S/PV.1016 Security Council

In accordance with the earlier decisions adopted by the Council, 1 shaH, with the CO\U1ciPs consent. invite the representatives of India and Pakistan ta take part in the consideration of the question. At 'the invitation of the President. Mr. Muhammad Zaf:ro11a Khan (Pakistan) andMr. Krishna Menon (India) rook places at the COUDcil table. 2. premier bres a exemplaires sous

Before giving the floor to tIle :(j,r.et spea~e:r OQ the list, 1 draw the attention of the members of the CO\U1cil to the fact that a draft resolution has been submitted bythe representative of Ireland. Copies of this drait resolution are being circulated as dooument S/5134. 3. de

My purpose inintervening at this stage is ta introduce the draitresolution spon- 5. The draft resolution contained in document8/5134 aims tc reflect as accurately and fairly as possible the consensus of the points of view of the majority of the COWlcil as they have beeu expressed here. Members of the COWlcil will observe that the text contains nothing new or uniamiliar. On the contrary, the ideas which it embodies have been thoroughly discussed both here at the COWlcil table and in informaI consultations between members of the COUncil over the past few weeks. We believe th8t the draft represents the widest possible measure of common agreement existing at the present time. 6. In the preamble, three different considerations are taken into account. First, the COWlcil notes that it has received the last report of the United Nations representative for India and Pakistanli and it expresses its thanks ta Dr. Graham for it. 8econdly, the preamble contains a paragraphnotingwithsatisfaction the assurances given by India and Pakistan that they will refrain from the use of force as a means of settling the Kashmir question. Third1y. the preamble contains a paragraph confirming the awareness of the 8eclll"ity Council that it has a responsibility under the Charter for helping India and Pakistan ta reach a peaceful settlement of this question. These 1ast two preambular paragraphs are, of 'course, in close accordance with the ~s expressed by many members of the Counci! in the course of the discussion. 7. The operative paragraph 1 of the draft refers to the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948Y and the United Nations Commissionfor India and PakistanTs resolution of 13 August 19481/ and 5 January 1949, aU of which were accepted at the time by both India and Pakistan. References were made during the course of the discussion to the importance and signi- 8. The aspect of the question upon which the largest measure of agreement emerged during the course of the debate was the desirability.of an effortbeing made by India and Pakistan to reach a settlement of the Kashmir issue by means of negotiations and agreement between themselves. The purpose of the drait resolution which we have submitted to the Council is ta place the maximum emphasis, at this stage of the question, on this desirability. This is the object of the operative paragraph 2 of the draft. The text of that paragraph is, 1 think, self-explanatory. It urges India and Pakistan to enter into direct discussions at the earliest coilvenient time with a vi~ ta the settlement of the Kashmir question in accordance with the principles of the Charter, including Article 33 of the Cbal'ter, which itemizes the various procedures open ta Members of the United Nations seeking a solution of their differences by peaceful means. 8. large serait de mire un avons avec efforts paragraphe paragraphe demande des rapidement d.e principes énumère Membres cherchent paCifiques. 9. ce mêmes. Pakistan atmosphère ce faciliter qéclaration d'aggraver prononcêes sentants convaincus 9. The next mo operative paragraphs of the draft resolution are also self-explanatory. They urge India and Pakistan to endeavour ta establish and maintain an atmosphere favourable ta the direct conversations which it is the principal aim of the drait to further and, in tills regard, ta refrain from statements or courses of action which might aggravate the situation. We are confident, in the light of what the representatives of India and pakistan have said here at the Council table, that they will endeavour to do so. 10. 1 do not think 1 need add anything more at this stage. The drait resalutian which we have had the bonour to submit ta the Cauncil speaks for itself. Our purpose in submittin:r it is to enable the Security Counci! to reach a conclusi0n on the issue before it, as we believe it must be the aim of the Council to do. We hope that the drait resolutian will commend itself ta members of the Council as a warthwhile step towards bringing the question of Kashmir nearer to a peaceful, just and equitable seUlement. 10. quoi de au notre ..(j'aboutir il le du résolution mesure l'heure cette 11. l'anglais): du sur répéter dire dont présenté représentant

