S/PV.107 Security Council

The next item on the agenda is the discussion of the letter from the representative of the United Kingdom on the Security Council to the Secretary-General, concerning incidents in the Corfu. Channel. In accordance with a decision taken previously by the Security Council, and if there is no opposition, I shall invite the representative of Albania to take his seat at the Council table. CENT-SEPTIEME SEANCE Tenue aLake Success, New York, le mardi 18 fcvrier 1947, a11 heures. President.: M. F. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique ). Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, France, Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. 59. Ordre du jour provisoire (docu ment SI280) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Lettre au Secretaire general du representant du Royaume-Uni llU Ccinseil de securite, relative aux incidents survenus dans le detroit de Corfou (documents S/247 et S/250)1. 60. Adoption de I'ordre du jour 61. Suite de la discussion de la plainte du Royaume-Uni contre J'Albanie Le PRESIDENT: L'ordre du jour appelle la. discussion sur la lettre au Secretaire general du representant du Royaume-Uni au Conseil de securite, relative aux incidents survenus dans le detroit de Corfou. Conformement a la decision prise anterieure~ ment par le Conseil de securite, et s'il n'y a pas d'opposition, j'invite le representant de l'Albanie aprendre place ala table du Conseil. (A ce moment, le representant de l'Albanie, M. Hysni KapoJ Ministre pUnipotentiaire en Yougoslavie, prend place ala table du Conseil.) • Voir Proces-verbizux officielr du ConJeil de recuritJJ Deuxieme Ann6e, Supplement No 3, Annexes 8 et 9~ Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): From the correspondence enclosed in my letter of 10 January1 to the Secretary-General request- ing him to bring this dispute before the Security Council, and from other documents subsequently circulated to the members, the broad outline of the case is sufficiently plain. I may have occasion to circulate further documents, and I shall deposit with the Secretary-General certain other evidence which will be available for members to consult at their convenience. I will now orally, and as briefly as I can, sup- plement this documentary material in order to complete the narrative of the events which are the subject of the charge which my Government is compelled to make against the Government· of Albania. On the early afternoon of 22 October 1946, a squadron of British warships was on the move through the Straits between the Greek island of Corfu and the mainland of Albania. The Medi- terranean fleet, to which these warships belong, had recently, in accordance with an old peace- time tradition of that fleet, been visiting various Greek ports. This particular squadron visited Corfu. At the time in question, they had left the port and were moving northwards through the Straits in order to rendezvous with certain other of His Majesty's ships in the open sea north-west of Corfu Island. They were in normal passage formation-here I would refer to the chart (Exhibit I) which illustrates their movements.2 The cruiser Mauritius was leading, followed at an interval of a few hundred yards by the destroyer Saumarez. Behind them, after a gap of two miles but on the same course, was the cruiser Leander followed at an interval of a few hun- dred yards by the destroyer Volage. The course they were taking was through a channel which had been swept of mines in 1944, and which I will in future refer to as the "swept .channel". On their left, or westwards, as the exhibit shows, German mine fields were still in existence. I should explain, however, that even apart from these mine fields, their course, close as it is to the Albanian shore, is a necessary and reason- able one for navigational reasons. The waters to the west near the northern coast of Corfu are dangerous and rocky; it has always been quite normal for all shipping which passes through this area to keep close to the Albanian shores, where the waters are deep and safe and naviga- tion is much easier. At 2.45 p.m., two bursts of machine-gun fire were heard by the leading warships on the Albanian coast. They proceeded on their pas- sage and did not alter formation. At 2.53 p.m., a .heavy explosion took place in His Majesty's ShIp Saumarez. The destroyer Volage was im. 1 Document 5/247. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de [Janglais): Les communications jointes ala 1ettre que j'ai adressee le 10 janvi~:1. au Secretaire general pour lui demander de SaISIf le. Conseil de securite de ce differend,ainsi que les autres documents qui ont ete, par la suite~ distri):mes aux membres du Conseil, do:pnent un apen:;u suffisamment clair de l'affaire. Peut·etre aurai-je l'occasion de distribuer d'au~res ?O,CU- ments. Je remettrai de plus au Secretall'e general quelques autres preuves que les membres du Conseil pourront examiner aloisir. Je voudrais maintenant compIe~er cet~e doeu: mentation en vous relatant de VIve VOlX, aussl. , . brievement que possible, les evenements qU1 contraignent mon Gouvernement a porter son accusation contre l'Albanie. Le 22 octobre 1946, au debut de l'apres-midi, une escadre de batiments de guerre britanniques etait engagee dans le detroit qui separe l'ile grecque de Corfou de la cote albanaise. Suivant une ancienne tradition du temps de paix, la flotte de la Mediterranee, a laquelle appartenaient ces navires, avait touche differents ports grecs. L'es- cadre en question avait fait escale a Corfou. Au moment dont je parle, les ba.timents venaient d'appareiller et faisaient route au nord, dans le detroit en direction du large, vers un point situe au nord-ouest de Corfou, ou ils devaient rejoindre d'autres batiments de Sa Majeste. Ils naviguaient: en ligne de file, et vous pouvez a ce propos vous reporter a la carte Oll est indiquee la route suivie par les batiments (piece No 1)2. Le croiseur Mauritius naviguait en tete, suivi du contre-torpilleur SaumarezJ a quelques cen- taines de yards. A deux milles derriere eux, mais gouvernant au meme cap, venait le croiseur LeanderJ suivi, aquelques centaines de yards, du contre-torpilleur Volage. L'escadre suivait un chenal qui avait ete drague en 1944, et que j'appellerai desormais "le chenal drague". A babord, c'est-a-dire en direction de l'ouest, ainsi que la carte l'indique, se trouvaient encore des champs de mines posees par les Allemands. Je tiens toutefois a faire remarquer que, meme inde- pendamment de ces champs de mines, il est necessaire et raisonnable, pour des raisons de navigation, que les navires serrent la cote alba- naise. En effet, en direction de l'ouest, pres de la cote septentrionale de Corfou, les caux sont pleines de recifs dangereux. 11 a toujours ete normal que les bateaux traversant cette region serrent d'aussi pres que possible la cote albanaise ou les eaux sont profondes et sures, et la naviga- tion plus facile. A 14 h. 45, les navjres de tete entendirent deux rafales de mitrailleuse venant de la cote albanaise. lIs ~ontinuerent leur· route sans changer de for- mation. A 14 h. 53, une violente explosion se produisit a bord du Saumarez. Le contre-tor- pilleur Volage re~ut immediatement l'ordre de sDocument 5/247. 1 V:oir Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de s8curite, DeUlCleme Annee, Supplement No 6, Annexe 15, piece No I. At this point, I should like to express my gratitude on behalf of His Majesty's Govern- ment to the valuable assistance which was of- fered by the Greek authorities. The crews strug- gled to keep their ships afloat and to make their slow and dangerous passage back to Corfu. In this they were successful. Mter nearly twelve hours of hard endeavour, both ships made the few miles of passage back to Corfu and arrived there at 3 a.m. It has since become clear that His Majesty's ship Saumarez has become a total loss. The nature of the explosions and the extent of the damage were such as to indicate that they were caused by contact mines. The matter was therefore immediately reported to the Mediter- ranean Zone Board of the International Mine Clearance Organization. I think it would be convenient if I explained, at this point, what this organization is and I am therefore tabling as Exhibit Ill, the agreement which constituted the International Organization for the Clearance of Mines in European waters. 