S/PV.1064 Security Council

In the vtew .... of my delegation, the insistence by the delegation of Ghana •on the consideration' of the item On the provi.;",i:>nalageIida todayrepresents an abuse of the functions of the Counoil. "1 should be surprised if the representative Of Ghana can persuade my collea~es thatthis matter is properly brought before them and that the material which he has' placed before the Council has any relevance ta· the purpbses of tlUs body as laid down. in the Charter. l~ d'aujourd'hui des reprêsentant coll~guesqu tion a dêfinJs 4. gation contraire de de centrale 4. It is. certainly a matter of greatregret to my Goverllm.enl thatthe Qhanaian delegation has contrived . to persuade itself in an opposite sense and that it shouldbe seeking to persuade this Counail to diagnoaethe steps we are endeavouring to talte towards as()lution of thep~oblenls .()f Central Afrioa 6. As members of the Council will be aware, my Government does not accept that' Southern ,Rhodesia is 'a Non-S~1f-GoverningTerritory~ For 'this reason we caimot accept the somewhat involved a.rgument Note 1 of the Ghanaian mettlorandum circulated under cover 'of document S/5403, to the effect that the mattersbrc:lUghtbefore, the Security Councilin that memorandum fall outside the scope of Article paragraP1l 7 of the Charter. In our view, Article paragraph, 7. clearly applies. The onus therefore lies on those countries which have brought the itembefore us ,to est8.blish that a situation exists in Southern Rhodesia calling for action under Chapter VIl of the Charter and thereby justifying the derogation, from Article 2, paragraph 7 provided for' in the last sentenct} ,()~ that paragraph, My'd.elegation does not believe. that the' representatives of Ghana and, Morocco will be able to do this-certainlythevoluminous . doc11IIlentatioJld!s~ribl1ted by tile Ghanai~ delegation do~~n9t,support such a çoptention. The bulk 'Of the ~ ·lIl.àterial in this documentation bearsontheprovisions of the Victorià Falls Agreement aIld on the internaI ~airs. ofSouthern, Rhodesia. These are essentially mattel's o! domestic' jurisciiction and, in, my delega- :tion's ldc\y.a.ff9rd nogrounds on w;'ùchthe Council could take action eitherunder Chapter VI or Cnapter VII of the Charter. ?. Mo:r,e generally. my Governmentdoes.notconsider th!lt.there ls anygenuine ,question of a situation existing,in SOlltllern Ith()Clesia "which the 8eeurity Coupcil shoù1.d deal with in,discharge of itsr.esponsibility for the, maintenance oÎ international peaceand security. The documentation which l'tas been circulated to us· by the Ghanaian 'delegation sllggests that they see the Securfty Council operating in a very different ,l'ole and one not contemplated in the Cllarter. My delegationdoès not accept tllat the,Charter can bentin,·this .way to suit the convenience of individual delf;lgations. The'SecUJ'ity Counçi,l Is in no pcJsition to writè>ÎIlto theCha.l'l;er wI:mt ls not all'eadytbe,.œ. Itis nQt'Üle Security Cauncil's .function to pronounce 9n. wlletb~,l'a territory js 01' is ,not non~self~gc:>vern­ ~g., It.follows therefore ,thatthe.implic~tion;inthat part ()f', the. Ghanaian memoraru;l11IIl to which' 1 have referre.d~arlier~ that the Security ..COuncil .canin some way .establish the applicabilityof Article in the case ofSouthernRhode~iaIs as unf0unded 'previoua'assertions iI!' the ,GeneraiAsl:\embiy to thé .Same·effèct. . 8. . Ithl!d.Men my hope t~t•.onfurther.cOnsideratioÎ1 the spollsors ()f.this item,would haverecognized the v:~li(Uty, Qfa~guments,whichhavebeenput' to them The agenda -was adopted. Letter dated 2 August 1963 from the representatives of Ghana, Guinea, Morocco and the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5382); and letter dated 30 August' 1963 from the Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of the Congo (Brazzaville) addressed ta the President of the Security Council on behalfof the representatives of Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republ ie,Chad,Congo (BrazzaviIle), 'Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, IvoryCoost, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritanie, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,Senegal,Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda and Upper Volta (S/5409)

The President of the Republic of Mali has addressed a telegram [S/5417] ta· the Secretary-General requesting that Ambassador Sori Couiibaly, the Permanent Representative of Mali, be permitted to participate in the Council's discussion of the question. just inscribed in our agenda. If there is no objection., l propose to invite the representative of Mali to take a seat atthe Council table. 11. There being no objection, it is sa decided. 12. The Secretary-General has also received a com-' munication [S/5419] from the Vioe-President of the Republic of Tanganyika ,requesting that Tanganyika be pertnitted ta participate in the deligerations of the Cpuncilon this question. If there is no objection. l propose to invite the representative of Tanganyika to take a seat at the Council table. 