1 made the Views of my delegation on the màtter under discussion clear in my statement of 15 June [1012th meeting}. 1 do not wish ta repeat anything that 1 said then, but 1 should like ta say a few words about the draft resolution that is not before us and which bas been so persuasively commended by the distinguished representative of Ireland. 12, It will he evident froID my statements to the Counci! that this drait resc.'lution a0cords with the principles which my delegation thought the Council should bear in mind and withthe actionwhich my delegation thought that the Council ought to take. My delegation will, therefore, vote in favour of it8 adoption. 12. j'ai est inspirer devrait de 14. 1 conclude, therefore, by commending fuis draft resolution to the COUDCi! and to the parties. 1 hope that it will be accepted inthe spirit in which 1 am sure that it is offered-as a sincere and constructive attempt, prejudicial to neither party, to take a step towards an eventual solution of the problembeforeus. 15. Mr. Krishna MENûN (India): We have sat at this COWlcil table now for several days, listenmgpatiently to discovel' sorne reason for" the convening of this .meeting and ta what its deliberations are likely to lead. We have now reached the stage when from our }X)int of view, the unfortunate position was reached yester.day, when the United States received seven votes and was therefore able ta continue this meeting. My Government has always taken the view that there was no reason for convening the Security Counci! beoause no new situation had arisen to aggravate any position", in Jammu and Kashmir, so far as we are concerl1ed, although there might have been actions on the other side. 16. We understood that that was the position of a large number of countries and that this meeting was convened merely at the insistence of the State of Pakistan, with which others cop.oerned agreed. My country, Government and people are mystified by the fact that, though the insistence was on the side of Pakistan, the initiative in the debate was take,1 over by the United States from the day the present sitting began. 17. This afternoon-though 1 did not see it tîll this moment, 1 saw this draft resolution this morningwe still had hopes that, realizing the consequences of the action that is proposed in the resolution on the general situation in Jammu and Kashmir, Ireland would refrain from putting its name to the draft reso- Iution which we had expressly informed that Government would he regarded by us as an unfriendIy act-I do not want ta exaggerate this, 1 am sure my friend, Mr. Boland, would accept it in the spirit in wlûch it is made. 1 think that the sense of shock in our cOWltry about the Republic of Ireland being the spokesman-I would not use any other ward-of this particular move would be very considerable. The relations between our two countries did not begîn yesterday, and 1 mean the close relations between our two countries. They go back to the last century, right tbrough the period 18. Now we come to the text of this draft resolution. We do not yet have the text of Mr. Boland's speech in our hands, butIlistenedtoitverycarefully. The sentiment that ran right through itwas thatthis drait. resolution represented the consensus of opinion in this Council or the majority opinion. 1 }mve been af. sorne pains, after Ambassador Plimpton's speechyesterday, to analyse this assumption. In that analysis one finds that the statement does not ref1ect the opinion even of the majorityj it ref1ects the opinion of Pakistan, whose case has been somewhat ably argued by a number of members. Pirst of aIl, it was said that seven members-that is to say, the majority in this case-are supporting this position. Yesterday Ghana, on the one hand, and Venezuela entered their caveatsagainstthat statement. Mr. Haseganu suggested whenhespokethat the UNClP resolutions were impracticableorthatthey could no longer be implemented. This is therefore not 'part of the majorlty view. The total number of members who supported this point of view would be five and not seven. The majority of the members did give expression to sentiments in regard ta negotiations, so c&Ued, between pakistan and India. Most of them-I believe with the exception of the United States and the United Kingdom-·t'mphasized the necessity of creating the necessary atmosphere for fruitful talks. If l am wrong about that, 1 shaH withdraw it. Ambassador Plimpton also quoted five members in support of the idea of the good offices of a third party. Two members-Ireland and Ghana-qualified their statements. The remaining three, even if we take an five as constituting a group are still a minority. Ambassador Plimpton said yesterday that aU members had not failed ta comment on the responsibility oftheSecurity Council in this matter. 18. Nous M. l'orateur, projet tout la d'analyser cette que dont certain on en Ghana cette discours, inapplicables appliquées. s'agit sentants au ont de entre à Uni atmosphère Si j'ai du d'une l'Irlande Les personnes tuerait minorité. membres observations Conseil 19. We do not deny the responsibility of the security COill1oil. On the other hand, the main basis of our position would he that the security COUDoil has a tremendous responsibility. but that the question is whether, in exercising or discharging its responsibility. it is doing sa ta any benefit. Ambassador Plimpton quoted seven members in supportoftheview he had taken. Four members, the United Arab Re- PUblic, Ireland, Chile anô France qualified their statements in this respect. The ~emainingthree aonstitute a minority. 1 am not gOlllg ta say any more about Ws aspect DOW i 1 shaH do sa at a later stage. 19. reconnaissons de qui endossant mandat M. du ces République France, trois 21. At the present moment l propose to confine myself to tills drait resolution and not ta dwell on the large numbers of statements which have gone into the record, statements which my Government caIUlot intend ta leave uncorrected. The first paragraph of the preamble reads: "Having heard statements from representatives of the GOvernments of India and Pakistan concerning the India-Pakistan question". l suppose this refers ta the speeches made in April and May in regard ta which the reprs-sentative of the United states and of the United Kingdoru wanted time to contemplate. They contemplated for a month and a half or approximately that Ume, and then acquiesced in calling this meeting-under Pakistanpressure. They did caU this meeting, however, and have expressed their opinions-no doubt, afte,r contemplation. They still wanted time to contemplate: that is ta say, it is right to conclude that either they made those statements after consideration, or without consideration. We decline to believe the latter. If they made their statements after consideration, my Government does not see auy reason whatsoever why these meetings sbould have been dragged out almost to the point of dilatorIness. As l stated previously, this is hardlytbe way ta treat a Member State of the United Nations. Having suggested that there was sorne grave urgency in this matter, and after one of the Governments concerned had communicated the difficulties it had in attending meetings of this kind-meetings whichwould serve no purpose whatsoever-the Security COilllcil has met for a couple of hours each day, not for the purpose of further clarification here but no doubt for other reasons which we now see resulting in this resolution. 22. My Government, first of all, is against ariy resolution coming from this Council at this time, because from our point of view, any resolution that might come out at this time would not have any factual relevance. It would not be of any _value unless it was a resolution calling upon Pakistan to vaaate its aggression. That the COUDcil is not ready to do. Sorne day it will do so; we do not consider that impossible. We think. that any resolution from this Counai!, like the present one, will on1y be interpreted in India, on the one hand, as a very partisan statement. The effect on Pakistan, on the other hand, wOlÙd be ta lead it ta think tbat in this matter and in its aggression it has the moral support of the great Powers who occupy these chairs. 23. However, dismissing this aspect, we come to the next preamblÙar paragraph which reads: "Having considered the Report of the United Nations Representative, Dr. Frank P. Graham". 24. Following the traditions of our country, hOwever. whenever these famous gentlemen have visited our shores, we have offered them our traditional hospitality in so far as our poor resources would permit, and we have treated them with the courtesy that is characteristio of our relations with visiting people. But apart from that, we have not recognlzed Dr. Graham's position in regard to this matter. We would not be prepared at any time ta say that these efforts have in any way assisted in the salutionaf the Kashmir question, as it is nOw popularly called; butrather that they have aggravated it. 25. Then we come to paragraph 1 of the drait resalution which reads: UReminds bath parties of the principles contained in its resolution of 17 January 1948, and in the resoltrtions of the United Nations Commission for lndia and Pakistan dated 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949". These three resolutions at least must be taken in W:o parts. The resolution of 17 January 1948 was an appeal to the two parties not ta aggravate the situation. 26. For fourteen years, the Security COlU1cilknowsthrough the reoOI'ds and through the comm1lllications made to it by UNCIP, and by all the facts of which, as lawyers would say, you can take "judicial notice"- the resolution of 17 January 1948 had been continuously disregarded ·by Pakistan, by resorting to continuing and progressi.·'e aggression, whichwefullydiscovered ouly afterwards and which was laidbeforetheCollncil, and also to very substantial psychological warfare in the shape of propaganda for whatis called the "jeliad", the holy war against India. 27. With regard ta the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 Janual'Y 1949, this is notthetime to go seriatim into the various paragraphs. We want to say, however, and not merely for the pl1rpose of the record, that we hope that even at this late stage someof the members will not allow preconceived notions on this problemto override the factual situation. These resolutionswere hammered out between UNCIP on the one hand and, so far as we are concerned, our Government-mainly our Prime Minister~on the other. In regard to each of them and ta the main parts of these resolutions, the UNCIP at that time gave us various categorical assurances. Those assuranceswerenot privateassurances; they were not personal assurances; they were assurances of the Securit" )lIncil and they are commitments on behalf of the.... ourity COlU1cil. 29. The woi'd "obligations Il bas been used very freely, particularly by the United States. Speaking in the Security Couneil in 1957 and 1958, my Government made it clear that while it would honour aIl international obligations, the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949-which, aS l said. differ slightly from the resolution of 17 January 1948-were, in the view of our Government, engagements and 1.10t obligations. Those engagements were carried out .1'. the context within which they came about, and if the resolutions were not implemented, the fauIt does not lie with us. 30. Therefore, to speak of the principles contained in the draft resolution as thoughno changes have taken place in twelve or fourteen years is not only unrealistic, but it is to disregard the political, economic and other realities-andthe military realities-obtaining in our two countries and in our part <;lf the world. what is more, it is todisregardthecontinual violation and fiouting of decisions and resolutions and the concealment of facts from the Security Council. :u. Ml'. Stevenson was at pains, in opening fuis debate in titis particular continued series of meetings on 15 JW1e, ta read out rnragraph 1 of the resolution of 5 January 1949. It was of course possible for him to do that if he so desired. It is possible to read the scriptures and ta prove anything by one paragraph. The whole of that resolution, first of aIl, is supplementary to the resolution of 13 August 1948, and until the 13 August resolution had been implemented the 5 January resolution has no meaning. 32. Secondly, if paragraph 1 of the 5 January resolution must be read, then paragraph 2 must also be read, and there are sa many others that should similarly be l'ead with it. 1 do not intend to elaborate on the matter at this stage, butIwantto say that clause 1 of the operative paragraph of the present resolution is probably stronger than any resolution adopted here, most of which we have not accepted. It is not in conformity with the facts that now obtain. 33. The only part of the resolution of 13 August 1948 that has been implemented by and large is the cease fire. It Is the intention of my country to observe the cease-fire agreement until someone else seriously breaks it on a large scale and in sllch a way that it cannot be maintained any longer. 80, even though the other parts of that resolution have not been implemented and logically we would therefore even be entitled ta disregard the cease-fire agreement, we do not intend to do sa. 1 shaH stop there and read the rest of it afterwards. Here 1 want to say thatwehavealways taken exception to the practice of treating Pakistan and ourselves on the sarne basis in regard ta this question. We are equal Members of the United Nations; in that way \Ve do not claim any differentiation. But in regard ta this question they are the aggressors and we are the aggressed. 35. We brought a complaint here. That complaint is in regard ta the situation created by Pakistan in respect of Kashmir. The only answer Pakistan gave relevant ta Kashmir on 15 January 1948 was ta say that it was not invadingl that it was not in Kashmir. That, therefore, is the first preliminary objection ta treaUng India and Pakistan as though they were two peasin a pod. That has always been the usuaI British practice; here, however, when it cornes ta a serious matter of tbis kind, we must go into the substance of the question. 36. We have said that this Council is not a court of law. You are not the World Court. This body has no right ta go into legal questions or ta pass judgement on them. At best it is a body representing the United Nations and bas1ng itself on the principles of political relations in terms of international morality and law, and 1 also submit that those who want remedies here must come ;,vith clean hands. But over and above that the immediate objection ta this is that those who sponsor the draft resolution and, 1 fear, the majOrity of the Members of the Council either are ignorant of the fact or refuse ta accept the position that in the last few months-let alone the earlier past-the Government of India, as embodied in the persan of the Prime Miriister, has repeatedly invited the head oi the 8tate of Pakistan to come and talk these things over-negotiations may not be the right ward, but any way the intention was ta ta1k these things over. 37. The Prime Minister, during his visit ta West Pakistan, extended an invitation ta Pr~sident Ayub Khan on 23 8eptember 1960. My Prime Minïster went there. This invitation was renewed through Pakistan's Minister, Mr. Akhtar Hussain, on 10 January 1962, when the latter met the Prime Minister in New Delhi. The invitation was again renewed by our High Commissioner in Karachi on 1 March 1962. The Security Couneil was informed of aIl these invitations in document 8/5060 and at the 990th meeting of the Cooocil. Therefore we say that you calillot issue a proc!.<tmation in the air calling upon the t'No parties, when one party has invited the other to come and they have been refused. What is more, the other party said that they preferred to come not ta us, but here. It follows that there has been no response ta the move for bilateral meetings. If the resolution had said "calls upon the Government of Pakistan ta respond ta the repeated invitations of India and ta go and talk to them", that would have been reality. But the approach adopted in the resolution displays partiality, and 1 am certain 38. As regards the second point, the representative of France, the President, has referred to it more than anyone else. The resolution says: "... at the earliest convenient Ume \Vith the vîew to its ultimate settlement in accordance with Article 33 and other relevant provisions ofthe Charter of the United Nations". 39. Ta a lay reader. a persan who does not know the details and nuances of these things, li he reads tbis draft resolution aione. it looks very nice; that îs to say, what co\Ùd he better thanarbitration. conciliation and aU those ideas have been setout?He would therefore tlùnk that this is a very equitable and honourable thing for nations ta do, and \Vhat they expect hom membership of the United Nations. But \Vhat i8 forgottell is that this issue comes under Chapter VI. under the pacifie settlement of disputes, and not anywhere else. 40. It is .and has always been our submission-and we shan continue to uphold it-that the position that exists in connexion with the so-caUed Indo-Pakistan question is not a dispute in terms of the Charter. It is a situation created by Pakistan's aggression on our territory, by the annexation of that territory and by the :...epeated violations of the principles and re80- lutions of the United Nations, and therefore Article 33 is inapplicable ta this case in any way. But even if it is said that the substance ofArticle 33 can be defended on grounds of good conscience and should be accepted by nations-that is, negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement-I submit that aU but the last have been tried over aU these ye.ars. We have had sa many negotiations on this-here, in Geneva, in Paris, in aIl kinds ofplaces. There have been men of goodwiU who have come over and ta1ked to us and we have talked ta them. So there have been negotiations, direct and indirect, times without nUInber. As to inquiry, 1 suppose even the Security Council would be satisfied with the volume of material which has come out as a result oI inquiry. As to mediation, this has also been tried, in the sense that men of goodwiU have ta1ked to us, including McNaughton, Dixon and Jarring. 41. However, when we come ta' arbitration, international law, as 1 shall point out at the appropriate time, lays down certain principles that are basic to arbitration. There are sorne things that are arbitrable, others that are not arbitrable. That istrueinindividual relations. domestic relations and international relations. There are some things which are beyond arbitration! The sovereignty of a country, Us inclependence and integrity, are uot subjects for arbitration. The belief that they are sa arises from a groundless fallacy of which the United states delegation has no cause to te guilty, because Ml.'. Warren Austin, speaking many years aga before this Council, laid itdownwithout any reservations whatsoever that sovereignty lay \Vith 43. The drait resolution then says: 43. "~Deals ta the two Governments totakeallpossihIe measures ta ensure the creation and maintenance of an atmDsphere favourable to the promotion cf negotiations." We have no objection ta this appeat. But, sa far as \Ve are concerned, it is pushing an open door-and those who push an open door are likely ta fall on their nases! Nous en ouverte risquent 44. gouvernements possibles" avons que troupes Ce viennent Cachemire créés hommes dites 44. The draft resolution lIappeals to the two Governments to take all possible measures"-when, for years, we have informed this Council of the psychological war being wagedby Pakistan, and ofthe gathermg of troops or intruders, or threats of the same. Even tills morning, the news from India is that, in the puppet régime of so-called "Azad" Kashmir, theyhave been collecting people, and other agencies of Pakî- stan's creation have beeu colleoting people, in arder ta make so-called tribal invasions of India. 45. bien Le tanais, Président comme 45. 1 do not know whether at this time you want me to read many things out. The main mouthpiece of the Pakistan Government, th.e newspaper founded by the first President of Pakistan-some people regarded him as the founder of Pakistan-says:. "The final settlement of the Kashmir question is not going ta be worked out. in New York. The bands of the Indian tyrant will be foroed by other means. leaving him no alternative but ta liberate bis victims." Le la ville Fort trop The same paper went on to say that, if India wanted a war, we would have one, and they would raze Delhi ta the ground, and every oitY înIndiawould be destroyed, and things of that kinr!.. Fortunately, we take aU these things in our stride. 46. télévision permet des Angleterre vernement 46. On 9 May, the same paper said that on the BBC television-the BBC does not normally allow peopleto say things of this kind, 1 lived long enough in Britain ta !mow this.....the representative ofthe "Azad" Government of Jammu and Kashmir said: "The faith of the Kashmiris in the United Nations Security Couneil has been shaken, and they might soon take up arms on the Algerian pattern." Again, ten days afterwards. one of their leaders announced that "the Ali-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference has decided to resumetheKasbmir liberatian movement following the failure of the United Nations ta solve the Kasbmir issue1l • 48. A great deal has been said about the dignity, the responsibility and the role of the Security Council. ls the Security Council going ta pass resolutions Wlder threats of this kind-we had one when Sir Muhammad began lùs speech on the last oecasion-I am glad ta say that he modified it toward the end? "The AH-Jammu and Kasbmir Muslim Confsrence"-not a public meeting, you know, but the main politieal party, in sa far as they have any politieal parties-lOannoWlced today.its intention to resume the liberation movement by the middle of August of this year. This decision was taken at the annual session of the Conference, concludedtoday. The Conference decided ta recruit 10,000 trained Mujahids (crusaders) within threèmonths from today." 49. They cannot Und people from lOAzad" Kashmir to undertake this mission, and therefore, according ta our information, 1947 is ta be repeated, and thE! tribal peoples from the North-Western part-what was formally the North-Western Province-are tabe enlisted. 50. Mr. Bhutto, one of the Ministers of the Pakistan Government, said last month, afterwemethere-these dates are important-after we met and coneluded the last session, this Minister, who must presumably be reflecting the views of his Government, even in a non-parliamentary system, told a news conference that "Pakistan now realized that the Kashmirproblemwould have to be settled by 'our intrinsic strength', and that the Kashnûris migbt rise ta the same heights as the Algerians." 51. 1 will not tax the COlUleil with more editorials, beeause it ean always be said that they have a free Press and that nobody canpreventanybodyfromsaying this or that. But the Presidentofthe "Azad" Government again cornes on 29 May, a few days after we met here, and reiterates that-lOThe fight ofliberationwould have ta be fougbt on three fronts-namely, the diplomatie front, the pr0.1;laganda front, and on the ground." He also said that "he was glad that sorne people who until recently had talked of peacefulagitationhadultimately agreed with his point of view that theKashmir libera- 53. 1 would ask the Counoil not to dismiss this newspaper, though it is one of several; Iwould not say that it is an official paper-I do not mean to say that-but it is usually regarded as expressing the voiee of the Government in that country, not ouly in thi3 régime but in previous régimes. It goes on to say: 11 pakistan must have the Kashmir question settled, no matter what it takes, no matter what it costs. Indeed, the repudiation by IndiaoftheSecurityCouncil resolutions, including the one calling for the cease fire, and the aggressive redeployment of her forces have made Pakistan's task a little easier. The great impedirnent ta the liberation of Kashmir. namely, our obligation to maintain the cease fire, no longer exists. The grave danger ta ourterritory, our interest and our people is rnounting. Acts of violence, of intimidation and threatening speeches have become a cornmon feature across the border to keep us away from liberating our Kashmir brethren. "Pakistan is threatened with an alI-out war if the 'Azad' Government of Kashmir makes any move ta alleviate the sufferings of the Kasbmiris under Indian occupation, whilethatcountry's determination to occupy the 'Azad' territory is voiced on evelY conceivable occasion b~r the Defense Minlster. These threats, of course, can hold no fear for ns. If India wants an aU-out war, she will get one. If Lahore. Dacca and Karaclù are bombed. Bombay. Amritsar and New Delhi will be razed to the ground." Nobody has said anything about bombing Karachi or any other place. "For us in Pakistan, the virtues of peace are no different from the virtues of a war of liberation." -a very good statement-if it is a war of liberationand when a gr_eat newspaper does not know the difference between peace and war, you know what you are dealing with!-"The people of tlùs cowltry were prepared for the present aggressive posture ofIndia and the repudiation by her of international commitments. having witness~dthe impotence of the UBited Nations"-that is for you-"and of the big Powers in regard ta the occupation of the Portuguese enclaves. We should no longer ask ourselves whether we should start defending our c01Ultry only when the first bomb drops on our territory or when soldiers cross our borders. The time for active defences has come."-that is preventive war, you know- "Now is the time to thwart the designs of the Indian expansionists. The massing of forces within striking distance of our territory is an aggression of which we have to take note. The repudiation of the cease fire is nothing but a declaration of war. We have never sought and do not seek a shoot'mg war, but neither do we wa:nt peace sa much that we are will- That may be reason why 80me peoples subscribe ta these things. 54. The 8ecurir-i COWlcil says that it ia appealing ta the two countries ta maintain a peaceful atmosphere. As 1 said earlier, the appealloses its point because you are puslùng against an open door ou Due side. Even in the highest oïroles in Pakistan, no attempt bas beeu made ta create a favourable atmosphere. As l pointed out, not only has there beeu no favourable response to India's repeated request for a "no war" declaration, but even the invitation il'om the head of our Government to the Head of State of Pakistan, who is also the Prime Minister de facto, has not produced any response. 55. The representative of Pakistan has successfully made every attempt in the Security Council to keep this debate in progress and to create a sense of controversy in order, perhaps, ta promote feelings of irritation with India and cause difficulties for that cOlUltry. 56. The operative paragraph 4 of the draftresolution reads: "Urges the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan ta refrain from making any statements, or taking any action, which may aggravate the situation." We have asked this COUDcil repeatedly for the past twelve years ta point out ta us what statements we bave made that are aggravating the situation. even though the fact remains that forty thousand square miles of our territory are occupied by the other side. 57. The operative paragraph 5 of the draftresolution reads: "Requests the Secretary-General to provide the two Governments with such services as they may request for the purpose of carrying out the terms of this resolution". - That part of the resolution is innocuous; it is one of those omnibus clauses that are added on ta resolutions. Furthermore, we do not want 10 bring the Secretary- General into this controversy at all. In any case. since we are not likely to request theseservices, that paragraph is inoperative. 58. This. therefore, is the draft resolution whichhas been submitted when each of the Governments concerned knows for a fact that it will not lead to the solution of any question. It will ouly aggravate the ~ituation and will be used in Pakistan for a purpose which is entirely different from what ls intended. Besides. it is entirely contrary to facto ,60. It i8 not my intention to make a more detaUed statement at the present time but 1 hope, in fairness to my Government and in view of the large number of mis-statements that have been made in the Counctleither out of ignorance or for political reasons-that 1 will be allowed ta put this record straight sa that, on a future occasion, it will not be said-as has been said sa often-that the Govermnent of India did not take exception ta this, that or the other. 61. We have the same feeling as a lot of other people that the repetition of these things is becomîng a bit tiresome. But then, if 1 neglect to abject to any particular point, that omission is brougbt up at the ensuing meeting and it is said then that India had no objection. Therefore, we intend at the appropriate time, if that is the pleasure of the Council, ta put our position with regard ta this matter more fully on record. 62. The only other speech to which 1 should really refer is the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom. 1 shaH not do so for several reasons. The first is that it is expectedj the other reason is that 1 have no desire to aggravate the relationship between our two countries. But 1 hope that they will stop speaking ta us in that fasmon, enjoining us yaguely ta preserve the status of relations in the Commonwealth in regard to these matters. Pakistan is a military ally, not only one of the members of the Commonwealth. In the context ofthingsastheyappear, therefore, such statements, fall very unpleasantly upon our ears. But our relations withthe United Kingdom, in spite of everything, are very close and no doubt Sir Patrick Dean follows his instructions and bis own wisdom in the matter. 63. 1 wish to reiterate to the Council that in passing this resolution it will not be, as Ml'. Boland has said, diSChal'ging a duty that will in any way promote the purposes which motivate it. Besides, it is not the function of the Security Councîl to pass resolutions without a purpose. If 1 may say so, we sometimes develop a habit of doingthings and then do them whether they bave a purpose or not. 1 remember being interviewed by a newspaper editor on television sometime aga. He told me that Ididnotunderstand his difficulty, 64. Similarly, there 18 no reai obligation for the Security COWloil ta pass 'a draft resolution which 18 not 1lkely ta lead ta anything but which will only proclaim ta the warid that this question has not received the kind of consideration that it should from members of Ws Council and from nations that are committed ta the same principles as we have observed in our country. Therefore, 1 submit, with an the earnestness at my command, that the uncommitted couutries in partioular should not now become parties, either passively or actively, to a resolution of this character. 65. 1 have no desire to analyse elosely the other statements that have been made which will only lend strength to forces of disruption either in India or in relation to India and Pakistan, for that would not he calculated ta lead ta peace in our part of the world. Conditions have changed. Sinee 1 intend· to refer -to them more fully later on, 1 shaH not do sa now-I therefore request the members ofthe Seeurity Couneil, even though a draft resolution is before them, not ta complicate the difficulties in the situation by adopting it or even supporting it.

