S/PV.1104 Security Council

In aaoordana with prsvlour daolrlonr of the Couaoll, I prop000 now, with the amrsnt of thr Couaofl, to tnvita the repnrentatlvor of India and P&Wan to partiofpata without vok in the oonaidrraMoa of the question. At tbo hvftatftm af the PmMant, Mr. 8. N. C&akmnrty (Mfa) and Mr. 2. A. Bhutto (P&Man) took plaoss at the colmofl table. SW I’fnvftatia &I Pnhfdsat, Y 8. N. C-rub, (If&) et M. 2. A. Bhutto (W8t8n) pronnont ptaoe d la table da Conseff. 2. Le PlUISIDENT (tmduit de l’anglois): Les membres du Conseil se souviendront que lorsque lo Conseil de seourite a exnmln& oette question pour 1~ derniQre fois, la X7 f8vrler [10938me s&moo], I 11 nla pas fix6 de date pour In reprise dee dbbnts. LB 4 mars 1964, la reprk3sentnnt du Pakistan a, d’ordre de aon gouvernemeut, demondo au Prbeldeut de oonvoquer le Conseil de sbourit8 aussit8t que possible on vuo de roprondre l’exnmen de la question [S/6576]. LB 8 mars 1964, le repr6eentnnt de 1’Inde [L fnit objeotion h oe qua le Consell de s6ourltcJ solt oonvJqu& & une dnte rnpproohbo [S/6682]. 2. The PIUWDENT: It will be reoalled that on .L’r Fehrunry JO04 (1093rd meeting], when the Seoudty Counoll last disoussed the Item now lnoluded in our agenda, the mooting wa8 adjourned without fixing n date for further disoussiou. On 4 Maroh 1964 [S/6676] the representntivo of Pakistan, on instruotlone from his Oovernment, requested the Prealdent to oonvene a meeting of the Seourity Cow011 a8 soon as posslble to resume its oonsldarntion of the question. Thereafter, on 8 Mnroh 1964 [S/GG32], the representative of India expreseed his objeotion to the request for an early meeting. Pr&yMt: w. L&l chiob (Chim). Lettre, en date du 14 Janvler 1964, l drerab nu Prdrldont du Conaeil de r6aurlU3 par lo reprb rentant prmsnent do PIndo (S/5522). Adoption do I’ordrr du iour L’ord+odujouferta&ptd. Question Mr-Palclstan PrMdont du Cons011 do rburit6 par lo Minlatrr drs affairrs l xt6rIourrs du Pahlrtan (S/5517); PrMdont du <onso do &wit6 por IO mphsmtont pormonmt ds I’M0 (S/5522) aonrIdoratlon of the rltuatinn in Jammu and Kuhmtr and ita grava roporourrionr on the m31auonr ktweuI India and Paktrtan, At the 109Srdmeetiagofthe Caunall, I requested po&ponemmt of a few dayr in the CoUnOil’r p-w@. My QoVWIUnOnt deeply Q&WOolatu tbat thlr requut WII granted by the Council, 5, My plrpoae in l ddrudng the coluI0i1 again la, flrat, to gtva a brief a-t of the rituation in Kuhmir u it bar &volojW dnoa our lart maettng urd, woondly, to oldfy my Qovunmonttr podtlon in nlatton to tha prrpeotlvu that rmorged during t& Counoll9 dirourrion In February. 6. It will be reoallad that the rituation whloh we braught to the Councdl’r l ttenUon had aa itr immediate baokgraund the anncunoed intention of the Government ad India to integrate Jammu and Kashmir with the terrktory of tho Indtln Union In vtolatlon uf the international mnient F tbg the Stat+an~ment binding upon both pa OL tothe dtrpute. The annamoomrnt of thir polloy OS the Oovesmment of India evoked the utmort rewntmrnt of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The reeult WI@ an outbreak of open rebe!lion agalnrt India in Kalmtr. 7. After the Cuunoil had heard both partier, every memher l xpruud deep anxiety for a prompt and pro&l aolutlon of the dirplb. An appeal to the two partier to refratn from moanurea whioh might aggravata the rttuation warn okar in the rtatementr made i$ iho mimkn of the Camoll without oxooption. It tr mv tinful duty to report that thtr appeal har not ban-hiubd by b Clove~inment of Indlai -On the oontrary, the Mlnider of Eduoaion of bdla, in a datemerit d 24 February 1964, made In the Iedian Parliament, 0-n trhd to dlrtort the rtakmontr of the mrmbera ai Uw Soourlty Camotl andintorpretedthem am oonvoytng a twit aoorptanoe of further mrarurer &&&waUon of UN Stata d Jammu and Kaahmlr into 8. Tlnu Theo faotr ham rmrrgad during the interval dno our lad mootIns; firat, the movement of protest ta tiw 8th of Jamlfiu an&Kaahmir ham ootitlnued; moody, India lur &own no dgnr of rrlrnting In Ik polloy of mprerdon again& the people of the State: thirdly, the Qovernment of India has shown itself to bc bent on adopting those vary measure8 towards the annexation of the St& ngainot whioh Wcistan had speolflonlly protested to tie Ccunoil. Thus, during the intervnl, thexe has been no mitigation of the gravity of the eltuntlon betwoen Indin rind P&Wan. 9. Let me olte some lmportnnt developments that have ooourred einoe our last meetlng. On 20 February 1964, India’s Mlnleter of Home Affairs, Mr. Chdznrilnl Nanda, Indicated In the Indlnn Parlinmeht that @the ratlonr, tour isnr &oeption oit olalrrment demand6 aux dew wrtlrr de r*abrknir de touter melurem rlrquant diaggraver la rltuatlon. Or, je doir, A mon urand remt. rlgnaLr quo lo Oauvernrment lndlen %a par kt&du %t app61. Blan plur, danr une dbolantion qu*il a fake lo 24 fbvrler 1064 devant lo Parlrment Indian, 1s Mini&e de l*bduoatlon de PIndo a ohrrohb A fauarer lo renr drr dbolaraUanr dw msmbrrr du Carrot1 de rburitb en lrr interprb tant oommr d 0110s ranotionnalent taoltrment but0 nouvello trrtatlve d~intbgratton de 1’ Etat de Jammu et Caohomlre A PIndo. 8. Trolr faoteurr me rant dono fait Jour pendant Nntervalle aui Vut booulb druuir la drmlbre rbanoe du Conneil db rbowltbt preml~rement, lo mouvsmant da ~rotutatton r’ert nourrulvi danr l*Etat de Jammu et ~aohemlre: deuxl~mement, Nnde n’a manlfert6 auoune intention de renonoer II oa polltlque tie rBpreselon n 1’6gn1ul de la population de oet Etnt; troiP!amement, le aouveruement lndfon a paru voulolr adopter lea mesure mbmes d’nnnexion de PEtat de Jnmmu at Cnohemlre oontre looquelles lo Pnkiet.1111 n exprees6ment prnteotd dovnnt le Consail. Comma on le voit, la grnvit6 de la sltuntlon qul exlste entre 1’Inde et le Palcistnn n’a en rlen dimInu6 pondnnt l~ictervnlle qui &eat 600~16. 9. Jo voudrnis mnlntenant mentionner oertalno 6v6- nements importnnts qui ea sont produits depuis la dorniibro shnoe du Consell. Lo 20 f6vrier 1964, M. Ckdenrllnl Nwdn, ministre de l’intfhieur de 10. On the l me day, a 0orrerpoaQat 08 The 7lmrr ai London. renortina from Srtnwar. raid that Delhi would %obble~ some’ •rrangeman~m tin Kuhn&. The arramement that wau oobbled wao the tnatallation of 8 new’plppet Premier in fndlan-oooupid Karhmlr on a8 February 1964. Xt la rtgnifloant that thl~ WII done in dsflanoa ad the warn!ngl given by saner ebmentr wtthtn India itulf. A prominent member of the Indian Parliament, Nr. M. R. Mauni, rtated on 1 February that ~mplaolng Mr. Shamruddin with Mr. CL M. Bad& u Prime Mlnirtor oould not rtablliw the rltuatlon In the State for long”. Indeed, the new puppet wau inrtalled even thrn@ The Timer reported on 96 February that Qwentmcii Dolhilr inrlrt4nce on lrnpolh htm hadinorsarod OonBidOrably in KaDhmW. ~)ure a 9t6 prlre en d&pit dw averttrrementr don& par lea 919msnta plw luoldea de l%de mhe. Le 96 f&rier, un membre dmlnent du Parlemcnt Mien, M. M. Ft. Ma~anl, a d6olrrb quo “10 remplaoemart de M. Shunruddin p&r M. 0. M. Sadlq au post41 de premier minlrtm no pouvait rtablllrer la rltuation danl PEtat de fagon durable% Male lo nouveau fantoohe a aunnd m8me 4t6 mtr en plaoe au moment m8ms op ie Timer de Lomdre8r dt~ 1b~fQvrlsr l lgnalalt quo *lo rarr~ent susoit8 par l~aoharnemant quo l%M mettait A l’impoaer r’itait oonrldbrablem(vnt aooru au Caohemire”. 