S/PV.1025 Security Council

In accordance with the decision taken at the 1022nd meeting, 1 propose to invite the representative of Cuba to take a place at the Council table inorder to participate in our discussion without the right to vote. A t the invitation of the President, Mr. Mario GarcXa Inchaus tegui (Cuba) tooka place af the Security Council table. 2, Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America): Today we must address our attention to the realities of the situation posed by the build-up of nuclear striking power in Cuba. In this connexion I want to say at the 3. My Government is most anxious to effect apeacefui resolution of this affair. We continue to hope that the Soviet Union Will work with us ta diminish not only the new danger which had suddenly shadowed the peace but a11 of the conflicts that divide the world. 4, 1 shall not detain the Council with any detailed discussion of the Soviet and the Cuban responses to our complaint. The speeches of the communist representatives were entirely predictable. 1 shall make brief comment on some points suggested by those speeches and some other points which may have arisen in the minds of Members of the United Nations, 5, Both Chairman Khrushchev, in his letter to Earl Russell, and Ambassador Zorin, in his remarks to this Council, argued that this threat to the peace has been caussd not by the Soviet Union and Cuba but by the United States. 6, We are here today, and have been this week, for one siagle reason: beoause the Soviet Union secretly introduced this menacing offensive military build-up into the island of Cuba while assuring the worlcl that nothing was furthex from its thoughts. 7. The argument of the Soviet Union, in essence, is that it was not the Soviet Union which created this threat to peace by secretly installing these weapons in Cuba, but that it was theUnitedStates which created this crisis by discovering and reporting these installations, This is the first time, 1 confess, that 1 have ever heard it said that the crime is not the burglary but the discovery of the burglary, and that the threat is net the clandestine missiles in Cuba but their discovery and the limited meàsures taken to quarantine further infection, The pôril arises not because the nations of the Western Hemisphere have joined together to take necessary action in their self-defence but because the Soviet Union has extended its nuclear threat into the Western Hemisphere. 8, 1 note that there are still some representatives in the Council-very few, 1 Buspect-who say that they do not know whether the Soviet Union has in fact built in Cuba installations capable of firing nuclear missiles over ranges from 1,000 to 2,000 miles. As I say, Chairman Khrushchev did not deny these facts in his letter to Earl Russell, nor did Ambassador Zorin on Tuesday evening, [1022nd meeting] and, if further doubt remains on this score, we shall gladly exhibit photographie evidence to the doubtful. 10. In the next place, there are some troublesome questions in the minds of Members that are entitled to’ serious answers. There are those who say that, conceding the fact that the Soviet Union has installed these offensive missiles in Cuba, conceding the fact that this constitutes a grave threat to the peace of the world, why was it necessary for the nations of the Western Hemisphere to act with such apeed? Why could not the quarantine against the shipment of offensive weapons have been delayed until the Security Council and the General Assembly had a full opportunity to consider the situation and make recommendations ? 11. Let me remind the Members that the United States was not looking for some pretext to raise the issue of the transformation of Cuba into a military base. On the contrary, the United States made no objection whatever to the shipment of defensive arms by the Soviet Union to Cuba, even though such shipments offended the traditions of this hemisphere. . Even after the first hard intelligence reached Washington concerning the change in the character of Soviet military assistance to Cuba, the President of the United States responded by directing an intensification of surveiIlance, and only after the facts and the magnitude of the build-up had been established beyond a11 doubt did we begin to take this limited action of barring only those nuclear weapons, equipment and aircraft. 12. TO understand the reasons for this prompt action, ~ it is necessary to understand the nature and the purposes of this operation. It has been marked, above all, by two characteristics: speed and stealth. As the photographie evidence makes clear, the installationof these missiles, the erection of these missile sites, has taken place with extraordinary speed, One entire complex was put up in twenty-four hours. This speed not only demonstrates the methodical organization and the careful planning involved, but it also demonstrates a premeditated attempt to confront this hemisphere with a fait accompli. By quickly completing the whole process of nuclearization of Cuba, the Soviet Union Would be in a position to demand that the status quo be maintained and left undisturbed-and,if Ge to have delayed our counteraction, the nuclear- Ization of Cuba would have been quickly completed. 