S/PV.1059 Security Council

ln accordance with previous decisions of the Council.1shaHinvite the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and ofIsraelto take seats at the Council table. At the invitation of the President. Mr. Salah El Dine Tarazi (Syria) and Mr. Michael Cornay (Israel) toole placelS at the Security Council' table.

WhenIaddressedtheCouncil on 23 August r1057th meeting], the Secretary-General had not yet received and submitted to the Council the report of the Chief of staffof the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine [8/5401 and Add.1 to 4] and 1 then stated that my delegation would no doubt make submissions on the report when it became avlÛlable. It is for this purpose that 1 have asked for the floor now. while leavingfor a later stage 4. On this latter point. it is not without irony that the investigation of the Syrian complaint showed that the incident of 20 August. which is the theme of that complaint. started in accordance with the same pattern of aggression of which we have complained so strongly.... namely. Syrian military positions opening fire on Israel farmers working in their fields. This constant harassment of our civilian population is becoming intolerable, and one of the 010st serious and urgent ways to reduce tension li'3s in thesuccessof UNTSO's efforts to hait this practice of Syrian resort to firearms. 5. As regards co-operation with the Chief of Staff. my Government's view corresponds with that stated by Ambassador Stevenson. namely. that measures to improve the situation should be worked outbyGeneral Bull with the parties concerned. In facto that is our understanding of his letter to the Secretary-General. .transmitting his report on the two complaints before the Council. The Chief of Stafi then adds that he has provided a panoramic view of the situation on the border against which to examine these complaints and also to advise the Secretary-General "of measures 1 have taken and measures of ageneralcharacterl proposed should be taken ••• ". In other words. General Bull is simply informing the Secretary-General. and the Secretary-General is informing the Council. of matters which the Chief of staff has taken up directIy with the Governments concerned. 6. The Chief of Staff is concerned. and should primarily be concerned. with securing the willing cooperation of the parties and establishing with them a relationship of trust and harmony. My Government has been extending to him thefullest co-operation. andwill continue to do so. In facto since his arrivaI on the scene•.there is not a single requestsubmittedto us by General Bull. in mattersof both major and minor importance. with which we have not readily complied. 7. There should be no insurmountable obstacles to working out mutually acceptable arrangements. on a pragmatic basis. and in a spirit of mutual understanding. We welcome discussion with him on the merits ~f any issue he may think helpful. After· aIl. we share the same objective. which is to relax tension. damp down conflict on the borders. andcreate a more peacefuI atmosphere.In the light of this general attitude. 1 8. 1 do not propose reacting to the statementmade by the representative of Morocco at the last meeting which gave expression to the conventional Arab attitude towards Israel. 1 would confine myself to correcting a misstatement of facto This is not the first time Israel has brought complaints to the Sècurity Council. That has been done on various occasions. the last of them being in December 1958 and in ,January 1959. Both incidents. characteristically enough, involved the killing of Israel civilians by gunfire from Syrian military positions from across the border. 9. 1 would now ask the indulgence of the Council to examine in some detail the evidence relating to the Almagor murders. which are our primary complaint. That evidence. as will be shown. establishes beyond any reasonable doubt that these murders were perpetrated by a Syrian army unit which had penetrated into Israel territory for the purpose. This conclusion is not stated in the report in so many words. The reason. 1 assume. is not that the picture is unclear to the investigators. but that in their view the Council is seized of the issue and should pronounce its own verdict on the evidence. 10. The time and place of the attack are confirmed by the UNTSO observation post in the area. 1 would here refer to the sketch map of the Almagor Zone which my delegation has prepared for the convenience of Council members and which has just beendistributed. The position of O.P. Deltawill befoundmarked on that map by a hut and a flag near where the Jordan River flows into the lake. Paragraph 8 of General Bull's report. reads as follows: "At 1715. 19 August 1963. O.P. Delta .•• reported. that approximately seventy-five rounds of heavy machine-gun fire in bursts of five to siX rounds per burst were hea.rd. The firing. the originof which coulà not be observed. seemed to be about 1.500 metres north-west of O.P. Delta." 6. The time given here.I715.isGreenwichmeantime and corresponds to 1915 hours local time. thatis. at a quarter past seven in the evening. which wouldbe just at dusk at this time of the year. In the next paragraph of the report. that is. paragraph 9. thereis quoted the Israel verbal complaint at 1830 hours that evening. which starts: "On 19 August 1963 at approximately 1715. a tractor ofkibbutz Almagor was ambushed ••• ". It will be noted that the time given in this complaint corresponds exactly to the time of the firingrecorded by O.P. Delta. As regard the place. ifone takes a line 1.500 metres north-west of O.P. Delta. itbrings one to the place of ambush. 12. The evidence as a whole leaves an overwhelming impression of a precisely planned and executed military raid. The following salient features of this evidence may be pointed out. 13. First. Nisim Abdu. the Israeli who escaped with his life.and lives to tell the tale. told the United Nations 14. Next, the choice of a particular moment for the attack is also the obviousresultofcarefulforethought, and not accidentaI. l would quote the evidence, also in the report of the United Nations militaryobservers [S/5401,.annex llIl, given b;Y the witness Ashkenazi. a settler of Almagor kibQutz. Here, again, it should be pointed out that this portion of bis evidence was not brought forward as part of a prepared statement but was elicited by the questions of the investigators. The passage in question reads as follows: "Question l.Please give a military appreciation of events." This settler was connected with the defence arrangements of the kibbutz. "Answer 1. This trip of the tractor is routine, taking place every day at much the same time. In my opinion this was an ambush setfor the tractor. About half .an hour prior to the ambush, fifteen of our settlers finished their work in the terraces andwere collected from the fields. . "Question 2. How do you consider the ambush was mounted? "AnsWer 2. We have two OPs [observation postS] watchingthè east, but one of these had not been manned since noon while the other' withdrewat appro,q.mately 1900 LT .