2 This organization consists of a Central Board, which sits in Lon- don, and contains representatives of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Under the Central Board are a number of local or zone boards. The Mediterranean Zone Board, with which we are here concerned, contains representatives of France, Great Britain, Greece, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia. When the Corfu incident was reported to the Mediterranean Zone Board, the Board on 28 • Ibid., Exhibit Ill. Trois quarts d'heure plus tard, a 16 h. 16, une forte explosion se produisit a bord du bati- ment Volage dont l'etrave fut emportee. Ces deux incidents provoquerent la mort de quarante- quatre marins; quarante-deux autres furcnt blesses. Les deux navires etaient alors desempares et dans une situation tres critique. Un vent d'ouest de 15 a 20 milles a l'heure les poussait vers la cote el ils risquaient d'y faire naufrage. J'ai fait distribuer que1ques photographies prises au moment de l'incident (piece No Il) 1. Bicn entendu, les autorites navales britanniques pri- rent toutes les dispositions possibles pour venir en aide aux navires et le commandant de la marine grecque a Corfou organisa immediatement des secours. Je voudrais, a. ce propas, exprimer toute la gratitude du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste pour l'aide si precieuse qu'ont apportee les autorites grecques. Les equipages firent tous leurs efforts pour maintenir leurs navires aflot et pour rallier Corfou a. vitesse tres reduite et dans des condi- tions dangereuses. I1 fallut aux deux navires pres de douze heures de durs efforts pour couvrir les que1ques rnilles qui les separaient de Corfou, ou ils arriverent a 3 heures du matin. Il est apparu depuis que le Saumarez etait entierement perdu. La nature des explosions, comme l'etendue des degats, prouve qu'elles ont ete causees par des mines de contact. En consequence, cet inci- dent fut immediatement signale au Bureau medi- terraneen de l'Organisation mondiale de demi- nage. 11 conviendrait peut-etre que j'explique maintenant cc qu'est cette organisation. C'est pourquoi je presente comme piece No Ill, le texte de l'accord etablissant l'Organisation inter- nationale de deminage des eaux europeennes2• Cette organisation comprend un Bureau central qui siege a Londres et groupe les representants de la France, du Royaume-Uni, des Etats-Unis d'Amerique et de l'Union des Republiques soda- listes sovietiques. De ce Bureau central dependent un certain nombre de bureaux regionaux au bureaux de secteur. Le Bureau mediterraneen, qui nous occupe en ce m.oment, comprend des representants de la France, de la Grande-Bre- tagne, de la .Grece, des Etats-Unis d'Amerique, de l'Union des Republiques sodalistes sovietiques et dela Yougoslavie. ' Quand cet incident fut porte a sa connais- sanee, le Bureau mediterraneen recommanda a 1 VoirProc6s.verballx 0 fficiels du ConSilii de sAcuritl, Deuxieme Annee) Supplement No 6, Annexe 15, piece No 11. oIbid., piece No Ill. This recommendation of the Mediterranean Zone Board was submitted to the Central Board which, on 1 November unanimously decided that the North Corfu Channel should be re- swept at a favourable opportunity. It was on the basis of this decision that the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediter- ranean, ordered mine-sweeping of the Corfu swept channel.. The action taken in the diplomatic field was as follows: On 26' October, my Government had in- formed the Government of Albania that, in view of the mining of the two warships, the swept channel would shortly be re-swept. The Al- banian Government replied in a communication of 31 October in which they protested against the alleged violation of Albanian waters by British vessels on 22 October. This is a point with which I will deal later. The Albanian reply went on to say that they had no objection to mine-sweeping of the channel, provided that this was carried out outside their territorial waters; the Albanian Government would take no re- sponsibility if mine-sweeping were carried on in Albanian territorial waters and would consider this a flagrant violation of the integrity of their country. My Government considered that this part of the Albanian reply made no sense, as the swept channel-an international highway be- tween two parts of the open seas-lies in terri- torial waters. Accordingly, a further note was sent to the Albanian Government on 10 November, in- forming them that mine-sweeping would start on 12 November. The Albanian Government re- plied with a protest against what they called the unilateral decision of His Majesty's Government. I have already explained how this decision, though communicated by His Majesty's Govern- ment, gave effect to the decision of an inter- national body. The Albanian reply went on to propose the establishment of a mixed commis- sion to decide what area of the sea should be considered to constitute the channel of naviga- tion. This proposal, my Government were wholly at a loss to understand. The limits of the swept channel were perfectly well known and had been so known for years, to every Government in Europe. I have aJready explained the reasons arising from mine fields and from navigational considerations for which this channel takes the course it does. The Albanian Government had been kept fully informed; since October, 1945, terranee donna l'ordre de proceder a un nouveau deminage du chenal drague de Corfou. Les mesures prises dans le domaine diploma- tique furent les suiv~ntes: Le 26 octobre, le Gouvernement du Royaume- Uni informa le Gouvernement albanais que, en. raison du fait que les deux navires de guerre avaient ete endommages par des mines, le chenal serait prochainement drague de nouveau. Le Gouvernement albanais repondit par une com- munication datee du 31 octobre, ou il elevait une protestation contre ce qu'il appelait une yiolation des eaux territoriales albanaises par des navires britanniques le 22 octobre. Je reviendrai plus tard sur ce point. Le Gouvernement albanais declarait ensuite qu'il ne voyait aucun inconve- nient a un dragage du chenal a condition qu'il ait lieu en dehors des eaux territoriales alba- naises; si des dragages etaient effectues dans les eaux territoriales albanaises, le Gouvernemen t albanais declinerait toute responsabilite, et considererait l'operation comme une violation flagrante de l'integrite territoriale de son pays. De l'avis de mon Gouvernement, cette partie de la reponse albanaise n'avait aucun sens, puisque le chenal drague, qui constitue une route interna- tionale reliant deux zones de la haute mer, se trouve dans les eaux territoriales. En consequence, une nouvelle note fut adres- see au Gouvernement albanais, le 10 novembre pour l'informer que le dragage commencerait l~ 1? novembre. Le Go~vernement albanais repon- dlt par une protestatIOn contre ce qu'il appelait la decision unilaterale du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste. J'ai deja explique que cette decision bien que communiquee par le Gouvernement d~ Sa Majeste, ne faisait que donner suite a la deci- sion prise par un organisme international. Le Gouvernement albanais proposait ensuite dans sa reponse, la creation d'une commission'mixte qui determinerait queUe partie de la mer on devrait considerer comme constituant le chenal de navigation. C'est la une proposition que mon Gouvernement n'est pas arrive a comprendre. Tous les Gouvernements de l'Euiope connaissent parfaitement les limites du chenal drague et ceci de,Puis des annees. Je vous ai deja expliq~e qu'en ralSon des champs de mines et pour des motifs de navig.ation, le chenal ne peut emprunter une autre VOle. Le Gouvernement albanais avait ete I table as Exhibit IV.copies of the diplomatic correspondence quoted above.1 Mine-sweeping was carried out on 12 and 13 November as, notified. British mine-sweeping forces only were used; as it happened only British forces were available. A French naval officer, however, attended as an observer. This officer, Captain Mestre, was the French representative on the Mediterranean Zone Board, and the Security Council will be interested to see his re- port. I am depositing the original of this report with the Secretary-General, but a copy, with an English translation, is being circulated to