S/PV.1014 Security Council

In accardance with the decisions adopted earlier by the Council, 1 shaH, with the Council's consent, invite the representatives of India and Pakistan ta take part in the consi.deration of the question. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Krishna' Menon (India) and Mr. Muhammad Zafrillla Khan (Pakistan) took places at the Counci! table. [

The first speaker on my list is the representative of Venezuela and 1 now give him the fIoor. 3. Ml'. SOSA RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Although the question of Kashmir has been pending for fifteen years and has been the subject of more than a hundred meetings afthe security Council, this is the first timethatmycountry, now a mem- J 4. My delegation was pleased to note that the representatives of both Pakistan and India have expressly stated that their Governments have no intention of resorting ta force for the final settlement of the problem. This shows the respect of both parties for the prineiples of the United Nations Charter, as also the ties whieh, despite all their vicissitudes, must of necessity unite two countries whieh for ethnie, geographical, eeonomic and cultural reasons are called upon to practise close and friendly co-operation. That is what my country, which feels sincere friendship and goodwill towards them bath, would like to see, and it is with that in mind that it will view the problem and eo-operate in the 8eeurity Coullcil in preparing the way for a prompt, peaceful andfriendly settlement of the question of Kashmir, which, unfortunately, is still bedevilling the relatiolls between the two sister countries. 5. The problem before us derives from the events which took place in Kashmir in August 1947, when that State had not yet decided whethertounitewith India or Pakistan after those two countries attained independence. 6. The Indian version and the Pakistan version of those events are very different. According to the Indian account, what occurred was an invasion by miscreants and tribesmen from Pakistan who, with that country's help, attacked the people aqd local forces of the Maharajah of Kashmir. According to the Pakistan account, the population of Kashmir rebelled against the tyrannical government of the Maharajah Hari 8ingh and elements of related tribes in Pakistan came to the aid of the rebels. 7. In any event, whatever may have been the cause of the events, they prompted the Maharajah to ask for the State of Kashmir to accede to India in order to obtain military aid fram that country. In a letter dated 26 October 1947.!Jaddressed to Lord Mountbatten, then Governor-General of India, Maharajah Hari Singh explained the situation and agreed to signthe instrument of accession of Kashmir to India. The instrument of accession signed by Maharajah Hari 8ingh was accepted by Lord Mountbatten. Nevertheless, in a letter of 27 October 1947, addressed to MaharajahHariSingh, Lord Mountbatten recognized that "... the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State; it is my Government's wish that, as soon aslawandorderhave been restored in Kashmir, and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession shouldbesettledby a 1~15, 227th meeting. pp. HI~19. ! 9. Of the measures recommended by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, onlythose Concel'lüng the cease fire and the line of demarcation of the !.ndian and Pakistan positions in Kashmir at the time of the cease fire could be implemented. That line has been respected by both parties ever since. They were not, however, able to agree on theinterpretation and implementation of the l'est of the measures in the resolutions. Later efforts by United Nations representatives who replaced the Commission when itceased to exist, in conformity with the Security Council resolution of 14 March 1950,ZJ werenotableto reconcile the two parties. détail par mis 10. The present situation andthe respective positions of the parties in regard to the problem have been explained with a wealth of detail by the representatives of Indîa and Pakistan in their recent statements before the Counci!. Those statements have stressed the following points: 1! (~) Both parties accepted the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 of the Commission appointed by the Security COWloil, but each party ascribes to the other the failure to implement parts Il and III of the 13 August resolution; 13 du et résolutions de tion Q?) Pakistan insists that the solution of the problem lies in the progressive irnplementation of the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, and has declared that if it is a mistaken interpretation on its part that is impeding the implementation of those resolutions, it is willing to aocept an impartial interpretation of the terms of the resolutions by the Seouri- IL In view of those circumstances and of the background of the case, my delegation has the following remarks ta make. 12. Firstly, the accession of Kashmir ta India took place in special circumstances in that the instrument of accession could not be isolated from the letter of 26 October 1947 from Maharajah Hari Singh ta Lord Mountbatten and the latter's reply of 27 Octoberl947. Consequently, from the time the instrument of Accession was signed the accession of Kashmir ta India produced aIl the juridical effects of accession, but the indefinite continuation of those effects, or in other words the final consolidation of the accession, remained subject to a later act. namely, its ratification through a consultation of the people of Kashmir. 13. The promise of Lord Mountbatten, or rather of the Governor-General of India at that time, was a promise made ta the people of Kashmir and not ta Pakistan. However, it was a promise made, as Lord Mountbatten 's letter says, "in consistence with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State". 