During this meeting there have been a nwnber of appeals to the COWlcil to finish this debate as soon as possible. Yesterday, when 1 suggested that a meeting should he held today, 1 myseIf indicated that we should try ta conclade the discussion this evening. 67. If there are no more speakers, would theCouncil have any objection ta my putting the drait resolution ta the vote? 68. Ml'. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): It is not difficult ta see that the draft resolution which the delegation of Ireland bas submitted for the consideration of thé Security Council [S/5134J basicaHy corresponds tothe so-called "summary" madebytheUnitedStates representative at the meeting held by the Council yesterday. 69. Immediately after this statement the USSR delegation demonstrated that this so-caHOO summary, being inaccurate and incomplete, did ilot correctIy reflect the course of the discussion and that, in particular, the draft resolution, which is practically a photo-copy of the United States summary and reproduces some of its conclusions, or in fact any resolution on this subject, is absolutely wmecessary in view of the wide exchange of views that has taken place. 70. Historians ma)' be interestedbythe report emanating from Press circles at the United Nations that the draft resolution was originally co-sponsored by yet another delegation, not onlyby the delegation oflreland, and that at the last moment this second sponsor's name was removed from the document issued under the symbol S/5134. 1 do 'lot know whether that was reaUy sa, but in any ca:·;; s comparison between the 71, 1 should like to remind you that, as recently as yesterday, not only the USSR delegation, but also the delegations of other countries represented in the Counci! eommented on the United States representative's incorrect Interpretation and incomplete and inaccurate description of the positions they took here in the COWlcil. 72. The USSR delegatioil considers that the COUDcil should reject aIl attempts, at this stage of the discussion and after such significant delays and protraction of the debate under various pretexts, to impose on it at aIl costs a draft resolution which reflects a one-sided and hence incorrect view of the question of Kashmir. 73. A careful study of the draft shows thatits central idea is, as the United States representative asserted more than once, tLCl.t. our earlier resolution on holding a plebiscite in the territory of Kashmir in order to determine whether this territory belongs ta India or ta Pakistan is still in force at the present time. This idea ia still the central factor of the draft resolution now before the Security Council, as is perfectly evident from the fact that the operative part of the resolution begins with the proposaI to remind both parties of the principles contained in earlier Security Counci! resolutions and, in particular, in Hs resolutionof17 January 1948 and in the resolutions ofthe so-called United Nations Commissionfor India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. 74. And yet, gentlemen, it is no secret ta any of you that these are the very resolutions which contain detailed proposaIs for holding the plebiscite. Accordingly, the crux of the matter, as was amply proved during these debates, lies in the fact that certain members of the Council still consider it necessary to hold a plebiscite for the above-mentioned purposes. 75. We have already pointed out in our statement of 4 May 1962 [lOlOth meeting} that the resolution about this plebiscite was adopted by the Councîl in quite a different set of practical circumstances and that the resolutions adopted by the UnitfJdNations Commission for Iudia and Pakistan rested onconditionswhichwere prerequisites for carrying out this whole plan. The most important condition-and 1 must apologize for having, so ta speak, ta return from Z ta A, but that is not the fauIt of the USSR delegation-was the preliminary withdrawal of Pakistan troops from the entire territory of Kashmir. 76. Let us not embark now upon a repetition of aIl that we have heard and said during aIl the meetings -and they were lengthy and protracted enough-that the Security COlUleil has devoted to the examination of This question. Suffiee it to say that years have passed since these proposaIs were submitted and adopted, and life has taken its course. In the territory of 77. That is why in the present circumstances the request for a plebiscite in the territory of Kashmir is, as we have already pointedout, quiteunreasonable. lt is perfectIy obvious that this request casts doubt on the fact that Kashmir belongs to India. 78. That is why we cannot endorse the proposaI that the Council should now reaffirm an the resolutions which it and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan adopted in quitedifferentcircumstances. The purpose of this proposaI is to ensure that fuis main difference of opinion concerning the sitùation between Pakistan and India should be settled infavour of Pakistan, that is ta say. settled in favour of one of the par~ies. F 79. Assertions have been made here-as inthestatement of the Irish representative, who defended this draft, ta our deep regret-that the question is simply one of noting that the relevant resolution was at one time taken by the aforementioned organs of theUnited Nations. Such references and such assertions ooly serve ta show that sorne delegations are so anxious ta bring about the adoption of the draft now before the COWlcil that they are ready to contradict the very text of the draft and their own earlier comments on it. 80. It is obvious ta aU that the key reason for introducing the draft is the holding of the so-called plebiscite, which in the present circumstances would be nathing but open interference in the domestic affairs of India, as Mr. Krishna Menon, the Minister of Defence of India, so rightly said here. li that is not the aim of the authors of the draft resalution, why do they include in their text the aforesaid reference to earlier resoluUons of United Nations organs which mention the holding of a plebiscite? Surely they have not set themselves the task of writing, from their seats in the Security COUDCit, a kind of historical monograph in which everything that happened in the period they are describing must be stated with equal emphasis? 81. It is self-evident that what may be appropriate for historical studies, which must refer to everythU-""elthat happened during the period under discussion, iB" naturally inapplicable to the political decisions of the Security Counci!, which are taken in the light of the practical circumstances and conditions prevailing at the Ume when the decision is taken. The attempt ta create the impression that aIl fuis is mentioned, so to speak.. for the love of the art of history is doomed tri failurej it ~annot and should not rnislead anyone. 82. Moreov:er, it is perfectIy obvious from the context of the drait resolution that the negotiations between the Governments of Iodia and Pakistan, the renewal of which is urged in the draft, are to take place on the basis of the principles set forth in the now outdated resolutions of the Security. COUDoil and the United Nations Commission on Kashmir. That, gentlemen, is the real purpose of "recalling" the principles contained in those resolutions. 83. Neither references in the draft resolutions ta the provisions of Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, which no one has contested, nor any other references ta the provisions of the Charter, nor the 84. At the same time, although the paragraph of tbis draft resolution which relates to the negotiations does not refer ta mediation by a third party, as did the draft which was not submitted, but was sa widely bruited about in the halls of our Organization that it has long been an open secret-although the new draft does not refer directIy ta mediation by a third party, paragraph 5 of the draft nevertheless in essence contains this idea of mediation, in a somewhat different form. And yet we have already héard several statements here from the Indian representative to the effect that interference by third parties in the negotiations between India and Pakistanwould beunacceptable. Then what grounds are there for believing that the adoption of such a resolution can help ta clear the atmosphere and to ensure the normal course of any negotiations wlùch may be conducted "between India and Pakistan? 85. Moreover, it should be noted that, as the Indian representative has pointed out, India has never in principle rejected the idea of bilateral negotiations between itseIf and Pakistan. However, as ithasrightly been pointed out here, these negotiations should take place on an equaI footing, without any interference by third parties and without any attempts to impose an obviously unacceptable hasis for such negotiations. 86. Moreover, it should be noted fuat the proposed draft also fails ta reflect the real situation in that it absolutely ignores the historicnl fact that, as early as 1948, it was India, gentlemen-and this calh"'lot be disregarded if we are to see this question in its proper historica1 perspective-which brought the quest~on before the Security Council, after Pakistan troops had occupied the territory of Kashmir. As we aU know, Pakistan troops continue to occupy approximately one-third of the territory of this country, containing about one-fourth of the total population of Kashmir. 87. Accordingly, when the tiraft resolution attempts ta place on an equal footing boththeState which originaUy b;rought the question before the Security Council and the State wiüch was called upon to answer for its actions at that time, we cannot regard thatview of the situation as objective. And yet that is the manner in which the questiQn is presented in operative paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the draftresolution. Accordingly, the seemingly wel1-intentioned appeals for negotiation, for the maintenance of a favourable atmosphere, and so on and so forth, assume an obviously hypocritical character in the light of the motive to which 1 have just referred. These proposaIs should be viewed not outside the context of the resolution as a whole, not outside the context of the whole course of historical events over the past fourteen years, but in close connexion with this course of events. It will then be seen 88. That is why, in the light ofallthe aforementioned circ~stances. thè USSR delegation opposes the adoption of this draft. 89. A decision such as theonewhichisbeing imposed on us here, under the guise of thebest and Most pious intentions, can only serve to aggravate tension in the relations between India and Pakistan, and that is obviously contrary bath ta the interests of the peoples of these countries and ta the interests of the maintenance of universal peace and security and hence undoubtedly at variance with the functions and raIe of the security Council, as the organ oftheUnited Nations beariiig the principal responsibility for the maintenance <;Jf universal peace and security. 90. In conclusion, we feel obliged to repaat what we said in our statement on 4May and in our statement at yesterday's meeting of the Security Councn, that the COUDcil would do well to note that the Government of lndia and subsequently the Government of Pakistan declared during our debate that theywouldnottake the initiative in using force ta setue the question of Kashmir, and also that neither side rejects the idea of bilateral negotiations. , li ,, 91. We believe that such an outcomeofthediscussion in the Securlty Council would be the best way of promoting the rapid elimination of differences between Pakistan and India on the Kashmir question, differences which, moreover, are nothing but a consequence of the era of colonial domination. We believe that such an outcome of the discussion would further the establishment of friendly relations between the two QOuntries in the future and that this would be in the 10- terests ai the peoples of India and Pakistan and would promote the strengthening of peace iI'I. that region and in the whole world. /