13. A iewmoments ago the President l'eceived a letterfrom the representativ~ of the United Arab Republic [S/5420] requesting'thathe .beinvited to participate in the discussipn of this question. If there is nopbjection, l propose to invite the representative of the United Arab' Republic ta take a seat at the COUncil table. At the 'invitation of the President, Mr. SoriCottlibaly (Mali),,' Mr. B. J. Mkatte (Tanganyika) and Mr. 15. ,In addition, ,the President has received separate letters, of endorsement of the original request fr.om. the representatives of Algeria, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, ,Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria, Tanganyika, Tuiùsia antl Ugafida. 16. Membersof the Council have also received the English text of a dOCument entitled "lYlemorandum in regard to Southern Rhodesia submitted to theSecurity COlmcil on the2nd August, 1963, together with documelÎts andnates supplementary thereto". This memorandum was submitted by the delegatiori ofGhana and transmïtted ta, members of the Council by the President on. 21 August under cover of a note verbale. The delega.tion of Ghana formaUy requested i~s circUlation asaSecurity Counci! document on.28 August and it has been distributed as document S/5403. 17. Mr. QUAISON-$ACKEY (Ghana): The delegation of Ghana bas taken note of the reservations just made 1:>Y the representative of the United Kingdom. I am sure that aS the debate unfolds,. he will Ï'ealiz;e that he will have to abandon his reservàtions. But 1 must sayfrom the. outset that the Counci!has been convened not at the insistence of Ghana but at the insistence of thirty-two other African states"as isclear from the agenda. 18. As'reg4\l'ds the competence of the SecurityCouncil, ,which bas been called into question by the represeIitative of the Cnited Kingdom, may I sayat cince that '.thé COUDcil is called upon to considcr àny issue which in the opinion of a Member State is likely to eridanger peace or is a threat to peace and security; an.d '. we'have "come here because of the likely threat to, peace which certain events in, Soùthern Rhodesia are going to prodace. What is more, the report of thé Special Committee on the Situation with ,regard to . the Implementation of ,the Declaration, on the Granting of ID!lependence, to ,ColOnial Countries and peoplesY-of whichmembers ,of the Council are aw~re""makes it very clear that the situat~onin !/For the text of this document see Officia., Reéords of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, 4nnexes,addendüril to agenda item 23 (A/5446/~ev~I), ,cltapter III. Transmitted tothe Sl;!curit)' Council by liletterfrom the CjIairman of the Special Committee (5/5378), 20. The delegations of Ghana, Guinea,-Morocco and the Unitêd Arab Republic, in a letter dated 2 August 1963 [S/5382], together with an explanatory memo... randum addressed to the President of the Security Council, requested a meeting of the Council to be convened in accordance with ruIe 2 of the provisional ruIes of procedure of thè Security Counci! for the purpose of examfuing the question of SouthernRhodesia in the light of recent developmentsin that territory. As l have said, this request is unanimously supported bythe othertwenty...eightAfrican delegations whose decision was communicated to the President of the Security Council by the Chairmanofthe African group of Member States, the Charge d'Affaires of Congo (Brazzaville), in a letter datêd 30 August 1963 [S/5409]. This unanimou~ approach of the African states has demonstrated once more that in the anticolonial struggle, Africa speaks with one clear unmistakable voice. . 21. But my delegationmust make it clear from the very ou.tset that no African State takes delightin coming to the Security Counci!, Wh<;ln werequest a meeting of the Gouncil, it mustbeon a grave and urgent issue. Therefore, while the request before the Counci! musttie viewed as part "of the systematic process by which aU the independent African States are seeking to effect completeeradication of colonialisrn from their Continent and to .put an end to the inhuman and undemocratic white minority ruIe in Africa, the question of Southern .Rhodesia l'aisés particular and urgent issues which~qnthe information at present available, appear to all African States to constitute a serious threat ta the peace and security of the African Continent. 22. Within a very short space oftime, possiblywithin weeks, there will be transferred ta the exclusive control of the SouthernRhodesian Government, the most powerful" air force at present existing on the African Continent, together with asmall but highly efficient army recruited on a racial basis. 23. My Government hasobtained detailed reports on the air force. It is mOre powernl1 even than the South African Air Forceatthemomentandis stronger than, the metropolitanand colonial airforces ofPortugal put together. In order.to avoid any dispute as to thesefacts, my Governinent has had a study made by li. le~ding British· firm" ofaircraft consultants which, ü;iJ\th~y,e xqqr( p,$;rmj.§!'lion, MI'. President, l will pass on tQ.members .of the~Qouncil. outside.Souther~ Rhodesiaand supporting aircraft includinglongd,istance trobp carriers. ~~~. .. . .. 