[localtime]. The Syrians most probably knew our routine; therefore they picked this particular spot close betweentwo curves in the road, with a stone wall immediately east of the track. They probably crouched behind the wall in firingpositionsand fil'ed from there. "Answer 3. The distance uphill is considerable and part of the approach is in dead ground. Considering the failing light, the fact that OP personnel were preparing to withdraw for the night, it is thought that. all combined, these f~ctors enabled the Syrians to infiltrate unobserved." 1 would merely add that when he says: "the Syrians most probably knew our routine", the map which 1 have put before Council members shows that there are three Syrian military positions within a radius of a couple of thousand yards from the settlement, and the movements of the settlers would be under constant observation from these Syrian positions. 15. Thirdly. the evidence of the tracker. borneoutby the United Nations examination of the marks on the ground. shows that the attack was carried out in a carefully-planned. rehearsed way by a disciplined group of ten persons. which 1 amtoldis the regulation size of an infantry section in the Syrian Army. 16. 1 shall now quote from another passage of the report of the United Nations militaryobservers. under the heading "Physical Evidence": "Approximately 200 metres east of the area ofthe incident on a terraced area on the slope of the hill which was the western limit of the demilitarized zone. evidence was seen where approximately ten persons had halted fora short period of time. This was indicated by numerous footprints in the area. The footprints moved up the hill from the direction of the Jordan River in extended line to a covered position on the eastern sideofthe stonefence bordering the east side of the cultivated area. In this area ten distinct positions were located. proven by footprints and fired cartridge cases. In front of two of these positions part of th~ stone fence had been damaged by small arms fire." Further on it states: "From the tractor. footprints could he seen returning down the hills to the east. in the direction of the Jordan River. No evidence could be found of this party halting during their return trip." This is the eVldence ofthe United Nations investigators. 17. Fourthly. aIl the evidence found at the actual spot of ambush is of a military character. Again 1 shall quote from the same report concerning physical evidence: "The tractor had been severely damaged by small arms fire and there were traces of blood near the driver's seat of the .tractor. Aroundthetractorwere fired cartridge cases and spent bullets. Approximately 10 metres north-west of the tractor a lever Incidentally, that bears out the contention that when these two men· had been shot down, their attackers advanced upon them and killed them at short range on the groood. The report continues: "To the south-west of the traetor, approximately 20 metres in the area of the alleged escape rO:lte of Nisin Abdu, were discovered three small crateX's where it is suspected grenades had exploded. "... "In a hospital in Haifa two bodies were viewed. ••• The bodies were riddled with holes that cduld b.ave been caused by small arms fire. The top left portion of the head of one ofthe bodies had sustained severe injuries and the brain was visible." The medical evidence is, therefore, completely consistent with the accooot givenofthe attack and with the physical eVidence fOWld at the spot. 18. Next, shortly after this incident, a truck belonging to the settlement was blown up by a landmine at the exact spot of the ambush. Not only were the fragments of this mine produced, but also another intâct mine which had failed toexplode. In paragraph 40 of the report of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO [S/5401; a police engineer stated thatthe Wle'Wloded mine "Wt,s ,,~British Mark il .anti-tank mine, containing 2.5 kilo~~l'ammes high explosive, alleged to be in standard use by Syrian military forces ". Later in the same paragraph it is stated that: "The physical evidence seen by the United Nations military observers included a hole made by the explosion, mine fragments, damaged truck rear wheels, one ooexploded mine, footprints proceeding east and west." l'am able to tell the Cooocil that this is the same type of minewhichhas been used in several other mining incidents in the border areaover a number of years. 1 need hardly emphasize that the laying of anti-tank mines is a professional military job. 19. Lastly, it is important to note that the Syrian border throughout its length is linedby a chain of dugin and fortified military positions. This border on the Syrian side is Wlder strict military control. Throughout the years all border incidents have involved these military positions as the Syrian element in the incidents, and in fourteen years there has been no recorded case of attacks or raids carried out from the Syrian side by non-military personnel. In this respect, the Syrian border differs-foodamentallyfroplthedifficulties which have arisen from time to time on certain other borders. It is in effect a sealed border. 21. Even the representative of Syria does notpresume tomake such a suggestion. In his statement to the Council last Friday [1057th meeting]-and out of respect for the Council 1 shall refrainfromcommenting on the deplorable tone of that statement-he proffered an alternative explanation of his own. It was, if 1 understood him rightly, that the attack never took place at aIl, but that the two Israel farmers were deliberately murdered somewhere else in some barnfor the object, 1 assume, of a false charge against Syria. This suggestion is intellectually ridiculous in the light of the evidence, and moraIly beneathcontempt. Inother words, not only is there overwhelming and conclusive evidence ta support the Israel complaint, butno alternative explanation has even been suggested to this Council which can have any relationship at aIl with the facts. . 22. Mr. President and members of the Council, on 19 August last a Syrian military unit was dispatched across the border of its country into the territory of the State of Israel, carried out a dastardly,calculated and carefully-planned murder of two innocent Israel citizens, and withdrew back into its own country. The tacts are before the Council. The conclusion ofSyrian responsibility is inescapable. We are seekingredress from the Council and it would be inconceivable to the Government and the people of Israel that Syria should not be condemned for this action of its armed forces.

