S/PV.1013 Security Council

In pursuance of earl1er decisions taken by the Council, l shall, with the Council's consent, invite the representatives of India and Pakistan ta participate in the examination of this question. 1 ! 1 J At the invitation of the President. Mr. Krishna Menon (India) and Mr. Muhammad Zafrolla Khan (PaIdstan) teck places at the Council table.

The COUDCi! will now continue its discussion ofthe question on Us agenda. The first speaker on my Hat is the representative of Ghana and l now caU on him.

After an interval of nearly five years, the Security Council has again 4. EarUer in the present series, of meetings. the Council heard lucid and comprehensive expositions of their respective Governments' views by the representative of Pakistan snd the Indian Minister of De... fence. My delegation, whichwas notpresent atprevious meetings of the COWlcil on this subject, feels bound to express its gratitude to both of these speakers for the clarity and fulness of their statements. These statements have been of great assistance to my delegation in its efforts to understand the extremely complex andmutually relatedhistarical.legal, andpolitical aspects of this question. Of course, the Governmentof Ghana has had an opportunity ta meet the aecredited representatives of bath Governments at Accra many times and ta discuss the facts and intricacies of the question with them. Wry own delegationhas also studied carefully all the relevant records on this subject. It is clear to us that bath sides are sineerely convinced of the righteousness of their respective cases. 5. However. I must state at once that the Government of Ghana wolÙd have wished to he spared the painM experience of being conironted with sucb a delicate and seemingly intractable problem. But as a member of the 8ecurity Council. the Government of Ghana has a responsible duty ta perform where the peace of the world is concerned. We believe iliatnoproblemin this world should he allowed ta degenerate into a situation which would bring about hostilities or armed confIict. It is becoming increasingly difficlÙt ta adopt a policy of containment towards regional conilicts which can easily erupt into a world conflagration, with dire consequences for all mankind. For this reason it is a matter of deep sorrow and anxiety to the Government of Ghana that no material progress has yetbeen made towards a solution of this question andthatthe friction between India and Pakistan, which arose from this lack of progress, has increased rather thandimînished. My Government's concern is enhanced by the fact that it enjoys very close and friendly relations with bath countries. based on history, sentiment and common interest. 6. We have always been conseious and appreciative of our growing partnership with these two nations within the frameworkofthe United Nations-thatwlique institution for co-operation and collaboration which transcends differences of race or creed. Like Ghana, bath India and Pakistan had beenunder Britisbcolonial rule and had been sorely tried by bath extremes of fortune, without having been deterred by either. We have long regarded as a source of inspiration their long and arduous struggle for freedom and independence. We havefollowed with admirationthe tremendous efforts they have madeto seclire progress in the political, economic, social and cultural fields since their independence, and we have dravm much satisfaction from the constructive role they have played in international affairs, particlÙarly inpromoting and supporting the liberation of subjugated peoples in Mrica and elsewhere. Furthermore. we share with them, as ~embers of this communitya 7. It i8 for these reasons that the friction over Kashrnir bas caused us sllch grief, as indeed must oeeur when one 'g friends quarre!. Therefore, rather than being concerned with taking sides, we have en.. deavoured ta gain a sympathetic understanding of the difficulties. opposing points of view and differing înterpretations that have stood inthe way of a mutually acceptable settlement of the problem. In this spirit. the sole concerJ.l of my Government throughout the long and intractable history of the question has been the achievement of a peaceful and just solution, in cOJÛormity with the Charter and acceptable ta both sides, This coneern was, for instance, reflected in an informai suggestion that was made ta bath parties ta the dispute during the early years of Ghana's independence by Osagyefo, the President of Ghana-who at that time was Prime Minister-that he would be happy ta lend any possible assistance, should they wish ta avail themselves of bis good offices. nous une par possible Il, 8. My delegation has noted with satisfaction the assurances given here that. despite their dissatisfaction with the present situation, neither side will take the initiative in using measures that are outside the scope of the Charter, 'With a view to precipitating any change. While welcoming these assurances not ta resort to force, my delegation cannot ignore the fact, increasingly apparent from recent statements in the COUDcil, that the views of the delegations of India and Pakistan are as far apart as they have ever beeu in the past. if ,net further, on a number of the most important points at issue. faction malgré actuelle, sortant l'évolution assurances délégation fait, dêclarations des tions aussi irl 9. This is a sad but hard fact and in the view of my delegation no useful purpose would be served by attempting to apportion the responsibility forthis situation; nor is it, in our opinion, desirable that the Council should take up in detail the questions of past history which have been elaborateduponby the representatives of India and Pakistan. The charges and counter-charges of aggression and conspiracy have previously been considered by the Councll, and regardless of whether or not the Security Council's resolutions on these matters were adequate, my delegation cannat overlook the necessity, at the present time, to make reference ta the basic principles accepted by the Council-principles which, it 1s our impression, have in the past been accepted by ooth India and Pakistan. Gnly