25. Itmust be realized that in Southern Rhodesia. the. African population is particularly susceptible to indiscrittlinate ai.r attack. OUt'of â total Africanpopula.tion of around 3.7000.000. weIl over 2 million are peasants living in segregated farming lands where Europeans are not parmitted to reside. Close on 700.000 more live in what that distinguished United States scholar. and my friend. Professor Thomas Franck. has cal1ed "the African ghettos". which are far from European townships. It·is thereforepossible to ma:ke indiscriminate attacks on the great bulk of the African population without evenrunning the risk of injuring any European. As will be seen from the technical report which 1 have passed around. the aircraft being transferred can be used to drop incendiary material like napalm. and are normally equipped with rockets and other air-to-ground missiles. None of these weapons could of course be usedfor the purpose ofcontrolling a l'iotor other civil disturbances. They are essenti~lyweapons of mass terrorism. 26. The ratio of.traiJ$lg airerait to fighters andy bombers further suggests that the air force to be ta:ken over has been designed for rapid expansion. 27. One of the arguments which has been made-and in fact jUstrepeatedby the· representative of the United Kingèl.om-agalnst the Security Council considel'ing the question of Southern·Rhodesia is that everything is calm and quiet in that territory at the moment. But then it can also beargued that if this is in fact so, ft is very difficult to see why the Southern Rhodesian white mlnority Government requires theseaircraft so urgently. 28. Itmay ofc::ourse be that the Southern Rhodesi.lW. Government .does not require this forceprimarily for action inside "our territory".-which they call their territory-but for aggressive action against neighbouring states. Indeed. how can a contrary view he berd in view of Winston Field's pronouncements? In fact. the possibility of hostile action is suggested by the technical information. which members have before them. one passage of which 1 shall quote as an illustration: "For attack the Rhodesian Air Force has 18 Canberra B4s. These are the heaviest combat jet aircraft in ·Africa apart from Tupolev Tu-16 Baèl.ga,r aircraft bperated bythe UnitedArab Republic. Unlike the Canberra force in.for instance. Peru. DUttlbering 'less than one squadron. the two squadronsinRhodesia constitute a big enough force to be militarily viable. The Canberra was designed to ta:ke the .standard Britishand Americanatomicweapons whi\ch arecurrently several timesmore powerful than the bombs thatdestroyed the Japanesecities in World War IL The Canberra is wellsuited to car- "With wing-tip extra fuel, underwing rockets, bombs, napalm, âild with bombs or fuel in the bomb bay, the Canberràremains oné oftheworld'sformidable ~eapons." 1 should like to quote one sentence from the Consultants' conclusions, w1).ich reads as follows: "They are therefore able to inflict severe punishment at short notice and present a situationto which neighbours have necessarily had to adjust themselves." . 29. Withoù.t wishirig to revive former bitter feelings" my delegation must pOint out that seven years ago the United Arab Republic was engaged in a military conflict with two major Powers, yet the long-range bomber strength of the United Ar':l.b Republic airforce is nothing ill comparison in numbers with the longrange bomber strength of the air force it is proposed to transfer to Southern Rhodesia. 30. Up till now this powerful air force has been under the control of the so-called Central African Federation, which meant in practice thatft was under British control. So long asit was under British control, this was to us aredeeming feature. But to have it transferred to the white minority government presents a grave crisis. If one turnstothe official United Kingdom reports of the period, it is clear, for exam';' pIe, that the British Government wàs ~ble to deploy the then Federal Air Force in Cyprus and in the Aden Protectorate, and indeed certain of the aircraft are speciàlly equipped for fighting in the Near East.' . 30. s'agit ration elle'était sous accepter de l'on cielles Gouvernement appelait et ces. au 31. sera ment Mon pourquoi à ont été sie raisons cette 31. Now, it .is this gigantièand powerful air force which ia goingto be placed at the disposal of the white minority gove~ment of Southern .Rhodesià. Is my c9lleague from the United Kingdom in a position to tell the Council why such a force i8 being trans... ferred and, further, is he in a position t,o tell the COUDcil what reasons, if any, the Southern RhodeSian Government gave for wishing to ,hav-e this air force' transferred to it? 32. 1 am sure that therepresentll-tive of the United KingdoD)will realize the importance of the answer to these .questions. If itwasbecause the internaI political situation is now so critical that the British and Southern Rhodesian Governments both believed. that the settler governmentcouldonly maiIitain Its position by threatening 1he African inhabitants. with' mass destruction bynâpalmbombsandrockets,then .clearly the situation is one which the 8ecUrityCouncn shOuld investigateatonce.J'heuse of napàlmbombs in Angola isstill·. so fresh,ln OUl" memories as to cause grave concern at. the possible extension' of theiruse in Africa.by'much morepowerfulaircraft. If, on. the other hand, the Brttish Government. were assuJ:ed. by the Southern .Rhodesian.Qovernment that the internaI situation was calm ar,home, then for what purpose did the southérn Rhodestan Gove:rnment reqUire this air force? . 