself and that when they were asked ta go and seewhat was happening they refused ta go. i 1 i! j 1 1 1 1 "After the arrest [of Sheikh Abdullah] the Pakistan Press told of Muslims being 'mown do'WIl' by Indian troops. The Indian Press retaliated with fantastic staries of an international plot. When Ifirst heard of the rumours that Abdullah had been in league with a foreign imperialist Power, my reaction was that he had been caught out in negotiation with the Soviet."- the representative of the Soviet Union willforgive me, 1 am not saying this - "1 rubbed my eyes when 1 read that the villain was Mr. Adlai Stevenson, alleged to be plotting on behalf of the United States of America~" Equally, 1 ask Governor Stevenson to forgive me; 1 am not saying this. This is the sort of allegation on which the trial is taking place. 70. Then there was a long account which 1 do not question of the improvements that have taken place in Kashmir, the rising standard of living, the rising investments. Sorne figures were quoted yesterday and, as 1 said, 1 accept them. It is said that there are cÎvil libertles on the one side and none on the other; none in "Azad" Kashmir. It is said there is a rising standard of living on one side, d,epression, misery, poverty and destitution on the other. In other words, on the one side there i5 Paradise, on the other side the reverse of it. Well then, if from the other side people see the miserable conditions of the people in "Azad" Kashmir, and the people of "Azad" Kashmir look across into the valley and see the flcurishing conditions, prosperity, civil liberties and sa on on that side, then why not hold a plebiscite? Let it take place in "Azad" Kashmir also and if they want to go into this paradise on the other side, the whole dispute will come to an end. W Christopher 8romhead Birdwood. Two Nations and Kashmir. London, Robert Hale Limited. 1956. 72. 1 shaU not take up much more of the Security Council's time, and 1 am sarry 1 have taken about ten minutes more than 1 estimated. 1 have only one final ward, and that is that yesterday sorne suggestion \Vas made that 1 have claimed that KashrI'ir should come to Pakistan because the population was Muslim. 1 have replied ta that. It was said that there are 60 million Muslims living in India who are very loyal subjects. We waut them ta be loyal. Every citizen of every Btate must be loyal. There are also ten or twelve million non-Muslim, Hindus, living in Pakistan, and they are loyal subjects also. The:re are perhaps ex"eptions on both sides; there was for instance the story about somebody wishing ta assassinate Prime Minister Nehru. On bath sides we hold these loyal citizens in great respect and we consider their help very necessary for the integrity of the subcontinent and for its progress and welfare. 1 repudiate here and now on behalf of the Government any knowledge of anythingof that sort, We are not people of that kind. 1 do not mean ta say that they are. What 1 mean is that this kind of charge has no basis at aIl. Everybody knows that with very minor exceptions, apart from that first W2.ve ta whioh 1 do not want ta have ta refer too often, 1 do not waut ta have to undergo the kind of emotion through which we have aIl passedinseeingthe suffering of those near and dear ta us, but after that tirst wave was over and with very slight if any eruptions here and there which were immediately put down, on the Pakistan side the minorities have had a clear rWl and a clear slate. 73. In spite of the best efforts of the Government of India, on the Indian side, that condition has not yet been reached. There have recently been aIl sorts of occurrences. How ta judge these things? There is an account of what had been happening at Malda in India in The New York Times today. Mr. TrumbuIl, who was quoted with regard ta sorne matter yesterday by my :riend across the table, reports from East Pakistan having seen tbese refugee camps of 1,000 people who came from Malda after aIl the horrors that have been practised, with 2,000 more that were expected, describing aIl the perils against them, and the condition in whîch they arrive. Against that, the Prime Minister's account in the Parliament is that tbree people have been killed. This statement says 1,000 Muslims were killed. 74. The Prime Minister said that five or six diedj and the note that has been issued by the Indian Mission here says that it is absolutely untrue and fantastic thal a large number of people have gone over ta East Pakistan as refugees. But Ml'. TrumbuIl who is there r6ports th80t he has seen these l,DaO refugeesand that 2,000 more are expected ta come in. The Indian. statement said that only three persons were killed-the Prime Minister said five or six; but that makes no difference-in religious disturbances in the Malda 1 ~ 76, The PRESIDENT: The representative ofIndia has also asked to be g'iveu the right of reply. 1 now give llie floor to the representative of India for that purpose. 77. Ml'. Krislma MENON (India): 1 have no desire to prolong this debate wlduly. My colleaguefrom Pakistan said this moming that 1 had covered a \Vide field. 1 lliink the Council well knows that the limita of Ws field \Vere not set by me; we were not asked ta come here on this occasion.Whatis more, sincel introduced my observations, the representative from Pakistan has covered large areas of what he alleges to be a facto 1 believe 1 tried ta finish in as short a Ume as possible; but anyway, he covered a wide field; the initiative did not come from me. J 1, 78. Secondly, 1 want ta say right away that it is not my intention, nor part of my Government' s policy, ta go into large numbers of matters which Sir Zafrulla Khan has memories about. This 15 not a place to write bis memoirs or what V. P. Menon, an ex-Government official, after a time in the Government, had written, without authority of Government. 1 know the name of Menon ca:T1es SOIT'e weight. but not every Menon's. Therefore, we start from the beginning. , J 11 79. The first thing is thut Sir Muhammad tries ta repudiate that there had been a.ny threat before the Security Councîl. That aIl depends on what you mean by "threat", A threat may be in words; it may be by display of force; it ~uy be by other action. But we have no doubt in our minds; and in the view of the Government of India, as expressed by the Prime Minister in Parliament two days age, we will not negotiate, we will not carry out COllversati€lns under threats of any kind. On the other hand, our policy is not likely to be changed because someone, Wlwisely,l think, tries la introduce lile element of threat. A 1 1 80. Be that as it may, what was said here 1 am not going ta repeat. Sir Muhammad said that once; it was raised again yesterday: and. therefore, 1 will not read the whole of this. But he did saythis much even later: "l intend-and 1 trust 1 will be able to do it when 1 come toward the close of my submission to the Security Council-to stress one aspect which was stressed here by the late Ml'. Warren Austin: that nobody should deceive himself that, merely by 81. 1 submit, both in substance and lallgunge, it is nothing short of n t1u'elü; but even thatis uot the main thing, becl\tlse 1 think we cun nfford to live \Vith tl1em. \Ve have lived with these threats, and ,,'hat is more, with the violations of inter\'ationallaw and neighbourly behaviom' l'rom this country for the past fourteen years. We will still exerclse restraint in regard to these mtlttel's. 82. There are t\\'o other things to beconsidered:on'9, the responsibility of the State in regard to the use of Hs territory by \\'hat ure cll.lled lltribesmen", in the same pattern ns in 1947. "We Imownothing about them; we canllot stop them; they are co-religionists, and this, that and the other." This is exactty the same patterll being followed, and it ls Ilot to be wondered id' t1wt \\"e begin to think about what i$ happening. But ove1' fmd !lbove thnt, 1 believe there nre sorne international obligntions on States which are Memb(>rs of the United Natiolls !lnd, therefore, h!H'e full statehood. 83. It is an extraordinary statement tl1nt the people of "Azad" Kashmir and the people of Pakistan who are C'itizens of Pakistnn mny get out of control and Governments become powerless. This is n statement \\'e cannot easily accept, That is to say, on the one hfllld, if fi citizen of a Stnte is badly treated by another, then the Stflte rightfully comes to his rescue. On the othe!' hand, if ft citizen l'uns nmok, then he has no responsibiUty. This cannot be, coming from Sir l'I'!uhammnd, an ex-jtldge of the World Court. This is a very sh'flnge interpretntion of the behaviour of nations. He is probnbly pl'oceeding on the mistaken theOl'y that Il State thnt is sovereign can have no responsibility, no legal responsibility, in regard to whnt Hs citizens do. But the exterllaI responsibility of aState-the extel'nlll responsibility in these matters-must attach to every Stnte. Even when volunteers leave n country to participnte in lin internaI war somewhere, Stntes are supposed to bear the responsibility. 84, In this connexion, Oppenheim says about this that aState 's responsibility concerning internat:.- . 'lS is fi legnl l'esponsibility; a State must, according to intel'nntioll9.1 law, bear vicarious l'esponsibility for the injuries and ncts of private individuals. My colleague must have been famillar with this in the famous decision handed down by the World Court to the effect that it is the obligation of every Stafe not to al]()w, knowingly, its territory to be used for acts contrary to the 85. But \vhat worries us is thnt we find the same pattern as befare. You heard the statement by my colleague that 1 was not Foreign Minister at that time. With this there is no argument: the Foreign Minister of the country is expected to accept the responsibility of his Government to continue its institutions. But 1 will leave aIl that alone. 1 am glad to think that this glass denotes a reconsideration of the wisdom or lack of wisdom of making a statement of this kind in this Counci!. Let us hope that this process will continue. 86. But when you look at what has been said by responsible people in Pakistan in the last two years- 1 do not go very far back because there was a change of régime-but according ta what has been said, he was not the Foreign Minister and therefore not responsible. It was said by the present President of Pakistan on 29 December 1958: "Amidresoundingcheers-" .,. 87. Ml'. ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan): On a point of arder. Ml'. Pl'esident ..• 88. Ml'. Krishna MENON (India): 1 did not interrupt the honourable gentleman, Sir.