thus will the Council be able te determine whether, in the light of subsequent developments and changing circumstances, progress is possible on thebasisofthese principles, or whether sorne fresh basis should and could be discovered. For although it cannot dictate or impose a solution, the Security Council has a responsibility for assisting the two sides to !ind one, in the absence of a direct, mutually acceptable agreement between the parties. -9. tian les pas examine exposêes Pakistan. accusations vouloir a ne stage principes Pakistan ainsi des lution partir une une à ment 1 1 f 10. It is clear that whenever the Security Council has considered the question, it had looked ta the future in preference to the pasto While this approach did not 10. sêcurité l'avenir ~ 11. However, the grounds for hope which were thus revealed were subsequently shaken by a number of prima facie extraneous events which, it was claimed. had changed the whole context of the problem-. Mr. Graham's subsequent efforts ta secure agreement with a view ta making progress towards the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and towards a peaceful settlement did not meet with full success. The obstacles still remained, foremost among which. according ta bis latest report dated 31 March 1958,'i( was the procedure for the withdrawal of the Pakistan troops and the bulk of the Indian Army as Ilrovided for in part il of the resolution of August 1948. ,,, 12. In spite of Mr. Graham's inability ta report success. my delegatian considers that in default of any other basis for agreement being discovered, the Council must find out whether it can buüd upon its past efforts, having particular regard to the international obligations by wbich the parties stood bound under the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan's resolutions of 13 August1948 and 5January 1949. 13. These resolutions together constituted a plan of settlement based on the principle thatthefuturestatus of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should he determined in accordance with the will of the people, but for the implementation of this principle. they called for the fulfilment of certain conditions precedent, consisting of a cease fire and the preservation of peace, followed by a programme of demilitarization. 14. The merit of this plan lay not oilly in the fact of its voluntary acceptance by bath sides, but in its conformity with the provisions of the Charter. My dele- . gation has noted that as recently as 1957, during the debate on tlûs question in the security Council, the representative of Pakistan had stated that Pakistan recognized "•.• no international obligations ••• except those it has voluntarily accepted ••• inthe resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan dated 13 Au~st 1948 and 5 January 1949" [761st ,, 1, \, j î i "The only things that bindusinregardto Kashmir, so far as the Security Couneil andthe world are eon- eerned, are these resolutions"-namely. the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan's reso- lutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949-"with all the conditions 1 have mentioned. And 1 would say that, while we are not a member of the Security COWleil, as a MembeL' State which has earnestly tried to discharge Us solemn obligations to the inter... national community, the Councll will think many times before it is led eventa think, let alone express a view, that the Government of India has in sorne way tried to get round international commitments." !763rd meeting, para. 77.] 15. The view of the delegation of Ghana is that the UNCIP resolutions ta which 1 have alluded have to be taken as one integral whole in relation to the context in which they were conceived, and that it is not a meaningful approach to concentrate all attention on one aspect of the plan of settlement to the exclusion of the other factors to which it is linked. Equally, it would be futile to deny that, inthe words of the Chair- man of the Commission, "the Security CouncU 's reso- lutions are static, but the situation is dynamic". It must also be admitted that. as the Commission stated in its third report: 1 1 ! "In essence, the problem of the withdrawals lies in the fact that the sequence for the demilitarization of the State, as contained in the Commission's 1'eso- lutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, is not adequate to solve the present situation. The situation in the State lias changedj the resolutions remain unchanged." !t 1 j 16. Again. it would be difficult to quarrel with the remarks Ml'. Jarring of Swedenmade inthis connexion in part III of bis report: !lIn dealing with the problem under discussion as extensively as 1 have during the period just ended. 1 could not fail to take note ofthe concern expressed in connexion with the changing political. economic and strategic factors surrounding the whole of the Kashmir question, together withthe changingpattern of power relations in West and South Asia." He then went on ta say: !IThe Council will, furthermore, be aware of the fact that the implementation of international agree- ments of an. ad hoc characterr which has not been achieved fairly speedily, may becomeprogressively more difficuIt because the situation with which they were to cape has tended to change." 'ü 17. My delegation thus attaches due weight ta ail the changes that have occurred in the situation sinee these two resolutioIÏs were adopted. "What action then should the Security Council take in these circumstances? lj Ibid.. Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 7, para. 249. W ibid" Twelfth Year, Supplement for April, May and lune 1957, document 5;3821, paras. 