32~ se ces tique nement britannique du colons menaçant sives il desécuritê l'on encore ayons de . sants, de britannique êtaitcalIfie, demandê 34. Again, 1 am sure that the representative of the Ullited Kingdom will realize the importance of this question. If any Power on the African Continent or outside it has promised to subsidize. either directly or .indirectly, by paying for other services which thé Southern Rhodesian Government cannot otherwise meet owing .to its heavy.new armament commitment, then whatever·.Powerhas made such an agreement 1s .not only directIy subsidizing repression of the African population in .Southern R1:lodesia but .is also starting an arms race on the Africa!l Continent, thus endangering the peace and security of that continent. Obviously, no African state within range of the Southern..RhOdesian Air Force-and these include the Comll1()nwêalth. countries and, of course, 1Il0rthern Rhodesia and Nyasaland-could id1y look on without somecounter-armament. 35•.. The..UDited Kingdom ~Iinister respOl1Sible' for CentrlÙ Africa, MI'. R. A. I ; Butler, has stated that 'tb.ereare. no" secret agreements ,Vith Britain, and 1 of courseaccept that.· Nevertheless, iriview of the ctl'\Îl1lJ1stantial stories appeariIlg in the British Press tô the contrary,.ft might be desirable for the representativeof the Ullited Kingdom. to give the Council some f1.1rt:her specifiê assurance. aEl.'l'herealissue,however, is whether there is à. seôretagreementbetween. ~oqthernRhodesia, Po~- ···gai,a.n,.clSouthAfrica"1;>y...whichthesepowers WQuld ;payfor'tHecCistof'the Air.Force•. III this conne~on, "DIllY lquôteaparagraphfromThe Observerof London .·.·.·of3IW~rqh19~3~ ..The correspondent of'. The ObseJ,'ver, ·····wri~fJ,'om· Sàlisb\ltY,said: . ",,;':,: ~~Si1:~Roy h~i{reœnj;ly'raised the salaries of. top Al"IP-Yarid.t\ir ;For~ of1içers.·About ~9 million is .nQ~ be~gspent.annu~l1y·ott ·'de~~Ilce'. inthe Federa-' ;UQn, .ànq..()ne,question Sit;'llqy là cont1,nuallya~king ,:.)~:l!,()w.-the.Federati9Ji';;i~!iiildualtel'ritories;could' " .·bearsuch;à burderi' In-the··event·of a Federal dis.,. :~RI~Qn.:.;:.. -,,'c i:;.' '. ."', .. ' •.,.c:', ~,.'_. \i',;··- 38. This brings me to yet another question which 1 hope the representative of the United Kingdom will be able to answer because it is germane to the whole issue now under discussion in the Security Council 39. On Thursday, 5 September 1963. after document S/5403 had been published, the London diplomatic correspondent of the Guardian reported this as the view of the United Kingdom Government: "Britain, in facto will retain control over the external defence of Southern Rhodesia. inCluding the deployment of her froces outside Rhodesia and questions· of defence agreements with other countries. Under such an arrangement there is no question of the forces being used. for instance, in the COl1go. It was recalled that the Federal Government had previously been restrained from action when events there could have been considered a threat to the Federation itself." 40. But time and time again the United Nations have been told by the United Kingdom representatives that, quite apart from the technical legal position, the British Government is powerless to deal with the Southern Rhodesian question in practice, whatever the legal position. 41. My question is therefore this: how is this control in practice goingto -beexercised by the Government of the United Kingdom? 42. 1 am sure that the members of .the Council realize the importance of this question. There· will be a Defen.ce Minister responsible onlytathe Southern Rhodesian Government. Ifthen this Minister decides, for example, ta dep!oy the air force. which is propqsed to transfer to Southern .Rhodesia. in Angola or Mozambique. h6win practice can the British Government stop this Miîù:ster? How is it that the United Kingdom nowfinds that. ithas. after aIl. power.at a 1n()ment's .notice ta. revoke the·.deployment of the Southern Rhodesian Air ForceoutsideSouthernRhodesianfrontiers? If. infact. the British Governmellt continues tohave< thisa,uthority over the Southern .Rhodesian (lovernment•... thenhow lsit .•that itsays tha.tW is powerless t9Calla. ConstU:utional.Con- . ferençe.as the United Nationshas r~p,e,atedlY r~'" ..quested?Let us bebJ;Utally frank here. Inour opinion, the United Kingdom Governmenthasultima.te autilority and power ln Southern Rhodesia.and it must exercise these powers, however residual. inthename ofAfrican aqvap.cement and peaceand not for settlerentrenchment in SoutliernRhodesia. . surIe _.,Peut-il $e omcers~ There is also in the course of formation' a second regular battalion of aU-white troops for which the officer class will come largely from Britain and South Africa and the men from~the United Kingdom. In addition to these there are four white territorial battalions. The permanently entployed officers and non-commissioned officers for these territorial battalions come mainIy from. Britain and South Africa, but the reservist component isdrawnexclusivelyfrom the white settler class. These are given an initial four and a half months' full-time training and subsequently attend army centres for extensive further training during their period of service. 