1 would have preferred not to speak today, for 1 thought that 1 had explained Syria's case atthe1057th meeting of the Council on 23 August 1963, but the statements made by the United States representative this morning and by the representative of the Israel authorities this afternoon oblige me to clarify the situationonce again. 24. What emerges from the statement Just made by Mr. Comay is that the report bythe Chief of Staff does 27. The UT'ited States representative went a little too far this morning in drawing conclusions from the investigation carried out by the Chief of Staff. He deplored the murder of the twolsraelfarmersin moving terms; 1 could wish that he had regretted the death of the Syrians in similar terms. To show what 1 mean 1 need only quote whatMl'. Stevenson-amanwhoml have long greatly admired but who was not objective this morning-said atthe Council meetingon 28 Marçh1962. i.e•• the date of the debate on the Syrian complaint to the Security Council concerning the attack made by the Israel authorities on the Syrian positions at El- Merab on the night of 16 to 17 March 1962. On that occasion. Ml'. Stevenson said: "In the present encounter a number of lives have been lost. both among Syrian and Israelcitizens. We deeply regret t;his catastrophe and extend our sym.- pathy to the families of thosewho have sl.>ifered. The loss of life is .all the more tragic because this sacrifice is more likely to have set back the cause of peace than to have advanced it. ft [999th meeting. para. 102.] 28. The moving statement Ml'. Stevenson made this morning goes beyond what he said when a much more serious act had been committed. In his statement on 28 March 1962. the United States representative did not differentiate betWeen the parties. the Syrians and t.~e Israelis. although on that occasion it was obvious that Syria had been the victim of a flagrant act of aggression. We should have liked to hear some words of r,egret today aboutthe losses sufferedbythe Syrians but we have heard nothing of the sort. 29. You have naturally been told that the8yriancomplaint was unfo~ded since by the time the United Nationsobservers arrivedon the scene all traces had disappeared. Why is itthat in the eyes of certain members of the Security Council the Syrian complaint has not been substantiated. whereas the Israel complaint has been? The re.ason isvery simple: itis that, in both f 1 1 i 31. 1know that 1 am not addressing acriminal court. and 1 do not wi!3h towearythe Council with legal arguments. but this is above all a legalpoint; all 1 can say is that. as matters now stand. the Is1"aelcomplaint is. to use a legal expression.notproven. Itmay be proved by fine speeches. by sentimental appeals orinvarious other ways. but legally the charge is not proven. If a criminal court were to take a decision on the basis of the evidence at present available on this complaint. the judgement of that court would obviously be quashedby the Court of Cassation. in France for example. or by the corresponding court of higher instanceinanyother country. It would be y,uashed for violation of the law because the evidence is not conclusive. r1 r1 l ] ~ 32. For instance. in the report of th\;.' Chief of Staffon which 1 do not wish to speak at any great lengththere are elements which incriminate the Israel authorities. 1 regret that they were not mentioned by the United States representative. The report states in particular: "The investigating United Nations militar·y observers saw burnt fields atDarbashiya(MR2105-2770). El 8ayyadi village (MR 2110-2770). the Wadi El Fazir (MR 2110-2748). the Wadi El Jalabina (MR 2105-2724) and damage from smallarms fire at El 8ayyadi village. Photographs were taken and a sketch map drawn. n [8/5401. para. 20.] 1 1 1 ! ~ l ll1 The 0hief of Staff goes on: l "At 1054 OP Charlie (MR 2103-2719) reportedthat fire was opened again. this time by Israelis. Fire was returned; heavY machine guns were used. The initi81 shots were observed by OP Charlie as orginating west of the OP." [Ibid•• para. 21.] 1 1i Consequently. with the evidence now available. 1 do not think that it can be said with certainty that 8yria is responsible for the murder of these two farmers. ~ ~! 33. Furthermore. an examination of the photographs annexed to the report of the Chief of Staff [8/5401/ Add.l. photo. 9] will reveal a striking facto One of them shows what is described as a Syrian soldier's sandal. 1 can assure you that Syrian soldiers do not wear sandals of this type. If you want to make an in- 34. It follows from the foregoing that, in the absence of convincing evidence, it is impossible to reach the conclusion here and now that Syria is responsible for acts allegedly comuùtted in this area specliied in the Aruùstice Agreement. 35. What is striking in this situation is that Israel, having subuùtted a complaint to the Security Council and without waiting for it to be considered by this organ, is threatening the Council. 1 am not saying that these threats have been clear and specliic. They are, however. implicit in the statements made by the Israel authorities on this subject. At the 1057thmeeting 1referredto the statement quotedin a Press agency dispatch that li the Security Council failed to condemn Syria, Israel would proceed to carry out reprisals or to punish Sy~ia. 36. Furthermore, on 26 August 1963 Mr. Levi Eshkol uttered even more direct threats. The 27 Augustissue of The New York Times publishedatelegramfrom the Israel sector of Jerusalem quoting the Prime Minister's own words, as follows: "We are entitled to hope that the Security Council will do its duty by treating the matter with the seriousness it deserves and adopting an unequivocal resolution condemning the murder at Almagor,which was preceded by a chain of Syrian acts of provocation." 37. Thus, not content with making a complaint to the Security Council, Israel is resorting to threats and, curiously enough, is seeking to secure the condemnation of Syria by threatening the Security Council. Frankly, this is not the way to behave, at least it is not an honest way. Mr. Comay spoke just now about respect for morality but we .see that on his side morality is not respected. 38. Be that as it may, we can say here and now, even after a study of all the elements in the report of the Chief of Staff, that the question that has been brought before the Security Council should have beenreferred to the Syrian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, an organ provided for inArticle VIIofthe General Armistice AgreementbetweenSyriaandIsrael•.Y The Armistice Agreement provides for recourse to this Commission for the settlement of cases such as those now before the Security Council. 1 therefore thinkthat it shows lack of respect towards the 8ecurity Council to submit to it matters which are not worthy of consideration by this supreme organ responsible for the maintenance pf international peace and security. In these circumstances, li one wanted to employ another legal argument, one uùght seek the dismissal of the Israel complaint on the grounds that the alleged incident has not yet been brought before the lower orgari competent in the matter. A case may notbe brought 39. It follows that the complaint nowbeforetheCouncil should have first been submitted to the Mixed Armistice Commission. Why was this not done? For the very simple reason that Israel will have nothing to do with the Mixed Armistice Commission. Israel does not want to appear before this Commission. for it does not consider the Commission competent to settle any matter connected with the demilitarized zone. 1 have already had occasion to explair. to the Council-and 1 do not want to revert to the matter today-that since the date on which the demilitarized zone was established by the MixedArmistice Commission. Israel has refused to recognize that the zone is within the competence of the Commission. As far back as 5 April 1951, in a letter addressedto the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, the leader ofthe Israel delegation indicated that his delegation would no longer appear before the Commission. 40. Such defaulting on the part of the Israel delegation already endangered peace at the time of the Houleh incidents in April 1951. The Syrian Govern':" ment submitted a complaint on that subject tothe Security Council, which met and adoptedthe resolution of 18 May 1951,,Y in which it noted the status of the demilitarized zone as interpretedby Mr. RalphBunche, Acting United Nations Mediator in Palestine. 