The representative of Pakistan has the nOOl' on a point of arder. 90. Ml'. ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan): My point of arder is fuis. 1 have not said-and 1 challenge the Defence Mlnister of India ta say that Ihave-that 1 am not .responsible. 1 merely said that 1 have no personal knowledge of certain inci~nt8, and the Defence Minister of India said, "Foreign Minister, and not knowing what was happening?" 1 then said 1 was not Foreign Mlnister at that time; 1 was abroad. 91. 1 have not said that 1 am not responsible. 1 am responsible for everything that happened. 1 represent the Government even whether 1 was Foreign Minister or not. 92. Ml'. Krishna MENON (Indla); 1 have said what 1 have said, 93. The PRESmENT: The representative of India now bas the floor. 1 know that in the course of his statement there wiU be points ta which others may wisb ta abject. 1 requ~st aIl members here ta refrain from interruption. If they should take exception, 1 will be glad ta glve them the fIoor after the representative of India has finished. Please continue, 94. Ml'. Krishna MENON (lndia): This is not a question to be disposed of by simply arguing about whether one persan was Prime Minister or not. \Vhat was said was that these atrocious things tbat were recited that 95. Now to continue General Ayub Khan's statement of 29 December 1958, at the chittagong public meeting: "Amid resounding cheers the President declared that Pakistan will consider no sacrifice tao great to 8nsure the Hberation of the people of Kashmir. The question of Kashmir is a question of life and death ior us and we are prepared ta stake everything for freeing Kashmir." previously, in an interview given ta foreign correspondents, he had said: "We must have a satisfactory solution. It affects our security and our whole existence."-That is ft point J will come to later on when we speak about the rights of the peoples of Kashmir. "Sl1Ould we he forced to adopt extreme measures the responsibility will be that of Bharat"-that is, of India. "Asked li he meant war, General Ayub said: 'Yeso certainly'." The President of "Azad" Kashmir, speakingatMuzaf_ fal'abad, also said: "The liberation of Kashmir wus the question of life and death both for Pakistan and the people of Kasllmir and tl1ey were determined ta achieve their objective at aIl costs. Il 96. Lieutenant-General K. M. Shaikh, who is now the Minister of the Interior, speaking on 19 January 1959, cteclared: "We will jointly work for the liberation of Kashmir. That is why 1 still wear my uniform;" He was talking ta the so-called "Azad" Kashmiris. The papel' [Pakistan Times] also reported that: " ••• the tribesmen had offered aIl help ta the Government in settling the dispute and they were even ready to start a 'jehad' against India on this question". A "jehad" is a holy war. and here we havelistened to the representative of Pakistan telling us that religious questions do not come into tbis. r j 97. Baid the President of Pakistan again that " ••• Kashmir was as much a question of life and death for Pakistan as for the people of Kashmir. Kashmir was vital for Pakistan not only politically but mllitarilyas weIl". Therefore the issue for Pakistan is notthe right 98. Mr. Akhtar Hussain, the Governor of West Pakistan, was quoted as follows: "The Government was fully alive to the growing concern of the tribesmen over Kashmir andthe Canal Water deadlock and would spare no possible means to get these life-and-death problems resolved. If need be, he added, offers of sacrifices extended Ume and again by the brave tribesmen in this behalfwould he fully utilized". j 1, [ 1ij 1 1 That was at the time when they \Vere obsessed by the idea of mediation, under a mediator who was a United States citizen, the chairman of a bank. A great deal of effort was made ta resolve this Canal Water question, which at great sacrifice to ourselves has now reached the stage-whether it is settled ornotI do not know-where it îs no longer a live controversy, at least at the moment. But in defence of such statements made by responsible ministers of the Government-I do not mean responsible in a parliamentary sense, but ministers of the Government-how can we say that these people are not egging the tribesmen on? 99. Major Mohammad Yusuf, the Resident and Commissioner of the Frontier Regions, replying to an address of welcorne at a huge representative "Jirga Il of Mohmand tribes at Shabqadar-and he is the main man responsible-said he \Vas confident that when and if an emergency arase, they would come tothe help of their Kashmir brethren. A "Jirga" is a collection of people, of tribes. If it is said that tribesmen are excitable and that their feelings are not necessarily conditioned by the resolutions of the Security Council, how can a responsible official say things like this? 100. "The Kashmir dispute was a powder-keg. and unless it was peacefully resolved it could lead to a conflagration", declared the President of Pakistan on 8 June 1959 at Muzaffarabad. 101. Mr. Khurshid, the present President of the "Azad" Government, so-called. said in the course of bis speech that: ft ••• it was the good fortune of the Kashmiris that a 'mard-e-Mujahid' like General Mohammad Ayub Khan was at the he~m of affairs in Pakistan, and that he had promised that he would not rest until the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir was liberated. li- Mr. Khurshid added that he had full faith in that promise, as he knew that a "mard-e-Mujahid" means what he says. nThe bearded Ahmadzai Chief called upon the big Powers not to tax 'our patience but to press for an early solution of the problem instead'. Otherwise we 102. President Ayub Khan, speakingin Ootober 1960- not sa long ago-said that the Pakistan Army, the defender of the motherland, "could never afford ta leave the Kashmir issue unsolved for an indefinite bme". And it is said that we are seeking military solutions; The President also said around that same time: "l assure you that the feelings of the people of Pakistan on Kashmir are notlessagitatedthanyours are.n-he was speaking ta the people in IlAzad ll Kashmir._IIThe people as weIl as the Government of Pakistan, andparticularly the Army ofPakistan, have aIl along remained perturbed and restive at your worries and the miseries of those who live on the other side of the oease-fire line. Il The Counoil will remember, 1 set out the oircumstances of those "miseries" yesterday, when 1 spoke about the progress made in Kashmir. 103. Again, the president of Pakistan, on 27 Oatober 1960 said that the Kashmir problem was a "time-bomb never very far removed from the flash_point 1l• He said: "Unless the intention is ta make it explode through lack of foresight and statesmanship, the answer is ta defuse it as quickly as possible, and that cannat be done without touching it," In other words, itis a threat of war. 104. President Ayub Khan, on 25 May 1961 was quoted as having declared that: Il ••• Pakistan would have to pursue every means available for the solution of the Kashmir problem. The President told u questioner that it was wrong to think. that Pakistan was depending on the United Nati0!1s alone for the solütion of the Kashmir prob_ lem.n-Then 1 do not know why they came here._ l'He emphasized that the people of Pakistan could not forget Kashmir, because the present cease-fire hne was a constant source of danger to Pakistanls rail, river and road system, and provided innumerable defence problems.n The President of the State says this and challenges the very kind of uneasy truoe on which we rest. The oease-fire hne was the result of the exertions of the Commission at that time and was agreed to by military representatives on both sides who met in Karachi afterwards. Now they say that the oease-fire line is a oonstant source of danger ta Pakistan's rail, river and road system. 1 do not know ho-\\' it is, but 1 would not like to go into the question of how many railroads there are. f 1t 106'. The President of "Azad" Kashmir said: " ••• that the 1Azad' Kashmir regular forces were not a purely defensive force"-and these are the descendants of the local authorities that the Commission set up and that we were supposed ta assist- "but theyhadbeencreatedwith a specifie objective"- by whom weretheycreated, by Pakistan-"andtherefore had a mission ta fulfil ••• He said: 'Let it be borne in the minds of aIl Kashmiris that there is no peaceful solution ta the Kashmir issue and that they should from now on concentrate their potentials on finding a solution by other means.'" 107. Mr. Khurshid again said: "Thirteen long years had been lost in debates and 'now only military action remained for the solution of the problem." That was on 4 February 1961- 108. The Lt. General Azam Khan-the Governor of East Pakistan-said in Dacca: "•.• that the people of Pakistan would sacrifice their life, if need be, for getting their right of seIf-determination for their Kashmir brethreIi." At least inthis case there is sorne talk about the Kashmir brethren. 