As 1 have not heard any objection ta my proposaI that we should now vote, 1 shaH put the draft resolution submitted by Ireland beiore the COUDcil {S/5134] ta the vote. A vote Wéi:'. taken by show of hands. In favour: _ Chile, 'China, France, Ireland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northernlreland, United States of America, Venezuela. Against: Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Abstaining: Ghana, United Arab Republic. The result of the vote was 7 in favour. ;] against. with :J abstentions. \ The draft resolution was not adopted. one of the tnegative votes being !hat of a permanent member of , the COlmciL 95. From the beginning of the United Nations one of its special characteristics has been the voting procedure in the Security Council. We aIl recall the serious deliberations wllich took place at San Francisco concerning the nature and the import for the future of the veto right for permanent members of the Security CmUlcii. The veto was given to thepermanent members primarily because it would betheir mUitary and economic power which would have to be used to sustain and enforcesecurityCouncil decisions directIy affecting vital world lnterests. The repre,sentatives of the small and middle-sized States emphasized their anxiety that the veto might be used to !lamstring the Security COWlcii. In arder to meet such fears, the four sponsoring members of the Conference set forth their conception at that time of the Wlanimity rule, with which the delegation of France also associated itself. The big Powers, including the Soviet Union, specific:::Uy stated nthat it is not to be assumed that the per:m<'."ent members, any more than the nonpermanent members, would use their veto wilfully to obstruct the operation of the COWlcil". That was the way we start"ed at San Francisco seventeen years ago this very week, 1 believe. 96. What has happened since? Eefore the firs·t year was out, the Soviet Union !lad cast nine vetos. The Soviet member of the CouncU has today cast its hundredth veto. For fifteen years, the Soviet Union on occasion after occasion has sought ta obstruct the operations of the COWlcil, sometimes where Soviet plans Md prestige were directly and clearlyinvolved, and at other times when Soviet interests were not directly involved, save that the continuationoffriction might contribute to Soviet objectives. 97. The Soviet Union has used the veto lavislùy to prevent States from assuming their rightful place in the United Nations. In fact, fifty-one of these vetoes were cast on applications for membership of the United Nations. Ireland, a member of this COWlcil, was denied membership for nine years. So were Jordan and Portugal. Austria, Finland and ltaly were kept out for eight years. Ceylan was kept out for seven years, Nepal for six years. Mauritania was vetoed in 1960 and Kuwait in ] 961. Korea is still not a member. The veto has been used to tie the admission of clearly qualified States, for which there was widespread support, to the admission of States and rêgimes about who.<:e qualifications for membership there were grave doubts; this, despite the fact that the tying of the admiO:''iIion of one applicant to that of another has be€n speciii.cally held by theInternational Court of Justice to be contrary to the Charter.

lgive the floor ta the representative of the Soviet Union On a POint of arder. 100. Ml'. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Ml'. President, this is, of course, the beginning of a very interesting lecture, reviewing aU the occasions on wlùch tue Soviet delegation has used the veto. 101. 1 should be prepared ta hear out such a reviêw if it were in line with the agenda item wlùch we are nOW considering. However, the agenda item is not entitled IIReview of the use by the Soviet Union of the right of veto in the Security Council since the inception of the United Nationsll • Only when we have placed such à.n item On the agenda shall we be able to listen ta anything which any member of the COWlcil may say in this cOlUlexion, includillg the distinguished representative of the United States. 102. For the moment, however, since wearenotconsidering such an item, but an item which is entitled IIThe India-Pakistan question" and which is known ta world publiC opinion as the "Kashmir question", it would be proper for you, Ml'. President, ta use the discretionary rights vested in you under the provisional rules of ~mcedure of the Security Council and ta explain to the United States representative which item we are now engaged in considering, and if, now that the drait resolution has been put ta the vote, the United States representative has nothing to say in explanation of lùs vote, then perhaps he will be kind enough to postpone his very interestingpopular lecture to another time. But now we obviously have further explanations of vote to listen ta, and 1 therefore l'aise this point of arder and ask you, Ml'" President, if you wish to carry out your duties impar'tially, to call the United States l'epresentative ta arder. 103. As far as the USSR delegation is concerned, we shaH exercise our right to explain our vote on the draft resolution when the Ume cornes. 104. 1 request you, Ml'. President, to settle the point of arder which 1 have just l'aised.

'l'he representative of the USSR statecl that as President 1 had discretionary powers. 1 am not entirely in agreement with him. The powers of the President derive from the rules of procedure and the practices of the Security Council. 107. 1 appeal to aU members of the CoWlcil to make their statements as brief as possible and to remain as far as possible within the limits of the subject. If the representative of the Soviet Union asks ta speak, 1 shall certainly give him the floor. lOS. Ml'. STEVENSON (United States of America): When 1 was interrupted 1 was cHing the instances in which the veto had beeu used some thirteen times to 'assist Soviet bloc activities against the territorial integrity and politicnl independence of other States. After realizing its mistake in boycotting the Council during the North Korean aggression against the Republic of Korea in 1950, the Soviet Union, 1 would remind representatives, finally returned to the Council in August and immediately began ta veto Security COWlcil decisions designed ta uphold the independence of that cOWltry. Fortunately for the Korean people and for this Organization, that effort failed-because we \Vere able to proceed through the General Assembly. 109. Similarly, in 1956, theUnHedNationswasforced ta move through the General Assembly ta condemn Soviet intervention in HWlgary after the Soviet Union had supported Hs aggressÎ'.lll against the Hungarian people by invocation of the veto. Most recently, in September 1960, the Soviet Union vetoed a resolution on the Congo, sponsored by Ceylan and TWlisia, because the resolution was designed in part to resist Soviet efforts ta intervene in the Congo despite the fact that tue United Nations peace-keeping operation was already ln action. Again an emergency session of the General Assembly was required before the United Nations could do what was necessary. There are still more areas in which the veto has been used to obstruct the operation of the Counci!. The veto bas been frequently used ta prevent the United Nations from investigating ... 110. Ml'. MOROZOV (Union of SOvic3t Socialist Republics): Point of arder. 111. Ml'. STEVENSON (United St<:.tes J~ America): The gentlemen will, 1 am sure, have the opportunity ta reply ta what 1 have ta say which 1 submit, Ml'. President, is entirely consistent with the rules and entirely propel' for me ta say. 112. Ml'. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): 1 ask for the floar on a point of arder. 115. Therefore, Ml'. President, in making this stntement 1 request you ta put your ruling ta the vote sa that we may see which members of the COllncil support-actively support-a decision ta aUow the United States representative ta take the floor after the vote, Ilot in explanation of vote, but ta make a statement which obviously has far-reaching political implications. 116. 1 ask-vou, Ml'. President, once again ta call the United States representative ta arder and ta request him ta confine himself, li he wishes, ta the Soviet vote on the item we have heen discussing. Even this would he a very great concession made in a spirit of conciliation, sa ta speak, aiter aIl we havejust heard, hecause the fact of the matter is that no one bas the right ta discuss the rea8011 for my votewhen speaking in explanation of his own. The Council's general debate i5 over, and we must proceed in an orderly manner. 117. If, Ml'. President, you do not come ta tltis entirely legitimate and reasonable conclusion, which 1 insist is in full confornlity with the provisions of the Charter, relating ta the work of our Cowlcil and with the rules of procedure. 1 shall ask you ta put your ruling ta the vote. 1 shaH of course vote against this ruling. Others may support it, or abstain, or do whatever they see fit. And li a ·~ecision is taken on this procedural question contrary ta the one upon which 1 insist in full conformity with those provisions of the Charter nnd of the rules of procedure which allow me ta do 50, then it will be all the more evident that the right of veto in the Security CouncU is a s<'.gacious prov1sion which forces even certain great Powers ta keep within bounds, against their wishes, and, sa ta speak, forces them ta take their feet off the table, where they are nOw trying ta put them in the American fashion. 118. That is the question 1 now put ta you, Ml'. President.

Thé representative of the Soviet Union has appealed against the interpretation of the practice of the Council which 1 gave. Under mIe 30 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council 1 must submit his appeal to the Council for immediate decision. 120. In these circumstances, 1 request the members of the COWlcil who are not in favour of my interpre-

1 raised my band before you spoke, actually. 1 was going ta say that 1 did not know exactly what you were going ta say in response ta the request made by therepresentative of the Soviet Union. But according ta rule 30 of the provisional rules of procedure, it 15 only when you make a ruling that there can he a challenge ta that kind of ruling; and in that case, this 15 put ta the vote. However, in 50 far as my delegation can make out, yOU never made a ruling; you merely appealed ta the members of the Council to restrict themselves ta the points under discussion. Therefore, my delegation finds itself in a quandary as ta what action you WOlÙd require us to take in response ta the request of the representative of the Soviet Union. 1 would again repeat that you have not made a rul1ng; you have made onlyan appeal; and 1 think the mattershould rest with the appeal, and not with the ruling, unless, of course, you are going ta make a ruling. In that case, my delegation would have ta consider its position again.

