S/PV.1095 Security Council

In aooordanoe with previour deoirionr taken by the Seourity Counoil, 1 shsll Invite the representativer of Cyprur, Turkey and Grssoe to partioipate in our oonsideration of the question. 1. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’anglalr): Conform&- ment B la d6oirion prire ant6rleunment par le Conseil, j’invite les rsprbrentants de Chypre, de la Turquie et ds la QrBoe B partioiper A nos d6libG I*&ons. Sur J’invitatfon du Prt?sident, M. S. Kyprianou (Chyprw), M, T. Menemenoioglu (Turquie) et M. D. S. Bitsios (Grèce) prennent place à Ja table du Conseil. A t the invitafion of tJ]e President, Mr. S. Kyprianou (Cyprus), Mr. T. Menemenoioglu (Turkey) and Mr. D. S. Bit&os (Greeos) took plaoes at the CounoiJ table. 2. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’anglais): Le Conseil va maintenant aborder l’exnmen de la question qui figure A son ordre du jour. Le premier orateur inscrit sur mn llste est le repAsentant du Royaume- Uni.

The Council will now proooerl to con~icler the question on ile agendn. The first speaker insorlbed on my Iist for thie rineeting is the rQresentntive of the Unlted Kingdom, on whom 1 now Wll. 3. 1 oall on the representative of the Soviet Union 011 B point of order. 3. Je donne dPabord la parole au repr6oentant de l’Unlon 8oviOtlque pour une motion d’ordre. 6. In the Seourity Counoil~s agenda as adopted at yesterday’s meeting, the eaaenoe of the item being oonsidered by the Counoil is formulated as follows: “Letter dated 26 Deoember 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the Preeident of the Seourity Counoil (5/6488).” This wording of the agenda for the Counoil’e meeting is entirely oorreot and in full accord with the oonolusion stated by the President of the Seourity Counoil in Deoember of last year when the Seourity Cour1011 for the firsi time oonsidered the question raised by Cyprus [ 1086th meeting], Allow me to quote the words whioh the President of the Seourity Counoil, the representative of the United States, then used in oloeing the meeting: “We have now heard statementsfromtheinterested parties, a8 well as oertain assuranoes. 1 suppose that the members of the Counoil may well wish to oonsider the statements that we have heard tonight. 1 would therefore euggest, if the members of the Counoil agres, that we adjourn the meeting. The Counoll wotild then be reoonvened, on oonsultation by the President, when and if it is oonetdered appropriate by the membere.‘. (1086th meeting, para. 94.) 8. Therefore, Mr. Preeident, the wording of the Counoil’s agenda adopted yesterday and retained today properly refleots the faot that the Counoil hae resumed oonsideration of a mntter whioh it had already disouesed at its 1086th meeting in Deoember 1963. The wording 1s proper in terms of both form and substanoe, beoause to our knowledge no one, Inoluding the representative of the United Kingdom, intends to raise in the Council any issue other than that whioh we disousssd in Deoember. 7. As you know, after the Seourity Counoil meeting of 27 Deoember 1963, Mr. Roseides, the representative of Cyprue, in a letter dated 2 January 1964 addreesed to the President of the Seourity Counoil, drew attention to “a new situation involving a grave menaoe to the existenoe and the integrity of the Republia of Cyprus” and stated that “oonsequently a meeting of the Seourity Counoil le neoessary in order to proteot a Member State from aggression and prevent a further deterloratlon of the situation” [5/6602]. u 8. A meeting of the Seourity Cour1011 was not oalled at that time, aimply beoaure of the assuranoes given by oertain Powero that they would do their utmoet to find a solution aoceptable to Cyprus. It was at that time thnt the so-called London Conference WRS beld and efforts, or rather pressures, wore exerted by the NATO Powers-but we a11 know how these rnanwuvres ended. Q, Ao we aee from the letter of 16 February frotn the Permnnent Representative of Cyprus to the President of the Council [S/SSSO],L/ Mr. Roseides hdd on 14 Februnry alerted the President of the Security ‘1 Ofllc~sl Itocords of the Swxt’lty tiuncll, Nineteenth Ycar, Supplement for .lonwry. r’ebrcary ond Morch 1961. 7. Comme on le sait, aprbs la r4union du Conseil de s6ouritB du 27 d&embre 1963. M. Roseides. le repr6sentant de Chypre, dans un8 lettre adre&be le 2 janvier 1964 au Pr6sident du Conseil de sburitb, a sOulign0 qu’il s’est or68 “une sltuation nouvelle qui menaoe gravement l’existenoe et l%t+ltb de la Republique de Chypre . . . . C*ent pourquoi il faut que le Conseil de sbourit6 se rbunisse pour protbger un Etat Membre contre une agression et emp&cher une nouvelle dbtbrioratlon de la situationa [S/6602u]. 8. Si lc Conrell de sbcurltb n’a pas btb oonvoqu6 .h ce moment-& o’ent tout simplement pame que uertaines puissances ont don& hmmnoe qu’elles feraient tout pour trouver une solutlon aooeptable pour Chypre. On sait qu’A la m6me @oque a ttu lieu 10 VonfBrence de Londres” et que des gouvernements de pays membres de IlOTAN ont olors d8ploy6 des efforts et exerce dee pressions; au reste, nul n’ignnore comment ces manœuvres se sont termin02s. 9. Ainsi qu’il ressort de la lettre adressoe le 16 fevrier nu PrBsident du Conseil par le repr6sentant permanent de Chypre [5/565Ou], M. Rossidee avait, d8s le 14 fevrier, prlB le PrBsident du Conseil de 11. Si, dans oes oonditions, le Royaume-Uni, pour des raisons qui le regardent, a d6oid6 de foroer les 6v6nemonts et de demander lui-m6me la oonvooation du Conseil de sbouritb et si, par suite de oertaines manœuvres, la oommunication de son representant permanent [S/6643.lJ porte maintenant une oote antbrieure, oela ne ohange rien au fond de l%ffalre. La question a 6t6 soumise au Conseil par Chypre dAr le mois de dbosmbre. Il EtagIt d’une menaoe A la libertb, A l’indbpendanoe et A ltint6grit6 territoriale de Chypre et non d’un autre ?Bat. Comme on le volt d%prAs le oompte rendu de la lOR%me s6anoe et d’aprbs le libell6 de l’ordre du four de notre rbunion, le Conseil de s6ourit6 se r6unit aujourd’hui pour poursuivre Vexamon d’une question antbrieure et non d’un problAme nouveau. 12. Par oon&quent, de l’avis de la d616gatlon sovi6- tique, il faut Qvidemment donner la parole en premier lieu au pays qui a demandb au Conseil de sbourit6 de le protbger oontre une menaoe ext6rieure et put voudrait exposer au Conseil des donntes nouvelles sur oette menaoe croissante oontre son ind6pendanoe, son lnt6grit6 territoriale et sa souverainet6. 13. A cette reprise des travaux du Conseil de s6ourit6, M. Kyprianou, le Ministre des affaires 6trangAres de la Rbnubliaue de Chyme. est venu A New York. Le devoir des membras‘ du.Conseil de stourit6 est d%ntendxe tout d’abord le Ministre des affaires btrangbres de la Rbpubllque de Chypre, qui, pour la premibre fois, prend part A nos travawt, attendu qu’il est de la plus grande importanoe pour la suite de notre disousaion de savoir, dbs le d6but, quelles sont les mesures.ooncrAtes que le Prbrident et le Gouvernement de Chypre attendent pr6ois6ment du Conseil, 14. Y a-t-il dono un pays qui ooit plus Intbrerol que la Rbpublique de Chypre elle-m6me A la question que nous disoutons? Y a-t-il un gouvernement qui soit davantage fond6 que le Gouvernement de Chypre A 6tre entendu en premier lieu par le Conseil? 15. Pour les raisono que je viens d’e]P>Oser, je vous demande Instamment, Monsieur le Prbrldent, de donner d’abord la prrole,Anotmr6anoedtau)ourdthui, A M. Kyprianou, le Ministre des affairer 6trang6rer de la Rbpublique de Chypre: apr6s quoi, oela va ranr dire, nous pourrons entendre 6galement sir Patriok 12. In these cL~oumstanoe8, the Soviet delegation believes that the right to speak first should naturally be given to the oountry whloh appealed to the Seourity Counoil to proteot it from an external threat and whioh would like to put before the Seourity Counoil new faots oonoerning the growing threat to its independenoe, territorial integrity and sovereignty. 13. At this reoonvenedmeetingof theSeourityCounoi1 we have with us Mr. Kyprianou, the Mlnlster for Fore1 duty, tr Affaire of the Republio of Cyprus. It is our e duty of the members of the Seourity Counoil, to hear first the Minister for Foreign Affaire of that Republic, who is partioipatingintheCounoik~sdeliberations for the first time, beoause for our further disoussions it is most important thet we rhould know at the outset what oonorete aotion ie expeoted of the Counoil by the Government of Cyprus and its Prasident. 14. 1s there any other oountry whioh le more deeply oonoerned with the question we are oonsiderlng than the Republio of Cyprus itself? And har any Qovernment more ground than that of Cyprus to be heard firrt by the Counoll? 16. For the reasons 1 bave adduoed, Mr. Prcstdent, 1 should Iike to malce a speoial reauest that at our present meeting you rhoÜld cal1 -firot upon Mr. Kyprisnou, tho Mlnirter for Foreiun Affaira of Cvorus. after whioh, of oourse, the floormay be given-to thé Permanent Representative of the United Kingclom, Sir Patrick Dean. 16. Any other deoisfon would be a totally unjustified breaoh of the Seourity Council~~ estnblished proocdure and of the elementary aorms of diplomntic courtesy. Dean, le reprAsentant permanent du Royaume-Uni. 16. Toute autre d0cision constituerait une violation totalement injustlfiAe de l’ordre du travail Atabli au Coneeil de eAcuritA et de8 normes AiAmentnires de 10 oourtoisie diplomatique. 17. We entirely support the position, taken in tbe letter of the Permanent ReDxw6entatiVe of Cv~rue nddreaeed to the President of the Seourlty C&cil [S/6660], that in view of the uraenov of the reouest of the Republio of Cyprus it shoÜld &ke priority over the request for an early meeting by the representatlve 17. NO~ nppuyone entiArement le point de vue exposA dnns In lettre adrestz.Ae par le reprAsentant permanent de Chypre au PrAsident du Conseil de sAouritA [S/GL>GO], A snvoir qu’en raison de l%ngenoe de an demande celle-ci doit nvolr prIoritA .sur la requ6te du I’eprAEIentant du Royaume-Uni tendant A oe que 18. The flrst member of the Counoll who slgnlfled a deslro to speak in tbis debate, in thls meeting of the Counoll, was the representatlve of the Unlted Klngdom, and that 1s why 1 oalled on hlm first. 20. 1 am, of oourse, in the hands of the Counoll. If the representatlve of the Soviet Union has made a forma1 proposa& 1 wlll be very glad to put lt to the Counoil for deolslon lmmedlately. 21. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Soolallst Republics) (translated from Ruselan)! We have expressed our vlews on thls subjeot and would llke to hear the opinion of other members of the Seourlty Counoll. The forma1 oonslderatlons stemming from the provlelonal rules of prooedure of the Seourity Counoll to whioh the Presldent referred us were of oourse no seoret to us. That le the forma1 aide of the matter. 22. Referenoes to prooedure or to the prooedural aspeot do not dispose of the question. What we have in mind le not the forma1 aspeot but the eubstanoe of the item whloh fs on the Counofl’s agenda and whioh we must examine. This question was ralsed by the Qovernment of Cyprus snd lt le therefore qultenatural that we ahould hear the repreoentatlve of that oountry, and that others should not, as the Russlan expression gges, try to “push ahead of fatherw. 23. There 1s aleo another aspeot of the matter to whloh 1 should llke todraw ycru attention. 1 am thlnklug of the ethioal aspect. We are all fully aware of the prestige and prlvllegee enfoyed among dlplomats by representatlves of hlgher, rank and partloularly by Mlnlaters for Forelgn Affaire. 1 need hardlyexpatlate on thls tradltlonal praotloe, wlth whloh our Brltlsh oolleagues ehould, of a11 people, be well aoqualnted. 1 belleve lt le a matter of honour for a dlylomat, on grounds of polltloal and dlplomatlo tact. to yleld to romeone senior in rank-in thls oase the representatlve of Cyprus, that oountry’s Mlnlster for Forelgn Affaire. 1 thlnk that 1s how any one of us wouId aot.

1 oall on iilu I epresentntlve of tbe Unlted Klngdom to spenk on tbe point of order ralsed by the ropresentative of the Soviet Union.

1 bave listened very onrefully to what tbe representotive of the Soviet Union rrald in support 00 hls proposa1 that the Pore@ Mini&er of Cyprus should be cnlled upon to spenk first in our current clebnte on the agenda whlch the Counoll brio Just adopte& ment est r6dlg6 dana ces termes: “Le PrBsldent donne la parole aux reprbsentants dans I’ordre OP 11s l’ont demand6e.’ 18. Le premier des membres du Conseil qui att demand6 R prendre la parole dans le d6bat d’aujourd’hui est le repr6sentant du Royaume-Uni, et olest pourquoi je lui ai donnb la parole en premier. 20. Bien entendu, je me oonformeral A la d6olslon du Conseil et, si le repr6sentant de lXJnlonsovl&lque entend formuler une proposition enbonne et due forme, je suis pr6t A la soumettre lmm6dlatement auConseil. 21. M. FEDCRENKO (Union des RBpubllques sooia- U;tes sovl&lques) [traduit du russe]: Nous avons expos6 notre point de vue A oe sujet et nous voudrions entendre l’opinion des autres membres du Consell de s6ourlt6. Vous aves lnvoqu6, Monsieur le Pr6sldent, des oonsld6rattons d’ordre purement formel qui trouvent leur expression dans le r6glement lntirleur provisoire du Conseil, et que nous connaissons fort bien. C’est IA l’aspeot formel de la question. 22. Toutefois, reoourlr A la proobdure, ou bvoquer les aspeots de l’affaire qui touchent A la prooedure, oe n’est pas r6soudre le probl6me. Il s’agit 101 non pas de proo6dure, mais du fond de la question qui figure A l’ordre du four du Conseil et que noun devons examiner. Cette question a 6t6 pr6sent6e par le Ciouvernement de Chypre, et o’eat pourquoi 11 est tout A fait ‘normal que nous entendions le repr6sentant de oe pays; pour paraphraser un diaton russe, 1I vaut mie& ne pas oheroher A passer avant son p6re. 23. Je vnudrala souligner un autre aspeot de la question, A savoir son aspot moral. Nous savons tous le prestige, les prlvllbgee dont fouissent, psrml les diplomates, les reprbuentants de rang 6lev6 et, notamment, les ministres des affaires btrang6res. Je n’ai certainement par besoin d’insister davantage sur des usages traditionnels que nos 00116gues anglais doivent oonrfaftre mieux uue sufoonque. pour un diplomate, olest une affaire d’honneur; une question de taot politique et dlplomatlque, que d’aooorder la priorlt6 A celui qui oooupe le rang le plus 6lev6, o’est-A-dire, en l’ooourrenoe, le reprbsentant de Chypre, mlnlstre des affaires dtrang6res. Je ponso que ohaoun d’entre nous aglralt de la sorte. 24. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de I*onglals): Je donne la parole au repr6sentnnt du Royaume-Uni sur la motion d’ordre que vient de pr&entor le reprBsentan! de l’Union sovl6tlque. 26. Sir Patrick DEAN (Royaume-Uni) [traduit de I’unglnis]: J’ai 6cout6 avec beaucoup d’ottentlon ce que vient de dire le repr6sentnnt de 1Wnlon sovi6- tique pour appuyer sn proposition tendant A ce que le Ministre dea affaires BtrangBros de Chypre prenne In pnrole en premier nu sujet de la question lnacrlte A l’ordre du jour que le Conaeil vient d’adopter. 27. Naturally, 1 do not dispute for one moment the rlght of the Foreign Minister of Cyprustoaddress tbe Counoil when the time cornes. K hope that he will believe that 1 am not guflty of any disoourtesy in asking to exerclse my rlght to speak flrst. On this oooaslon 1 have a statement whioh 1 should like to make to WI Counoil and, wlthout in any way showing disocurtesy to the non-members of the Counoil who bave been invited to ait here today, 1 ehould like to exeroise my privilege and make my statement flrst. Therefore, with your permission, Mr. President, 1 shquld like to make my ststement. a& The PRESIDENTr 1 assume that there le no formal proposa1 before the Counoil, and lt le therefore my intention to oomply with rule 37 and oall on the representative of the United Kingdom. However, I shall first oall on the representatlve of Czeohoslovakia to speak on the point of order raisedby the representative of the Soviet Union.

1 should like to draw the attention of the President and other members of the Seourity Counoll to another oiroumstanoe wbioh, in my delegationts view, militates in favour of thé proposa1 made by the representative of the Soviet Union. The present meeting was oalled at the request of the representatlve of Cyprus, a request whioh we reoeived on Saturday, 15 February. It will be remembered that, in the oonversations whioh the President held wlth Counoil members regarding that request, its urgenoy was aoknowledged by us all. Now, it was on the basis of those oonversatlons and in li&t of the urgenoy of the requeet that the President deoided, on Saturdayafternoon, 16 February to oall the Seourlty Cwnoil meeting for Monday afternoon 17 February, unless in +he meantlme events neoessltated the oonvening of the meeting at an earlier date. Thus the meeting oalled for yesterday, Monday, waa adjourned to today. There oan be no doubt at ell on this soore: this is a meeting whioh was oonvened at the request of the Covernment of Cyprus on a question whioh had been brou@ before the Counoll by the representative of Cyprus in Deoember 1983. 30. The letter in whioh the reprerentative of Cyprus urgently requested the oonvening of this meeting oontains a paragraph 6 whloh 1 take the liberty of drawlng to your attention. 1 bm referring to dooument S/6660 of 17 Februnry 1964. The representatlve of Cyprue, at the snme time a8 he requeete the ur-;ent oonvenlng of this meeting, nsks that hi8 request rlhould reoelve priority over the request of the United Kingdom representative ond thot hle delegntlon’s etatement should lave prlority nt the opening of the discusoion on thc urgent matter before tbe Council. 31. 1 therefora believe that, before rule 27 ici striotly applied, a deoision should be taken on the roque& for prlority made by the representative of Cyprus when 31. Je crois donc qu’nvnnt d’appliquer striotement l’article 27 11 fnudrnit prendre une d6cieton nu eujet de la domnnde de priorit0 qui aetbfaite par le repr13- 94. Repreeentatives here will be well aware that untll 16 Auguet 1960 Cyprus was a British Crown Colony. They will be equally well aware that the laet four yeure of Brltieh rule were marked by a dispute whioh waa only ended on the signature in February 1969 of the Agreekente of Zurloh &d London regnrdingthe establiehment of the Cyprus Republio. I‘ehould like to ouote the followinn memorandum whloh was eitzned in &mdon on 19 February 1959 by the Prime Mi%aters of the United Kingdom of Clreat Britain and Northern Ireland, of the Kingdom of Qreeoe and of the Turkieh Republlo. There three Prime Mlnieters: ” *.< “Takin note of the deolaration by the repreeentative f o the Greek-Cypriot oommunity and the reprerentative of the Turkish-Cypriot oommunity that they aooept the dooumente annexed to this memorandum ae the agreed foundation for the final 6 % lement 0: the problem of Cyprus, Wereby adopt, on bebalf of tbeir reepeotive Governmentr the dooumente annexed to thlr memorandum and lirtd belw, a8 the agreed foundation for the final rettlement of the problem of Cyprt~r.~l/ 96. Among the dooumentr annexed are one entltled *The Bado Struoture of the Republio of CyprurW and s2e;by “Treaty of Guarantee” to whioh 1 &a11 36. A further eighteen months of detailed negotiations led to the trnnsfer of pcwer by Britnin ancl to tbe estnblishment of the Republio of Cyprua on 1GAugust 1960, Among the documents wns a Trenty of Guarantee oonoluded between the 8ame four parties, tbnt is to sny the United Kingdom, Qreece, Turltey nnd the Ropublio of Cyprus. It is tbis Treaty of Guarnntee, signed in Niooeia on 16 Auguet 19GO nnd whioh entered into foroe on tbe snme date, which hns enguged tbe United Kingdom, Turkey nncl Greece in present cvente in 2/ C.~nf~ren~~ on Cyprus, Miscollnncous No. 4 (IY59), Çmnct. 670, 1I.M. Stnrionery Office, London. “Prenant aote de la dtolaration du repr0sentant de la oommlmautb ohypriote grecque et du reprb sentant de la oommunaut6 ohypriote turque, par laquelle ils aooeptent oomme base du r8glement final du problbme de Chypre ler dooumenta annexds au prbsent mbmorandum, @Adoptent, au nom de leurs gouvernements reapeotifs, les documenta annexbe au prbeent mdmorandum, dont la Ilote eut don& oi-deaaoua, oomme bare du rbglsment final du problbme de Chypreg.” 35. Parmi les doouments annex6s, l’un r’intitule Wruoture de bare de la République de Chypre” et un autre, sur lequel je reviendrai par la suite, *Trait4 de garantie”. 36. Dix-huit mois de n6gooiations serr6es ont abouti, le 16 aofit 1960, au transfert dee pouvoirs par la Qrnnde-Bretagne et R 1Wnbliesement de la RBpublique de Chvme. Parmi leo documents annex0e nu mernornnduk se trouvait le Trait.6 de garantie conclu entre les auatrs nnrtieo. c’est-h-dire le Royaume-Uni, la G&e, la Turquie. et la Republique de Chypre. C’est en vartu du Troit6 de garantie, sign6 tl Nicosia le 10 ao&t lP60 et entr6 en vi@.~eur h In m8me dnte, que le Royaume-Uni, la Tulqule et la OrBce 80 in~6Rralt3mBn~ OU pfirtk2bmWn~ h BUOUUc Union Politiquë ou eoonomi&e aveo quelque Etat que oesoit” et elle deolarait interdite “toute aotivit8 de nature & favoriser direotement ou indireotement aussi bien l’union aveo tout autre Etat que le partage de 1’Ple”. 39, In artiole II of the Treaty of Uuarantee the other three High Contraoting Parties-Qreeoe, Turkey and the United Kingdom-took “note of the undertakings of the Republio Of Cyprus set out in Artiole I”-that is, the artioir whioh-i have just quoted-and expreesly reoognieed and guaranteed “the indapendenoe, territorial integrity and seourity of the Repub!io of Cyprus, and aluo the state of affaira established by the Basie Arkioles of its Constitution”. 39. Dans l’artiole II du Traite de garantie, les trois autres Parties oontraotsntee - B savoir la QrBoe, le Royaume-Uni et la Turquie - prenaient aote ‘*des engagements de la Republique de Chypre &ablis dans l’ar#ole I”, olest-A-dire l’artiole que je viene de oiter, et reoonnaiasaient et garantissaient formellement nltind6pendanoe, 1’intAgrltA territoriale et la eAouritA de la RBpublique de Chypre, ainsi que l’ordre de ohoecs Etabli par les artiolee fcndamentaux de sa oonstitution~. 40. L’artiole IV du Trait6 de garantie prAvoit que: 40. Artiole IV of the Treaty of Quarantee protides that: “In the event of a breaoh of the provisions of the preeent Treaty, CWeeoe, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to oonsult together with respeot to the representations or measures neoeseary to ensure obsarvanoe of thoee provieions.” The artiole Lves on: “In Bo far as oommon or oonoerted aotion may not prove poesible, eaoh of the three guaranteeing Powers reeerves the right to take aotion with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affnirs oreated by the preeent Treaty.” 