20 and 21. !1i 1 j ! J "However \Vide the differences and deep the dis- trust, and however bad the situation in the opposite views of each other's position, no situation is com- pletely and forever beyond the redemptive power of the development of reciprocal faith and the creative interchange of views and proposaIs for a peaceful settlement as alternatives ta the deepening differ- ences in an age of unprecedented peril and hope."W 18. -,Vry delegation, therefore, cannot but earnestly appeal that, given the continued goodwill and tolerance which has largely characterized the relations between the two Governments, they will agree to resume nego- tiations and ta make a continuing effort ta create and maintain an atmosphere favourable to such negotia- tions-call them conversations or talks or what you will. It is our belief that it should be possible at the earliest auspicious time for bath India and Pakistan ta set the stage for these negotiations, starting, if possible, at the level of Foreign Minister, sa that the ground can be properly prepared for an eventual understanding. 19. In the light of past experience. the idea of having a third party assist in allah negotiations, without pre- judice ta the rights and claims of the parties, would seem ta commend itself. Whenever there has been a kind of catalyst in auy negotiations or conversations between two parties, the results have oiten been satis- factary. However. my delegation agrees that the effec- tiveness of a third party, whEilther proffering the um- brella of auspices, good offices or mediation; depends on the willingness of the twosidestouse,his services, and that no such approach is vaUd L>1 itseli unless the fY Ibid., Thirreenth Year. Supplement for lanuary. February and March 1958. document 8/3984, para. 36. 20. In view of the importance Ghana attaches to its relations with India and Pakistan, we would naturally behappy to avoid saying anything that would attract crîticîsm from or in any way impair our relations with either or 1xlth of them. Nevertheless, we wotùd be evading our respollsibility as a member of this Council if we did n'lt play our part in the attempt to seek the solution of a problem w:tJ.ch, according ta the Council's resolution of 20 January 1948,21 ftmight by its continuance, endanger the maintenance ofinter- national peace and security ft. JJ ) ] ] ) 21. It is in this spirit that we have approached the question, and we have done so with what we hope is prudence and a consciousness of its complex and in- tractable nature. We believe that a final settlement of this question can only benefit bath parties. It is weIl known how heavily the burden of armaments lies on the two Governments andhowfervently, atthe same lime, they desire to devote as muchoftheir resources as possible to econonùc development and social re- construction. But as long as the friction arising from the Kashmir question continues. sa long will it con- tinue ta have serious and adverse eifects on the lives of hundreds of millions ofpeople inIndia and Pakistan, and so long will it continue ta exacerbate their rela- tions, with serious implications for the maintenance of international peace. i j j l J 22. The reasons for making yet another serious attempt to achieve progress are. therefore, overriding, and the Council will certainly require more than ever all the understanding. patience, impartiality and sense of responsibility that it has evinced in the pasto It is the fervent belief of the Government of Ghana that it lies in the power of India and Pakistan to achieve a solution. The two countries occupy dominantpositions in the African-Asian world and have significant roles to play in the international community. Let them rise to the occasion and prevent this question fram assum- ing cold-war proportions. Let them bury the hatchet and solve this problem in amity and in peace.

1 havelistened \Vith great interest to the statements ofboth the representatives of India and of Pakistan presenting the point of view of their countries regarding the present question. The Government ofthe United Arab Republic. as you are all aware, has close and friendly relations with bath India and Pakistan. Therefore, it is natural for me to confine my statement at th1s stage to the aspects which we believe are sllch as should encourage 1 \ 1 J ~ Wlder the aegis of the Charter. The Counoil, in its wtsdom, ShOlÙd exert every efforttoseektheendorsement of the two parties in any action which it may take. No useful purpose could beservedifthe Security Council were to act in a way which might complicate an already sensitive situation. Iadmit that the question Wlder consideration is not of a kind which could he solved easily or in a shorttime, but the fact that additiona! time and effort are needed should not discourage us from deploying all possible means ofcopingpeacefully with this situation. 25. It is true that the Council has tried very hard ta help the parties ta reach a solution, but it is equally true that any solution which is not acceptable ta the parties will not be a workable solution. The Security Council has specifie responsibilities undertheCharter in dealing 'With such questions, but the Charter itself does not say that any specifie course should or could be imposed on the parties to a questionwhen a settlement is needed. 26. So the most important objective is to help the two parties to resume contacts with a viewto reaching a peacefnl solution. We have every reason to believe that this is the only advisable course for the Council ta follow at the present time and we, in the United Arab Republic. are particularly encouraged by the statements which were made by the representatives of Pakistan and India. 27. 1 believe. therefore, that it is perfectly in order if we address ourselves once more ta bath India and Pakistan-especially after they have demonstrated such a high standard of statesmanship and set such a good example of self-restraint throughout the history of the question-appealing ta them ta continue ta exercise the same se1f-restraint and ta display a will to solve their differen,-As through peaceful means. 28. It is reassuring to listen to the solemn and responsible pledges which were made by the representatives of India and Pakistan declaring that their respective Governments will not resort to the use of force. Statements ta this effect are indeed significallt and we hope will pave the way ta the resumptiop.. of negotiations between the Governments of India and Pakistan ta reach a final andjust solution. This, 1 take it, could not be done unless the parties endeavoured ta create the proper atmospherenecessaryforfurther negotiations. To be able ta reach this goal, the parties should refrain from taking any action which might aggravate the situation. 