109. Mr. Khurshid again declared on 4 April 1962- that is, after the Security Council had firstmet-"that the armed forces of the 'Azad' Government will be equipped with modern arms ta liberate the oecupied territory at any time when they are forced by circumstances ta do sa. Il Addressing a public meeting of Kashmiris in the Town Hall, Mr. 1<'"1luJ'shid al80 said that the l'eople of IlAzad" Kashmir and the Kashmiris living in Pakistan would be given militarytrainingand arms and arnmWlition. 110. Here is a news dispatch from Dawn, Karachi. Itsays: - "President Mohammad Ayub Khan said here today that in an emergency, Pak,istan would use all the weapons in her armoury"-and this is where her military allies come in-"to safeguard her independence. In such a situation, he said, there would be very Httte time ta consult anybody,"-meaning his allies... lland 'we would not care if anybody ie annoyed by our action'."-I make a present of this ta the United States-"The President was asked by aquestioner at a questio1] and anSwer meeting of Mardan Basic Democrats whether, in view of the Indian troops concentration on the Pakistan border and the possible threat of aggression, Pakistan would be able ta use the weapons received under the United States military aid .•. The President said he did not think Pakistan's BEATO and CENTO alIies wouIdnot come ta her aid if she became a victim of aggression, but, even if they did not, Pakistan would fight the enemy with ail its strength and with every 111. On various occasions Sir Muhammad here and elsewhere, and other Pakistan representatives, have spoken about the concentration of the Indian Army on the Pakistan border. In our system of government, ministers do not ce>mmand armies oor do they engage in their deployment. But they have certain responsibilities in regard to the matter. At leastthey know where they are and how they are deployed. 1 want to tell this Council, with aIl such responsibility as 1. hold, that even in the recent action of the Indian Army against Goa, troops had to be withdravm from the area near Pakistan. l'here was not any armour, no additional troopS nor anybody within forty miles of the Pakistan border because we knew that it would be cited as an act of provocation. We have every reason to be suspicious, having had experience two yearsbeforeonthe Assam frontier about aIl these things. But, in spite of that, no concentration of any kind was made. Still, we are perfectly entitled to do so because that is our sovereign territory. 112. It is quite true that on the border between India and Pakistan there are troops, but the entire concentration of the Pakistan Army is within ten to thirty to forty miles of Our frontier. Where is Abbotabad? How long does it take for troops to go from Abbotabad ta Kashmir? But the concentration of the Pakistan Army is in Western Pakistan, within a stone's throw from our frontiers, whether it be in Kashmir or anywhere else. So this is a purely irrelevant argument. What is more, now that this has been said, 1 do not want to throw aIl of our domesHc internaI matters into the Security Gouncil, but 1 am left with no other choice. 113. Recently, there was a general election in India. There was internaI tension in the State of punjab on account of the differenceS between the different political parties. One of them was probably prone to violence and things of that character. It would be the dutYof the Government ta he onguardagainst internaI difficulties, and SOrne police forces which were normally on the border were withdrawn for the elecHon. We took the risk because it is far more important that there should be no difficulties inside the country. The police forces tha,t were normally on the border-and they are relatively small army personnel on the frontiers of India, mainly guarded by the police-were withdrawn. 114. The Pakistan Government took this opportunity for organizing what is called a boar hunt, that is to say, a hllnt presumably, ostensibly for wildanimals, except that on this particular occasion the Pakistan Army and police were asked to take part. l'hese are aIl methods of countries that adopt the practice ofundeclared war. 1l Î 1 , 115. 1 \Vant ta tell you here that we will continue ta do so. We have no intention ofallowingyou to put your foot on our soH. 116. 1 therefore wishta reiterate the convinction oimy Government that the Pakistan representative has come here holding a threat both against the Security Couneil and the Government of India. 1 want ta assure you, Mr. President, on behalf of rny Government that our action is not likely ta be dictated by this kinri of provocation because provocation is one of the means whereby we may he put in the wrong, where we may take an unwise action. Therefore, we have no intention of payillg greater attention ta it than it deserves. Î1 117. Then we come ta the newer facts that have ta be dealt \vith. You will find that soon after this had been disposed of, both the speaker from the Soviet Union, who can take care oi himself. and my humble self, have been taken ta task merely for repeating what the representative of Pakistan said, andhesaidsomething that is entirely not factual. 118. The representative of Pakistan said: "In the context of their first urgent concern-that is. the Security Council's-that is to say, ta bring about the cessation of hostilities-they took up the position: 'Why is the fighting going on?' And they came ta the conclusion-and it was perfectly obvious-that the fighting was going on as the people of Kashmir desired to come to a decision with regard to the accession, through the exercise of their own choice, and not the Maharajahs. Therefore, once they were assured that their desire, their wish, their objective would be fulfilled through completely peaceful means they would realize that it was not necessary to go on fighting for it. Consequently, that was affirmed and reaffirmed, not only by the members of the Security Council, but also by the representatives of India and the representatives of Pakistan." [lOlOth meeting, para. 53.J 119. 1 submit that this is totally unrelated ta facto There have been questions of consulting the w1shes of the people, if you like. There have been references to a plebiscite, to withdrawals, ta demilitarization and to aIl kinds of things, but there hasneverbeen any question of the cease fire having to be established in relatian to this particular factor. The whole idea of, the cease fire at tbat Ume wasthatunnecessarybloodshed was going on. And, as has been rightly pointed out by Sir Muhammad, the cease fire was not agreed to by us at a time when our armies we" in retreat, In the 120. 1 may say here and now that it has always been the position af the Government of India that Pakistan has committed aggression against us. Vv'hat all these arguments about the plebiscite and about the determination of the people's will-has to do with Pakistan we cannot understand. Time after time the United Nations Commission has saidthat Pakistanhas nothing ta do with this matter at aIl. Pakistan was not ta take part in the ple.biscite. Pakistan cornes here as an aggressor. Pakistan cornes here because we brought a complaint of aggression. Otherwise Pakistan wouldnot be here at aIl. We made a complaint with regard ta aggression in Kashmir, and the President, who is an old hand at this, "will remember that the answer of Pakistan contained a number of points-so far as my memory serves me. Out of these only one referred to Kashmir. AU the others referred to various other matters. 121. That reminds me of the tale in Aesop's fables about the taBor who lost a needle in his dark house and, because he could not find it there, went out into the li&"hted street to look for H. 122. There was no answer to the question of aggression, and there was no answer in the Pakistan reply with regard to Kashmir. lt was all about Hyderabad and Junagadh, what V. P. Menon had said, and this, that and the other. 123. In the letter of 20 August 1948!&' the Prime Minister of India wrote ta the Commission: "FinaIly, you agreed that part III, as formulated, does not in any way recognize the right of Pakistan to have any part in a plebiscite." And the Chairman of the Commission answered:l1J "The Commission requests me ta convey to Your Excellency its view that the interpretation of the resolution as expressed in paragraph 4 of your letter coincides with its own interpretation." ~ Officia! Records of the Security Council, Third Yeu. Supplement ~vember 1948, document S/1100, pan. 78~ !li lbid., para. 79. 125. Then.Mr. Lozano, on bebali of the Commission, agreed with us-li the Council sa desires 1 will read the text, but it lS unnecessary; 1 do not think it Can be contradicted since it is all printed in the proceedings of the Council-that disa1'ming meant disbanding. He said that disarming must include disbanding, orwords to that effect. Disarming implied disbanding, and therefore the whole of this rebel army that had been built up by Pakistan had to disappear. Thus, Pakistan bas no locus standi in this matter at all. It cornes he1'e as an aggressor, and what an aggressor has ta do is ta mend its ways and vacate aggression. That is our position. Now 1 want ta say this quite firmly because, due to shortness of time, one tends ta be rather abrupt. ", -j -1,, 126. The second point concerns accession. 1 think that this question of accession has been argued and can still be argued until the cows come home, as it is said. But, ta summarize our position. we regard the accession of the State ofJammu and Kashmi1'ta the Union of India as full, complete and final, irrevocable and, what ia more, perpetuaI. There is no way under our Constitution whereby any part of the territory of India lUleier the suzerainty of the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir before accession can be made over ta anybody else legally. That is ta say there is no unwinding of an accession, and aIl these passages l'ead out about what the Prime Minister said at a particular time or about what someone else said at sorne other time will not cut aoy ice. The position is that this accession is full and complete. 