41. SO muoh for the legal and historioal baokground. My purpose in desoribing it at suoh length has been to demonstrate that the baslo artloles of theConstitution of Cyprus and the provIsions for their msin&nsnoaby Turkey, Qreeoe and the United Kfngdom, as well as by the Qovernment of Cyprus, are inextrioably linked in tho settlement which led to the indapendanoa of Cyprus. The Trenty of Gunrnntee 1s of partioulnr importnnce as the linohpin, as it were, of this oomplionted settle+ 3ut. Tho reprosentutives will hnve noted, 1 am sure, that the Treaty of Guaruntee bears upon “the state of tifdire eetablished by the Uasio Articles of” tbe Constitution of Cyprus. Tbese basic artioles, wbicb are llsted in aunex III to tbe ConsMition,Y are net subject to nmendrnont whetber by way *En oaa de vioiation des dispositions du prbsent Traite, la QrBoe, le Royaume-Uni et la Truquie s’engagent A se oonoerter en vue des dbmarohes ou mesures n6oeesalres pour en ansurerl’observation.” LIaMole poursuit: “Dans la mesure oh une aotion oommub ou oonoertAe ne s*avArsrait pas poosible, ohaoune des trois Puissanoes garanten se r6serve le droit d’agir dans le but exolurlf du r&ablissement de l’ordre or86 par le présent Trait&” 41. VoilA pour l’aspeot historique et juridique de la question. Si je me suis (tendu sur oet arpsot dr la question, o’est afin de montrer que les artioles fondamentaux de la Constttutton de Chypre et les dispoeitions garantissant leur respeot par la Turquie, la GrAoe et le Royaume-Uni, ainai que par la Gouvernement de Chypre, acnt indissolublement 116~~ dune l’aoocrd qui a abouti A l’indbpandonoe de Cbypro. Le Trait6 de garnntie est, si l’on peut dire, la ohoville ouvriers de cet aooord oompllqub. Les ropr6sentants aut<onL not6, j’en suis eQr, que le TraItcJ de garnntle porte eur l’ordre do ohoeoe &abli pur loa artioles foiidamontnux” de la Constitution de Chypre. Ces artiolos foiidamentaux, qui sont Bnumbrbs A l’nnnexe III de la Constitution-/, ne peuvent Otre ni modIfiAa, -- 3/ Unltcd ktl011B. Trenty SerIet,, vol. 3uZ (196O), No. 5475. a/ N~u P onu Unloa, ItecuoIl dy ‘I’roltbu, vol. 382, 1960, No $475. 42. It had been the hope of a11 partie8 oonoerned that the Constitution of Cyprus would provide an instrument whioh would enable the lwo oommunities to sink their prevlous differenoes in a oommon conoern for the future of Cyprus and to work harmoniously together towards this end. Unfortunately, this ha8 not proved to be the oase. Tension between the oommunltics in Cyprus mounted steadily in the laet months of 1963 and, after a number of inoidents on 21 Deoember in that year, serious inter-oommunal fighting broke out. in the island. After unilateral appeala by my Qovernment to the lwo sides in Cynrus to stoa the oonfliot had failed, on 24 Deoember 1963, the Governments of the Unitod Kingdom. Greeoe and Turkey iseued an appeal to the Cyprus Government and an iffer of good offioee in the following terms: “The British, Greek ancl Turkish Governments, as signatories of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, jointly appeal to the Qovernment of Cyprus and to the Greek cnd Turkish oommunities in the island to put an end to the present disorders. They appeal to the Cyprue Government to fix a suitable hour this evening for a oease-fire and to oall upon both oommunities to observe it. “The three Gcvernments, mindful of the rule of law, further offer tteir joint good offioee with a view to helping to resolve the difficulties whioh have given rise to the present situation.~~ 43. When on 25 Deoembor it beoame apparent that the situation was oontinuing to deteriorate, the three guaranteeing Qovernments informed the Government of Cyprus-inoluding both the Greek and Turkieh elemente-of their readrness to aasist, if invited to do SO, in restoring peaoe and order by meane of a joint peaoe-making foroe under Brit\ah oommand and oompoeed of the forces of the United Kingdom, already etationed in Cyprue by virtue of the Treaty of Establiehment between the United Kingdom, Greeoe, Turkey and Cyprue, and of the foroee of Greeoe and Turkey under the Treaty of Alliance behveen Greeoe, Turkey and Cyprus. 44. The aooeptanoe of this offer by the Cyprue Qovernment waa announoed in a communiqu6 iseued on 26 Deoember as followe: “The Government of the Republic of Cyprur ha8 aooepted an offer that the foroee of theunited Kingdom, Qreeoe and Turkey etationed in Cyprue and plaoed under British oommand, ehould aeeiet lt in !ts efforts to secure the pressrvation of the oeasefire and the restoration of peace.” 45. Tbe joint pence-making force wae nccordlngly estnbllshed under the command of Mujor-Canera1 Young, who was the Commander of the Cyprus district. On 28 Decbmber, tbe Secrstary of State for Commonwaalth Affalrs of thc Unlted Kingdom Govornmant, Mr. Duncan Sandys, flew to Cyprus to dIscusa lhe situation on tbe spot with members of tbe Cyprus Govemment-including nlemonts of botb the Greek Cyprloto and ‘i’urlcisb Cyprlots nnd representatives of the Greek and Turklsh Qovernments in Cyprus. On 29 Decembor a Polltlcnl Liaison Committee consistlng 42. Toutes les partie8 int6re886ee avaient eep6r6 qut la Constitution ohypriote serait l~inetrument qui permettrait aux deux oommunaut68 de surmonter leurs divergenoeo anterieures et, dans Pi&&& oommun, de oollaborer ensemble harmonieusement B l’avenir du pays, Tel n’a, malheureusement, pae et6 le oas. La tension entre le8 deux oommunaut6e de Chypre n’a fait qu’augmenter au oours des derniers mois de 1963 et, Ii la suite de p’usieurs inoidents survenus le 21 d6oembre de la m6me annbe, des 6meuteo graves ont Bolat6 entre le8 deux oommunaut68. Les appela adress68 de fapon utilathle par mon gouvernement aux deux parties afin qu’elles mettent un terme au oonflit Btant demeur6e sans effet, les Qouvenements britannique, greo et turo ont lano4, le 24 d6oembre 1963, un appel au Gouvernement ohypriote et lui ont offe:t leurs bon8 offioes dans les termes suivants: “Le8 Gouvernement8 britannique, greo et turo, en tant que signataires du Trait6 de garantie de 1960, conjurent oonjointement le Gouvernement ohypriote et les oommunaut68 greoque et turque de 1’ fie de mettre fin aux d68ordres aotuels. Ils prient instamment le Gouvernement chypriote de fixer oe soir m6me une heure oonvenable pour un oessee-le-feu et de presser le8 deux oommunaut68 de le respeoter. “Les trois gouvernements, soucieux de faire observer la primaut du droit, offrent Agalement leurs bons offioes en vue d’aider B r6gler les diffioult6s qui ont engendre la situation aotuelle.” 43. Lorsqu’il eet devenu manifeste, le 26 dboembre, que la situation B Chypre oontinuait h s’aggraver, les Gouvernemente britannique, greo et turo ont inform6 le Gouvernement ohypriote (tant ses membres greos que 88s membre8 turos) qu’ils Btaient dispos&, s’il8 y Btaient invit&, A aider B restaurer la paix et l’ordre grgoe R une foroe oommune pour le maintien de la oaix Dlao6e 80~8 oommandement britanniaue et oom- &s4e des foroes du Royaume-Uni deja en’garnieon a Chypre en vertu du Trait6 relatif R la or6ation de la RBpublique de Chypre auquel etaient parties le Royaume-Uni, la Qrboe, la Turouie rt Chynre. et des foroes greoquee et turque8 pr&use par le-Trait6 d’alliance signe par la Greoe, la Turquie et Chypre. 44. Un oommunlqu6 pub116 le 26 d6oembre a annonob l’aooeptatlon de oette offre par le Gouvernement ohypriote dans le8 terme8 suivants: “Le Gouvernement de la R6publique de Chypre a aooept6 l’offre qui lui a Bt6 faite que les foroer du Royaume-Uni, de la Qrboe et de la Turquie en garnison a Chypre et plao6ee BOUS oommandemant britannique l’aident dans aes efforts et1 vue d’acsurer l’observation du cessez-le-feu et de rstal:!** la paix.” 46. En oonssquonce, In force commune pour 10 maintien de la paix a Bt6 Etablie sou8 le oommnnclement du gén6ral Young, commandant du district de Chypre, Le 2.8 d#zembre, M. Dunoan Sandys. seor6talred~Etat aux affnires du Commonwealth &I .Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, s’est rendu par avion h Chypre afin de discuter sur plaoede la eltuntion avec des membres du Gouvernement chypriote - tant grecs que turos - et des repr6sentnnts A Chypre des Gouvernements grec et turc. Le 29 decembre, un oomit de llnison politlqus oompos6 du Haut Commlssnlre du Roynume- 46. D’autres entretiens qui ont eu lieu R Nbosia ont permis d’aboutir B un aooord sur la r&nton d’une oonfbrenoe qut se tfendra proohainement et tentera de r6gler les riiffioult6e qui ont provoqu6 la eituatton aotuelle. Cela a 6tB annono6 le 2 janvier par M. Dunoan Sandys dans les termes oi-aprbs: 46. Followlng further dieoueelona m Nlooela, agreement was reaohed on the holdlng of a oonferenoe to rssolve the diffloulties whioh had given rlee to the preeent situation. Thle was announoed on 2 January in a slntement by Mr. Dunoan Sandys aa follows: “1 have tonight reoeived from Arohbishop Makarios and Dr, KUqUk their aooeptanoe of the offer of good cffioes of the British, Qreek and Turkish Governments to help In the solution of the problem of Cyprus. For this purpose, a conferenoe of repreeentatives of these three Qovernments and of the two oomml litles ~111 be oonveued in London at an early date. “J’ai reçu 08 soir de l’arohev8que Malcarlos et de M. KUçUk leur aooeptatlon de l’offre de bons offioee faite par les Qouvernemente britannique, greo et turo pour aider B rbgler le problbme de Chypre. A oet effet, une oonf6renoe groupant des reprbsentants de oes trois gouvernements et dee deux oommunautis se tiendra A Londres dans un proohe avenlr. “After the opening plenary session, a working oommittee will be formed, oompoeed of representatives of the two Cyprlot oommunities, with n ohairman appointed by the British Qovernment, and will report from time to time to the plenary oonferenoe.” “AprBe la s&noe pl&ni&e d’ouverture, il sera oonstitu6 un oomit de travail oompos8 de repr& sentant8 des deux oommunaut6s ohypriotes et d’un prbeident d8eign6 par le Qouvernement britannique. Ce oomit fera rapport de temps B autre & la oonfhrenoe p16ni8re.1’ 4’7. Dr. KUçUk, as 1 am sure my oolleaguee are aware, 1s the Vioc-President of Cyprus and the leader of the Turkish Cypriot oommunity. 47. Aine1 que mes ooll@uee le savent certainement, M. KUçUk est le Vtoe-PrBeident de Chypre et le ohef de la oommunaut6 ohypriote turque. 48. Meanwhile, the Qovernments of the Unit& Kingdom, Qreeoe, Turkey and Cyprus Jointly requested the Seoretary-Qeneral of the United Nations to appoint a representntlve to act as a United Nations observer in Ç:;prue, whoee role would be to observe the progress of ihe peaoe-making operation, and report on it to the Seoretary-Qeneral. 48. Dans l’intervalle, les Qouvernements britannique, greo, turo et obyprlote ont demande oonjointement au Seor&aire gWra1 de l’Organisation des Nations Unies de nommer en qualit d’observateur des Nations Unies 8 Chypre un repr&santant dont le rble serait de sutvre les progr8s des op&atione de maintien de la paix et d’en rendre compte au Seor&aire g6n6ral. 49. My Government lnformed thls Cou11011 of the eituation up to this point in a letter dated 6 January 1964, from the aoting Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the President of the Seourity Counoll for that month, whioh was oiroulated as a Councll dooument [!3/5506].~ 49. Mon gouvernement a inform8 le Conseil de la situation jusqu*B oe moment-la dans une lettre, en date du 8 janvier 1964, adres& au PrWdent du Conseil de e6ourit6 pendant oe mois par le repr&sentant permanent adjoint du Royaume-Uni, lettre qui a &6 distrIbu&e en tant que dooument du Coneell [S/SSOEti]. SO. In aooordanoe wlth the requeet of the four Qovernmente’ conoerned that a Unlted Nations observer should go to Cyprus, the Seoretary-General held oonsultatione wtth theee Governmente and agreed to send Lieutenant-Qeneral P. S. Qyani to Cyprue as hic pereonal representative in oroer to observe the progrese of the peace-making operation. The taek of Qeneral Qyani wan to report to the Seoretary-Qeneral on how the United NatIona Observer oould functlon and be mort effeotive In fulfllllng the tank areigned to hlm. My Qovernment 1s moet grpteful to the Seoretary- General for agreelng to send General Qyanl on this mission. SO. Conformbment P la demande des quatre gouvernemente int&eesf3e tendant B oe qu’un observateur de I’Organlaatlon des Nations Unies soit envoy8 B Chypre, le SeorBtaire g&&ral, apr8r des oonrultatlonr aveo oes gouvernements, a aooeotb d’envoyer. en tant que représentant personnel, lefinbraI fi. 9. Oyant R Chypre, afln d’observer les progr&r de l’opbratlon de pa&fioation. La mission du &&a1 Qyini Btatt de fatre rapport au Seor&aire g6n6ral sur la mantbre la plus effioaoe dont l’observatnur de ltOrganiration des Nattons Unies pourrait remplir le mandat qui lui serait assignf3. Mon gouvernement est reconnaissant au Seor&uire g6n6rul d’avoir bien voulu envoyer le g6n6ral Gyani pour staoquitter de oette mission. 51. At the anme time, the Socretnry-General ngread to send Mr. Rolz-Uonnott, bis Deputy Chef do Cabinet, to London In rosponse to an invitation fpom flll the Govemments partlcipating In the Conference on C~~>rus which had opened on 15 Jnnunry. ‘IIe Secretnry- General made reports to tho Security Council on bis notions wlth regard to these mnttsrs on 13 January [8/5614] ?/ nnd 17 Jnnunry [9/5516].?/ 61. Au m8me moment, le SeorBtnire g&iBral a ocoept6 d’envoyer h Londres M. Rolz-Bennett, son ohef de cabinet adjoint, en r6ponse h une invitntion adress6e par tous les gouvernements participant h in ConfBrenco sur Chypre qui 6’est ouverte 10 16 janvler. Le Soor&iire gBnBra1 a fait. rapport nu Conseil de s6curit6, les 13 Janvier [S/G614s/] et 17 Janvier [S/561G~], sur les mesures qu’il rivait priees. 63. In these oiroumstanoes, my Government felt it deslrable that RAB onerous burden of keeplng the peaoe in Cyprue, whloh in praotioe fell exolusively on the Britieh element of the joint foroe establlshsd at the invitation of the Qovernment of Cyprus, should be shared by the participation of addltlonal oountrles in the foroe, Cn 31 January, proposa18 for augmenting the peaoe-keeplng foroes were oommunloated to the partiolpatnts in the London Conferenoe, and lt was announoed that if the Qovernments of Qreeoe and Turkey aooepted these proposale, they would be formallu out to Arohbishop Makarlos and Dr. KUgUk for &eir agreement. It was made olear that the objéotive of the propoeals was to provlde a means for stablllalng the iltüatlon and woüld inolude poeltlve eteps towards a solution of the polltloal problem of Cyprus. The Qovernmente of Qre6oe and Turkey aooepted these proposale on 1 February and they were aooordingly put to Arohblshop Makarios and Dr. KUçUk on 2 February. The Unlted States Government, as a Qovernment with olose tles of friendshlp with a11 the oountrlee oonoerned, was aesoolated wlth my Government ln the presentation of these propoaals. 64. Brlefly, the 31 January proposale provided for the eetabllshment of an enlarged peaoe-keeping foroe drawn from oountriee friendly to Cyprue. Thle foroe would remain ir. Cyprus for the shortest poselble perlod neoeesary to aooomplieh lts peaoe-keeplng mieeion, and national oontingents would be oommltted for a perigd of not more than three months. It would be under a Britieh oommander, who would reoeive polltloal guidanoe from an inter-governmental oommlttee of repreaentatives from the partioipating countriee sltting in London, The Greek and Turkieh oontingentr in Cyprue would be part of the peaoe-keeping foroe, but nelther oontlngent would be augmented. Meanwhlle, the Uovernments of Qreeoe add Turkey wonld undertake not to exeroise thelr rights of unilateral interventlon under artloie IV of the Treaty of Quarant@e, to whioh 1 have referred earlier, for three monthr on the underetandlng that the peace-keeplng foroe would be in plaoe during that perlod and the pnrties ooncorned uvould ngree to nccept mediation of their differonces in 8. spirit of mutunl nccommodntion, and to tho npgolntrnent of n medintor for this purpose. 66. On 4 Februnry, Archblshop Mnkarios gnve bis reply to these proposnls, whlch he regretted ho wae unnble to nccept In the form in wl~lcl~ they hnd been presented to him. The mnin polnts of difficu1t.y wcwc thnt tlio torms of reference of tire pence-lceeping force and of the nredintor weru not precisely definod; tbnt the Cyprue Government would net be representod on 65. Le 4 f6vrier, lsnrchev6que Mnlorios n r6pondu h ce8 proposItions en d6clarnnt qu’il regrettai1 dc ne pas pouvoir les ncceptor dnna In forme oh elles lui avnient 6t6 prosentées. Les principalos diffioult68 provenaient du fait que le rnnndnt de In force de mnintien de In paix et du m6dinteur u’Bt&tpna clnirement d6finI; que le Gouvernement de Chypre ne 66. On reoeipt of this reply from Arohbishop Makarioe on 4 February, my Covernment, aoting in oonjunotion with the United States Government on the same bas18 as before, immediately oonsulted the other guarantor Powers on ways to reviee the 31 January proposals in order to make them aooeptable to a11 oonoerned. Agreement was reaohed with the Qovernments of Greeoe and Turkey on the terme of fresh proposala, whioh were formally presented to the Arohbishop on 13 Fehruarv. TO avoid any risk of misrepresentation or misunderstandingof thesepropoealeof ig February, 1 think it would be desirable if 1 were to set them out in some detail. 66. Lorsque mon gouvernement a reçu oette repense de l’arohev6que Makarios le 4 f6vrier, il a oonsult6 immediatement, agissant conjointement aveo le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis pour les m8mee raisons qu’auparavant, les autres puiesanoes garantes sur les moyens de reviser les propositions du 31 janvier, afin de les rendre aooeptables pour tous les 1lrteresstW C’est ainsi qu@ un aooord fut oonolu aveo les Qouvernements de la Greoe et de la Turquie sur les termes de nouvelles propositions qui furent pr6sent6ss offioiellement le 13 fevrier 6 l’arohev8que Makarios. Pour Eviter que oes propositions du 13 fevrier puissent &re presentees sous un faux jour ou mal interpreteee, je orois qu’il serait bon que je les expose un peu en detail. 67. Premierement, une foroe internationale de paoifioation serait oonstitu6e, oomprenant des oontingents appartenant R des pays dont les gouvernements ont aooepte de partioiper 6 oette foroe. La foroe engloberait les contingents turos et grecs existants qui seraient plaoes sous le commandement du chef de la foroe, comme les contingenta des autres pays, mais ne seraient pas renforo8s. La foroe ne demeurerait R Chypre que le temps neoessaire R Paooomplissement de sa mission et les pays fournissant les oontingents s’engageraient 6 laisser leurs unites R Chypre au maximum pendant trols mois. La mission de la foros internationale serait d’emp6oher la reprise des oombats entre les oommunautes, de reprimer les d&sordres, de r&luire la tension entre oommimaut6s et de or& des conditions grgoe auxquelles la population pourrait retrouver sa libert6 de mouvement et reprendre sa vie normaIe. La foroe serait plao6e sous oommandement britannique: son chef, d6eign6 par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, reoevrait ses direotiver des gouvernements int6resrbr agisrant par le truohement d’un oomit intergouvernemental A Londres. 67. In the first plaoe, an international peaoe-keeping Poroe would be establishsd, oomprising oontingents from those oountries whose Gov&nme<ts agreëd to aartioipate. The foroe would inolude the existing Greek -and TÜrkish contingents, whioh would oome under the oommand of the foroe oommander in the same way as oontingente from other oountries and would not be augmented. The foroe would remain in Cyprus for the shortest period neoessary to aooomplieh its mission, and the oountries providing contingents would oommit themselves to leaving these foroes in Cyprus for a period of not more than three months. The mission of the international foroe would be to prevent a reourrenoe of inter-oommunal fighting, to suppress dieorders, to reduoe inter-oommunal tension and to oreate oonditione in whioh free movement and the ordinary life of the people oould be reeumed. The force would operate under a British commander to bs appointed by the Britirh Government, who would reoeive guidanoe from ihe Covernmente oonoerned, aoting through an intergovernmental committee in London. 68. Seoondly, the oreatlon of tbla foroe would not affect any of the exlstlng trenty rights und obligations of the Britlsh, Greek nnd Turkish Governmenta relnting to tbe Republio of Cyprue, lnoluding the obligntions in respeot of the lndependenoe nnd territorial lntegrity of the Republio of Cyprus. 58. DeuxiBmement, In crention de cette force n’nffecternit ni les droits ni les obligntions dbooulnnt des traitos existants pour les Gouvernements britannique, grec et turc 8. 1Wgatd de In Republique de Chypre, y compris les obligations interessant llindependance et l~lnt~grit6 territoriale de Chypre. G9. Tblrclly, in view of the common effort tbus undertnlcen wltli respeot to Cygrus, tho tlireo gunrantor Powers would recognlze thnt the queatlonof unilnternl notion would net arlse during the perlod of suoh conoerted notion and Prosident Mnkarios nnd Vloe- President I<Uçilk would give aaauianoe8 thnt tbey 59. Troisl8mement, en rnlson des efforts commune ainai entrepris h l’tlgnrd de Chypre, les trois pulsaancee garantes reconnnltrnient que la queetion de l’action unilatbrnle no 88 poeernit prie tnnt que durerait cette Action concertee, et le prdsident Makorloe ainai que le vice-pr&ldent, M. Kiir;Uk, E%ngageraient B 61. Finally, the Cyprus Qovernment would aak the Seourity Counoll to take note by oonsensus of the arrangements made for the oreation of thls peaoekeepihg foroe and for the appointment of the mediator. The Qovernment of Cyprus would also request the Seoretary-Qenernl of the United Nations to arrange for bis representntive to remain in Cyprus, 80 that he might maintain linlson with the Commander of the peaoe-keeping foroe. 82. 1 npologlee to the Counoil for sottingtheseprovisions out at some length, but 1 am sure that members will agree that the proposals are realistio and praotloal, that they take full aooount of the position of a11 the oartiee direotlv oonoerned. inoludinn the Covernment of the Republio of Cyprui, and thatxhey are fully ln aooordanoe with the Charter of the United Nations, 1 would draw partioular attention to the provision whereby the Seourity Counoil would take note by oonsenaus of the arrangements for the oreation of the peaoe-keeplng foroe and for the appointment of the mediator. The proposals, as 1 said, also provide for the oontinued presenoe in Cyprus of the representatlve of the Seoretary-Qeneral, who would maintain liaison wlth the oommander of the peaoe-keep1t.g foroe. In addition, it 1s provided that the mediator shall keep the Seoretary-General adivsed of his progress. 63. The meaaures oontained in these proposa18 do not in any wny infringe the rights and responslbilities of the CWernment of the Republio of Cyprus; in partioular, the proposa16 state oategorioally that the oreation of the international foroe shall not affeot any of the existing Treaty rights and obligations of the Brltish, Greek and Turkish Qovernments relatlng to the Republio of Cyprus, inoluding-and 1 emphaeice this phrase agaln-obligations in respeot of the lndependenoe and territorial integrlty of the Republio of Cyprue. 64. Nevertheless, despite very great efforts made by my Clovernment and the other Oovernments oonoerned to meet the varlous points raised by Arohbishop Mnkarior in oonnexion with the original proporals of 31 January, to our regret Arohbishop Makarios onoe again wns unable to nooept these rovisud proposnls as thay stood, and mnde a numbar of countor-proposnls. 