45. In 1960, when the MoncktonCommissionreported on conditions in the Federation,Y anumber of members of the Commission, including British members ofParliament supporting the present British administratioo:, pointed out in an annex to the report the grave dangers of the organization of such a force, which never existed in Sonthem Rhodesia· prior to the Federation in 1953. They pointed out that ifthe so-caUed Federal Government's argument was correct that the African people were being terrorized by small groups of African extremists, then clearly the great bulk of the African people would have equal intel'ests with the European settlers in maintaining lawand order. In fine, thisaU-white army has two features. So far as the regular. officers and men are concerned, it· is almost· entirely a mercenary force. So.far as the non-permanent· territorial component is concerned, it is drawn from a tiny minority of the white population who are determined to oppose by .force any advance of human dignity, equality and justice in Southern Rhodesia. Need 1 point out the lesson of hlstory which. sl1iJWsinevitably thateither. type of these forces léads. ultimately to increasing repre~sionand•the. most violent and ,bitteI' type "of civil. war. ,If .ourorganizatJ0\l took.steps..to eliminate mercenaries fr()II1 Katanga as. a threll.tto .. peace, i8 there nota duty onthishighestorganto take thé saIne' steps as in the case of Katanga? .' .'••. 0'-', ,. '. 46. ,.Intlle case ofthe reguIal"battalionofall-white . troops ··llJld thepennanent'çadres, ,of thëterritorial' arD}y,· nb'l,'eason c~ existwhy·they shouldnot,l'eturn to ,their hOInelands,except thatol>vloûsly .someone would llaVetopay-themcompensatioJl.. Apparentlythis solutionwasnèver ëonsidèred by the United Kingdom . Governmelltat.tlle ,·Victoria Fà1ls CoIiference".wl)0se handling of tliedefenèe issue. 'in genera.l appears to .have,.been ll'lost obscure. The'impression hassom~ how been createdthat thismatter was also discussed at the Conference. In fact~ bf course, this' was not .v .Rèport6LthèMvisoryCilmmiss{onon theRevieW of t1îe cOnsti..: turion ..• of· RhOdesia and' NYasafànd, LOiidon; tLM.' Stlltionel'yOffice, CrririlL 1148. .. . . "••• one has only to be in Central Africa to realize the intense anxiety of everyone as to their own future and the future of their own country. '!I therefore summoned a ~eeting of heads of delegations. outside the conference aided by the Minister of Defence of the Federation ••• and we reached an agreement which the Conference endorsed."21 48. In fact. if one looks at the composition of this meeting "held outside the eonference" at which Ml'. Butler said "we reached an agreement". no single African was represented. and the head of the delegation of Northern Rhodesia appears to have been an official recently appointed from Britain. Nyasaland was only represented by a civil servant observer. 1 leave the Council to draw the relevant conclusions from these facts. 49. It may be that the representative of the United Kingdom can throw some light on why this procedure was adopted. 50. The Ghana Government had hoped that the United Kingdom Government would be able to supplyinformation. about which it asked some time aga in regard to the countries of origin of the members of the armed forces. If the information is available now. it would he useful to have it. For the puzopoSè of thi.s meeting. however. it is sufficient to quote from Ml'. WUlian Gutteridge's book entitled- Armed Forces in New ,States&..1I which I.s generally regardèd as the standard and most recent work on armed forces in Africa. Ml'. -Gutteridge is a senior lecturer at the British Mllitary Academy and it is unIikely that he would be misinformed. Speaking of the officer class in the FederaI Army of the defunct Central African Federation. he says: " ••• Themajority of army and air force officers. all of them European. have been recruited either in Britainor South Africa. Many have seen considerable service in the forces of their country of origin andin them have acquired their professiolllÙ outlook. The range of politicalattitudes amongthem seems ta conform fairly closely with that of the rest.ofthe whitê population." 51. Can you wonder thataII Mrican States are extremely concerned about the handing over of such forces. to the control of a. Government'formed from apo!ltical 'Pllrty which myfriend. Sir Patrick Dean, desC};'ibed at the 1120thplenary meeting oHheGeneral Assembly on. 28 'June 1962. as the "extreme quaIifi~. génêrale. trême-droite"? right-wi~Europet'lllParty".It is further worrying y Parliamentàry I:lebates (Hansard), House of Commons, Official' Repol"t. Landon. aM. Stationery Office, FiftfiSênes, vol. bSC, Sësslon 1962..63, col. 1432. i/OxfOl"dUniversity Press, London, 1962, p. 49. 21 Report (Londres, 1962-63, 11 "Th~ Conference ••• "Invites, further, the colonialpowers,particularly the United Kingdom with regard to Southern Rhodesia, not to transfer the powers and attributes of sovereignty to foreign minority governments imposed on African peoples by the use of force and under cover of racial legislation; and the transfer of power to settler minorities would amount to violation of the provision of United Nations Resolution 1514 (XV) on independence; "Reaffirms its support of African nationalists of Southern Rhodesia and solemnly declares that if power in Southern Rhodesia were to be usurped by a racial,white minority Government, state Members of the· Copference"-that is,African States-"would lend their effective moral and practical support to any legitimate measures which the Africannationalist leaders may devise for the purpose of recovering such