S/PV.1096 Security Council

Durlng the nlneteen flftles, the polltloal problems of Cyprus wera the rubjeot of bltter dispute in the General AssembIy of the Unlted Nations year alter year. Flnally, however, a oarefully balanoed settlement wna renohecl, wlth the agreement of a11 of the parties: Greeoe, Turkey, the two oommunltles in Cyprus ltself and the Unlted Klngdom. 1 thlnk we a11 breathed a slgh of relief at thnt tlma and allowed oursolvas to hope thnt, wlth the conclusion of the Zurloh Agreements nnd tlm estnbllohment of the liopubllc of Cyprus, the peaco wbioh waa 80 longed for nnd 80 needed by the people of that hlstorlc lsland had flnnlly been nohloved. trh oorlmonlsux, devant I’Assembl6o g4ndrale des Nations Unies, des anndeo durant. On est finalement parvenu h un rBglemont soigneusement 6qulllbr0, aveo l’aooord de toutes les parties: la Grbce, la Turquie, les deux oommunaut& de Chypre et le Royaume-Uni. A 08 moment+ nûus avons tous, je orols, pouss6 un soupir de soulagement en oomptant que, gr3oo nux Aocords do Zllrloh et il la or6atlon de la R6publlqua de Chypre, la paix, à laquelle RSplraient dapuls si longtomps les hnbltants de cette fle historique et dont ils avalent tant besoin, btalt enfin rSalls60. 67. Aussi avons-nous 6t6 tr6s peln6s lorsque ont 6olat6, on d0combre dernier, de nouveaux combats qui 37. Wa wore thorefore deeply chstressod when now figlltlng broke out laet Dacember whlch resulted in 69. Sinoe 26 Deoember a Br#tsh foroe has sought to koep the peaoe on the ieland. Today, the United Kingdom haa deepatohed further troops to troubledCyprue. I believe that a11 of us hero, andmost partioularly the repreaentatives of Cyprus, owe a debt of gratitude to the United Kingdom for undertaking thie unenviable task. 70. Politioal eff0rte to resolvetheproblems were also promptly started. A oonferenoe of the parties was, as we know, oonvened in London in an effort to work out a solution of the politioal issues whioh dividedthe two oommunitiqs on the island. But that oonferenoe, alas, was unable to pmduoe an agreement. Deepite the determined efforts of British foroes on Cyprus, violent inoidents multfpliod and bloodahed oontinued. Withthe Oovernmont of C%~rue and the leaders of the Cypriot ootnmunitiee unatXe or unwilling to oontrol thé-passions whioh had been unleashod, it beoamo oloar that tho restoration of publio order, 80 imperative bofore the long-range politioal problems oo:tid be attaoked anew, would require a ooneiderebly luger numbsr of troops. 71. The United Kingdom told the Government of Cyprua that !t oould not oontinue to shoulder alone tbe responefbility fur peaoe on the lsland. The oonolueion was obvious that a larger and more broadly based poaoo-keeping force was required to augmont the British force@ if order were to be re-established and maintained throughout the Island. The Government of the United Kingdom thon prooeeded to oonsult with the Qovornments of CIreoie and Turkey, whioh are alao partior to the international agreemsntr that led to thr ostablishment OI the Ropublio of Cyprue in lQ60, It also oonsulted with my Clovernment. A plan for tbe ostablfshment of suoh a foroo, inoludtng provision for an tmpartful mediator to holp rsttle the disputa, was agroed to by t3rowo rnd Turkey, and by the Cyprlot Vioo-President, Dr. KUo& Amhbirhop Makarioa, however, raised a number of objeotions. 