23. This is not a risk which this hemisphere is prepared to take. When we first detected the secret and offensive installations, could we seasonably be expected to have notified the Soviet Union in advance, through the process of calling a meeting of the Secusity Council, that we had discovered its perfidy, and then to have done nothing but wait while we debated, and then have waited further while the Soviet repre- 14. One of the sites, as I have said, was constructed in twenty-four heurs. One of these missiles cari be armed with its nuclear warhead in the middle of the night, pointed at New York, snd landed above this room five minutes after it was fired. No debats in this room could affect in the slightest the urgency of these terrible facts or the imrnediacy of the threat to peace. 15. There was only one way to deal with the emergency and with the immediacy, andthat was to act, ancl to act at once, but with theutmost restrnint consistent with the urgency of the :threat to the peaee. We came to the Security Council, 1 would remind you, immediately and concurrently with the Organization of the American States. We did net even wait for the OAS to meet and to act. We came here at the sarne time. 16. We immediately put into process the political machinery that we pra~ will achieve a solution of this grave crisis, and we did not act until the American Republics had acted to make the quarantine effective, We clid not shirk our duties to ourselves, to the hemisphere, to the United Nations or to the rest of the worlcl. 17. We are now in the Security Council on the initiative of the United States, precisely because having taken the hemispheric action which has been taken, we wish the political machinery, the machinery of the United Nations, to take over to reduce these tensions and to interpose itself to eliminate this aggressive threat to peace ancl BO ensure the removal from this hemisphere of offensive nuclear weapons and the corresponding lifting of the quarantine. 18. There are those who sny that the quarantine is an inappropriate ancl extreme remecly;,that thepunishment does not fit the crime. But I would ask those who take this position to put themselvss inthe position of the Organiz ation of American States and to consider what they would have done in the face of the nwlearization of Cuba. Were we to do nothing until the knife was sharpened? Were we to stand idly by until it was at our throats 1 What were the alternatives available? On the one hand, the Organization of American States might have sponsored an invasion or destroyed the bases by an air strike, or imposed a total blockade of a11 imports into Cuba, including medicine and food. On the other hand, the Organizationof Americari States and the United States might have done nothing. Such a course woulcl have oonfirmed the greatest threat to the peace of the Americas known to history and would have encouraged the Soviet Union in sirnilar adventurcs in other parts of the world. It would have discredited our Will and our determination to Itve in freedom and to reduce, not increase, theperils of ‘this nuclear age. The course we have chosen seems to me to be perfectly graduated to meet the character of the threat. TO have done less would have been to fail in OWS obligation to peace. 20. Some here have attempted to question the legal basis of the defensive measuxes taken by the hmerican Republics to protect the Western Hemisphere against Soviet long-range nucleax missiles, and I would gladly expand on our position on this, but in view of the proposa1 now before us, presented last night by the Acting Secretary-General, [1024th meeting] perhaps Ehis is a matter for discussion which, in view of its complexity and length, could be more fruitfully delayed to a latex time. 21. Finally, let me say that no twisting of logic, no distortion of words cari disguise the plain, obvious and compelling commonsense conclusion that the installation of nuclear weapons by stealth, the installation of weapons of mass destruction in Cubaposes a dangerous thxeat to peace, a threat which contxavenes paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter, and a threat which the American Republics are entitled to meet, as they have done, by appropriate regional defensive methods. 22. Nothing has been said here by the representatives of the communist States which alters the basic situation, There is one fundamental question to which 1 solicit your attention, The question is this: what action sexved to strengthen the world’s hope of peace? Can anyone claim that the introduction of long-range nuclear missiles into Cuba strengthens the peace? Can anyone claim that the speed and the stealth of this operation strengthens the peace? Can anyone suppose that this whole undextaking is anything more than an audacious effort to increase thenuoleax stxikingpower of the Soviet Union against the United States and thereby magnify its frequently reiterated thxeats against Berlin? When we are about to debate how to stop the dissemi+ation of nuclear weapons, does their introduction into this hemisphere by an outside State advance sanity and peace? Does anyone suppose that if this Soviet adventuxe went unchecked, the Soviet Union would. refrain from similar adventuxes in other parts of the world ? 23. The one action in the last few days which has strengthened the peace is the determination to stop this further spread of weapons in this hemisphere. In view of the situation that now confronts us, and the proposa& made here yesterday by the Acting Secretary-General, 1 am not going to further extend my remarks this afternoon. 1 wish only to conclude by reading to the members of the Council theletter from the President of the United States whichwas delivered to the Acting Secretaxy-General just afew minutes ago in reply to his appeal oflast night.He said to U Thant: That letter is signed “John F, Kennedy”. I bave nothing further to say at this time.