29. It is c1ear that the GovernmentoftheUnited Arab Republic does not favour any action which is not acceptable to the two parties and we sincerely hope that the Security Council 'Will not depart from its previous attitude in dealing with this question, namely, that the Counci! has never tried ta impose a solution on the parties, but has always sought ta secure the acceptance of the two parties as far as it was feasible. This is the ooly course which we believe might lead t0 the resumption of negotiations. Consequently, we could not support any proposaI ta which a party entertains 1l 31. As two great nations with high traditions inAsia, and as faithful Members of the United Nations, both Inclia and Pakistan, l am convinced, will realize the responsibilities which rest on their shOulders. They will not fail, 1 am sure, to worm the Council at the proper time of the progress whichthey will have made in seeking an early settlement of this importantissue. 1 1) 11 )

The Romanian delegation has carefully studied the documents relating to the situation in Kashmir and the statements made before the Counoil by the representatives of the two parties directly concerned, India and Pakistan. We have, of course, also studied the history of the Kashmir question, the records of the discussions and all the documentswhichhaveaccumulated over the fourteen years during which the United Nations has been considering the question in oneform or another. 33. In my delegation's opinion. acomparisonbetween the debates which are now taking place and those held in earlier years leads to one preliminary remark: the discussions have remainecl at the same stage, the same problems are raised, the same arg'.lments are used and reference is made to aspects of the question which are in fact the same and mostof which are weIl known. 1 ) 34. Accordingly, we must first of aIl conclude that there are no new elements to indicate any real aggravation of the dispute between India and Pakistan in Kashmir and to justify a fresh and urgent examination of fuis question by the Security Counci!. 1• 35. There can be no doubt. however, that in order to reach a correct conclusion and an effective solution we must analyse not oiÙy the Security Council's debates but also the living realities andthe developments of the situation which we are discussing. From this point of view, it will be seenthatduring these fourteen years, while the discussions in the United Nations marked time, life itself moved forward and provided a reply ta the question around which the Security Council's debates have revolved: to whom does the State of Jammu and Kashmir belong and what is the will of the people of that part of the world? r i 1 1l 36. If the question is considered from the strictly legal point of view, the reply is not difficult. Indeed, the actual legality of the act of association of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India is not and cannot be questioned by anyone, just as the legality of the association to India of over 500 Indian States and principalities cannot be contested. To cast doubt on that legality would he tantamount ta questioning the legality of the creation and accession to independence of both 1 1 1 j 38. If we analyse developments in the StateofJammu and Kashrnir in the years 1948-1962. we shaH find that it has become completely integrated in the Republic of India, that the relations between the people of that state and those of India have been consolidated and that there are no noteworthy signs of any clear trend towards separatism. Thus. while the theory of the need ta consult the will of the people had some meaning in 1948, ta begin to diseuss it again today would simply amount to disregarding the real facts, which show that the people ofKashmirexpressedtheir will in local and general elections in 1951, 1957 and 1962. By the votes they cast on those occasions and by their active participation in the effort that is being made to raise the economic and culturallevel of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the people of Kashmir have shown and are still showing that they regard their country as an integral and Inalienable part of the Republic of India. 39. Accordingly, there is now no legal or factual basis for discussing to whom the State of Jammu and Kashmir belongs. From that point of view, we consider that our discussion is pointless. 40. In the light of those considerations, the Romanian delegation feels that the Seourity COUDoil can make a useful contribution ta smoothing out the differenoes between India and Pakistan on the question ofKashmir by accelerating the settlement of this dispute through direct conversations between the two parties and by preventing the problem from being artificially complicated by the introduction of elements foreign ta its substance. Unfortunately. we have ta admit that suah elements do exist and are actively brought ta bear. 41. In this connexion, 1 should like to draw the Security COUDCi!'s attention to sorne facts. For example, whilethe Indian representative has stated categorically and unreservedly that his Government would not take the initiative in resorting to force in the case of Kashmir, the representative of Pakistan has in effect avoided giving any such guarantee here. He showed us that, although the Pakistan Government does not intend ta take the initiative in resorting taforce, there might be cases in which it would no longelo be able ta control events. 42. We do not think that the representative of Pakistan is contemplating the possibility of a repetition of the events of 1947; on the contrary, we hope that the Government of that country will ultimately give the sarne guarantee as the Government of India andthat it will make every effort ta curb any rash actions. 