all members of the Council as Exhibit V. 2 Twenty-two mines were found; nine were identified on the spot and two have been pre- served. As many as possible were sunk on the spot by rifle fire-:-this doubtless accounts for the allegation' in the Albanian note of 21 December concerning machine-gun fire-but some drifted on shore before the westerly wind. The mines found Were identified as being Ger- man V-type mines containing 600 pounds of explosive. They are the largest moored mines in existence and are capable of inflicting enormous damage to the largest ship afloat. I will lay be- fore the Council as Exhibit VI a number of photographs to illustrate the recovery and iden- tification of these mines.s Examination of these mines showed conclu- sively that the mine field was newly laid-six months or less before the incident. There was no rust or marine growth. The horns unscrewed casily. There was still grease on the mooring wire. The paint shone brightly in the sun and identification marks were still visible. I invite the Security Council to examine carefully Cap- tain Mestrc's report and the photographs I am exhibiting. I could, if necessary, table more de- tailed reports by the British naval authorities on the identification of these mines, but I expect the Security Council will agree. that the docu- ments mentioned make the case sufficiently clear. This discovery gave the incident a serious and sinister aspcct. It was now clear that His Majesty's ships had not been damaged by loose or drifting mines but that a minc field had becn deliberately, recently and secretly laid. The lay- ing of this mine field, which stretched for three ment, six mois, ou meme moins, avant l'incident. Elles ne portaient aucune trace de rouille ou d'algues. Les antcnnes des detonateurs ont pu ctre facilement devissees. Le cable de la mine etait encore enduit de graisse. La peinture bril- lait au soleil et les marques d'identification etaient encore visibles. Je prie les membres du Conseil de securite d'examiner avec attention le rapport du capitaine de vaisseau Mestre, ainsi que les photographies que je leur presente. Si le Conseil le juge necessaire, je pourrai fournir sur l'identi- fication de ces mines des rapports plus detailles emanant des autorites navales britanniques. J'es- pere toutefois que le Conseil de securite recon- naitra que les documents en question apportent suffisamment de clarte sur l'affaire. La decQuverte de ces mines donnait a l'inci- dent une gravite sinistre. Il etait manifeste que ce n'ctaient pas des mines mal amarrees ou den- vantes qui avaient cause des degats aux navires de Sa Majeste, mais qu'un champ de mines avait etc delibcrement, recemrnent et secretement 1 Voir Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securitJ, Dcuxieme Annce, Supplement No 6, Annexe 15, piece No IV. , Ibid., piece No -V. I have laid before the Security Council as Exhibit VII a chart to illustrate this mine field, showing the exact position of the mines discov- ered.1 The chart shows that these mines appear to have been laid in rough lines across the ap- proaches to Saranda. One such line is easily identifiable and may have been based on a bearing running approximately north from the land mark of San Giorgio monastery. For these reasons, ~y Government felt com- pelled to send a communication to the Albanian Government, recapitulating the whole affair, drawing attention to the responsibility which so clearly lay upon them and requesting an apology and compensation for the loss of life and prop- erty involved. My Government considered that the Albanian reply to this communication was entirely unsatisfactory and they therefore have no option but to submit this case to the Security Council. I have already laid before the Council copies 6f the two documents.2 Those are the facts of this unhappy incident. The Security Council will, I am sure, have no hesitation in accepting the facts I have stated as to the presence of this mine field and the damage it has caused. I should now like briefly to explain the pro- visions of international law as applied to the laying of mines. The law is perfectly clear and is covered by the Hague Convention No. 8 of 1907, articles 2 to 5, inclusive. The text of these articles is as follows: "ARTICLE 2: The laying of automatic con- tact mines off the coast and ports of the enemy with the sole object of intercepting commer- cial shipping is forbidden. "ARTICLE 3: When anchOred automatic contact mines are employed, every possible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping. "The belligerents undertake to do their ut- most to render these mines harmless after a limited time has elapsed and, should the mines cease to be under observation, to notify the danger zones as soon as military exigencies permit, by a notice to mariners, which must also be communicated to the Governments through the diplomatic channel. tres grave. La carte constituant la piece No VII, que j'ai present~e au Conseil de sec~~te, montre ce champ de mines ainsi que la pOSItion exacte des mines qui ont ete decouvertes 1 • D'apres cette carte, il semble que ces mines aient ete mouillees apeu pres suivant des lignes paralIeles, dans les eaux proches de Saranda. ~n peu~ facilen:ent suivre le trace d'une de ces hgnes qUI a peut-etre ete etabli sur un relevement partant de l'amer constitue par le monastere de San Giorgio, apeu pres en direction du nord. C'est pourquoi, mon Gouvernement s'<;st ~ru dans l'obligation d'adresser une commumcatIOn au Gouvernement'albanais. Cette communication contenait un resume de l'affaire, attirait son at- tention sur le fait qu'il en etait responsable de toute evidence, et demandait des excuses et une reparation pour les pertes en vies humaines et les degats materiels subis. Mon Gouvernement .a estime que la reponse du Gouvernement albana~s ne lui donnait nullement satisfaction et qu'il n'avait comme alternative que de saisir le Conseil de securite de cette affaire. J'ai deja remis aux membres du Conseil de securite des copies de ces deux communications'. C'est donc ainsi que s'est passe ce regrettable incident. Je suis certain que le Conseil de securite n'hesitera pas aadmettre les faits que je viens de relater, en ce qui concerne l'existence de ce champ de mines, et les degats qu'il a causes. Je voudrais maintenant expliquer brievement queUes sont les dispositions du droit international en matiere de mouillage de mines. Les regle- ments sont parfaitement clairs. a cet egard; iIs font l'objet des articles 2 a 5 inclus de la Conven- tion de La Haye No 8 de 1907. Void le texte de ces articles: "ARTICLE 2: Il est interdit de placer des mines automatiques de contact devant les cotes et les ports de l'adversaire, dansle seul but d'intercepter la navigation de commerce. "ARTICLE 3: Lorsque les mines automa- tiques de contact amarrees sont employees, toutes les precautions possibles doivent etre prises pour la securite de la navigation paci- fique. . "Les belligerants s'engagent a pourvoir" dans la mesure du possible, a ce que ces mines ~ev.ie,nnentinoffensives,apres un laps de temps hmlte, et, dans le cas ou elles cesseraient d'etre surveillees, a signaler les regions dangereuses aussitot que les exigences militaires le permet~ tront, par un avis a la navigation qui devra etre. aussi communique aux Gouvernements par la voie diplomatique. 