S/PV.1024 Security Council

Monday, Oct. 22, 1962 — Session None, Meeting 1024 — New York — UN Document ↗ OCR ✓ 4 unattributed speechs
This meeting at a glance
7
Speeches
3
Countries
0
Resolutions
Topics
Security Council deliberations General statements and positions War and military aggression Latin American economic relations Global economic relations Peace processes and negotiations

The President unattributed #119873
In accordanoe with the decision taken by the Security Counoil at the méeting yesterday, 1 invite the representative of Cuba to take a place at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mario Garcfa Inch&stegui (Cuba), took a place at the Council table. The interpretation into French of the statementmade by Mr, Aiken (Ireland) at the 1023rd meeting was given.
This agenda item is one of the most serious that the * .Security Council has ever had before it. We must admit that the situation in Cuba today is a threat to international peace and security. ‘, 1 4. TO say that Cuba is an independent State which has the right to take what defence measures it sees fit is not a justification or even an explanation. Cuba is not acting alone now, if it ever did have the initiative. When a small Power places itself in such circumstances at the disposa1 of a great Power and lends itself to offensive military preparations, there cari be no doubt that this Will imperil world peace, and the international community is therefore entitled to take the matter up. 5. The most serious point, it seems to me, is the deliberate incxeasing of tension in an area where for several years efforts had been made precisely to prevent any crisis from becoming acute o,r spreading. 6. 1s there the slightest justification for the sudden introduction of extremely powerful offensive weapons into a country whose territory no one claims, and which is not exposed to any of the nuclear threats about which we have heard SO much from the highest leaders of the Soviet Union in years past? 0 7, 1 am compelled to answer “No”. No threat of this kind has been made against Cuba. The appearance of foreign nuclear missiles on Cuban soi1 cannot therefore be regarded as anything but a serious action aimed at opening up a new war front in a region which had hitherto been safe. 8. 1 cannot but note at the same time that in acting in this way, the Soviet Union clearly shows the real nature of its interest in the doctrine of non-alignment, of which it has become the champion. Nothing could show more clearly the real designs it harbours and how much importance it attaches to the independence which it claims to defend SO fiercely against the socalled imperialists. 9. My delegation feels that the reactions of the Latin American countries are an added reason for believing in the gravity of the situation created by the Soviet Union, We know how jealous these States are of their independence. We know that they have tried to keep Cuba within the Latin American community. Despite the sympathy which some of them showed at first for the Cuban revolution, they are now obliged to review their selations with Cuba in the light of the requirements in the securlty of the Western Hemisphere, which they see as inseparable from the need to safeguard the freedom to which they have always been attached. 11, For a11 these reasons, the French delegation considers, in conclusion, that the draft resolution submitted by the United States IS/5182] meets the requirements of the situation. Without minimizing thegravity of the situation, it clearly shows that the United States Government is striving for a peaceful solution in accordance with the principles of the Charter. France believes that such a solution is possible anddesirable, not only in the immediate interest of the oountries most directly concerned, but also to banish once and for a11 the peril in which the recent developments in Cuba have placed world peace. 12. For these reasons, the French delegation will vote for the United States draft resolution.
The President unattributed #119881
1 now cal1 on Mr. Liu.
Mr. President, at this critical hour in world affairs it would be inappropriate on my part not to overlook the unparliamentary mannes in which 1 have been called upon to speak. 15. For some time now, my Government haswatched the events in Cuba, where we have a large Chinese oommunity, with considerable concern. The revolution that started with promise of democratic development has passed into totalitarian darkness. It is particularly disturbing to observe that this country has now been transformed, as a result of “Sino-Soviet intervention”, in the words of the communiqu6 of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics on 3 October, Ynto an armed base for communist penetration of the Americas and subversion of the democratic institutions of the hemisphere ne 16. We of China have great sympathy for the Cuban people, who find themselves today in the same state of misfortune as the Chinese people on the mainland of China, They are being held captive by an alien force through a regime which is sustained in power by violence. Their entire homeland is being converted into a beachhead for international communism and their natural resources and manpower are being diverted to serve the purposes of the oommunist aggression. 1’7. This similarity of fate that has befallen the Cuban people and the Chinese people on the mainland enables my delegation, perhaps bettes than many others, to appraise and understand what is taking place in Cuba. It is no surprise to us that the Soviet Union should have installed weapons of mass destruction in that strategic island to further its designs on the Western Hemisphere. Nor are we surprised that the Soviet Union should have covered up its nefarious aotivities by a string of declarations couohed in terms of falsehood and deception. 18, We heard at the last meeting the voice of Latin America-the whole continent-speaking through the L/ Subsequently circulated as document S/5193. 19. It has been said that little Cuba cannot be a threat to her neighbour to the north, themostpowerful country in the world. 3ut what is now threatening the security of the United States, as well as that of the Western Kemisphere and the free world, is not tiny Cuba, but a Soviet nuclear base in the Caribbean, which is intended as a merans of blackmailing and terrorizing the whole continent into submission. 20. Last evening [1022nd meeting] we heard the only dissenting note from Latin America in the person of the representative of Cuba, who, in somewhat melodramatic manner, questioned whether missiles cari be classified into good ones and badones. My reaction was simply this: a11 weapons cannot intrinsically be differentiated into good ones or bad ones, but the man who carries such weapons cari be easily differentiated. A revolver in the hands of a gangster is not the same thing as a revolver in the top drawer of a peaceful oitizen, Whether a person is a gangster or a peaceful Citizen depends entirely on his record. And what a criminal secord international communism has written for itself in recent years. 21. As the representative of the United Kingdom made it quite clear at the last meeting, everyone knows the tragic and terrible story of Cuba and of the agreements broken and aggressions waged by the USSR since the end of the SecondWorldWar. The real threat to the peace, therefore, does not lie in tiny Cuba, with its strategic position in the Caribbean, but in the deolared polioies as well as the undeclared intentions of the Soviet Union, and in the posture of hostility assumed by Dr. _ Castro towards the democratic institutions of the Americas since he brought his country under the domination of the Soviet Union, 22. The issue at stake is not whether Cuba has the right to build up its own defence, but whether.the Soviet Union should be allowed to install weapons of mass destruction in that strategic area, with a11 the foreseeable consequenoes. 