6G. 1 ueecl net remind members of this Counoil that this serins of negotintions, with its propoeuls, counterproposale, ravised proposnls nnd revised oounter- ~>roposnls, wus not tnking place in a vnouum. On the contrnry, tbe situation in Cyprus ltself, whioh had been to a grent extont stabilized by the establishment of the Joint Force in Deoember nnd the ceuse-fire nrrnngemont reached thoronfler, ngaln begnn tocleteriaux dispositions ds la Charte de 1~Organisation des Nations Unies. J’attire en partiouller l’attention sur la dispoeition par laquelle le Conseil de s6ourit6 prendrait acte A l’unanimit6 des arrangements oonolus en vue de la cr6ation de la foroe de maintien de la paix et de la nomination du m6diateur. Comme je l’ai dit, les propositions pr6volent Bgalement la pr6senoe permanente A Chypre du repr6sentant du SeorBtaireg6n6ral oharg6 dt&3urer la Ilaison aveo le Commandant de la foroe. De plua, 11 est pr6vu que le mbdiateur tiendra le SeorBtaire g6n6ral au courant des progr6e r6alis6s. 63. Lee mesures oontenues dans oes propositions ne portent aucun pr6judioe aux droite et aux responsabilit6s du Gouvernement de la RSpublique de Chypre: 088 propositions pr6oisent notamment que la or6atlon de la foroe internationale n’affeotera ni les droits nl les obligations d6oouIant des trait68 extstants pour les Gouvernements britannique, greo et turc A 1’6gard de la RBpubliaue de Chvure. Y oomnris - et le sou- Iigne A n&veaÜ ces rnoté - iea oblig&ions oonoernant l’lndbpendanoe et ltlnt6grlt6 territoriale de la Rbpublique de Chypre. 64. Cependant, mnlgrb les efforts oonsId6rables faits par,mon gouvernement et par Ier autres gouvernemonts lnt6rerr6s pour r6pondre aux diverses objeotionr que I’arohevbque Makarios avait exprlm6es au oujet des propasltions originales du 31 janvier, ltarohev6que Mnltarios n’n pas pu cette fois encore, A notre grand regret, accepter les propositions revis6es qui lut etaient prbsent6es et il a soumis un certain nombre de oontre-propositions. 65. Je n’ai pas besoin de rappeler aux membres du Conseil que les 6vBnemente ne s%taient pas arr&& tandio que se dbroulait toute oette s8rie de nbgocintiens, avec oes propositions, contre-propositions, propositions revlo6ea et contre-propositions revie6es. Au contrnlre, In situation b Chypre mbme, qui s%tnit stubllis6e dans une mestn’e appr6clable A la suite de la cr6atlon, en d&embre, de la force commune et 66. On 3 February, there was a battle in Khoulou village in Paphos area: one TurkishCypriotwas killed and twenty were bellevec! to be oaptured by Qreek Cypriots. 67. Chi 4 February, Turkish Cyprlots blooked a road at Qhasiveran and detained eighty-nine Qreeks. Large Oreek Cypriot foroes were mobilised ta go to their resoue, and battle was only averted after urgent negotiations had led to release of a11 but four of the Qreek Cypriots held. 66. Cn 7 February, there waa a major inoident at Ayios Sosomenos, a few miles from Nioosia. A Qreek Cypriot gendarmerie patrol was ambushed, one gendarme boing killed and another seriously wounded. The Qreek Cypriot gendarmes attaoked tbe Turkieh Cypriot seotor of the village, set fire to Turkish Cypriot houses and oolleoted Turkish Cypriot women and ohildren, who were used as shields during the ensuing fighting. British troops then entersd thé village to separate the oombatants snd, after some hours, persuaded the Creek and Turkish Cypriote to stop the battle, without firing a shot themselves. The Qreek Cypriot gendarmes subsequently retlrsd, takingfifteen Turkish Cypriot women and ohildren as hostages. 69. Similar inoidents were taking plaoe in other parts of the ielfmd, and by 10 February it had beoome olear that tension throughout the oountryside had greatly inoreased. Although the Qreek Cypriote professed their ihtentlon of oalming the fears of the Turkish Cypriote, hostility between the two oommunities in the village8 had risen disturbingly. Moreover, events suoh as those 1 have just desoribed, and the full horror of whioh it 18 dlffioult for ua sittlng in this Counoil room to realiae, illustrated beyond doubt the limited abiltty of the leadere of bath aides to oontrol their followers. Inoidents involving the taking of hoetages on both sidoa, with a11 the fear and suspicion whioh this arouaeo, ooourred with alarming frequenoy, and only the mort strenuous efforts by the British Commander of the Joint Foroe and the British representative in Cyprus at a11 bours of tbe day nnd night preventad tliese leading to figbtingon a large sonle. Greek Cypriot polioe, gendarmerie and irregulnr troops were in an exoitable stato as a result of tbe disustrous,lnoident in Ayios Sozomenos, and, whereversmall Turkish Cypriot villages were surrounded by hostile Greek Cypriots, tbsy were in a stste of feor and terror. 66. Le 3 f&rier, un combat a eu lieu dans le village de Khoulou, dans la region de Paphos: un Chypriote turo a 6t6 tu6 et l’on pense que 20 autres ont Btd ospturbs par des Chypriotes greos. 67. Le 4 f6vrier, les Chypriobe turos ont bloqu6 la route A Qhaziveran et retenu 89 Qreos. Dtimportantes forces ohypriotes greoques ont et6 appel&6 A la resoousse et la bataille n’a pu 6tre 6vit6e que graoe A des n6gooiations qui ont Bt0 engag0ee imm& diatement et qui ont amen6 la lib6ration des Chypriotes greos, B l’exoeption de quatre d’entre eux. 68. Le 7 f&rier, un inoident important s’est produit A Ayios Sozomenos, A quelques milles de Nioosia. Une patrouille de la gendarmerie ohypriote greoque est tomb4e dans une embuscade, un gendarme a 6tB tu6 et un autre grievement blese& Les gendarmes ohypriotes greos ont attaqu6 le quartier chypriote turo du village: ils ont mis le feu aux maieons et ont rassembl6 les femmes et les enfants chypriotes turos, qui ont et6 utilis6s oomme bouoliers pendant le oombat qui a suivi, Des troupes britanniques sont alors entrbes dans 10 village pour 86parer les oombattants et, apr8s quelques heures, ont oonvainou les Chypriotes greos et turos de oesser le oombat, sans avoir eux-m6mes tire un seul ooup de feu, Les gendarmes ohypriotes grecs se sont alors retir68, emmenant aveo eux oomme otages 16 femmes et enfants ohypriotes turos. 69. Des inoidents semblables se sont produits dans diverses parties de lVle, et le lOf&rier il est devenu Bvident que la tension S’&ait aggrav6e oonsid&ablement dans tout le pays. Bien que les Chypriotes greos affirment leur intention de calmer les craintes des Chypriotes turcs, les hostilit68 n’ont oess6 de s’amplifier de façon inqui6tante dans les villages entre les deux oommunsutls. Ds plus, des dvsnements semblables A oeux que je viens de d6orire - et dont il nous est diffioile en oette ralls du Conseil de rbaliser l’horreur - prouvent olairement quW est bien diffioile aux dïrigeantr des deux parties de oontrdler leurs partisans. Des inoidsnts au cours derqusls l’un et l’autrs camp prennent der otages, aveo toutes les oraintes et les soupçons que oela oomporte, se sont produits aveo une fr6quenoe nlarmante, et seuls les efforts oonsiddrnbles dbploybs par le Commandant britannique de In foroe oommune et par le repr6sentant britnnnique h Chypre, a toute heure du jour et de la nuit, ont emp6ch6 que oes incidents ne 88 trSt~SfOrlru3Ilt en une bAtAille g&6- ralisde. La police chypriote grecque, la gendarmerie et les troupes irr9guli8res Btaient dans un Btnt de vive Barotion A la suite de l’iuoident dbaastreux survenu A Ayioo Sozomenos et, lorsque de petits vlllnges chypriotes turcs Btaiont cernds par les Chypriotes grecs hostiles, la population vivait dans la terreur. 71. It was against this baokground of reprisa16 and oounter-reprisale, mounting fear and growing terrorism, that the revissd proposals for the establishment of an international foroe were put to Arohbishop Makarios on 12 February, and it was these faotors whioh made it ao essential to reaoh the earliost possible agreement. Regrettably, not only did Arohbiehop Makarios feel unable to aooept the r vised progsals, but a fresh outbreak of violenoe, whioh exoeeded in gravity even those whioh 1 have already desoribed, broke out in Limassol on 12 February. 1 should mention in pausing that, up to that moment, Limassol had been one of the few parts of the island where conditions had remained fairly normal and unaffeoted by oivil strife elsewhere. 72. Full details of the eventa in Limassol are still not available and there are oonflioting aooounts of the origine of the battle. But it is olear that extensive firing between Greek and Turkish Cypriots began in Limassol town on the morning of 12 February and oontinued throughout the afternoon. As a result of strenuous efforts by the British Commander cf the Joint Foroe,, a oease-fire was arranged at 6.30 in the afternoon and it was agreed that British troops would oatrol durinn theninht in an effort to keep the two eides apart. Iioweier, i<the early hours oi 13 February, Qreek Cwriots. launohed an attaok on the Turkish Cypriot $sitiot$ supportsd by an armoured vehiole and heavy weapons suoh as bazookas, and very bitter fighting oontlnued, with the Qreek Cypriote pressing home the attaok until a new oease-fire was arranged at 8.46 on the morning of 13 February. The exaot number of oasualties has still not beon established, sinoe the prooess of olearing away the rubble and searohing demolished buildings has not yet been oompleted; but the number of Turkish Cypriot oaaualties are, aooording to the bsst information available to me, sixteen dead and thirty-five wounded. The number of Qreek Cyprîot oasualties is not known. Although an uneasy peaoe now prevails as a result of the seoond oease-fire agreement, and the looal politioal liaison oommittee has been disoussing plans for the removal of fortiftoalions on both aide8 under Britieh military supervision, the oease-fire now seems to have been oonsolidated as a reeult of General GYani’S intervention. 73. Moanwhile, in the town of Ktima, firing brokeout on the night of 13 February and oontinued through 14 February. There have been reports that Greek Cypriots mounted an nttaok on the Turkish Cypriot qunrter on the nfternoon of 14 Februnry, supported by two nrmourecî vehiclcs, nnd thnt a cesse-fire had been arranged nt 6 p.m. 74. Rleewhere Greek Cypriot irregulars surrounded tbe Turkish Cypriot sector of Polie on 14 Februury and two Turkiob Cypriots were reportod Itilled in the firing. Here, too, latest reports indioate that a viait by General Gyani lino temporarily improvecl mntters, but the situcction 1s et111 tense. 71. C’est aur oe fond de représailles, de oontrsrepr6sailles, de oraintes oroissantes et de terrorisme grandissant que, le 12 fbvrier, les propositions revis6es pour la oonstitution d’une foros internationale ont 6t6 soumises & l’arohev6que Makarios: oes faoteure rendaient essentiel un aooord aussi rapide que possible, Malheureusement, non seulement l’arohev6que Makarios n’a pas pu aooepter oes propositiens revis6es, mais de nouveaux’ aotes de violenoe se sont produits B Limassol le 12 f6vrier, d6passant enoore en gravit6 oeux que j’ai d6orits pr0oedemment. J’ajoute en passant que fusqu’h oe moment-18 Limaeeol Btatt l’un des rares secteurs de l’fle oh la situation Btait dsmeur6e B peu pr6a normale et n’avait pas 6tb affeot6e par la lutte civile qui se d6roulait ailleurs. 72. Nous ne disposons pas enoore de tous les d6tails concernant les 6v6nements de Limassol et l’on se trouve en pr6senoe de oompteo rendus divergents qusnt B l’origine de la bataille, mais il paraft certain que de violents Bohanges de coups de feu entre Chypriotes greos et Chypriotes turos ont su lieu B Limassol le matin du 12 février et se sont poursuivis au oours de l’apr&midi. A la suite d’efforts d6ploy6s par le Commandant britannique de la foroe oommune, un oessez-le-feu a pu6tre appliqu6 B 17 h 30 et il a 6t6 d6oid6 que les troupes ,britanniques patrouilleraient toute la nuit pour emp6oher les contacts entre les deux oampe. Cependant, d6s les premi6res heures du 13 f6vrier, les Chypriotes grecs ont lano contre les positions ohypriotea turques une attaque appuy6e par un v6hioule blind6 et des armes lourdes, notamment des bazookas: la bataille a oontinu6 aveo aoharnement, les Chypriotes greos poursuivant les Chypriotes turcs dans leurs retranohements, jusqu’au moment oh un oessez-le-feu a 6t6 dbolar6 le 13 f6vrier B 8 h 46. L’importanoe exacte des pertes n’a pas enoore 6t6 6tablie, oar le d6blaiement des ruines n’est pas aohev6: mais les pertes chypriotes turques, selon les informs.tions dont nous pouvons disposer, s’6lbveraient B 16 morts et 36 bless6s. Les pertes ohyprlotes greoquts ne sont pas encore connues. Bien qu’un oalme pr6oaire r6gne maintenant B la suite du deuxi6me aooord de oessez-le-feu, et que le oomitb looal de liaison politique ait 6tudi6 des plans en vue du dbmantblemsnt, sous surveillanoe militaire britannique, des fortifications des deux oamps, le oeasezle-feu semble maintenant avoir 6t6 oonsolid6 gr&oe B l*lntervention du g6n6ral Gyani. 73. Entre-temps, dans la ville de Ktima, des ooups de feu ont 6t6 tirbs dans la nuit du 13 fbvrier et la fusillade a continu6 dans la journbe du 14 f6vrier. Certains rapports indiquent que les Chypriotes grecs ont lniicb une nttaque colAtre le quartier chypriote turc dans ltaprbs-midi du 14 f&*ier, attaque appuy6e par deux v6hicules blindbs, et que 10 cessez-le-feu n 4t4 d6clor6 II 18 heures. ‘74. Aille~r~, des trouyes irrQuli8res cbypriotos grecques ont encerclb, le 14 f&rier, le quartier chypriote turc de Polie, et deux Chypriotes turcs ont 6tC tubs. A cet sujet, des rapports plus r6cento encore indiquent que In visite du g6narnl Gyani a amen6 une d6tente proviooire, mais que la situation demeure tendue. 76. Reporta of other lnoldonts oontlnue to oome in from dlfferent parts of the is!and. 77. I have desorlbed these aots of vlolenoe and terrorlsm dlspaselonately and ln order that the Counoil may be aware of what IF golngonand have 8ome foretaete of what may et111 happen. 1 am not here oonoerned to eeek out the root oauses or to try to apportlon the blame. 1 am hereonlytostate the faots, whloh are grave enough, and to show to the Counoll how men, women and ohlldren are sufferlng and living ln fear for thelr llves. 78. It was ln the grave and forblddlng olroumatanoes whloh 1 hnve desorlbed-namsly, the moet serious deterloratlon in the seourlty sltuetlon in the lsland of Cyprue and the lnablllty of the Qovernment of Cyprus to aooept the arrangements for augmantlng the peaoekeeplng force on the lelsnd wbioh had been agreed upon by the guarantor Powers-that my Oovernment lnstruoted me on 16 February to request that an early meeting of the Seourlty Counoll be oalled to oonslder tMs urgent matter and to take approprlate etepe to enaure that the dangeroue situation whlohnow prevalls be resolved, wlth full regard to the rlghts and responelbllltlee of both the Cyprlot oommunltles, of the Qovernment of Cyprus, and of the Qovernments party to the Treaty of Quarantee. 79. My Governmant le fully oonsolous of the serlous nature of the etep whloh lt hae taken in requestlng thls meeting, bu& reoent evente, partloularly those in the laet few days, have left lt no alternative. 1 want, however, to make the followlng point abeolutely olear. 80. Fltst, the United Klngdom’e aotlons in regard to the situation ln Cyprue have throughout been wlthln the framework of tlie Treaty of Quarantce. 81. Seoond, the preeenoe of Brltleh foroes in the terrltory of Cyprus stems from an invitation by the Oovernment of the Republlo of Cyprus. 82. Third, my Qovernment’r efforts rlnoe the beghlng have been dlreoted to one end only-namely, to oalmlng ths situation and restorlng peaoe. 83. Fourth, my Qovernment does net wleh to oontlnue co bear the burden of thln penoe-koeplng operation alone for a day longer than neoessary. It is for this reason that it hns on severnl oooasions made proposa18 for nugmenting the pence-keeplng foroe wîlb oontingents from other oountries. 04. Pifth, we hnve at a11 stages made it olenr thnt our intention is to aot with the ngreemenl of the duiy oonstituted nuthoritles in Cyprus, and there hnd been no question of nny proposnls being implemented without suoh agreemant. 88. At the’ flrst outbreak of theee troubles on the Island, we were Pound to meet the need for help. We were in a position to move swlftly. But over the longer perlad a broader baee, an lntern,tlonal oompoeltlon, le needed if law and order are to be ra-establlshed and malntalned. Apart from the immedlate problem of eettlng up a peaoe-keeplng foroe, there ie the longer-term problem of re-establlshing oondltions in Cyprue in whloh the two oommunltles oan llve peaoefully together. Thle Councll hae lts reelpneibllity for preeervîng international peaoe, but that muet be exerolsed ln a mariner oonelstent wlth ths treatlea upon whîoh the independenoe of Cyprua and the oonetitutional righte of the oommunltiee depend. 89. My delegatlon therefore belleves that two main objeotlvee muat be before the Seourlty Counoll, aa followr. SO. Flrrt, membere of thls Counoll, by thelr dleoueslon of thie grave problem and by the views they here eucprerr wltb the full welght of thelr experienoe of other orlreu behind them, murt brlng the lnfIueno6 of the Counoll to bear on the tenre rltuation in Cyprua, and exert a oalmlng effeot on a11 the partie6 oonoerned. 91. In thlr oonnexlon, my Qovernment oommendr the rtatermanllke merrage whioh the Seoretary-Qeneral rent on Saturday Iart to Arohblrhop Makarlor and to the Forelgn Mi&tera of Ckeeoe and Turkey. The Seoretary-Qeneral appealed to the three Qovernments oonoorned to refrain from nny nots whloh might lead to n worsening of the situation nnd furtber bloodsbed, and Ire further appeaied to a11 oonoerned, inoluding the members of tbe two oommunities ln Cyprus and tiieir respeotive leaders, to aliow tlle greateet possible understanding ~nd restraint. Thls mosango clearly ~howo the wuy for this Counoil to not in regard to the first objeotlve-nnmoly, the lowering of tension on the i6llllKl. DrOb%IIe imm6dlat de la or6ation d’une fOIYIe de -maintien de la paix, il faudra r6soudre, 4 plus longue 6oh6anoe, oelui du r6tabllesement dee oonditlona qui permettront aux deux oommunaut6e ohypriotes de vivre o8tp 4 o6te dans la paix. Le Conseil est oharg6 de maintenir la paix internationale, mals oette responsablllt6 doit s’exeroer oonformément aux trait68 qui garantissent l’lnd6pendanoe de Chypre et les droits oonstltutionnela des oommunaut6e. 89. Ma dblégation estime en oons6quenoe que le Conaell de r6ourit6 doit viser les deux objeotlfa easentlele suivants. 90. Tout d’abord, les membres du Conseil, par leur examen de oe grave problbme et les opinion8 quWa expriment loi PVOO toute la force de leur exp6rlenoe des orlosr ant(rleurer, doivent faire perer 1Wluenoe du Conseil sur la situation tondue qui rbgne 4 Chypre et n’effomer de oalmer toutea Ier partie6 int6rersber. 81. A oet bgard, mon gouvernement ae f6llolte du merrags plein de ragerse politique adrerr6 samedi dernier par le Seor6talre gbn6ral 4 l’amhev6que Makarlos et aux Minfrtres des affaires 6trang6res de Grboe et de Turquie. Le SeorBtaire g6n6ral a demand6 instamment aux trois gouvernements lnt6- ress6s de s’abstenir de tout aote susoeptible d’aggraver la situation et de provoquer de nouvelles effusion8 de snng: il a Bgalexnent demand6 4 tous les intb rossbs, y compris aux membres des deux oommunaut6s chypriotes et 4 leurs dirigeants respootifs, de faira Preuve de la plus grands oomprbbension et de la plus grande mod8ration poesibles. Ce message indique o!airement dans quel sens le Conseil doit agir pour atteindre le premier objootlf, c’est-4-dlro IR dbtente dans l’fle. 98. 1 had oonsldered whether it would be helpful to the Counoil if 1 were now tu introduoe a draft resolution for oonsideration. But it seems to my delegation that it is perhaps premature at thts stage for any delegation to introduoe a draft resolution. 1 might have to reoonsider my position on this in the light of developments. 94. lt would seem to me, however, that a draft resolution should oontain endorsement by the Counoil of the appeal whioh the Seoretary-Qeneral has already made: it should oall on the parties oonoerned, inoludlng tho guarantor Powers, and in oonsultation with the Seoretary-General, to aeoure the establishment of an effective peaoe-keeping foroe as soon a8 possible: it should aleo provide in appropriate form for agreement to be reaohed on the designatlon of an impartial médiator who may assist the parties in aohieving an agreed settlement. The Counoil will no doubt wieh to oall on a11 States and suthorities oonoerned to respsot the independenoe, territorial integrity and seourity of the Republio of Cyprus, tn aooordsnoe witb the’rreaty of Guarantee snd as established and regulated by the baeio artioles of the Constitution. 95. If the Counoll were to prooeed on thoee Unes, 1 oan assura it that it would have the full support of my Gcvenmunt. 9tl. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the Fore@ Minister of Cyprus, to whom 1 now give the floor. 96. La PRESIDENT (traduit de 1Qnglair): L’orateur stioant est le Ministre des affaires 4trangAreu de Chypre, A qui je donne la parole, 97. M, KYPRIANOU (Chypre) [traduit de Prnglair]: J’ai 4ooutd attentivement la d4olaration liminaire du rspr4rentant du Royaume-Uni. 11 faudra toutefois qtm j’4tudie oe diroourr avant de r4pondre aux diverrer questions que son auteur a soulev4n. Je r4rerva don0 ma position B oet 4gard. Je voudrais nbanmoins formuler une ou deux observations d’ordre g4nbrnl. 98. Le repr4sentant du Royaume-Uni a expos4 oe qu’il estime Btre le contexte historique at juridique de la situation. Je ne voudrais pria reven!r sur les Qvbnaments qui ont prt3o6d6 la signature des Aooords de Zurloh et de Londres, On n’a oepndant pae expliqu6 pou~quol, A un oertain moment de l’histoire de Chypre, la lutte n soudainement Bolat4 entre les deux oommucaut48, nlors que depuis des annbos les 614mente maronltes, nrmt?nlens, turos ou groos qui composent In population de Chypre vivaient en bonne