11. I1 ert 4vfdent quo M. Sadiq a 8tO plao6 A la t&e du gouvernrm& mlr aa plaoa par 1Vnds au Caohemire Daroe qu’il a auparavant demand6 l wio inalrtanoe q\ \ le Caohemlre roit oompl9tement In T au r&e de IVnde et oe#ue dtavolr UII rtatut rp9o al. I1 a ldpondu A l’attente de •~# maftxw en anonpant, lo ler marr 1964, quo Kn gouvernemant ~llmtneratt tour lea obrtaolsr A l’tnt&ratlon du brritoire au “rode de 1’Inde”. A oette fin, lo nWv8(;u Wvernb merit mlr en plaoe par Nndd a d6por6, 16 10 mm 1994, un projet da 101 devant la prbtwdw arrrmbl&e @Et& tradrnt h ohM@E k titn &I 0h.f dr l’Bt&t et du ohef du Qouvernement du Caobemire oooup6 par Flndo rt h remglroer b drapeau ck oatttat par orlui de l*Indc. 11. La noutrrl Mnt de 1’Inde au Caohomlra ert m&no all& plur la&t 11 a demand8 quo lo Clouverneur du Caohomirr wit nomd mr lu Prbidont de IcInbr au lieu d’&re 81~ par 11 *A<rembYe l~rlatlve~ de 1’ Etat. h nouveau Cabtnet oomprend tm rnhbtra qul l ppartiant A une oqaniratlon extr6mirte hkdoue et dont lo daraetn a-6 out ds transformer 10 Caohemire an une r&gin A majorlti hlndoue, en noounnt A la violenoo rt t&m A uno Immtqrrtton maorlw d’bl(menntr venant de l*Inde. De plw, dw poetu olef~ de l~admlnirtrrtlon olvllr et da la poller ont 4t9 attrlbu6r A drr fonotlonnairor non origtnairer du Caohrmlre, notamment oslui de reolbtrir~ prlnotpal, auqurl a OU nommb uu fonottanntira du Qouvornemrnt lndlrn qut a tout pouvoir pour cmfier @au&or porter l trat4glquea A der fonotbnnalrer du Cbuvwnsment indtsn. 11. It ir evldent that Mr. Sadiq war nominated to head the Indian-ownrored r6gtme In Kamhmlrkoawe ha had been dema&ing complete integration wtth the mrt of India and the ending of KaahmlV~ #peotal rtatur, Ho iulftlled the expeotatlonr of htr patron@ by announo- 1 on 1 Maroh 1964 that hlr Government would remove 3 barrlerr to the territory~r integration with %a rut of Indian. To thir end, the now I&an-rponrored r4gims tn Kashmir Intr&uc@J a bill In the ro-oalled State Auembly on 10 March 1964, whioh aeekr to ohm the LIlnnaMon af the Head of State and the Head 08 Qovetient of Indian-oooupld Kalhmlr, and ~$wIvI~# for replaoement of the Stab flag by the flag 11. lndia’a new writ in KWmIr bar gone even further and bar oallad for the appolntmmt of the Qovemor ai Xndtan-oooupled Kashmir by the Prerldent of Indlainr~rddhirkinOalookdby,yths State %+@a- Iaturs~. Tbu new Cabtnet inoluder a Mlnirter belongIng to an sxtremirt Hindu organbation, whew rvowul ohjrot ia to oonvwt by munr of vlolenoa and by largenoalr tmminratlon from India. Kashmir into a Htndumajority ah, FurWrmore~ key port0 in the oivll md wllae admlniotration of Indian-ooouplrd KaWnlr hati km turnodover tonon-Karhmiri ofiloialr. Them Inoluda the port of Chtof boretay, to whioh an offlotal ad the Oovor3unont of Inda bar boon appointed with full powerr to ill other rrnriflrr poatr by the offtoialr of (ho oovornlnmt of Indir. 13. It is hardly neceesary to explain at length the effeot whioh those measure8 are designed to have. Their menning ie unmistakable. They are deelgnsd to oarry out the annexation of the Stata of Jammu and Knngmir to the Indian Union. They are designed to deetroy the idontlty of the people of Jammuand Knehmlr. ke I said in my stat&meats in February, the ciuestlon at iesue le not whnt provlsion Indin should retain tn, or eliminate from, ite Conetitution. Tko queetion at iosue irr whether India intends to fnoilltate the exeroise of free ohoice by the people of Jnmmu and Kashmir or work8 !o prevent it. Innomuok tl~ Indin, at nn enrly stage, sought to give a symbolic reoogni- 13. Point n’est beeoln de pr6oiser h quo1 tendent oe8 mesures. Leur but eat evident. Llles vlsent II nnnexer PEtat do Jntnmu et Caohemire h PUnion Indienne. Elles viscnt B supprimor l~idontit~dupeuple , du Jnmmu et Cnohomlre. Comme Jo l’ai dit en EBvrier, la qrstltion n’est pas de snvoir quelles diepositlouo de an oonstitution PInde devrnit maint0nir ou nbroger, mais de snvoir al 1’Inde a l~lntention de fnoiliter A In population du Jummu et Cnohemire l’exeroioo do EIO. llbert6 de oholx ou, au oontralre, de le lul interdire. Si PInde n, au cXbut, en adoptant Particle 370 de an oonstitution, oheroh6 I reoonnnnre aymboliquement l’identlt6 du peuple du Jammu et 14. We have protested to the Securtt :ounotl agalnrt India keeping the aocredited leader8 of the people of Jammu and Kaehmir in gaol. Butwhatweam witnerahg now is the wholeeale lmprieonment of an entire people and an attempt at rslnforoing and multiplying the bars of steel behind whloh they have been enoaged. Permit me to say that no aot of the Qovernment of India oould be more oalculated to serve aa a grave Drovooation to Paktstan and to demo&rate oomplete heflame of the wishes of the United Nation6 f&r an amloable rettlement of the dispute. Considering the timing and the rapidity of the exeoution of these measure8 for the integration of Indian-occupied Karhmlr with India, how ie it possible, I aek, for uo to under&and them except a8 evidence of India’s determination to bring matters to a head and stage a showdown? This la the eituation that we arebrfnging to the Counail’e attention. 15. It wtllbe reoalled that, when we drew the Counoll~s attention to the upsurge of popular feeling in Kashmir against India, the Indian reprosentatlve emphatically replied that “the demonotrations in Kaohmir were aimed at the looal administrationn and had no bearing upon Karhmir’s relation with India or Pakirtan. The question naturally arisen: what irr the truth? 16. The truth could be found out by an independent faot-finding agenoy of the Security Camoil, if one existed, and my Qovernment would be under no neoerrity to elaborate the point further. In the abrence of suoh an agency, however, one oan only turn to the reporta of impartial fomfgn obrervcra Cut of the many which have appeared reoently, I shall quote only a few. The Timer of London, of 13 February 1964, for example, reported: “Intenre feeling in the Valley again& the ruling party in tbe Stab, the National Confermoo, har been projeoted againat Delhi 86 well, and feeling there haa probably never been more rtrongly againrt integration with India than It is now.” 17. I might rsoall here that in my rtatementr before thr Counoil in February, I had raid that It wae the revslationr brought about by the Iiaaratbal inoident, rather than the tnoident ltrelf, to which we were reeking to draw the Counoil~s attention. All rubsequent developments In Kashmir have borne out the truth of our submlsslor.. Here. for exr.m?lnle. is a reoort in The New York Times of 2b Fobruar;lD&, whlci says: “The riots that followed the theft from a mosque of a halr revered as a relic of”-the ProphetnMohammed brought to light strong anti-Goveniment feeling in Kashmir . . . “New Delhi was alarmed by the pro-Pakistan sentlmerits of the people, which continued to be expressed after the relic hud been restored.” 