23. The United States, as we know, has already initiated measures oaloulated to cal1 an immediate halt to the shipment of military flmatériel” to Cuba, I think it is quité within the right of the United States to stop the continuous flow of offensive weapans into Cuba 24. In bringing the matter promptly to the attention of the Security Council, the United States has demonstrated its earnestness toprevent any further aggravation of a situation already fraught with the gravest potentialities. Since the present crisis has been brought about by the Soviet military build-up in Cuba, it cari be speedily brought to an end by removing the offensive weapons from Cuba, if the Soviet Union wishes to convince the world of its professions. 25. The draft resolution submitted by the United States [S/5182] is, in the opinion of my delegation, a reasonable one. It is peaceful in intention and peaoeful in its objectives, It should therefore have the support of the Council. 26, Ms. SCHWEITZER (Chile) (translated from Spanish): The people and Government of Chile note with deep anxiety that the cold war has broken out on our continent, giving rise to one of the gxavest threats to peace and security throughout the world. A chill of terrox is now gripping mankind. Any worsening of the situation in the Caribbean woulcl be the beginning of catastrophe. 27. Upon Cuba hinges the fate of a11 peoples of the world, At this critical turning-point in histoxy, we must pxoceed with extxeme tare and seek, decisively and intelligently, a rapid and effective solution which Will enable the United Nations to impose its policy of peace and undexstanding between nations, ‘sions que celle-ci 28. Chile has always maintained a calm attitude with regard to Cuba, its’ revolution and the impact of that revolution on our hemisphere. We have disagreed with Cuba, but we have not attacked it. Onthe contrary, we maintain normal relations with it. 29. My countxy has always been confidentthat between C*uba and the rest of the Latin Amexican countxies there could ultimately be a xeconciliation whereby that country would be reincorporated in the xegional system. 30. Chile has always defended the principles of nonintervention and the self-determination of peoples. Although we do not share the Cuban rulexs’ political ideology, which is incompatible with the prinoiples of xepsesentative democracy upheld by the American Rates, we have presexved an objective and dispassionate attitude towards the Cuban régime. This stand taken by Chile invests my words withacalm that must be recognized in these crucial moments. 31, Today it is not a question of the Cuban revolution, the infiltration of its ideology into oux countries, the nature of its doctrine, or its political methods. Unfortunately, in Cuba an extracontfnental Power has found an open door thxough whioh to intexvene in our hemisphere and menace its security, to try to COnVert the Caxibbean island into a wax base whexepads bave been set up for the launchingof long-range nuclear missiles that are, self-evidently, offensive in charactex. fait qulti Cuba une puissance une base de guerre 34. In face of the very grave danger to peace, the integrity of the American continent and the security of a11 nations which has arisen inthe Caribbean, Chile adopts a firm and well-defined attitude in keeping with its traditions and its international commitments. 35. From the very beginning of their independent life, the American’ States have demonstrated their apprehension lest any political influence from abroad should present a threat to their sovereignty. This gave rise to unilateral doctrines and, later, to the conclusion of a series of bilateral or multilateral treaties whereby the American countries undertook to unite in repelling any alien, extracontinental interference that sought to influence their political systems. 36. ..The appearance, in this Century, of pOlitiCa1, social and economic systems of an expansionist type increased the American States 1 fear that an extracontinental Power might seek to exert an influence over their destinies. Various resolutions were therefore adopted, within the regional system, to prevent outside intervention. Very many ,resolutions were adopted, at the Pan-American conferences, for the purpose of resisting nazi or fascist intervention in the American continent, Such wese the xesolution on protection against ideologies subversive of the inter- American ideal, the resolution on activities directed from abroad against national institutions, @nd the resolution on the propagation of doctrines tending to endanger the common inter-American democratic ideal or to compromise the security of the American republics, 37. ,The Second World War had basely,endedwhen the American States condemned, at BogotB,z/“in thename of international law, interference by any foreign Power, of by any political organization serving the interests of a foreign Power, in the public life of the nations of the American continent”. Later, in 1951, the American Governments again rejected a11 foreignpolitical interference in the Continent!s aff airs, 21 Ninrh International Conference of American Sraces, held at Bo@t&, Colombia, from 30 March to 2 May 1948. VeIiUOn by any American State jeopardizes American solidarity and security, wherefor the Organixation of American States is, under obligation to disapprove it and rejeCt it with equal vigour”. They also agreed to reject “the attempt of the Sino-Soviet powers tom&e use of the political, economio, or social situation of anY American State, inasmuch as that attempt is capable of destroying hemispheric unity and jeopardizing the peace and the security of the hemispherel’. 40. The position of the American Governments was therefore clear with regard to any extracontinental int;srvention in the affaira of the hemisphere. 4.1. Nevertheless, in Cuba, interference continued to develop ever more actively and intensively. Accordingly, the Amerioan Ministers of Foreign Affairs met again, in January of this year, at J?unta del Este, Although there were differences among them with regard to the exclusion of Cuba from theinter-Amerioan system and the appropriateness of adoptingpolitioal or economic sanctions against that oountry, nineteen Mini&ers of Foreign Affairs were unanimously agreed that “the attitude adopted by the present Government of Cuba and its acceptanceof military assistance offered by extracontinental communist Powers breaks down the effective defence of the inter-dmeric an systemtt , Y 42. It was hoped that those resolutions wouldprevent increased alien intervention in Cuba; and that hope was particularly felt by those countries which, like Chile, hacl not agreed to Cuba’s exclusion from the inter-American system, had refusedto adopt measures against that country’s Government, and had or still maintained diplomatie relations with it. 43. This month, on 3 October, the American Mini&ers of Foreign Affairs met informally at Washington and expressed the opinion that Yhe Soviet Union’s intervention in Cuba threatens the unity of the Americas and its democratic institutions, and that this intervention has characteristics which . . . cal1 for the adoption of special measures ” under the ReciProcal Assistance Treaty of Rio de Janeiro.9 3/ Resolution 1 edopted by the Seventh Meetingof Consukation of Ministere of Foreign Affairs of the Amerkao sates. See document S/448O. 4/ ~i,-,~l ,&t of the Eighth Meeting Of COnBUhtiOn Of Mhkmis Of Foreign Affairs of the American States, held at Punta del Em UruWY, frorn 22 to 31 January 1962. See Officia1 Records of the SeCmi&’ (%ncil* Seventeena yeer, Supplement for January, Febru=?’ and Mer& 1962. document S/5075, resolution VI. 5/ Inter-American Treety of Reciprocal Assistance, eignd et Rio de Janeiro on 2 September 1947; see United Nations, *eV serie% vol. 21 (1943), 1. No. 324~. 45. Accordingly, when it was requested that the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-Amerioan System set up under the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro beconvened, Chile unhesitatingly pronounced in favour of such a meeting. 48. At other times we had opposed the application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance t0 the case of Cuba, because we felt that the evidence Presented did not constitute sufficient ground for resOrt to that juridical machinery. But, in the light of events which were exhaustively studied by my Government, we came to the conclusion that this time it; was advisable to set the regional system’s seourity machinery in motion, Once again, Chile acted inperfect accord with its juridicial traditions, and felt that the moment had arrived when it should contribute its cooperation to the cause of continental solidarity. 47. We were exceptionally alarmed by the existence of nuclear weapons in Cuba-weapons of whioh the Latin American countries had hitherto been free, and which are SO contrary to the peaceful disposition of OU peoples. We were particularly alarmed that such weapons should have arrived clandestinely. IlIf suoh efforts were to miscarry, Chile considers that as a partial and temporary measure we should at least achieve the setting up of atom-free zones in the world. And we further consider that Latin America should be one of those zones. Our countries would commit themselves not only not to pursue nuclear weapons, but to reject them if they were offered to us n* . 49. The representatives of Brazil and Mexico, Mr. Arinos de Melo Franco and Mr. Padilla Nervo, have expres sed similar views at this session of the General Assembly. This shows that the Latin American oountries are keenly exercised by the problem of nuclear arms, and explains the great distress we experienced on learning that such arms already existed in one of OUI’ continent’s republics. 48. We Latin American nations have been seeking how to be spared nuclear war. At this session of the General Assembly, when the question of the suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuolear tests came up, the representative of Chile-a few days ago-called for the rapid ending of such tests and, supporting the Eight-Power Memorandum, said: 50. It is therefore no matter for surprise thatyesterday, 23 Ootober, the American States meeting under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance agreed to apply its defensive provisions and to adopt tbe individual or collective measures which are oonsidered neoessary in order to ensure that the Govern- .ment of Cuba does not continue to receive war material -/ Thf s zment waa made at the 1249th meeting of the First Committee, tzhe officia1 record of which is published in summary form. Quotadon taken from rhe Verbatim record of rhis meeting (A/GI/ PV.1249). 51. As an officia1 communiqu8 issued yestexday by my Government puts it: 51. officiel Vhile is a peaceful, progressive and democratic countxy. As a result, anxiety is felt in a11 strata of our population, and it is the Government’s duty to make its position publicly known. It does not seek to, and must not, shirk its responsibilities; and it therefore thinks that it shouldlendits support, based on this principle of serenity and justice, to the measures which in its view Will be conducive to safeguarding the defence and secuxity of the hemisphere.” 52. We support the draft resolution submitted by the United States delegation [S/5182]. In our view, it contains positive elements capable of oontributing to the finding of a formula fox the solution of the present conflict. Apaxt from the immediate withdrawal and dismantling of launching installations, we refex in particular to the authorizing of the Secretaxy-General to send a United Nations observer corps to Cuba. Unfortunately, the representative of Cuba rejected that idea yesterday. 52. par contient, peuvent Nous pensons diat et au démantelement ment, Secrétaire vateurs sentant 53. que Nations et garantir &re la zone r&olution 53. In such decisive heurs, we believe that Cuba should have confidence in the methods of the United Nations for extinguishing the flames of conflict and ensuring peace. One such method might be a United Nations presence in the zone of conflict, as suggested in the United States draft resolution. 54. We fervently appeal to Cuba ta accept such a pxocedure. This appeal is made by Chile, whose people feels itself bound to the people of Cuba by sacxed and indissoluble ties. It is made by a country that cannot be accused of malice or recognized as having any puxpose other than the finding of solutions to prevent the txagedy which an aggravation of the conflict might produce. This appeal is made by our country, which simply desixes the welfare and happiness of the Cuban people and Cuba!s retuxn to the continental family. We repeat: Even though the United States draft resolution should fail of approval, we consider it feasible, indeed we regard it as necessaxy, that the Secxetary- General should appoint a commission to go to Cuba immediately. 54. demander le Chili lie au peuple cubain par des liens tructibles, veillance, que celui a empi2cher en cas d’aggravation que le bien-8tre le retour le repetons: Etats-Unis bien par rendrait 55. le resolution partisan réjouirions L’Union non seulement actuellement dental, subsistent logue sine qua non du maintien de la paix. 55. We are also greatly interested in the last operative paragraph of the United States draft resolution. Chile has always favoured direct negotiations, and we should be vastly gratified if the United States and the Soviet Union held talks, not only to remove the present threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere, but also to remove other thxeats in other parts of the world. Discussion between both Powers is essential to the maintenance of peace. 56. Woxld opinion is anxiously awaiting the results of this meeting of the Security Council. If we cannot now; reach an agreement on SO vital andurgent a question’; the peoples of the world Will be grieved and disconcerted. The Soviet Union% veto of the United States 56. le résultat Si nous ne parvenons aussi seront 57. Should the Council reach an impasse, my delegation believes that the Secretary-General shouldtake some initiative, With his demonstrated ability, intelligence and wisdom, he might propose some immediately effective measure. His intervention would be welcomed gratefully. 58. At present, everything looks dark. Yet fxom this acute crisis-the sharpest and most disturbing of recent years-it is possible that there may emerge some favourable factors, conducive to the strengthening of world peace. When man looks down and sees the abyss before him, he Will instinctively feel the need to cling to some protection. That is what is felt, today, by every human being. _ 59. We fervently hope that in this houx of tria1 the United Nations will make an effective contribution to dispel the threat to peace and calmour anxiety. Chile, in addition to fulfilling its hemispheric commitments, is prepared to collaborate resolutely here in order to banish the danger now overhanging mankind. 