127. Apart from all1egal questions, the Government of India is entitled to hold the position that for the maintenance 0';; Its integrity ann its security it cannat adopt the process whereby States can optin and opt out at will, and no State P.;' this table with a system of parliamentary or con:;;-ressional government would accept that. Yesterday 1 quoted French, United8tates, British, Austrian and other instances and cases of internationallaw in support of this. TheUnited8tates, as 1 said, was engaged in the most sanguinary war in history in order ta maintain the sanctity of the union. "There is, indeed, no doubt tbat the 'Azad' forces now have a strength which changes the military situation ...11 The cease fire was agreed to in the context of things as they were. and the whole idea ofa cease fire is tbat there shall be a general stoppage-a tourniquet put on hostiIities. That is, there must be a standstill, but the Commission says in its report: nThere is, indeed. no doubt that the 'Azad' forces noW have a strength which changes the mîlitary situation and to that extent makes the withdrawal of forces, particularly those of India, a far more difficuIt matter to arrange within a structure which considers only the regular forces of two armies. AIthough it might be a matter of discussion whether the numerical strength of the 1Azad' Kashmir forces has actually increased since August 1948, there isuo question that those forces, who have since then been working in close co-operationwiththe Pakistan regular Army and who have been trained and officered by that Army, have increasedtheirfightingstrength. It is reasonable to suppose that, if the Commission had been able to foresee that the cease fire period would be prolonged throughout the greater part of 1949 and that Pakistan would use that period to consolidate its position in the 'Azad' territory, the Commission would have deaIt with this question in part II of the resolution of 13 August. ,,~' 129. There are two matters thatcomeoutofthis. One is the change of circumstances that has taken place. First of aIl, aIl the arrangements of 1948 and 1949 were in the context of thinking that there was a cease fire and that in a few months-perhaps withina yearthere would be a settlement of this matter. But in our submission the Pakistan Government, by not carrying out part 1 of the resolution which 1 read out to the Councii yesterday, made the truce conditions impossible prima facie. Over and above that, however, section A of part II was repudiated in action, and the Cornmission's report itself sets out that that was the position. 130. Sir Muhammad stated yesterday, as far as 1 could understand what was being said, thatwithregard te the northern areas they had no complaints to make, The Commission has stated-and 1 have repeatedly quoted this before the Council-that to Hs knowl.edge Pakistan at the time of the passing ofthese resolutions and the agreement on the cease fire had no authority in those areas. It is quite true that the Government of India's band did not reach 50 far at that time, and the fighting situation ended soon afterpartition. TheCommission said; "It seems however very doubtful whether the northern areas were in fact iri the autumn of 1948 under the 'effective' control of the Pakistan Righ W Ibid.. Fourth Year. Special Supplement· No. 7, document S/1430, para. 225. That i8 to say. it was not for the purpose of abstract justice, of giving the people the governmenttheywant, or anything of that kind. They had entered the western area in order to defend the western area of Pakistan. It was purely a \Var action by a country in order to take another country that \Vas necessary for Us defence. , " 131. What \Vas the answer to that? By Jauuary 1949, Pakistan undeniably beld miUtary con~rol over the northern areas. l submit that that i5 a violation of the cease-fire agreement and changes the situation completely. And then they talk of plebiscite, after building up a hugh army such as 1 have described, on the other side. They then wish to blame the whole matter 1 on one side. , 132. In a document of the Security Council proceedings, the question of Pakistan was considered. On 26 April 1949, nearly four months after the cease !ire, Mr. Gurmani, Minister for Kashmir Affairs for the Government of Pakistan, disclosed the following in a letter to the United Nations Comnùssion: Il Efforts are being made to make the route Gilgit (-Bunji)-Skardu aiso jeepable within a shortperiod. n They had no right to build these roads. "There exist: a good aU-weather Dakota strip at Gilgit; a good aU-weather Dakota strip at Skardu; a Dakota strip at Chilas." This was aU in the northern mountain areas where we had temporarily withdrawn even from advaneed positions, in arder to make a peaeeful settlement. That these air strips were constructed under Pakistan occupation is clear from the following: !lIn addition ta necessities of llie, other goods such as fine cloth, soap, Cigarettes, etc., have begun to move in fair quantities sinee the construction of Dakota strips at Gilgit and Ska,rdu, and themaking of the Balakot-Gilgit road into a jeepable,one."W 133. 1 have no desire ta read aIl thesematters again. While it is true that itis very difficult for members of the Council to study these documents, they are aIl there and therefore, 1 am not going to go through the exercise of repeating these arguments again. Sir Muhammad, no doubt, if he had the time, would repeat them and would go on repeating them and 1 would then have ta answer again. The facts are aIl there. So far as we are concerned, the accession is final. Pakistan has not only violated international law by aggression; !V Ibid.. document 5/1430, para. 272. ?:2J Ibid•• document Sj1430jAdd.l, annex 24, appendix. 134. No\V \Ve come ta what 1 described as sorne of the new facts in the situation. Yesterday, partly beeause there \Vas not much time, and sinee we know that perhaps sorne of these matters had better not be related, unless we are compelled ta relate them, 1 withheld sorne of these observations on the eontinuing situation that now exists in thatarea. 1spoke yesterday about 400 bomb explosions in the state of Jammu and Kashmir-and these are not childrenplayingwithfirecrackers. There has been loss of life and much communal trouble. They put a bomb in aHindu temple and spread the story that Muslims are doingit. They put a bomb in a Masque and say the Hindus are doing it. Pakistan's entire policy toward us has been based upon the idea of creating division and hatred among different classes of people. This has been the history not only of Pakistan, but of its c.reators, the Muslim League, for the last fifty or sixtY years. 135. There has been aggression into our territory. In 1958, the Pakistan Government, in violation of the cease-fire agreement, organized a crossing of the cease-fire Hnes by civilians from the partofKashrnir under its unlawful occupation. There was no secrecy about it. There was a lot of propaganda ta contàct these so-caIled volunteers, who were comparatively well paid, to come over under the guise of civiHans, to have a mass exodus into our territory, and conceal weapons in order to commitsabotage.Atthattime, the Chief Military Observer of the United Nations, at the instance of the Government of India, had ta bring the matter ta the Chief of the Ge'neral Staffof the Pakistan Army. In his letter, No. CMO/92, dated 25 June 1958, the Chief Military Observer stated: "1 have drawn the attention of GHQ Pakistan to the advisability of exeroising stricter control over the activities of civilians close ta the cease-fire Hne, particularly in relation ta the use of explosives." It was a few days before the organized n'J.ovement ta cross the cease-fire line began that an attack along the oease-fire Hne had been planned. These crossings were the subject matter of two letters addressed by the Permanent Representative oflndia ta the President "1 have had assurance from the Chief of Staff, Pakistan Army. that immediate steps willbe taken ta control the civilians in this area on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire Une," And 1 am free ta admit that whenwe reoeived this assurance, our army people were more or less inclined ta take it at Us face value because, being soldiers, 1 suppose they do that sort of thing. 137. Since theu, the Government of Pakistan has given assurances of good conduct on behalf of the civilians in the area; none of these assurances has been honoured. Since that time, Pakistan has used civilians as a screen to conceal its aetivities of aggression. Civilians have been encouraged not only ta cross the cease-tire line on our army and police pickets and our villages, but also to occupy areas on our side ofthe cease-tire line and generally ta promote instability in the regian. A large number ofencroaehments have taken place-as many as twenty-nine. The report which 1 have isnearly ayearold now. But there were as many as twenty-nille encroachments alongthe cease-fire line on the international border. j , 138. It can easily be understood that the bOWldary between the area of Jammu and Kashmir, which ls administered by India and Pakistan, is partly covered by the cease-tire line and partly covered by the international border whieh l'uns through Jammu. In Jammu for the last twelve years, certain areas which had been in Indian territory have been occupied by Pakistan troops. But generally, with a desire to avoid large-scale conflict, we havenot pushed themout. That is our territory on which aggression has been committed after the cease fire, after the resolution, and while aIl discussions were going on. 1 think that perhaps the patience and the general restraint which we have exercised in these matters is taken for granted. As 1 said yesterday, it is mistaken for subservience. These are aets of aggression, in complete violation of the cease-fire agreement, Pakistan objects to anyencroachments being cleared, and we have tried to clear them either by talks or in other ways, on the gToWld that the acUviUes of civilians are not covered by the cease-fire agreement. We cannot push the civilians out because there might thenbe a skirmish and trouble. We cannot eomplain to the United Nations authority because they will claim that the people involved are civilians and not soldiers and that, therefore, the United Nations cannot deal with them. That is the position. lt draws support fol' its \,liew fI'cm some of the awards given by the Chief Military Observer. This i8 not the place for us to express our opinion about the Chief Mîlitary Observer and his staff, That will be done elsewhere. W Ibid.. Thirteenth yeu. Supplement for July, Augustand september, 1958, documents 5/4046 and 5/40B6. 