14. Nous rrvona protest6 devant leConsei1 de e6curit6 oontre l’emprisonnement par 1’Inde de dirigeants aoorbditir de la population du Jammu et Caohemtre. Maie, aujourd’hui, noua voyone met&e aux fere ILL peuple tout entier, nous aeeislone fl une tentative pour renforoer et multlpller les barreaux d’aoisr derrlbre leequele oe peuple est enfermb. Auoun aote du Qouvernement indlen, Je orols pouvoir le dire. ne pouvait Btre mieux oaloul6 pour provoquer grnvement le Pakistan et montrer en mame tempe que 1’Inde fait oompl&ement fl de8 VOBW manifest68 par lee Nations Uniee touohant le rbglement amiable du lit@. Etant donn6 lee oiroonetanoee et lea dt3lais tree brefe dane leaquele lea meaures tendant B in& grer le Caohemlre .¶ 1’Inde ont 6th ex6out6es, oomment pouvons-noue les interprbter, sinon oomme tzadulsant la volont6 de 1’Inde de provoquer une arise et d’&aler son jeu? Telle est la situation que noue signalons au Coneeil. 115. Cn 138 rappollera que, loreque nous avona attire l’attention du Coneeil sur l’explosion de oolbre pcpulaire oontre 1’Inde qui s’est produite au Caohemire, le reorbeentant de 1lInde a affirm6 oat&roriauement que 1;s manifestations qui avalent eu 1ie’G au-cache- ‘mire %alent dirig6ee or.tre l’administrationlooalem et n’avaient rien a voir aveo lee relations entre le Cachemire et 1’Inde ou le Pakistan, Ce qul oblige B se demander OP est la v&it& 16. 9’11 exietait un organieme d’enquete relevant du Coneeil de s&ourlt& il pourrait l’&ablir, oette v&it&, et mon gcuvernement n’auratt pas B lneleter davantage. Mais oomme il n’exiete pas d’organtsme de oe genre, nous devone noun en remettre aux oomptes rendus d’observateure &rangers impartlaux. 11 en a paru beauooup oea dernierr tempo, maie je n?en oiteral que quelquee-una. Ainei, le Ta de Londres du 13 f6vrler 1964 Bortvait: n L’hortllit0 que la population de la Vall4e Bprouve B l’endroit du parti au pouvolr dane 1’ Etat, la Conf&renoe nationale, elle 1’0prouve egalement B l*Qgard de New Delhi et elle n’a jamais Btb plue vlolemment oppoe6e P l’lnt&gration B 1’Inde qu’elle no Pest aujourd’hui.” 17. JU dit ioi en fhbr, Jo tienr I lo rap@er, que 0’6tait our la rituatlon r6velbe par l’tnoident d’liatratbal, bien plur que our l’tnoident lul-m&me, que noun oherohionr a appeler l’attentlon du Conrell. Tour les Bvbnemente qui se ront produits ultbrieurement au Caohemire ont oonfirm6 no8 all6gations. Jo clteral, A oe sujet, un article du New Yorl~Tlmes du 2D fbvrler, selon lequel: “Lea Bmeutes qul ont sulvl le vol, dam3 une mosqu6e, d’un cleveu qul &nit r&&r6 comme une rellaue du proph8te Mahomet ant rbv616 les violent8 sentiments Hitlgouvernemel,taux de !a population du Cachemire. , . “New Dolhl a 6t6 alarm6 par les sontlments prcpzkistanflls de la population, qul ont contlnub clc so manlfeeter nprbs que In rellyue eut 6t6 retrouv6c.” The oorrespondent then talks of “the oloud of gloom and despair” in the Kashmir valley beoaure of “a oomblnation of armed polloe and imported Indian administrators”, and then he adds: Wxlia now seeks a breathing spell to regain its shaky hold on Kashmir and wants time to absorb it gradually into Indian. 19. This testimony about the faots of the situation in Kashmir is further strengthened by reports in the Indian Press itself. Aooordlng to The Times of India of 20 February 1964, most of the shops in Srlnagar remained closed on 19 February in responrre to a oall g&en by the Action Committee for observance of a general strike as a mark of protest against the oonvenlng of the State Assembly whloh “was not a true representative body”. An artiole entitled “Inside Kashmir” by a oolumnlst, Nandan 8. Kagal, in the same newspaper on 26 February said: “Whether one likes it or not, the Aotlon Committee set up by Maulana MasoocU after the Hazratbal theft has within the epaoe of a few weeks seemingly beoome the voloe of the people of the Kashmir valley ..* It appears to have a wider popular base than any other politioal group in Kashmir today,. . It has oalled for Shelkh Abdullah’s release and also for Choudhury Cihulam Abas’s return to Kashmir. When these demand8 are coupled with the allegation that the State Assembly does not truly refleot the will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, the political objeotlves of Maulana Maeoodi and the Aotlon Committee beoome quite olear. Once the representative nature of the Kashmir Assembly is ohallenged, though its actions might remain legally vaild, their meaningfulness in terms of demooratlc prlnolples is R&C& Maulana Maooodi in effeot says that Kauhmlr’s aooesrlon to India Ir neither final nor lrrevooable , , , W Then The Times of India on 21 February said that: “It is %%w quite plain that Maulana Masoodl and his oolleagues on the Action Committee want to reopen the accession issu~.~ 20. What olearer refutation, I ask, could dmnnnl;o from India itself of tbe tbesls advanced by the representative of India here that “the demonstrations in Kashmir were aimed at the local admInistration”. 21. As a matter of fact, the latest reports leave one in no doubt about the nature of the popular movement in Kashmir. According to The Statesman of Delhi of 1964, la plupart dee magaslne de Srinagar sont rest68 ferm6s le 19 fbvrler, en r6ponee B un appel B la grbve g&Wale lano6 par le Cornit d’aotlon, en slgne de protestation oontre la r6unionde l’Aseembl6e dIEtat qul “n’est pas un organlame reellement rep&- sentatlf”i. Dana un artlole lntltul6 “Inside Kashmlrn paru le 26 f6vrler dans le m&me quotldlen aoua la signature du journaltste Nandan B. Kagal, on peut lire oe qui suit: *Qu’on le veullle ou non, le Comlt6 d’aotlon inetitu6 par Maulana Maeoodl aprbs le vol oommis & Haeratbal semble Btre deveru, en quelquea semaines, le porte-parole du peuple dane la ValUe de Caohemlre . , . 11 eat, aujourd’hul, eemble-t-11, plus populalre que n’lmporte quel autre groupement polltlque du Caohemlre, . . 11 a demand6 la lib& ration du ohelk Abdullah et le retour au Cachemire de Choudhury Qhulam Abas. Sil salt que oea demandee vont de pair aveo l*afflrmatlon que l*Aseembl6e dIEtat ne retlate pas r64lement la volont6 de la population du Jammu et Caohemlre, on oomprend fort blen quele eont les objeotlfa polltiques de Maulana Maaoodl et du Comlt6 d’aotlon. Une folr le oaraotbre rapr6sentatlf de l’Assembl6e du Caohemire mie en doute, ses d6olslonr perdent de leur polde our le plan des prlnoipes d+mratiquer, m&me el ellee restent Jurldlquement valablw. Maulana Masoodl afflrme en fait que le rattaoheinent du Caohemtre B 1’Inde n’eet nl d~finitlf ni irr&voonble , . ,” L.e Times of Indin dcrivnit le 21 f6vrier: “11 est maintenant Bvldent quo Mnulann Masoodi et 888 nmls du Comitb d’nction entondent rouvrir la question du rattaohement.” 20. Eet-11 possible de rBfutor plus olalrement que ne le fnit PInde elle-meme lo th8se avnnc6e 101 par le repr6sentant de 1’Inde selon lnquelle “lee d6monstrntlons qul ont eu lieu au Caohemlre btalent dlrlg6eo centre l’ndministrntion loonlen? 