'V?ir Proc~s.verbaux officiels du Conseil de securiM, Deuxleme Annee, Supplement No 6· Annexe 15 piece No VII. ' . , 2 Note en date du 21 decembre 1946 adressee par le Gouvernement alban3;is au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste pour l~ Roya~me-Um, et note en date du 9 janvier 194-7 tran.s~lse a 1Ambassadeur de Sa Majeste a Belgrade et destl,nee au Gouvernement albanais. Voir Proces-verbaux Of!i;ClelS du Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee, Sup- plement No 3, Annexe 8, pages 41 et 45. . "The neutral Power must give notice to mariners in advance of the places where auto- matic contact mines have been laid. This notice must be communicated at once to the Governments through the diplomatic channel. "ARTICLE 5: At the close of the ,var, the contracting Powers undertake to do their ut- most to remove the mines which they have laid, each Pow~r removing its own mines. "As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by one of the belligerents off the coast of the other, their position must be notified to the other party by the Power which laid them, and each Power must proceed with the least possible delay to remove the mines in its own waters." The language of these articles is perhaps somewhat repetitive, but they may be summed up as laying down the following general rules: (a) Nations are not to lay mines, even in time of war, except with every possible precaution for the security of peaceful shipping. (b) Nations are to give notice of the areas or danger zones where mines are laid. (c) Nations are to remove mines as soon as possible. The above provisions apply both to belligerent and to neutral States. This Convention, which is declaratory of the general law, only covers the laying of mines in time of war. The rules of conduct which it sets out and which the interests of humanity require apply a fortiori in time of peace. The laying of this clandestine mine field in the Corfu Channel is a blatant violation of the rules of conduct set out in the Hague Conven- tion. Quite apart from the Hague Convention, however, the laying of this mine field without notification is a crime against humanity. I would emphasize that this case in no way hinges on the mining of warships. These mines would equally have destroyed merchant ships of any nationality using this international route. It is pure chance that warships were the victims. The eastern coast of the Adriatic is peculiarly suitable for coastal traffic by shipping. This is so from the geography of the hinterland, which is fertile but mountainous and with undeveloped communications. In ordinary times" therefore, the local seaborne traffic is very considerable. Caiques ply all along the coast, as well as other " types of shipping. With regard to the Corfu Straits, my Government is informed that the average amount of shipping which passed through the Straits in the three months previous "Quant aux mines automatiques de contact amarrees que l'un des belligerants aurait posees le long des cotes de l'autre, l'emplacement en sera notifie a l'autre partie par la Puissance qui les a posces, et chaque Puissance devra proceder dans le plus bref delai al'enlevement des mines qui se trouvent dans ses eaux." Ces differents articles comportent peut-etre quelques repetitions, mais on peut resumer comme suit les rcgles generales qu'ils posent: a) Meme en.temps de guerre, les nations ne peuvent mouiller de mines qu'en prenant toutes les precautions possibles pour assurer la securite de la navigation pacifique. b) Les nations doivent faire connaitre les regions ou zones dangereuses ou des mines ont ete mouillees. c) Les nations doivent enlever les mines aussi- .tot que possible. Les dispositions qui precedent s'appliquent a la fois aux Etats belligerants et aux Etats neutres. Cette Convention, qui etablit une loi generale, ne vise que le mouillage de mines en temps de guerre. Les regles de conduite qu'elle enonce et qui sont necessaires dans l'inter~t de l'humanite sont a fortiori applicables en temps de paix. La pose clandestine de ce champ de mines dans le dctroit de COl'fou est une violation fla- grante des rcglements formules par la Convention de La Haye. Indcpendamment meme de la Convention de La Haye, c'est un crime contre l'humanite d'avoir pose cc champ de mines sans avertissement. Je tiens a. signaler que le fond de la question n'est pas le fait que des navires de guerre aient ete touches par des mines. Ces mines auraient pu tout aussi bien causeI' la destruction de navires marchands de n'importe quelle nationalite em- pI'untant cctte route internationale. C'est un pur hasard que ce soit des navires de guerre qui aient ete touches. La cote est de l'Adriatique se prete tout par- ticulicremcnt au cabotage, en raison de la geo- graphie physique de l'arricre-pays, qui est fertile, mais montagneux, et dispose de moyens de com- munication insuffisants. En pcriode ordinaire, le trafic maritime local est donc tres important. Des calques, ainsi que d'autres types de bateaux, circulent tout le long de la cote dans un va-et- vient continue!. Mon Gouvernement a ete in- forme que, pendant les trois mois qui ont precede le mois de mai 1946, la moyenne du trafic men- I confidently believe that the Council must find that these mines were recently laid, and that they were laid in violation of international law. The question then arises who laid them. I cannot produce actual eye-witnesses of -the laying. But a consideration of certain circum- stances points inescapably to Albanian respon- sibility. First I invite attention to the elaborate and vigilant defences which the Albanian Govern- ment maintains along its coast. The defences of Saranda are shown on the chart which I table as Exhibit VUP These were observed by the crews of the sinking destroyers when they drifted near the shore on 22 October; I have no _ doubt there are many others which are not pin- pointed on this chart. This chart, of course, does not attempt to show defences elsewhere along the coast, but only those near Saranda. If there is any doubt about the vigilance of the Albanians, I will quote a few examples of the use they have made of these defences. On 15 May, when two of our cruisers were making ~ peaceful passage southwards through the swept channel, batteries of 3.7 inch guns fired at them a dozen rounds at the close range of 5,000 yards -fortunately without registering a hit. On 6 June, at 8.30 a.m., rifle fire was opened on a small schooner south bound through the chan- nel. This episode was reported to my Govern- ment by the Greek Ministry of Marine and was also published in the local press. I have already described how our ships heard machine-gun fire from the shore before they were mined on 22 October. A week later, at 9.30 p.m. on the night of 29 October, the tug Tanac towing three UNRRA barges was fired at by what was stated to be machine-gun fire of .303 inches calibre from a position marked in Exhibit VIII. The tug was burning full navigation lights and was pro- ceeding through the channel in ignorance of the mining fatality of the previous week. This shoot- ing was observed by a Greek naval craft at observees par les equipages des contre-torpilleurs en perdition qui, le 22 octobre, furent deporres pres du rivage. Je suis certain qu'il y a encore beaucoup d'autres defenses qui ne sont pas por- tees sur cette carte, laqueIle, bien entendu, a seulement pour objet d'indiquer les defenses situees dans le voisinage de Saranda, et non celles qui se trouvent en d'autres points de la cote. Au cas 011 il existerait un doute quelconque sur la vigilance des Albanais, je vais dter quelques exemples de l'usage qu'ils ont fait des defenses en question. Le 15 mai, tandis que deux de nos croiseurs faisaient pacifiquement route vers le Sud en empruntant le chenal drague, des bat- teries cotieres de canons de 3 pouces, 7 ont ouvert le feu sur eux ala faible distance de 5.000 yards, tirant une douzaine de coups qui, heureusement, manquerent leur but. Le 6 juin, a 8 h. 30 du matin, on ouvrit le feu, a coups de fusils, sur une goelette de petit tonnage qui naviguait dans le chenal en direction du sud. Cet incident fut signale au Gouvernement britannique par le Ministere de la Marine grec et, egalement, relate par la presse locale, J'ai deja dit qu'avant que nos batiments ne fussent atteints par des mines, le 22 octobre, leurs equipages avaient entendu le crepitement de mitrai1l~uses instaIlces sur la cote. Vne semaine plus ,tard, dans la soiree du 29 oc- tobre, a 21 h. 30, le remorqueur Tanac, halant trois pcniches de l'UNRRA, essuya le feu de mitrailleuses qu'on a estimees etre du calibre de opouce, 303, instalIees en une positionindiquee • From these examples, the Security Council may well credit that the Albanian authorities are very wide awake both by day and by night and take care to observe-and do more than observe -anything that happens in their waters. Now the mine field chart (Exhibit VII) shows that the mine field comes actually as close as 300 yards off the Albanian coast. Will anyone be- lieve that this mine field, if it was not laid by the Albanian authorities, could possibly have been laid without their knowledge and conni- vance? . The Albanian Government has asserted that it could not have laid mines because it was incapable of sweeping them. This is nonsense. The laying of mines is' the easiest operation in the world. Almost any small craft can be em- . ployed and the procedure is most simple: the mines are simply tumbled over the edge and sink to the pre-arrangcd level. I have deposited with the Secretary-General a photograph of a small British craft prepared for mine-laying (Exhibit X) .2 Sweeping is a very different prop- osition. There is a considerable amount of evidence that Albania possesses and uses mines. For example, in November, 1946, a naviga- tional warning or hydrolantJ as it was called, was broadcast internationally by the United States naval authorities, declaring the entrance to Durazzo and Valona unsafe. This was, I understand, in consequence of a United States ;;hip having observed floating mines in the swept channel to Durazzo. But I will leave this aspect for comment by my United States colleague, if he is so disposed. 