1 shall quote the paragraphs of the resolution w~ch relate to the respect due to the demilitarized zone and to the fact that this zone is within the competence of the Mixed Armistice Commission. "The Security Council, ft ••• "Calls upon the parties to give effectto the following excerpt cited by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization at the 542nd meetingof the Security Council, on 25 April 1951, as being from the summary record of the Syria-Israel Armistice Conference of 3 July 1949, which was agreed to by the parties as an authoritative comment on article V of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria." The Council resolution then goes on to enumerate the provisions relating to the demilitarized zone: "The question of civil administration in villages and settlements in the demilitarized zone is provided for, within the framework of an Armistice Agreement, in sub-paragraphs 5 <!!) and 5 @ of the draft article. Suoh civiladministration, including:policing, will be on a localbasis uwithoutraising general questions of administration, jurisdiction, citizenship and sovereignty• "Where Israel civilians return to or remain in an Israel village or settlement, the civil administration "As civilian lüe is gradually restored. administration will take shape on a local basis Wlder the general supervision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. "The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. in consultation and co-operation with the local commwùties. will be in a position to authorize all necessary arrangements for the restoration and protection of civilian life. He wiU not assume responsibility for direct administra~ion of the Zone." 41. In its resolution of 19 January 1956Y on the comp:.:.lnt lodged by Syria against Israel concerning the attack made in the Tiberias region. the Security Council expressed itself in the foUowing terms with regard to the demilitarized zone: "Calls~ the parties to comply with their obligations under article V of the General Armistice Agreement to respect the Armistice Demaroation Line and the Demilitarized Zone". 42. In the resolution adopted on 9 April 1962~ in connexion with Syria's complaint concerning anattack launched in the area on the night of 16 to 17 March 1962. the 8ecurity Council said the following: "CaUs for strict observance of article V of the General Armistice Agreement. which provides for the exclusion of armedforcesfrom the demilitarized Zone. and Annex IV of that AgreeIDRnt. which sets limits on forces in the De:fensive Area. and calls upon the Governments of Is:rael and the Syrian Arab Republic to co-operate with the Chief of Staff in eliminating any violations thereof". 43. The COWlcil is thus in possession of aH the necessary factors for the settlement of this question. What the Syrian delegation is asking is that the authority. competence and jurisdiction of the Mixed Armistice Commission should be affirmed. What we are also asking is that the Council should decide that nothing is to be excluded from the field of competence of the Mixed Armistice Commission. since article VII of the Syrian-IsraelArmistice Agreementestablishing the Mixed Armistice Commission does notprovidefor any exception to the Commission's competence. AUow me to quote the following paragraph from article vn of the Syrian-Israel Armistice Agreement: "1. The execution of the provisions of this Agreement shaU be supervisedby a MixedArmistice Commission composed of five members. of whom each Party to this Agreement shaH designate two. and whose Chairman shaH be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer from the observer personnel of that organization designated by him following consultation of both Parties to this Agreement." ~ ~i1 1 If 45. 1 must add that in seeking to preclude the Mixed Armistice Commission from considering complaints relating directly or indirectly to the demilitarized zone, the Israel authorities had a specifie objective in view. 1 can assert this and can testify to it before the Council. 1 can make my modest contribution since 1 took part, as legal adviser to the Syriandelegation, in the negotiations which led to the signingofthe Armistice Agreement. The demilitarized zonewas suggested by Mr. Bunche, the acting mediator, to the two parties which were negotiating the Armistice Agreement simply in order to settle a fundamental problem, that of the adoption of the principle that an armistice demarcation line should be drawn. Asyouknow, when the armistice negotiations were under way the Syrian army had entered Palestinian territory. Under the Security Council resolution of 15July 19482/a truce of unlimited duration was brought about. The Arab armies and the Israel army remained in their positions andno-man'sland zones were created by United Nations observers working under the orders ofGeneral Riley, the Chief of Staff. ~ I\! 1 { 1 ·1l 46. The second item on the agenda of the armistice conference-as of any armistice conference, not only the Syrian-Israel armistice conference but also the Egyptian-Israel armistice conference, the Lebanese- Israel armistice conference and the Jordan-Israel armistice conference-concerned the drawing of the demarcation line. When we negotiated the armistice, the Israel delegation wantedthe internationalboundary to be used as the demarcation line. The Syrian delegation replied: "The demarcation line must be, not the international boundary, but the truce line fixed by the United Nations observers in pursuance of the Security Council resolution of 15 July 1948." 47. The debate became protracted and the armistice conference, which had started on 5 April 1949, had to be interrupted on 17 May at the request of its Chairman. Mr. Vigier. who was atthattimethe representatiW:l of Mr. Bunche. Mr. Vigier said: "1 want to refer the matter to Mr. Bunche." The negotiations having been suspended. Mr. Bunche, with a view to settling the problem which had arisen from the differences over the demarcation line, made his proposaI for establishing the demarcation line along the truce line. But where the truce line did not correspond to the ~ Ibid•• Third Year. Supplement for July 1948, document S/902. 48. Such are the principles onwhich the demilitarized zone is based. Israel. however, having signed the Armistice Agreement, having agreed to the inclusion of Mr. Bunche's interpretation in the summaryrecord of the meeting of the armistice conference on 3 June 1949 and having agreed to subscribe to this interpretation of the status of the demilitarized zone. later decided that the demilitarized zone should belong to it. On what basis can Israel claim that the demilitarized zone should belong to it? Onthe basis of the Armistice Agreement? That it cannot do. since even ifwe ignore Mr. Bunche's interpretation, even if we ignore the statements made by the two parties during the armistice conference and by Mr. Vigier,the Chairmanof the conference. Israel has tried to createadefacto situation and to prolong this situationinorderto transform it into a de jure situation. It is obvious, however, that this de ~acto situation has nothing to do with legality. 49. This is clear from article V, paragraph 5 (~, of the General Armistice Agreement, which states: "The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be empowered to authorize the return of civilians to villages and settlements in the Demilitarized Zone and the employmentoflimitednumbers of locaHy recruited civilian police in the zone for internaI security purposes." 50. It, is thus indisputable that, since 1951, when the Israel authorities literallyboycottedthe MixedArmistice Commission. the latter hasbeencompletelyparalysed. Not only has the Commission been paralysed, but the demilitarizedzone has suffered andthe harmony and balance establishedbythe Syrian-IsraelArmistice Agreement have been completely destroyed. 51. This balance rests on two essential principles. The first is that each party must be secure and safe within its own territory. The second is thatthe provisions of the Agreement in no wayprejudice the claims of the parties and that the Armistice Agreement was signed for military. and not political, reasons. 52. If anyone doubts my words, 1 shaH refer again to the Armistice Agreement. 1 am sorry to take up the precious time of the Council but mydelegation and my Government earnestly desire to see this question of the demilitarized zone settled once and for aIl by the Security Council, since we are appearing before the Council toclay. 1 shaH quote only the third principle. which reads as follows: IlThe right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected. Il 54. With regard to the principle that the Armistice Agreement is based on military and not political considerations, 1 shall confine myself -to quoting arti-- cIe n, paragraph 2, which reads: nIt is also recognized that no provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of this Agreement beingdictated exclusiv~ly by military, and not by political considerations." 