1 have listend with oare to the opening speech made bythe repressntative of the United Klngdom. However, 1 tee1 that 1 must rtudy hir rpeeoh firrt before 1 reply to various points whioh he bar rairsd. So 1. rslervs my position on that. Neverthelers, 1 would like to make one ortwo general remarks. 98. The representative of the United Kingdom gave what in hls view is the hlstorioal nnd the legal baokground of the situation. 1 would not like to glve tha lMo~ionl bnokground before the eigning of the Zurioh and London Agreements. Ono thing whloh hns not been oxplained is why, ouddenly, at II oertaln stage in the hintory of Cyprus, there waa ltltar-oommuJia1 fighting, whereas for yenrs in the past the peoplo of Cypruo ne a whole, whether Oreolc or Turlc or Armenlan or Maronite, hnve been llvlng peaoefully togetherwithout 99. The reprssentatlve of the United Kîngdom made partloular referenoe to the treaties, how the treaties oame about, what the purpoees of the treaties were, and, to a oertain extent, what the interpretatlons of the trearies are. On this partioular point 1 would like to reserve my position. 1 ehall reply at the approprtate time in the ooucse of the debate. However, one thing whioh 1 must make olear le that if in any of the treaties, in the view of any of the parties, there 1s a limitation to the lndependenoe and the eovereignty of the Rate, then in our view suoh a treaty or suoh a olause of tbe treaty does not exist. Furthermore, it has not been mentioned that Cyprus, after the signing of the Zurloh and London Agroements, beoame a Membsr of the United Nations. 1 would like to remind members of that. 100. On the question of the foroe, the impressionhas been given that the only man who io not interested in peaoe in Cyprus 1s President Makarios. May 1 be allowed not to agree with that position, to say the least? He ia the President of the oountry; he is the man most direotly reeponslble for and most interested in keeping the peaoe in Cyprus. Why le the blame put on him bsoauee he has net aooeptsd oertaln proposais? Let nie. in turn. uut thls question: Why have his proposa16 net bsen’ aooeptsd,‘and why haË 811 effort been made throughout to koep the Seourity Counoil out of the peaoe-keeping operatlon jn Cyprus? 101. As regards the effort to desoribe what aa11 “aggresslonn as the so-oalled right of unilateral abtion, 1 shall reply in detail at an appropriate tlme. But in our view, whatever the term means, no oountry has the rlght of military.aotion in Cyprus. We ehali never aooept the oontrary position. 102. My Government is moet grateful to a11 the membsrr of the Seourity Cou11011 for the deep and slnoere interert whloh they have shown in our problems. The Ssourity Counoil has been seiesd of ths situation in Cyprus sinoe the relevant oomplaint [S/6436]~ was lodged by my Clovernment on 26 Deoembsr 1963. On the following day, 27 Deoem’bsr, an emsrgsnoy meeting [1066th] of the Counoll was oallsd, in oonsequenoe of the imminent threat of aggresslon by Turkey, whose air snd naval unitr were making lt abundantly olear that they were ready for an invasion of the Island. 103. 1 should like to remind the Seourity Counoll of the evente of lnst Deoember. The air spaoe of Cyprus wns vlolnted throe tirnos, although only one vlolution wns ndmitted. The Turkioh oontingent in Cypruewbioh, pnra ,~lly, is stntioned in the island by pnrndoxalement, est stationn0 dnns l’île do C&ré vlrtue of thu . daty of Alliaaoe nmong the three counen vertu du Trait.6 d’allianoe entre les trois paya, dont tries, the .yuq~~~ of wblob is to defend Cyprus from le but est de d6fendre l’fle contre touts agression u lb& &bteentb Yeor, Supplomunt for Octobor, Novomber PM -- -/ Ibid., dix-bultldmo nmbo, Supplément d’octobre, novombra of Decomber 1962. dbcembre 1963, 200. En oe qui oonoerne la question de la foroe, on a lYmpresslon, d’apr6s oe qui a 6t6 dit, que le 60~1 homme qui ne s~int&asse pas au r6tablissement de la paix A Chypre est le pr6sident Makarios. QuW me soit psrmis, pour le moins, de ne pas partager oette opinion, Il est le Pr6sident du pays: 11 cet l’homme le plus direotement responsable du maintien de la paix ‘A Chypw et celui qui y attache le plus dcimportanoe. Pourquoi rejette-t-on le blRme sur lui paroe qu’il nIa pas aooept6 osrtaines propositions? Permettez-moi, A mon tour, de poser une auestion. Pourquoi oes propositions n’ont-elles pas 6té aoocp t6es et pourquoi s’est-on oonstamment efforo6 d’6oarter le Conseil de sbourit6 de Vopbratlon de maintien de la paix B Chypre? 101. Quant aux tsntatives faites pour qualifier os que noua appelons “agressionfi de prbtsndu droit d’aotion unllat6rale, j’y rbpondrai en d6tsil le moment venu. Mais, B notre avis, quelle que soit l’aoosption du terme, auoun pays n’a le droit d’intervenir militairement A Chypre. Nous n’aooepterons pas qu’il en soit autrement. 102. Mon gouvernement est tr6s reoonnaissant A toua les membres du Conseil de sbourit6 de 11int6r6t profond et sino6re qu’ils portent aux problbmes qui nous oonoerncnt. Le Conseil de rbauritb est saisi ds la situation b Chypre depuis qu’une plainte R 08 sujet [S/5488~~1 a bté dbpos6e le 28 d6oembre 1903 par mon gouvernement. Ls four oulvant, le 27 d6- oembre, tr, Conseil de s6ourlt6 @‘bot rlunl d’urssnoe [10806me séanoe], en raison de la menace imn&ents d’une agression do la part de la Turquie, dont 10s unlt6s navales et a6rlennes se pr6paraient manifestsment A ssvahir 1Yla. 103. Je voudrais rappeler au Conseil de s6ourit6 les 6vPnomonts de d6oembre dernier. L%spaoe o8rion de Chypre a 6t6 viol6 trois fois, bien qu’une seulo violation ait 4t6 reoonnue. Le oontinrrent turu. sui. of the Applloatlon Agreement of the Treaty of Allianoe, des poeltione de oombat face au secteur greo de Niooaia, en violation du paragraphe 2 de l’artiole V de llAooord d’applioation du Traltb d’allianoe, 106, At the tlme of the aforeeaid violation of the air 106. Loreque s’est produite la violation suamenapaoe of Cyprue by the Turkish militnry airoraft, the tionn6e de l’eapaoe a6rien de Chypre par llaviation Greek and Turkieh members of the Government of the militaire turque, lee membres greoe et turoe du Republio of Cyprua had unanimoualy agreed on prao- Gouvernement de la Mpubllque de Chypre s%t&~ent tloal stepe to aeoure a oease-fire and had aeked the mie dlaooord, B l%manimlt6, sur leu meBures pra- Government of the United Kingdom t0 aaeiet in the tiques propres B a*Iurer un oeseee-lbfsu et avalent observenoe of the oease-flre. demandb au Qouvernement du Royaume-Uni de lee aider B faire reapeoter le oessee-le-feu. 107. On the same day, the Britlsh BroadoastingCor- 107. Le m6me jour, la Britiah Broadoasting Corporation announoed that President Inonu had given poratlon annonpait que le prbeident Inonu avait donnd orders to the Commander of the Seoond Army tc inl’ordre au Commandant de la dewci6me armbe de apeot milltary unit6 wlth a view to urring them for passer en revue dea unit68 militaires en vue de eventual landings in Cyprue. d6barquamenta 6ventuels B Chypre. 108. Cn 26 Deoember-and in epite of the faot that 108. Le 26 d6oembre, bien que le oessec-lefeu oit the oeaee-flre had been maintained by the Cyprus 6t6 obeervb par lea foroes de sbourltb de Chypre, seourity foroee-hvo mllltary jet supereonlo airoraft deux avions militaires eupersonlques ont de nouveau agaln vlolated the air spaoe of Cyprus and flew over pi016 l’eopaoe a6rien de Chypre, survolant Nloorir Nlooeia at a very low height, over the roofe of the B trbe basse altitude, au ran des toits der malrono; housert .obviouely, the intention was not to oalm the de toute (vldenoe, le but reoheroh6 n’6talt par de atmoephere. The BBC announoed that, aooording to a ramener le calme. La BBC a annono6 que, aelon un oablegram from Ankara, C&neral Kemal Turun, Comt616gramme reçu d’Ankrbra, le g6n6ral Kemal Turan, mander of the Second Turkieh Army and Martial Law commandant de la douxibme arrnb turque et Wrrtlrl Commander of Ankara, had inapeoted troopr in the area of Irkenderun and that he wao viritîng Inkenderun Law Commander” de la plaos dlhnkua, avait paru6 beoaure of eventr in Cyprue and had found hir unite en revue de8 troupe0 dans la r6gfon dlbkenderun, oQ 11 o’6tait rendu B oauae den 6v6nementr de Chypre, well prepnred. et qu’il avait trouve 806 unltbr bien rntrafn6eer. 109. Cn the night of 26-27 December, three troop 109. Dans la nuit du 26 au 27 d(oembre, troir tranr- OaIrlerl, four dertroyerr and three submariner sailed porta de troupe@, quatre contre-torpllleurr et truie to wlthln a few miler oftheooart of Cypnu. 1 am mure roun-marins re ront approohér L quelqusr millrr de@ that ail thiu oan be oonfirmed by the reprerentative of the United Kingdom. Cn 26 Deoember, the Prime 0bt8s ohyprlot 91. Je ruir perrurd6que le repr6rrntant du Royaume- .Jni pourra oonfirmer tout oela. Le Mlnister of Turlcey stnted that the Tu:kish wurshipe 25 dboembre, le Premier Ministre de Turquie a had sailed from Constantinople toward Cyprus and d5olar5 que 1.1s I>ntime& do ~.x!*w turoo avaient that their return would depond on the oestintion of fire quitt0 Conotan .inople en direotion de Chypre et quWs in Cyprus; the lnnding of troops and the we of foroe ne eernient r.ppel5~1 que ai les oombate oesonlont A would depend on evente in Cyprus. Chypre; le cl{ barquement de Iroupes et 10 1’000,~~ A la foroe d6pe.&oient do 1’5volution de8 5v5nemcnte de Chypre. 110. General Kemal Turnn, Commander of theSeoond 110. La g5nFral Komnl Turan, oommandant de la Turkish Army, inapeotarl troopo, ne wau reported on deuxibmo B m5a turque, n pnao5 doa troupoo on 26 Dooembor, in the aron of Iskendorun. Ha onoo agnin revue, chm’n3 on I!n nnnono5 le 20 dboembre, dnns lefl: it quite olearly to be inferred thnt the troope wera la r5gion cilIakendsrun. Une fois & plus, il a olairo- 112. We believe that during the London Conferenoe we showed the maximum possible degree of patienoe, and we waited until the very end in the hope that reason might prevall in the minds of the opposite side. our attitude being that we should strengt& thefoundation of the independent Mate of Cyprus whereas the attitude of the other side wns to wreok it. 113. Whlie the London Conferenoe was I.tking plaoe the threat of aaprression oontlnued. The oonoerLtration of Turkish tro& on the southern ooast of Turkey and the movement of the Turkish fleet off lskenderun oontinued. On more than one oooasion we were given to understand that if we did not give way on a partioular point the talks might break down, with a Turkish invasion of Cyprus a8 the reeult. In view of suoh pressure we would not have been unreasonable had we walked out of the London Conferenoe. 1 ao not belleve that the Ciovernment of any oountry represented in this Ccunoil would have agreed to oontinue disoussions in view of the oontinuous threat of invasion of its country. However, we deoided not to walk out in our sinoere desire to do our best tc arrive at an understanding. 114. There 1s a wealth of evidenoe establishlng beyond doubt that Turkey, during the London Conferenoe, did not abandon the ides of R milltary attaok on Cyprus. Qn the oontrary, it lnoreased the oonoentration of warships and troops on the ooast faoing Cyprus, and ountinued to make threats of aggresslon. Thepreparatlons for the attaok were stapped up after the fallure of ths London Conferenoe and the threatr were renewed. 116. I shall mentlononly some reportswhiohevidence Turkish preparations to invade Cyprus. On 27 Deoember, while the Conferenos wau golngon, Britishfomes saw n*vk!sh rsgular troops of the Turkirh oontingent station& in Cyprus on both rides of the road arcund Trakhonas, a village near Nioosia. These Turkish troops dug themselves in and set themrelves in oontrol of the road. The foregoing faotr wero also reported on Saturday, 23 Deoembsr 1963 in The New York Times whioh also gave the information that the Britlsh oommander did not try to r?ove the foroe becuusa he felt that orders would not bo oboyed. Competent mllitary observera dld not disoount tbe 1>0sslbility tbat Turkey would interirene and send more troops from the mainland to tbe North of Cyprus. It waa point& out that the Turke oontrolled not only tbe road from Kyrenia but also the road that leads to Nioosia from tbs sheltered port of Vavilas on tbe nortb-west. ‘Tbose fncts also were reported in TA New York Times of 26 December 1963. 112. A la Conf6renoe de Londres, nous nous sommes montr68, nous semble-t-il, aussi patients que possible et nous avons attendu jusqu’au bout dans l’espoir que la raison triompherait ohee nos opposante, oar nous estimions que notre devoir Btalt de raffermir les bases de 1’Etat indbpendant de Chypre, alors que l’intention apparente de la partie adverse btait de leip dbtrulre. 113. Tout au long de oette oonf6renoe, la menaoe d’agression a psrslst6. Les oonoentrations de troupes turques sur la obte m6ridionale de la Turquie et les mouvements de leur flotte uu large d%kenderun se sont poursuivis. Plus d’une loir, on nous a lales entendre que si nous ne o6dions pas sur tel ou tel point les conversations risqueraient d%tre rompues et que les Turoe saleiraient oe pr6texte pour envahir Chypre, Soumis 4 une telle pression, il etX 6t6 parfaitement logique que noun quittions la Conf6renoe. A mon avis, pas un des gouvernements des pays 101 reprbsent6e n’aurait consenti 4 poursuivre des dieeussions sous la menaoe constante d’une invasion de son pays, Nous avons pourtant d6old6 de ne pas nous retirer, pame que nous btlons anlm6e du d6elr le plus sino6re ds parvenir 4 une entente, 114. Ds nombreux faite établissent de façon lrrBf& table que, tout au long de la Conf6renoe de Londres, la Turquie n’a pas abandonn6 I’ld6e d’une attaque contre Chypre, Au oontraire, elle a oontinub 4 oonoentnr ses navires de guerre et ses troupes sur la 06t.e en faoe de Chypre et hnous menaoer d’agression. Aprbs l’boheo de ln Conf6renoe, les Turos ont aotivb leurs pr6paratifs d’invasion et ont renouvel6 leurs msnaoes. 115. Je ne mentionnerai que quelques lnformatlons, qul montrent bien que les Turor sa pr6pardent 4 envahir Chypre. Le 27 d6oembre. rlorr que la Confbrence se poursuivait, des blbments dem forces brftanniauer ont vu des trouwr r6nuli6rer turques du oontinght en position des &XIX o&6r de la roÜte su% abords de Trakhonas. villags ritu prbs de Nlooaia. Ces troupss avaient oreus des re~ranohementr et oontrblaient la route, On peut 6galrment trouver cette information dans le New York-Times du samedi 28 d6cembre 1963, qui signale & oette oocasion qde le Commandnnt britannique n’a pas tent6 de fnire eivuouer ces troupes parne qu’il errtimait que ses ordres ne seraient pas suivis. Certains observateurs militaires qualffi6s n’bcartaient pas In possibilit6 d’une inteib vention de la Turquie et d’un envoi de nouvellos tronpes turques dnnu la r6glon nord de Chypre. On a falt rernr rquer que les Turc8 contrblnient non seulement la route de Kyrenia, mais bgnlement oelle qui va de Vavilas, un port bien abrite du nord-ouest de llfle, A Nicoeia. Lo New Yorkl’imes du 26 dticembre 1963 rnpportait Bgntement ceo falts. 117. Cn 29 Dsoember 1983, in Ank??a, a Turkieh Covernment enokesman oonflrmed that eleven Turkieh derrtroyere wère standing by at Merein, elxty miles from Cyprus, and that 10,000 Turkieh infantrymen, jet flghtere and paratroope were on the alert. The above faots were reported in the New York Rerw Tribune of 80 Deoember 1968. 116. Cn 80 Deoember the Turkieh Foreign Ministry deolared in Ankara that the Turkieh army unite “~111 not be wlihdrawn from the Turkieh quurters of Nlooelan. On 81 Deoemb-er 1968 the Turkieh troooe were et111 digging in at strateglo positions onthe edge of the oapital of Nlooeia. This faot waa reporteci in The New York Timee of 81 Deoember 1968. 119. Cn 7 January 1984 Turkieh lrregular armed foroeo who, in violation of the Treaty of Alllanoe, left thelr mllltary .oampe and oooupied positions to the north of Niooeia, were et111 manning roadblooke bevond the bridae at Orta Keuv. north of Nlooeia. Thie faot also w& wported in The New York Tim& of 8 January 1964. 130. On 16 February 1964 Reuters report& that Ankara had deolared ite deoision to interfere in Cyprus but had delayed aotion for forty-eight houre at the requert of the United Stater Under-&xwetary of State, Mr. Ball. Cn 14 February Reutere reported from Ankara that tbe eouth-eart Turkish port of Iakenderun had been oleared of olvillan ehipplng, that the main quay had been handed over to the oontml of thr Turklah Navy, and Mut the Turkiah dlvirion stationed there waa at alarm stationa. On 16 February the Turkish fleet waa rsported to bave returnedfrom a twentytwo-heur rlmulated attaok on Cyprur-en exerolse. Warrhipn oarrying an undirolored number of troopa, inoluding oommandoa, left Lkenderun on Frlday nlght,. 1 aooording to the report. The ship retumed to the Turkish port on the Mediterranean after having approaohed the ooart of Cyprur. They were aarerted to have been within rome heurs’ l aîling tlme from the Cy-priot rhore when they turned around for the rotum voyage, The above faote alao were reported in m New York Timer of 16 February 1964. 121. At Iskenderun the 89th Division waa moved into the area togethor wlth speoial unlts, inoludlng paratroops, otationed at the flir base at Adann, and on 16 Pebruary The New York Tlmeq oontained a report ihat ihe Turkieh Defenoe Mlnister stnted ihot Turkey waB oontlnuinq Mediterranean militnry exeroises. 123. On 30 January 1964, aooordlng to OUP informntion, the following was the oomposltlon of tbe Turkieb fleet near Cyprue. In tbe AIexnndrettn and Merain nrea, a total of 36 ships. At Merain tbere were 17, as followe: d minesweepere, 4 submarines, 4 nttnok sbips, 2 pntrol or&, 1 supply oraft. At Alexandretta Btait la m~ivaute. Dans lu r6gion d’Alexandr&te et de Merein, on oomptnit au total 35 bIitiment& A MerRin m6me, il y avait 17 nnvireo 8e rbpartiasant oomme suit: six dragueurs de mines, quatre 801m- 133. When it wa8 felt that a politioal aettlement oould not be aohieved in London the ohairman of the Conferenoe turned hi8 attention tothequestionof an international foroe to replaoe the preeent peaoe-keeping arrargemente. In faot, most of the time was epent dieoueeing that issue. After 801118 weeke of dieoussion it beoame olear that an agreement on the question of the foroe oould not be aohleved-not beoauee therewas disagreement that an international foroe should be eent thore. 1 do not want to go into the rea6ons why the other party oould not aooept our view with regard to the international foroe. 1 wish only briefly to put our viewe to the Counoil on the matter. 324. An international foroe, a8 we Bec it, should be under the oontrol of the Seourity Counoil, whioh is the only appropriate international iargan forthe purpoae, and 1 dc not aee why, inthepartioular oa88 of Cyprue. this organ ehould bëignored. We have offered to-àgree with the other parties, bath on theoomposition as well as on the terme of referenoe of tha foroe, before putting the question before the Seourity Counoil, in order both to faoilitate the taek of the Councii and to expedite the prooedure. 126. In our view, the tertrs of referenoe of the force should inrlude net on!y internai peaoe-keeping-baoaune, as 1 am goingtopoint out, the internal incidente in Cyprue are Juet eymptome-but euoh a foroe ehould aleo aeeiet the Cyprue Government in reetoring law and order and the return to normalconditions, a8 well a6 to proteot the independenoe and the territorial integrity of the State from any outside aggreeaion. 1 do not think that thie te an unreaeonable attitude. 126. We oould nor agree to any foroe oomposed of oontingente from various oountriee without it being under the oontrol of the Seourity Counoll. We do not wirh to quertion the intention of the oountriee whioh are ready to partiolpate in the foroe, but we oan not ignore the authority of the Seourlty Counoll whioh, for a small oountry, oan provide the mont effeotive guarantee in the llght of the varioue dangers whioh are involved in the prerenoe of an international foroo. 127. Final diragroement on the question of the international foroe virtually brougrit the London Conferenoe to an end. It ie na a resuit of that thnt wo take it tlint tbe Britisb Government hns nlso deoided to bring the matter before the Seourity Council in aooordanoewitb tbe Chnrter. My Government tleoided lnst Saturday to requeet the Counoil to proueed witb tbe examinntion of its oomplaint. This sbould be dono bot11 in tho light of the developments ns well na in tbe light of the renewoci thrents of aggression. At one stage we were even told that nggreseion migbt nctunlly take plaoe Ifwe deolded to corne to the Socurity Cou11011. That wn8 one of tbe means ueed to shp ua from ooming to tbe Seourity Cou~wil. We coneider thia, to say the least, ridiculorus. n’ont pas pu partager noa vue6 en oe qui oonoerne la foroe inter* ationale: je tien8 eeulement A exposer bri6vement devant le Conseil no# oonoeptione A oe sujet, 134. A notre sens, une foroe internationale devrait Btre plao6e sous le oontr6le du Conseil de a6ourit6, le seul orrranisme international oui ait oomp6tenoe en la mat&e, et je ne voie pas pourquoi, dans le oa partioulier de Chypre, il nouB faudrait oublier l’existenoe de oet organisme, Noua avons offert de noua entendre aveo lee autres partie8 tant sur la oomposition que BU~ le maudat ‘m6me de la foroe avant de soumettre la question au Coneeil de 66ourit6, et cela afin de faoiliter la tRohe du Conseil et d’acob 16rer la proobdure. 126. A notre avis, la foroe internationale devrait avoir wur mandat non seulement d’aeeurer le maintien de la paix - oomme je vais le pr6oiser, les inoidentu internes de Chypre ne eont que dee eympttnnes -, main aussi de pr6ter assistance au Gouvernement de Chypre pour rbtablir l’ordre, favoriser un retour A la vie normale et protbger en mbme temp l’indbpendanos et lVnt6gritb territoriale de 1’Etat oontre toute agression venue de l’ext6rieur. Je ne croie pas que oe soit 18 une attitude dbraieonnable. 126. Nou8 n’avonr pas pu aooepter l’idbe d’une foroe oompos6a de oontingents venant de divero pays, qui ne rel6verait pas du Conseil de r6ourit6. Noua ne voulons pao contester les bonnes intentions der payr qui #e montraient pr6t8 A partioipr A oette foroe, maie noue ne pouvone oublier que l’autorit du Conreil de réourit6 oonrtitue rano doute, pour un petit paye, la garantie la plue effioaoe qui #oit, oompto tenu der divers dangero que oomporte la pr6renoe d’une foroe internationale, 127. La Conf6renoe de Londrer a virtuellement pria fin A la suite du dbaaooord qui est finalement apparu sur la questioa de la force internationale. C’est en raison de la situntlon ainsi or66e que le Gouvernement britannique a d6cid6 de porter la question devant le Conseil de s6ourit6, oonform6ment B la Charte. Mon crouvernement a dboid6 samedi dernier de demandei iu Coneeil d9examiner sa plainte. Cet exnmen devrnlt Unir comute de l%volution des BvBnemente et des nouvelles menaces d>ogreseion oontre Chypre, A un oertnin moment, on IIOUB a m6me dit que cette agr@sslon pourrnit ee produire au moment oh noua prendrions In d6oleion de nous prbsenter devnnt 10 Coneeil de s6ourit6. C’est lh un des moyens euxquele l‘d8. In the last few daye thero have been new movemonts of Turkieh ships and, aooording to a oertain report, a high-ranking Turkish offioer in Alexandretta was again aeen wearing his battle uniform, while the port was olearea and oompletely taken over by the Navy, ready for action, aa 1 mentioned earlier. Aooording to another report, the United States Gcvernment just managed to persuade the Turkish Qovernment to postpone action. 129. These laet few things may oome fromnewspaper reporta, but, putting them tcgether with the faots of the situation and with various information we ourselves have from Qovernments olosely related to Turkey, they amount, to say the leaet, aaa firet stage of oold war against the people of Cyprus, in addition to the aotual threat of aggre&on, And this ia being done by the very people who olaim to he sinoerely interested in seeing peaoe prevail in the oountry. 1s Turkey interested in peaoe? The answer, in our view, le quite simple if one bears in mind the polioy the Turkirh mvernment ha8 pureued on Cyprus in the oourae of the last few yeare. It has been a polioy of interferenoe, a polioy of provooation, it hae baen a aolio~ the main purpcae of whioh was to disoourage oo-oieration be&e& the Qreek majority and the Turkieh minority on the ieland rather than to enoourage harmonj and friendsbip. Thie polioy, whioh oan easily be subotantiated from variouti statemente made by Turkish leader& 1s now, 1 eubmit, oompletely oonfirmed. 