power and restoring it to the African majority•••" 53. Membersof the Council will note that the 'preoccupation .of the Heads of African States in Addis Ababa in Maywas thatthe UnitedKingdomGovernment had already in contemplation at that time the transfer of aIl. the real powers and attributes of sovereignty ~ Southern Rhodesia, while at the same time obscuring ·the .position by withholding technical sovereignty. This was recognized even by Mr. Winston Field and he saidsohimself in some of his correspondence with the United Kingd.omGovernment. He wrote to Mr. Butler on 20 April 1963, pointing out: "When the Federation does come toan.end on the seces~ion.of either·NorthernRhodesiaor Nyasaland, the functionsand powers formerly exercised by the Southern Rhodesian Governmentbefore entry into Federation willrevert to Southern .Rhodesia in as .full a degree as they existed before that time, and in fact. in a tuIler degree, insofar as they will now ~.. o~rated ·under the 1961 Constitution, whereby the United Kingdom Government's reservepowers bave ·been eliminated ex~pt for certain formal items." 54.· In o\lrview the break;"up of the Federation presentedthe United Kingdomwith greatopportum,ties fora eolution. to.thepr()blem we are l).OW discussing. In .·fact, a· solution waspUt forward by. Mr. Kenneth Kaunda of Northern Rhodesiaand the NorthernRhodesian ·delegationat the Victoria . Falls Conferen~. Accord!ngto the IJnited Kingaom \Vhite Paper dealing with therepqrt of the €entral African.Conference,the Northern Ilhodesian delegation pUt forward a proposaI which wouldiilfact have prevented any important " .,. The Northern Rhodesian delegation indicated that their approach to the problem was different. They considered that the United Kingdom Government should at an earlydateappointaCommissioner to take over aU the functions of the Federal Government, and then to arrange for the progressive transfer of those functions to the territorialgovernmemts. •• This view was not, however. accepted. by any other delegation, ori the grounds that the process of dissolution oughtto beworked outbetween the Governments in advance of some date at which time the dissolution could or should take place. It was also made clear by the Chairman"-that is to say, the British Minister in Charge of Central African Affairs-"that the concept of appointing a Commissioner to inherit the functions ofthe Federal Gov'ernment formed no part of Hel' Majesty' s Government policy.Il§I From this White Paper, it is unfortunately only too apparent that the United Kingdom Government was not prepared even to take into consideration a solution which would have enabled it to bring pressure on the Southern Rhodesian Government and which was supported by the only delegation present which .could claim to be in any way representative of African opinion. Ce ment prendre permis la délégation ritablement 55. pas n'y en le occasion était 55. It is important to po~t out that at this Confer'- ence, Nyasaland was not represented at all, except by European officiais who .came as observers and that therefore the United KingQom Governmeilt 1'13- jected on this occasion. the onlyview which could be said to be the voice of Mrican political parties. 56. The ur~ncy of this. serious situation has been accentUatecl by the enactment of a 1aw by the British Parliament, .the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Act; 1963, which permits the United Kingdom Government by the formal.process ofenacting an Order-in-CoUncil suhsequently to make the necessary detailed provisions for the break-up of the Federation and the transfer of its p,owers. In, short, the United K:ingdom Government can.in law transfer at any time from now onall the POwers and atti'ibutes of sovereignty, about which the Headsof states of Africacomplained to the Southern Rhodesian Government, without even necessarily obta~ing the consent of theBritishParliament. When thishand-over wilfa,ctuallytake place it is more difficult ta estimate. But it ls likely to be fairly soon. 56., s'est a 1963. par dispo;;;mons ration le transfêrerà RhodêSie la·. élevés obtenir britanpiqu~. fert prochainement. '57 qui la le Uni tive sera.1e.nt· l'approbation . ·2/, H. 13 57. The positionis that the process of handing over of what are in' fact the, powers and attributes of sov- .ereignty to Southern Rhodesia must at the very latest be completed by ,31 ,December ,1963. But.the United Kingdom Government·has pledgecI .itself to .seek.re... trospective Parliamentary approval of such powers thatare in fact transferred before October 1963 and prior'Parliamentary approval of any powers trans- §I Rl:!PQrt of thl:! Olntral Mnca Conference. 1963.London,H.M. Stationery Office, .Cmnd. ?093. 58.. It will be argued that the armed forces and the air forc~ about which we are complaining' are already in situ in Southern Rhodesia. But, as we have made it abundantly clear, the issue at stake is who controls them. With the dissolution of the so-called Central African Federation, the oppressiv.è "extreme rightwing European Party" wishes to gain èontrol of these forces under. a: cloak of secrecy for reasons which are not far to seek. AU African States, therefore, caU upon the Council to consider the seriousness this eventuality. Already, aU Members of the United Nations are aware of the organized oppression of the African population by the /?maU European minority. The records of the United Nations are replete with the oppressive and repressive laws which have the actual force of the policy of apartheid. 