72. The other parties made a new effort to meet these objeotions, and a revised plan within the framework of the United Nations and agreed to by Greeoe, Turkey nnd the United Kingdom nnd by my Government, was put bsfore Arohbishop Makarioe on 12 February. On tha followlng day, he informed reprosentatives of the United Kingdom andof my Government that thfs revised proposnl was nlso unacceptable, although he agreed in prinoiple to tho naedfor an international ponce-keeping 13. A traglo loee of life and pmperty ooour8 dally in Cyprua; international oomplloations inoreaae: and a solution dally beoomea more diffloult. The recomm mendatione of the guarantora would, we belleve, bave helped to avoid ail of thia. datlone des garants auraient aida, pBnaon@-nou8, A hiter tout œla. 74. Nous savon6 toua, je oroie, que le Trait6 de garantie fait partie intigrante des dispositions organiques qui ont or86 la Republlque de Chypre. C’est, pour ainsi dire, l’un dee articles fondamentaux de la Conatllution de Chypre. Ce truiM garantit ltind6pendanœ, ltint8grit6 territoriale et la 86ouritb de la RBpublique, de m8me que la eauvegarde de sa oonrtltutlon. Il 0onfBre aux puieaanœe garantes œrtaiwr responeabilitba du point de vue du rerpeot de la Constitution et du TraitB lui-mhme, y oom ri# le respect de 1’8quilibre soigneueement nbgooi 8 et de la proteotion des deux oommunaut0s ohypriotes, Il a 0te eign6 aptie plueieure ax&ee de n6gooiaMonr mtnutieuoea et approuv6 par toutes ler partier. Ce trait8, oomme tout autre trdt4 international, ne peut &re ni abrog6, ni d8nono8, nl modlfi8 dana 601 termea ou ees effets par le Conseil de &uriW &a Nation6 Unies. Il ne peut Qtre abrog6 ou modîfi6 que par accord entn, tous lee signataires ou oonform6- ment B ses propres dfapositione. 74. 1 thlnk we all kMw that the Treaty of Quarantee forme an lntegral part of the organio srrangements that oreated the Repuhlio of Cyprus. In faot, it te a eo-onlled basio artlole of the Constitution of Cyprue. That Treaty a8auree the independenoe, territorial lntegrlty and eeourity of the Republio, ae well aa respeot for lts Constitution, It aeelgne totheCuarantor Powera oertaln responaibllitles mgarding the maintenance of the Constitution and of the Treaty ltself, lnoluding the oarefully negotiated balanoe and proteotion 3f the two Cyprlot communities, It was signed after literally yeare of seul-searohing negotlation and approved hy all of the partiee, Thie Treaty or any international treaty oannot k abrogated, oannot he nullified, oannot be modified elther in faot or in effeot hy the Seourity Counoil of the United Nation& The Treaty oan he abrogated or altered only by agreement of a11 of the eignatoriea themeelves or in aooordanoe wlth lte terms. 76. No one is threatening to take the terrltory of Cyprus, no one is threatening its independenoe- Turkey or Creeoe or anyone else. What le possible ie-and 1 quote the language of the Treaty: ‘aotlon” exprersly authorieed by artiole IV of the Treaty %ith the sole aim of re-eetabliehing the etate of affairr oreated by the present Treaty#. 76. Time is waeting. Whlle we talk people are dying, and any moment violence and bloodahed may erupt rgaln on a large soale, with predictable and grave oonsequenoer. The important, the imperatfve, tbe ulc gent thing to do la to restore order and oommunal tranquillity and do it qulokly before new violenoe breaks out, before the atmosphere le furtherpoironed, before the poeltlons of the part& on the politloal irsues that dlvide them beoome more inflexible and, lndeed, hefore peace in the Eastern Medlterranean le endangered. 75. Nul ne menaœ de s’emparer du territoire de Chypre; nul ne menaœ #on ind6pendanoe - ni la Turquie, ni la Odœ, ni personne d’autre. Ce que le Traite permet aux puirranœs garnbr - et je olta foi l%rtiole IV du Trait4 - ote& “d’agir dana le yTzz$aif ctu r&abllrrement de l’ordre or& par m . 