60. Mr. Mahmoud RIAD (United Arab Republic) : 1 have listened attentively to the statements of the members of the Council, as well as to that of the representative of Cuba [1022nd meeting]. My Government has examined thoroughly the situation around Cuba and, in particular, the recent developments resulting from the declaration of President Kennedy, with which the Council is seized. 61. 1 am confident that the Council is wellaware that the peoples of the world are anxiously watching the present dangerous situation. The flow of the reaction sf the peoples of the world demonstrates beyond any doubt the extent to which world public opinion is olosely watching our deliberations. 62. Fearful of an armed clash, desirous of finding a peaceful solution, and fully aware of the dangers inherent in the sitùation, representatives of some fifty Member States gathered together last nightfor almost three hours. There was oommon agreement among them on the seriousness of the situation and the urgent need to exert every effort to save mankind from the disastrous consequences entailed in an eventual armed conflict. Fully aware of the urgency of the problem, t.he same representatives resumed their meeting this morning for the same purpose. They have delegated from among them the representative of Ghana and CYPrUS and myself to meet with the Acting’Secretary- General in order to convey to him on their behalf their deep concern and anxiety. 65. donc nécessaire temps de la pouvoir tivité d’une solution équitable. 66. principes s’inspirent Unies ferences l’honneur doung et de Belgrade, politique nationales par 23 juillet defendu les principes les affaires tout Etat de choisir vernement d’&ablir qui integrite 67. Unies, que, conformément la Charte, dans leurs relations menace ou a l’emploi grite Etat, les soutenu doivent pacifiques, internationales mises 68. Feunis attachement instamment toriale qu’aucun Etat ne s’ingere d’autres soient ment a ces principes. 69. ont réaffirmé ont proclame 67. We have always maintained, as a loyal Member of the United Nations, that in accordance with Axticle 2, paragxaph 4, of the Charter, a11 Members should refxain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other mannex inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Similarly, we have advocated the view that Member States should settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangexed, 68, While these basic principles are enshsined in the Charter, the United Arab Republic, together with twenty-eight countries, reaffirmed at Bandungatheir faith in these principles and called for respect for the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of all nations, abstention from intervention or interference in the interna1 affairs of othex countries, and the settlement of a11 international disputes by peaceful means prescribed by the Charter of the United Nations. 69. Al1 these fundamental principles werereaffirmed by the participating countries at the Belgrade Conference S/when they declared their determination and 7/ avril 7/ Asian-African Conference, held at Bandung in April 1955. & alignés, i/ conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-AlignedCountries, held in Belgrade in September 1961. 71. As to Cuba, the participating countries at the Belgrade Confexence called fox the respect of its right, as well as that of any othex nation,.freely to choose its political and social systems in accoxdance iwith its own conditions, needs and possibilities. We believe that Cuba has every right to cherish these pxinciples and develop its potentialities SO as to be able to safeguaxd its sovexeignly, political independence and territorial integxity. 72, I felt it necessary, befoxe stating in detail our position on the item under discussion, to outline the fundamental pxinciples which have guided us in this matter. 73. On 22 October 1962, President Kennedy deolared in his speec.h the steps to be taken by the United F%ates. These steps included the initiation of a strict quarantine on a11 offensive military equipment in shipment to Cuba. Together with this, a11 ships of any kind bound fox Cuba from whatevex nation or port Will, when they are found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended if needed to other types of cargo and carriers. It was latex declared that any ship that might attempt to run the blockade shall be sunk. 74. The Government of the United Arab Republiç cannot condone the unilatexal decision of the United States of America to exexcise the quarantine in the Caribbean Sea, This action, we believe, not only is contrary to international law and the accepted noxms of freedom of navigation on the ‘high seas, but also leads to a situation which, 1 am sure representatives a11 agxee, is pregnant with a11 the symptoms of increasing woxld tension and ,threatens international peaoe and security. This is an action whioh was taken outside the United Nations, without authorization from the Security Council upon which the foundex Members of the United Nations have confexxed primary xesponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and seourity. 75. The United States voiced its feax that Cuba might ac@uire nuclear weapons or warheads which threaten the security of the Western Hemisphere. As regards this question, the delegation of the Soviet Union has denied snpplying Cuba with nucleax weapons. In this connexion, the United Arab Republio delegation, upon instructions from its Government, reaffirms itspolioy against the spread of nucleax weapons. The General Assembly has endorsed this pxinciple in sevexal resolutions. 77. In his statement to the General Assembly on 8 October 1962, the President of Cuba, Mr, Dorticbs, . said that the weapons which Cuba has acquired axe defensive in nature, and not offensive, that Cuba is trying to build itself and strengthen its capabilities because it has been under constant fear of intervention in its interna1 affairs. Moreover, Mr. Dortic#s made it clear that Cuba is ready to sit with the representatives of the United States to reach an agreement or a settlement which may lead to the normalization of the relations between Cuba and the United States. Mr. Dortic6s said that, were his country given effective and satisfactory guarantees concerning its territorial integrity, then: II . . . Cuba would not needto strengthen its defences and would not even neecl an army, and we would gladly apply a11 the resources now employed in defente to the economic and cultural development of our nation. II-/ 77. Le Président de la République cubaine, M. Dortic&, 1962, que les armes acquises par Cuba sont de nature dgfensive et non offensive et que, si Cuba cherche a S’ Bquiper et B renforcer ses installations, c’est parce qu’il vit dans la crainte constante d’une ing& rente dans ses affaires intérieures. D’autre part, M. Dorticbs a nettement indiqué que son gouvernement est disposé à conférer avec les représentants des Etats-Unis en vue d’aboutir h un accord ou à un r8glement qui puisse normaliser les relations entre Cuba et les Etats-Unis, Il d ajouté que si son gouvernement recevait des garanties effectives et satisfaisantes touchant son intggrité territoriale: In our opinion Cuba then, neutral.and sooialist, would be free from foreign military bases and excessive military installations. A notre avis, Cuba, pays neutre et socialiste, pourrait alors se debarrasser des bases étrang&res et des installations militaires d’&re. 78. The situation may look very dim indeed, but one should never lose hope since there is a desire declared by a11 parties to negotiate, as well as an assurance given by all that there is no aggressive intention. As 1 have mentioned, Mr. Dortic6s made it clear that Cuba is ready to negotiate, The same desire is expressed by the Soviet Union and tihe United States, From this premise we hope that a11 efforts Will be deployed to bring the parties together with a view to ironing out their differences and settling the problem peacefully. In the meantime my delegation urges a11 parties concernecl to refrain from any action which might, directly ox indirectly, aggravate the situation. 