59. The outcry of the African States against the undemocratic constitution of Southern Rhodesia by no means confined to the African Continent. Mr. Stonehouse, a British Member of Parliament, expressed his concern at the intransigence of the white IIlinority when he. saidin the House of Commons 11 July 1963: "There is hanging over us today thethreat that, because of the intransigence of a few white political leaders out of touch withthe main strea:IIlof opinions in these territories. there will be civil war in this territory and an Algerian~type wal' between black .and white. There Is this d~ger and we should not disregard it."§J 60.. Itis obvious that thisgravewarningwasprimarily directed to the British Government whose responsi~ bilityiIi these riiàtters is inescapable. Ifthe inevitable doom descends upon Southern Rhodesiaand itisturned into a second .Algeria, itwillnotbefor lack of warning voices.The alarm has been raised time and agàin, but. alas, it has been ignored and even contemptuously brushed aside. We now calI upon the. C01JDcil to act. 61. As long· ago as 1955 the distinguished United States author, Mr. John Gunther said: ffThere are, no doubt, honest English people who have a sentimental attachment to Rbodesia, and for that matter honest Rhodesians who have no basis 'of comparison with other countries and who are blind to what is happening under their noses; ignorant the fact that racial discriminations in Rhodesia are among the most barbarous, shameful and disgusting in thevvorId."7J .2!PariiamentaryDebates (Hansard). 'House of Commons. Official RepOrt. Fifth series, vol; 680, session 1962-63. London, H.M.· Stationety Office. col. 1529. Z/lnside Mrica. New York. Harper and Brothers, 1955. p. 632. 63. I need not reitèrate here the convictionwhich my delegation h~s longheld, namely, the responsibility of the United Kingdom for tb.a present state of affairs in Southern.Rhodesia. The African States have never entei'tained any doubts about the, conclusion of the Special Committee set up as' a result of resolution 1745 (XVI) on the status of Southern Rhodesia. The Special Committee had stated unequivocally in its report,Y "that the territoryof Southern Rhodesia is a Non-Self-GOverning Territory in the meaning of ChapterXI of the Charter"'. 64. This 'has sincebèen E:ndo:rsèd by tlie Genèral . Assembly and this viewhas been'confirmed in subsequent General Assembly resolutions,particularly resolution 1760 (XVII) of 31 Octooer 1962, which reaffirtned resolution 1-747 '(XVI) of 28' ..Tune 1962. The ~pecial Committee in' its,résolutiôn of,20'oIune 1963, alsô confirmed this conclusion~, ' 65. It is a curious irony of fatethatit·was,the Unitéd Kingdom which" according to Mr.Wilfred Benson, who was present throughout the San Francisco Conference, as an official, Ilestablished a cla1m to the paternity of Chaptel' XI of'our Charter by pl'esenting principles of general policy" , 66, Indeed, the view has long beèn widely heldthat the preservation of international pëace and, colonial emancipation are but twoaspects of the saméproblem, and .thattherefore· they are the direct'concern of allMembersof the United Nations. Thelate MI'. .Tohn 'Foster Dulles 'said-that ChapterXI ofthe Charter "is 'not' merely the concerIi of the colonial Powers, but also theconcern of the United Nations". Oh this issue, évery African State would support the former Secretary. of State of the United States. Whythis is '. so has beeuexplained oy a. distingllished B,razilian diplomat ,and lawyer, some of ",hosé words on the matter, withyour permission, I, shallquote: "From, the point,of View. ,of'originalityand inÎlovation, it isindisputB.ble that the Declaration regarding non..self-govérIifug. territories stands out as one of the boldestandmost.positivecontri~utions of' the San Francisco Conference to the légal order y Offi~ial Records o~ the General Assembly, Sixteenth, Session, Annexes, agendaitern 97, document A/5124, annex Ill. 67. In 1923, the sarne year in which the British Government enacted the Southern P..hodesian Constitution and allowed a small minority of white settlel's to enter into a plebiscite regardless of African aspirations, they set out in a White Paper their considered views ontherelationship between Africans and settlers in Africa. This i5 generally knownas the Devon.,. shire Declaration, from the Duke of Devonshire, the thEm British Colonial Secretary. This Declaration states: ," ... His Majesty's Govemment think it is necessary definitely to record ,their consiàered opinion tbat the interest of the African natives must be paramount; and ü, and when, those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict the former should prevail."21 Weareasking theCouncil to bear this in mincI. 