give the floor to the representative of Cuba.

The statements made a few moments agO by the representative of the UnitedStates Government are the best proof that the serious crisis created by that Government when it ordered a unilateral act of war against the people and Revolutionary Government of Cuba was based on mere bluff. 26. The United States representative has not produced any serious evidence to substantiate the assertion of his President that Cuba constitutes a nuclear threat to the countries of the Western hemisphere. The weapons in Cuba% possession are exolusively of a defensive nature. They are weapons which we were compelled to acquire owing to the aggressive and interventionist policy of the United States Government towards Cuba. 27. The attitude of the United States is still another proof of its manœuvres to conceal its attacks and aggression directed against our territory, our sovereignty and our independence. . 28.. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): If no one else wishes to speak, 1 shall take the liberty of saying a few words as representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. 29. We have just heard a statement by the representative of the United States. In contrast with the statement which he made at the first meeting of the Council, Mr. Stevenson did not on this occasion attempt to prove the rightness of the position of the United States as regards its basic motives for introducingthe question of so-called aggressive intentions of Cuba andthe Soviet Union. The whole of Mr. Stevenson’s speeoh of today, as could easily be seen, was defénsive in character. He tried to convince the Council that the actions of the United States, which have brought about a serious crisis in the world, are in some sort justified. He tried to prove that the United States could not have done otherwise than to declare an arbitrary blockade and to undertake what amounts to piratical action on the seas, and that no other action could have been taken by the Organization of American States, which in this case acted under pressure from the United States of America. 30. Mr. Stevenson tried to prove today that the principal reason for the action taken by the United States was the action taken by the Soviet Union, and by Cuba 31. The groundlessness of this position is perfectly ObViOUS. The Soviet delegation proved, in its first statement, [1022nd meeting] in the greatest detail, that there is no question here of any evidence or, as it was called in the American Press and even in the statement of the President of the United States, %nmistakable evidence” of the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba; the real question is that ofthe aggressive intentions of the United States with regard to Cuba. That is the crux of the matter. 32. When the United States tried to put these aggressive intentions into effect, it met with the resistance Of world opinion and of the overwhelming majority of Members of the United Nations, who were alarmed by these aggressive actions and exercised considerable pressure on the United Ststes of America, and on a11 countries supporting it, with a view to preventing further dangerous aggressive action by the United States. 33. After this, Mr. Stevenson was, onthe instructions . of his Government, forced to change his tone. Everyone present at this meeting of the Council sees perfectly clearly that his statement of today is different from the aggressive statement which he made at the 1022nd meeting of the Council and which found some support only among the direct military allies of the United States, who, although they talk of their independent policy, are obliged to follow the course dictated to them from Washington, The representatives of countries which are independent and not associates with military blocs openly stated in the Council-we heard their statements yesterday-that the blockade was illegal, was contrary to the United Nations Charter and to the universally recognized rules of international law; they defendecl Cuba!s right to organize its defence as it considered necessary for itself; they defended the right of the Cuban people to independence, to the independent existence of the Cuban State, and they openly condemned these aggressive actions by the United States of America. They spoke net only on their own behalf; they spoke, as the representative of the United Arab Republic said, on behalf of more than forty countries of Asia and Africa which are net associated with military blocs. Their voiceforced the United States to ponder any further steps it might take. 3~1. But now that Mr. Stevenson has tried today ta accuse the Soviet Union of being the prime cause of these aggressive actions by the United States, 1 should like to draw the attention of a11 members of the Counoil to the fact, staggering as it is for the United States and for a11 of LIS, of the provocative and wholly unjustifiable actions of the Government of the United States of America. 1 would draw attention to the following circumstance. In his statement of 22October 1962, Mr. Kennedy, President of the United States, spoke as follows : “Within the past week unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now inpreparation on that imprisoned Island. The purpose of these bases cari be none other than “Upon receiving the fixst preliminary certain information of this nature last Tuesday morning at 9 a.m.