21. En fait, lea dernl.Gres Informatlons reques ne laissent nucun douto sur lfl nature du mouvemont populnlre au Cncbemirc. Yolon lo Statesman de ‘,?a, The truth is that India knows full well the reality of the people’s movement in Kashmir and the oause of the oontlnued orlsls there. Yet what 16 the response of the Government of India? It is to prooeed with greater speed to integrate Kashmir into the Indian Union. It is to threaten stern aotion against anyone in Kashmir who stands in the way, When theQovernment of India threatens dire oonsequences for it the people of Jammu and Kashmir take the stand that they are entitled to deolde their own destiny, it brings out the explosive nature of the present situation more clearly than it oan be desoribed. It shows that India, whloh is a Member of the United Natlone, a signatory to the Charter, pledged to respect the authority of the Seourlty Counoll. is prepared to persecute e people for no-other aoi th& tcelr making manifest the demand that a principle of the Charter, and the deolslone of the Se&rlty Council based on it, ehouldbe implemented in their ease. Even if there had been no other dlsquieting faotors in the present situation, this attitude of the Government of India woald in itself be enough justlfloatlon for Pakistan to seek the Council’s lnterventlon. 23. Aotually, there are other disquletlngfaotors whloh I have already reported. They emphasice the orltloal, oanoeroua n&are of the pierent rltuatlon between India and Pakistan. The situation on the cease-fire line, always uneasy, is today more troubled than ever before. Seriour incidents have taken place in recent weeks, leading to heavy exohanger of fire, resulting in a number of deaths, The urgency of the situation is am pronounced as it is poignant. There is no internntional agenoy but the Seourity Counoil whloh oan meet it and thus help to avert the danger to peaoe, which is otherwire being dangerously augmented day by day. 24. The danger to poaca is indicated by the statements of responsible Indian spokesmen. On 15 Mnroh 1964, India’s Minister for Works and Rehabilltution, Mr. Khanna, said that PaIdstan is “India’s enemy No, 1” and urged Indian students to follow %e path of Shivajl and Govlnd Singhit. These were war-lords in Indian hIstory who fought ‘against the Muslims rind who were defeated by the Muslims. Theee were the war-lordo to which the Indluns referred during the Sine-Indian conflict. The Defence Minister of India has added to this statement that Indtn will be “P&atan’s graveynrd”. Those are the words spoken by the 22. La v&it4 est que VInde ne salt que trop gull1 exlste effeotlvement un mouvement popuialre au Caohemlre et quella est la oause de 1’6tat de orlse permanent qul r&ne dans oet Etat. Et pourtant, comment le Qouvernement de 1’Inde rbaglt-117 11 essale de realiser le plus rapidement possible l’lnt& gratlon du Caohemlre dans PUnion lndienne. I1 menaoe de prendre des mosures bnergiques oontre quloonque s’oppose au Caohexlre A 88s desselns, Lorsque le Qouvernement de 1’Inde met en garde la population du Jammu et Caohemlre oontre de grave@ oone6quenoes si elle oontlnue A proolamer qu’elle a le drolt de d&older de son sort, 11 revAle le oaraot&e exploslf de la situation aotuelle plus olalrement que ne pourralt le faire auoune description. 11 montre que PInde, qul est Membre de 1’Organlsatlon des Nations Unies et flaure au nombre des sianatalres de la Charte, et qui itest engagee A respeot& l’autorite du Conseil de s&ourlt& est p&e A per&outer un peuple qui n’a oommls d’aitre or&e que de rbolamer ouvertement l’applloatlon E aon propre 08s d’un prlnolpe de la Charte et de d8olalo.ns du Consell de &uritb fond&es sur oe prlnolpe. Cette attitude du Qouvernement de llnde &fir&it B elle aeule, et m&me s’il n’y avalt paa d’autres Bl4ments inqul& tants en jeu, A justifier la demande pakistanalse d’lnterventlon du Consell do s6ouriM. 23. En fait, I1 y a d’autres elements inqul&ntr et J’en a1 dejA parl6. 11~ forAt apparafire le oaraotare oritlque du differend, qul eat une sorte de plale ouverte entre 1’Inde et le Pakistan. La situation sur la llgne de oessez-le-feu, qul a toujours 6th inntable, est aujourd’hul plus troublee que Jamals. De s6rleux lnoldente se sont produlte au oours dee derniares remaines et se ront sold&i par une fuslllade nourrie qul a fait plusieura morte. L’urgenoe de la situation cut aussi manlfeste que deeolante. Auoune institution lnternationnle, ei oe n’est le Conreii de r&ourlt&, ne peut y faire faoe et nous alder A eoarter oette menaoe A la palx qul e’aggrave ohaque jour. 24. Quo In pnlx solt en dunger, c’est co clue montrent blen 10s dklarntlons de porto-pn role lndlens nutox*~s~s. Le 16 mnrs 1964, tout rfkemmont dono, le Mlnistre des trsvnux publics et= de in reconstruction de l’Intle, M. Khnnnn, n dit que le Pnltlstnn &nit “l’onnemi No 1 de I’Indel’ et il n instnmment demuntl6 flux 6tudillllts indiens dil SUiVl~U “ln vole do Sl1lvnJI 8t da Govlnd Singh’l , co sovt ill doux guerr1ers fnmoux de l’hlstoire lndienno qul ant combuttu loo musulmuns et qul ont BtB vninous par eux. C’est leur nom que les Indlens invoqualent ~~endant Ic confllt slno-lndten. Lo Mlnistre do III dfXenso do 25. The Counoll~s oonelderatlon of the question In February helped to bring out agaln those aspects of the insue whloh, we believe, must not be obaoured lf a just and psaosful settlernsnt 18 to be aohieved. The pronounoements made by the members of the Counoll showed agaIn that the United Natlons is not Insensitive to those prinolples upon whioh alone a structure of peaoe oan be enduringly built, 26. Les debate du Conaeil en f6vrier ont mla en lumibre de8 aspeote de la question qui, oroyonsnous, ne doivent pas rester dans l’ombre ei l’on veut mettre au polnt un reglement equitable et paoiflque. Lea d6olaratlons dee membres du Conaeil ont moqtr6 une fois de plus que les Nations U~ies ne se d6slnt6ressnlent pas des prinolpes qul peuvent seuls oonetltuer 18s aeeiscp d’une paix durable, 26. The problem, however, remains that thoee pronounoements have to be brought to bear in reality on the situation whloh oonfronts us. One of the trends of the Counoilts debate has been to emphasiee the neoeselty of resuming negotiations between India and Pakistan, I need hardly remind the Counoll that this advice is not, and oould never be, unweloome to Pakistan, Throughout the exfstenoe of the dispute, the Qovernment of Pakistan has been anxious toutiliee all roasonable methods for its peaoeful and equitable solution. When Member States of the Counoil talk of negotiations between India and Pakistan, I would merely ask them to Lake into account our long experlenoe of this partioular method of trying to resolve the cllsnute. 26. Cependant, il reste Ii reller oes d&olarations sur le plan oor.oret R la situation A laquelle noue avons 8 faire faoe. On a notamment eu tendanoe, au oours des d6bats du Consell, 5 soulignsr la nboeseit6 pour 1’Inde et le Pakistan de reprendre lee n@oolatIone. 11 eat A pelne besoln de rappeler au Consell que le Pakistan n’oat pas et ne saurait Btra hostile B une telle reoommandation, Utrpuis que le differend existe, le Qouvernement du Pakistan aouhaite utiliser toutes lee m6thodetl raisonnnbles permettant d’arriver a une solutionpaolflqueet Bqultable. Au% Etata membres du Consall gut parlent de n&gooiatlons entre 1’Inde et le Pakistan, je voudraie seulement rappeler que nous avone une lonbue experienoe de oe mode partioulier de reglement du lltlge. 