1 want to make it abundantly clear that my Government is ready to extend any assistance in this direction. My Government earnestly believes that the Security Council should find an acceptable and durable solution, 78, La situation parai? tr&s sombre L1 l’heure actuelle, mais il n’y a pas lieu de desespérer puisque toutes les parties en cause ont exprime le désir de n&gocier et que toutes ont donnti l’assurance qu’elles n’ont pas d’intentions agressives, Comme je l’ai dit, M. Dortic& disposee & négocier. L’Union soviétique et les Etats- Unis ont manifesté le m&me désir. Dans ces conditions, nous espérons que rien ne sera ngglige pour rapprocher les parties en vue d’apl,anir leurs divergences et de rggler pacifiquement le probléme. En attendant, ma delégation demande instamment B tous les int&?ess& de s’abstenir de toute actioh qui pourrait directement ou indirectement aggraver la situation. Je précise que mon gouvernement est pr&t B offrir offices pour faciliter persuadt% que le Conseil de sécurité trouvera une solution acceptable et durable, 79. En examinant la position et les intérêts des diff&rentes parties en cause) le Conseil ne doit & aucun. moment oublier le peuple cubain, son souci d’intégrit8 et d’ind8pendance et, par-dessus tout, son droit de vivre comme bon lui semble et de coexister pacifiquement avec les peuples voisins. 79. In dealing with the various positions and vestecl . interests in this delicate situation, the Council should not forget for one moment the interests of the people of Cuba, their integrity and independence, and, above ail, their right to their own way of life and their right to coexist peacefully with neighbouring countries. 80. Pour résumer, le Gouvernement de la République 80. TO recapitulate, the Government of the United Arab Republic and its delegation feel that the Council Will be embarking on the right path prescribed in the Charter if the members of the Council concentrate their efforts to achieve the following: first, that a11 parties concerned should refrain from taking any ’ action which, in one way or another, might hinder the arabe s’engagera dans la bonne voie, Celle qui est prescrite par la Charte, si ses membres s’attachent & obtenir que: premi&ement, s’abstiennent de toute action qui, d’une façon ou d’une autre, pourrait compromettre les possibilités 9/ Officia1 Record? of the GeneFal Assembly, Seventeenth Sessioh, Plenary Meetings, 1145th meeting, para. 57. Séances plénléres, 81. Fully convinced of the seriousness of the situation and its far-reaching implications, Ghana and the United Arab Republic, as non-aligned countries, feel it imperative to ask the Security Council to act urgently and resolutely to save international peace. Our only desire is to bring the Par$ies concerned together in an effort to avoid a further deterioration of the situation, 82. That is why, upon instructions from my Government, 1 have, jointly with the representative of Ghana, drawn up a draft resolution [S/5190] which has already been submitted to the Secretariat. We certainly believe that the adoption of this draft resolutïon would contribute positively to the efforts of the Security Council in coping with the psesent dangerous situation. 83. Mr, QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): This meeting takes place at a time of serious crisis, the most serious since the Second World War. Upon our words, upon our deeds, bang grave events, events that may well prove decisive for the very survival of humanity. The Council is indeecl calleci upon to shoulder heavy responsibilities, to pronounce on momentous issues, It is therefore incumbent on the Council-on a11 of usto proceed, if not along lines of serenity and a lofty sense of responsibility, at least along those of sanity; to treacl, if not the road of wisdom, at least that of circumspection. This is the time when wise counsel should prevail to arrest a world catastrophe, 84. A situation which my delegation characterized, in its statement two weeks ago during the general debate in the General Assemblyti as one of the sorest points in present world tensions, has now developed into an acute crisis unparalleled since the last World War, with the two great Powers confronting eaohother with their sabres and frightening human beings everywhere. The stridency of this confrontation is reflected in the documents-the letters dated 22 and 23 October 1962 addressed by the .representatives of the United Sttites of America [S/5181], Cuba [S/5183], and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [S/5186] to the President of the Council-which form the subject of the Council’s present deliberations, and in the statements which have been made during the current discussion, 85. My delegation has had the honour on severalpre- V~OUS occasions to define the framework within which the position of the Government of Ghana with respect to this situation cari be determined. In view, however, of the gravity of current developments, 1 shall, with your permission, briefly recapitulate my Government’s approach, in the prayerful hope that it may be a constructive contribution to the discussion and the o/ [bid.,;143rd meeting. “TO refrain from any threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or integrity of any State, or at fomenting civil strife and subverting the Will of the people in any State “, _’ 87. We are equally committed to the principles of non-intervention and of equality of rights in international relations. We believe strongly in the peaceful settlement of international controversies as the only way to overcome tensions and to assuse a stable and lasting peace. This position flows directly not only from the generally acceptedprlnciples of international law, but also from the Charter of our Organization. 87. de la non-intervention les relations au rkglement seul et d’assurer découle gén&alement encore de la Charte de notre organisation, 88. de la plupart tions heureux de la Conférence comme on s’en souvient, par l’adoption le 6 septembre les participants viction 88. The position of my Government is the same as that of most small nations of similar persuasion. Indeed, my Government was much grattfied at the implied endorsement that this position received from the Conference of Belgrade, from which, as Will be recalled, there emerged a unanimous Declaration on 6 September 1961. The participants in the Conference reaffirmed their conviction that: “(a) Al1 nations have the right to unity, selfdetermination and independence, by virtue of which right they may determine their political status and freely pursue th&r economic, social and cultural development without intimidation or hindrance”; “(bJ Al1 peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international eaonomic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit and international law. In no circumstances may a people be deprived of its own m@ns of :subsistencel’. On Iit ensuite The Declaration went on to say that the participating countriès: “believe that the right of Cuba, as of any other nation, freely to choose the political and social system besk suited to its own conditions, needs tind possibilities, should be respected”. And the participating countries further expressed: II , . , their determination that no intimidation, interference or intervention should be bxought to beas on the exercise of the right of self-determination of a people, including that people’s right to pursue constructive and independent policies for the attainment and preservation of its sovereignty. n et enfin que les participants 89. It is on the basis of these considerations that my d$Jegation Will deal with the conckete issues before the Council, and we do SO in the furtherance of the cause of peace, for this is a crisis which affects a11 small States and, in fact, all humanity. 