55. When we read this text. we see that in endeavouring to absorb the demilitarized zone completely, Israel has not only tried to upset the balance established by the Armistice Agreement but it has also soughtto gain advantages which are forbidden under article n. paragraph 2, of the Armistice Agreement. 56. Whereas the demilitarized zone was supposed to be administered on a localbasis, we find today that the settlements in the demilitarized zone are not administered locally; they are administered directly by Israel. This is a violation ofthe Armistice Agreement. The violation might not be so important if it did not lead to attacks by Israel; since the status of the demilitarized zone should be fully respected. and the Israel authorities have violated this status. it should be the Armistice Commission's task to settle these disputes and save the Council much precious time. 57. That this has not been done is due to the refusaI of the Israel authorities to appear before the Armistice Commission. If, then, as 1 heard mentioned this morning. the Security Council sees fit to reactivate the machinery which was set up under the General Armistice Agreement, it should do so in a concrete way, otherwise we may have many more incidents in the fUGure and we may have to come once again, and perhaps more than once, before the Security Council. 58. If. therefore, we want the Armistice Agreement to be fully applied, aIl these questions must be examined in the light of the actions ofthe two parties. 1 am readyto see the actions ofboth parties taken into account; 1 am not thinking solely ofthe Israel authorities, for the Government which 1 have the honour to represent here can proudly vindicate its conductbefore you and state that it has never broken its word with regard to th~ application of the provisions of the 59. The Press will probably not reproduce everything 1 have said. since itdidnotpublish the substance of what 1 said the other day; as far as 1 am concerned. however. 1 am not speaking to the Press. 1 am speaking to the representatives on the Security Council. The Press may take what it likes from my speech and interpret my words in a way which may be more favourable to the Israel authorities. but 1 am sorry to have to say that the other day it did not reflect my statement objectively. As Rabelais said. one must break the bone in order to obtain the substantial marrow. 60. 1 repeat. this question should not have beenbrought before the Security Council. but since this course was decided on 1 will take the opportunity to expose more fully the illegal and illicit acts ofthe Israel authorities which. to say the very least. contravene the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. What is there behind all this? There is the fact that Israel wants to present the Security Council with a fait accompli. These littl~ illegalities. these little violations of the Armistice Agreement. particularly with regard to the demilitarized zone. must continue so that when the Council comes to consider the case it will say: the situation must remain as it is now. 1do not think that this is the attitude of the members of the Security Council. 1 know that the Council must ensure peace and that it has very heavy responsibilities; but it must not evade its responsibilities by simply saying now that the Armistice Agreement must be implemented. The Council should indeed say that the Armistice Agreement must be put into effect. but it should also say how and why that has not been done up to the present time. 61. You want to reactivate the Armistice Commission. but in this connexion 1 should like to make two suggestions. The first is that the Secretary-General shouldbe asked to conduct an inquiry. in which• .of course. the Chief of Staff of UNTSO would participate. The object of this inquiry would be to inform the Council of the reasons which led to the de facto breakdown of the General Armistice Agreement and of the reasons why the Mixed Armistice Commission set up under this Agreement has remained inactive and silentfrom 1951 to the present day. Whenyouh8.vethefacts before you. you will be able to judge and decide for yourselves. You can take the necessary steps if you wish. but 1 would prefer the Counoil not to resort to such a procedure. which would take time. We want the question to be settled today; the Security Council has before it resolutions which it adopted itself and which should be put into effect. The integrity and1would say the honour of the Security Council are at stake. 63. The secondproposaI which1should like to make, if 1 may-but 1 do not know whether it will be agreeable to you-is this. The Syrian delegationisplacingbefore you printed texts which, 1 repeat, appear in official publications-I am not inventing them, 1 am taking them direct from the United Nations library: in these texts-namely the various provisions of the Israeli- Syrian General Armistice Agreement-it is laid down that everything relating to the implementation of the Agreement is to be submitted to the Armistice Commission. The Israel delegation, however, will have none of tbis and denies the competence of the Armistice Commission in matters concerning the demilitarized zone. The only course, therefore, would be to apply to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on that point. 64. In making aIl these proposaIs 1 am moved by a single desire, that of ensuringthatpeace is preserved,. By violating the provisions regarding the demilitarized zone. Israel has made itself responsiblefor the events which have occurred. Not only is it responsible for the aggressive acts against Syria; it tries to appear in the guise of a victim and to claim that Syria is the aggressor. But Syria has never been the aggressor. It would be ridiculous to say that Syria is an aggressor when it is merely exercising its right of self-defence. 65. It is the Israel authorities who have disregarded the provisions of the Armistice Agreement regarding the demilitarized zone. Consequently, if these provisions are to be enforced in the future. the Council must say so clearly and precisely. stating who is responsible and who is not. We do not consent to be treated on an equal footing with the violators of the Armistice Agreement. If there have been attacks on Syria or other Arab countries, we are not responsible. Moreover. even whenthe Arab countries were attacked. sorne members of the Council. moved perhaps bytheir desire for peace. or making too precise and meticulous an appraisal of their international responsibilities. said: both Parties are responsible; we shall send you away without condemning either of you. or. if we have to condemn one of you. if we have to condemn Israel. we shall say that the Arabs were to sorne extent responsible. Last year. at the time of the attack on Syria which occurred on the night of 16 to 17 March 1962, Syria declared that an act of aggreBSlon had taken place. Israel maintained that the act in question had occurred but that it was the consequence of provocation. And sorne members of the Council accepted both the act and the provocation. The provocation. however. resulted from the violation of the provisions governing the status of the demilitarized zone. If these provisions of the Armistice Agreement had been respected the Israel authorities would not have had occasion to commit acts of aggression against Syria. 67. That is the present situatiGn. 1 do not wish to prolong my statement but 1 mustmake one final comment regarding any decisions which the Counci! might take following its consideration ofthe two items before it. If the Counci! means to condemn Syria for these actions, tbis condemnation will affect the Syrian people, the Arab nation, the whole Arab world. Since submitted its complaint Israel has been repeating that Syria must be condemned and that, failing that, it will take its revenge inta its own bands and punish Syria itself. 68. We, for our part, have so.far said nothing of the kind. We have said that we should repel any attacks but we have not addressed the Counci! in such strong language ·as that used last week by the Israel authorities and two days ago by the Prime Minister, Levi EshkoI. We have refrained from doing so out deference to the Counci!; but now that we have heard Mr. Comay, the representative of the Israel authorities, making these same threats to bring pressure to bear on the members of the Council and on public opinion which may be favourable to international Zionism,...as the representative of Morocco said this morning-we would say this: on the basis of a report which does not incriminate Syria, you want to condemn Syria simply in order to satisfy political needs which may be temporary. If you do this, you will have to take the consequences. Sucb an accusation will be directed, 1 repeat, against the Syrian people, against the Arab nation, against the Arab world as a whole. This ëondemnationwill not have the effect of improving the situation or re-activating the Mixed Armistice Commission and all the machinery of the Commission. In Syria. in Egypt, in Lebanon and in Jordan there are United Nations observers. Theil' task should be facilitated and not made more complicated. This is the only appeal which 1 make to the Counci! and it is dictated by the desire of my country and of aIl the Arab countries for peace. 