27. There were oonversations between the Prime Ministers of India and Paklrtan even before the issue was brought to the Counoil in 1948. There was a long corrsspondenoe in 1950 and 1961, pursotuated by personal oontaots between the Prime Mlnlsters of both oountries, about formulating the principles whioh should govern the settlement of disputes between the two oountries. There were negutiations again between the two Prime Ministers in 1963 and 1954. There were some dlreot talks in 1966. From 1958 to 1961 the President of Paklstan made eustained endeavours to eeoure a jurt ‘and peaoeful settlement of the dispute by direct negotiation. Then agaln, as tha members are well aware, six rounds of talks wefe held between India and Pakistan from Deoember 1962 to May 1963. It oan, therefore, hardly be aaid that we have failed to explore the porsibllltles of this method, far less spurned it. 27. 11 y a eu dee oonvereatlone entre lea Premier8 Mlnietres de 1’Inde et du Pakistan avant m6me que la question ne soit port&e devant le Coneeil en 1948. Une longue oorrespondanoe a 6th Bohangee en 1960 et en 1961 et parallblement deu oontaote pereonnelr ant, BtB Btablis entre les Premiers Minietres dee dew paye au sujet c’e la formulation dee prhoipe sur la base desquele lea differends entre lee dew pays devraient Btre r6gl6s. De nouvellee n&gooiations se sont ddroul6es entre lee dew Premier0 Mlnlstres en 1963 et en 1964. Des entretiens dlreotr ont eu lieu en 1965. De 1958 B 1961, le Pr6sident du Pakistan a fait dee efforts pere6v6rants pour trouver un rbglemont juste et paolfique au differend par voie de n&oolatluns direotes. Puie de nouveau, oomme lee membres du Conaell le rave& rix s&lea d’entretiens ont eu lleu entre 1’Inde et le Pakirtan de dboembre 1962 A ma1 1963. Cn ne peut dono pan dire que n@us n’avons pas explore toutes les possiblllt&s offertelr par oette mt%hode, et enoore molnr que noua avons refusb de l~utiliser. 25. Sinoe all direot negotlatlonr between India and Paklrtan ao far have falled, we believe that it 1s neoerrary to baar in mind the rearonfor their failure. When one party refers to the governing prlnolpler of the oase and the other rellee on its might, when one seeks the reality of negotiation and the other wants only to contrive its semblance, when one seeks to expedite the prooess und the other is determined to stnll it, what is the result? The inevitnble result is that the parti 3 talk at croes purposes with enoh other. There is then nothil!g to prevent negotiations not only from being wasteful but, through their futility, from worsening n tense situation. Even medintlon does not help greatly in suoh a case, unless the medlntor is in a position to direct the negotintions nnd to relate them to n frnmeworlc which is renaonnbly precise. Thnt ~10110 oan glvq the negotiations some ooheronce and purpose. l’o as1\ a mediator to 28. PUhqUe, juequ’iol, toutae lea n&oolationa dlreotee entre PInde et le Pakistan ae ront roldher par un (oheo, noua ertimonr ndoerraire d*lnnrlrter aur la rairon de oet Boheo. LoraquQne de8 partier se rbolame dee prinoipes applioables en l’espeos et que l’nutre oompte sur on puiasnnoe, lorsquvune des pnrties d&ire einobr’ement nbgooieret qua l’nutre se oontonte de fnire semblnnt, lorequ’~e doe pnrties ohorohe A hflter les ohoses et ql;e llnutre est rbsolue A lee f:dre trnlber en longueur, quo1 eet lo rBsult&? Le rL,ultut est fnWement un dlulogue de soupde. Non nu monde ne peut empQohcr de telles ]&goolutlone d’6tre non ~3eulomonl inulllos, mnio m&no nulslblos, du fuil que, par leur iuefficnollb, ollos ng@,uvenl uno situntlon d6jA tendue. M&no la m ,Wintion n’est pnb cl’un grnnd seooura en pnreil clue, A moins quo le medintour ne soit on mesure do ~iriger les n6goclntions et de les orientor drum uno dirootion SO. TM s kind of statement is probably an aat reminder to the Seourity Cumoil that n&form& for negotiations oan help if it is vague and lends itself easily to distortion, Given the authority of the United Nations and his personal standing, the mediator’s goodoffioeswill oerhinly ‘be a posit&e element. But ihis element, in order to be constructive, needs a foundation and a base, St needs preoise terms of referencn that oan be objectively oommended, 31. What point of depafture oa11 bs more objeotively commended than the prinoiples of the Charter and the international agreement whioh has been solemnly aoospted by both parties? This agreement was not imposed by the Council. It is based on the oommon *nominator between the deolared standpoints of the partles and, in iteelf, embodies a compromise between their respeotive olnims. It is an agreement to whioh the Security Council itself is a party and to the olarifioation of which the thought and effort of scores of Member Statea and the eminent individuals who have served as representatives in the Seourity Council have been devoted 32. That the agreement embodied the pledge given by India and Pakistan to the people of the State is a foot whioh has been oonstantly affirmed and redfirmed by the Seourity Council. Thus, the agreement has had behind it the reoognitlon of all Members of the United Natioys. If anything was wanting in making this reoognition unfversal, that, too, has now been done. 33. I must, in this oontext, stress before the Counoll that plebisoite in Kashmir is not just a slogan of Pakistan, It is not any oonslderatfon of prestige whioh attaohss us to the in+ Jrnational anreement on ths state of Jammu and Kashmir, that is tiie two resolutions of the United NaHons Commission for India andPakistan. We invoke the principle of self-determinatlonbeoause it is the only basic--I repeat, the only basis-on which a solution of this problem can endure. Let us keep in mind the nature of this problem. It Is not the problem of a border. It is not a dispute over a piece of territory. It is not a clash of economic interests. It 1s not a rlvolry between two systems. It 18 the problem of the life and future of nearly 5,000,OOO people who inhabit a territory six times RR large a8 Switzerland, III this day nnd age, bow can we possibly dispoee of this problem without impartially consulting the wishes of theoe people7 Whether from an tithical or from a politico1 point of view, there is no getting away from the fact thnt no solution of this queotion will be viable if 31. Y a-t-i1 une base de depart qui soit objeotivement plus digne d’approbation que les prinotpes de la Charte et l’aooord international qui a Bt6 solennellement aooept6 par Ita deux parties? Gel aooord n*a pas BtB impos6 par le Consell. II est fond6 sur lee 616ments oonmuns aux positions prisee offiolellement par les parties et oonstitue, en lui-m6me, un oompromis entre leurs pr6tentions respeotives. Vest un aooord auquel le Conseil de s6ourlt6 luim6me eat partie et dont un grand nombre d’Etats Membres et dl6minentes personnaltt66 qul ont repr6- sent6 leur pnye au Conseil de s6ourit6 ont travaIlI& aveo patienoe et sagesse, B p&leer la portbe. 32. Que oet aooord renferme la promesse faite par 1’Inde et le Pakistan B la population de PEtat, o’est un fait que le Conseil de s&o&it& n’a oess6 de r6affirmer. Ainsi, oet aooord a Bt6 sanotionn6 par tous lee Membres de 1’Organisation des Nations Unles. ?(I1 manquait quo1 que oe soft pour que oette sanotlon aft un oaractbro universe& o’est maintenant ohoss faite. 