89. ma dblbgation le Conseil la cause de la paix, car nous sommes d’une en fait, l’hÛmanit6 91. The Government of Ghana has no information available to it as to the nature and charaoter of the steps Cuba has recently taken with the assistance of the Soviet Union in this field, and therefore my delegation has had to take note of, and to sift, the statements of the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union and Cuba made before this Council yesterday jlO22nd meetingJ. The representative of the United States stated that: “Missiles which help a country to defend its independence . . , whioh are not designed to subvert the territorial integrity or political independence of other States . D a assistance in this form and with these purposes is consistent with the principles of the United Nations. But missiles which introduce a nucleer threat into an area now free of it, which are installed by clandestine means , . 0 assistance in this form and with these purposes is radically different.” [1022nd meeting, para, 61.1 92. On the basis of what the United States representative has told us in this Counoil, my delegation understands perfectly well the anxieties and fears of the United States Government. But should the fact that Cuba has received weapons of a11 kinds from the Soviet Udion constitute sufficientpretextfor the gigantic action of a naval blockade imposed by the United States against Cuba? 93, There is, after all, the assurance of the representative of the Soviet Union, made yesterday, that: “The Soviet delegation . , . officially confirms the statements already made . , . in this connexion, to the effeot that the Soviet Government , . . is not now sending offensive weapons of any kind to Cubai’. [Il&J., para. 152.1 and that the assistance being given was “exclusively designed to improve Cuba’s defensive capacity” [Ibid., para. 1551. 94. Equally, the representative of Cuba reminded us of, and we affirmed, the following assurance contained in his President’s address to the General Assembly on 8 October 1962: “We have been obliged to arm ourselves, not in ‘ordex to attack anyone, any nation, but only to defend ourselves. n ..* 1’. . , Cuba does not constitute the slightest threat to the security of any oountry in &r continent, It 96: Fortunately, my delegation has no technical knowledge of nuclear weapons. But is a weapon offensive by its intrinsic nature, or cloes it become offensive by use? From the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom [1023rd meeting], it seems as if it is the intent behind the possession of a weapon that gives that weapon its character of offence; and the faot that Cuba has long-range missiles capable of hitting targets 2,000 miles away, coupled with Cuban and Soviet intentions, makes the weapons in Cuba offensive and dangerous, 96. Ma délQation, naissance nucléaires. sa nature raison la [1023&me detenteur offensif; portée capables d’atteindre des cibles Situ&es B 2 000 milles, joint aux intentions sovi8tiques et cubaines, rendrait les armes de Cuba offensives et dangereuses. 9’7. There is thus a genuine fear that the Western Hemisphere is threatened by Cuba!s military build-up, while Cuba is afraid of attack from its neighbours, including the United States-which is the reason fox its defence measures. 97. Ainsi, on craint tres sincerement que l’hémisph&re occidental ne soit menace par les installations militaires de Cuba et, d’autre part, Cuba redoute une attaque de ses voisins, notamment des Etats-Unis; c’est 18 la raison des dispositions d&fonsives que ce pays vient de prendre. 98. If my conclusions are cosrect, then my delegation proposes that the United States should give a written guarantee to the Security Council that it has no intention whatsoever of interfering in the interna1 affairs of Cuba and taking offensive military action, directly ox indirectly, against the Republic of Cuba, Then Cuba should also give a written guarantee to the Security Council that it has no intention whatsoever of interfering in the interna1 affairs of any country in the Western Hemisphere and taking offensive military action against any country. Although our sproposa.ls are long-term palliatives, we are confident that such guarantees would help in the restoration of mutual confidence and respect between Cuba and its neighbours. 98. Si mes conclusions sont justes, ma dglegation propose que le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis donne par 8orit au Conseil de sécurit& l’assurance qu’il n’a aucune intention de s’immiscer dans les affaires intgrieures militaires offensives, directement ou indirectement, contre la République, cubaine. De son cBté, le Gouvernement cubain devrait donner au Conseil de S&urit& la garantie Bcrite ‘qu’il n’a aucune intention de s’immiscer dans les affaires intérieures c!‘aucun pays de l’h8misph&e occidental, ni de prendre des mesures militaires offensives contre un pays quelconque, Sans doute ne s’agit-il que d’unpalliatif, mais nous sommes certains que de telles garanties oontribueraient respect entre Cuba et ses voisins, 99. Mon gouvernement a toujours Bté partisan d’une politique de non-engagement et de neutralitg positive, Il ne pense pas que la création de bases militaires Btrangbres où que ce soit serve la cause de la paix internationale, L’Osagyefo, président de laRepublique ghaneenne, a expliqué d’une façon tr& position sur ce point dans la déclaration qu’il a faite a 11Assemblee g&%rale en septembre 1960. Il a dit qu’ il etait 99. Dedioated as my Government is to polioies of non-alignment and positive neutrality, it does not consider that the cause of internationalpeace is served by the establishment of foreign military bases anywhere. Osagyefo, the President of Ghana, explafned our position in this regard very fully in his statement to the General Assembly in September 1960 when he said that it was: Ii . . . essential that we on the Afxican continent take positive ‘steps to isolate ourselves as far as possible from the effects of nuclear warfare. One ofthe first and most practical steps whioh could be taken in this regard is to prevent any State having nuolear weapons from possessing military bases on the African continent.“-/ 869émaance, ‘I/&, 1145th meeting, paras. 56 and 78. -/Ibid., Fifteenth Session (Part 1). Plenary Meetings, vol. 1, 869th meeting, para. 64. 101. The President of Ghana, speaking today on the present crisis, referred to the question of foreign bases. With your permission, 1 Will wote his words: Yl?he President of the United States has been informed that there are rocket bases incuba. We haue no means of knowing whether that is the case or not. Ve do know, however, that intelligence reports on Cuba have misled the Government of the Unit%d Statës I bFfore now and have caused serious damage. “We believe that foreign bases, wherever they exist, are an evil. Should the present crisis lead to general inspection and progressive demolition of such bases, that would be a welcome, if unforeseen, outcome of a perilous situation, But we cannot possibly, regard allegations regarding the setting-up of such bases in one country, Cuba, as justifying international action which, on the face of it, would constitute, a departure from international law. B that were SO, the Soviet IJnion, too, would have to be regarded as being justified in applying a blockade, for example, to the Black Sea toast of Turkey, where the existence of American rocket bases is not a rumour, but an acknowledged fact. We would deplore any Soviet action of that kind against Turkey, just as we deplore the proposed TJnited States action in relation to Cuba. l1 102. Nevertheless, my delegation must insist that no Stafe has the right to abject to other States entering into international defensive ,arrangements SO long as they axe not directed towards the maintenance of imperialism and colonialism in a11 their manifestations; and that in SO fax as they contribute towards peace they should not be the cause of misgivings. My Government feels equally that, in any event, the measures which any State takes td preserve its own security are entirely a matter for its judgement. 