“-that Tuesday was 16 Octobex-llI dixected that OLW surveillance be stepped up. And having now confirmed and completed oux evaluation of the evidence and our decision on a course of action, this Government feels obliged to report this new cxisis to you in fullest cletail.” [1022nd meeting, para. 13.1 35. Let LIS establish the first fact. On 16 October the Pxesident of the United States had, in his hands, unmistakable evidence. What happened then? On 18 October the President of the United States received the representative of the Soviet Union-A, A. Gromyko, the Minister fox Foxeign Affaixs. Two days aftex he already had %nmistakable evidence’l in his hands! Why, it must be asked, did the President of the United States, when receiving the Minister of another Power which the Government Of the UnitedStates accuses of sending to Cuba offensive weapons directecl against the United States, not say a word about this “unmistakable evidencefl to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union? Why? Because there is no such evidence. The Government of the United States possesses no eviclence except fake evidence, produced by the Intelligence Service of the United States, which is exhibited in halls for inspection and is distxibuted to the Press. That is what the United States has in its hands-fake eviclence! 36. If there had been any unmistakable evidence, the elementaxy rules of relations between States would have required the President of the United States, when receiving the Minister for Foreign Affairs of another Powex against which the United States was making a charge, topresent that evidence. These axe the elementaxy requirements of normal relations between States in our troubled times, particularly when the United States considers it necessarytoproceedto such extraordinaxy measuxes as the declaration of a blockade. 37. On 18 October the President of the United States said nothing about this to the Minister for Foxeign Affairs of the Soviet Union, but on 22 October he declared the blockade and announced that he was prepared t0 sink Soviet vessels. 1s this normal behavioux on the part of a great Power whichobserves the principles of the Charter and the rules of international Inw? NO, this is highway robbery; and thenormal policy of a great Power cannot $e conducted by such robbery. It is not for nothing that reasonable xepxesentatives of the United States Pxess arenow sayingthat this was a gross mistake. 38. I should like to draw attention to an. article by Mx. Lippmann, whose wisdom Springs from long expexifince and who is sufficiently well informed. Today he writes as follows: “1 see danger of this mistake in the fact that when the President saw Mr. Gromyko on Thursdayn-thal; was 18 Octobex-lVand had the evidenceofthe missile build-up in Cuba, he xefrained from confronting Mx. Gromyko with this evidence. This was to suspend diplomacyl’. 39. Mr. Stevenson, you have stated at sessions ofthe &&eral Assembly that the United States is in favour SC, -, ? 40, Instead of submitting, by the diplomatie process and at the highest level, his doubts and the facts needing examination to the Government of the country against which he intended to apply armedforce, instead of doing this, the President said nothing at a11 about the matter to A. A. Gromyko, And 1 would go even further: he assured him that the United States planned nothing against Cuba ancl that he believed the information published by the Soviet Government. What is this, a system of double-accounting? You say one thing in officia1 talks, and two days later you declare that the Soviet Union has been deceiving you. 41. No; pardon me, it is you who are deceiving your own people and the wholo world, and incidentally the Amerioan Press is now writing about this. I would draw attention to the New York I?erald Tribune, which writes as follows: “Today, Friday 19 October, as well as the whole of the week-end, the Department of Defense has declared that it has no information indicating the presence of any offensive armament in Cuba.” And yet the President declared in his statement that he had learnt of theexistenceofsuchrockets at 9 8.131. on Tuesday, 16 October. Then, citing a whole series of officia1 statements by government organs of the United States, the slanderous or, as they delicately say, protective nature of which has already been revealed by the actions of the UnitedStates Government, the newspaper reluctantly asks the following question,. which 1 shall repeat here: “If a lie has to be told, the public for its part is entitled to ask: When did the lie begin, and when did it end?” That is a legitimate question for the American 1Jress to put. 42. 1 Will not expatiate further on this theme; but from what 1 have already said, Prom the unmistakable evidence which cannot be refuted by Mr. Stevenson, it is clear that the United States Government has deliberately sharpened the crisis, bas deliberately engineered provocation, and has tried to obscure this by a discussion in the Security Council, at a time when there were no grounds for suoh a prooedure. Even now, you cannot advance any grounds except, 1 repeat, the fake evidence supplied by your Intelligence Service. But world politics oannot be carried on in this way. Such reckless adventuring cari lead to catastrophic consequenoes for the whole world. The Soviet Government has warned the United States and the entire world of this fact. 43. Mr. Stevenson referred to the letter of October 24 from Nikita Khrushchev to Bertrand Russell, but his interpretation of this letter in no way corresponds with the letter ‘s contents. 