1 tlùnk that the position is perfectiy clear. When 1 spoke just now, 1 gave my interpretation of the practice of the Council and the representative of the Soviet Union challenged my interpretation. 124. Rule 30 of the roles of procedure is perfectly clear: 1 must put ta the vote the appeal which was made against my interpretationô in accordance \Vith this provision of rule 30 of the rüles of procedure, the President's ruling "shall stand unIessoverruledft • 125. That being 50, 1 ask themembersofthe Security COWlcil who are in favour of the appeal made by the representative of the Soviet Union ta raisetheir hands. ,

1 want to speak about voting procedure, Mr. President, about the order in which you put matters to the vote; 1 am therefore in arder, although you have announced the beginning of the voting. 127. The point is that rule 30 reads as follo~';a: "If a representative raises a point of arder. the President shall immediately state bis ruling. It itis challenged, the President shall submit his rulingft -1 repeat. his ruling-"to the Security COlmcil for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled" . 80, Mr. President, the subject of the vote can only he one question, namely, which members of the Council support your ruling. 1 shaH not nOW speak on the substance of the matter; you have formulated it, and 1 wish ta remain within strict procedural limits. 128. Thus, Mr. President, the subject of the vote should pe your rubng. Will you therefore please put 130. If you come ta sorne other conclusion, then clearly there will be nothing to vote on, because there is no other way of putting the questionto the vote than the way in which 1 framed it. 1 have the right ta do that, at least there is certainly no way in which you cao deprive me of that particular right. And if the Council recognizes by a majority of votes that waging the cold war is the most appropriate form for its activities ta take, then that of coursewillbe the affair of those who vote for such a decision. In that case there will be nothing more for me ta do here but ta exercise my right ta explain my vote on this matter and ta make an end of aIl the extraneous and irrelevant elements which sorne delegations keep tryingta introduce here. 131. 1 think my request is very clear: to have the question put ta thevoteinpreciselytheform 1 request.

The representative of the Soviet Union may be certainthat 1 shaH deal with this question in the manuel' most favourable ta bis delegation. 133. 1 know one precedent which may enable me ta settle the dispute between him and me, and in this precedent 1 shan rely on the interpretation of the representative of the Soviet Union, which moreover was that of the representative of France. 134. It was at the 330th meeting of the Security CouncH, v.l 7 July 1948, on the Palestine question. The President having proposed ta put his ruling ta the vote, the representative of the Soviet Union objected, and tbis is what the recor.d says:.2I l'iIt seems to me that the correct way ta proceed would be exactly the reverse. We should "{ote on the question: who is against the Presideni::s ruling?The results of the vote would decide that question. If 1 an not mistaken, this would be more consistent with the rules of procedure." "The ruling of the president was put t9 the vote in the form suggested by the representative of the USSR, and upheld.".2./ y Quoted in English by the speaker. 2J See Repertory of the Practice of the Security Council, 1946-1951, chapter J. part 1. sect. 2, case 63. p. 35. 137. The point is, Ml'. President. that your ruling consists of two parts: first, you said that you saw nothing in the statement of the United States representative which went beyond the bounds of a normal discussion of this question, beyond the bounds of the agenda item now Ill1der discussion. This is the first part of your ruling. In the second part of your ruling you called upon members of the Cowlcil-whieh ineludes the United states representative, as the United states is also a member of the Council-to adhere ta the item DOW under discussion. 138. 1 am ready to vote for and support the second part of your ruling. 1 am not ready ta vote for or support your statement that the remarks made here, ta which 1 am taking exception, are relevant ta the agenda. Yoti must therefore now put the first part of your ruling ta the vote in the formof a positive statement, sinee 1 do Dot contest the second part of your ruling. You must put the first part of your ruling to the vote so that it may receive or fail ta receive the necessary minimum of seven votes. 139. It is evident from the extraordinary rapidity with which you found all these references that this whole business was weIl stage-managed in advanee, for it would have been impossible for you ta fmd referenceS on a question which goes back ta 1948 sa quickly if you had not beeu prepared for possible objections on my part, Ml'. President. This, too, is self-evident. 140. That is why 1 ask you, Ml'. President, ta ascertain how many members of the Council are prepared to support the first part of your ruling, which 1 consider ta he contrary ta the rules of procedure, the provisions of the Charter and the whole pràctice of the Security Couneil. 1 support the secondpartof your ruling. 1 do not contest your ruling in its entirety. 1 wish ta make that clear once again.

1 agree with the representative of the Soviet Union that we sbould put an end to tbis sterile discussion, which has already lasted all tao long. J could, as he himself has said. sinee he declared that the President had discretionary power. adhere to my position completely and put the appeal he made against my interpretation to the vote. This i8 my formaI l'1ght and 1 could do so if 1 wished. Nevertheless, in order ta take his observations iuto account 1 am prepared to put to the vote the interpretation 1 have given, which ls thefollowing: 142. This ,·.''lB the interpretation 1 gave. 1 shaH put this interpreî:ation ta the vote. This interpretation shall stand unless it i~ overruled by a majority. These are the exact provisions of rule 30. That ls my decision.

Mr. President. it really i~ Ume ta put an end ta this business. 1 am very satisfied that no one apart from yourself has supported the conduct of the United States representative. 1 think we can leave it at that, and 1 withdraw my proposai for obvious reasons. 144. A vote in the form youhavesuggestedor further discussion of this matter would be completely point- less. 1 shaU, however, exercise the right ta e:xplain my vote, as well as the other rights arising from your conduct as President of the Council at this meeting.

1 thank the representative of the Soviet Union and 1 give the floor ta the representative of the United States with the request that, in view of the Ume, he should he aS? brief as possible and should keep as closely as possible to the subject.

Mr. President, 1 do nothavemuchmoreto say. Before 1 proceed 1 must say that 1 was not aware, if 1 understoad the representative of the Soviet Unioncorrectly, Ihat rpy shoe was on the table. 1 wonder if he could have confused me ,with some one else who has still other uses for shoes and tables. 147. Whea 1 was interrupted for the second time, 1 was saying that the veto has been frequently used ta prevent the United Nations from investlgatingcharges brought ta the Security Council by the Soviet Union itself. On at least four occasions, with the use of six vetpes, the Soviet Union refused, after usingtheSecu": rity CowlCil ta air its charges, ta let its own assertions be examined. 148. 1 invite your attention ta 1950, when the Soviet Union charged the United States Air Force with the bombing of Communist-held areas of China. The Soviet Union vetoed a commission of investigation. 149. In 1952, the Soviet representative climaxed one of the most shameless falsehoods in history, the long crescendo of accusations that the United States and the United Nations troops were employing germ warfare in Korea, by bringing the issue befare the Security Council and then promptly vetaing a proposai for an impartial examination. 150. In 1958, when the Soviet Union purported to be concerned about United states flights over the Arctic 152. In each of these cases, the Security Council tried ta exercise its proper peace-keeping function through systematic investigation. In each case, after having brought the charge. the Soviets vetoed the attempt at a remecly. 153. One of the most disturbing facts a~so revea1ed in the history of a hundred vetoes is the consistent effort ta preveut the Security Council from developing processes of peaceful settlement. Not OlùY do many of the vetoes 1 have referred ta faH into Ws category, but most of the remaining ones were also cast against efforts ta promote peaceful settlements: four times with respect ta Spain in 1946; once again on a resolution on traop withdrawals from Syria and Lebanon in 1946, not because the resolution was wrong but because it was not extreme enough; twice in connexion with problems arising at the timeofIndonesian independence; once against Security Counoil recommendations for a solution of the Berlin blockade in 1948; once on Goa; twicetopreventextensionof United Nations peace-keeping functions in Lebanon in 1958; and five times since 1960 in the Securitycouncil consideration of the Congo. The USSR also vetaed four resolutions in the field of disarmament. 154. Distortion of the veto power has been a fact of life in this Council. lt is a fact that led ta the "Uniting for Peace l1 procedure, adding ta the United Nations peace-keeping machînery a flexible means whereby United Nations Members can assure that the United Nations primary function of preserving the peace will be carried out. The veto does exist, within its proper context, as a recognition of political reality. But it is a privilege to be used, not to he abused. And abused it has been, for the Soviet Unionhas wilfully obstructed the operation of thîs Council. It has violated that part of the four-Power declaration at San Francisco in which the Powers agreed not to use their veto wilfully to obstruct the operation of this Council. 155. So muoh for yesterday and for today. What of the future? The Council is a vital, purposeful organ of the United Nations, in spite of the veto. It provides vital and purposeful direction and leadership, and, in areas of its work where the veto does not apply, we believe the Council might well widen its activities and increasingly provide that direction andthatleadership in our affairs, 156. As for the veto itself, we hope that, long before the Soviet Union approaches its two hundredth veto, it will :realize that .its own interests lie not in national 157. Ml'. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): In its statement opposing the draft resolution the Soviet delegation explained in sorne detaU the basicprineipleswhichled it to the conclusion that it would have to object to this resolution. 158. Until the very last moment we had hoped that good sense and awareness of the need for objectivity wotùd preveut the submission to this COUDcil ofa document which, as is now clear from allthat has happened -and, if anyone had any doubts about it, was made quite clear by the statementofthe United States representative-was inspired and prepared by the United States of America for purposes which have nofuing in cornmon with the tasks of rnaintaining tranquillity. ereating friendly relations and strengthening peace in the Kashmir region. 159. It is also now cornpletely obvious_from thefaet that Ml'. Stevenson used a text worked out and prepared in such detail and having nothing ta do with the subject under discussion-that. fuis whale "Production" was weIl rehearsed and took place, so to speak, under the over-all stage-management of the United States of America. 160, Since 1 intend ta confine myselfto an explanation of the reasons why the Soviet delegation voted against this drait resolution, 1 shall refrain from assessing the political significance of this whole venture. However, the who~e world can see that all this, including of course this Cirait which was presented ta us here with pious words-all this is directed towards aggravating ta the utmost the relations between the two Asian countries. 1 have already had the honour ta tell the Council who it is who stands to gain by thus setting the two countries against one another-when 1 pointed out that what had been put to work here and was con- Hnlling ta work at full speed was the ancient formula "divide and ruIe"_and drawing the correspoJ;ldîng political advantages from this division. 1 do not think 1 need to expound in detall who is doing this and for what pUI'P0ses. 161, That is why we were deeply eonvinced that the adoption of such a decision would merely add fuel to the flames, merely heighten the tension prevailing in the region we are now discussing, rnerely aggravate the situation which has arisen there and about whieh both the Iodian and the Pakistan Governments have fortunately dec1ared that neither oné of them would take the first step towards resolving fuis problem by force. 162. That is why we considered that all attempts preceding the submission ofthe draft, which originated in sucb peclÙiar circumstances, circumstances characterized by delays, postponements. and pressures first by the group of five which was working on it, then by the group of three, then by the two, then finally by one or two delegations (1 directly assert that the United States delegation il'.tended to submit fuis drait today and rernoved its name from it at the last moment)- this whole operation, tms exceedingly malodorous 164. 1 have, in one capacity or another, takenpart in, or sat in at, mostofthe meetings of the Security Council at which the Soviet delegationusedthisSoviet veto. including fifty-one cases where it was used in connexion with the admission of new Members ta the Organization. Let us begin with these fifty-one votes, so that we can dear them out of the way. 165. It i8 obviotls to every impartial observer that these negative votes by the Soviet Union were provoked by the refusaI of the United States and its military allies, for reasons of favouritism and without any arguments or groUllds whatever which might have found support in the Charter, to admit a Humber of States which, being responsible and qualified, were also eligible for me..lllbership in the United Nations, ~.66. Many of th8se countries are DOW fortunately representp.d in the United Nations and sorne in the Security CowlCil as weIl. The United States and its allies had sufficient wisdom in the end. after rnany years (seven, eight, ten and more, and in the case of the Mongolian People's Repuhlic. almast sixteen). and tlllough courage to vote for the admission of these States to the United Nations, and the impasse which had been created by the United states of America was immediately overcome. 167. 1 was a member of the Soviet delegation when these fourteen new Member States were admitted. ta the United Nations, and 1 must say that as saon as the United states removed its veto-the veto with which it had barred the admission of a number of new States without any justification-the whole matter was settled literally within the space of half an hour, bath in the Security Council and in the General Assembly. 168. We all witnessed the final reperCUssions of this affair last year, when the question of the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic was settled and that country at last took itsrightfuIplacein the United Nations family after sixteenyearsoffruitless effortsefforts which had been constantly frustrated by the political resistance and sabotage of the United States of America. 169. The right of veto in the Security Council IS a sagacious provision, the cornerstone of the United Nations Charter. Without the right of veto it is Ilot difficult ta imagine what would hav~ been the shape cf many of the Security Council's resolutions, which would have meant success for the United States in its attempts ta rule the whole world. But the real balance of power in the world is not such as to allow the 170. We are proud of the occasions on which we use this veto in the interests of univel'sal peace and security-on such occ ions, many of which were recalled by Ml'< Stevenson, as when we rightly supported India's pvsition in the question of Goa, which was also accounted one of our mortal sins by the United States representative, or when \Ve prevented or tried ta prevent the policy of imperiaHst aggression in the Congo, and on many other occasions enumeratedhere. 171. I do not intend ta go over this whole keyboard of Ml'. Lodge's on which Ml'. Stevenson gave us such a fine recital taday-nor, indeed. is there any need for me ta do so, There is no needto go over it in arder ta say that we have supported the principles ofthe Charter and the strengthening of the United Nations, and intend ta go on doing sa. Weintendto vote in the SecurHy Council only for decisions likely ta promote the maintenance of international peace and secUrity. 172. We are prepared neither ta partieipate in norto be passive witnesses of this completely unambiguous political game which has been played out here, at this meeting and at earlier meetings of the Couneil, in which the Kashrr.Jr question has been used ta increase tension in the relations between two Asian cOWltries and thereby to undermine international peace and security. We have nevel' taken part and never will take p!W:'t in operations of this kind. 173. 1 believe that neithel' Ml'. Stevenson nor the United States Government has the right ta pass judgement on the :"oliey of the SOviet Union. This policy is well known ta the peoples of Asia and Airica. However. we do not expect the approval of th05e who attempt ta impose their own will or their colonial policy in allch questions as Goa, the Congo, etc., etc. 174. Permit me ta conclude \Vith that, and ta say that when thi;,; meeting of the Council is over we shall nonetheless go away satisfied despite the strained atmosphere which was created in the closing stages of the debate deliberately and for definite political purposes. 175. We shall go hence with satisfaction, for wehave heard the Indian representative declare that his Government will not he the first ta resort ta armed force in the Kashmir question; we have also heard. although not quite so clef"ù'ly worded. a statement to the sarne effect by the representative of the Pakistan Government. We have heard, moreover, that neither side rejects the possibility of ta1k:s on this matter, and if such talks take pllJ.ce withoutthe interference of third parties, in a bush.6ss-life andharmonious atmosphere. we are confident that th\~ maintenance ofinternational peace and securityin {~,:,s area will he assured.