130. We have in our poesession offioial documente whioh prove beyond any doubt that the polioy of provooation followed by the Turkieh Qovarnment te baeed on a well-prepared plan to advanoe further the idea of aeparation in the ieland wlth the ultimate purpoee of partition, In a dooument whioh 1 am sure the Turkieh Qovernment le well aware of, it 18 etated: “We aooepted the Zurioh and London Agreemente a8 a temporary etage, and it wa8 for thie reason that we aigned them, If they were not a temporary otage but the final rolution we would not have aooepted them. We would have prolonged for a further period the dlrputer between the two oommunitierr and we wculd have arked the Unfted Nationo for partition.” Here 10 another quotation from the same document: “For ua to nooept the Zurich Agreement ha a final solutiot~ mean tliat we ourrrelves are oausing tllo extermination of tho Turkisb element of the Island. For this reaaon, it wns ngroed with tho Government of the Turkieh l~o~ublio at the tirne thnt durinz this traneitictial peritxï we shoulcl be @en toa mnxYmum dokree eoonomio and othor aid for the renlization of OU~ final gonl. It is worth noting that In the oour8e of the first oontnota wo had with Gurser Pashn, Prealdent of cur Provisionnl Covernment, the 6nme thi11gE were qp~eed upon and it wa8 nmiOUn0ed t0 118 in the moot dcfinite wny poeelble that the ngreements 129. Sans doute, les derniers renseignements que je cite viennent-ils d%formatione parues dane les Journaux, mais, dans le oadre de la situation aotuelle et joints aux diveraee informations que noua avone pu obtenir de gouvernements btroitement 1148 A la Turquie, île oonetituent B tout le moins, en plua d’une menace rdelle d’agression, la premibre Etape d’une guerre froide entreprise contre le peuple de’chypre. Telle est la aituation orMe par oe8 gens m&mee qui proclament leur d4sir eino8re de voir le oalme revenir dane le paya. La Turquie souhaite-t-elle vraiment la paix? La repense, B notre avis, eet bien simple. Il suffit de ae rembmorer la politique suivle par le Qouvernement turc B l%gard de Chypre au oourm de oes dernibree anndes: politique d’ing6renoe et de provooation. oolitioue dont l’objet eeeentiel &a% de dboourager toùte o&p&ation ont-m la majo& grecque et la minorit6 turque de l’tle plut& que d’enoourauer l’harmonie et lt~miti6. No& jugement sur o<tte politique - et diverses d6olaratione faites par les dirigeinte turce peuvent aiedment oorroborer notre opinion - eat B notre avis amplement oonfirm4 B l’heure actuelle, 130. Noue sommes en posseseion de documente offioiela qui prouvent sans oonteab aue la uolitiaue de provoc~tior? suivie x ar le Gouverneïnent tiro re+sait sur un plan bien arr t6 de oultiver dans l’fle l’id6e d’une abparation en vuo d’aboutir en fin de oompte au partage, Dana un document que le Gouvernement turc oonnaft bien, j’en auia aQr, il eat dit notamment: “Noua avons aooeptb les Aooords de Zurioh et de Londres comme une 6tape temporaire et o’eat poursuoi nous lea avona aim6a. S%a avalent reor6- Ëent6‘ non par une éta+ temporaire, maii la rolutton dbfinltive du problbme, nour ne lea aurfons par aooeptbr. Noua auriona prolo@ enoore le oonflit exiatant entre les deux oommunaut4r et noua noua rerionr adrerstr aux Nationr Unie# pour obtenir le partage.” Vo101 un autre passage du meme dooument: wPou~s nous, aooeptor que 1’Aooord de Zurich oonfltitue la solution d6flnitIve du problbme 6quivnut h provcqXr l’exterminntion do lQ316ment turo dans Ilfle. C’est pou~~quoi 10 Gouvernement de la IiBpublique turque et nous-mbmes 8ommea oonvenu6 que pendnnt la pbriode de trnneition nous reoevrions le mnxlmum d’aide, Boonornique notamment, peur nous permettre de rbnliser notre chjeotif ultime. Il est InMressant de notai’ qu’ou OOLUEI des pramiertr oontacts que nous avons eu8 aveo Gureer Pacha, ~r6sidont du Gouvernement provisoire, leo mbmee d6cisiona avaient Bt6 orrbtbos, et 11 nouf4 rivait 6t0 131, Members of the Counoil might be partioularly intereated to learn that those Wo pereons who are mentioned in thia dooument as beîng in favour of unifisd munfoipalities in Cyprue are not alive now. They were both aeeassinated on the eame night two years fw. 132. Thle dooument goes on: “There 1s only one path open to us that we sec and it le the followfng: “&) TO propagate a11 over the ieland a falth and a oonviotion to be paseed on from generation to generatlon. Thîe faith and thie oonviot.ion ehould make every Turk, Young or old, .feel that it 1s moet neoeesary t3 bring about the vindioation of the truth whioh ie that the agreemente are a temporary etateof affairs and that our oommunitiee ehould form a eeparate r6gime; n(bJ TO reaot to a maximum degree to any effort of the Qreeh who are trying to effeot th& oollapse of the r6gime of the eeparate oommunity: “(0 TO oonkin and obetruot those whose propagan a and publioationr dieripate the national flght 0 and to diotate to the membere of the opposition within the Turkish oommunity that their aotione agalnrt the national atruggle oonrtitute a barlo mirtake.n It goer on: Wurghan and Hikmet, whooe writinge and aotionr serve the efforts of the Qreeks”-1 mentioned the two nnmes earlierJ0.11 these must stop nnd, if these people do not boliave in the oxistonoe of OU~ nntionnlist struggle, they must be silenoed.” 133. Another document, dated 14 September lDG3, thnt is to sny only three months before the reoent inoidenta started in Nicosia, around Christmas-the other document wbich 1 montioned wns of an enrlier dut&-and signod by Turkish lenders, spenks of the possibility of an effort by the CIreek Pnrty to amend the Conetitution. It says: 131. Ce n’eet paa cane int6r6t que les membres du Conseil apprendront que les deux personne8 mentionn6ee dans oe dooument oomme 6tant partisane de l’unifioation des munioipalit6s de Chypre eont mainterant mortes. Elles ont 6t6 aseaeein6e8, au ooure d’une m6me nuit, il y a deux ane. 132. Plua loin, on peut lire, toujours dans le m6me dooument : *Une seule voie e’ouvre B nom, semble-t-il, et otest la euivante: “4) Propager dans toute 1Yle une foi et une oonviotion qui devront 6tre tranemieee de g6nbration en gbn6ration. Anim6 par oette foi et oetta oonviotion. ohaaue Turo. Jetile ou vieux, devra 6tre p6nbtrd de la nboesr~t6~absolue de faire triompher le prinoipe selon lequel les aooords ne sont qu’un btat de ohoses temporaire, nos oommunaut68 devant un jour devenir des entitbs distinctes: “9) R6aglr au maximum oontre tout effort de6 Qreos pour abolir le r6glme der oor.lmunaut6r e6parber; “Q) Faire 6oheo A oeux dont la propagande et les publioationa sont oontraL%s aux objeotifu de la lutta nationalirte et d6montrer aux membre6 de l’opporltlon A l~int#irieur de la oommunautb turque que leur aotlon oonrtitus une erreur fondamentale.’ Phu loin, on lit enoore: “M. Gurghan et M, HlkmeV - j’ai mentlonn6 081 deux noms plus haut - *dont lea Borita et les aotee servant les desseins des Creos, eux et toua les autres doivent ofnrrbter et, si oee gens ne oroient paû A l’exietenoe da notre lutte nationnlisto, il fout les oontrnindre nu silenoe.n 133. Un autre dooument, dnt6 du 14 septembre 1063, c’est-A-dire traie mois seulement nvnnt les r6oenta inoidents survenlls A Niooain, aux environs de No&1 - l’autre dooumont que jV11 mentionn6 Btnll plu8 anoian -, et signb pnr le8 dirigennts turos, mentionne ln possibilit6 d’un effort du parti greo pour modifier la Constitution. Il dit: 134. Of oouree it 1s known that there have been oep tain propoaals for negotiation on the question of amending oertaln oonetitutional provielone and they were put forward to the Turkieh leaders by Preeidont Makarios. 1 oannot understand why the representative of the United Kingdom did not make referenoe to them. Thoee proposale were turned down, not by the Turkieh Cypriote to whom they were addreseed, but they were turned down in the moat unorthodox manner, to eay the leest, by the Turkish Qovernment, although the propoaals were never addreaeed to them, 136. The dooument to whioh 1 laat referred, whioh deals wlth the way the Turkiah Cypriota should reaot to any proposa1 for amending the Constitution, statea: Vhe suooeas of the implementatlon of euoh a plann~in other words, to take inti their own handa their deetlny-awill require of the Turkieh oommunity the waging of a ver; hard fight whioh must oommand the support of many interna1 and external faotore. Undoubtedly, the materlal and moral support of thg mother oountry, Turkey, 1s the moat important of the outside faotors. Indeed, there 1s no likelihood that the Turkieh Cypriote ~111 be able to fight under present oonditions without havingeeoured in advanoe the oonsent and eubsequent support of the mother oountry. Therefore, it is abeolutely nsoessery that we agree in advanoe with the mother oountry on the oourse of action based on a detailed plan, Makarios has not yet made eerioue attempts to abrogate or amend the Treatles. Thus we have tlme ahsad of us to prepare suoh a plan and we ehould profit from this.” 136. 1 do not wish to read out the entire dooument beoause in Lt there 1s the whole plan of aotion, some details of whioh 1 think 1 should not disclose, at leaet at this stap. But 1 would just quote another paregraph: Ben eoonomioally, militarily and morally ready in the full sense of the word, the Turkish oommunity will aval1 itself of the opportun@ presented by the ooourrenoe of a oonstitutional orisir to strike with noms 0uooeoo.~ The above dooumenb and quotationr are, I believe, quite enough as a real baokground to the inoidentr whioh ooourred in Deoember last in Cyprus. After all, the only pop10 who would benefit fmm intsrcommunal flghtlng in Cyprus would be thore who are in favour of separation and division, and not those who believe in unity and whose polioy 1s that &eeks and TUrks nnd Armenians nncl Maronites cnn nnd should live happily together 1161 oitieons of one Stnte, oltlzens with equal rights. 137. The trngio evonta of Chrlstmns in Cyprus, trnglc to both parties, hnve beon followed by a sories of provoontlont3 whioh rosultod in a serlee of other inoidents. Tho offorts to mova foroibly populntlotle from mixod vlllngee io part of tho wholo plan, oonceived by Turkish lendors nnd pursued In oo-operntion with tho ‘I’urklsh- Cypriot leodors. Rven tho Turkish Prime Minister, in a reoent stntement, mnde it qulte olenr thntthe policy 135. La dernier dooument auquel Je me suie rbfQr& indiquant le manibre dont les Chypriotes turne rbagiraient devant toute proposition d’amendement de la Constitution, d4olare: “Le euoo&e de la mise en œuvre d’un tel plana - o %st&dire la prise en main de se propre deetlnbe - “exigera de le part de la oommunautb turque qu’elle mbne un oombat tr&s dur qui doit WnBfioier de nombreux appuis internes et externes, Sens auoun doute, l’appui mat&iel et moral de la mbre patrie, la Turquie, est lW6ment extdrieur le plus important. En fait, il n’est gubre possible que les Chypriotes turoe puissent oombattre dans les oonditions actuelles aano 6tre essurbs A l’avanoe du oonsentement et, par la suite, de l’appui de la m8re patrie, Il est dono absolument nbessaire d’arrbter B l’avanoe aveo la mbre patrie un plan d’aotion dbtai116. Makarioe n’a pas enoore essayb sbrieusement d’abroger ou de modifier les trait& Nous avons donc du temps devant nous pour prbparer un tel plan et nous devons en profiter.” 136. Je n’entends pa# lire le document tout entier, our il oomprend tout le plan d’aotion dont Je orotr ne pas devoir tivéler oertains ddtalls, tout au moins A oe stade. Main je voudrair oiter simplement un autre paragraphe: nL4xsque, our las plans bonomiqua, militaire et moral, nous oerons pr&a au plein renr du terme, la oommunautb turque profitera de la posrlbilitd qu’offre une orire oonstitutionnelle pour frapper aveo une ohanoe de ouoo~r.~ Le dooument et !er oltationr ci-dessus ma paralrrrnt suffisanta pour montrer dans quel oonkxts I~I sont d6rouMr les inoidents survenus an dbembre dormlrr A Chypre. A~r&r tout, les seuls b6n6floia1~r &sntuels der luttes entre les oommunaut& ohypriokr sont oeux quf plboonisent la sbparation et la division, at non oeux qui oroient A l%mitb at dont ln politique veut que les Ureos, les Turoa, les Armbuians et leo Maronites puissent vivre heureux eusemble, en tnnt que oltoyeus dtun mBme Etnt jouiesnnt do droits Bgnux. 137. Letes Bvbnemente de No81 h Chypre, tragiques 1>0ur les deux pnrtics, ont Bt4 suivla d’notos de provoontion qui ont oonduit a uue s6rie de nouveaux inoidente. Les sfforts pour d6plnoer de foroo les populrrtlons de villnget, mlxtes s’insorivent dails un plnn d’eneomblo oonçu pnr 100 dirilpante turos et nppliqu6 611 ooop6rntion avec leo dirigenuts ohypriotos turoe. Le Premier Minlstro de Turquie lui-mbme, 138. “We want a federal etate in Cypruan, the Prime Minister of Turkey says, =and if we do not aohieve this, we ehall aek for partition.” 139. Apart fmm the other tragedies of the situation whioh the Turkiah polioy ha@ brought tocyprua, it hae also brought grave, and unneoeasarily grave, and tragio hardehips to the Turkieh-Cypriot population of the oountry. Turkish peaoe-loving villagers havebeen fomed to abandon their houaea, their land, their prop ortie& and some thousands of them are now living aa refugeea in other plaoes. 1 would give only ono example of how people are foroed to leave their villages -whioh examplo la also direotly oonneoted with the ieeue bofore the Seourity Counoil today. 140. In the 0aBe of a oertain village, representatives of the Turkieh terrorist organieation told the inhabitanta, when the latter refused to leave: “You have t0 move beoauee in a few days this area will be bombed by Turkish, planes and it will be a pity for Turku to be Mlled by Turkish bombe, You have to move to Rome other area where there will be no bombing.” 141. Tc oonolude thie point, the following is an extract of one of the dooumenta dated 14 September 1963, whioh 1 mentioned earlier, This quotation le, I feel, of partloular importanoe to the iasue: Wndoubtedly, this plan of the Turkish oommunity will meet with a strong oounter-aotion and reprisa18 of the Oreeke, Theae oounter meaaurea will reeult in an inter-oommunal fight whioh will deoide the outoome. When the fight begina*-this 1s the qaotation of September, three months before the events in Cyprus-“the Turkish oommunity, interspersed throughout the Island, will be foroibly oonoentrated into an area whioh it will be obliged to defend. The oite of this area will depend on the rtrategio plan prepared by the experts. Before the fighting breaks out, the Turkish oommunity must bave the neoesrary supplies, ample food-stook and detailed plans for the otrengthening of ib tics with the mother oountry.n 142. 1 oan take up a lot of time and rpeak perhapr for hourr quoting examples and giving evidenoe of the polioy and the purauita of the Turkish Government. Ilowevar. 1 feol thnt t!lis is unou& for the tima boing. I PCQ~X~V~ my rlght to elnborato Iurtlmr if it proves neoessnry nt a Inter stab*, 143. Whnt 1s to be doue? Much importnnoe hne been pnid, quite rIghtly, to the question of the Intornntlonnl foroe. But no Imr)ortnnoe hns been pnid to the bnelc olemont in the wllole Issue, whlcb 1s tho proteotlon of lho turrilorlul intelrr1t.y nnd the Indopondcncc of thc Republlc of Cyprue~ Tiils le not only in itself important, but, nlao, thls le tho bust menne In our vlew »f brirrglng nbout in Cyprua a muoh colmaintmoephore. 138. “Nous voulons un Etat f6d6ral b Chypre”, a dit le Premier Ministre de Turquie, “et, si nouII n’y parvenons pas, noua demanderons le partage.” 139. En plua dea autres aepeote tragique8 de la situation qu’elle a provoqu6e il Chypre, la politique turque a inflig6 de façon tout ii fait inutile des souffrances tragiques A la populatfon ohypriote turque. De paisible8 villageois turoe ont 6t6 obligbe d’abat+ donner leura maisons, leurs terme, leur6 bieno, et plusieurs d’entre eux 10 tv.ivent maintenant dans la situation de rbfugibs. Je ne donnerai qu’un exemple des proo6dOe utiliebe pour foroer oee gens A quitter leur8 villages. Cet exemple eet d’ailleur 6galement en relation direote aveo la question dont le Coneeil de e6ourit6 est aujourd’hui eaiai. 140, Dans un oertain village, les représentante de l’organisation terroriste turque ont dit aux habitante qui refusaient de partir1 WVoun devee partir, cardans quelques jours dee avions turoe bombarderont oette r6gion et il serait regrettable que dea Turne soient tu60 par des bombea turques. Vous devez voua rendre dane une autre r6gion qui ne sera pae bombard6e.” 141. Pour en terminer aveo cet aspect de la question, je donnerai un extrait de l’un de6 dooumente dat6s du 14 septembre 1963, dont j’ai par16 plus haut, Cette oitation me parait rev8tir une importance partioulibre: Wane auoun doute, oe plan de la oommunaut6 turque se heurtera R une vigoureuse contre-attaque et A des reprbeaillee de la part des Greos, Ces oontre-mesure6 provoqueront entre les oommunaut6a une lutte qui dboidera de l%sue de la question. Lorsque la lutte oommenoera,n - la oitation est du mois de eeptembre, c’est-k-dire trois mois avant les 6v6nements de Chypre - “la oommunautb turque, dispero6e dans toute l’tle, sera oonoentrbc par la foroe dans une rbgion qu’elle sera obligde de d6fendre. L’emplaoement de oette rbgion dbpendra du plan stratbgique pr6par6 par ler experts. Avant que les oombats se d6olenohent, la oommuqaut6 turque devra dirporer der approvioionnements n6oeaeaires, de vivre8 abondante et de plans d6taill6r pour renforcer eeo lieno aveo la m8re patrie.” 142. Je pourri& ri je le voulais donner pendant plu&eurr heurea der exemples et der prelrver de la politique et des desseins du Qauvernement turo. J’estlme toutefois que cela suffit pour le moment. Je me r&erva le droit de m%tenclra pluo longuement eur In question si la ohose alnvBre n6oeseaire pnr la suite. 143. Quelle solution ndopter? On n nttnali6, A bon droit, l~enucoup dtlmportnnoe A la quostlon de In foroe internntionnle. Mnia, par oontre, on nIen a ncoord6 nucune h lW6ment fondamental de toute ltnffnire, h BRVOh’ 10 proteotlon de l%~tbgrlt6 territorlula et de ltlnd6pendnnoe de la R6publique de Chypre, Ln ohoee nln pno oeulomont un6 importunos en 001, mn10 oonstitue Bgnlement, selon noue, le meilleur moyen d’npnlser oonoid6rnblement l~ntmoeplibre t! Chypre. 146. 1 should like to oonolude my opentng stabment by saying that, as far as the Qovernment of Cyprue 1s oonoerned, we are open to suggestions and ready for disounaiona bath on the politioal eolution of the problem and on the peaoe-keeping aepeot of the problem within the framework of the United Nations. 1 must, however, make it quite olear that the territorial integrity, the unity, the eovereignty and the oomplete independenoe of OUF oountry are not negotiable. Theae are the very thinge we oall upon the Seourity Counoil to safeguard and proteot. We a!% an equal Member of the United Nations, and we feel that we are entitled to this pr+ teotion. We are confident that the Seourity Counoil will not fail uo. If the fundamental elements whioh form the bas& of the exietenoe of the Republio of Cyprua are proteoted and the threat of aggresrion 1s done away with, peaoe in Cyprw oan easily be rertored. TO thie end, my Qovernment le pledged to do ite utmost, with the assistance of tho Seourlty Counoil. 146. Je voudraio, pour oonolure ortte dblarrtion liminaire, dire que, pour sa part, 1s aOuvernement de Chypre est Pr& P entendre ler rwtionr et h partioiper EI des dlsoussions tant en vue de lr uolutlon politique du problbme qu’au rujet de la quertion du maintien de la paix dans le oadre des Nationu Unier. Je dois toutefois bien pr6olser que llinttgritO territoriale, IQniU, la rouverainetb et l’ind6pendanoe oompl&e de notre pays ne @auraient faire l’objet de n4gooiations. C’est pr6oiaOment OI que noua demrndonm au Conseil de a6ourlt6 de protiger et de sauve rcler. Noun sommer Membre8 de I~Organiration des atlonr r Unies, B pleine bgalitb de droite aveo les autrer Metmbree, et nous avoua droit k cette proteotion. Nour voulo~ croire que le Con~011 de WuriU ne nouI dbevra par. Si l’on p&&p ler 616menta fondamentaux qui sont A la bars de llexirtenoe de la R4publique de Chypre, et ri la menaoe dtagre~ricm sot QoarMe, la paix pourra Me airOrnent r&ablie P Chypre. Ls Qouvemsment de la R4publîque de Chypre ofengage h tout mettre en œuvre pour attoindm 06 but, avec llurirtanoe du Conmeil de r6ouriU.

The next speaker on my list 1s the representative of Turkey. First, however, I give the floor to the representatioe of the Soviet Union on a point of order. 148. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’anglain): Ltorabur suivant eur ma lirte ert le reptidrentant de la Turquie, Toutefoi@, je donne d’abord la parole au reprbrentau~ de l’Union roviOtique 8ur une motion d’ordre. 147. Mr: FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Sooialirt Republiosl (tranalated from Ruselan): 1 do not intend to revert to the moral aspeot of the order of rtatemenb. After the brilliant explanation by our Brltlsh oolleague, 1 think that no one hao the rlighteat illWons left about how Britirh diplomatr underntand the question of dlplomatio taot, prrrtlp rnd 10 forth. A8 Ieee it, our oolleague har somewhat infringed, broken with, oertain diplomatio tradition6 of etiquette. But, ae the raying goer, W you break the oharry-tree, it willnot flower” -1t will bear neithor flowerr nor fruit, Mr. Prorident. 147. M. FRDORENKO (Union der R6publiquer eoolalistes sovi~tlque~) [traduit du ruare]; Je n’ai pu Pintentlon d%voquer 1. nouveau Varpot moral de l’ordre der interventiona. A~r&r ler brillanter rxplioationm de notre ool1@10 du Royaume-W, 10 ornia que pnonne n’a plua d~illurion sur la fapon dont ler diplomakr britanniqwr rnvira nt le trot ot le preatige dipIomatlqW3r. Il me 6 rem le qW notre ooll&ue tient de rompre oertainer trrdttlona de lWquot& dbplomatlqua. Mai@, oommo dit le provarbo, un oeririer orra& ne porte plur de ffeun. Il n’a nt floun ni fruits. 148. En oe qui oonoorno la suite do notre d6bnt, Jo voudruls snvoir SI nous allono entendre nujourci~bui tma oeux qui sont insorits MU* lu lista du PrBsIdent ou si nous nous bornerons h Booutor oortains orateurs. Ne pensoe-vous paa qu’il se fait tnrd ot que lVnte+ vention lourde do son8 du Mini&s des affaires &rang&w de Chypre nous obllgo h rr3flbohlr b bien des ohoses? Celn exlgrn du temps. Peut-Btro purrionb-nous noua urr8tor mnlntonnnt. Je voudrnis savoir, Monsleur le Prbsldont, comme VOUQ envisagea la suite dea travaux du Conseil. 148. As 1qlrds OUl’ fUla31~ prooeduro, 1 sllould lilto to know whether we rire to henr toduy 011 the spi3nlcore on tho Presldent~s list or Ifmit ourselves to R oertain group. Do~s net Ihe President thlnlt thnt the hour 1s rathar lnte and that the very serious statement by tho Mini&% for Poreign Affairs of Cyprua requiros of us oonsidernble study nnd thought, for whlch Urne ~111 ho noeded? Perhnps we mlght stop here for today, I ahould Hlte to raise thie queetlon, or In nny cnso to lonrn tho i+esidentls oplnlon nnd nslc how ho vlsunl1zee t110 Yocwlly counc1l’s TUlw31~ worlc. 160. 1 oaIl on the reprerentative of mrkey to opeak on the point raired by the repmnentative of the Soviet Union. Ml. Mr. MENEMENCIOGLU (Turkey)] l%e rtatement whioh the Counoil hae junt heard wae direoted against my dovernment and my people snd the Turb of Cypr~& I am eorry to detain the members of the Counoil, but 1 fesl that in thh partioular oaee, einoe we heve besn direotly attaoked and slnoe a dirtorted pioture har been given, a pioture oontrary to the true eituation in Cvorue and in Turkeu. 1 ahould in a11 frirnk be alitiwed to present our-ride of the otory thir evening. I ehall make very brief replier and shall make my rhtement, reserving the righttospeakagain tomormw.