1 shall take the liberty of reading out part of this letter, SO that you Will see what the Soviet Union’s position really is. In the face of United States provocation threatening the whole world with thermo-nuclear war, Mr. Khrushchev said: “It is a well-known fact that if one tries to appease a bandit by giving him first one’s purse, then one% overcoat, and SO forth, he doesnot become any more charitable as aresult. He does not cesse his banditry, but, on the contrary, he becomes .even bolder. It is therefore necessary to restrain the bandit in order to prevent the law of the jungle from becoming the law prevaletit in relationships between civilized people and States. “The Soviet Government considers that the United States Government should show restraint and refrain from carrying out its piratical threats, which are fraught with the most serious consequences. “The question of war and peace is a question of such vital importance that we would advocate a meeting at the highest level, with aviewto discussing a11 pending problems and doing everything to remove the threat of an outbreak of thermo-nuclear war. “SO long as nuclear rackets have not been discharged, there is still a possibility of avoiding war. But once the Americans have unleashed aggression, such a meeting Will become both impossible and useless.l’ 44. Such is the Soviet LJnion’s position on this question, It has been stated consistently by the Soviet delegation from the outset of the discussion of this question; and after the initiative taken by the Aoting Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, we received and passed to U Thant the reply dated October 25 sent by Mr. Khrushchev, tothe letter mentioned by the Aoting Secretary-General in the last Security Council meeting. 1 will read the text of this reply: IQsteemed U Thant, “1 have received your communication and have carefully studied the proposa1 contained in it. Iwelcorne your initiative. 1 understand your concern at the situation which has arisen in the Caribbean area, sinoe the Soviet Government also regards this situation as highly dangerous and as callingfor the immediate intervention of the United Nations, “1 inform you that 1 am in agreement with your proposai, which is in accordance with the lnterests of pence. n With that 1 Will, with your permission, conclude my statement. 45, Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America): 1 wnnt to say to you, Mr. Zorin, that 1 do not have your talent for obfuscation, for distortion, for confusing language and for double-talk-and 1 must confess to YOU that 1 am glad 1 do not. But, if 1 understood what 46. -Next, let me say to you that, if 1 understood you, you said-with a trespass on credulity that excels your best-that our position had changed since Ispoke here the other day because of the pressures of world opinion and a majority of the United Nations. Weil, let me say to you, sir: You are wrong again. We have had no pressure from anyone whatsoever. We came here today to indicate our willingness to discuss U Thsnt’s proposals-and that is the only change that has taken place. 47. But let me also say to you, sir, that there has been a change, You, the Soviet Union, have sent these weapons to Cuba. You, the Soviet Union, hnve upset the balance of power in the world. You, the Soviet Union, have created this new danger-not the United States. 48. You asked, with a fine show of indignation, why the President did not tel1 Mr. Gromyko last Thursday about our evidence, at the very time that Mr. Gromyko was blandly denying to the President that the USSR was placing suoh weapons on sites in the New World. Well, 1 Will tel1 you why: because we were assembling the evidence-and perhaps it would be instructive to the world to see how far a Soviet officia1 would go in perfidy. Perhaps we wanted to know whether this country faced another example of nuclear deceit like the one a year ago, when in stealth the Soviet Union broke the nuclear test moratorium, And, while we are asking questions, let me ask you why your Government, your Foreign Minister, deliberately, cynically deoeived us about the nuclear build-up in Cuba. telles être irait &re nouveau cas de duplicite registre au moratoire sommes pourquoi affaires voulu nous tromper aires 49. Finally, Mr. Zorin, 1 remind you that the other day you did not deny the existence of these weapons. Instead, we heard that they had suddenly become defensive weapons. But today-again, if 1 heard you correctly-you say that they do not exist, or that we have not proved they exist-and you say this with another fine flood of rhetorical soorn. Al1 right, sir, let me ask you one simple question: Do you, Ambassdor Zorin, deny that the USSR has placed and is placing medium and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no? Do not wait for the interpretation. Yes or no? 49. l’autre armes. qualifier bien compris, n’existent de leur de belle bien, mais laissez-moi tion: vous d’installer mediaire ou non? &Pondre.