Before the interpretation of the statement by the repre- 178. Ml'. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russiân): Mr. President, inasmuch as 1 am canvinced that those who llstened ta me with open hearts and minds have understood what 1 wanted to say. 1 do not insist on its being :repeated twice more in the other languages. 1 agree ta the suggestion of the Ghanaian representative. 179. The PRFSlDENT (translated from French): If nomember of the COUDcil wishes ta speak, l shall give the floor ta the representative of Pakistan. who has asked to make a brief statement.

If 1 have requested permission to speak at this late hour and at this late stage in the proceedings of the Security Cauncil. it is for a very definite and precise purpose. 1 have no intention of starting or resuming a debate. but in view of certain statements which the Defence Minister of India has made-statements which he had an absolute and perfect right ta make but which, if 1 did not say anything with regard ta them, might create the impression that Pakistan had eUher acceptadthem or acquiesced in them-I feel some comment from me is necessary. 1 assure you that my comment in each case will be quite brief. 1 will not take up everything that he has stated, but only certainoutstanding matters. 181. He started by saying that there is no dispute between India and Pakistan. That is not in accord with the record. There has til these years been a dispute between India and Pakistan over the question of the accession of the States of Jammu and Kashmir ta buüa or ta Pakistan, 182. With regard to the resolutions of the United Natians Commission for India and Pakistan. cextain matters have been referred ta-and they had also been referred to before-as having become inoperative for certain reasons. Some ofthe reasons thatwere adduced were also adduced before the Commission itself and the Commission took note of those matters-for instance, the validity of the accession. the sovereignty of India, the alleged aggression by Pakistan; and it was after they had taken everything into account that they proposed their resolutions, which were then accepted Dy bath parties. Those matters were therefore covered by the resolutions. The suhstanceofthe resolutions which bath parties accepted was, apart from the procedure through which'that substance was to be given effect. that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be determined through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. Why i8 it alleged today that the resolutions are no longer operative and that the plebiscite is no longer in arder? 1 will comment briefly on some of the grounds. l:~a 183. Firstly, it was stated thatIndiar2dneveragreed 1 ta the plebIscite. This again is manifr;lBl1y contrary to 184. 8ecolldly, it has been stated that the resolutions have become illoperative because Pakistan has not complied with Hs obligation to withdraw its troops completely from the nAzadn Kashmir territory and that that is whythefurther implementationofthe resolutiolls was bloclced. Now, the question ofwhatwas the obligation lU1dertalcel1 by Pakistan and when it was to come into operation is in dispute hetween the parties. On behalf of India ft is stated that that obligation had to he carried out completely before any further implementation coulel take place. That is not the text of the resolution, that is 110t the e>.:planation of the Commission; but l will not enter into that. Assume that India may be right or that, on the other hand, Pakistan may be right: that is a question in dispute. The determination of that question depends upon where the respollsibility lies for the blockiugorobstructionofthe further Implementation of the resolutions. Tbat question needs determination, 185. Thirdly, it is said that iuasmuch as a long tim~ has elapsed since the resolutions were accepted, their Implementation lS no longer feasible. There the important questi.on that al'ises is: Who is responsible for the long time that has elapsedwithout implementation? That agaiu is a question to be determined. If it is Pakistan that is responsible for the delay, it may he that Pakistan cannat today, thirteen and a half or fourteen years after the resolutions were accepted, after having blocked their implementation, request that they be carried out. But assuming that whatever determinatlon takes place finds that it is India which is responsible for blocking the implementation and for the long lapse of time, surely India could not then take advantage of its OWll default by saying that, since it has succeeded sa long in blocking the implementation of the resolutions, it shmùd no longer be called upon to implement them today. 186. Fourthly, it is stated that certain changes have taken place anel that therefore the resolutions cannot he implemented. That, again will depend on what type of changes have taken place and on what the effect of those changes may he upOn the obligations undertaken by the parties under the resolutions. Again, a question which must be determined. 1 , 187, Filthly, it is said that the resolutions and the plebiscite cannot and indeed need not be carried out, because the people of Kashrnirhave already expressed their wishes three times, during elections, with regard ta the accession. On Ws 1 will submit just three very brief comments. 188. First, not all the people of Kashmir have taken part even in the so-called expression of the wishes of the people. The people of Kashmir who were fighting in 1947 and 1948 have not expressed thei1' wishes in this matter because they have reliedol1 the assurance,';; of the Security Cou.'lcil that the fighting should cease, hecause what they were fighting for would be assu1'ed 190. 1 would submit. therefore, that it is neither a safe DOl' a vaUd contention to hold that a unilateral pronouncement by one of the parties who have under-- taken international obligations towards the Security Counci! and towards the other party ta a dispute-or ta a situation, whichever way it may be describedreleases that party from its obligations. This, as 1 said, is not a saie method. Indeed it is a very dangerous principle, for if it were accepted it would black all peaceful settlement ofinternational disputes. 191, ln my original submission to the Security Counci! 1 pointed out, and 1 now repeat, that if India is allxious to be released from its obligations under the UNCIP 'resolutions on any of these grounds, on all of these grounds or on any other grounds which may or even which lllay not have already beeu mentioned by India, then there is one method of doing it. It has been stated by the Defence Minister of India that the Security Counci! is not a judicial body. But there is a judicial body available for the determination of justiciable questions-and ail these questions are either pure questions of law or mixed questions of fact and law. If India wants a release from its obligations on any of those grounds, it should propose as much ta the Security Counci! and 1'equest an advisory opinion of the International Court on all tbese mattersthe validity of the accession, the question of the sovereignty of India over the State of Jammu and Kashmir, questions which are in dispute and have not yet been determined. Therefore, it is begging these questions to say that India treats them as though they are determined in its own favour. 192. Taking al! these matters-all the considerations that India has mentioned here and any others that it might be desirous of including for determinationinto accotmt, the real question in the case today is: Having regard to the changes that have taken place, ta the time that has elapsed and to the fact that the implementation of the resolutions has been halted, under aU these circumstances, what are the obligations of the parties under the resolutions? That would he a fair way ofmaldng a determination. Let the International Court determinethese matters, ifIndia wishes to request 8uch a determination, and let the parties agree in advance that they will accept the determination of the International Court and carry out their obligations accordingly. ; ~ 193. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): 1 have no more speakers on my list. 1think that at this J 194. Ml'. Krishna MENON (Indial: ln my last statement, when 1 spoke on the draft resolution, 1 took care ta reserve my position with regard ta the various statements of the members of the Couneil. 1 deliberately did not make those comments at that time in order that the Council might proceed with!ts business on the draft resolution. Even after 1 had made that reservation and the voting had taken place, and there had been another long discussion on \Vhichitis not my business as a non-member of the Council ta comment, 1 stiU had reservations with regard to entering into a debate again. Although the representative of Pakistan had aIl the time-from the fifteenth of this month onwards-and the liberty ta intervene in tlùs matter, he did not do sa. Now he has spoken at the tail en". of the discussion. It would-hardly be fair ta my country and Government ta leave unanswered the statements which, if they remained unanswered on the record, might perhaps be taken as unanswerable. That would not be proper. My Government and 1 would Ilot be able ta justify this to our people or to our ParHament. l 195. Although the representative of Pakistan, with aU bis skiU and ability, has tried ta condense these points, it i8 necessary ta reply to them because what he has doue has been to throw a number of stones-a stone can be a very small one but it can hurt a lot and its impact can be widespread. It is quite easy for Sir Muhammad ta say that accession is in "dispute", it is then necessary for me to prove that it is not in dispute. The tactics are the same as in the case of their infringements upon our border. They choose the place in which to fight. It we shoot it will be into the jungle, but they can shoot in our villages. They choose the place of the aggressor. These are'always the tactics of people who do not follow the :rules of war or peace. 1 shall deal withthesepoints one by one. ~ 196. First, the representative of Pakistan said that the Government of India has said that there is no dispute. This is certainly a lldispute" in popular language in the sense that there is a difference of opinion, there is a difference of views, there is a difference of interests; but there is na "dispute" in terms of the Charter. It is a IIsituation" which was crea::ed by the aggression of Pakistan against the territory of India. At one time it was admitted by Pakistan itself, in that they said that they were not there. Therefore, other people who came there were not authorized to be there, We maintain that tbis ls a situation of aggression and not a dispute. They have said that there are points in dispute, namely accession. Accession, even if it were in dispute, would not come here, Validityof accession, at best, is a legal point. There is no dispute about the fact of accession; the fact is with us. One third or one fourth may remain with them by 197. But sinee Sir Muhammad l'aises this question of accession again, what am 1 ta do except ta point out that. as we have repeatedly said, the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir ta the Union of fudia, both by her Act of Accession and by our Constitution, by the agreement of the British Government, Pakistan and ourselves, i6 full, complete, final and irrevocable. Therefore, any rernoving of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. or any part of it, fram the Union would be an aat of cession and an aat of disintegration of our country. Therefore, it ls not l'ight ta say that accession i8 still in dispute. j 198. As 1 said once before today and once on a previous occasion, this was admitted and was stated in this Council by no less a persan than the representative of the United States, whose statement 1 quoted on the last occasion, when Ml'. Warren Austin said that the sovereignty of Kashmir lay with India, and that is why she is here; otherwiseshe wouldnotbe here at aIl. Moreover, on the question of accession, if it was a dispute, the Security Council still could not be seized of it. On the other hand, if Kashmir ha,.d not acceded to India, we would not be entitled to be here. 199. Then cornes the question of the UNCIP resolutions. This is a matter which unfortunately requires very considerable elaboration. It does misleadanumber of members of the Counci! who, 1 have no doubt, are weIl intentioned. It has been said more than once that the two UNCIP resolutions wash out aB our contentions about sovereignty and so on. In fact, they do nothing of the kind. Each of the main paragraphs in these resolutions was discussed by the Commission and by the Government of India, mainly by the Prime Minister, and when we agreed to it clause by clause or part by part it was in the context and on the basis of the assurances that were given ta India. 1 could l'ead the text to the members of the Council if they had tirne to listen. But 1 shaH summarize the points of these assurances• 200. The first assurance was: "Responsibility for the seourity of the State rests with Indîa." This was not only agreed to by the Commission, but it was also stated in the resolution of 13 August itself, when the Gov~rnment of India was asked ta malntain garrisons in the Northern areas, to keep external forces from coming into our territories, and to assist in the maintenance of law and arder within the cease-tire Hues in the places which are now illegally occupied by Pakistan and which it was anticipated they would evacuate, so that the territory would be returned ta India. 201. Secondly, "The sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the enUre territory of the State shaH not be called into questionn. On this particular matter-and 1would like my colleagues to take note of this-pointed questions were asked by the 203. The fourth of these assurances given was that, "There shaH be no recognition of the so-called 'Azad' Kashmir Government". 1 am bound ta say that there has been no recognition by the UnitedNations although attempts havebeeu made in that direction. But Pakistan is a party to fuis agreement. There were no "Azad" Kashmir forces recognized at that time, theycouldnot be recognized as an entity, let alone as a gnvernment. 204. The fifth condition was that "The territory occupied by Pakistan shaH not be consolidated". Not only has it been consolidated, but it has been annexed ta Pakistan under their constitutional law and sorne sort of accession obtained from sorne parts contrary to any provisions anywhere. 205. The sixth assurance refers ta the: "Reversion of administration of the evacuated areas in the north to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and its defence to the Government of India, and ta maintain garrisons for preventing the incursion of tribesmen and to guard the main trade routes." l want to submit that what l am reading \Vere and are not demands by India, (and were not proposaIs submitted ta the Commission_ but are aSsurances given tp India on behalf of the Council. ~06. The seventh of these assurances states that: "'Azad' Kashmir forces shaH be disbanded and disarmed". That is to say, since these "Azad" Kashmir forces were presumed to be at that time for the most part people from that area itself, they could not be sent away; they belonged there. Therefore. the only t.hing was that they should be disarmed anddisbanded. There was sorne argument about tbis, and the Commission ultimately agreed that disbanding and dis- 208. When speaking about this resolution, therefore, you cannat divorce it from these assurances and the other assurances that have been given at various times. As the President has asked me ta he brief, 1cannat say very much more on tbis question. 209. Then we are sometimes asked, why is tilere no plebiscite? Apart from the question of "changed conditions ", the impassibility of taking it, how can \Ve take a plebiscite, even if we wanted ta, unlese part 1 and then part II and part ID of the resolution of 13 August are implemented? ln the implementation of part III will come the discussion between the Governments of Pakistan and India separately \vith the Commission as to the manner of determining-there i8 not even a reference ta a plebiscite in the third part of the resolution_the future status of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the ,,"in of the people. The implementation of part ID was prevented not by us' buf by ·Pakistan from those days onwards. We immediately proceeded to democratize the area under our control. Elections have taken place not only nationally, not only in towns and urban areas, but also in villages aIl over the territory. There is democracy in the areas administered as part of the Union ·right down ta the village leveI. 1 lmow that tbis is not part of the pattern of Pakistan, but that does not mean that it is not what was intended. We had never agreed to a plebiscite under any circumstances, butto aplebiscite at that time following aIl these things step by step. ln any cas'e, there has been no opportunity, even within the existing limitations, for the people of the socalled IfAzad" areas to express their views in any way whatsoever. 210. Th~ texts of these resolutions are before you and, as 1 pointed out, each of these paragraphs was agreed to in tbis way. India accepted tbis resolution, Pakistan did not accept it at first. After three or four months of negotiations, they stated their acceptance. 210. résolutions l'occasion paragraphes L'Inde est mois 211. Then came the 5 January 1949 resolution. Mr. Stevenson has referred ta one paragraph in H. It should be understood that the 5 January resolution \Vas supplemental ta the previous one. It is like an architect's plan, that is, when the third part of the resolution was implemented, then, if we agreed on a plebiscite, the way of doing it was there. That was the idea of that resolution. It is clearly set out in 211. M. graphes. 5 en troisième été plébiscite, i 213. 1 shaH skip a number of other points and then come to tm3 point raised by Mr. Muhammad Zafrulla Khan which obviously will have a kind of superficial appeal for some people, that is to say, that the SecurUy Council had promised the people who were fighting for liberty in Kashmir that the matter would hesettled in a certain manner. Who were the people fighting for liberty in Kashmir? Pakistan and its predecessors were fighting for the British Government against the people who weTe fighting for liberty in Kashmir. 214. It was also said that the whole of the trouble in Kashmir arase because of the rebellion against the Maharajah by the' people. As 1 said, unfortunately for me but perhaps fortunately for you, because you do not want ta be bored by it, there is a whole set of papers here which 1 cannot read out now. If it is the desire of the Council, we could either file them as a document or read out ta you. This is the diary of Major-General Scott, the British Commander of the Maharajah's forces. He \Vas not suppressing a rebellion. There is no instance in this diary, except in one or two places, of incidents occurring in which the local population joined the intruders. Apart fromthat, the diary of Major-General Scott, which 1 intend ta submit as one of the documents, states on 31 August 1947, that is ta say sixteen days after independence. in a note: "Encounter on 29th between the Miljtary procee:ding to Bagh and hostiles who \Vere armed with mode~n rifles •••" 1 will not read aIl of it because it is vJell documented. The Maharajah's army was not dealing \Vith the population of Kashmir but with the people who had come from the trans-Kashmir area from -and over the territory of Pakistan. We had been told by the then Prime Minister-and we. had accepted in good faith-that this invasion was not undertaken with their connivance or their assistance. The intruders, we were told, could'not, be stopped because they were co-religionists or something of that kind. They were. however, the armed gangs from west of the Jhelum River andtheyhadbeen at large in Western Poonch since 4 September. 