43. Yet, objectively speaking, whatever may be the intentions of the Government of Pakistan-which we 44. la 1t a coïncidence that the question of Kashmir began to be venttlated once again at the Ume when India liberated Goa and other territories which had belonged to it for centùries from colonial oppression, and at a time when we arewitnessinga recrudescence of imperialist pressure against India? We cannot but conolude that the dispute between India and Pakistan about Kashmir is being artüicially fostered by those who are anxious to maintain strained relations in South-East Asia and to compromise the contribution which India is making to the struggle for the total abolition of colonialism and for the relaxation of international tension. 45. Being forced to retire from the historical arena, colonialism is endeavouring to band down tu the liberated peoples a most difficult heritage, a large number of time-bombs, which will enable the colonialists te retain or re-establish their privileges in one form or another. The situation which has been created in cOIUlexion with Kashmir is an illustration of fuis colonial strategy. While life, in its forward march, is in the process of solving the problem, we are witnessing efforts to maintain artificially the explosive character of this issue. ! 46. The Romanian delegation considers that the United Nations should oppose any such action. We do not think that any proposaI which caUs for fresh investigations or establishes new arbitration or mediation procedures can serve a useful purpose in the present circumstances. 47. In so far as the question of Kashmir is still a dispute between India and Pakistan, it primarily concerns those two countries and its constructive solution depends above all on the cessation of aIl outside interference. 48. We are convinced that the peoples of India and Pakistan, which have so much in common in their history and which waged a joint struggle for the overthrow of colonial domination, will be able, especially in the present circwnstances, to make what unites them, namely the interests of peace, security and the advancement of aIl mankind, prevail in their relations. ) 1

We inthelrlshdelegation listened with the closest interest and attention ta the statements which were made here at the Counciltable by the representatives of India and Pakistan at the end of April and early in May. We are very glad to have had an opportunity, during the interval of time which bas elapsed since then, of giving those statements the careful and detailed consideration which their importance so obviously demands. 1 ] 50. Before discussing the question presently before the CouncU, may 1 say that Ireland, like ather mem- 51. The statements of the representatives of Pakistan and India devoted much attention to basic points of difference which have existed betweenthetwo GOvernments ever since the question of Jammu and Kashnùr first came before the Counci! in 1948. These include the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kaslunir taIndia in1947, the question of Pakistan' s responsibility for the tribal irruptions into Kashmir in the same year, the action oi the Government of Pakistan in sending regular Pa."tistan troops into the State in 1948, and-sa on. 52. These, of course, are very basic issues. As we all know, however, tbese issues had already been clearly defined and were fully in the minds of aU conce:rned when UNCIP formulated its resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, whichboth Pakistan and India accepted at the time. Those resolutions did not purport to resolve the basic legal and other issues of which 1 have just spoken and, in our submissiqn, no useful purpose would be served by an attempt by the Security Council ta go back behind the Commission's resolutions in an efforttoresolvethose issues now. What the Commission' s resolutions did do was to lay down a carefully considered procedure whereby, it was hoped, a peaceful settlement of the question of Jammu and Kashmir might be achieved. 53. The task of the Security Council now, it seems to us, is not to attempt te adjudicate upon issues on which UNCIP, in its wisdom, refrained from pronouncing itself, but te consider what progress cau be made towards achieving a peaoeful settlement of the questio.n of Jammu anJ;! Kashmir in the circumstances which exist today. 54. Unfortunately, if there is one thing tbat emerges more clearly than any other from the statements which we have heard from the representatives of Pakistan and India, it ls that the differences of interpretation which prevented the prompt implementation of the Corrunission's resolutions in the first instance, instead of narrowing" have become wider and wider with the passageoftime. Lookingback, ltis impossible fiot to deplore the circumstances which prevented the prompt Implementation of the resolutions of 1948 and 1949 in the favourable atmosphere which had been created by their recent acceptance by both India and Pakistan. The delay was mostunfortunate inits results because, as the Chairman of UNCIP said atthe timeand his statement was recalled bere this afternoon by my colleague, lherepreeentativeofGhana-"TheSecu- 56. In their statements to the Council, the representatives of India and Pakistan dealt in detai! with the differences of opinion and interpretation which have prevented the resolutions of 1948 and 1949 from resulting in a settlement of the Kashmir question on the lines contemplated in the resolutions themselves. Whatever the individual members of the Council may think of the rights and wrongS of these difterences, one thing seems to be only too clear, and that is that the basic reason for thefailure to make any progress towards a settlement of the question of Jammu and Kashmir lies in the fact that there is at present a complete lack of any measure of common agreement whatever between the Governments of India and Pakistan. What seems essential to us at this stage is that everything possible should be done ta repair that lack; and, in our estimation, judging bythe statements which have beeil made here at the COWlciltable by the J reprel3entatives of India and Pakistan, thebest chances 55. WJùle so muoh may be freely admftted, it seems ta my delegation quite a d:l:fferent proposition ta argue that because of what has happened in the meantime, the resolutions of'1948 and 1949 shouId now he