Iam net in an Amerioan court of law, and therefore do not wish to answer a question put to me in the manner of a prosecuting counsel. You Will receive the answer in due course in my capaoity as representative of the Soviet Union, 50. pas ici devant un tribunal américain, je refuse celles utile sovietique.

Please continue your statement, Mr. Stevenson, You Will receive the answer in due course, 53, Mr, STEVENSON (United States of America): 1 am prepared to wait for my answer until Hell freezes over, if that is your decision. 1 am also prepared to present the evidence in this room.

1 cal1 on the representative of Chile.

Mr. President, Ihadnot expectedtheincident which has just occurred, and 1 should prefer to speak after you have replied, if you should deem it necessary, to the oomments or questions addressed to you by the United States representative. 1 should be glad to yield the floor to you for that purpose.

1 had not finished my statement. 1 asked you a question, Mr. President, and 1 have had no reply to that question, 1 Will now proceed, if 1 may, to finish my sta.tement. 57, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): By a11 means, you may proceed.

1 doubt whether anyone in this room, except possibly the representative of the Soviet Union, has any doubt about the facts, but in view of his statements and the statements of the Soviet Government up until last Thursday, when Mr. Gromyko denied the existence of or any intention of installing suoh weapons in Cuba, 1 am going to make a portion of the evidenoe available right now. If you will indulge me for a moment, we Will set up an easel here in the back of the room where 1 hope it Will be visible to everyone. 59. The first of theae exhibits shows an area north of the village of Candelaria, near San Crist6bal in the island of Cuba, south-west of Havana. The map, together with a small photograph shows precisely where the area is in Cuba. The first photograph shows the area in late August 1962, It was then, if you oan see from where you are sittlng, only a peaceful countryaide. The seoond photograph shows the same area one day last week. A few tents and vehioles had corne into the area, new Spur roads had appeared, and the main road had been improved. 60. The third photograph, taken only twenty-four heurs later, shows faoilities for a medium-range missile battalion installation. There are tents for four or five hundred men. At the end of the new spur road there are seven l,OOO-mile missile trailers, There are four launoher-erector mechanisms for plaoing these trailers in erect firing position, This missile is a mobile weapon whioh cari be moved rapidly from one place to another. It is identioal with the l,OOO-mile missiles which have been displayed in 62. A second type of installation is designed for a missile of intermediate range, a range of about 2,200 miles. Each site of this type has four launching pads. The exhibit on this type of missile shows a launching area being constructed near Guanajay, south-west of the city of Havana. As in the first exhibit, a map and small photograph show this area as it appeared in late August 1962, when no military activfties were apparent. A second large photograph shows the same area about six weeks later. Here you Will see a very heavy construction effort to push the launching area to ranid completion. The pictures show two large concrete bunkers or control centres in prooess of construction, one between each pair of launching pads. They show heavy concrete retaining walls being erected to shelter vehicles and equipment from rocket blast-off. They show table stars leading from the launching pad to the bunkers. They show large, reinforced-concrete buildings under construction. Abuilding with a heavy arch may well be intended as the storage area for the nuclear warheads. The installation is not yet complete and no warheads axe yet visible, 63. The next photograph shows a closer view of the same intermediate-ra.nge launching site. Here youcan clearly see one of the pairs of large, concrete launching pads with the concrete buildingfrom which launching operations for three pads are controlled. Other details are visible, such as fuel-tanks, That is only one example, one illustration of the work going forwardin Cuba on intermediate-range missile bases. 64. New, in addition to missiles, the Soviet Union is installing other offensive weapons in Cuba. The next photograph is of an airfield at San Julian in western Cuba, On this field you will sec twenty-two crates designed to transport the fuselages of Soviet Ilyushin- 28 bombers. Four of the aircraft are uncrated and one is partitilly assembled. These bombers, sometimes known as Beagles, have an operating radius of about 750 miles and are capable of carrying nuolear weapons. At the same field you cari see one of the surface-to-air anti-aircraft guided-missile bases, with six missiles per base, which now ring the entire coastline of Cuba. 65. Another set of two photographs covers still another area of deployment of medium-range missiles in Cuba, These photographs are on a larger soale than the others and reveal many details of an improved field-type launching site, One photograph provides an over-a11 view of most of the site, You cari sec clearly three of the four launching pads. The second photograph 66. These weapons, these launching pads, these planes-of which we have illustrated only afragmentare part of a much large-r weapon complex, of what is called a weapon system. TO support this build-up, to operate these advanced weapon systems, the Soviet Union has sent a large number of military personnel to Cuba, a force now amounting to several thousand men.

I now cal1 on the representative of Ghana. 67. These photographs, as 1 say, are available to members for detailed examination in the Trusteeship Council room, following this meeting, There 1 shall have one of my aides who will gladly explain them to you in such detail as you may require. 1 have nothing further to say at this time,

1 wouldprefer to speak towards the end of the meeting. 70, Mr. Mahmoud RIAD (United Arab Republio): The Council has just .heard the message of President Kennedy in response to the appeal which was addressed to him by the Aoting Seoretary-General. The delegation of the United Arab Republic cannot but hail the instruotions of President Kennedy to Mr. Stevenson to discuss promptly the arrangements proposed by Acting Seoretary-General U Thant, and we acknowledge Mr. Kennedy’s desire to reach a satisfactory and peaceful solution of this matter. This is a very welcome step forward and one, we believe, in the right direction which should be seizedby a11 membera of the Council. 71. We also weloome Chairman Khrushchev’s letter to the Acting Seoretary-General agreeing to his pro- Posai, whioh meets the interests of peace, and 1 believe that the climate is ripe for the parties to corne together. 72. This is a historical moment indeed, and 1 think that the members of the Council should start in a business-like fashion to prepare the way for thenegotiations. Let US profit from the declared good intentions Of both sides, and let them begin negotiations without losfng any more time. 73. In conclusion, 1 should like to express our satisfaction at the developments ao far, We shall watch very closely how things develop. But 1 shall close on a note of optimism which is based on the fact that the response of President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev was in fact a direct result of the concern of the members of the Council and world opinion in general