140. Here is the report on this matter. In order to deal \Vith this mounting la\Vlessness, disorder, subversion and sabotage, the Jammu and Kashmir Government \Vas compelled to open two additional police posts, one of \Vhich was in BalakOte, within the 500-yard zone. There \Vas an agreement that \Vithin 500 yards, military people should not go. This was merely a restoration of a police station that had existed in this area before 1947. The seoond was at Tarakundi, 600 yards from the oease-fire line. 141. The local Superintendent of Police illformed the United Nations Field Observer about this decision to set up thesB posts, and the latter raised no objection. The Government of India informed him that these posts would be bunt for the maintenance of law and order, and the United Nations Observer raised no objection. But, when the police post was set up, a United Nations Field Observer was aise preselltin the area. These posts are intended ta enable the police to disoharge normal functions. However, no soonerwere illey set up than they came under continuons and heavy maohine-gun fire and ather fire from the Pakistan side, And, when we talk about a violation of the cease-fire Hne, 1 waut to say that they are not just rifle shots or pistaI shots or anything of that kind. Light maohine guns, grenades and other war equipment is utilized. And it is not as though they fire one round: when they tire, it goes on the whole time, and in practice little battles take place in these areas. United Nations Observers have seen the Balakote post being fired upon when it \Vas being estabHshed, and also on subsequent occasions. Not satisfied \Vith tms, Pakistan armed forces and Pakistan police organized predetermined raids against these two posts. Indian armyauthorities have lodged complaints. 142. If 1 read aIl this, it \Vill take a very long time. At any rate, violations of this kind have been taking place. 143. The representative of Pakistan has raised an argument of internationallaw, and I would hateto join iSsue with him-because, after all, who am!to dispute what may be the very learned opinion of an eX-Judge of the World Court? But 1 would like to say that India is the successor State of the British Empire, of the British power in India. This is not something we invented. Certain orders were passed under the "The international rights and obligations to which lndia is entîtled and subject immediately befOl'e the 15th day of AUgLlst, 1947, will devolve in accordance \Vith the provisions of tbis agreement. "Membership of aIl international organizations together \Vith the rights and obligations attaching ta such membership, will devolve solely upon the Dominion of India. "For the purposes of this paragraph any rights or obligations arising under the Final Act of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference ..." This is the only thing 1 am going to read. It is quite true that ît was said: "\VeIl, there are many matters to be settled. The territory whlon is neighbouring the Dominion of Pakistan-she will carry it out. " 144. It will be noticed that, in the statement of the representative of Pakistan, he treats "successor Government" and "successor authority" as synonymous. There is a difference between a "successor Government" and a "successor authority." Pakistan was entitled, where it was a successor authority, to deal with these matters. But 1 do not think we need be satisfied with the Government ofIndiaAct, even though it is binding on Pakistan. 145. This matter came up before the United Nationsand this is not a secret document. The Secretariat of the United Nations, while dealingwith Pakistan 's claim, found itself in the position of having to make an administrative decision with far-reaching legalimplications, and it consulted the British Government. The British Government was of the opinion, quite correctIy, that Pakistan had Hot succeeded to the treaties of British India and that, in strict ll'.w, it commenced this life unfettered by conventional obligations. The Secretariat thereupon delivered the following opinion: "From the view point of international law, the situation is one in which a part of an existing State breaks off and becomesanewState,Onthis analysis, there i~ no change in the international status of India; it continues as aState with all treaty rights and obligations, and consequently, with a1l the rights and obligations of memberships in the United Nations. The territory which breaks off, Pakistan, will be a new State; it will not have the treaty rights and obligations of the old State, and it will not, bf course, have II?-embership in the United Nadons." 146. So Pakistan was admitted as a new Member, which Britain and ourselves supported at that Ume. And it is too late in the day to argue the question of 147. That lS aIl l said. And, what is more, while l did l'aise that point, it was not said that the question of the relation or the membership of Jammu and Kashmir, to the territory of the Union, was based upon puramountcy. That is based upon the accession, so far as law is concerned-and, so far as the fact is concerned - upon the history ofthepast andthe will of the people, whether it is exercised by plebiscite or not. 148. When we come to this question of plebiscite, l am free ta confess-and we cannat deny it, for it is in the papers all over-the ward "plebisci.te!' has been used many times. At one time it was thought that a plebiscite would be taken indeed. Ifithad been possible, if Pakistan had honoured its obligations, if it had not concealed facts from the Security Council, if it had not indulged in provocations and egged on disturbances, and if the local authoritîes had remai.ned as local authorities, if the Government of lndia had been able to gan'ison the northern area as it was allowed to do under the resolutions, if it had been able to ward off other troubles-in those circumstances, a plebiscite could have been takell. But time passed and conditions changed. 149. Then we are asked: What is the meaning of the Mountbatten statement? Mountbatten d:id make a statement. He did not make it out of his OWll head. He was speaking as the Head of the Government of India, and we take full responsibility, as the Governrnent, for what the Governor-General said, because he was a constitutional Governor-General. He simply meant, as 1 said yesterday, that we were not satisfied-not in legal terms, but we were not satisfied in political and moral terms-merely to have the signature of the Maharajah, in the sarne way that they gat a nabob running away with his dogs. Thatwasnotsuffident for Our purposes. We wanted the moral authority of the people, and 1said repeatedlyyesterday that we foUowed the practice ofthe British Government, which consulted us as the greatnationalmovementofthecountry-not a parliament-not by a referendum, not by a plebiscite. India did not become independent by seIf-determination. l know of no British colony or no British dependency that became independent by self-determination. It was always by negotiation and by arrangement. 150. 1 have no intention of goingintotheseextraneous problems. Kashmir is big enough for the Security Council-with the limitations on its time. 151. Seoondly, who has stopped the ascertainment of public opinion in Kashmir? So far as the Indianadministered area of Kashmir is ooncerned, as Ihave said, there have been three eleotions. This was ridiouled by the representative of Pakistan two days aga, but 1 think wisdom prevailed and, today, he did Ilot do so, because the facts were against him. There have been free elections lately organized under the Election Commission, open to the public in everyway. We have a free Press and everything else. There have been three eleotions in the lasttwelveyears. Therefore, the people over whom wehave any authority have been able to express their opinion. The people who have not expressed theil' opinion are the people in so-called "Azad" Kashmir. because they have no parliament, they have no riewspapers, they are not allowed to vote in the constituenoies for which the Kashmir Constitution provides. Over and above this, when \Ve came here last time, in about 1957, the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir in session. Now, under our law, even if the Constituent Assembly were to decide differently, the accession would not he changed, 152. But in fact that Constituent Assembly-not by some sort of rubber-stamp decision, but by debate for a very long time, with arguments on hoth sides and a real interesting parliamentary debate for a long period-came ta the conclusion, as regards the alternatives, that they may do this, that they may do that, that they may do the other thing. They set out the consequence of doing this, that or the other, and they decided that the acceSsion of Indla was necessary for Kashmir-and they were not speaking only for their part but for the whole of India. 153. Therefore, first there was the opinion of the national movement; there was the fact that over a peri'od of years there was contentment andprogress in that land. There have been no protests about going away. AIl the going away business is in Pakistan, not in Kashmir. It is not as though the Kashmir people want ta go away, but it îs an external authority, an invading country whîch wants to filch them away, and that is an entirely different situation. 