76. Le temps passe. Tandir que noua parlonfi, der geno meurent; h tout. moment, la vlolenœ peut (olater et le sang oaaler A nouveau, aveo les grave6 oons6quenoee auxqueller on peut fltutt8ndre. Ce m est important, œ qui ert impbratif, œ o’eot de rbtabllr l’ordre et la tranqullli tr Pr-@% entre Ier oommunaut&, et de le faire au plur tit, avant quo ne ourgisrent de nouveaux dhordrem, avant we ltatmorphbre ne aoit empot~an6e davantage, avant que ler poritionr des partier sur leo wrtlonr politiques qui Ier opposent ne devIennent plus infkxlbler encore, avant, enfin, que la paix en M(ditorra& orientale ne ae trame en danger. 77. 1 repeat that the urgent buslnesr hefore the Counoil and the rerponsiblllty of tbe Government of Cyprus le to restore communal paaoe and order and tc stop the bloodshed, The sooner thnt we m the kurity Counoll turn our attention to this, the better 1t Will be for ail. 1 respeotfully urge thut the Securlty Counoil net be defleoted from this purpose. Onoe we bave met this problem and oommunal peaoe 1s restored, 110 ques~lon of any aotlon under the Trenty of Guarantee would arise. 77. La t&ohe la plu8 urgente du Conseil et le devoir du Gouvernement de Chypre oonrirtent, je le r@bte, A r6tablir l’ordre ei la paix entre les oommunaut68 et A wr&er l’effusion de sang. Plus tbt 10s membres du Conoell de ~3ouritB 88 prbooouperont de cette tAohe, mleux oela vnudrn pour tous. Je me permets dtlnsieter pour que le Conseil ne 88 lnisse pas dBtourner de ce but. Une fols que nou8 serons venua A bout de co problbmo et que In pnlx entre les oommuaaut6s 8era r&ablle, il ne 88 posera plus de question de me8ure8 qui pourraient Btre priees en vertu du Trait6 de garantie. 78. The Unltod Sentes bas no position ns to the form or the rchnpe of a finnl settlement of the Cyprus prob- 78. Les Et&-Uni8 n’ont pas d’opinion arr&&0 qutult A In forme que pourrait revOtir une solutiond&‘lnitive 79, 1 shall not dwell at thls t$ms upon the aasertions of the representative of the Soviet Union whereby the anxiety that most of us have that peaoe must be restored to Cyprus 1s some sort of a NATO plot. No one is even proposing that the international force tm oomprised just of NATO military unit& The parties Will have to agree upon the partioipants in any suoh foroe, , 80. 1 have outlined why the United States eupported the proposala developed for a peaoe-keeping foroe in Cyprus. 1 have said that the Unlted Rates is deeply oonoerned with thls grave situation and the imperative need to keep the peaoe in the Mediterranean area. Peaoe on that Island today is as preoarious as it is preoious, and we do not know what new violence tomorrow may brin& The need for suoh apeaockeeping foroe la, 1 repent, oritioally urgent, Clandestine arms shipments have reoently inoreased the dangsre. The world oannot stand by as an Idle and silent witnesb to the fire tbat is oonsuming Cyprus and whîoh oould rpread 80 rapidly. 81. We muet ask ourselveo what the Counoil oan and rhould do in these oiroumstanoes. That 1s olear. We rhould go 8traight to the point at whioh we oan rcally bs mort helpful. 1 suggurt that we must bring about a prompt rgreement on an international peaoe-keeplng force for Cyprur, the need for whioh has been reoognited by ail, i~luding Preeident Makarios. Thls may require that we intmduoe into these oonrultations an exoert in the oeaoe-keeoinR field of reoosniced impa’%iality Gd’rtature. No’one botter fiils suoh a reouirement than the Seoretaru-General of the Unlted Naflons. We therefore reoommend thnt the Counoil nppanl to the pnrtias concernod, in consultation with tho Seoratary-General, to move ahend quickly in working out suoh nrrangements. Other Stntes ca11 make a contribution towurd the establlohment of a ponoe-keoping force. Thosa that oan do 80 should cooperate freely and generously In thls endeavour. 62, Strenuous efforts wlll also lu! roqulred to l>ring about agreement betweon the two parties on n political. 