I was informed that the distinguished representative of Ghana wished to speak again, but, knowing that 1 wished to make a short statement by way of reply to the representative of the United States, he postponed his statement and Will speak after me, 1 shall therefore ventùre to say a few words as representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. 76; Mr. Stevenson asked me a question about the sending of nuclear weapons to Cuba, asked me to reply to that question; but thereafter he displayed nevidenoen which the United States could produoe as grounds for their aggressive actions, 77. 1 shall confine myself to a brief answer. The answer to Mr. Stevenson and to the United States Government has already been given by the Soviet Government. 1 would venture to recall this answer, which was contained in a Tass statement of 11 September: n . , . The Government of the Soviet Union has authorized Tass to state, further, that the Soviet Union does not need to transfer to any other country, suoh as Cuba, its existing means for the repelIing of aggression and the delivering of a retaliatory blow. The explosive force of our nuclear resources is SO great, and the Soviet Union has such powerful rookets for the delivery of these nuclear charges, that there is no need to seek places for their installation anywhere outside the bordera, of the Soviet Union.” That is our answer to the question which interests you. There is no need for us to deploy our powerful rookets and nuolear resources anywhere, including Cuba. The questions which Mr. Stevenson tried to ask were therefore, in reality, rhetorical questions and nothing more. 78. In addition, Mr, Stevenson himself said that Mr. Gromyko, in his conversation with Mr. Kennedy, denied the presenoe of such offensive weapons, in Cuba, What more do you need? That is my answer to your question. 79. The second remark 1 would like tomakeis about the so-called “evidence” and photographs whioli Mr. Stevenson produced here. Similar methods were used by Mr. Stevenson, though without success, in April 1961. At the meeting of the General Assembly’s First Committee on 15 April 1961-as may be verifiedfrom the Verbatim record-Mr. Stevenson showed US photographs of a Cuban aircraft which had allegedly strafed Havana, and which allegedly formed part of the Cuban armed forces; and after showing us a11 these photographs, he said: “It has the markings of the Castro Air Force . . ., which everyone cari see for himself. “I/ I/ This statement was made at the 1149th meeting of the First Committee, the officia1 record of which was published in summary form. Quotation taken from the Verbatim record of this meeting (A/GI/ PV.1149). It was this photograph, of this aircraft, prepared by the United States Intelligence Agenoy, which was presented to the First Committee as evidence purporting to show that it was Cuban aircraft which had strafed Havana. 81. This is an actual fact, and you cannot deny it, What is the value of a11 your photographs? He who lies once is not believed a second time. Therefore, Mr. Stevenson, we do not propose to look et your photographs, 82. If you had something in the way of serious evidenoe, you should have presented it in acoordance with diplomatio practice, as suggested by that reasonable man Mr. Lippmann, to the Government which you are accusing. You have not done this, but are using the Security Council as a show for the display of your photographs. 1 consider that this procedure lacks seriousness. I had a higher opinion of you personally. Unfortunately, 1 was mistaken. 1 regret it very much. 83. 1 corne to my last point, Suppose that a11 this play-acting, a11 this show, indicates only one thing-a desire to distract the Security Council from the main issue: the violation by the United States of the universally acoepted rules of international law, and of the United Nations Charter, and the arbitrary declaration of a blqckade, which constitutes an aot of war. Your main task is to distract the Security Council from a11 this, and for this purpose you display a11 sorts of faked photographs. 1 do not propose to enter. into a discussion about these photographs, for 1 do net wish to be a party to anything ,which n@ght help you to distract the Seourity Council from the main issue. 84. Those, properly speaking, are my answers to your observations and questions, 85. As for the proposa1 put forward by therepresentative of the, United Arab Republic, I assumeit Will be neoessary for us to exchange views on this subjeot, after which we oan take the appropriate decisions. 86, In my capacity as PRESIDENT, then, and if there are no objections, I shall cal1 on the representative of the United States who asked to speak before the representative of Ghana. With the consent of the representative of Ghana, I therefore oall upon the representative of the United States.