69. MI'. JACKLING (United Kingdom): It is a matter of concern and of regret to my delegation that the Security Counci! is again faced with complaints relating to the state of affairs on the frontier between Israel and one of the Arab States. It has been, it still is. our hope that stability be brought to this troubled area. We must believe that. with the help of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, border incidents can be reduced to the point that they b~come the exception rather than the norm. This should surelybe the overriding interest of all concerned, and it is in the direction of this interest that our own efforts have always been turned. 71. 1 turn now to the particular incident which is described in paragraph 1 of the letter dated 20 August from the representative of Israel [8/5394]. This is the alleged murder at Almagor of two Israel citizens. Available f.l-S evidence we have the sta.tements of the representatives of Israel and 8yria, and the full account of the investigation carried out by United Nations military observers contained in the report submitted by the 8ecretary-General to the Council [8/5401, annex III]. These we have studiedwith verygreat care. 72. The first point which struck my delegation was to w~at a great extent the details of the Israel complaint as set out in document 8/5394 were corroborated by the account of the investigation of the United Nations military observers. There are little or no discrepanoies between the two descriptions of what happened. For his part. the representative of 8yria contented himself with affirming. on the instructions of his Government. that the incident as described in the Israel complaint had never occurred. 73. From the evidence produced. my Government is satisfied that the incident did occur. and that two Israel citizens were killed in Israel territory. The report before us establishes the ascertainable facts, to which there is testimony human or physical. As to the human testim.ony, 1 think anyone accustomed to reading proofs of evidence cannot fail to have been impressed by the statement and the record of interrogation of Nisim Abdu, appearing in section 5 of annex III of document 8/5401. The statements recorded of the other witnesses also, to my delegation, smack of truth. As to the physical, we have Major Pettig:rew's summary on section 7 of annex III of the same document. Taken together, this seems to me to be solid stuff. IncidentaUy, the representative of 8yria made a reference to one piece of physical evidence, but 1 must say 1 thought the caption indicated that the boot was on the otherfoot. This evidence establishes beyond the doubt of a reasonable man that this act was carried out by a party of armed and trained persons, sorne ten in number, who came from the direction of the demilitarized zone and the Jordan River. 75. It may be said that the evidence we have is not conclusive, but these are circumstances when it is, in my view, proper to make known this conclusion to which my delegation has feIt compelled to come. cannot doubt that when they review the facts set out in this report, the Syrian authorities will set on foot the most rigorous inquiries to satisfy themselves either that despite these facts this conclusion is unwarranted or else to bring to book the irresponsible elements who permitted this tragedyto occur. It cannot be disputed that the responsibility for preventing any incursion from their territory lies with the Syrian Government, as it does with any Government in the area for any incursion of such a character. 76. 1 now propose to deal withthe subject of the Syrian complaint, namely that an Israelforce openedfire with automatic weapons from the Israel settlement of Dardara. In the case of an incident of this kind relating to an exchange of fire, it lS much more difficult to determine which party is responsible. It is clearfrom the report of the United Nations Truce SUpervisory Organization investigating teams that on 20 August there was considerable firing by both sides. My Government deplores aIl such incidents and aIl such exchanges of fire. They are in violation ofthe Armistice Agreement which debars any warlike or hostile act. Nevertheless, in the state of tension which must have existed in that area of the frontier at the time, it is, in our view, very difficult to pin the blame on one party or the other. 1 would add here. however. that there does' appear toOO someevidencethat Israel armoured personnel carriers and one tank did take part in the exchanges. As is pointed out in paragraph 22 of the Chief of staff's report, this too is a violation of the General Armistice Agreement. We have no (;.\ ,dence, however, of what the Syrian repl'esentative descriOOd in his complaint as a heavy concentration ofIsrael troops in the area. Furthermore, the figures quoted by the Syrian representative regarding the 77. In their speeches, both the Syrian and Israel representatives referred to the underlying causes of tension which inevitably lead ta incidents of this kind. The Israel representative in particular said 1'j ...{ f·i wleq~vocally that the time had come for the United Nations ta do something about it. For this reason, the Israel Government had decided to bring this incident ta the attention of the Security Council as the culminating outrage in a long series which has been going on for many months. My Government entirely agrees that the United Nations should take action in whatever way is open to it. The United Nations has had for many years special responsibilities in the area, and has at its disposaI the Truce Supervisory Organization, which is its agency for dealing with situations of this kind and, so far as is possible, for bringing peace between Israel and her neighbours. fi 1 111 \ j j li i ·1lJtl., l 1 \ Il \1 ('1 j ! 1 J! 78. My delegation heard with great satisfaction the statement of the Secretary-General atthe last meeting regarding the success of the efforts of General Bull in co-operation with the Israel and Syrian Governments in establishing a cease-fire and in carrying out certain inspections. 1 would like to take this opportunitYto paya tribute to General Bull and ta the investigating officers for the prompt action which they have taken and also for their report which had formed the basis of the document which the Secretary-General has circulated to the Council. Inour searchfor finding ways and means of preventing a constant repetition of border strüe, we would commend particularly to the Council's attention part E ofthe ChiefofStaff's report, which deal with measures taken and proposed by the Chief of Staff to alleviate tension and to restore tranquillity in the area. The Chief of Staff lists a series of measures on which he has it in mind to make progress in consultation with the parties. The Counci! may feel many of them to be long overdue. If, with the co-operation of all concerned. tney can be carried out, we believe they would make the Truce Supervisory Organization more effective and more able to perform its function of reducing friction and preserving peace. \ li "1 11 1, 1 ! 1 )'11 \ ·1:·1 ~11l 1J il1! rI l' 79. We feel strongly that the more effectively matters of this kind can be investigatedand settledon the spot, the less the risk of incidents assuming dangerous proportions. We very much hope that means can be found by which the local machinery, and by this 1 have particularly in mind the Mixed Armistice Commission, can be reactivated and play its intendedpart. In saying this, we are, of course, conscious of the difference between the parties in this matter and we have just heard a full statement from the representative of Syria; but we believe this reactivation important and 1 would like at this time to say no more than that. We would strongly urge the parties to co-operate withthe Chief of Staff and with his teams in UNTSO in working out ways of making effective the measures which he has outlined. Peace on the frontiers must be a prime interes.t to both Israel and Syria. It is certainly the .1 Cd ..~ ~1 .\ 80. 1 hope these observations may indicate lines upon which a resolution can be satisfactorily formulated.