33. Je dols souligner 101 q&en demandant l’organisation d?m pl6bisolte au Caohemire le Pakistan ne se borne pai B lancer un slogan, Ce n’est pas pour den oonsid&ations de prestige que nous restons fidbles B l~aooord international sur lIEtat de Jammu et Caohemire, o’est 9 oause des dew r6solutions de la Commlssion des Natlons Unles pour 1’Inde ot la Pakistan. Nous invoquons le prlndue du droit des pcuplcs & disposer d’eux-m8mes paroe que c’eet, je le rbpbte, la seule base sur lnquellc puisse &re fond& une solution durable. N’oublions pas en quo1 consiste le problbme. I1 ne s’agit pas d’un differend de frontiQre; il ne s’agit paa d’un litigc concernant une pnrcelle de territolre. 11 ne slagit pas d’un conflit d’lnt6r&s Bconomiquee; il no s’agit pas d’anhgonisme entre deux aystBmes. 11 s’ngit de la vie et du eort de p&s deoinq milliona de personnca qui hnbitent un territoire six fois plus Btendu qua la Suisse. Comment pourrions-nous, n notre Bpcque, r6glbr un probl&me pm-oil Rnne consulter impnrtlnle- 34. Suppoee, in a mocd of real politio and mindful only of the ohanqingexpedienolesdpolitior andpower, we were to try to hulrtls through what is oalled a politioal eettlement. Is it a likely proposition that thin settlement will be conducive to peaa, if it is oppolbd by the people involved7 It 10 natural that rome men of gccd will should feel the need for a frerh approaoh to a problem that har perrirt8d for rixteen year& Butand here is the oold faot of the matter-no freah approach ie likely tc be anything but perverse if it. doea not have the Ipport of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. That lo vhy we remain unrhaken in wr convlotion that any deviation from the principle6 of the two retiolutlone will result, not in an easement of the problem, but oniy in ite aggravation. 36. We have grappled with this question all these year8 and one thought abides with UI. Suppose the slate were sponged clear and you were tc consider the problem an if it had arieen now, not in 1946, but today. What would happen? In your Bearoh, however pragmatic, for an equitable settlement, you would be driven to the conclusion that there la only one 8ure way-the way of fiuding out what the people of Jammu and Kashmir themselves want. You would thur be driven to write again the aubetance of the reeolutiorm. I 36. At the Counoil~e meeti f s in Fenmary, it wao I one of the &ark statement8 o the Indian reprerenta- I tlve that the rerolutionr are obrolete. I would like to raise two quertions. The first ir general. If these ~ resolutions are obsolete, does that mean that the people of Jammu and Kashmir are alro obroleta and that their right of self-determlnatlon is alro obsolete? The second quentlon is one of even more urgent implioa- I tions and it needr to be ccnontely answered by the I Security Counoil, on the one ride, and by India, on the other, The quertion is thir: if we aocept the pcrition of the Government of India that it regard@ there ) resolutions as obrolete, then doer it not follow that I the oeare-fire in Karhmir is alro obrolete, beoau#e ~ there is no other ranotion behind the ceare-fire than the validity of there reaolutionr and their aooeptanoe by India and Paklatan? St la evident that thlr 11 not a I rhetoriod quertlon and we do not ark it in order to wore a point, On the oontrlry, oonrequenoer of an ~ extremely praoW.oal nature will flow from the answer , that wlll be given to ua by the Government of India. 37. We have been gratified by the references made ln the statements of the members of the Security Council to the realities of the situation. We weloome the sugge&ons that a solution must pay dua regard to these realities. So people of Jammu and Kashmir are not any less of a reality today than they wore In 1949. Will this statement be contested? The primary reality of the situation 18 the fact that, all passage of time notwithstandlng, these people are not recon- 31. Nous avona 6t6 heureux de oonstater que les ’ memhres du Conseil de s6ourit6 se sont rbf6r6s dans leurs d6olnratfons nux r6allt6s de la situation. Nous aooueillons aveo satisfaotion l’id6e que la solution doit tenir dament compte de oes r6alMs. I& peuple du Jnmmu et Caohomire est une r&lit6 auJourdlhuI tout nutant qu’en 1949. Cette nfflrmation sera-t-ello contest6o7 La c6allt6 essentieile de In sltuatlon est qu’en d6pit des ann6es qui 30 oont 6couldee la popu- 39, These are the oonolderationo that must govern any endeavar towards a settlement, if that endeawur lo really a oeriouo one, While thorn is no doubt that they have been lmplioit in the thoughto oxpmsoed hem in the Counoil, the rituatlon in Jammu and Kashmir domando ouitable international aoMon based on them, When I oaf that this a&on hao been looking, it will, I hope, be underotood that I am not unappmoiative of the efforts made by the members of the Seourlty Camoil during the series af meetineo in February to bridge the &f between f.he parties.-It la, howeve*, diooouro#iM that the spokesmen of the Oovernment of India oh&l& have lord no time in distorting the expreooed vlewo d the Counoll members and in @estioning the very baoio of a oon1enouo. This attitude underliner ths neoerrity of the Cnunoil to adopt a pmoloe and oonorete formula for rotting in motion a prooerr that will result in an amloableand honourable settlement of the dioplb. We do not deny the value of appeala and exhortationo. But it ir errential that an appeal should oonrtituk an adequate rraponre to the urrnt demando of the preaent situation. A ouggeotion to the two partirr to negotiate ir nothing mom than an exhortation, unleor some inouranoe lr provided for the negotlatlonr to be moanlngful. I am oertain thd them lr uo member of the Seourity Counoil who will be oatiofied by the partie@ merely going through the motions of negoMaMono and, as a moult, inorearing a dangerour feeling of futility in Jammu and Kalhmlr and in India and Paklrtan. 40. We have come here a@n to offer our co-operation to the Counoll for the betterment of the situation between India and Pakistan. While we appreoiate the spirit of the agreed opinion of the members of the Seourity Counoll and endorse its ooneents, we beg to remind the Counoil that this opinion need8 to be olothed in suoh a form and conveyed in suoh terms as will tangibly help to move the situation towards a just, a peaoeful and an honourable settlement of the dispuputo of Jammu and Kashmir. 41, The PRESIDENT: I now oall on the represenkative of India. SE. C’eot our 08s r6alit6o que doivent Otre ax6a loo efforts d6ploybo en vue d’une solution paoifique du problbme 01 l’on veut qulllo Solent fruotueux, Auoune 8tfapon no*velle d’aborder le problOme” ns peut permettre de remplaoer par autre ohooe le droit deo peupleo A dioposer d’eux-m@meo. Auoune m6- thode nouvelle ne peut marquffr un progrbs par rapport A oelle qul est d6finle dans lea r6eolutions et qul oonoiote A tenir oompte de la volont6 du peuple du Jammu et Caohemire oano auoun reoouro A la foroe ou A la oorruption et oatto auoune intervention extb rleure. 