215. W~ see an entry in Major-General Scottls diary on 16 September 1947 as follows: "Report is Paltistim army vi~ited Alibeg on 14th within State border and a Sikh ce'ntre". ! 217. The argument that is being repeatedly adv~nced is that Lord Mountbatten said something at that time and wrote a letter at that time. No one denies this. What is more, he wrote itontheadvice of the Government of India, for he was the constitutionalGovernor- General. What is ta be remembered, however, is that there was a document of application for accession and ·an acceptance by the Governor-General which made the accession complete. This letter is not part of that document, it 1s a separate matter. Once accession i8 completed, anything else that is said is a wrilateral declaration on our part which it may be moral or immoral for us not ta impIement., but it is not a matter for the Security Counci!. We could not implement it in the way we desired beca'.lSe as we said even then. and it has often been repeated in this Council, even by our friends, that Lord Mountbatten also said, it was ta have been implemented when the country was rid of invaders-and the country has never been rid of invaders. It was not as though anything he said had been morally, legally or otherwise breached in performance. 217. avait époque. cette dont tionnel. qu'il d'adhésion concrétisait fait question. qui unilatérale paraitre pas faite dit aussi cation envahisseurs des qu'il ment, 218. Then, reference has been made to the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir. In 1957, the United States delegation was slightly misled on the question of the Constituent Assembly. In fact, they thought that the delegation of India had made long speeches in arder to practise what is familiarly called in this country filibustering. 1 could not have filled in for five days in aoy case, but over and above that we have said from the very beginning-not vis-à-vis theSecurityCouncîl, but vis-à-vis the Constitution of India-that under our system the States may express the forms of government they want, and sa on. It is quite unlike the United States where they have State rights vested in the States; OUr reserve powers are in the centre. And so we say, weil, of course, we will very gladly allowyou ta Bay ail these things, but they will not be legallybinding. They have, or may have, a moral effect, no doubt, but they are not binding upon us. There was no need to drag in the Constituent Assembly here, but if the Constituent Assembly discussions have any validity, they are all against the case made by Pakistan. 1have no desire ta repeat aIl the details because they have allbeen placed 218. du était En faisait ce "filibustering". parler noUS du Constitution Etats qu'ilS aux dévolus; du serons toutes ment. n'en avait sur 220. We are tald that WB want a relea::><>. from the UNCIP resolutiolls. We want nothing of tI. . kind BUggested or implied by those who say this. If WB wanted ta be released froID the UNCIP resolutions, whydo we honour the cease-fire Hne? Yet it is a cease-fire Hne which we have many rea::.,JUs for terminating, because it is not always administered-according ta us-with the degree of impartiality that 15 required of those concerned. What is more, Pakistan, even after the marking of the cease-fire Une, has taken territorywhich we could retake by force, but that would lead to an aggravation of the situation. Sa, striking a balance, Wb let them keep it for the present. There are other parts on the other side of the international frontier of Jammu and Kashmir where there have also been breaches of thiskindby Pakistan. As many as 140 violations of the cease-fire Une have taken place this year. l'here are approximately ninety or ninety-five incidents lnside Kashmir organized by Pakistan, by way of violence and sabotage, in which Pakistan, British and American ammunition has been found. 1 am not for a moment suggesting that either the British or the Americans gave it ta them for this purpose, but what 1 am saying is, give a child a Imife to play with and he will hurt somebody. He 'Will not ask bis parents' permission ta do sa. 221. We have been asked why we do not go ta the World Court for an advisory opinion. 1certainlyunderstand Ml'. Zafru1la Khan's respect for the World Court; he .has been there for sorne Ume, but this is not a matter for a World Court or for an advisory opinion. This is a poHtical issue and, what is more, we are bath members of Sir Patrick's much-Ioved Commonwealth and under the terms of our adherence ta the World Court we have made sorne exceptions in regard to the matters which can he referred ta it, and while there may be reason why they or we should not change these reservations, we are not going to pour the baby out with the bath water, without finding out what the consequences 'Will he. What with the common and the uncommon markets, all kinds of disputes may arise and we sha1l find ourselves, instead of being in a fraternity, engaged in all kinds of litigation. That is my personal opinion. So the question of reference to the World Court does not arise. 222. Before 1 conclude, and 1 shall not take much more time, 1 should like ta refer to the scepticism that exists in regard ta our argument about changed conditions. Let me point out what it means. If 1 had the Ume 1 could quote instance after instance in which the United States, from the time of the Revolutionary War and its independence right up to the time of President Roosevelt, has invoked this doctrine of 223. In 1881, the UnitedStates invokedcertainchanges of circumstances as a reason for revising the provisions of the Claytan-Bulwer Treaty of 19 April 1850 between Great Britain and the United States. Lord Granville, who was the British Secretary of State at that time, replied that the opinions of acknowledged writers on international law could be quoted in support of his own opinion that "The principles upon which the whole argument of the despatch is founded are .•. novel in international law". He therefore treated the matter from the side of the practical considerations it involved, reserving the legal dispute. That is to say that at that time even the British Government, while having doubts about it, did not reject it. tout 224. Then other Secretaries of State-in regard to the Panama Canal, a very sore subject-argued in 1882 and 1883 that the treaty was voidable because the articles relating to the Canalhadbecomeobsolete, and because Great Britain had violated important provisions of the treaty. The first contention was based upon an interpretation of the treaty, contested by Great Britain, according to which the treaty related "ta a particular ship canal ta be construetedby a particular company", and so on. So, anyway, conditions had changed. 224. - - pouvait au Bretagne motif testée trait taine les 225. Then we come to the Secret Treaty of London of 1915. France, Great Britain and Russiaagreedwith Italy in 1915 that if th~ latter entered the war against the Central Powers on the side of the Allied Powers, the former would consent to the extension of Italy's frontiers in case of victory. But President Woodrow Wilson argued in 1919 and 1920 for a revision of the treaty of 1915, dirninishing the rights promisedto Italy because "the whole face of circumstances has been altered" since 1915. That was with regard to a secret treaty which, at that time, was considered ta be even more binding than an open treaty. 225. 1915. la entrait côté dissements 1919 Wle avantages conditions s'agissait pératif sont pays. France l'apPui Baneour diplomatiques dénonçait, Htion que, du présentes". "What was the reception afforded ta this act-this unilateral act-of a great Power declaring the treaties abrogated by thesolefactthattheyno longer corresponded to present circumstances, though none had mentioned it save Great Britain? What was the reception given ta this Wlilateral application, pushed '0 'he ext,eme, of 'he olause of rebus sic stantibus?" 43 226. 1 shall not read many more of these. There are sa many of them. There is your own COWltry, Ml'. President. On 10 July 1929 France invoked precedent and practice in its support of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. Ml'. Paul-Boncour asserted that "a series of diplomatic notifications emanated from the British GOvernment which denbunced, by virtue of the same clause rebus sic stantibus, a whole series of treaties concerning the abolition of the slave trade, believing that the treaties which had ruled a determined situation in the middIe of the century no longer responded ta present circumstances ". He asked: 227. 1 wish ta say here and now, firstly, that because 1 have read only a few snch instances, that does not mean that there are not many more of thern, and secondly, that we are not for a moment suggesting that either the resolutions of the Security Council or anything else that takes place here have the status of a treaty. We are saying here that even if they were a treaty, that is the situation. We have not accepted the position that there were any treaty obligations, or even that they are obligations. We have said thât ihey are "engagements" whichwehave entered into, andthat they th",refore vannot be treated as treatyobligations. 228. Then it might seriously be asked whether these "changed conditions" of which we speak are sa serions as ta affect our position. Our answer is that conditions have changed in the sense that Pakistan, in violation of its obligations under internationallaw, has annexed our territory, committed fresh aggressions after 13 August 1948, taken over the territories in Gilgit and other parts of the northern areas, accepted accessions-or sorne similar thing-froill the smalt titular cbiefs in the northernpart of the Kashmir area, in Hunza and Nagar, thereby changing the wholepolitical :mtours of this area, andhas thus created changed con<.oltîons. Secondly, Pakistan has enteredintoamîlitary alliance with other countries, both of Asia and Europe, whereby-as representatives will find li they read the SEATQ treaties-along witn most of them, and as a party to that agreement, Pakistan takes South Asia under its protection. The political map has thereby been changed, and a11 tbis was done after the Kasbtnir situation arose. 229. Thirdly, conditions have changed because of the creation of "Azad" Kashmir-practically a separate entity. Sometimes we are told it is administeredfrom Karachi, now from Rawalpindi, sometimes not. Itmay he that a separate state has been created. But conditions have changed by vîrtue of there being at l~ast twenty-five ta thirty battalions of so-called 'IiAZad" Kasbmir forces-which are front forces for the Pakistan Army-today, equippedwithmodernweapons made available to Pakistan from îts own resources or by Ha military allies. 230. It was expressly stated that the territory under aggressive occupation abould not be consolidated. That was part of the undertaking given to us by the Commission. The consolidation, as l said, has t,aken place-in fact, so much so that they have a Minister of Kashmir Mfairs in their Government. 231. 1 will not say anythil.1g about the psychological war that continues to ma~e it impossible under the cir.cumstances ta obtain a fair plebiscite. We are a Ei8cular State, all of our organization is political and has nothing to do wîth the religious aspectaf a peapie. We are not prepared to face a positionwhere religious fanaticism is ta be, or is, protected. 232. Over and above aIl this tl.,::m has occurred the -situation in wbich Pakistan today-not for any good reasons,. but merely for nuisance value and as an in- 233. Our frontiers are "delimited" and "demarcated". For the most part, they are demarcated, but they are delimited throughout. Our frontiers are delimited in their entirety by historical circumstance and all the other factors that go withit, anddemarcatedin places. Now, Pakistan bas agreed that they are neither demarcated nor delimited! That is to say, they have soId away our birthright in so far as they could. AU these cbanges that have taken place in regard to our own territory and in South-East Asia are matters which maIre the position, as you see in the book, no longer possible. 234. 1 am sarry, therefore, that sorne countries which, quite rightly, have an affinity for legalisms, take one clause out of an agreement and say that we agree ta seIf-determination or something of that kind. This is not tenable. 235. 1 am sorry that other extraneous circumstances bave lengthened the meeting ta this extent, but mainly thanks to your kind courtesies and ta the patience of thé members, 1 have made my brief subnrissions. 1 should like to express my appreciation to you and ta the Council. 1 do not suppose 1 have succeeded in boiling down Anna Karenina to ten pages, but 1 have tried ta counter 1 will not say the arguments-but the impact of the stones thrown at us at the last moment, although there was plenty of time ta do SO on sorne other occasion. 236. 1 wish ta sayhereandnowthatwe are as amdous as anybody that there should be no breach of the peace -of international peace and security-in our area, because ottr people would suffer Most by it. We are as much concerned about international peace and security as any other Member of the United Nations. Even those who do not agree with us, 1 hope.• would not challenge that. 237. SecondIy, 1 wish ta say that, whenthe Security Council is asking us for direct talks on the one hand, and also referring ta the question of not changing the situation by force, 1 wish the followingtobe takeninto account: On behalf of the Government of Inilla-not only now but on a11 the occasions when we have metwe have said that. irrespective of our legal, moral, political and equh~,ble claims, or auy other rights we may have, it ig not the intention of the Government of India to change or redress the wrongs against us by taking the initiative through the use of force. 238. We were not asked ta make this statement; we volunteered it. What is more and must be obvious ta aU, despite the fact that no part of the agreement has beeu imp1emented or honoured, the cease fire is still being observed. 239. In answer to our challenge ta-the attitude of the Gcvernment of Pakistan, and compe11ed by our peaceful. declarations, Pakistan, through Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan the other day said something some- 240. V:ith regard ta the "guarantee" of which Sir Muhammad spoke, as 1 have already said, however, it should not be -forgotten that tbis cornes after the first statement a few days previously threatening us with war. He has said thattheywouldnot seek t·.... bring about a change in the situation except by peaceful methods-that Pakistan wauld always have recourse ta peaceful methods for a settlement. Buthetook care te say that he \Vas "bound ta warn the Security COWlcil that the situation. may not al\Vays continue ta remain passive. Not that the Government itseli will do something to convert it into a situation of tension, but tension might arise. That is not something which anybody should raise his eyebrows over. How can it happen? It has happened. Governments are upset, new Governments take their place and new Governments can change policie13. People get out of hand. There is nothing extraordinary in what 1 have mentioned ta the Council. 1 have merely stressed that there is a live dispute ..." [1010th meeting, para. 65]. There are likely to be changes in government: more sa in our country where there .are elections, than anywhere else, y~t we have not made auy reservations. This, therefore, is a very qualified statement compared to ours. 241. Finally, we are two Members of the United Nations, and, as Sir Patrick would wish ta stress, also member States of the Commonwealth. There is no reason why we should not talk to each other; we have talked to each other on a number of issues. But it is one thing for us ta initiate talks in that way, and something else ta hold talks under sorne mandate of the Security Counci!, with its concomitant implication of a report back, and the same kind of controversy going on. 242. What 1 really want to point out is tbis: that during tbis year my Prime Minister, directly, in his OWll persan, and through our respective representatives, has made at least two efforts ta initiate this, and each of them has been turned down. Yet now the Secur.;.ty Couneit" turns around and' says that the ntwo parties" should get together, and sa on. 1 told my friend from Ghana the other day that 1 understand the desire for conciliation and péace. However, a differer,t approach should be adopted towards those who do sorne things and towards those who do Bot. Vlhile this does not mean that you should not urge the holding of talks in that way, the faet has ta be taken into account that the fauit is Dot on our side. 244. There ls a great deal of 1008e talk about doing this or that or the other. The only good thing that has emerged from aIl the deliberations in t"18 Council over the years, as weIl as from our efforts and theirs, ls the willy-niIly cease-fire Hne, In spite of a11 provocation, 1 say, in al! conscience-I knaw something about this-in spite of a11 provocation, we have not allowed war to break out. 1 hope the Security Council, in spite of all the other extraneous circumstances that may condition the thinking of sorne of its members, whatever side they may belong ta, will take ioto account the fact that, for us, this i8 a guestion of great and vital importance on which 18 centred the unity of India. the secular character of our State, and, what is more, the internaI peace of the country, where there is a population of so-called minorities numbering nearly a hundred million, where very large economic and social experiments-if you like ta calI them thatare takin~ place, sometimes shaking the out of date 244. ou du des ligne tions, quOi guerre en inspirer de fait vitale séculier rieure dlenviron pris les surannées foundation~ of a time-worn society. 245. If lt ls your desire to see progress take place, that cannat be achieved merely by passing resolutîons which have no meaning, which cannat apply in the present circumstances, and which would be used by Pakistan only in arder ta prov@' ta their people that "we have big -people outsige to assist us and therefore you cau do what you really wdut todo"-that Is, attack India, provoke ber and he intransigent. 245. vous des cables ment extérieurs c'est-à-dire avec 246. It is not our desire to create more trouble in the wo:::ld than there already is. But at the same tîme, the Council should not mistakeour desiretogo on adopting a calm and patient approach in tbis matter for an attitude of weakness or subservience or a willingness ta surrender our sovereignty under pressure. We shall never negotiate our sovereignty; we shall neVet surrender our sovereignty. But we shall make a very peaceful effort ta prevent the situation from developing into one that would threaten the peace of the woNd, whereby it would threaten the peace of India as well. The Union of India, its integrity and progress, is a matter of vital ooncern ta us. We are often told by our friends who have our well-being at heart of their great concern for us. Do they really mean that? If they do, they w:i.ll bear this in mind. 247. 1 tbank you and the members of the Council for your kindness and patience. 246. nouvelles jamais notre servilité Notre tions; voulons choses du intégrité, pour nous vraiment? phrase. 247. obligeance