regarded as having ceaeed ta have any bearing on the matter at aIl. The UNCIP resolutions of 1948 and 1949 derive a special importanoe from the faot that they were accepted and agreed to at the time by both India and Pakistan. They liave formed the basis ,of theCoWlcil's consideration of the question of Jammu and Kashrnir ever since. It would be lUlrealistic not ta recognize that the interpretation and implementation of those resolutions have given rise to conflicts ofview between the two cOlUltries which this Counci! has sa far fOWld it impossible to reconcile. It may be admitted tao that any agreement between the two cOWltries with regard to the question of Kashmir in the circumstances of today would need to take a. fair and realistic accolUlt of such major political or other changes as may have taken place since those resolutions were adopted. But the UNCIP resolutions of 1948 and 1949 catU10t be treated as if they had totally ceased to exlst. They remilin on the statute book of the Security COlUlcil and their provisions must be kept in view in the continuing search for a peaceful settlement oftheKashmir issue. J J J of repairing that lack in the present circumstances l , lie in direct discussions between the two Governments and in the creation and maintenance between them of a pol1tical atmosphere in which such discussions cao be carried on with good prospects of success. 1 57. As other members of the Council have pointed out before me, it is not for the security Council to attempt to impose or dictate a settlement of the Kashmir question. Nor can any action which it is open n ta the COWlcil to take help to bring about a peacefUl __ snd stable settlement of the Kashmlr question wlthout 13 58 _ There are elements. even in the state ofdead10ck which exista today, which justliy the hope thatsuch an effort would not be unproductive of results. Members of the Council will have heard wit.:.':: lively satisfaction, for example, the assurances gîven by the representatives of India and Pakistan that their GOvernments will not resart ta force for the sett1ement of the Kashmir question. Another positive aspect of the present situation is that, in spite of the occasional isolated incidents which are a1ways apt ta occur on either side of truce or cease-fire 11nes, the ceasetire line laid down in 1949 continues ta be respected. 59, These are welcome and even hopeful features of the situation as it exists today. They provide a, useful starting point for further efforts ta widen the area of mutual agreement. And fuis, in our opinion, should now be the primary aim, because, when aIl is said and done, in matters such as this there is really no satisfactory substitute for mutual agreement. No other settlement, no matter how it is arrived at, can possibly prove as effective, as stable or as enduring as one worked out and agreed ta by the Governments cencerned. 60. In that beUef. we earnesUy hope that the Governments of India and Pakistan will be prepared-in the spirit of the phrase in the Preamble te the Charter which you, Ml'. President quoted the other day-ta sit down and endeavour to resolve the outstanding difficulties in direct talks between themselves, and that in the meantime they will, by mutual understanding, carefully refrain from any statements or courses of action which might have the effect .of worsening the state of feeling between the peoples of the 000 countries. We are convinced that it is only in this way that the question of Kaslunir can now be moved forward towards a peaceful settlement.

Does anyone else wish to speak at this stage of the debate? 62. 1 have no more speakers on my list for this afternoon, but one member of the Council has tald me that he would like ta take the floor at a future meeting. Several other members have informed me that they would 11ke to be allowed a short periocl in which ta receive the instructions for which they have asked their Governments. Since Ihavegrantedsimilar delays to other members of the COWlcil and ta the other States represented here, 1 cau see no reason for refusing these requests. 63. If the Council bas no objl3ction, 1 would suggest that we hold our next meeting the dayafter tomorrow, 21 JWle. at 3 p.m. If we agree on that date, however, 1 would ask members of the Council to see to it that we can conclude our debate that same day. The Indian Minister for Defence has tald me that he must return ta bis country as saon as possible and 1 do not think 1 1 65. With regard to your procedural proposaI, 1 think that the decision on it should be taken in the light of certain considerations arising out of this whole discussion, which, 1 should say, bas been rather oddly slow and long-drawn-out. 1 say oddly, because during the interval between 4 May and 19 June, and even before the last meeting, there was more than enough time foi' delegations which consider this discussion ta be useful or necessary-we are not one of themta prepare their arguments, proposaIs and the like. The course of our discussion bas shown that what is really going on is a curious kind of marking timethings move as in a slow-motionfilm, or in the Russian ballet "The Sleeping Beauty". This in J.tself is enoogh to illustrate the artüiciality of the attempts now being made to draw the attention of theSecurityCoWlcil to a problem which, at the present time at least, does not require discussion. 66. Tbat is why, bearing in mind the number of very complex and important duties which many of us have ta carry out inter alia in connexion with the current session of the General Assembly, and the overlapping of meetings of the Fourth Committee and the plenary Assembly, 1 object ta conduoting our work at this pace. Sa far as 1 am concerned. 1 am prepared ta reach a conclusion at today' s meeting, but as it is already 5.23 p.m., it might be wiser ta postpone the meeting un.til tomorrow morning, so that, in accordance with the most democratic and sOlUldest rutes lmown to parliamentary practice, aIl those who have been Wlable in six weeks to prepare themselves ta speak in the COWlcii on this question can speak tomorrow, înstead of deferring the matter for as long as you have proposed.