99. Telles oont lee ooneid6ratlono dont doit stineplrer tout offork, vrahent o&leux, de r6glement. Elleo ont, 08110 nuoun doute, oervi implloltement de fondement aux ld6eo qul ont 6t6 exprlm6eo au Conrail de o6ourit6, mais la situation au Jammu et Caohemlre exige doe meoureo internatlonaleo approprl6eo reporant our oette bare. Loroque je dir que de teller meoureo n’ont pas 6t6 prloes juoqu’loi, on oomprendra, je l’eop6re. lue Je ne sour-eotime nullsment 10s efforts aooomplis par les membreo du Conoeil au oouro den s6anoeo du mols de f6vrler pour oombler le foso6 qui o6pare les dew parties. Mais 11 eet d6oourageant de oonotater que lee porte-parole du Couvernement indien n’ont pao perdu de tempo pour ddformer lea vueo exprim6eo par 160 membres du Conreil et pour met& en oauoe le fondement mdms d’un accord. 11 eat d’autant plus n6oesoaire pour 1s Conselk de a6ourit6 d’adopter une formule pr6oioe et oonor6te en vue d’amoroer le prooeosus ouooep tible de oonduire A un rbglement paoiflque et honorable du diff6rend. gnn(~ nler la valeur deo appelr et der exhortations, nous penoono qu%n appel dolt de tout0 n6oeorlt6 tenir d&nent oompte deo exigenoeo urgenteo de la oituation aotuslle. Sugg6rer aux deux partleo de n6gooier n’eot rien de pluo quo loo oxhortsr A le faire, A molno qu’on ne oolt aoour6 que 10s n6goolatlono mbneront quelque part. Jo ouls oertaln qu*auoun membre du Conoell de l 6ourit6 no o@eotlmerr rrtirfait al &r prrtier M bornent b entamer deo n6gooiationl de pure form0 et A aooroitre pr 16 la ro~ttable impmorlon de vanit6 deo &fork qui exiote au Jammu et Caohemlre, en lnde et au Plldrtan. 40. Noue venona de nouveau offrlr notre ooopdratlon au Conseil de s6ourit6 afin que la situation entre 1’Inde et le Pakistan pnisse s’am6liorer. Tout en appr6oiant et en approuvant la communaut6 de vu88 qui s’est d6gag6e au Conseil de s6ourit6, nous demandone instamment au Conseil de ne pas oublier que oette oommunaut6 de vues doit se trnduire 80~8 uno forme et dans des termes susoeptibles d’aider II orienter effeotlvement la quaetion vers un r&lemerit juste, paoifique et honorable du differend oonoernant le Jammu et Caohemire. 41. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’anglais): Jo donne maintenant la parole RU repr6sentant de 1’Inde. 44. When the Counoil met on 9 February 1964 11087th meeting], our Minister of Eduoatlon, Mr. Chegla, had urged that there wee no new situation in the State of Jammu and Karhmir, and that there W&I no grave emergenoy a8 alleged by Paktrtan and a8 auoh there we8 no oeoe for a meeting of the bourity Coundl. The Pakirtani plea we8 one of grave emergency. I wa\ld llke to adr the Foreign Minister oi Paklrtan how dtd thir smergenoy suddenly dtreppear on 17 February 1964 (109&d meeting] when he arked for an adjournment. Obviourly, he himrelf wa8 not ratirffed about the emergency. By agreeing to this requert for edfournment, the Council alro woc@z.ed that there wa8 no emergenoy. 46. An the Counoil will reoell, the Mlnlrter of Eduoatlon of India, Mr, Chagle, protertod again& thlr adjournment and he 11Pfd: 46. Comma ler membrer du Conrail r’sn Kntvtendront, le Mini&e de l%uoetfon de PIndo, M. Chglr, e’eet 610~6 oontre oet afournemennt et a dblrr6 notomment: @Lo repr6rentant du Pakirtm trouve 6 aa oonvenanoe de 14 rendre denr ron pay8 pour quelquej jour~, pub de rermtr, Or, oelr no me oonrlent pa, It mol. Apr68 tout, r’tl r’rgit d’une questton de oonvenanoe peraonnelle, 11 feut tenir oompte de@ pr6fCenoer der deux pertler en oeuee. *VoilA pourquol je rn’ome Cergiquement 6 ta& proporition d’rfournemmpt du prbent &at, mhme pour MI br6ve p6riode. Je rulr. dtrpor6 6 rlbgor aujourd~htd, domain et rpr&-domain, afin de mottn un term4 A oette &faire.* [10996mo ubnoo, pm. 10 et 11.1 40. Per la r&e, unr motion ayant 6t6 d6poa6a par le representant du Meroo, 14 Conrell e efourn6 le debat sine die en vertu de l’alin6a 2 de l’nrtlolo 33 du r6glemmrleur provisoire. *It ruftr the oonvenlenoe of the representative of Paldrtan to go to Paldrtan for a few days and oome beok. It doer not rult me, After all, if It fr e qti4aMOn of oonvenfenoe, the oonvenlenoa of both partfor rhould be aonridered. “Therefore, I rtrongly appo~ any Ngge&fOn tbet thir debate rhould be edjourned for e rhort time. I m reedy to rft here today, tomorrow md the day efter tomorrow and oonolude tbeae prooeed@I.” (109Srd meeting, purur. 10 and 11.1 46. Thereoftar, on a motion by the r6p1~0nktltn of Moroooo, the Counoll adjourned under sub-paragraph 3 of rule 33 of the provisional rule8 of procedure. An adjournment under this rule la an adjournment s& g!g. 47. Le Mini&e des nffafres extkleures du Pakistan a invoqu6, a l’appul de aa demande d’ajaurnement, le 17 f&rler, qu’il voulait oonsulter flon gouvernemerit et nueal avoir plus do temps pour r6fl6ohir. Ma18 IIOUS snvlons que la rnleon v6rltable de EID requ6te Btnlt qu’il d6sirait reoevolr lo Premier Mini&e et le Minlstro de8 affalros btrang&es de la RQpubllque populnlre do Chine. Ce fait n’a pas, B 1’6poque, 6t6 port6 h la oonnaiseanoe du Consell, 47. Now the oetenslble reason given by the Foreign Minister of PaIdstan on 17 Pebrunrv in support of his request for adjournment w8t-1 to enable b& to have oonsultntlons with his Government and also to have more time for refleotlon. We lmew that the real reason why the Foreign Minister wiehed to return to P&i&an wab his desire to play host to the Prime Minister and Porelgn Minister of the People% Republlo of China. Although this faot was not given out at the time to the 48. We would have homed that the Seaurity Caunoll w&d convey itr displeasure to the Fare@ Minister of Pakistan for the cavalier fashion in whloh he was treating the Counoil. He Oalls for 8 meeting of the Security CamoIl whenever it suits his convenience and asks for an adjournment to suit his own timetable without oonslderinfg the oonv8nienoe either of the members of the Se0urity Counoil or of the Qovernment of India. Despite cur objeotionr, the Counoil, in its wisdom, deolded to grant the request of PaklrkR and adjourned the meeting sins die. Again, when the Forsign Mlnlster of Pakirtix for yet another meet& the majority of the members of the Counoil once more aooommodatod him in oomplete disregard of the convenlenoe of my CJovsrnment. 0. In my lett8r of 8 Maroh 1964 ISlSS8‘dl. I already o&eyed -to you, Mr. President; the tiiwr of my Governmeht with regard to the holding of a fmeh meetlag. We have al60 oonveyed to you in that Istir the understanding of the Government of India of the oiroumrtances in whioh the Security Council adjourned. We had also vontuwd to e%prees our views that a further meeting of the Security Counoll 0811 be oonvuned only for substantial ruaeono with due regardfor the oonvenienoe of the two sldee. No cuoh realona have baen furnished by the Permanent Reprerentatiw of Pakistan in hir letter dated 4 Maroh 1864 [S/S6’?6], 50. The Foreign Mini&r of P&&stun ha8 now tried to Introduos some argument6 to justify an urpnt meeting on the ground that WaOe on the Oeare-fire line in Kashmir is threatened. 