133. In conolusion, let me say how muoh the United States values the spirit of oo-operation whioh Qreeoe and Turkey bave shown in these dangerous weeks. They have demonstrated great restraint at a diffioult moment in history. Both &vernments, 1 believe, are to be oommended for approaohing Cyprusf problem, whioh ha8 suoh sensitive Implications for both ofthem, with a sens8 of responsibllity not only to the respeotive oommunities in Cyprus but 8180, more importantly, to the entire world commuaity. We should be grateful to hoth of them. 84. The PRESIDENT1 The representative of Qreeoe has indioated hi8 desire to address the Counoil, and 1 now oall upon him, 86. Mr. BITSIOS (Qreeoe) (translated from Frenoh): In the statement we bave juet heard, the United States representative found it neoessary to mention the position of my oountry and my C&ernment in the delioate nsgotlations whioh have been helrt in the last few yeeks. He also saw fit to do SO in a way whioh would imply that we ehould hold Arohbiahop Makarios, the President of the Republio of Cyprus, entirsly responsîble for what 1 might oall the non-suooess of thoee negotiations and he added, if 1 understood him oorreotly, that no one fs threatenlng the independenoe of Cyprus. 86. The Counoil ha8 given me the opportunlty to be present here in order to explain, in my oapaoily as representative of Qreeoe, the position of my oountry, whioh 1s what 1 tried to do yesterday. Permit me to repeat what 1 said on this subjeot in my statementr 86. Le Conseil, Monsieur le Prbsident, m’a aoourd6 le b$n$fioe d%tre prhent parmi vous pour lu1 exposer, en tant que reprgsentaat de la. Orbce, la position de mon pays et oWt 08 que j’ai essayb de faire hier. Vous me permettree de mentionner oe que j’ai dit B oe sujet dans le passage suivant de ma d6olaratlon: @Partant de ces prinoiper, il a ggalement inrlste pour que tout arrangement dans oe oeno, ainsi que les modalitia œnœrnant les n&gooiationr sur le plan politique, recueille Itasrentiment des parties prinolpalement int6resrbe6, et rurtout oelui du Gouvernement de la R6publtque de Chypre. Vest A cette oondition expresre que l’aooord de prinoipe a 6t6 dom& par mon gouvernemeat aux propositions qui ont 6t6 faites B cliver8 rtader des nbgooiations.* 87. J’avais ajout& *Si oes propositions, formul6es par des hommes d’État anim& du d&ir de oontrlbuer h In vaciflcntion, ont Bchou0, c’est qu’ils n’ont pas pu four& des assurnnoes eufflsnntes h WI Dtnt qui oe sent mena& dnns son existence marne, dans son ind6- pendanco ohbrement ncquise.” [108GBme sbance, par. 237 et 238.1 ” .*. On the basis of those prinoiples it has also urged that any arrangement in that regard, and also the modalities for politioal negotiations, should have the oonsent of theparties prinoipally oonoerned, and first and foremost of the Oovernment of the Republio of Cyprus. “It wac on thfs express oondition that my Government agreed in prinoiple to proposais made at various stages of the negotiations.~ 87. S added: “If these proposala, emanating from statesmen motivnted by the desire to promoto penoe, hnvs failed, it 1s bocause thay were unnble-to givd euffioient assur~mco to n Stnte which feels its very life, its donrly bought indopondenco, to be threntened.” 11006th meeting, parus. 237 nnd 238.1 88. 1 venture to hope thnt in my stntemant yesterdny 1 mnnnged to strilre a note of moderation, of concllintlon. It 10 not aasy for the representntiveof Greoce to mnster hla emotions when spenklng of Cyprus; however, 1 wnnted to set an exnmple and 1 close now by 88. J’espBre avoir pu donner hier, dans mon intervention, un ton de modbrntion, de conciliation. Il n’sst pas fnclla au raprbsontnnt do 1~ GrBoe de ~UPmonter 808 Bmotlons qunnd il pnrlo de Chypre; mais j ‘01 voulu donner l’oxomple et je termine en form&.nt il en est ainsf d6oM. La slhnoe est lev6f3 d 18 b 10. NORTH AMERICA/ AMl!RIPllE DU NORD