Does anyone else wish ta speak on this procedural question? 68. 1 should like to make it quite clear that the President has ,no preference in this matter and is prepared to fall in with the views of the majority of the COUIlcil. The spirit of my proposaI was in keeping with the suggestions made here. 1 understand that the representative of the Soviet Union would prefer the meeting of the COWlcil to be held as early as tomorrow morning. 1 shaH therefore suggest a solution which may satisfy aIl the members of the COWlcil: if ft would suit the representative of the Soviet Union, we might meet not in the afternoon of the day after tomorrow, but at 3 o'c1ock tomorrow afternOon. 69. Ml'. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian~: MI'. President, you are so generou8 and kind that 1 can only say that 1 should not like to have a meeting either tomorrow afternoon or the day after tomorrow. But if most of the COWlcil's members want ta meet-and 1 stress that that does not include me-thèn 1 should prefer J 1 1 CYPRUS/CHYPRE: PAN 10 AL.,,"d« lhe Gr••t Sboel, AFRICA/AFRIQUE CAMEROON/CI\MEIlOUN, l18R/lIRlë DU PEuPl.ë AFRICAIN L. Gé,.nte. a. P. 1197. Yaounde. DIFFUSION l'lTERt'lATIONAlE CAMEROUNAISE OU L[VIl~ H DE LA PRESSE. Sansmohm•. CONGO (l~"p"ldyille)' INSTITUT POl.lT<QUc CONGOLAIS, B. P. n07, L&oooldv,,,o. CZECHOSLOVA~IA/TCHÉCOS~OVAQUIE: ~RTlA LTO.. 30 v~ Sme~~.jch. CESKOSLOVENSKY SPISOVATEL Na,oonl "id. 9, P'aha, 1. DENMAR~/OANEMARK, N.."o.ade 6. K~h.nh..n. ~INLANO/FINlANDE: AKATEEMINEN 2 Keskusk.lu. Helsm". FRANCE: EOITlD'lS A. PÉDONE 13. "J. Soul!lot, Pa,,, (V'·). ETHIOPIA/ÊTHIOPIE: INTERNATIONAL FRE:SS AGENCY. F, O. Bo. 120. Md.. AbaM. GHANA: UNIVERSITY BOO~SHOP Un"o",t, CoLlORO 01 Ghan., LOROO. Aoc'O. KENYA: THE E.S.A. BOO~SHOF Bo. 30167. Na"obL MOROCCOfMAROC, CENTRE O~ DIFfUSION DOCUMENTAIRE DU B.E.P.I. B, ru. M.ohou<·Bolla"o. Rabat SOUTH AFRICA/AfRIQUE CU SUC, VAH SCHAIK'S BOOK STORë (PH.), lTO. Churoh Sueet, Bo. 724. F'eto'l'. SOUTHERN RHOOESIA/RHOOÉSIE DU SUD: THE BOOK CENTRE:. '''st S"e.1. Sal"bury. ~~~~M.o.:(rN~~~~;~~~~~~~Bf~l~É~~~E Il. EISENSCHMIOT Sonwanln".r SI'. 59. Frankfu'lIM.,n. El.WERT UND M~URER H.upt,l.osse 101, S..IIn·sohon.lle'R. ALE~ANOER HORN SpiegelBa..e 9. w..,lla'en. W, E. SAARBACfl G.muden'l..... 30, KaIn GREECE/GRtCE' ~18RAlI'lIE 2B. ,,,e du Sla~•. "'lhèn.,. UNITEO ARAII REFUIlLIC/RtPUBL/QUE ARABë'UNIE: lI8RAIRIE "LA RENAISSANCE O' IOYPTE" g sn, A"Y Pa.ha. Cairo. HUl'IGARY/1l0NGRIE: KULTURA P. O. So< 149. 8udape.. 62. ICElAND/ISlANDE, B6~AVERlLUN ëYMUNOSSONAII H. F. Au,lurstraeh lS. ROY'Ja,lk. lRELAND/lRlANDE, STATiONëRY OffiCE. Oub!'n. A5IA/ASIE BURMA/BIRMANIE: CUI'lATOI'l. GOVT. 800~ OëFOT. R.oROOO. CAMBODIA/CAMBODGE: ENTREPRISE KHMÈRE lTALY/lTALlE, U8RERIA COMMISSIONARIA V,a G,no Cappon; 26, ';r.n, <1; V,. Paolo Merour; 1918, LUXEMBOURG, U81'lAIRIE J. TI'lAUSCHSCHUMMER l'lace du Tn.Hil... ~u••mbou'S· NETNERlANDS/PAYS,aAS: N. v. MARTINUS NlJHOFF ~~P~i'~:~~Rl.\.op.to"e.S.• R. l .. phnom.Pen!