In the light of what the Counoil hae herrd fmm the reprerentative of Turkey, may 1 urume thnt it le prepared to oontinuethedebate now? 169, Ao 1 bear no objeotioa, 1 cal1 on the repreeentative af Turkey. 164. Mr. MENEMENCIOQLU (Turkeybt 1 thank you, Mr. Prerident, and X thank the other members of the Counoil for giving me thir opportunity to speak. 165. We bave Jurt heard an extraordinary distortion of whrt hu hapwned. 1 am net hem to tive a11 the an#wera thir e%.ingr it ir now late and, iii any oaee, my main rtatement oontainr most of ths annwers, My doloption ir not hera ae a defendant. We are the aooumen, net .tha defendank: it ir we who have ben wronged, If I rpeak thia evening, it 10 beoauae we owe it to the tnemory of hundrh of dotimr to aet the piohwe rtrright, oorreoting the one chat har juet been plroed before the Counoil. 166. Befon making my main @tatament, 1 wirh to drrw tba rttention of inerdmrr of Mm Counotl to the following. Tbe Turkirh Cyprlot leader, Dr. Fmbil KU#k, ViocPrrridsnt of tke Republlo of Cypnu, oiroulated during tb previour debak hia virwr oonoeminr tbe entirely uuoonetitutioarl rltuation whioh l xidrtr ; f05, roo0rdin r -to the Constitution of Cypnu, any dooirion to aek or a meeting of tbe Seourity Counoil and to mrnke 8 polioy statement befora it ahould be tuken only after oonrsultation with tho l’urkieh mombers of tbe Cabinet and wlth tho uoaent of tha ‘I’urkish Woa- Preeldent. Dr. KUqt&% viowe wero oiroulntod to tlie Seourity Counoil in dooument S/G491.3 167. Yoatorday, wo bnd onotber meosn(le from Dr. KUc$ik; thia bac aleo lztxsl oiroulated [8/GGGl ].y In lt 2 IbIfL - la d6olrlon de demander une r4unicrn du Conroll de abourltb et d’y prbsenter une dbolaratlon d’ordre politique no devrait lX.re prise qu’nprbo ooneultation dos mombree turos du Cnblnet et nvoo ltnssentimotlt du Vioo-PrBaident turo. LB dooument S/G4Ol~qui 0. Et6 dIstribu au Coneeil de 80ouritb oontient 10s vue8 do M. Kt!çUk. 167. Hier, nous nvono BU un autre message do K\. KUçUk qui n B@emont 6t4 dLtribu6 [S/GWl% z/ Ibid. 168. 1 now wish to make my main statement. 169. On 27 Deosmber 1963 the Qreek Cyprlot representative, Mr. Ro&des, requeeted an urgont meeting of the Ssourity Counoll on the grounda that Cyprruu waa under the threat of imminent attack fmm Turkey. Mr. Rosridee motlvated hi8 requeet on three pointa: he alleged that RAF planes had epotted TurNeh ships moving towarda Cyprua; ho olaimeci that the Turldsh military unit of 600 men, statloned in Cyprms in aucordanos with the Treaty of Allianoe, was aoting in violation of the Treaty obligations; and he asaerted that Cypriot air opaoe wa8 being violated by TurMsh airoraft. Mr. Rossides insieted on a preoipitate meeting, whloh started at 11.18 p,m. and went on until the early hours of the next morning. Fome avaient rep6r6 des navires turor 06 dirigeant vera Chypre; il affirmait qu’un oontingsnt militaire tum de 600 hommea, rtatlonn6 A Chypre oonform6- ment au Trait6 d’alliance, agirrail en violation der obligationa ddooulant du Trait6, et il affirmait que l’eepaoe a6rien de Chypre btalt viol6 par l’avlatlon tu ue, “f ait M. Roasides insistait pour qu’une r6union ieu imm&liatementr la r6union a eu lieu 0 18 h 16 et c’est poureulvie tard dana la nuit, 160. Le monde entier sait qu’auoune dea aoouaationr de M. Roa~ides n’6talt fond6e. Au oontraire, 11 a 6t6 prouv6 par la ruib que le rapport de la Royal Air Fome oonoernant les navires turor dana la M6dltarran6e orientale avait 6U d6form6 et falrffib par le pepr6eentant de Chypre. L&a b&timenta tun aa question avalent 6tb apergua r’bloignant de Chypre et non pas oe dirigeant verm Chypre: efi fait, ila avaient 6t6 rep6r6r A 38 mlller de la CM! de Chypre. Comme oetta fie ert ritu6e A 40 milles de la Turquie, les navin’r en question se trouvaient normalement dana Ier eaux territorialor turques. 161. En dewdbme lieu, le gbntral Young, oonunanlt en ohef der fomer britannique& turquer et greoqwa ohargbsr du maintien de la paix a Chypre, a ptii86 dans une d6olaration Qrîte que le@ unit68 turqmr avaient agi et oontint.@ent d’agir uniquement relon oen ordres, oomme oela avait 6t6 oonvenu par les troir pubranoer garantor. 161. En trofribme lieu, la pteuva a 6t6 faite, au moment of8 M. Roerider damandait d’ur F noe la oonvuoation d’une r6anoe de nuit du Conte 1 da r6ourit6, qu’auoun avlon turo n’avait rurvol6 Cbypm depuis tmir jour& Un reul avion a rurvol6 10 territoire le II d6oembro, demandant l’urr6t der effuslonr derang dalu l’fle. 163. Xl vlont d’6tre frit k nowoau atluekm A OOI VOIR. M. Kyprfano~ oient de dire qua Ifavlon volait au ras dsr tolte, 06 qui dOrangeait oertafne habitante. Mai6 noue notu trouvons en face d’aoteo ri horrible8 que je loieee aux membre8 du Conseil le coin de juger de la gravit6 de OQCJ vole paoiflques sana ooup do feu et ann8 dommago pour quioonque; je laieee nux membre6 du Conseil le 8oin de juger 00th tentative pour gros& d6meeur6ment les faits. 164. Comme on 10 sait, lee membres du Conseil de s6ourlt6 n’ont marne pae diaout6 lee nll@a#o~ do la d616gation obypriote paroe qu’il n’y avait rien b. dleouter: auoune propoeltion n’n 6t6 faite et auoune d6oieion n’a Bu) prieo. 160. Al1 tic world knows that non6 of the olaims of Mr. Roarides WM substantiated. Cn the oontrary, it wao rubaequently proved that the report of the RAF about Turktsh rhip in the Eastern Mediterranean had been distorted and falsified by the Qreek Cypriot repre sentative. The Turkish shipa in question were spotted rteaming away from Cyprus, and not towards Cyprus, Aa a mattor of tact, they were spottedat a dietanoe of thirty-right mile6 from the ooast of Cyprua. As that Island ia forty miles off Turkey, these rrhipe were in normal Turkirh ooartal waters. 161. In thr reoond plaoe, Ganeral Young, Commander of tk Britirh-TurNobQreek peaoe-keeping forotrr in Cypnu, har given a written atatement to the effeot that the Turkirh unit8 have aoted and oontinue to aot entirely under hir ordere, an agred uponbythe three guarantor .Fowem. 162. In tbe third place, it wae wrified that at the time Mr. RoUdee waa arking for an ur r meetfng of the Seourity Counoil, no Turkir nt nlght a1mrJt bad flown owr Cyprue for tbree dayr. The oely fligbt waa a ring10 fligbt on 21 Dsoember, urgingthe oema- Uon of bloodrhed on the irland. 163. Wa ham jumt haard another l llurian to there flights. Mr. Kyprfanou har jurt raid that the airoraft fIaw very low over the roofa of the ho~ea, disturbing Rome inhabitants. But WI are oonfmnted tith euoh horrible deed~ that 1 lenve it to membere of the Counoil to judge the eeriousness of penooful flights, in wbloh there wna no firlng nnd whioh onuaad no damage to nnyone: 1 leave it b members of tbe Counoil t0 jndge tbe attompt to mnke a big story out of thie. 164. A8 1s known, the memhere of the Seourity Coun- 011 did not even dieouas tho nllegations of the Cyp:iot dolagation beonuao tbere wna nothing to dlsouss; no proporrnle were modo and no deoisione waro tnken. . 166. The reason why euoh an attempt was made to divert the attention of the world was that during 27 Deoember, for the first time, foret@ oorrespondents in Cyprus httd found it possible te pas8 through ths Qreek Cypriot terrorist bande whioh eurrounded the Turkish oommunity of Nioosta. During tbe entire week before that day, the Turkieh seotors in Cyprua had bad their telenhone lines eevered and a11 their means of oommunioation with the outside world had been oomnletely out off. What was happening in Cyprus was made known only tbrough the Qreek Ctiriot radio, the Qreek Cypriot oommunity ànd the bulletins ieaued by the leaders of the Qreek Cypriots.Cn29 Deoember the newspapere of the world were to report for the fimt time wi.at impartial newepapermen had seen as eyewitnesses in the Turkieh seotor of Nioosia. 167. What’they saw and what they had to report wae horrible. The faot that the Seourity Counoil, the highest organ of the United Nations and, in many oases, the supreme instanoe for the preservation of peaoe on our planet, was being used in an attempt to divert attention from theee hideous orimes only esrved to aooentuate the tragedy of that unhappy Chrietmae week in Cyprus. 166. Witb your permission, 1 shall read a few very brief extraob. Thir one is from the London Q&lr $xnresr of 29 Deoember-preoisely the morningwben the Seourfty Counoil finished its debate here-under the beadline ‘In the Forbidden City”: *We went tonight into the realed-off TurMsh auerter of Nioosia in whioh 200 to 300 neoole have &cn alaughtered in the last five dayr ;. . ke have eeen thinas too friuhtful to be deroribed in nrinthorron Ëo sxtremsthat tbe people seemed &med beyond tsars and reduoed to anhyrterioal and mirthlerr glggle tbat 10 more terrible than tean , , . We made our way into a house wbore floorr were oovered witb broken @arr .,, in the bathroom, lookinp Iike a group of waxworks, were three deadobildrenpiled on top of their murderedmother.In aroom nuct to it we glimpeed a bndy of a woman rhot in the head . , ,a 169. Tlmt euds the quotatlon, whioh is only part of tbe horrible nrtiola. Newspapers nnd magazines a11 over tha world published photogrnphs of wbnt WRS seen during theee first days of the visit to Nioosia. 170. Rere is nnother extraot frcm a reprt, dated 30 Deoember, sent by Mr. Ceorge Weller, Pulitzer Prize winner nnd oorrespondent for the Chiongo m News: The U.S. Aid Miesion wes able to provide food for t.he besieged Turkish sohool ohildren after severel houre of negotiation by Amerioan aid ohief and U.S. Ambaesador , , ,a 171. Theee were somo of the deeds witnessed forthe firet time on 26 Deoember. The mornintz after the Seourity Counoil waa being asked to 1iËten to unfounded allegatione on how thfa llttle ialand wes being threetened by a big neighbour. During the dey* that followed the impartial Preee of the world. nemely, Italien, Frenoh, &rman, Brftish, Amerioen,~Japene& and other oorreepondente, publiehed eyewitneas reporte of the hideous maesaore planned andpsrpetrated by the extreme Qreek Cypriot faction againet the defenoelees Turkieh oommunity, inoluding women and ohildren. It is oleer by now to the world thet this emall island has a big orime on ita oonsoienoe whioh it 18 trying to oonoeal to no avail. A# the Itelinn new.speper Il Gforno of 15 Januery 1964 saysr 171. VoilRquelques-uns des note8 dont oertaine ont 6tb b3moine pour la premibre foie le 26 dboembre: le lendemain meme, ie Conseil de obouM btait ap$el6 B 6oouter de8 all6aetions denuber de tout fondement sur le meni&e dont oetre petite fie (tait meneo6e par un grand voisin. Au oours des jours qui ont nuivi, la presse fmpertiale du monde, B savoir les fournew italiens, frange& allemands, anglais, embrioainb, japonais et autre& a pub116 les rboitu de Mmoino ooulai=e dea maeseorea ebominebiee organieba et perpbttis par les extrbmietee ohyprlotea grecs oontre le oommuneutd turque oens ddfenne, y oomprir ler femmes et les enfants. Il est maintenant bvident pour le monde entier que oette petite ile a un,grend orime dur le ooneoienoe et qu’elle esreie en vain de le dissimuler. Comme l@oriveit le 15 fanvier 1964 le joGel itaiien Il Oiornor “Noua esslstons maintenant L l’exode de Turorr qui fuient leurs villages1 dee milliers de Turor quittent leura foyera et leur8 tcrrreo et abandonnent leur Wteil. b terrorisme greo est Implaoable. Rien ne peut plus maintenant le dlsrimuler, rien ne peut rileaohe; un oomportement ruari horrible et ausri .** 172. C1eat un orime qui a dt6 oondemn6 pw la preare internrtionale. Le Journal suiroe m du 16 janvier 1964 1% quelifi6 de ‘oruel*. Le m YLLprlrt, journal paM8tantib. a prrl6 danr r0n nuln&Q “We now witneas en exodua of Turko from the villages8 thousands of Turks are leaving their homes, their land and their oattle. The Qreek terrorism le impleoeble. There 10 nothing thet oen oonoeel, at thia time, euoh horrible end feroolous behaviour , , ,a t72. Thla 10 e orime whioh hee been oondetnned by the international Pre61. Switcerlendlr Neue Zllroher Zeihmq of 16 Jenuary 1964 hes termedit a6 r~ruelty”. Pekirkn’r Mualim World of 4 Februery 1864 har oelled lt .?gonooide”. Mw Cloe in le Fi K) of du 4 fdvrier 1864 de g&moIde. MU Clor, duu & Fi ro du 3 f6vrier lB64, rapporte qu’un membre 0 Irp”, EOKA, I’organtration brrorlrte, I, dtolar(r Qfakarior e oommlr une erreur quand il a ri@ le oerrec-le-feu le 26 d4oembm. Il aura& db noum donner 24 heures de plua. Il n’y aurait plur eu alolm un oeul Tum 6 Nlooria.~ 3 February 1864 quoter e member of E &* rorirt urgenierrtion, a0 seying: aMekarior WBI wrong in rlgnlng the oeere-firs on Deoember 26. He rhould bave glven ua another twenty-four heurs. ‘T’nere would have bzen no Turb left in Nioosie.’ 173. The &rooitiel thet were oommltted durlng the Chrlrtmrr week rnd the burning of Turldrh borner wem deroribed by the London D 11 ---if Of 1 January 1864 81 @appalling rightr , . , In a ni t of terrer 360 villapn, men, women and ohildren, venished. They were ell Tu&.’ 174. Tlw next doy ths London Dnilv Skstoh reported: 173. Lea l tmoiYr oommlror au om de larem8h0 Q No61 et lfinoenUio de mairotu turqwr ont w ~~~~l~~~~:,~~~~~ nuit de terreur 310 villageole, hommr, femmrr l t enfanta, ont disparu. Toua @aient Tur06.~ 174. Lo londsmnin, 10 Dailv Skstoh de Londroe 6orivoit: V~I maieons tUlqU0B dans la ville (do Niooeia) ont 6t6 inoendi6es au moyen de fl8ohas entour6oB de ohiffo nduits de pnrnffine at uns oentaine do partisane de 1’EOKA pnroouralont loe villos ct villages, l’nrme au poing.” 176. 1s i4 jnnvier 1964, 10 Daily Mail de Londrosa “Turkish homes in the oity (of Nioosiu) hod bosn Bet ablnze by arrOWB tipped with pnrnffin ooatod rags, nnd 100 hard oore MOKA men were prowling towne nnd villngss under ar8ms.n 176. On 14 Jnnunry 1064 tho London DA~~Y hIail roported “AbOUt 20 to 30 TU~~E were Cound orudely buried in trsnohes”. A ~~Ap~lOl~tB qUO “20 A 30 TurOs Avaient bt6 d6oouverts sommalromont entorrds dnns de8 trnnoh0os”. 171. B dwalling at some length on tb8 prw!oua meeb Ing of 213 Secwlty Counoll on th!r querüon, my dsla- Uon whhœ to drrw the attentfon of the memben of 8 8 the hlghert organ of the Unit& Nation# b the IVourrwnt attsnrpb to ab-0 ltr rutborlty. hrrkey ira10 of the foundem of tbe Unitel Nttloni and wu alro a Member of tha former Leagua of Nat!on& Bver dnoe itr ertabllrhment Lha ltepubl!c of ‘IMmy bar been a mœt vdent Mfmder of !nt4rnat!oaaloo-opciratlnn, of ooUwjt!vc~ reourltv. of tbn ~ro!f!o rsttlsment of d!r- C. prkr, of tba rerpeof ior humin rlghh, of d!xrrmament md d the brothhood anclthad!arftyof!nen. In rhort, Turkey hu bwn rd aontlnusr to bëamoet loyal r* porter of tbs pr!m!pler rnd purpooox uf tha Charter d tb Unltai N&ON. Ws bave rerled thir alleg!aeae to tlm pr!no!pler rd tbe Un!ted N&!OM w!th tha blood d œr mm wbo hnve ven +Uxdr Mer in Kart38 under Thrkey hu oollaborrted montmdtbmAlateMnœdper~!n*rrlouuprrtud tbe world, %WI~Y bu srfd a11 ltx aontr!but!oaa rnd tbw brwght lta iot!ve Ëuppwt to t!w praoe-kaep!n# Fr nticna d tlm Uatkd N&~OM. In rhort, ‘Ua Unltad auaw h the corœrrtoœ of Turkhh fOrelgn policy. Wo klhva tlut In tb!t rugi2 Orgudutlon lie tba bqm for rnvhg humudty fmm utter dhuter. Tbsre Ln tlla muoM why w find ît lMdmh.ibb thal any oou&y, wlMher ît k blg or rmall, rhould nthmpt ta tuo ow Orgmlorttœ u 8 rhleld for Ita rlnhtw eobmm mdthat Rrhouldtrytomakarmoolrsrs’of WPW. 178. Tb momlmru d tlu 6oourity Caxboil rrmr’h jeoMd to 8mUnr lmrd pmaura dmnmd for an omkm lT0, A lbutteri newu d!Bpatoh quotad tba Commander of the jo!nt petto+mrldng foroe, General Pater Young, Au lLBylng the foIIowing1 nntmhlre de IA uol!t!atm Otrandm tum-. Nau or&0118 qu’en oeita r&ub oig8ntrntiOË rOpM0 I’amfr de umumr l’human!t6 d’un dhutm flnrl. mih ront lea rrirau pour leaquellex ncxmext!mom qu’il art inadmhr!bIe qu’un payx, grand ou petit, urrh b II. mervir dr notm organhtion oomaiod’un bowIler pour moUre A œ&outha wa rînhtm PmleM et qu’tl eorrlr Q jrtm k dhor&Iit IUF mm trrtrw. 176. Lu membm du Coaxail 6m 9hw!t6 ont (tl l’ab@t il y 1. trolr ji’uw dr namllw prwrfotu pair oonvoqwr d%rgmoe Ii Co~o!l, x0111 le pr4tod db autra intamantton !mm!wnted’ua!th m!l!Wru blqtmm 8 cllypm L8prorruhnqulbrdBrChyprlobr ~arwdQttenauwlIoW.mboduCamoDoob aidut ao 1’borNurqw IemaldurdpK’uve@a @ppmmt l’nttrpu plwodiw opwe ia Eu!t plat &C&e par k pouœ okyprioteotdnbuldaooirtL n fa quArtlen r4Mmud8 tulw do oertain moment un ohnr de fabrlortlon lucale L attnqub et d6truit une ol!n!quB turque ob Otalant hwp!tr!!80~ dœ !IIfirDles et dcfJ’~Adea. . -110 179. Selon uue d@%oha bR l’rgenoe Reuter, le Con+ mandant de la foroe oommune de mr!n#en Cie le Paax, le g8nOral Peter Young, a dit oe qu! Su!t; Wo bonne heure 06 mrtln, lot3 Or8os onl lnncb une l thque dOlib6rba rppuybe par un ohw de faix+ oatinn lonaIe, un bu!!doasr bl!n&! et cEiverur~ arm@@ offsnu!ves telle0 qua des basookwo airna!, Iwpolw’ olabd Pmrr of 14 February the mornlng riter the maaraom of Limasrol the Qmek Cyprlot Pmeo, 1:‘ huge headllnes, sald the followinpl$ ‘Ha11 to the heross -We’ve won’, and ‘Turka hrrs bean ranqul&ed- TO killed”. Aho, u.loordlQg to th #ew ‘Yo- T La%?= of 15 February, 1n oontrnat to the delolation Turklah quartor tka Qmek quartar, wbioh ir flva timer largdr, W*LI in a Mlday mood, and a Gmsk poliosman boaetaI that them waa net a&gleo~ualty en tbalr ride, 131, Thir lr ths typa of Individua with whlob vm bave to derl. Thir lr tha mentallty whioh dominater tba lma@nation of tha Qmek Cyprlot terrorlsb. Thir L the way of thînktng of a mob toda , They am an md wlth tha oMllzad world beoauns 2 t ry msent net allowad t6 oarry on a widsr rlrughter. lng 133. 1 am uwam that nome of tba thinp I bave to ray muat round fnomdlble, unbal1evable. Unfortunately, thay am a11 trw and, M tha memlnxn of tha Couna mlght bava notlopd, I hrve been extremsly oautloto t0 quota only fmpartlal aour00I. 1 bave not qu0tad Turklah ~oumea, 133. AM! now, Mr. Pmrldent, witb your permins1on may we taka up brMlythequsrUon0fsliatirattlm b0ttom d a11 theas troubler in Cyprua. 184. Aa in known, Cyp~~ ir an lrland lnbab1ted by two dbthot 0ommunltler, eaob with ltr own 1 and religion, and erch wlth a rrparato oulkr T3 etbnI0al baokgmund. Ttm la-r commun@, about 80 pr actnt, Ir tbe Orsek oommunity~ tba rmallrr me, about 10 par oent, lm Turldrh. Tbs entlre 134. comme 011 b ralt, chyplu ut ‘JlM ll8 bahMa pu deux oommunautb dirttnotu ayant ohaoum aa luuw.rrmlidon6ltohMuwuMoultumatw#rd ?zP of Cypw b about E80,OOO. Tbe IrlamilIwa fi!! mile8 off tha oout 0f kla XbUn0r, tb6 mainland of TU~- key. In hbtory, cyprua hM belo* b ths kryrian, lbml~, Arab, Eutern Roman Empfmr, to tba LwlgMw’,thevowtluNandto~TurkbhBmpin The fate of tbb irland ha8 atwayr tin Mmd to that of klr Nlnor of wbloh lt haa formed a put throu&- ait mwt of lta hldory. 131. It’ 1933, Turkey 0e&d, by tho Tmrty 0f Latllumo, fta uvetmignty omr Cyprum to Omat Britain, nrhloh had aoquimd effwttm abmlnlrtratlm of t& Waed in 1373 00 tht bulr of a rprohl r*rangmant. Cypnu tbmafbr mmdmd a Brltlrh ooloay u1tl1 lt beorm~ an lndependent Republlo in 1960. 138. Wii Cypruo WPO a Brltieh oolony, tbe C?m& CyprW-4 oftm mgitated in fwour of w~Oel~n, tbe anwxah~t~ of Cyprw to (Ireaoe. The Turklah Cyprlotu, on th@r sfde. demandod tbe return of the Island Q TpLrkey. YAngt. debatee and uorimonlous dleoueslon& bdh lnalde tbIe United Nattons and outiide in oth0r oonfemnoe@, dld not provs frultful In arrlvlng at a 80luticn cm sny of tb0ee llnce. 136. Laruqw Chypm btalt uw oolonle britaunlque, leo Chypriote8 gre0e ont mouvant manlfeatb en faveur de l’Enos1a. l’annexion do Chuar0 L la CM0e. Do leur a6tQ, lie Chyprlotam turor ont d6manM la && de l’fls P la Turquie. DO w d&tm et d’hpr+sa dlsowrlow, tant au roln Q I’OrganfsatlPo d6a Natfoar Unlar quQ d’autre0 oonfbrenoen, n’ont par rmir d’arriver A une aolutiun DAM un senu ou LEla ts(l autre, 187. 