14. Secondly, although it might entertaindoubtsabout the desire of the people of Kashmir ta be unUed with India through the accession of their State, Pakistan could not lawfully aid the rebels-ifrebels theywereor the invaders-if they were invaders, far less intervene directly in Kashmir with its regular forces. .15. Thirdly, when the matter was submitted to the Security Council for its consideration, bath that United Nations organ and the parties to the conflictagreed ta settle the case de facto and de jure in the form laid down in the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 of the Commission for India and Pakistan. 16. Bath the question of Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir, as India describes Pakistan 's action there, and the question of the accession of Kashmir to India, challenged by Pakistan, were precisely the two questions contemplated in the resolutions oil3 August1948 and 5 January 1949, which laiddowntheprinciples and established the procedure for a peaceful settlement of 17. Fourthly, the elections whichwere held in the part of Kashmir united to Iudia could not take the place of the plebiscite mentioned in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, which both parties have accepted. The agreement resulting from their acceptance of those resolutiQllS was of an international character and cannot be amended unilaterally by any law or constitution. That was the principle which the Security Councîl upheldin its resolutions of 30 March 1951.&and 24 January 1957•..2/ 18. In t.hose elections, however complete and democratic they may have been, the people of Kashmir were Ilot consulted about whether they preferred to accede to India or to Pakistan. Those elections cannot therefore be likened to a plebiscite on the question of accession. \ 19. Fifthly, it is a fact that the resolution of 13 August 1948 has beeu implemented only with regard ta its part 1 concerning the cease fire and the cease-fire hne, and that, in the absence of agreement between the parties on the interpretatiou of the terms of the resolution, parts II and III of that resolutiol1 could not be implemented. Nor was it possible for the resolution of. 5 January 1949 to be implemented, since that required the prior applicationof aIl the provisions of the resolution of 13 August 1948. Eachparty blames the other for the lack ofimplementationofthese resOlutions, but in the face of disputed facts and divergent interpretations it is difficult to apportion responsibility. At aIl events, mese resolutions are still in force and having sorne effect; for one thing, theyprovide the legal basis for the present provisional status quo in Kashmir which has at least prevented the continuation of armed conflict. ! 20. It must also be remembered that, whatever the true reason for the failure to implement parts II and III of the resolution of 13 August 1948, and hence the resolution of 5 January 1949, nearly fourteen years have elapsed since then and the circumstances which then prevailed have beeu modifled by a series of events. It would be therefore advisable, without departing from the basic principles contained in the Council 's resolutions on this question, to take these new circumstances into account in future efforts towards a final solution of the problem. My delegation j J!I Text identical with that of the dl"aft l"esolution adopted without amendment at the 539th meèung of the COlllicil. See Official ReCOl"ds of the SeclJl"ity Council. Sixth Yeal". SUJl!?lemem fOl" lanuary. FebruaO and Marcb.1951, document Sj2017/Rev.1. :li Official ReCOrds of the Security Council. Twelfth Yeu. Supplement for January. February and March 1957. document S/3779. 21. In view of the foregoing considerations and the fact that both parties have stated their intention not to resort to force in settling the question of Kashmir, my delegation considers that 011 this occasion the action of the Council could be l',ited to recalling the basic principles contained in h-J previolls resolutions and inviting the two parties to undertake direct negotiations as soon as possible, so that in an atmosphere of understandil1g and harmony they may arrive at a final solution of the problem of Kashmir. 22. In conclusion, 1 should like to reaffirm once again the sincere friendship and sympathy which my country feels towards both India and Pakistan, and to express the grave conoern with which it views the continuation of a conflict which darkens the relations between these two great countries, diverting their attention fromthe work of progress and development whîch they are carrying out in their Asian subcontinent. My delega~ tion trusts that the clearsightedness and ability of the statesmen of bath countries will enable them ta overcome the difIiculties which have hitherto stood in the way of a solution to thîs thorny problem and that they will finally reach that agreement for which their friends sa eagerly hope, for the good ofthe people of Kashmir, of India und of Pakistan. 23. Ml'. SCHWEITZER (Chile) (translatedfromSpanish): Last January, when the Government of Pakistan asked the Secul'ity Council ta meet again to take up the question of Kashmir, there seemed to be an urgent need ta resume our consideration of that complex and long-standing problem, to which sa many efforts have been devoted since Hs ftrst appearance towards the end of 1947. 