1 Ibid., Exhibit X. Le Conseil de securite peut voir, par ces exem- pIes, que les autorites albanaises font bonne garde, nuit et jour, et qu'elles surveillent avec attention-et font meme plus que surveiller- tout ce qui se passe dans les caux albanaises. La carte qui constitue la piece No VII in- clique que le champ de mines s'etendait en fait jusqu'a 300 yards du littoral de l'Albanie. Qui pourrait croire que ce champ de mines, s'il n'a pas ete pose .par les autorites albanaises, ait pu l'etre a leur insu et sans leur connivence? Le Gouvernement albanais a soutenu que l'Albanie, ne pouvait mouiller des mines, n'etant pas en mesure de les draguer. C'est la une asser- tion illsoutenable. Rien n'est plus facile que de mouillcr des mines. Presque n'importe queUe petite embarcation peut etre employee et l'opera- tion est des plus simples: les mines sont simple- ment larguees par-dessus bord et s'enfoncent a une profondeur calculee a I'avance. rai remis au Secretaire general la photographie d'une em- barcation britannique de petit tonnage, amena- gee en vue du mouillage de mines (piece No X) 2. Le dragage est une tout autre affaire. Il existe de nombreuses preuves que l'Albanie possede des miries, et qu'elle s'en sert: Au mois de novembre 1946, par exemple, un avis aux navigateurs, ou hydrolantJ fut radio- diffuse dans le monde entier par les autorites navales des Etats-Unis, pour declarer dange- reuse l'entree des ports de Durazzo et de Valona. D'apres les renseignements que j'ai recueillis, cet avis fut diffuse apres qu'un navire americain eut repere des mines flottantes dans le chenal drague qui donne acces a Durazzo; mais je laisse au representant des Etats-Unis le soin de faire une declaration a ce sujet, s'ille juge apropos. J'ai encore un autre point a presenter au Conseil de securitc: le 10 septembre 1946, la Yougoslavie et l'Albanie ont conclu un accord maritime prevoyant, entre autres chases, l'insti- tution d'un service de navigation regulier entre les ports de mer yougoslaves ct albanais, allant de Zadar, au nord, aSaranda, au sud. Cct accord ayant cte conclu, on pouvait s'attendre a ce qu'il £Ut mis a execution; pourtant, d'aprcs les infor- mations re~ues par man Gouvernement, la der- nicre escale qu'un navire ait faite a Saranda remonte au 24 septembrc. Je voudrais aussi attirer l'attention du Conseil sur la propagande a laquelle se livre l'Albanie contre la navigation alliee dans les caux alba- naises. Je n'en citerai qu'un exemple: dans le 1 Voir Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de s!cllriU, Denxieme Annee, Supplement No 6, Annexe 15, piece No IX. • Ibid., piece No X. "British ships have brutally violated three times in succession the sovereignty of our country. They have purposely created inci- dents so as to charge our people with things for which they have not the least responsi- bility." I will deal with these so-called brutal viola- tions later. My present point is that the tone of the Albanian Government certainly gives the impression, not that it had no part in doing the things with which we now charge it, but that whatever it did it was justified in doing. I should have thought that if the Albanian Government were in good conscience', innocent and ignorant of this mine-laying, it would have denied the charge, supporting its denial with such evidence as it could muster, rather than raise counter- accusations and imply justification. Moreover, it might have made a better show of innocence if it had co-operated in the re-sweeping of the channel. I particularly refer to the Albanian Govern- ment's obstructive attitude in the face of the' recommendations of the Central Mine Clear- ance Board that the channel should be re-swept. As I have said before, the mixed commission they suggested was quite unnecessary and the terms of refex:ence they proposed made no sense. It would almost seem as if they were trying to gain time for the removal of evidence against them. Another example of the same tactics is the innuendo in the Albanian note, unsupported by any evidence, that those mines were laid by Greece. This was obviously intended to deflect suspicion from themselves. A Greek denial has already been published. I will therefore say no more about it, except to say that this malicious insinuation might well have been omitted from the Albanian note to my Government.1 There is one final point that I would ask the Security Council to consider very seriously. The Council will note from the diplomatic corre- spondence that the Albanian Government claims peculiar and special proprietary rights over its territorial waters, even where these are part of an international channel between two parts of the open sea. They deny the rights of shipping of other countries to pass through these waters, contrary to international law and long-estab- lished practice, and they frequently shoot at those who do pass. I suggest that if the Albanian Government claims and exercises such extreme control over its territorial waters it cannot re- pudiate the corresponding responsibility for what goes on in its waters. We know that a new mine field had been put there, within 300 yards of its shore. Does the Albanian Government seriously me~. Au mepns des dISPOSltlO?S du droit inter- natl.onal et dune coutume anclenne, il denie a ux naVlres marchands des autres pays le droit cl traverse~ ces eaux et fait frequemment tirer su~ ceux qm veulent les traverser. J'estime que si 1 Gouv:meme~t alb:u:ais pretend exercer u~ controle aUSSI outranCler sur les eaux territorial alb . il .. cs an~lse,s, ne peNut reJeter la responsabilite de ce qUI s y passe. ous savons qu'un nouvea " u 1 Voir Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseii de, secU1'ittf. Deuxieme Annee, No 18, 111eme seance. - Je parIerai plus tard de ces pretendues viola: tions brutales. Le point auque1 je m'attache...ra!- pour l'instant, c'est qu'on est vraiment parte a croire, d'apres le ton employe par le Gouverne- ment albanais, non pas qu'il n'a eu aucune pax:t aux actes dont nous l'accusons aujourd'hui, ;rnalS que, quoi qu'il ait fait, il avait de bonnes ralsons pour le faire. J'aurais pense que, si le Gouverne- ment albanais ignorait, en toute sincerite, le mouillage de mines, et etait innocent en. cette affaire, il aurait oppose un dementi a l'accusa- tion dont il etait l'objet en l'appuyant de tou.tes les preuves qu'il aurait pu rassembler, au heu de formuler des contre-accusations et de donner a entendre que ses actes etaient justifies. ]'ajoute qu'il aurait rnieux fait ressortir son innocence s'il nous avait aides a redraguer le chenal. Je pense surtout, en disant cela, a la taC1:ique d'obstruetion employee par le Gouvernernent albanais lorsque le Bureau central de dexninage a recommande de proceder a un nouveau dra- gage du chenal. Comme je l'ai deja dit, la com- mission mixte clont le Gouvernement albanais a propose la creation etait parfaitement inutile, et le mandat qu'i! a suggere n'avait aucun sens_ On aurait presque pu penser qu'i! essayait ainsi de gagner du temps, afin de faire disparaitre les prtmves defavorables asa these. On retrouve la meme tactique dans la note albanaise qui insinue, sans aucune preuve, que les mines ont ete mouillees par la Grece. Le Gou- vernement albanaischerchait ainsi, evideUl.lnent a detourner de lui les soupc;ons. ' Le dementi donne par la Grece a deja. ete publie. Je ne dirai donc rien de plus a ce sujet sauf qu'il aurait mieux valu que le Gonverne~ ment albanais s'absunt de formuler cette in- sinuation malveillante dans la note adressee a. mon Gouvernementl, . 