154. Seoondly, thel'e were free el"6ctions, the maintenance of publio institutions, free debate and free 155. Therefore, India is notto beblamedj the Government of India is not to be blamed and the Security Council is not to be blamed if there has been no plebiscite in this matter. There is this word "plebiscite" again. Even the Commission has said that if the plebiscite is not possible, not practicable, thell we will try other means. 1 do not know whether the Counci! would want me ta read the Commission's report which says that if the plebiscite is not practicable, if it is not possible, then we shall try other means. This has also been said by Sir Owen Dixon in his :œport. 156. So the idea is not as though it is the law of the Medes and the Persians that cannat be changed. We submit ta the Counci! that in sa far as we have a moral obligation, which we will respect, we havetakenevery step to ascertain the will of the peoples. The will of the peoples in Kashmir is in affinity with the Union; they are part of the Union; they are citizens of India just like anylxldy else. The people who are being kept out are kept out by external force, they are held captive by an empire under a colonial system. That is our contention. Therefore, there is no answer to thîs question except the vacation of aggression by Pakistan. 157. We also submit that the Government ofIndîahas at aIl times stated that Pakistan and ourselves cannot be treated on a plane of equalîty in this question. In this matter 1 must registel' my caveat at the Dontinuous use of the word "dispute" by Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan. In popular language anything îs a dispute. If people differ in an argument, you cancallit a dispute. But we are now speaking in the Security Council in the context of the Charter and its provisions. We have maintained frorn the very beginning that this is not a dispute but a situation. There is no dispute between us and Pakistan. How can there be a dispute between us and Pakistan in a matter in which Pakistan has no locus standi? Pakistan, by its own unlawful action, has created a situation. That situation creates sorne difficulties for us. And as far as the Charter is concerned, 1 do not know if it is necessary for me to talk about it. Therefore, while 1 have no objection ta using the word "dispute" in colloquial terms, in terms of the Charter, we are not engaged in a dispute whether political, legal or anything else. Asituationhas arisen through a fact of aggression that has taken place, so far as our country is concerned. " ••• India had advanced not onlv the contention to which 1 have already referred t1 _0 Pakistan was an aggressor, but the further contention thatthis should be declared. The Prime Minister of India, at an early stage of the meeting made the same contention and he referred ta :_ repeatedly during the conference. took up the positions, first that the Security Council had not made such a decIaration; secondly that 1 had neither been commissioned to make nor had I made any judicial investigation of the issue; but thirdly that, without going inta the causes or reasons why it happened, which presumably formed part of the history of the subcontinent, "-without going into that history-"1 was prepared to adopt the view that when the frontier of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was crossed, on 1 believe 20 October 1947, by hostile clements, it was contrary ta internationallaw, and that when, in May 1948, as I believe, units of the regular Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the State, that tao was inconsistent with international law.":gj 159. 1 submit that the security Counci! had not pronounced on it, that Sir Owen Dixon had not gone into the history of it, and yet he insists that there has been a violation of internationallaw. This strengthens the argument about violation rather than weakens it. If he had been asked ta go into it, it would have been another matter. But even thpugh he had not been asked to go into it, it stuck out a mile, that is going into the territory where they had no business ta go. After all, it was not ana ma.'1's land. Sir Owen Dixon goes on to say: tlI therefore proposed that the first step in demilitarization should consist' in the withdrawal of the Pakistan regular forces commencing on a named day. After a significant number of days from the named day. then other operations on each side of the cease-fire line should take place and as far as practicable, concurrently. What number of days should be fixed? .••W That is ta say, here again there is an argument that Pakistan forces only need withdraw, and sa on, and then we withdraw, and so on, Butthe whole trend of the discussion has been that these are aggressors and they must go; and when they have gone we ought ta do certain things in order to bring about peace. gt Ibid., Fif>.J! Yeu, Supplement for September through December 1950. document 5/1791 and Add.l. para. 21. El Ibid., para. 22. 161. It is clear that parts l, II and III of the resolution of 13 Augnst 1948 form an indivisible whole and implementation of one part is conditional upon the implementation of the other. Thus, for example, part II of the resolution can be implemented only after part 1 has been carried out and the implementation of part II, B, withdrawal of Indian forces, is conditional upon the carrying into effect of part II, A, and finally part IIIascertaining of the free will of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir-is to becarriedoutonly after part II has been carried out with discussion between the Commission-not with Pakistan, but between the Commission and the Government of India, as to what is the best way of proceeding. At notime did Pakistan come into the picture at all. 162. Moreover, various parts of the resolution stand or falI together. There cannot he one without the other. No other interpretation can be attributed to the above resolution if the various parts of it are read in their Tlnatural and ordinary meaning". A fundamental prin_ ciple of interpretation is that words of a treaty or an international agreement must be given their Itnatural and ordinary meaning". Thus, in a case relating to Competence of the General As sembly for the admission of aState to the United Nations wherein the International Court of Justice was asked to give an advisory opinion,W the Court stated: "The Court considers it necessary to say that the first duty of a tribunal which is called up0n to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is ta endeavour ta give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in whichthey occur. If the relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is an end of the matter. If, on the other hand, the words in their natural and ordinary meaning are ambiguous or lead to an unreasonable resuIt, then, and then only. must the Court, by resort to other methods of interpretation, seek to ascertain what the parties really did mean when they used these words. As the Permanent Court said in the case concerning the Polish Postal Service in Danzig (P.C.I.J., Series B, No. II, p.39): lIt isacardinalprincipleof interpretatLn that words must be interpreted in the sense which they would normally have in their oontext, unless such interpretation would lead to something unreasonable or absurd.' ~ Competence of the General Assembly for the admission of aState to the United Natlons, AdvlSory 0plnIon: I.e.). Reports 1950, p. 8. '! 163. In this case, there 15 no difficulty, and the thing ls set out there-the Pakistan Army. its nationals. and the "Azad" forces must withdraw. Theyhadno business ta be there and have no business tohave gone in there. , ·i 164. Bath today and yesterday statements weremade by the representative of Pakistan on behalf of his Government saying this, that and the other. One of these thirzs is that they would withdraw their forces. 1 submit that during the Iast fourtzsn years we have not prohibited them from withdrawing their forces nor has the security Council, and if the Government of Pakistan has not withdrawll them, and what is more in actual performance has acted in the reverse manner, what credence is to be attached ta these statements? They are merely strings of words. If in the last fourteen years they have not withdrawn these troops but have augmented them and have improved them so that they are as good as the ..cegular forces of the Pakistan Army, they are still onourfrontierjthey are equipped with air forces, weapons ofmoderncharacter -:nto the details of which 1 need not go-well, instead of withdrawing their forces they have been building them up. This argument has gone on during these fourteen years and aU the time in the background before the Security Council not ouly have the relevant facts been withheld but contrary versions have been given. j, .~ ! 165. The late Ml'. Mohammad Ali Jinnah said he had no control ovar the tribesmen, but the same Mohammad Ali Jinnah, as 1 pointed out yesterday, reviewed the tribesmen and egged them on. It was the same Mohammad Ali Jinnah who caUed Lord Mountbatten and said: "if you will do this 1will caU the whole thing off." How could he calI the whole thing off if he hsd no influence over them? It was the same Mohammad Ali Jinnah who gave o1'ders to the British Comm~nder-in­ Chief ta wage war against Indla. Fortunately, the British Commander had either the sense or the discretion not ta do so. 166, These are the facts, and nowtheycomehere and say, in a vacuum, before the Security Counoil, that they will do this and they will do that-nobody is preventing them from doing it. If Pakistan withdrew its entire forces and all the works that go with them and cleheq out of the place whe2'e they have no business to be, then a new situation wouid arise. In this new situation any Member State of the United Nations would act according to the principles of the Charter against the background of the history of the case, But this is a conundrum. It is an argument, it is an offer, and we see nothing that ls worthwhile in tbis matter. 