1 ohall not go into tbo argumenta and oou&p argumentm exp0undod durlng tbe longthy debatoc In 137. Je n’6ntmr81 pas dana le d63tall der argtimenb et oontm-arpmmb a~& au o0um c%a d&& 136. Xt III under there oiroumstanoea mat the Turkish and Qreek Governments, realieing their reeponoibilitiee toward the two oommunitier in Cyprua and toward ths maintenanoo cl world peaoe, hadarrived at a oomnromise formula at the Zurioh Conferenoe in Febru&, 1969. Thie oompromise formula, latsr endoreed bu Oreat Britain and the two Cynriotoommunitiee at the London Conferenoe, 1s the very bas16 of the pmssnt oonetitutional and juridioal statue of the island. 189. The purpose of the London and Zurioh Agmemonts wa8 to ensure equilibrium and harmony between tbe oommunil;ee livingron tbe island, to safeguard the internata of Turkey, of Qreeoe and of the United Kingdom and to bring peooe and atability to the area. TO tbis effeot, indopendenoo was granted to Cyprus with 8 rpeoial Constitution suited to its partioular oiroumstanoes and ssveral treatles were oonoluded. lB0. Tbis Constitution stinulated that C~~rue would be a republio under a presidential tiglme; ihe Pmaident being a CWeek Cypriot and tbe Vioc-Preaident a Turkiah Oypriot, eleoted by the Greek and Turkish oommunitier d Cyprue, respeotfvely. Complote oommunal autonomy waa awarded in the Conetitution for the two groupe of population, Qreek and Turkieh. It alao inoluded many provirions derigned to ensure equitable partioipation by tbu TurkisL oommunity in legirlative and governmental funotionn. Again& a parfble danger that tbe Qreekr, who ware innumerioal majority, migbt dîrregard oompletely tbe intererts of tba Turldah oommunity, the Vice-Fresident WM vested wlth a veto power in oertain mattera in the fieldr of fore@ polioy, defeme atxl reourity. As far aa taxation wmm oonoerud, tha Conrtltutfon raqulred the oonourrent majoritler of botb tbe Turtdeh and Orwk memben of Parliament. 101. In addition to *%a Oonrtitution, treatier were oo~0luded ta guaranfae the statue of the irtand under itr Co~titution, am well u to provide for tb8 mutual defewe requiremente of C@rue, l nd of the region. Tbe Treaty of Quarantee wae derigned to l afeguard &e !mbpendewe, territorial integrity and reourity of Cypnu u welt a@ the bamio l rtiolem of Itm Co&ltutioa. Aooordi~ to thir Treaty, tbe Republio of Cypnu radrrtook to reopot ftm Conmtitution. Greeoe, TWœy and thm Unitod Kin@om, for thelr pa&, r ranteed tba mtatm of affaira oreated u a remit the buîo l rtiohm of thm tXmmMtuU00 of Cyprw. Tlmy further mrdsrtook, ln tbe event of a breaoh of the Treaty and of tho coMt1tution, to ooneult toizether. with resneot to the measurea neoossory to eGur0 the observanoo of the oommitmonte. The Treaty provided aleo tbat if oommon and ooneulted notions ehould provo impossible, eaoh of the guarantor Powers would hnve the right to take individual aotion with tho aim of reeatablisbiug tha state of affaire oreated by the Treaty. Tho Treaty of Allianoo, betweon Turkey, Graeoe and the Republio of Cyprus, establisbed a tripnrtito bondquarters and provided for the atationing of Turkieh and <Yreek foroes in Cypms, in oertnin numbera. Tbese were tbe foruos that oausod tho oomplaint 01 Mr. Kyprianou aome time ago, ment. loi, En plus de la Constitution, des trait& ont bt4 oonolur pour garantir le rtatut de Pfle en vertu de l a oonetitution et pourvoir aux benoine mutuels de &fen.ee de Chwre et de la rbdon. Le Trait4 ds P rantie btait ~&stine A rauvegader i%xlbpendaooe, ‘inugritb territoriale et la s6ourit8 de Chypre ainsi que Ier artioler fondamentaux de aa oonrtltution. En vertu de oe traitb, la R@ubliqw de Chypre ofengapait A rerpeoter ea oonetitution. La Gr&os, la Turquie et le Royaume-Uni, de leur 06% garantfrraient IWat de ohoeer or66 par Ier artioles fondamentmx de la ConrtlMîon de Chypre, Il@ #‘Ongageaient en outm, en osa de violation du Trait4 ou de la Constitutioo, A se oonrulter sur les meoures A adopter pour assurer le respeot des engagements prie., la Traite prevoynit 8ga~Onlont quo, 81 des mo8ure~ oommunes ot oonoert6es 88 r0v6laient impoeslblos, ohaouno des Puismnooe gnranms aurait le droit d’agir B titre individuol dans le but dc retablir l%tat do ol~osae or&3 par 10 Traite. La Trait4 d’alllnnoe, oonolu entra la Turquie, la QrAoe et la Rbpubliquo do Chypre, Fortait or6ntion d’un quartier gt%~6rn1 tripartite et prevoyait IO stationnement A Chypre d.d troupes turques ot grecques, dont il dOterminait les effaotifs. Il s’agit IA des foroes dont M. Kyprianou s%at plaint il y a quelquo mmp6. a4 “The C&neral Assembly, Vlavinp oonsidered the question of Cypmrs, 19;;Ma11ing its resolution 1013 (Xl) of 26 February , nExnrssseo lb oonfldenoe that oontinued efforb will bs made by the parties to reaoh a peaoeful, demooratio and just eolutlon In aooordanoe with the Charter of the United Nation&” 194. Having debated the Cyprus questlon for four years, the United Nations thus deoided unanimously that thb only way to arrive at a uatisfaotory solution would be by direot negotlatlons amongthe parties oonoerned aimlng at a harmonloun squlllbrium betwsen tbe varlous legitimate interests. Turkey WM partloularly pleased wlth the prospeot of a harmoniow settlement errived at in the Zurioh and London Agreements. Turkeyls lnterest in Cy-prua has nover sbmmed from a derire of territorial aggrandleemsnt, from any ambitlon to aoquire pnrstlge or from self-interest. Tur key’r main oonoern, f rom the ouket, ha6 been to safe- @tard the rfghb and the lioes of its oompatriota on thlr irland whfoh 1s geographioally a part of Asla Mlnor. At the rame tlme, ‘lkrkey Le a great stake ln the malntenanoe of psaoe and atablllty and tranqullllty In tbe eaatern Medlterranean ao it bar the 10ngsrt rbormllne in thnt @on. Every tlme that the psaoe of tblr vital region ir dlrturbed, Turkey rlrka bain@ lnvoloed In the oonfllot. Therefore, Turby tua a real lnterert In havlng ruoh a rtatua In Cyprua an would l llow both communMer to live in psaos. Ths ouly way of aohlevfn 0llmInrtlag tba % ruoh a rtatus 10 obviously by porrl Ility of one oommunity oppresslng the other. In oonaequenoe, Turkey has strongly f0lt from the outsat that the only roaeonable and lastlng solution to the Cyprus problom wodld be one whioh would provlde approprînte guaranteoe to the smallor oommunity, whlob 1s tho Turkish oommunity. 195. T%us, TurIrey% Inturoet for tho exlstenoe of lasting poaoo and stablllty on ib Mediterranean ~>OIL dore envlsagee the welfnre, the aafety, the happinese d6old6 A l~unanlmltb que la seule manlbra dtaboutlr A une solution eatisfaisante reralt dlhWuer des nbgoalatlonr dlroobs entre Ier partles en oaum, sfin de rballser un bquilibre harmonieux entra le@ dlvera lnt+Itbtr 10 P Urnes. La Turquie s%tsit par tioulibrement fblio tbs des perspeotives d’un rbglement ratlrfalaant auquel avalent abouti les AaooMa de Zurloh et de Londres. L%Mr8t qw la Turquie porte A Chypre n’a JamaUi 6M lrupltd par un d4olr dlexpannion territoriale, par l’ambition d%qrdrir du prertiga ni prr un lnt&# &&Me. WI le dbbut, II, prlnolpale pr8oooupatlon a 6U de prot4ger le@ drolta et ler vler de #ao oompatrloter dans oette fie, qui, @ographiquement, fait partis de l’Aaie Mineure. En m6me temp, la Turquie rttrohe un If and lnt6Ht YU mdntlen de la pdx, de la tranq lllt4 st’da la rtabllitd en M6dibrran40 orientale, 4tant cban6 quWle pamAd0 la ligne de ~Oter la plur 1 rbglon. Chaque fols que la paix wtt rzr drar oatte ldedulm oet(s r(glon d’lmportsnoe vit&, la Tuxqule risqua ds I» voir rutraM duu 10 oodllt. Par ooar(qwnt, olh 8 rbrltsblement MM& A nlllor L 00 quo Cbypn alt un rtstut qul permette aux deux oommunaut6s ds ooexlstor paoiflquemont. La seule fapon d’arrlvor A oe etatut est bvldsmment dWimlnar toute poaeibllltb pour une oommunautt3 d’opprlmor l’autre. Par oonf@uent, la Turquie a fait savoir ti%s bnsrglquemeut, dAe le ddbut, que la eeule eolution raieonmble et durable du problbmo do Chypre serait oolle qui donneralt des gnrantfoe eatlsfaleantes A la oommunautb la plm faible, oteet-a-dire In oommunnutb turqrre. 106. Ainai, lM&,8t que la Turquie porte A l%tabllaeemont d’une palx durable et A la otablllt0 sur SOQ frontibree mbùiterran6snnaa n pour objeotif le blonof the agreements, was determined to bring about ohanges in the status of the ieland in one way or another and eepeoially to do away with the guarantees aooorded to the Turkish oommunity. X97. Arohbishop Makarios not only refueed to implement the fundamental provisions of the Constitution, but also made plain, in a numkr of etatemente, that he wns looking for the first opportunitp to try to do away with the basio artioles. We have in our files a very largo assortmbnt of statements to this effeot. Although he was warned by the Turkish oommunity and the Turldsh Glovernment of the danger of suoh aotiom, he persieted in doing 80. Last Auguet, Arohblshop Makarios publioly announoed that he would oonsider 1964 as tbe appropriate year for ohanging the Constitution in the way he desired, deepite the Turlcish oommunity% warning that the time wa8 inopportune for reopening this issue. Subsequent events hare shown how tragloally aoourate this prediotion was tobe. 198. During the inoreased oampaign whioh followed for the repudiation of tbe international treaties and tha basio artioles of the Constitution, the Cresk Cypriot leaders made it plain that they intended to Imep a11 the advantages and the benefits they had aoauhd throush the multilateral oonferenoe and its oompromise, <hile they were determined (0 do away with a11 ths oounterparts that had made these arrangementi aoasptable to the other inter&& parties. 199. In November 1963, Arohbishop Makarios rubmltted to ths Vioc-Pxwrident, Dr. Facil KUgUk, and te the three guarantor Powers, a memorandum in whloh he put forwaxd thirtsen proposrls for amending ths bulo artioler of tb Constitution. There proporalr wers designed to alter radioally the presrnt rtatus of tlm irland and to talco awry fmm the Turkish oommunitF ths rights whioh were oonsîdered as srsential for its proteotion by the Zurioh and London Agreement& The Turldsh oommunity indioated that it oould not aooept suoh proposale whioh would endanger it8 vory oxistenoe. Tbe Turkisb cYovornmant, ns one of tbe guarsntor Powers, also made known its objeotiona to the propoeals of Arohbishop Mnknrios. 200. During thia period tlhe Creok Cypriot Proea nnd radio brondonste inoreasod theirvirulont nntl-Turkisb propagunda and thoir inetigntione to terrorlee the Turkiah oommunity and to oubjugnte it by violent moans. Apnrt from thia yrese and radio onmpnlgn, Omok Cypriot underground organizotions inoreaeed 201. On the night of 21 Detoember 1983, aotionetarted with the killing by Qreek policemer. of two Turks, a man and a woman, and the woundingof five others who were travelltng in an automobile, The next day, the Qreek Cypriot polioe openeïi fire on Turkishstudents, wounding two youths. Thie is how this inoident and the preoeding one were reported in the Manohester @ardiw by Miohael Wall, ita uorrespondent in Nioosia t “, ,, in the early morning of Deoember as, a Turkish mari and a woman were kllled. There ie no doubt that oertatn Qreeks .had been deliberatsly provoking the Turks to aotion. For a weekor two before thid, Qreeks in oivillan olothes had been demanding to sec the identifioation papers of the Turku in Nioosia whioh oaused bitter rssentment. Qn Deoember 23rd, armed Qreek polioe shot at Turkish sohoolboys.” 202. There incidents oonstituted only the bsginning of an ail-out aotion undertaken by Qreek Cyprlot termrists against the Tu&, not only in Niowla but tbrougbout the ieland where, in many parts, thel’urklsh oommunity 1s surrounded w muoh larger Qreak oonununitier. On Christmas Eve wao staged the 11+ funour attrtik. of tbe EOKA terrorirts on the rosidential diotriot &Kaimakli near Nioosia, It wao during thir rttaok that the greatest number of Turkirh women and ohildren were brutally killed, as attested to by Britirh eyewitnero corresponde&. Everywhere the Qreek Cypriota attaoked syrtematioally by uoing ruoh hsavy weapons as mortars and maohlne-guns. During thir onslaught, Qreek Cyprlot terrorbb penetrated TurkIsh Cypriot houoer and oarrled away at gunpoint hundredr of women and ohildren aa hostagor, There vers 700 at one point whoue liver were moatly rrved through the kind intervention of tha Britbh foroe. Unfortunately, 160 are rtill unaooounted for. ont tir6 sur un booller turc.” aoa. Oea inoidank n’btaient que le dObut d’une ration de grande envergure entreprise par ler ter* rirtor ohyprioter greos oontra les Tuma, non roulement L Niooolr, main danr toute ~T¶O, oh, en de nombreux poinb, la oommunaut6 turqw Malt rnoerol&a par des oommunaut4s grwques bleu plus nûmbreurer. La veille de NoUl r’ert produite l’attaque odieume dsr torrarirtaa de 1’EOKA oontre le quartier rbridsntlel de Kaimakll, prbr de Nlooria, Clut au oours de oett0 attaque que le plum grand nombre do Turoa, felnlnrr et enfants, ant a4 sa le rapportant de8 oorrerpondantr T ment tus, aamms ritmniquur qui aat dtt( ttmoinr ooultirer cler btinsmsnts. Partout, lor Chypriotsr greor ont attaqub ryrthatiquement, utilisant des armer lourder telles qua deo martien et des mitrailleuror, Au ooura de oe maawore, Ira brrorirtu ohyprioter greor ont p(dtr4 danr lrr maisoru de Chypriotes htror et en fntt rrrpulr6, sotu la me~ao des armm, dsr oentatnor cb femmor rt dfrnfanta pri@ oomme ot I. A un oertain -t, il k I tf” rn eut 700, dmrt la l n’a (Y raur(c, qur FLO, bpparhnm fatonmntian drr forau brihuniqun. Malbaursuaememt, 160 otaw rot onoore manquants. !203. Lea Chypriotes turoe ont t3t4 obllg6a de prendre dee mosurea dbfenMwe im rw1~6e~, P mata, oommo île ne poas6dalent que doe Tell do oharreo d6mod0a et quelques autres armes l@rea, ils ont subi daa portos e6vBrce. 203. Tbe Turkish Cyprlob wore obligod to taha whatevor dsfonsive moasurea thoy oould improvisa, but as tbay possassod only old-foshfouod huntlng rifles and somo otbcr smnll nrmu, tboy eufforod heavy oasualties. 204. Au oours do ootte Bprauvo fnfllgbe B la oommunaut6 turque do Chypre, tout l’appareil gouvernemonta1 ubypriote grw a agi d’aouord avoo loe assaillants, Le0 vlvros, l’oauot loe produits pharmaooutiqueo ont 6eB ooupds danrr lcrr quartfora turoa. Lns oommunluntions t616pb~nIquos, postaloe st t610graphiquea du aeutour turo ont 6th intarrompues. 37 204. During thls ordoal of tho Turkish uommunlty in Cyprus, the entire apparatus of ths Oreok Cypriot Qovernment notod In oonoert wlth tho neeallants. Tho fond, modlunl nnd water eupplioe of tho Turklsb dlstriota were out off. Telographhlo, postal and tolepbona 0ommunIuotions to tho Turkish sootor wsro ssvorod. 208, Despite the oeaee-fire ugreement tha C+reek Cypriot terroriste, with the partioipation of the sooalled Cyprus seourity foroes, oontinued their onmpaign of intimidation by way of murder, arson and looting. The international Press is full of reporta on this oampai Qeorge Wel er wrota in the Chioago Daily News of Y of terroriom, PulitEer priee-winner 31 Deoemberr %9kylloura 1s a town of 280 Turks and 760 Oreeks IV. only the Turkieh half is burning , , , Skyllourn was set to the toroh three daye after the Christmas Day oease-fire.” 907. m Tlmep of Londonof 2 January 1964 reported! “Firee havc been raging in the Turkish suburb of omorphita . . I Greeka set fire to a number of Turkish houses,” 303. Bernard Jordan wrots in the London Dailu Mail of 7 January 19641 “Homes are blaeing ngain tonight in Omorphitn. 1 oounted eleven flms in the area where the Turks fled from their homes lnst week.* 200. A week later, ths pailv Tels& of 14 January 1964, reported thatr n .I. bodies of Turks wers found orudelv buried outeide the village of Ayios Vnsilios . . , thé searoh for the bodies begsn after Qreeks had told Turks that twelve were buried on the site , , ,” 210. Cn 33 January, the Bairaktar mosque was bombed. This mosqus is situated in the heart of lhe Greek quarter of Nioosia and 1s oonsidered a saored shrine by tha Turklsh Cyprtotu. 211. At the beghrning of my statement, I gave information on the more reoent trrgio evenb in Cyprus, whioh emphasice thrt the situation continuer to be extremely grave. In fret, the Cypriot Qovsrnment hrr loot its oonstitutionaloharroter, as the Vioc-Prerident and tba Turkirh memkrr of the Cabinet are no longer oonsulted on any deoision. There are no loge1 foroes on tire oide of the lnw. Al1 tho arms in the arsenal8 of the aovormnont hnve beon dlstributed to ontlroly Irrasponeible elemonte who bava foinad whnt used t0 bo ths polio0 foroe. Now, tho momber0 of tha former ~1100 foroo aot folntly wlth tllo J.?OJ(A torrorists in perpotrotlng alaughtor, ~1’8011 nnd lootlngon the ielnnd. 212. lnnumorable ah1pmont.y of arms oontlnuo to erriv0 on tho islnnd nnd ~0 qulokly dletrlbutod to irreeponsible olvilinn (Iroek torrorlsts. Turor btaient enterrbe A oet endroit , , .” 210. Le 23 janvier, une bombe a 6M dbpor6e A la morqube de Bairaktar. Cette mosqube se trouve au oœur du quartier greo de Nioosia et les Chypriote0 turos la oonridbrent oomme un lieu raor6. 211, Au Ubut de r?a dbolrration, j’ai donn6 sur ler tout derniers 6v6nements tragiques survenus A Chypre des dbtails d’oh il ressort nettement que la situation continue dWre extrbmement grava. En frit, le Go+ vernement ohypriote ti perdu ron orrrotbm oonatitutlonnel, pufrqus le Vioc-Prbrident rt les mrmbmr turos du Cabinet ne sont plus consuIt sur les dboisiona h prendre. Il n’y a plus de foroes lbgaler pour fnlre rospeotor la 101, Toutos 10~1 armoi3 doe ILrsenaux gouvernamontaux ont 6t6 dietribubos h d0e 515menta totalornent lrpesponsablee qui se sont joints A oe qui btolt auparavant la foroedo plloo. Mnlntet>ant, les membres do l’anolunno foroo de polloe agiesont do oonoort avoo les terroriatos do I’EOKA, mausnormt, illoondiant et pillant dnns lV10 OntIbre. 212. D’innombrabloa oargniaon0 d%~rmeti oontinuont d’RrrlVer dans l’flo, oll olloo oont rnpidement distrlbudes h des oivile greos irresponenblos qui so llvront a\r lorroriemo. 214. !lWs ie an illustration of the veryeerious-very grave-eltuatlon grovailing ot thie moment in Cyprua. a1.s. Under these trngio oiroumetanoes, many efforta bave been mctde, within tbo letter and eplrit of the Treaty of Uuarantee tu4 well a8 on different lave18 of international oo-owration, to find a prrotioal and workable formuln for peaoo-keeping operationx on Cyprus, Eaoh one of theae propoeala haa boen rejeoted by Arohbiehop Maknrioe and the leadera of the areek oommunity. In Borne oa8eB the Ureek Cyprlot leader6 have cet forth oonditione and, when these oondltions wero met, they have rejeotedthe proposa18 ondifferent grounde, Ae a gmat part of world opinion18 begînnlng to underetand, the areek Cypriot leadera juat do not dosire any kind of poIioe force on tha Island. On tha oontrary, what they would liks ia aome kind of United Nations reeolutio& whioh they think they oould protend to intmpret PB though international treaties bnd been nbrogated, a8 thougb oommitmenb no longer exieb aome formula whloh would eliminate their obligations not only to the guarantor Powere but a180 to a11 the oivillsed world, 80 that they oould prooeed wlthout lnterferonoe to the final extermination of the Turktuh Cyprlots. 216, Dans oea aondltiona tragiquea, de nombreux efJortu ont 6t.U faltu, oonform6msnt A l’erprit et A la lettre du Trait6 de garantle, et Adifftlrenta niveaux de ooopbrrtlon lntarnationrle, afin de t-r une fo& mdle pratique et viable pour les opbratiana de maistien de la paix h Chyp!