11 est, enfin, un dernier point important q ne Je demande au Conseil de securite d'exa:rniner avec beaucoup d'attention. 'Le Conseil consta- tera, en prenant connaissance de la correspon_ dance diplomatique echangee, que le Gouverne_ men~ albanais revendique des droits de propriete specIaux sur les eaux territoriales albanaises meme lorsque ces eaux font partie d'une vo" internationa~e .reliant .deux: .zones de la hau~~ Before I conclude my case, I must for a few minutes refer to certain counter-charges which the Albanian Government has made and may make again before the Security Council. The first such counter-charge is that the pas- sage of our warships through the swept channel was not innocent. This may take two forms. One is that our ships were passing unnecessarily close to the Albanian shore. The answer is easy. They, like all other shipping, must use the swept chan- nel, and the chart shows that the channel hugs the shore. The swept channel has always taken this course since it was first instituted during the war. The Germans originally swept this chan- nel; it was re-swept and kept open by the Allies. It followed its present course because it was known that mine fields existed to the west and, for obvious reasons, it is easier and more eco- nomical to re-sweep a channel formerly swept than to clear a new course through a known mine field. Moreover, navigational reasons have always caused shipping to follow a course close to the Albanian shore. The north-east coast of Corfu is roeky and dangerous and all shipping prefers to hug the well-known landmarks and to proceed in the decp water close to the mainland. Alternatively, the Albanian Government may suggest that our ships' passage was not innocent because their conduct was provocative. That it certainly was not. To start with, there is no secrecy about the movements of our naval squadrons nowadays. Anyone who is interested can know where they are going and why. When they passed through on the first occasion on 15 May, the two cruisers proceeded without stop- ping, in normal passage formation, that is, in line ahead. When they were fired on by Albanian batteries they refrained from returning the fire. After. this epi~ode, express orders were given to those ships not to return through the North Channel, even if this were the most convenient route, so as avoid any possibility of a fresh inci- dent while tempers were still hot. On 22 October our ships were also in normal passage formation proceeding at a speed of ten knots and again they did not stop. As has al- ready been published in the press, their crews were at action stations. In view of the previous shooting, this was an elementary precaution which needs no justification. Action stations are merely a form of defensive alert. Express orders were given that the guns should be trained fore and aft, not pointing towards the shore and not loaded. I might add, as a testimony to the La premiere de ees contre-accusations est que le passage de nos navires de guerre dans le chenal drague n'etait pas un passage innocent. Cette accusation peut s'interpreter de deux manieres: d'une part, on peut dire que nos b~himents navi- guaient plus prcs de la cote albanaise qu'il n'etait necessaire. A cela, il est facile de repondre. Ces batiments, eomme tous les autres navires, de- vaient emprunter le chenal drague, et la carte montre que ce chenal serre le littoral de pres. Depuis le moment OU on l'a etabli, pendant la guerre, le trace de cc chenal est reste le meme. A l'origine, il a ete drague par les Allemands. Les Allies l'ont ensuite drague de nouveau et 1'ont maintenu ouvert a la navigation. La route qu'il suit actuellement a ete choisie parce que l'on savait que des champs de mines se trou- vaient a I'ouest et que, pour des raisons evi- dentes, il est plus facile et plus economique de draguer une seconde fois un chenal qui l'a ete auparavant que cl'en ouvrir un nouveau a travers un champ de mines connu. En outre, des raisons de navigation ont toujours oblige les navires mar- chands a longer de pres le littoral albanais. La cote nord-est de Corfou est rocheuse et dange- reuse, et tous les navires preferent ne pas. s'eloi- gner des amers qu'ils connaissent bien, et faire route en eau profonde en serrant la terre. D'autre part, le Gouvernement albanais pre- tendra peut-etre que le passage de nos navires n'etait pas innocent, car ils se sont eomportes d'une maniere provocante. Ccla ne saurait se soutenir. Tout cl'abord, les mouvements de nos escadres ne sont plus secrets aujourd'hui. Qui- conque le desire peut connaitre leur destination et le but de leurs deplacements. 10rs de leur pre- mier passage, le 15 mai, les deux croiseurs passe- rent sans s'arreter, dans la formation normale en pareil cas, c'est-a-dire en ligne de file. Lorsque les batteries albanaises ouvrirent le feu sur eux, ils s'abstinrent de riposter. A la suite de cet inci- dent, ils ret;;urent ordre expres de ne pas rentrer en empruntant la partie nord du detroit, meme si c'etait la route la plus commode, afin de parer a toute possibilite de nouve! incident tant que les esprits ne se seraient pas calmes. 1e 22 octobre, nos navires, toujours en forma- tion normale, faisaient route a une vitesse de dix nceuds et, cette fois encore, ne stoppcrent pas. Comme on l'a deja appris par la pl'esse, les equi- pages ctaient aux postes de combat. Etant donne que Ies batteries albanaises avaient precedem- ment tire, c'etait la une precaution Clementaire qu'il n'est nul besoin de justifier. L'appel UlL"C postes de combat est simplement la manifestation d'un ctat d'alerte defensive. Les batiments avaient l'ordre expres cl'avoir leurs canons pointes Finally, when the mine-sweeping took place on 12 and 13 November, the independcnt ob- server, Captain Mestre, has testified to the scru- pulous correctness of the conduct of our flotilla. Before I pass on I would like to give my Gov- ernment's assurance to the Council that the object of the passage of our ships both on 15 ~ay and 22 October was to pass by the quickest and ,most convenient route from one place to another. The'sea is a highway for all, and it is for that purpose we use it. The Albanian shoot- ing of 15 May was a complete surprise. I do not suppose that anyone in these ships had a single thought about Albania until the Albanians them- selves opened fire. The Albanian Government has also chosen to accuse us of flying aircraft over their territory in a menacing fashion. We have carefully looked into this charge; it is quite without foundation. We have- no tri-motor aircraft, as they alleged. None of our aircraft carry the marking PK-4. Examination of all the journeys carried out by our aircraft on 22 and 23 October shows that none flew within a dozen miles of Albanian ter- ritory. The map to show the routes flown by our aircraft on these days is tabled as Exhibit XI. 1 It may be, however, that the Albanian Gov- ernment will now allege that there is no such thing as the right of innocent passage; in other words, that the very presence of our ships was contrary to international law unless there had been prior notification and even permission ob- tained through diplomatic channels. This in effect would be a fonn of counter-charge, and the Security Council must consider very care- fully the legal relevance of this unsubstantiatcd charge. A person charged with an offence can- not excuse himself from the charge by alleging that the victim of his crime has himself com- mitted some other legal wrong. To take a simple example: If a policeman in the streets of this or any other city were to shoot the driver of a passing motor, otherwise innocent of crime, it would be no defence for him to allege that the motorist was driving his car in the wrong direc- tion up a one-way street; it would be even more outrageous if the motorist was in fact not driving in 'the wrong direction. In short, the Albanian counter-charge of trespass, even if it were valid, as it is not, does not modify or affect in any way 1 See Official R~cords of the Security Council, Second Year, Supplement No, 6, Annex 15, Exhibit XI. Enfin, lorsque les 12 et 13 novembre, on pro- ceda au dragage des mines, le capitaine Mestl'c, obscrvateur independunt, put attester la parfaite