1 submit that it is the very same representative who has told this Couneil time sfter time that they neither a.ided nor abetted the tribesmen, but that the tribesmenwould go in and they were not able ta stop them. It ia like some of those people who train ~:ogs, and say in the presence of the dog, "If you are not careful the dog will bite you." It is practically as if they gave an arder ta bite people. In the same way, they say these tribesmen will get in, li the Pakistan Government is sa incompetent that the writ of its law does not l'un in its own 168, The sovereignty of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir lies with the Union of India. Jammu and Kashmir js now part of the Union and, therefore, it is not in the gift of Pakistan. She is not entitled to negotlate with China or anybody else nor enter into international negotiations; and in trying ta play off bath sides against the middle she is violating international law. Not only is she violating international law, she is acting in a way whioh is in total disregard of the decisions of the Security counon with far-reaching consequences. 168. et et il Le ou ciations avec international. droit total les 169, Furthermore, 1 want to sayon behalf of my Dovernment that the Pakistan Government has no authority whatsoever to constitute any kind of polity in the area that i5 under her oocupation. The Commission had very definitely laid it down that there shaH be no consolidation. But consolidation has already t'aken place in regard to the areas under oocupation. Annexations have talell place and now "de-annexations" will have ta take place before there is peace. There has been agreatdealoftalkofllAzad" Kashmir as a kind of inùependent State, They have set up information offioes in various plaoes and this, that and the other; Pakistan has never recognized them but anybody who is opportunist enough to do sa may recognize them. However, the creation of any politY in the territory of Jammu and Kashmir would be a violation of ïnternationallaw and a disregardofthe decisions ofthe Security Council, and we shaH not recognize them-and certain consequences follow fl'om this. 169. gouvernement, aucune oocupe Commission n'y lidation Des opérer s'Hablir. oomme des le est nartre, administration et international décisions naîtrions vraient, 170. Therefore, what 1 saidyesterday i8 conditioned 170. :;'d~~~e ;::;;'l~'~~~'::%i::'~~~~r~: ~~tV~~t~n;~~tp~fs't~~~~ 45 ~:::'~~t 1, ,, 171. Here, therefore, are very serious matters. It is not merely a question of scoring a debating point. 1 want it to go on record that no agreement, no negotiation, nouncterstandinghowevertemporary-because aIl things are temporary, since they take place in the context of time-wlil bind the Government ofIndia. We shall not submit ta the implications of any undertaldng we may have given ta our people to the Security Council, or to theworld; ail that is conditioned by these changed circumstances. The security of our country is something which we cannat barter away. Changes that takeplace on our borders-not outside our borders, but within our borders-are a matter ofconcern ta us. i 172. These conditions exist; these are the new circumstances which have arisen and it is the wish of my Government that we !;'~~uld submit to the Security Council, and place on record, thatno changes that may take place in this way, either inthe form of the demarcation ofboundaries submitting certain areas to foreign jurisdiction or the demarcation of boundaries witbout consultation with us, will be binding upon us. No attempt to set up a governmentin "Azad" Kashmir and say tbat it is a government, in IIAzad"Kashmir or any other country, will he binding upon us either, because under our Constitution it is onlypermissible to demarcate boundaries inside the Union. Therefore, the socaIled territory of IIAzad" Kashmir. and other areas alleged to have acceded to Pakistan in the Himalayan region, we say, continue ta be integraI parts of the territory of the Union. This is one of those things on which the Government of India will not yield. 173. Ta conclude my observations, we are at all times prepared ta find ways and means for reduoingtension. We recognize that in this world it is not always possible to obtain logioal solutions. We also recognize that aggression somewhere 'may well become aggression a11 over the place. We also reoognize that conflicts are likely to spread. For all these reaSQns 1 repeat the undertaking on behalf of the Government of India-aîl undertaking which 1 am sorry ta say Sir Muhamma,d thought he should ridicule, when it is his Govern'llent which for twelve continuous years has refused to enter into a no-war agreement with the Government of India-we say, whatever our differences, we will try and settle them 0:' leave them unsettled but we shall not go ta war. That proposal of ours has been turned down Ume after Ume from 1947 onwa.xds. What they say is yes, we will enter into a no-war agreement with you whe11 you have ctone what we want you ta do. What is the point of agref;ment? It is not we who are on the war pathi we have enough con~tructive work to do in our own country. We are not exciting feelings in this way; we axe h(lt shaking 174. One more point: It has been said-and 1 think the Council should not be misled in this matter-that Pakistan is an Islamic State-a theocraticState. Wedo not quarrel with that; it is not our business at ail what kind of State they have. What is called a two-nation theory has been propounded even though it may apply ta what was formerly in a sense partitioned, sorne phrases have been said, somewhere, that populations of one predominant type will be grouped that way, and others will be grouped this way. But the Prime Minister at the time, in his statements, and in the acts of Parliament, made it quite clear that this does not apply to the Indian States; and Sir Muhammadcharges me with having suggested that he had said something about communal oompositions andthe claim of Pakistan -1 do not know what thatis-thec1aimof Pakistan, the claim of conquest, the c1aim of aggression, the olaim of foroe, the claim of illegal occupation. But in answer to that, he says it is not the olaim of religion, as such. 1l) J 1 ~ 175. First of aU, 1 want ta point out to him that he misguoted Lord Mountbatten in support of his argument, and said that accessions were ta take plaoe having regard to one-two-three-religious-orwhatever it is-communal affiliations or something of that kind, quoting the name of V. P. Menonwho is no longer an employee of the Government of India, who used Government records without permission and without authority. 176. We neither accepted nor repudiated it. Lots of people write books: it is one of the ocoupations of retired people. We are not bound, therefore, by what these people said; but l would like to read out to you the position cf the Pakistan Government with respect 10 the internaI changes taking place. 177. There is a well-known axiom international behaviour that States do not die: Governments may change. Therefore, the present Government of Pakistan repudiates it, and, by its conduct, indicates its repudiation, It is bound by the polioies that have been expressed by its predecessors, both in public and, even more, in the Security Counoil. 1 would like ta read out to you what happened on 18 February 1957. The then Foreign Minister of Pakistan spoke to tIlis Couneil on this matter of plebiscite, beeause we said at that bme that religious oonsiderationshouldbekept out of it: "It would be perfectly legitimate in the oase of a plebiscite to draw attention ta religious, cultural, linguistic, economio, geographio, strategie andother ties, affinities and considerations that might sway the choioe. So long as nothingha.; been <ione to incite lawlessness or to exercise coercion, the exercise of aIl considerations that might affec ..he choioewould be legitimate. "1 think that Mr. Krishna Menon-and 1 bowbefore him for his knowledge of the English language-forgot to differentiate between the word 'eleotion' and the ward 'plebiscite'. Whereas in an election it is the duty of a Government to see that it is iree and no 178. And it is not only onepassage. There are dozens of passages in the statements made by Pakistan leaders. In fact the whole idea ls that. Then Sir Muhammad says that we are not aversetoplebiscites, and that we indulged in this pracUce before. His facts are wrong. 1 have some knowledge of this because 1 handled this matter. There was no plebiscite in the former North-West Frontier Province. Whatwas done was thîs. The North-West Frontier Province at that time had a kind ofparliament which hadbeen given by the British. although it had no total responsibility. Since there was sorne dispute, and although the general expectation was that the North-West Frontier Province would remain with the Union, we said, "Ifthere is any doubt about it"-ultimately, after days of argument- "let there be a referendum". And therewas a referendum in the North-West Frontier Province which, for various reasons, was boycotted by the majority. Out of the remaining minority Pakistan obtained the majority. Several thousand of them who boycotted it are now in goal. And their leader, a man lmown as "Frontier Gandhi" in popular terms, has been in Pakistan prisons for years and years. One of the pioneers of our national movement, who had suffered imprh,onment unds!' the British and hact been in various demonstrations and agitations in the past, indeed, a great national leader,he languishes inprison. 