% Chaouns de 011 pmpoalthm a 6t4 rejet60 par l%rohMque tUario0 et les dir&erpLII de la oommunaut6 moqua, Dana oertaln0 011, Ier dirigeanta ohyprlotea greou ont posb Qs o&ltiona pr0alxbles pour rejeter enautte 1# propoJ1tiarU, H>uI dmronta prbtexteu, loruqus OeI conditioku ttalent aooept430, Comme unn grande partie cb Voplnlta mondlrle oommenae A le oompti*, le@ dirl~anta ohypriotw greoe rouhaltent tout olmplement qu 11 nIy *ait rwune fooros Q polbs duu 1Ws. ce qu’llr vQl+ drrient, au oontrai~, otert qw nisatlon 7 w rbroltttlon~ VO& der Nationa Unier qu’ Ir puuUrt poutir l& rprclter oomme abrogeant ler traltd LnbrnaMonaun, oomme mettant fin aux engagementi aQworltm, quelqtm formule qui rupprimeralt leunr obllgatioor kum r* ment h l’bgard Qn pulrsanoer rantel, mrlr WI1 A l’bgard du monde olvlltrb, afia dr ~1rsxbrmb.r dbflnltivement lea Ohyprfotel W ~11111 rlaqus dlk terrention sxthleum. !t 216. Ae a11 the membors of the Seourity Counoil will agree, lt ie not only international law, but alrro Inter national mornlity and deoenoy, whloh opposer ruoh a rohemo. 217. 1 now wlsh to eay some flnal worda on the xxpeota of this tragîo aîtuation whloh oonoorn the 8eauuu rity Counoil more direotly. At tala moment of grert trrgody, the eyes of world opinion rra fooumed on tha Swurity Counoll. In the~foreground of thm CounoilS deliberatlonx, the liwr of tbousancla of Innocent mon, women and ohildren, the peroe and trmqulllity of I prrtioular deliorte area of tha world, and, not tbe le&, the aeIue of deaenoy md morality of tha humrn raoe are rt rtake, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ px~ond6ment tr sur le Uotuell. ?P w181,Y-h-w _( a qui m~0rt k mîwr d6p cldiit rauoxlu du caMed1, o’wt qu’y IWbt ti j.U k vl4 & millime db-, ds femmea at d’onfanta m kpahdlatraxbqulllMdatnmar4#lcJuQ~ pmUoullbramont xb6vralglqw, d - ao non mah d’&idaaor -boaxmdola&olum8t6hmorrWI Qlaraoehumalw. I 118. Turkey hu oome to tha &ourlty Couaoil with full oonfidenoe in the wisdom, tb #ente of equity and 918. k Tuqub rbatrdrmrk.uOoewlld.r(wrSY on Iaioant entlbm ooahwe A la rylwrr, au ww do l’(pldt4 et au prabtl menu dsr lWpnUabUlt464& toux les honorrbleu membrer de oet au$uata orgatirne, qui set l%utanoe rupr8ms &a Nmtlnw UnIea, Ls Con8011 de rbourltb 10 tmuvo bb . nnt ua pxv!bl)rib grave dont laa srpeo(r humanltaircrr et moraux ont une importkuoe vitale pour l~avenlr Bsr rslattoürp humniner, A l%ohelle nrthmale et lnta~tiotmlcl, Mn attitude bboidara paut-Atre du #orO dr l*WU, YW que l‘homme retourna A lr r&uv~Pla la pfurbWluh, du Moyen Age, malt qubna aertmlna dbawa pulro, mal@ tout oontlnuer A r(lgkw 11 tir & h w humxine mur oette planMe. the deep eenue of rerrponuibillty of a11 the honourable mcmbem of thlo august organ, whioh le the higheat in8tanoo of tho United Nntlane. ‘I’ho Seourity Counoil ia fuood wlth a gravn iatiue, the humonitarlan and moral aqeotu of whioh aru of vital ai~ifbanoo to th0 future of human relations, on a national and lntap national soale. The altitude of thi~ augu& organ may dooide whether tha human raoe will roturn to the Worut eavagory of tha Middlo Ages or whetheI* eome deoenoy oan atiI1 be mnlntained in the lubuequent Iife Of the human raoe on thir planet. entour6ee par dee agenta depolîoe obyprioter greor. Juste avant 14 heurea, le navire x apprreill6 an toute bAte nana avoir apparemment tsrmintl lo dbohargement des marohandises.* 214. VollA qui illuetm la situation tubs grave, trbr tendue qui exista aotuellement A Chypre. 216. Comm8 tcxm lea membrwduO0nuefld, $OourltO en oonviendmt, o’eat non mouhment 10 dro(t ht66 nrtlonrl, anrlr awol la morala ot k d)oenae iaUr nAtionrlM qui r’oppwexlt A 00 plan. 999. It $9 net my oontantlon Chat a19 traatlea aru p8rwnwt. Tlw point at lurus lu tlW f0110wlqf1Can an htematlonal traaty-duly aegotlrted, rl9ned und rntlfled by two or nwre aountrlea-ba abrogabd, auapamwl or amuncbd by A aWolutlon of tlm Seourlty c)ounotIT !ll¶b b what tlm wmbum of tlw suourlty UamolI huve buforu Uwm at thtu momunt. 918, Thb hau lxm and oontlnwu to bu on obueuulon an thu part of tlm Qmek Uy rîot Ieaderu, ‘Bey oetam t@ thlnk that chb mupmu i$ le organ of (bs united NaManu OUI be trloked lnto a haaty daobiou whiob qay locrtr tery fnuoosnt #.l muoarble but whlob for tho~‘wouldhaoethemeanWafhvinndomawa~ wîtb rpy klng d rurtmlnb 4G.l obllgatloar. mat li tlM ma8œI why tla suourlty CMtBoll wauaukudto havu .r pMaC8mwMnglnCh8dghbd%TD8o8mburand R&ruarv uwbr Ch8 Mue rlrrm d nn lmmhunt fal~aDdwlch8lltk8oard8enth8tabl8;mikï* futbIaMwUehIb8e8wrM8dlC8rraw8nehomuhu ~baIIy rIl thnt b woœrury to pmvhh for a pmopommuLabnppyfalrafwbatlw~oomlmmf~ ud tlu ‘Ittrkbh wnwnlty. Turkey wuld hallin lb poww b tilp brin9 about rwb P happy dovelopmant. ui, rl P wnlt4 entiAre, 11 a’enrult que, dans ler 6lsh sur toute quertion dont il wt saisi, le Con8011 de rbourlt4 doit veiller sorupuleuasment L respeotm Iw dmltr et les obligation8 qui ddooulent deu tralth, ala, Je ne prbtenda pu que tour le9 trnlt9u noient permanenta. L4 quurtlon eot la uuivnnte~ un trtitU lntarnatlanal, dhnent nbgoalb, rlgn6 et r8tlfl6 par dwx ou pluuluuru payu, peut-11 atm abmg4, ulmpendu ou rw& par un8 r4uolutlon du Uonuull du ub\lrlt9? vo11n la qwutlon qul ue poua A l’bum aotwlle aux wmbmu du 0olW11 cb r9ourlM. aas. Cela Wtt et oontlnus dWru unu obaurrloa poui 1013 dlrlpant9 ohyprlobu grsou. Ilu urmblunt omlm auu oa muwuotabla ormw duu Natlonu Untuu pourrali 9tm habllkment amutül P pmndm unu d9ofuloa hIMvu, fort lnnooente ut raluonnable L pmmlk vtm, malu qui uerult 1nterprMa prr uux oomm3 luu llbhnt du toutu obllgatfon et du toutu oartraintu, Voiu pauquoi 1s Chus11 de rburît9 a 9t4 appel9 Lue r6ualrAlahAte,drarlanultduITd9ao~n 8t du 16 f&rhr, mw prdtexb quhnu attquu pur rurprbu Italt lmmlnuntu, Oa punualt pouvoir affolur luu munhuu du 00 oouaell et ler lnoltor h adqhr uw rbrolutfoa bath0 qw le9 dlrl~antr 0 gmor ruralont 1nturprMu A dsr flnu et Eu rfot@& cY* h& dff6ranb. yIL tout la morde wtt qw 1’WrJI vltnl duu tlathu alnul CM la rie 8t lur dmltu Q IW, Il doit un Stm alnul pour Ohypm. la pmblWn ohypriob put Ym r4uola util rt dluoutd oun* ment, du bonne faf ut orrtm mr tabb. OuUu fh m@flqw qrd frit fa00 h aotm l1tt0ralm6dlterrodm powed8tout8u ludDnduplIy8lqw8~unlm~ atfrfrtmavanfrproap)methoumtxtanthlaIr mwautb gmoqw quA ln 00Ixuxnw~ -Y .Ia Turf@s ueralt prbta L film tout oe qul ou un uau pwvolr pour aider D prwoquor oetta baurauae bblb. ml. Comm8 vaut prow l0u dorlll&lw lwotbeatp trngiquw, l’or P 4th notwllu n’uut pau ouffluaaf@ r la vlr ut Isr drolt# Ir m#mbIW iiiYaB~puu turquu du Qhyprn. lfxttafob, fl atv a pal8 de rAifaon pour qu’en abordant oe p1WM9m aveo r4all8w, grAoe 4 la bomxJ volouta dr toW b intBmau&, noua na pula8iwa tmuwar mte bauu plw pratique WmWtant aux dtturr ootnmuuauth da vlm of%@ A o&e d’nnu la paix et l%arruoih The dlspatoh goes an to deeoribg bow thero people were taken away from their hou8013 at gunpoînt, how tbeir houses were burned and torndownbybulldoasra: it rtates that they am now rurrounded by CIrenk Irmgulara with guw in a Turtish ~ohooihou~e. 288, I wiuh to draw tha attantion of membere of tbu Cour1011 tu the Iaot that thora is a 11raam relsus of tha Qreek ayprlot deleptlon H.stingthaf tha repreroatntiw of tbs Unlted Nation# bar vlrital tbe mot and that eve 9 is normal, 1 bave rrtudied tbe illor of tbs Uultod Nn Ann and bave made lnquirfer. No rmb report ban bsen sent by the repmsentatlve of tl~~ United Nationa h Cypru8. 319. Tbere brutal rota, thi~ ravngery murt rtopt thsre rota mut rtop MW, Tbere horrible dwda mut be lnvutimted. The nullt~ muat be uuntubed. Ths alvilhed &Id knnot il& lbrelf b bé dra ts”’ brok toth lbflddle AgosbyahatuUulaltnadfaaa or.‘Ib orima d pnoalde OUI wnrf# cuunmti~~~~ mnunam onn wver be otmdoad bo UIB UlBuug ritusuon in SP nu-Turboy-wlll k nt tha afdo of auy praotioal MO utlon w&h OUL bs POUM to tbir tragia rltuatlon. Umnuil et duro d’iutrar l&llt& - 837, EX pourtant, tandis qu8 noua dtsoutonm iai, une autre tragbdlo 60 joue L Ch le-c3P re. Je voudrah ofter %lerr Cette dbpbohe dborit annuïb uomment oea gena ont bt4 arraohbs A leur foyer IIOUI la manaoe der armea, oomment lsum malona ont Otb lnO0~~ :zts par deu bullddsclraf elle dbolar4 tenant dnna un0 60010 turqtm anOero1 % par deo tmu#a irrbgullbmo gmcquu AdB Be fyllD, aa& Je voudrais attirer l~attentioa dsr mrmbrSr 2% Having said this, 1 in no way underesUmate the tragio charroter of tbe svenb whioh bave talwn plaoe in Cyprw. Tbe Oreek Qooernment and people Qeply deplore the exoesses whioh bave produoed so many viotlms. We deplore a11 aob of violenoe; they give rine only ta more violenoe. 936. From tbe begînning of the prenent orluis, my QOvernment ban taken n firm stand in favour of mocbr8Man and paaoeful rotion, IL hna done ail in ib poser to prevent an extension of tba oonfliot, It hau avoidod a11 provooation. In the faoe of military measures taken near the island, it has demonatrated rertraint, Beoause of this attitude it hasbeenpnssible to raid a dangerous pilin~up of measures and oountermeuursr. 897. Durlng tlw arduou wgotiatiouo whioh bave in tha meant@a been taking plaoe in tbe capital0 Of in- Cmuted oountrietr with a view to finding a formula or& in Cypnm, Qreeoa cir0.k aovemlwnt hua aooeptd tb prin- OI& of om&ag rwh a tome md hxa rlxo agmed thut it xhould ba plaoed undar tbs auspioer of tbe UnîWl ??a-. It hu ur@ that tbe arrrngwnentB for Mn 0ommund of Mn tome, 8lxl un fome’u tormu of tionaoe, rhuld lw muta olurr 8nd dofinite 00 u -intursrbtithuRlplb~ d ayprm. aa4.ltwuonthLrxprcuooabltba(brt~ckrdx xtwb l t 0 of ttw nt’gouotiono. Iv UtY pr’3Q’lsalm, rom otabsmen motivataxi by ths Qoire psaoe, hav0 failed, R is bwauoe tbey WB~ unablo to gîvn rufflotent llvlurruboe to a Mate whioh feula Lta va 7 life, lb dearly bought ladelpenrbws, to be thrdmw , Yr gag, Th8 ptieuemt meating of ths seourity COunOPl hw talwn pl&e in 0iroumstano0e benring an unfortunuta rewnblancm to thar wbioh nweraitated tbe urgent m00ting of 17 D3oember 1883 IlQSsath meeitingl. au. Au 0our0 des hborisuser n@ooiaUonu qui sa sOnt Uroulbsr entre-temps dam les oapitalar des payr inMreerrtr paur tmmr un8 formule p0rmettAEt de orOer m foroe internatioaalr oapable de titabltr et de maintdr ltordrur A Cbyprs, la GM a laJ W rdls aoUf et, jtoI0 dira, oolUtru0Uf. Ls CbUvO~ a acos@ le prinolp~ de la orbation dtm SZ or00 et a awri aooeptb qu’elle malt plaoM Y HW les auspioas des Netiow Uni~s. 11 a in&M Putwt do om prlnoipu, il a 8plement inrlrte pour qtm tuA arr8npnMtt duu oe Utl0 tiU1 W IU m0dalitAa oonoemmt las n6@rtiw Our 3 0 PM p0lluqw lwwillent 1’uMaUmrnt bu prtlrr p* 01puLmlemt lnMrnU6uu, et rurtout celui du(Mlv.mc mmtdDlalMpub~&chyPr.. 9%. O’rut A odtr auxMuoa l ~ruUO qw 1’aOOOrd de prinajps a btb &uuA prr mon r raomont acte propouitbnu qui ont t3t0 falteo A ver0 rtnder du r~Ap(ooiaUom. Si oea prop~uiUons, brmulfbr par ber hnmmar dfPtat animbr du d8rPr de oontribusr b la ~cdfioatlon, ont Oouu6, at8utqutilsntontpas pufOudr de10 asuur5noeu ruffirantar L un Etat qui ue scat mena& dmnn aon exiotenoe mOm& dans son i* psndanoe ohb.*ment aoquise. 236r. Er prboenk, r0aaoe du aOn@sil dr s00urit8 MI Uent dana bu oïmdiu. u qui priSsentant une maloi+ bIanos fhotmue avao oelbu qui ont rrrndu n@oesoal~ AP AuniOn d%trganoe du ‘d7 daosmbra 1983 (108Mïne 442. fn my Ileart of heartu 1 do net ba!!eve tbat aven tbe Power wh!oh bas olaimed thir right reallybel!eveer ulne in exero!ublg it it 1erveo t!! intaresta it profew~ ta Qfend, or #ha w!der intererta of tbe intsr Mona oommunlty. Hnv!ng thue been threatened and dlrappointed, Oyprua turned to tho Un!tcd Nation8 and tbe srJour!ty CouM!l. what uyprua aEk of tbe Counoil ir holp in Mtoring oond!t!oor urbder wh!ob &B problema d!vld!ng it OM, free fmm sxtenrrl threatm, be dafinad and analyred 0bjeot!vely aad nuonable dirowrlon opnnad in order to reek relu- &IN acosptable to ail. W. We muat re~offn!m that woh ooad!t!ona do net M!at at pmrnt. That L why we are bore. U4, CypnU eqmob unaqu!vaoal atWWorfl to Homb ho10 qwrtioao, anmwam that Will be Yardthm~ thr world rnd tbat hwld be capable of ua!vmal npplioatlon in rlmilar OMW. For wb!oh of \Y kre in thr Unltad Natimo oan ‘w abaol\drl a~ chat bs wlll mt om dry f!nd tdnuel froc& in La OWllOOWIbdUh m rimilar pmblrm, wfth a or!U jwt U LIII, I&ra mm the qurrtwa arbingr Ram wa hwe a Stmte Afember of our Organisation whioh !H goiq tlulough an 1nt43rnn1 orlrls? Nu thfn SePto tho rlght to suek rolut!ona to il0 problanu, perhnpo witb the Wiotauoe of other oountriso but !n any oame froc from any timat or !nWn!dat~on’? a46. Aa the reprerontat!va of CypruU haa jUSt IIOW bld w, hic counhy dwr net refuoa rwh a@rlrrtaIwe. hdesd, it 10 prapomd 00 raqueol it, and net cwrly in Wder to solw ita bro!u probLsru but alao to rSb%rO Paaoo mnd trcinqu!111ty in leo twrltwy. rrue at the U!ne time Lt a& th3 lb lude~~ancte and InWPllY &uld ba respeote& 240. Je voua laiaoe Juges de df3oider s! 008 dllmonatratiow millla!ree qti aa saut depu pourruivlea, ai prAs des o&e de Chypre, A dee momentu auau! oritiquee, eont vraiment wa oontrlbutlon aux rfforta que lar autrer gouvememenb, y oomprir le ~I!CI~ ne oeeeant dn dbployar pour Sa paoif!oa#onde Chypre. Il est an tout oaa oartaln qw 01 faotaur a p8J lourdement sur lse nbgoolstionn A toua lea &ador, et a fin! par en provoquer 1Wheo. 241. On pourrait srgotar ad !nf!nitumwroep&ndu droit d’htervantion, ma!@ il me rembla qu8, #ur 14 point jurlfliqua, olest-Cdirs lt!n~rpr4Mlondufa#rsw paragraphe !2 de l’artlols IV du Tra!tb de garantle, mule une ituUtutiot~ aonum la Oour !ntwnat!ona& de Juatioe pourrait slaher avao autorltb. Mafa, poli 7 ummt parlant, alors, qw plurlsum puhmnwr nbpoo et lsr moyetu dQ!dm au rdtablluaonmt dr l’ordre, alora que ler Nationa Un!e6 elleci-mbmer roïJ rairrier de la quaat!on, ~JM telle iptervantlon rerait- 011s oonWwt!re, ou au oontrrlm r!quera!t410, oommc4 js 1s 0Mum. ds ghfmlfmr b owfUt7 a4l. Bn mon for M&îeur, js 0I omI puqw rbme la puirranoe qu! ~wnd!qw~ oa droit penre vraimant quktu lbmrgont elfe uervirmlt 100 1ntAW quWs pr4tend dafandm et owx, plua vaatar dr la omh mwAut6 !nwrmnt!onal~, A!mi tnenr& ti a obypra 0’wt tollmQe vuru 100 Natfow w.-w 4% c0wi tb ~burit6, a0 Uauaeil, otu de 1Wbr telleo qw la plmblelwa l’abri du monnaem vouant du dmhm, 4tn Mffah ot maalyab ohwtlvemnnt, at qu’uar dirourrba mimou- Mbl@puiwEattnop(tykJfnntwrwk*r& aowotu o.ooqm~,.pbAv wm, a4ar ll#w faut dat4llu8onubm nW&o& pu - toia uini; qui ë@t aepeodant ün dse prîwl r s !oldrwwItwx di wtw okrtr. 100 Ohmlotu n’en Durml’ommr. lia ont 8t4 rppilb b ii faim 10 rr’Gtf~o’l en frvellr tb Jr owe de la pak Ou 0Wt rrmontlrllomout pour oolr qu’ilm ont oonarnti (LW Aooorb de Zurîah nt b LdNo, qut a8oovant leur4 uplratba 985, llyr tEY ‘l’uormplw b raariftow pul W-P YY- OI ororifioa du CWoa de hypm Et 11 frut bMn nouo on omtwnlr en abodant oe PU, T.1 pu’11 a 6t4 or&10 otatut &Uhypn - qui I, nmplaod en lF8~1980 1s ti@l oolanlnl - p* tmvdt, du moins, et rad!ourit lVMpmdm0, la aamraet8 et l’itlu rx t6 cb ohypm. 269. Du frit dm oa xwonwlmoanw mr la cxunmunrut8 lIltimuowl0, dB II, p4rtîoipmniu 00oImonwerlth et dn ION admiorion L l’Or@rrtioa deo Nation~ Unter, le R4putillq~ de CJbypn o solidemont ttabll ma pwwwlM8 înMrn~tîonrk BO dmit et an frit. PIS, N’ut-il pu bvldant que toute rttqus diraota ou lndîreuta, ouw~rte ou 0amuflC - oar OI: eords mdntrnrnt dé oamouflm la Main motde 93arta@-, oontm ost 8tat de ohomr IIOIY rrmbnmnlt b la oitu~tiaa ~lwive d’avant 1050 et, en dbalmohuit le ohm& tllmlnerdt le rrul wht de dbpmt rollde vera lr paolfloaUon cb 1We St rouvhit tdouraimment le pmblbme duu mn mmnbla? a54, Les trois Puiorrnoes lA rMplbuqus ds ahyprs, a rurtw, ruul blnn qua mat poulwuirm ‘m rrul but oommwt r+tablir l’ordre k obyp mdinQmndm poulblo lB Iwobrob d’uaw rouuon au fond du praMbnm. rwbmb qui dut pu pawribk tant 1” dumntlutrmblwrtqtmpmLtelrmm~~ddcrr oodlît intondoiml. la8 dlver#noou nbdntent qur rurlaflu&cdB.Nowwpr8tendoupuawlwftm lu r4pouu OMoMm b tdu lm qurrtioll# qui ae pount. MAin Iyw oomnlu oer(rlaa qw, qwllu qw noisat oelles qua amu dmusra l’Or5anWMon tnter nntiotm16, deomnt MueIL+ ler Ohyprlctes ont plaab leurs prdlbmem en toute oonflanoe, ellea ns pourront qu%tre en hrrtnonla awo ,lr lettre et i’esprit de Ir CharOS. !286. 11 oat don0 nntur4 que le ropr6uentAnt be Chgpn, vienne dsmuder b notre Uouaell, auquel Ir Charte a <roailM lr tbohe de pr&Agar Irpalx et l’ordre Inter&lonnl, d’bvlter touu 1leu Statu Membrea 0 rsrpeoiw !%u!f@andwos et l’lnt8grM de mon payr, Lu 06uvariIemnt po, fldble il 96x3 engagc”Ilentu, appuie oana r%@em r.ette denmde du uoupsrnWWIt de chypm. 255. Tîw PRIXDBNTI X ~A*S no fudhur na1y#a on lny llmt of P1 ‘-*rr for thia riternoon. XXowever, tha riBtB~~.ntcg Cypnu hrr lndioated a berlue to .all brleflr In order to aonvev to lt plun d’orat@ur LnrorXt Pur ma ltfJt@ p&Ir &t rklnldl. Toutefoln, le mnrbrrnt&ntQuhYDIYI tkYLJM 188. Mr. KYPRIANOU (0 % mPxy rt thlc IklPb to w a ruah x do wt pmpme ta tement ol tha rnPreUlb hilia of Tur&y,-X will do that on atmthar oioulon, ~~rint8soourseoithr.babrte.lButXfeltthrtX t to let t?M 0ouMil Ww ul OOrtaXn tnformattou whpo rrrlwd, whlle tha 8wurlty Uousoll wu Nwoutbt: quwtlon of Uyprur, and probably hout tba tlms wben the Turkm rcspreasntatXw kgan hlr rpwak l3n murrr~ im fmm tir&, rnd lt mrdrt DL4 rat -~rvetlw rlora qw x0 Uonadi-b r4ourM 80 reunlualt pour examlwr la qrwrtioa L ahypru l t’ramdouto,aloramahnquolrrmp~dn lu Twqule oomnmqatt usa lntcpmsntlaa, X.a lur#ryr pxwlwt d’hhm et ut r&l&8 oomnu ruitr Vhe Minlrtor of Xnformntion of thu l’urklab Governlwnt, Mr, An xhun Qop tady warned tlut lf tho Unlt8d NatImr Seour ty Uouna 1 wa~ unable 00 fXnd a Uyprur solution tha rarult wouXd lalmoat 0ertalnXy~ ba full-rorle lnteroommunal war, in whloh Turkey wouXd be ‘foraed to lntmvew~, *Ha told repo?teru tlut if Pawldent Malurloa loloued tbe door Q reuon Turkoylr only oouune wouXd ba reluotantly to break down tlw door by foroe(. V~B Mlniuter raid the tnovement of ‘ltwb fmm Orwk A~U ln Cmrw msrnt that ~r4ttlon wu Turkey &uXd hve nu dianatoh of Oroek rnd Türklmh troopu to elther ri& of in rgreed partitton Une to ldlroipline thelr own oommunîtler~. I Vhe only long-brm rolutlon, ha rdded, ~VU ths reparrtton of tha two communitka in a fedsrrl State. ‘Anmwaorinr awrtlons. tha Mlnirter rrld It wu probably tM tlïat ruuh i fedaratfon would pw lnto repwtu lnd~pendent Mater, whloh wouXd eventualXy opt for unlon wlth OIWOO and Turkay. lb raid Turkey would n& oppose thla sinoe lt wouXd mern tbnt tlïu dtvlrlon wfiïld beoome thr~ OreeoeJllwkey border and ‘Oreeoe and Turkey bave na daalre to flgbt s,oh otkW,’ aEntJpowe4dwquuUau,kMhlmtmr doolatd qu‘il etalt eaw daipb mi qjl+ma GUI fWratlon tvoXwmtt van tbU Xtt4t.n m dlrtlwtu qui ftntrriaat par opbr pour l’untoa l’un aveo lr orke et l’autre LVaa la Tur<lule. Balsa lui, lu Tulqute nu c’oppowralt pM L oetta roXut&u, oar la llpre L partage dsvfsndrelt Ir fruatiere gldcM&4~~uee~@ Zmdcl” ct la Turqula n’eut . 260. Tellso mont lem d&lrratlonr frlkier au$ourd’hul par le MInlntre cb 1WornWon du Qfsrucreruemeut turo, tandlo que le COMO1l cltr1t malri del la qwrtlua, 261. Ln PRESXDENT (trahit de l’ru&lr)~ Jo vamer&3 Xe repr#sentant da Ubypre. Je n*at plw 200. 7ht lr the atatement of the MlnIrter of Xnfor mrtlon of the I’urkîrh Uovernment whloh waa made May whils the Cou&l WLII disoummlng thia problsm. 061. The PREfUDENTt X thank oho repraaentat.lve of Cypruk X haï no 0th~ namee on my Il& of rperkern, bai9 daw 1’ ?Y rlblute d8 trww tma aolutba ;rk 9izz%&at du luiten do ohypm 11 on r(rultmtt, 4p.u antre lor d6w o&nunaut&’ JEY ?isdg&x ‘x’uquis remît “daw l’obXtg&Xoa d’W..a. rxx a dlt auu ourwllntu wnuli Maku~ Y t lrporta”4 la w ri Xe p*Xdont rrl#lrlrTllW@@ n’aura& bien m&rO ~XX@I. d’auto s+oouam aw dtMD~O&Of&iï If en ellt aillai ddcid6. m lneew me rt va pst La rdanoe crt lev& d 19 h 10.