The complaints consecutively lodged with this Council by Israel and Syria must be considered in the broad context of the Palestine question. In presenting the views of the Brazilian delegation on the issue before the Council. 1shall keep constantly in mind the long-term objective of the United Nations action, which is the establishmentofpermanent conditions of peace in that troubled area. 82. Let me state, before proceeding any further, that Brazil has strong and longstanding ties of friendship with the Syrian people, which we intend to preserve and strengthen. Through the many SY1'ians who have come to our shores and participated fully in the national life of the country. we have grown to know and to respect the virtues of this great people to whom we are indebted for their valuable contributions to my country's progress. As to Israel, we have maintained with that nation the most cordial and fruitful relations since Us inception. Rer sons are equally welcome among us~ and my Government looks forward to the closest cooperation with the Israel Government. 83. It waSt therefore, with the greatest regret that the Government of Brazil learned of the incidents reported to the Security Council on 20 and 21 August which have again increased tensions inone of the most sensitive areas in the world by provoking a dangerous situation between Syria and Israel. 84. May 1 recall that on 20 March 1962,21 the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic requedted that the Security Council be convened to consider the grave situation which had arisen from the acts of aggression committed by Israel on the Syrian frontier and in the demilitarized zone which threatened the peace and security of the region. My delegation has carefully reviewed the debates that took place then in the Council and 85. Now an equally clear situation seems to have arisen in relation to the Israel complaint of 20 August 1963. The report before the Council by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Chief of Staff establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the incident took place inside Israel terI'itory. that two persons were killed and a third shot at. andthat the aggressors withdrew in the direction of the Jordan River. We are faced. therefore. with a serious violation ofthe Armistice Agreement, and the Council should acknowledge this facto 86. In relation to the complaint submitted by the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, dated 21 August [S/5395], the report of General Bull. aIthough inconclusive as to the charges set forth in the Syrian complaint, makes ft abundantly clear thatthe exchange of fire that took place on successive occasions was initiated by Israel in some instances and by Syria in others. The two parties, therefore. are responsiblefor breaches of the peace and violations of international commitments. This situation. in our view, should also be reflected in the resolution that the COWlcil may wish to adopt. 87. The events under review are not isolated cases of border attrition which could in the circumstances be tolerated or at least understood. They fall within a long series that fills the archives of the Armistice Commission and have been discussed in this Council in the course of 191 meetings. What is worse, I am afraid the files of the Armistice Commissionwill grow thicker and other complaints will be reviews by this Council until the prevailing situation, based on a Convention. temporary by nature, gives way to a lasting settlement. 88. In the absence, however. of a permanent solution certain measures of an interim character. as suggested by the UNTSO Chief of Staff. should be adopted immediately in order to render effective the cease-fire arranged by General Bull and to avoid any further increase in the tension already prevailing in the area. 89. First. the Mixed Armistice Commission. which has been half paralysed since 1951. should be reactivated. as decided by the SecurityCouncil. Bothparties would benefit from makingfull use of the Commission's procedures whenever they feIt provocations had occurred. 11 Ibid., Supplement for April, May and lune 1962, document S(5111. !( Ibid., Supplement for January, February and March 1962, document S(5102 and Add.l. 91. Thirdly, the Armistice Demarcation Line andthe former international frontier should be clearly marked. as General Bull suggests. 92. Fourthly, the United Nations Military Observers should enjoy complete and unrestricted freedom of movement, particularly in the demilitarizedzone. 93. Füthly, an exchange of the prisoners held at present in Syria and Israel shouldtake place, including the three Israelis who on 13 July 1963landed on the eastern shores of Lake Tiberias. 94. The Palestine question has been poisoningtheinternational atmosphere for a great many years and it will continue to do so unless the parties directly concerned-Israel and the Arab 8tates-abide strictlyand in good faithbytheir commitmentsfreely enteredupon, and the rule of law is firmly establishedin the region.

must apologize to the Security Council for taxing its patience, and 1 am mostgrateful to you, Mr. President, for calling upon me for the second time today. In view of the statements 1 have just heard from the representatives of both the United Kingdom and Brazil should like to explain the situation with regard to the alleged attackwhich, accordingto the Israeldelegation, led to the death of the two farmers. 96. In this connexion 1 should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to annex nI to the report by the Chief of staff [S/5401], in the last paragraph of section 6 of which they willfind the following words by the Chief of Staff himse1f: "The senior Israel delegate even \Vith the offer of a signed receipt would not hand over to the investigating ùNMOs any of the physical evidence found in the area of the tractor, except four fired cartidge cases which are enclosed and for which no receipt was required. Il 97. 