179. Anyway, what took place? There was a referendum. It is quite true that in Sylhet there was a referendum. AIl countries make mistakes and that was one of the mistakes we made. But that again was not in fact a plebiscite. It was a referendum. The difference le small, but it was not aplebiscite. We abided by that referendum and it has not been felicitous for the stability of that part oÏ Indla. But it i5 wrong to say that, therefore, we are familial' with plebiscites, and that the plebiscite is one of the things that we ordinarily use. It is wrong to say that as a reply to the argument which 1 quoted from the British Foreign Office documents to the effect that it was not a practice in parliamentary systems-not their practice. 1 also quoted Australian and other law against it, and to say in reply, "You are accustomed to theplebiscite"again is a misstatement of facto 180. 1 conclude by saying that firsttheGovernmentof India holds the accession of the State of Jammu and Kr 'hmir as full, not temporary or provisional, as fin' ,: and perpetuaI. There is no power in India ta eut asunc.:er any part of this territory except by an act of cession to be sancUoned by the Constituent Assembly. If there was a political agreement it would be our responsibility to do that. 181. Secondly, we will not sit back if changes are made which are in violation of the provisions of the Charter, L'e ctecisions of the Security Council and 182. Thirdly, we shall not at aJ1? time submit this matter to what is caUed Mediation '.ir arbitration, and we are not frightened by having it thrown in our face that this is a normal methodof international settlement. There are Many matters on which we will go to arbitration, We have gone ta arbitration in regard to Pakistan itself on small matters, butwewillnot agree ta arbitration or mediation on the question of the sovereignty of our ter:ritory. 1 said this in 1957 and 1 repeat it with the authority of my Government. ~he sovereignty of a country and its independence,likethe honour of a man, arenotthesubjeotof arbitration, and 1 am quite certain that the other representatives of nations which sit here will appreciate this argument. Not one other country would he free if its sovereignty were to be subject ta arbitration. Supposing two political parties of equal strength inside a country said, ltLet us arbitrate. Let us go ta somebody else and see who should govern t11is landl!. WIlere would they go? J 183. This is the fourth submission 1 have ta make. We have come here on the basis of aUegations that there was a threat to peace and security in that part of the area. If there are threats those threats and the conditions are created by the people who complain, and we are not responsible for them. The remedy lies in the hands of those who have sought ta come here. 184. No new factors have been adduced and a great deal of the Ume of the Councn he.s been taken, and there are new meombers present and for that reason we have had torepeatmanythingswehave said before. There have been 105 or 107 meetings of the Counci! on the subject, but irrespectiveofthenumberof meetings that we hold you cannot argue a nation irito dependence. India Îs an independent country, with no desire to absorb or encroach upon other people's territory but equaUy bound in honour, boundby its own interests, by its obligations ta its ownpeople, to safeguard its integrity and protect its frontiers. In doing 50 it will not be provokedbythreatsof aggression, but at the sarne time we look ta the Security Counci! not to allow itseIf ta be useC!. as a forum for tendentious propaganda. J 185. We have not violated any agreement that has been reacbed in the Security Counci!. The continuous r:alIing of meetings of this kind, when no new circumstances have arisen, does not lead anywhere. Wehave been asked why we do net talk together as two neighbours. My Prime Minister invited the President of Pakistan to come and talk. We cannot negotiate because we are not equal in this matter. We are equal in other ways, but in this matter we are not equaI. We are, however, quite prepared ta talk this thing over, but Sir Muhammad cornes here and says that directnegotiation does not work. That i8 to say, even before they come they rule it out. You know, there are many people of good-will, but the question is how they apply it, If they think that no bilateral negotiations can produce any result, they are very much mistaken. We ha.ve no objection to talking ta anybody, frÎend or foe, apponent or ally, but we do not think that there Îs any J 1J' 187. My country stands here with no pangs of conscience of any kind. Ourhands are c1ean in this matter. We came here on a charge of aggression and we expected you, the eleven members of the Secul'ity Council, ta stand up and say the Charter should be defended. We have gone a long way, and we shaH go a lot further; we shall not walkoutofthis Council at any time, even if the discussions do not lead anywhere. But if we have to sit here and listen to continuaI misrepresentations of our people, like the one given yesterday, for example, that a thousand people had been killed in West Bengal-whether this has any relevance to this matter or not, Itellyou it is an utter falsehood. ; 1 ! 188. And then there have been references to the refugees. What is the story of the refugees ?l,100,OOO people came from Pakistan into India. Less than 100 ,000 people have gone from India into Pakistan (tfter the great migrations. A million more people came from Pakistan to India even during the migrations. Sir Muhammad has quite unfairly drawn the attention of the Council to the grim atrocities of which bath countries are ashamed. l't ls quite true that in the post-partition period there was tumult in India and other circumstances which it is not thought necessary ~G refer ta at the present time. Sa far as my country is concerned, my Prime Minister and Mr. Gandhi, everybody, has repeatedly stated that itwas something that the whole world, not only our own people, but aIl human beings, was ashamed of-but that has nothingto do with this Kashmir situation. It had ta do with other matters and the promotion of this communal rancour or the misrepresentation of men like my Prime Minister in public-aIl this is likely to create bad feeling and only lays the foundation for more difficulties in future. 1,, 189. Mr. President, 1 have no desire to detain the Counci! any longer; 1 have made my statement and 1 have nothing whatever more ta add.

1 propose ta be very briei. This Counci! has listened for sorne !ive meetings to full statements by the representative of Pakistan and the MinisterofDefenceofIndia. These statements have covered in considerable detai! the historical and political aspects of this highly complex question. Bath speakers also made comparatively full explanations, from their respective points of view, of the extremely important legal considerations involved. My delegation is grateful ta bath the representative of Pakistan and the Minister of Defence oflndiafor their full presentations which have certainly been of help in expounding the issues involved, inparticulartopersons like myself who were not present at earlier meetings of the Security Counoi! on this subject. 191. My delegation wouldcertainlyrequire more time ta study aIl that has been said here and all the documents, both legal and political, to whichreferencehas 192, My delegation does not wish at this time to make any attempt ta weigh the actual orpotential risks ta the maintenance of peace in the areaitself or in the greater region surrounding it, which 8. cOntinuation of the present deep and long-lasting disputes poses or may pose in the future. Both sides have categorically assured this Counci! that however dissatisfied they may be with the present situation and at the prospect that it may remain unresolved for sometimeto come. they do not contemplate the use offorce or of measures outside the scopeofthe Charterofthe United Nations in order to alter it or terminate it. My delegation has taken careful note of these assurances and welcomed them without reserve.Other delegations andthe Counoi! as weI;. l,,;ay feel the same, butthat in itself cannat discharge the Couneil from the continuing responsibility plaeed on it by the Charter to avert any threat ta the peace that may be still inherent in the continuation of the present situation and to see to it that the situation does not deteriorate still further, thus endangering to sorne greater degree the maintenance of peace. 193. Is there anything more that this Counci! can or should do in the present state of affairs and at the present moment to discharge its Inevitable duty or te begin to help towards a solution ?On this my delegation would wish ta reserve judgement whi!e taking time ta study the legal and political issues involved. Mydelegation do, however, fee! that the solution in the end must be found by the road of negotiation. There are many forms indeed which such negotiation could take. The modalities, v.he conditions, the timing, and sa on, are aIl capable of discussion. 1 do not want ta go into this now. As 1 say, time may be needed to work these out. But at the bottom, this problem is one which for almost every reason-historical, legal and politicalis the concern of Pakistan and India and lt is to these two countries and ta their two Governments that in the end an who are, like ourselves, friends of bath and this Council must look-and must appeal-to negotiate with each other, using, ifso, in whateverform they may deem it helpful, sllch aid from outside as may lead in the direction which aIl Members of the United Nations 50 earnestly desire. J J J 1] JJ!J 194. Ml'. PLIMPTON (United States of America): Referring to ..the statement by the representative of Pakistan concerning the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah on the ground that he had been conspiring with a foreign Power and to the mention in that connexion of Governor Stevenson, although the Governor is absent on his way

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