1 b,1'1e no more speakers on my list and 1 ha't7A 'lnly ta adjourn the meeting. It is not likely that l s.lall have occasion to take the Chair again, and,before leaving it 1 should like to say ta the interpreters and to the members of the Secretariat who are here before me that 1 thank them for the outstanding services they ( 47 248. ma Cependant, revenir dire qui servicf'.8 AFRICA/AFRIQUE CTPRUS/CHYPR~, PAN PUBLISHING 10 ""e.and., th. 11,..t sl'eet, CZECHOSLOV... KI.../TCHÉCOSLOV"'QUIE: C"MERDDNfCAMEROUN' LIBRAIRIE DU PEUPLE AFRICAIN La Geranle. 8. f' 1197. Vaou"dè. DIFfUSION INTORN"'TIONALE CAMEROUNAISE DU LIVRE ET DE LA PlHSSE, SanBmel,m•• CONCa (Liopold.iUe): INSTITUT POLITIQUE CONGOlAIS, 6. P. 2307. L'O~old.,II•. ETN1DPI",ÉTHIOPIE, INTERNATIONAL PRESS "GENey, P. O. 90. 120. Add.. Abab•. CH"'N..., UNIVERSITY BOOKSHQP Un..e".lY College 01 Ghan•• Lo.on. "'ce,•. liENT", THE LS."'. 800KSHOP 90x 30167. N."abi. 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