68. ne.spitethe fact that the resolution ofthe General Ass~mblyof14December 1960, thefamousresolution ,1514' (XV),-repeated in other'words the Devonshire Declaration, so far .a.sSouthernRhodesiais concerned, the" United KingdPm has taken no effec~ve steps to comply with this resolution, thoughtheybavecompJied with .it.in regard to other African territories under their control.. Members of the Council willbefamilial' with .operative paragraph 5 of this resolution, and itdoes no harm to repeat it here: 1 "Immediatesteps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or a.1l other territorieswhich have. notyet attained indeplilndence, 'to transfer allpowers to the,peoples of those territories, without any condîtions or reservations, in accorqance with their freely expressed will. and desire, withbut any distinction as to raCe, creed or colour,jn' order to enablethenito enjoy complete independence and.freedom." 69,. 1 do not propose to say anything IIluch atthis stage. about the supposed British Convention, though it wouldbe interesting li the representative of the United Kingdom were able to tell the Council whether their allgedConventionhas been in eXistence for forty years, a position which he has, as spokesman f.or the' United Kingdom Government, always maintained; orwhèther it has been in existellce for only two years, which is what the :aritish Attorney General recentlytold the Houseof CommOllS. However, Ithillk 2J In4ians in Klilnya•. London. H.M. Stàtionery Office. Cmnd. 1922. p.9•. "Let me say one thing further which 1 think the Govèrnment may have tél consider. " . That is that li the present Administration ofSouthern Rhoclesia are not prepared in their own interests to advance at a rate which will give aIl· sections of the community equality. and a chance of practising democracy, .we are left wïth one ether weapon-we still have the power to suspend the Constitution and to withhold economic assistance."~ Clearly, therefore, the Opposition spokesman did not recognize the existence of any suchconvention which, as they say, has been in existence for forty years. 1 was always taught that BritishParliamentary Conventions could only be held to exist if theywere accepted at least by thetwo major parties .in Parliament. If 1 am wrongabout this, 1stand to be corrected. 71. My delegation has produced the full facts both in our documents and .in my .present statement-full facts in regard to th~ inevitable revolutionàry and explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia.. vve have ciemonstatèd that the forces about to betransferred are far toolJig to be handedover tOanycolonialterritory, let alone a white minority Government repre- Sf.lntative of only (; pel' cent oftheEuropean.populatiQn and totally unrepresentative of the 94 percentAfrican population; We have demonstrated that,prior tothe Constitution of the Federation in 1953 nosuch forces and,...as Mr. Winston· Field haspointed· out-no such powers, in many instances;existed Ullder ,the uncon::- troIled authority'oftheSouthern Rhooesia Government; In fact, it ca,n besaidthat tpis. is thefirsttimein history that Britainhasplannedtohandover large armëd forces llnd certain other.powerl'l to a GOvernment over whichit has J.'epeatedlystatedwithinthefile CouncH champers that it'has no·controt 1 , 72. From these facts it must be cleartoevei;y member of the Council that. the transferof tf~e armed forces and powerfulair force tci Southern Rhodesia cannot but result in a conflict on the African continent.This is why 'we have come here to-askfor an immediate remedial action. It ls, in the view of my delegatïon', essentially the dutY of the COUIlcil to deal with such situations before they develop into full armed conflict. 73. III the viewofAfrican States,the Councn should impress upon the United Kingdom Government. the extreme undesirability of proceeding v)ith the transfer of any armed forces to Southern Rhodesia untila !QI ParUamentary Debates(Hansard), House. of Commons, Official Report, Fitth Series, vôl.681, Sessi<ln 1962-63, London, H.M. Sta" tionery Office, cols. 1450 and 1451•. 74~Ffually~ let nie make an· appeal tothe United KingdomGôvernnien( Do.They not think that perhaps in the light-i:>fexpèrienèeandintheÜght of whafIhave sàid here, . their pOlicy,thepolicy of attempting to ~d ~ver .armed forces .aI-L .a powerful army to the . Soutliern RhodeslaGi:>vernment, has beeh niistaken? Fortyyears ago, the United KingdomGovernment prqclaimedtÀe 'Devons~re .Declaration. They· havè n-eve:r be~n a.ble to implement it in regard .to Southern Rho.desia;Ten, years ago,against-the advice of every Afrj,QlUlparty !Uld a.gainst the advice given.by certain Conunonwealthco1.1Iltries, theywept ahead to set up tlle"Eederfl;tion.. Today thatFederation is in ruins. Might·ltnot havebeenbetter if theyhadheededAfricanopinion then? The f!UlloUS words of tQat great British .statesman•. Oliver Cromwell,. when. he was at1;empting·.ûnsuccessÎU1ly to prevent a second civil war in Br.fl:ain,.apdwhichhassince"re-eohoedthroughbut Britisi!hil:!tory in critical situations, arel suggest, eqùallyapplfcàble tothe presE;lnt Southern Rhodeàiari situatidn/'ÇrotiiweU wrote: "IbeseeQh you, in the b<lWelsoÎ 'cl4'Îst--think it. possible you may be mistakéri:" .. ,.. ." '. . lpo>~rday. iLQonc~ude.witha .statementthat-l made. on J,8.J;unè. ~9{t2 W1i;he;Plen,arymeeting.ofthe General J\!'l§~w:bly'when,thequestiollofSouthernRhodesiawas p!;ljngJ:li!'lcq.ssed.Isaid: . ··•.•·•. "V/e.stilllJelieve··futheBritish sellse ofjustice ~dfa!J.fo1)l~Y"andwè pray thaHhe UIütèd Kingdom' s \fhitiatives iri'the'"direction•.of·.decolonization, .its :~le!u:iand'itseff()rts'wit1lregàrd t6h1JIllaneman- :.9ipati9hover' tbepast'füteen years will once more .' . bè;.'brought'intoplay.;; [l11pth pienarY niéeting, ''Par~.26;y'·' " ". . "