>. CEYlON/CEYlAN: LAKE HOUSE BOO~SHOP A..oc. No",p.per> 01 COl'on, P. O. Bo< 244, Colombo. CHINA/CHINE: THE WORLD 800~ COMPANY, llO. 99 Chu08 ~ing Ro.d. 1>1 SeoWn, Ta'ooh. Ta,,,.o. THë COMMERCIAl PRESS, llO. 211 Hon.n Ro••. Sn.nghaL HONG KONG/HONG_KONG, THE SWINDON SOO~ COMPANY 25 N.lhan Road. Ko"loon. INOlA/lNDE: ORIENT LON~M.\NS Somba,. C.lou"., H,derab,d, M,dros <1; No" Delh'. OXFORD SODK <1; STATIONERY COMPo!-NY Caloutta <1; New Del~,. P. VARADACHARY & COMPANY, M~~ra" ~an8. voarhoul9. ,.·G,a•• NORWAY/NORVtGE, JOHAN K.,l JOh.Mg.... 41, 0,10. POlAND/POlOGNE, PAN. W.""w•. PORTUGA~: lIVRARIA ROORiGUES 186 Rua Aurea. l;.ho•. ROMANIA/ROUMANIE: CARTIMEK SI'. Anshdo 8.i.nd 14·1S, P. O. Sox 134·135, Bucu'e~h. SPAIN/ESPAGNE, l.lBHERIA BOSCH 11 Renda Un;vo"idad. aa«elcn lISRERIA MUNOl·PRENSA C.".lIé 37. M~d,id, SWEOEl'I/SUtDE, C. E. FRITZE'5 lNDONES1A/INDONÉSlE: PEM8ANGUNAN, llO. Gunun8 Soh." 84, D"'a"a. JAPAN/JAPON, MARUZEN COMPANY. llO. 6 Toro·Niohomo, N'henbash;, Tokyo. KOREA (REP. OFl/CORh (RÉP. DEl: EUL.YOO FUBLISHING CO.. LTO. S, 2·~A, C~onsno. S.oul. PAKISTAN: THE PAKISTAN CD·OPERATlYE 800~ SOCIETY Oa"•. East Pak;"an. PUBLISHERS UNITED, lTO.. laM'e, THOMAS & THOMAS, Karacn,. ~UNGL. HOV80KHANOEL Fred'B,t.n 2, S'ockholm. SWlTZERLAND/SUlSSE, lEBRAIRIE PAYOT, S. A.. ~.u.ann HANS RAUNHAROT. KJrchS",'. TURKH/TURQUlE: LI811AIREE 469 "l,kl.l Cadde'i, S.yoS'u, UN10N OF SOVIET SOClALlST UNION OE5 RtpuaLIQUES SOVltTIQUES: MëlHDUNAROONAYA KN"GA. Smol.n.k." Pla,hch.d, UNITED KENGODM/ROYAUME-UNl, H. M. 5TATJONERY OFFICë P. O. Be. 569, Lood"n, 5.E. l.nd HM 50 branoho,;n 8.1I 8"'tol, Cord,ff, Ed,nbu'8h, YUG05LAYIA/YOUGOSLAYIE: CANKARJEVA ZALOhA PHILIPPINES: AlëMAR'5 BOO~ STORE, 769 Rizal Av.nu., Man"a, POPULAR 800KSTORE, 1573 00'0100 Joso, Man;la. SINGAPORE/SlN~APOUR: THE CITY SOOK STORE, l TO" Coll,or Qu.,. THAllAND/THÂiuNDE' PRAMUAN MIT. lTO. S5 Ch" ..w.t Road, W.I Tuk, Bangkok. NISONOH <1; CO.. llO. No" Road. Sik•• Phy. S'i. S.n~'o~. SUKSAPAN PANIT Mans;on 9. R'i.d.mo.ro A_enu~. SanB'ok. ~,ubl,.na. 510von,.. , DR!AVNO PREOUlECE Juge,lov.nska KnJ,ga. T.,a';J. PRQSVJETA 5. T'a Srot,l.a i J.o,n,lv>. PROsVETA PUSLISHING HOUSE ImporH.po," 0;V;500n, P, O. Tera"Jo 1611. aeaBrad, ~1~~·..j:~E.~~r:ET~~~~É:uf~I~HU t85. 'ue Tu·do, S. P. 283, S.,.on, EUROPE AUSTRIA/AUTRICHE: g.ë~OU~ltR;-?6-::r~NY,Grahen 3t. Wi.n, 1. LATIN AMERICA/ AMÉRIQUE LATINE M.,.us 5,ll'ku..l,.,,0 10, Sal'bu'S' GEOR~ FROMME & CO.. Sooo.or.osse 39. W;en. V. BE~GIUM/BE~GIQUE, AGENCE ET MESSAGERIES Dë lA PRESSE, S. A. 14,22, ,u. du Per,,'. Sru.oll.s, ARGENTINA/ARGENTlNE: SUOAMERJCANA. S. A.. AI"na BOLlVlA/BO~IYlE: L1aRE:RlA Ca.dla 972, L. Po<. BU~GARIA/BÛLGARIE: RAZNO(Z'lOS l, T,,, A".n. Sol,a, Ordors and onqui"•• lrom couo\"., wh... ".'.' ogono... hov. oot yel ".en ••l.bh,hed ~.Ie' So<l'OO. Un,l.d N."on" PalaIS Les command., el doma,'de, d. ,.ns.isn.m.nl, emanant d. P'" ou d n'e,i<le ONU. New Vo,. (toU.l, gu a la 5.01100 d•• venl"', Prîee: $U.S.: 0.35 (or ,,,,qvivalent Litho in V.N.