103. In the light of my analysis, the delegation of Ghana holds the considered view that any attempt to attribute an offensive character to military arrangements, such as those Cuba has adopted, must be accompanied by proof of the most incontrovertible kind. 104. The representative of the United States has argued, in support of his contention in the matter, that the reoent military developments in Cuba introduce a nuclear threat into an area free of rit, that they threaten the security and independence of defenceless neighbouring States; that they tookplace by clandestine means, and constitute a serious blow at the inter- Americin system. 106. That being SO, it was with much concern that my Government learnt that the United Rates Government has initiated measures, including the use of armed force, to quarantine Cuba against imports of military material and related supplies, This in turn has led to a serious warning by the Soviet Union to the United States, which has something of the character of an ultimatum. This, then, is the crisis which bedevils the peace of the world at this very moment. de matériel 107. In the presentation of his Government’s case, the representative of the United States gave the impression that he regarded these measures, as ratified by the Council of the Organieation of American States, BS falling sr$tarely within the competence of that organization. %tats 108. My delegation regretfully disse& from this j view. As we have said, on an earlier occasion, EFiougfi segional agencies or arrangements have rights and responsibilities which are recognized by the Charter of the United Nations and which they should not be prevented from exercising fully, these rights and responsibilities do not by any means involve absolute priority in relation to the competence of the United Nations, The flexibility which is desirable in the relations between regional agericies and the United Nations cannot be extended to the point of undermining the Security Council’s authority. prérogatives de les exercer n’ont de l’organisation nécessairement jusqufu’a saper 109. Unis que les action de coercition la Charte, maritimes envisagée comme termes de’s8curité. 109. In this particular case, j,f it is recalled that the United States delegation, in previous debates, had expressed the view that enforcement action consists of coercive measures involving the use of air, sea or land forces, of the type falling within the scope of Article 42, then it is clear that the action contemplated by the United States must be regarded as enforcement action, which is inadmissible in terms of Article 53, without the authorization of the SeEurity Council. 110. That being SO, are there grounds for the argument that such action is justified in exercise of the inherent right of self-defence? Can it be contended that there was, in the words of a former American Secretary of State whose reputation as a jurist in this field is widely accepted, Ila necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, lëaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation”? My delegation does not think SO, foi as 1 have said earlier, incontrovertible proof is not yet available as to the offensive character of military developments in Cuba, Nor cari it be .argued that the threat was of suoh a nature as to warrant action on the scale so far taken, prior to a reference to this Council. Even from a strictly juridical point of view my delegation cannot agree that in this particular case self-defence cari be invoked to justify the exercise of authority by the United States on the high seas, for the concept of freedom on the open seas, enshrined in numerous international instruments, entails absolute freedom of navigation for vessels of a11 nations in time of peace. 110, telle défense? employés dont largement fense, immédiate des moyens ne le pense pas, car, comme je l’ai d&j& dit, on ne possede pas de preuves irrefutables offensif de6 transformations militaires qui ont eu lieuà Cuba, Et l’on ne saurait non plus soutenir que la nienace Btait telle qu’elle justïfiat une action d’une telle ampleur, sans qu’il en ait Bté r6fér6 au Conseil de sBcurit6. M&me du point de vue strictement juridique, ma dhlégation ne peut admettre qu’on invoque la légitime defense pour justifier l’exercice par les Etats-Unis principes consacrOs dans de nombreux instruments internationaux navigation pour les navires de toutes nations en temps de paix. 111. En conolusion, je dois dire que la d616gation du Ghana n’est pas en mesure de repartir dans cette grave affaire. Ce qui importe, et ce qu’un tr& 111. In conclusion, I must say that the delegation of Ghana cannot apportion blame for this grave crisis. mat is important, and what a very large number of Member States of this Organization representing 112. The responsibility of the Security Council is overwhelming. What is urgently needed is negotiation between the parties concerned to resolve the present crisis on the basis of mutual respect for each other’s sovereign rights, and my delegation would urge that this Council authorize the Acting Secretary-General to confer with them immediately with a view to facilitating such negotiations. 113. It is in the light of these considerations and against the background of two days of consultations with a large number of Member States of the Organization that the draft resolution contained in document S/5190 has been prepared. It is my privilege to present this draft to the Council. The cVraft resolution is co-sponsored by Ghana and the United Arab Republic and it reads as follows: “The Security Council, “Having considered the recent serious developments in the Caribbean, “Noting with grave concern the threat to international peace and security, “Having listened to the parties directly concerne& “1. Requests the Secretary-General psomptly to confex with the parties directly concerned on the immediate steps‘to be taken to Eemove the existing threat to world peace, and to normalize the situation in the Caribbean; “2. Calls upon the parties concerned to comply forthwith with this resolution and provide every assistance to the Secretary-General in performing his task: “3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of paragraph 1 of this resolution; “4. Calls upon the parties concerned to refrain meanwhile from any action which may disectly or indirectly further aggravate the situation.‘! 114. The draft resolution is self-explanatory. The kernel of it is that the Acting Secretary-General should take prompt action in facilitating the posslbility of negoti.ations. We feel that the parties should, meanwhile, while the negotiations are going on, refrain from any action which would aggravate the situation and result ,in a conflict. This is a peace resolution, calling for negotiations withthe assistance of the Acting Secretary-General, and it should therefore receive the approval of the Cour@.