1 should also like to specify that the firing, the supporting fire, to use a militaryterm, camefrom the demilitarized zone. Now it is common knowledge that â demilitarized zone is a zone where there should be no armaments. In other words. there was firing from the demilitarized zone at the Syrian positions and the latter returned the fire from Syrian territory. 98. 1 should like finally to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the documents attached. ta annex IV td the report by the Chief of Staff. 1 would invite the members of theCouncil to look carefully at the panoramic sketch from OP Bravo. 1 should like to point out that allthe positions indicatedon the panoramic sketch. as being Israel positions~aresituated within the demilitarized zone and are there. consequently. in contraventi.on and flagrant viol~tion of the Armistice Agreement. 1 would also draw your attention i1 -1 >{ i 14 -\! Ji 99. Consequently. any Syrian fire that there might have been came from Syrian territory, whereas the firing from the Israel side camefrom the demilitarized zone; yet the two sides are forbidden to have fortified positions in this demilitarized zone or to launchattacks from there. M .l ~J ~t

Ihave consultedwiththe members of the Council with regard to their desires in so far as the future programme of meetings are concerned. It is my understanding that the members of the Council, üfeasible. would like to conclude this item before the end of the week. Representatives who have as yet not taken part in the general debat€: have indicated that they would be prepared to speak either tomorrow or on Friday morning. Furthermore. Ihave been advised that sorne members of the Council hope to be in a position to submit to the Secretariat a draft resolution tomorrow, before noon. 1, 1 ct1 ii j 1 ~'1 >:1j i 1 :! 101. With the approval of themembersoftheCouncil, l would suggest that we tentatively schedule a meeting for Friday afternoon, in order to continue the debate on the draft resolution and, ü necessary. onany other draft resolution that may be introduced. If possible. we will then proceed to a vote. ! 11 1 1 -! ,f It was so decided. The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m. ;>. l j 1l ! 11 r '1 U :i .1 1A ,j J'f .} :~{ ·î 'l ) CAMEROON/CAMEROUN: LIBRAIRIE DU PEUPLE AFRICAIN La Gêrante. B. P. 1197, Yaoundè. DIFFUSION INTERNATIONALE CAMEROUNAISE DU LIVRE ET DE LA PRESSE, Sonllmelimo. CONGO (Léopold.mo): INSTITUT POLITIQUE CONGOLAIS, B. P. 2307, Léopold.me. ETHIDPIA/tTH10P1E: INTERNATIONAL PRESS AGENCY, P. O. Box 120, Addi. Abobo. GHANA: UNIVERSITY BOOKSHOP University Coltege .of Ghana. Legon. Accra. KENYA: THE E.S.A. BOOKSHOP, Box 30167, Nairobi. LIIIYA/LIBYE: SUDKI EL JERBI (BOOKSELLERS) P. O. Box 78. lstiklat Street. Benghazi. MOROCCO/MAROC: AUX BELLES IMAGES 281 Avenue Mohammed V. Rabat. NIGERIA/NIG(RIA: UNIVERSITY BOOKSHOP (NIGERIA) LTD University College. Ibadan. NORTHERN RHODESIA/RHODÊSIE DU NORD: J. BELDING, P. O. Box 750, Mululira. N'1ASALAND/NYASSALAND: BOOKERS (NYASALAND) LTD. Lontyre House. P. O. Box 34. Blantyre. SOUTH AFR1CA/AFRIQUE DU SUD: VAN SCHAIK'S BOOK STORE (PTY.) LTD. Church Street. Box 724. Pretoria. TECHNICAL BOOKS (PTY.) LTD.. Faradoy Hou.e P. O. Box 2866. 40 St. George's Street. Cape Town. SOUTHERN RHOD~SIA/RHODÊSIE. DU SUD: THE BOOK CENTRE. First Street. Salisbury. TANGANYIKA: DAR ES SALAAM BOOKSHOP P. O. Box 9030. Dar es Salaam. UGANDA/OUGANDA: UGANDA BOOKSHOP. P. O. Box 145. Kampalà. UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC/RÊPUBLJQUE ARABE UNIE: LIBRAIRIE "LA RENAISSANCE D'EGYPTE" 9 Sh. Adly Pasha. Cairo. AL NAHDA EL ARABIA BOOKSHOP 32 Abd·el·Khalek Sarwart St•• Cairo. ASIA/ASIE BURMA/BIRMANIE: CURATOR. GOVT~ BOOK DEPOT. Ransoon. CAMBODIA/CAMBODGE: ENTREPRISE KHMÈRE DE LIBRAIRIE Imprimerie & Papeterie. S~ à R. L.. Phnom-Penh. CIYLON/CEYLAN: LAKE HOUSE BOOKSHOP Assac. Newspapers of Ce)lon. P. O. Box 244. Colombo. CHINA/CHINE: THE WORLD BOOK COMPANY, LTO. 9~ Chung King Road. lst Section. -raipeh. Taiwan. THE COMMERCIAL PRESS, LTD. 21.1 Honan Road. Shanghai. HONG KONG/HONG-KONG: THE SWINOON BOOK COMPANY 25 Nathan Road. Kowloon_ INDIA/INDE: ORIENT LONGMANS Bombay. Calcutta. Hyderabad. Madras & New Delhi. OXFORD BOOK & STATIONERY COMPANY Calcutta & New Delhi. INDONESIA/INDONÊSIE: PEMBANGUNAN, LTD. Gunung Sahari 84. Djail;arta. JAPAN/JAPON: MARUZEN COMPANY. LTD. 6 Tori-Nichome, Nihonbashi. Tokyo. KOREA (REP. OF)/CORÊE (RÊP. DE): EUL·YOO PUBLISHING CO., LTD. 5. 2·KA. Chongno. Seoul. PAKISTAN: THE PAKISTAN CO·OPERATIVE BOOK SOCIETY ~acca. East Pail;istan. PUBLISHERS UNITED. LTD•• Lahore" THOMAS & THOMAS. Karachi. PHILIPPINES: PHILIPPINE EDUCATION COMPANY, INC. 1104 Castillejos. P. O. Box 620. QL:apo. Manila. POf'ULAR BOOKSTORE, 1573 Dorotê'o Jose. Manila. SINGAPORE/SINGAPOUR: THE CITY BOOK STORE, LTD•• CoUyer Quay. T.H..lluND/THAiLANDE: PRAMUAN MIT, LTD. 55 Chakrawat Road. Wa. TUk. Bangil;ok. NIBONDH & CO.. LTD. New Raad. Sikak Phya Sri. Bangkok. SUKSAPAN PANIT Mansion 9, Rajadamnern Avenue, Bangkok. LATIN AMERICA/ AMÉRIQUE LATINE ARGENTINA/ARGENTINE: SUDAMERICANA. S. A BOLlVIA/BOLIVIE: L1BRERIA Casilla 972. La Paz. LOS AMIGOS DEL L1BRO Calle Perû esq. Espaiia. BRAZIL/BRÊSIL: L1VRARIA Rua México 98·B. Caixa Rio de Janeiro. L1VRAR'A FREITAS BASTOS, Caixa Postal 899. RÎo LIVRARIA KOSMOS EDITORA Rua Rosario 135/137. CHILE/CHILI: EOITORIAL OEL PAcfFICO Ahumada 57. Santiago. L1BRERIA I\lENS, Casilla ~:~~~~E.«:::ÉT~~(:I~r:~H(~ÊP.DU): 185. rue Tu·do. B. P. 283. Saigon. EUROPE AUSTilIA/AUTRICHE: GEROLD & COMPANY. Graben 31. Wien. 1. GEORG FROMME.& CO•• Spengergasse 39. Wien. V. SELGIUM/BELGIQUE: AGENCE ET MESSAGERIES DE LA PRESSE, S. A, 14"22. rue du Persil. Bruxelles. BULGAIÎIA/BULGARIE: RAZNOizNOS 1. Tzar Assen, Sofia. COLOMBlA/COLOMBIE: L1BRERIA AMERICA, Calle L1BRERIA BUCHHOLZ Av. Jiménez de Quesada COSTA RICA: IMPRENTA Apartado 1313. San José. Priee: $V.8. 0.35 (or equivalent