correction de la concluite de notre Ilottille. Avant d'aller plus loin, je tiens a donncr au Conseil, au nom de man Gouvcrncmcnt, l'assu- rance que le passage de nos navircs dans le chenal, aussi bien le 15 mai que le 22 octobre, avait pour but de !cs amener d'un cndrait a un autre par la route la plus rapide et la plus com- mode. La mer est une grand'route a l'usage de tous, et c'est acc titre-la que nous l'utilisons. Le tir des batteries albanaises, le 15 mai, fut pour nous une complete surprise. Je ne crais pas que personnc, a bord de ces navires, ait songc tl l'Albanie avant que les Albanais eux-mcmes ouvrent le feu. Le Gouvernement albanais a cgalemcnt jugc a propos de nous accuser d'envoyer des avions sur- voler le territoire albanais d'une maniere mena- ~ante. Nous avons etudi6 attentivement cette accusation et I'avons trouvee denuee de tout fondement. Contrairement aux allegations du Gouvernement albanais, nous n'avons pas d'avions trimoteurs et aucun de nos appareils ne porte la marque PK-4. De l'enquete a laquelle nous nous sommes !ivres sur les vols executes par nos appareils les 22 et 23 octobre, il ressort I qu'aucun d'eux n'est passe a mains de 12 milles du territoire albanais. Les routes suivies par nos avions pendant les deux jams en question sont indiquees sur la carte qui constitue la piece No XP. Quoi qu'il cn soit, il se peut que le Gouverne- ment albanais prctende maintenant que le droit de passage innoccnt n'cxistc pas; en d'autres termes, que la simple presence de nos navires dans les eaux tcrritorialcs albanaises, fante d'une notification prealable par la voie diplomatique, et meme d'une autori.<;atioll rCl;lIe par la meme voie, etait contraire aux dispositions du droit international. Il s'agirait la, en fait, d'une sorte de contre-accusation, et le Conseil de SeCUl1te doit examiner de tre8 pres si cette accusation sans preuve est juridiqucment valable. Dne per~ sonne accusee d'un delit ne peut se justifier en allegllant que sa victime a, elle-mcme, enfreint la loi d'une autre manit:re. Par exemple, un agent de polict': qui, dans une vill<: que1conqlie, tirerait sur le condllcteur d'une automobile qui n'a com- mis d'autre dclit que ele circultr a contresens dans tine rue asens unique, ne pourrait alh~gucr, pour sa defense, que ce chauffeur violait les rcglemcnts; et son actc rcvctirait une gravite plus gninde encore s'il l"avcrait qu'en fait, le chauffeur n'ctait pas clans son tort. Bre!, la contre-accusation tin GO\1vernement albanais I Voir Proce~-v(Jrbnux offir.iels du Conseil d~ securitJ, DClIXiclllc Annre, Supplt:ll\cnt No 6, AnrH'xe 15, piece No XI. The mine-laying was in any case illegal. The proof is that, if these ships had been merchant ships, as they very well might have been, the same accident would have occurred. The Al- banian Government, which is a party to the Statute on Freedom of Transit of the Barcelona Convention of 1921, presumably does not ques- tion the right of innocent passage by merchant ships, though it is true they have been guilty of shooting at them occasionally. I believe, therefore, that the Security Council will readily recognize that the international law concerning innocent passage has no relevancy to " the decision to be reached in the present charge of illegal mining. That being so, it is hardly necessary for me to argue at any length on the state of international law on thi" subject. That does not mean that my Government is not fully prepared to vindicate its views on the subject. The great majorIty of authoritative writings on international law favour the thesis that war- ships have the right of innocent passage through territorial waters. There is an even stronger con- sensus of opinion in .respect of international straits connecting two parts of the open seas. Among the resolutions of international con- ferences, I would mention, in passing, resolutions in favour of this right passed by the Institute of International Law, Paris, in 1894; by the International Law Association, Vienna, in 1926; and by the Institute of International Law, Stockholm, in 1928; and the so-called "Bases of Discussion Nos. 20 and 21" drawn up by the Preparatory Commission of the Hague Confer- ence for the codification of international law in 1930. The opinions of Governments on this question were last formally obtained in 1928 and 1929 in preparation for the Hague Conference of 1930. Fifteen nations stated their opinion that warships have the right of innocent passage through the territorial waters of another State. Only two, Bulgaria and Latvia, formally denied this. As to international practice, anybody may know the facts. It is sufficient to quote the famous straits of the world. No French warship would, I suppose, think of asking Italian per- mission before passing through the "Straits of Bonifa.cio. No Russian warships depend on the sanction of Denmark or Sweden to enter or leave the" Baltic. In our own case, just before the late war, we decided we should not deny to Japa- nese warships passage through the territorial waters of Hong Kong, on the ground of respect .ne toute manihe, il etait illegal de poser des mrnes. La preuve en est que, si ces navires avaient ete des navires marchands, supposition tres plau- sible, le meme accident serait arrive. Il est a croire que le Gouvernement albanais, qui a ad- here au Statut sur la liberte de transit de la Convention de Barcelone de 1921, ne met pas en doute le droit de passage innocent pour les navires marchands, bien qu'a la verite, il soit coupable d'avoir parfois fait tirer sur eux. Je crois donc que le Conseil de securite recon- nai:tra sans difficuIte que les dispositions du droit international concernant le droit de passage inno- cent n'ont aucun rapport avec la decision a prendre en ce qui concerne la presente accusa- tion de pose illegale de mines. Ceci etant, je ne vois guere la necessite de discuter, meme succinctement, les dispositions du droit international relatives a la question qui nous occupe. Cela ne veut pas dire que mon Gou- vernement ne soit pas tout dispose a de£endre ses vues sur cette question. . La plupart des ouvrages faisant autoriteen matiere de droit international viennent appuyer la these selon laquelle les navires de guerre jouis- sent du droit de passage innocent dans les eaux territoriales. L'opinion generale des specialistes est encore plus categorique en ce qui concerne les detroits internationaux reliant deux zones de haute mer. Parmi les. resolutions adoptees par des confe- rences internationales, je citerai en passant les resolutions votees en faveur de ce droit par l'Ins- titut de droit international, a Paris, en 1894, par l'Association internationale du droit, a Vienne, en 1926, et par l'lnstitut de droit international, a Stockholm, en 1928, ainsi que les documents intitules "Bases de discussions Nos 20 et 21", elabores en 1930 par la Commission preparatoire de la Conference de La Haye, en vue de la codi. fication du droit international. La derniere occasion que l'on ait eue de re- cueillir l'opinion officielle de Gouvernements sur cette question remonte aux annees 1928 et 1929, lors de la preparation de la Conference de La Haye de 1930. Quinze nations declarerent alors qu'a leur avis, les navires de guerre d'un Etat jouissent du droit de passage innocent dans les eaux territoriales d'un autre Etat. Seules, la Bulgarie et la Lettonie refuserent officiellement d'adopter cette maniere de voir. Quant ala coutume internationale, il est facile de savoir a quoi s'en tenir la-dessus. I1 suffit de citeI' les detroits les plus conIms du monde. Je suppose qu'il ne viendrait pas a l'esprit des Fran~ais de demander aux Italiens la permission, pour l'un de leurs navires de guerre, de passeI' par le detroit de Bonifacio. Aucun navire de guerre russe n'a besoin de la permission du Danemark ou de la Suede pour entrer dans la Baltique ou en sortir. En ce qui nous concerne, nous avions decide, juste avant la derniere guerre, So much for international law. But, as I have said before, this issue in no way affects the charge which the Council is now to decide. His Majesty's Government has brought this dispute to the attention of the Council under Article 35 of the Charter because an attempt at settlement through diplomatic correspondence has unfortunately failed. I ask the Council to take into consideration this attempt