The President unattributed #119889
1 cal1 upon the Acting Seoretary-General. 116. The Aoting SECRETARY-GENERAL: Today the United Nations faces a moment of grave responsibility. What is at stake is not just the interests of the parties directly involved, nor just the Interests of a11 Member States, but the very fate of mankind. If today the United Nations should prove itself ineffective, it may have proved itself SO for a11 time. 118. In this situation where the very existence of mankind is in the balance, 1 derive some consolation from the fact that there is some common ground in the draft resolutions introduced in the Council. Irrespective of the fate of those draft resolutions, that common ground remains. It calls for urgent negotiations between the parties directly involved, though, as 1 said earlier, the rest of the world is also an interested party. In this context, I cannot help exprepsing the view that some of the measures proposed or already taken, which the Council is called upon to approve, are very unusual and, 1 might say, even extraordinary except in wartime. 118. meme de l’humanitl: consolation muns pr8sentés sort n’en subsistent négociations directement comme je viens de le dire, soit aussi partie A ce propos, que certaines déja appliquées est invite à donner son approbation tuelles sauf en temps de guerre, 119. At the request of the permanent representatives of a large number of Member Governments who have discussed the matter amongst themselves and with me, 1 have sent, through thepermanent representatives of the two Governments, the following identically worded message to the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR: 119. d’un grand nombre la question Président du Conseil socialistes sentants des messages voici le texte: “1 have been asked by the permanent representatives of a large number of Member Governments of the United Nations to address an urgent,appeal to you in the present critical situation. These representatives feel that in the interest of international peace and security, a11 concerned shoulcl refrain from any action which may aggravate the situation and bring with it the risk of war. de gouvernements tion des Nations vous actuelle, de la paix intt5ress6s pourrait risque int&es&es r&nissent pacifique les Caraibes. volontaire de l’autre, de quarantaine route pour Cuba. Je crois volontaire semaines donnerait r6unir solution serais la disposition services “In their view it is important that time should be given to enable the Parti=s concerned to get together with a view to resolving the present crisis peacefully and normalizing the situation in the Caribbean. This involves on the one hand the voluntary suspension of all arms shipments to Cuba, and also the voluntary suspension of the quarantine measures involving the searching of ships bound for Cuba. I believe that such voluntary suspension for a period of two to three weeks Will greatly ease the situation and give time to the parties conoerned to meet and discuss with a view to finding a peaceful solution of the problem, In this context, I shall gladly make myself available to a11 parties for whatever services 1 may be able to perform. II urgently appeal to your Excellenoy to give immediate consideration to this message. afin message. sident des Etats-Unis Conseil socialistes ‘Y have sent an identical message to the President of the United States of America/Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.’ “If the United States could give assurances, by Word and deed, that it would not commit acts of aggression against our country, we solemnly declare that there would be no need for OUF weapons and our armies” . . . 13/ .X9.. Here again 1 feel that on the basis of discussion some common ground may be found through which a way may be traced out of the present impasse. 1 believe it would also contribute greatly to the same end if the construction and development of major military facilities and installations in Cuba could be suspended during the period of negotiations. 122. 1 now make a most solemn appeal to the parties concerned to enter into negotiations immediately, even this night, if possible, irrespective of any other procedures which may be available or which could be invoked. 1 realiee that if my appeal is heeded, the first subject to be discussed Will be the modalities, and that a11 parties concerned Will have to agree to comply with those responsibilities which fa11 on them before any agreement as a whole cari become effective, 1 hope, however, that the need for such discussion Will not deter the parties concerned from undertaking these discussions, In my view it would be shortsighted for the parties concerned to seek assurances on the end result before the negotiations had even begun. 123. 1 have stated in my message to both the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Council of Mini&ers of the USSR that 1 shall gladly make myself available to all parties for whatever services 1 may be able to perform. 1 repeat that pledge now. 124. During the seventeen years that have passed since the end of the Second World War, there has never been a more dangerous or closer confrontation of the major Powers. At a time when the danger to world peace was less immediate, or SO it appears by comparison, my distinguished predecessor said: “The principles of the Charter are, byfar, greater than the Organization in which they are embodied, and the aims which they are to safeguapd are holier than the policies of any single nation 01: people.” He went on to say: n ..* the discretion and impartiality . , . imposed on the Secretary-General by the character of his immediate task may not degeneraté into a policy of expediency , , , A Seoretary-General cannot serve on any other assumption than that-within the necessary limits of human frailty and honest differenoes of opinion-a11 Member nations honour their pledge to .% Ibid., Seventeenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1145th meeting, para, 58, 126. 1 hope that at this moment, not only in the Council Chamber but in the world outside, good sense and understanding Will be placed above the anger of the moment or the pride of nations, The path of negotiation and compromise is the only course by which the peace of the world cari be secured at this critical moment, 126. J’espere Conseil, sens Passag&e negociation conduire
If there is no objection, and in view of the lateness of the heur, 1 would suggest that we might adjourn until tomorrow. This would give an opportunity to a11 the members of the Council to study the statement which has just been made by the Acting Secretary-General. Therefore, if it would meet with the wishes of the members ofthe Council, I would suggest that we should adjourn unti14 o’clook tomorrow afternoon. 127. M. AIKEN personne donne l’heure et que nous ajournions membres l’occasion le Secretaire si de nous reunir
The President unattributed #119894
I understand that members of the Council have no objection to our postponing our further proceedings until tomorrow at 4 p.m. 1 should simply like to say that, if circumstances make it necessary to oblige the Council to take urgent measures, the President will inform the members of the Council that the meeting will be convened earlier. 128. que les ce que nous poursuivions midi B 16 heures. J’ajoute toutefois de la mesures 129, seance levée. Nous nous réunirons demain à 16 heures de ltaprès-midi, sous réserve de ce que je viens d’indiquer. 129. Since there is no objection, the present meeting is closed and we shall meet againat 4 p.m. tomorrow, with the reservation whioh 1 have just made, The meeting rose at 10 p.m.
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