I ..’ . . shall detain the Counoil only a moment, 88. 5 have not had a direct answer to my question, The representative of the Soviet Union said that the offioial answer of the Soviet Union was the Tass statement that the USSR does not need to locate missiles in Cuba. I agree: the USSR does net need to do that. But the question is not whether the USSR needs missiles in Cuba, The question is: has the USSR missiles 90. And now 1 hope that we oan get down to business, that we cari stop this sparring. We know the facts, Mr. Zorin, and SO do you, and we are ready to talk about them. Our job here is not to score debating points: our job, Mr. Zorin, is to save the peace. If you are ready to try, we are,

These are grave times. 1 agree with the representative of the United States that our job is to save the peace. Indeed, my delegation weloomes the responses conveyed by the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union to the timely appeal and constructive suggestions addressed to them yesterday by the Acting Secretary-General. My delegation wishes to record its warmest appreciation to U Thant for this tremendous show of statesmanship and initiative. The Aoting Secretary-General’s appeal and suggestions followed, as members of the Council are aware, a “d6marchett made to him by the representatives of Cyprus and the United Arab Republic and by me as representative of Ghana, in the name of the representatives of some fifty States Members of our Organization. 92. Al1 these representatives, sensitive to the waves of alarm whioh were engulfing a11 humanity and responding to the concern of their Governments and peoples about the increasingly dangerous situation, authorized an approach to the Acting Secretary-General with the suggestion that he might appeal to the parties concerned, in the interest of international peace and security, to refrain from any action which might aggravate this situation, 93. My delegation is happy that this appeal has been made and has evoked a generally favourable response from both sides. Our understanding of this response, indeed our hope and prayer, is that while refraining from any action which might aggravate the situation, the parties concerned-that is to say the UnitedStates, Cuba and the Soviet Union-Will avail themselves of the Aoting Secretary-General’s offer of assistance to facilitate the negotiations on the immediate steps to be taken to remove the existing threat to world peace and to normalize the situation in the Caribbean. 94. In this connexion, my delegation commends the suggestions made by the Acting Secretary-General, which we are confident will greatly ease the situation and give time for the necessary discussions andnegotiations to get under way. My delegatfon earnestly bopes that it Will be possiblefor the Acting Secretary- General to continue his vigorous task and to report in time to the Security Council meeting in conclave, We are confident that when the time cornes the parties, in conjunction with the Acting Seoretary-General,

As 1 understand it, a motion has been put forward by the representative of the United Arab Republio, wlth the support of the representative of Ghana, for the adjournment of further proceedings of the Council and for the closing of the meeting. Under the Council’s rules of prooedure, such a motion is introduced and decided upon without debate. The representative ..of Chile, however, has asked for the floor. 1 would ask him whether he wishes to speak on this motion or on some other matter, 1 should also like to know whether the sponsors of this motion insist that it should be decided upon immediately. If the other memberd of the Council, inoluding the sponsors of the motion, have no objection to the floor being given to the representative of Chile, then 1 myself, as President, see no objection to allowing him to speak, since his name had been included in the Iist of speakers earlier but he ceded hts turn. 96. If there are no objections, 1 shall give the floor to the representative of Chile.

1 am grateful to you, Mr. President and members of the Council, for giving me the opportunity to say what I was going to say when 1 preferred to yield the floor to the President SO that he could reply to a few questions which had been put to .him. 98. As a matter of fact, 1 was going to make a proposa1 similar to that made by the representative of the United Arab Republic and SO eloquently defended and supported by the representative of Ghana. 99, 1 entirely agree with everything they said; aotually, the initiative taken by the Acting Seoretary- General was necessary. I was glad to say SO when 1 spoke during yesterday evening’s debate, 1 am proud of the manner in which the Acting Secretary-General of our Organization is assuming his responsibility and the very heavy duties incumbent upon him. 1 am deeply gratified at the way in which his initiative was greeted by the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Mini&ers of the USSR. 100. 1 hope that the conversations to be held under W Thantls auspices, to the relief of the entire world, will be as fruitful as they should be in the interest of preserving peace, which is at present the chief concern of my Government and of the people of Chile.

If there are no objections, then, to the motion of adjournment introduced by the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Ghana, we shall consider it adopted. The motion is ado$ted.

As 1 understand it, the President Will in the iight of the results of the disoussions which are to take place, decide with regard to the further proceedings of the Council in respect of this matter. The meeting rose at 7.25 p.m.