at settle- ment and to recommend under Article 36 of the Charter settlement of the dispute by direct nego- tiation, after making the finding of fact without which such direct negotiation cannot succeed. I invite the Council to consider also the wider implications of this case, for it must be clear to all that international peace and security cannot be maintained for long where criminal incidents such as those I have described threaten death to innocent men and destruction to property of friendly nations. By Article 2, paragraph 6 of the Charter, the Organization of the United Nations is required to ensure that States which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with the principles of the Charter so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security; I suggest that the Council should retain watchful interest in the negotiations for settlement of this dispute, and furthermore should remind all States that it is incumbent on them to see that their terri- torial waters are free from mines. On the basis of the evidence which I have presented, I submit that the Council should adopt the following conclusions: (1) That an unnotified mine field was laid in the Corfu Straits by the Albanian Government or with its connivance, resulting in serious injury to His Majesty's ships and loss of life and injury to their crews. (2) That the United Kingdom and Alba- nian Governments should settle the dispute between them on the basis of the Council's finding in (1) above, and that, in the event of a failure to settle, either party may apply to the Council for further consideration of the matter. (3) That the Security Council will retain this. dispute .on its agenda until both parties certrfy that It has been settled to their satis- faction. (4) That, since the laying of mines in peacetime without notification is unjustified and an offence against humanity and since it is the duty of Governments to remove promptly mines laid in time of war, the . J'invite le Conseil a considerer aussi les reper- cussions profondes de cette affaire, car il n'y a aucun doute que la paix et la securlte interna- tionales ne pOl,lrraient etre maintenues longtemps si des incidents criminels comme ceux que j'ai mis en lumiere mettent en danger la vie d'etres humains innocents et les biens de nations amies. Aux termes du paragraphe 6 de l'Artiele 2 de la Charte, l'Organisation des Nations Unies doit faire en sorte que les Etats qui ne sont pas Mem- bres des Nations Unies agissent conformemen t aux principes de la Charte dans la mesure neces- saire au maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales. Je suggere que le Conseil suive attentivement la marche des negociations tendant au reglement du present difIerend, et qu'il rap- pelle en outre a tous les Etats qu'illeur incombc de veiller a ce qu'il n'y ait aucune mine dans leurs eaux territoriales. Etant donne les preuves que J"ai soumises J'c C il ' ' propose au onse d adopter les conclusions sui- vantes: 1) Un champ de mines a ete etabli sans avertissement dans le detroit de Corfou par lc Gouvernement albanais, ou de connivencc avec lu~; de ce fait, des navires britanniques ont SUbl de graves avaries, et des membres de 1eurs equipages ont ete tues ou blesses. 2) Les Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni et de l'Albanie reg1eront leur differend entre eux sur la base des conel.usions du Conseil figuranf au paragraphe 1 cl-dessus. Au cas OU eUes n'arriveraient pas a regler ce differend cha- cune des parties pourra demander au Conseil d'examiner de nouveau l'affaire. 3) Le Conseil de securite maintiendra ce differend ~ l'o~dre du jour jusqu'a ce que les deux partIes alent attestc qu'il a ete regIe a leur satisfaction. 4) Etant do;me que le mouillage de mines en temps de palX sans avertissement est injusti- fie et constitue un deIit contre l'humanite et qu'il est du devoir des Gouvernementsdten- lever rapidement les mines mouillees en This concludes my Government's case. It has been very painful for my Government to have to .bring it. But it is necessary for my Govern- ment to see that the lives of innocent mariners of every nationality are protected against clan- destine criminality. I trust the Council will not look at this case as an example of a large country trying to bully a small one. Even small countries are not infallible and must obey the rules of civilization, which lie at the basis of the Charter of the United Nations. I have seen a cartoon in a Yugoslav paper, depicting two Albanian peasants standing on the sea coast, and watching two warships pass- ing by; the caption is "Why did not those ships come when we were fighting the fascists here?" The answer is: "They did". The British Navy took part in countless operations in the Adriatic in 1943 and 1944, and I could produce lengthy accounts of the support it gave to the forces of liberation. It was our forces which, in co-opera- tion with the partisans, liberated Corfu, and Saranda itself in October 1944. It was on Christ- mas Day of the same year-a little more than two years ago-that the Royal Navy gave a Christmas party to 750 Albanian children. Let me assure the Council that the Navy would gladly accept an opportunity to repeat this hos- pitality, provided they can be assured it will not be returned with bullets, shells and mines.

Does anyone wish to speak? If no one else wishes to take part in the debate today, we can continue it tomorrow afternoon at 3 o'clock. The meeting rose at 1 p.m. HUNDRED AND EIGHTH MEETING Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 18 February 1947, at 3 p.m. President: Mr. F. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) . Present; The representatives of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. A representative of Canada also attended the meeting. 62. Provisional agenda (document 5/278) 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. Letter from the Chairman of the Atomic ou l'on a des raisons de supposer la presence de mines. Je termine la l'expose des faits et des arguments presentes par mon Gouvernement. I1 lui a ete tres penible d'etre oblige de saisir le Conseil de cette affaire, mais il est oblige de veiller a ce que la vie d'innocents marins de toutes nationalites soit protegee contre des activites criminelles clandestines.. J'aime it croire que le Conseil ne verra pas dans cette affaire une tentative d'intimidation de la part d'un grand pays it l'egard d'un petit. Les petites nations n'ont pas plus que les autres le monopole de l'infaillibilite, et elles doivent se conformer aux principes de civilisation qui sont it la base de la Charte des Nations Unies. J'ai vu dans un journal yougoslave un dessin humoristique representant deux paysans albanais qui, debout au bordde la mer, regardent passer deux navires de guerre, avec la Iegende: "Pourquoi ces navires ne sont-ils done pas venus au moment ou nous nous battions contre les fascistes?" A ceIa, je reponds: "Ces navires sont venus". La marine britannique, en efIet, a pris part, en 1943 et 1944, a d'innombrables operations dans l'Adriatique, et je pourrais fournir de longs rapports sur l'appui qu'elle a donne aux forces de la liberation. Ce sont les forces britanniques qui, de concert avec les partisans, ont libere Corfou, et Saranda meme, au mois d'octobre 1944. Ce fut le jour de Noel de la meme annee-il y a de cela un peu plus de deux ansque la marine royale britannique a invite 750 enfants albanais a une fete organisee pour eux. Je puis assurer au Conseil qu'elle serait heureuse d'avoir l'occasion de renouveler ce geste, si seulement elle avait l'assurance de ne pas etre payee de retour avec des balles, des obus et des mines. Le PRESIDENT: Personne ne demande la parole? Si personne ne desire plus intervenir aujourd'hui dans le debat, nous pourrions le poursuivre demain a 15 heures. La seance est levee cl 13 heures. CENT-HUI1'IEME SEANCE Tenue aLake Success, N ew-Yark, le mardi 18 jevrier 1947, a15 heures. President: M. F. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique) . Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, France, Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. Le representant du Canada assistait egalement ala seance. 62. Ordre du jour provisoire (document 5/278) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Lettre en date du 31 decembre 1946 adressee