24. Five months have gone by and we can say with satisfaction that, although the threats ta peaceandsecurity have not disappeared, they are not so alarming as they seemed and that the present dsbate has produced one positive result of great signîficance: we have been able to hear, bath from the Minister for Defence of India and from the representative of Pakistan, that their Governments will not resort to force ta settle their differences. That is asolemncommitment which reveals the willingness of bath Governments to fulfil theîr obligations as Members of the United Nations and refrain from the threat or use of force. The Council can now face this item on its agenda relieved of the great anxiety with whîch it reconvened ta consider it. 25. Nevertheless, it would have beendesirable to note sorne progress in so long and difficult a controversy. 26. The representatives of bath Pakistan and lndia have informed us at great length of their position on the question, which has increased in complexity and difficulty durillg the long period since the Council first took it up. 28. Tocatalogue the difficulties which have arisen does not appear to be a suitable approach to a solution of the problem, this Council's basic task, because it might serve to exacerbate feelings and to aggravate the existlng tension, and thus defeat its purpose. If this Council were not what itis, an essentiaBy political body rather than a court of law, its task would perhaps be easier, for it wouldmerely have to consider the background and arrive at a verdict. Its function, however, is ta preventproblemsfromgetting any worse, and to maintain international peace and security, bringing calm to a region agitated by passions of every sort, where the situation can become even more critical if it is not approached with deliberation, caution and discretion. 29. My Government, which maintains harmonious and friendlY relations with bath the countries affected by this question, has therefore striven to adopt an impartial and dispassionate attitude, doing aIl in its power ta help to reduce the difficulties and to find a solution compatible with the interests at stake and the principles enshrined În the United Nations Charter. 30. In my Government's view, that solution would consist in a resumption of direct ta1ks between the two countries with a view ta finding a formula upon which they can agree for the settlement of the dispute. We are firmly convÎnced that in cases such as this, if a solution is ta give results, ft must not be imposed but must arise from the wishes of the contending parties. 31. Such talks can he exp8cted to give the desired results if the parties undertake them with a sincere desire to reach a soiution. We do not doubt that this wîll bethe case, although we understand that in disputes of this kind, prolonged in Ume and complicated by various subsequent events, the greatest virtue lies in persevering patience. It seems to us, moreover, that the way to make thoee talks productive might be by the provision of such impartial aid as those conoerned might accept, or that the United Nations oould supply, if the need arose. 32. Also of fundamental importance in this matter is the creation of an atmosphere conduoive tothefruitful development of suoh negotiations. To thatend,itwould he necessary for bath Governments ta strive to adopt such prudent and discrete measures as might calm the atmosphere of the dispute, and to refrain, during the 34. We cannot show the world a Security Couneil powerless before this problem. It wouldbeeasyfor us to show our authority, if that proved neoessary. But 1 would stress that there is no question of that; ratller must we demonstrate our ability to prevent a problem that has beeu lying dormant from once more becoming acute, upsetting the peace that has been achieved and maintained during all the years of the conflict. 35. We appeal to the consciences ofbothparties, confident that they will be willing to showby their actions what we have beeu led ta expect Ïrom the promises made during the c!ebate. We believe that tbis Council, as on earlier occasions, will be able to point the way whereby both parties may reach a final solution of the problem, which would relie,re and gladden the peoples concerned and the whole world.

Does anybody wish to speak now? 1 have no more speakers on my list Ïor this afternoon but one delegation has expressed a wish to speak in the debate, if possible tomorrow afternoon. If the Council has no objection, we might adjouru uutil 3 o.'clock tomorrow afternoon. 37. Ml'. Krishna MENON (India): 1 am not sure, Ml'. President, that we have the right ta intervene Qt this stage. While the rules are not verjdear, it may be that delegations like my own, which are here by invitatioll, may not intervene on what you might decide on points of procedure. But this procedure is not separate from the substance of the matter. My Governmenthas found it very difficult to perform its duUes with re·· spect to the Security Counoi! on account ofthe frequency of what we regard as unnecessary meetings and the way they are drawnout andprolongect.. Wehave no right ta tell you what time you should meet and what time you should not. But you have nottoldus who is going to speak, whether it is the same delegation or another delegation, so that we can ma-1{e no preparations. We find this very difficult. It is ,notfor the Security Council to make the decision as to who should represent a Government; that is the Government's own decision. In ciroumstances where important matters are iovolved, where peace and security are invelved, the Security Council holds prolonged meetings and meets three times a clay; but here you are asking us to meet once a day, with a day's interval in b',tween, which makes it extremely di..fficult. 1 make this suggestion ta you because further proceàure with regard to the Security Council will depend onwhat we hear tomorrow, 1 presume. If we are not in order, 1 withdraw everythillg 1 have said, but if we are in order we would submit tha:t the Security Councilmeettonightortomorrow morning. a Je parole à

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