61. The Camoll will rrmember thst durfngtheperiod b8fore Pakistan oalled for the lart meeting of the Counoil on 18 Yanuary, Pal&tan had taken every opportunity of orrating dlffiaultier and bringing about au rtmosphen of oririr in Kahmir, In hlr letter al 1 November 1988.U the wpnsentative of Pakistan had alleg&milltar$ preparations by India on the oeasfe flro Unr aad dlrturbaimr of the pati ln the ama of Cluknot. This Pakistani allsgatlon was invenrtigated Iw &a Unitsd NaUonr CNrd Mllikrp Obwnrr who 6imr to the oonolurion that bdia h~faonoontra~ no troops in or in bhr olointty of Cbaknhbut that, on the oontrary, Pslcistant troops had been reinforoed in the area oontrary to the Cearro-flra Agroomant. Aooordingly, he gave an award of “no vlolatfonn agninst India and an award of Volntion” ngninst Pnk1stan.U Thus ths oomplaint of the Pakistan Government was proved to be false and baseless. ii Offlclal llacords of tbo Sucttrlty Council, ElShtconth Ynar, S+lomom for October, Novolnbr ml ~ecornbor 1963, document s/5450. 2/ Ibld., Nln;;Tieentl, Yew, Sup+ment for JsIu’~, t’ebrkwy and ~arch4, document S/m RL k IlOFld ill th0 hVUtll~OOL, With th6 hffiihar)r O~MTOP~ &OUt the ooare-flm ~I~lRtioflr. Amidto our mportta Pal&tan mleotad a rouuort by the Military dbaerk OrsUp fir an ~murminOa if tb0 rrfoty of the ~~monnel of the U&edNatlonr Obrorver C&au~ who hid b be rent ts tho tiosted area, India, on the other hrrtd, offered all faallltloa and oo-operation ta those perrsnnol, No doubt &o Unitod Nationa Obrervor Toam will ln duo earm be reporting on there laddantr and alro on whether it WRY Pakirtan or Indlr wbloh 18 at fault. There la no reaaou why the Counoil rhould at this atage rubmlt ta thlr klnd of pwaauaW from the Qovernmont of Pal&tan, 18, AitOthOF roaMi for &he ur@ita)P of thih(s me&~ &on by the Foreign Mluirtor ir that the new Prime Minlrtor of Karhmir, Mq &%diq, bar r6lGrabd the Lmand for tho so-oalled in&r&ion of Kahsnlr with India, The Catnot will rom<mber that thta WII the main plea of P&t&au for aalltag tho lrrt EePirr Bi meetings In January 1964. At tbrt time, tho Pakirtanl Forolgn Mlnlater had alro et&d that thore was a rev&t in Karhmlr. During the debate, Mr. Cha@a &early explained fo tho Counoil that this ohw@ of la-oalled lntagratlon waa a mure ppoprgonda man- QUVFI on tho pert d Pkkhlm, to ormtsths lmprurlon Lhat thoro wan a now rftuatlon in Ka&mlr whish d oasrm was not at all tnrd. Aa ha e%plaiad at tba tlmo, m oannot amiox a thing whloh la already *II, yuu oanaot m&&o more Bcsmploto what la already oompl6t& $9. Lo Mkilotre dar rF[lrls~ sxt4rl6uror du Paklrtaa a 6a-aloment all6~6. b 1WxnU de M domands do ~n~keatlon dtur&& du d&nmell, quo 10 noumu Premlor Mfnlrtre du Caohomlr~, M. L&a. a de nouveau l ollloM 1’ QMgratlonn du Ca~&klre 0. PIndo. La18 mombroa du Oanarll a0 rappolloronO quo lo Pal&tan avalt orrant~ellement fond6 suc aat a~6nt aa demand6 de oonvaoatlon de $mvlor 1984 A oette 6~~0, lo MMrtre der affal~ar oxtbieurer du Faklatan avalt 6galoment d6elar6 qu%ao tivolto wait &Art& au Cachemlre. Au aoura der d6bata, M. Chagla a olalromeat expliqu6 au Conroil @a formtiant ootto aaauaatlon de pr6tondus krt6gratlan lo Pakirtur IO llvrait rtmplemont I, de la prop& gmdr at ohortrhalt I dormer l~lmgrerslan gue la rltuatlon r’6tait modifi6o au Caohemim, eo qut, bion entsndu, 6tait abrolumont faux. Comme lo Mlnirtro ltr oxpllqu6 I lt6pquo, on no paut ann~por oo qtd vow qipartbnt d6JIg an ne pm& rondm plus Wmplot oo qul ort d6j6 eomplet. 64, Lo &uvornoment do 1Vndr r-aft wu r& ~avo qt.16 lo Prdriddsnt olf tout mombre du CaPuell de r6ourtt6 peut demander Ia oonvooatlaa do art organo pour oxuniner but0 quertion hrorlh 6 m5 wdre du Jwr, mair now ortlmena quo oe drolt doit 6tro oxor& fudioiouarmart ot 8ana abus, SW y a lieu de oenvequor Ir Ca~rrll de r&urit4, cru(orr no IO RF~ mm uslauomont dw VGWS du Gowwieed the Oov8ramont of India fully rooogaimrthat tk Prarident of tko Counall OF sny member th6raaf 18 rmpowomd to call for a mooting on my matter whioh II ~borno on tho won& d tho Qunoll. At the ram0 55. Le @onasll.anonpasunefolamaish Mix rep&sea tonu oompto dos vooux personnels du MInistro des nffalros 0xt6ri0Um du Pakistan, No sommss-nous patr on droit d’nttondro qua l’on tlenno Bgaloment oompta dos nbtras? Lo Ministro de l’fkluoatioa, N. Chnglu, ’ qua le Gouvornornont de PItide A d&s@8 oomma QOII reprBsantnnt aux ddbats du Consell de a&ourltB sur lo Cnohamfre. set notuollemont fort oooup5 par 55. The Counoil has not once, hut twloe, taken into aonsldsrntion the oonvanlonoo of tho Foro1g11 Mi~tisbr of Pakistan. Is it too muoh to oxpeot that our oonvsaienoo should also be taken Into nooolant? The Mfnlster of Eduoatlon, Mr. Chngla, whom the Uoverninent of India has appointed na its representatfva for the S3urit.y Ccunoil dleousslons on Kashmir. is oxtremoly buQy n&v with the budget session of tho &dinn Parlia~ meat. He is also the Leader of the UPPW House of tha 10s ddbnts bud&nires nu Pflrlumont indlen. ‘I1 set Brraloment PrBstdant da la Chnmhre haute du Purlon%t::t at. h 00 titre, rm peut s’nbs&er AU oours do 08s impoptants ddbats du Parlement. Tslle est lo mlson pour lnquoila nous avons domnnd6 AU Conseil Parllnmont and, BR suoh, ho onnnt% nbsent himself from the House during this trnpo&u~t sess1011 of the Pnrliament. It Is for this roasonthat we had request4 b Counoll to dofor tha oonsldorntlon of thki oaso 18. Furthermore, no conEtruotive diEouEslon~ on Karhmir or any of the other attrtandhg problemr oan be expeoted unlerr and until the P6ki~tan Ctovernmsnt rtopl the pmrent p6rreoution of it6 mlnoritie6, Memb6rE of the Saouritu Ccunoll 6~ evan now witnos~lrrp the large exodur of -minorities from Ea6t Paki~t n l& India. It is only with tbe flight, thir time, of the Christian mlnoritie6 of Eart P&irtan that the Wertern eountrire are now beooming awam of the trcmedu that la being enaoted there, A r&n of temer for %he-minorit1er ha6 be6n let loom in East Pakiotan whloh the Qovwnment of Pakirtut is either unable or unwilling to oontwl, Aotr of vio16nr+6, deprivation of property, arraultr on women, eto,, have bsoome the order of the day in EaEt PaWEton. Thor6 16 a daily influx of ovur S,OOO-I Fepeat, over 9,000~mfuge06 who are fleeing Pakirtun b6oauEe of oalaulatsd perseoution and oontinuod ln6rouritv a6 renardr their life and urocertv. Thin, of oourw; ir not-a matter before thd catnoii, We reaIlPe that, but In&a 11 fawd with the prospeot of hundmd6 and thourandr of mfugesr pourlag into India from EaEt P&iEtan, Already etwr 116,000 mfugaer have arriv6d in India, Nearly 9S,OOO people ham fled from one neighbouring distriot of Eart Pald~tan alone, and of there akut 40,000 am Chrir- Uanr. The Government and peopl.6 of India am direotiw their m6ourm and ener&Ei toward6 meeting thli tremendour human problem and are undertaking rnaaww for mbabilitation and reEettlrm6nt of this unfortunate peoplr fleeing from perreoution by PakiEt&n. My Qovernmrnt believer that firrt thinp mu& oomo fir& The dimension6 of thir problem am arruming more and mom Etaggering prep&ion6 rvery day and am a 6ouroe of grape ooneern to my Qcvernmsnt. The Government si Pakistan doer not worn to k oonoerned with this human problsm, but with a oynioal dirmgard for the 6uffering of it6 minsritier, I6 more lntemrted in diverrionarytaotio6 and in agttating the Kashmir 16ru6. We, on our part, hare already twioe made pfoporelr to the Pakirtan Government for taokling the problem by joint dircurrlonr at the level of MiniEkE for Homo Affalrr but that proper&l har ken turned down. 69, My tbmrnment oww it to its&f rad toitr peep10 that it rhould do Ml jurtlae to it6 rsprerentation in the Seourlty Cam011 on thls Important qua&fan, whloh la bound up wlth the unity, territorial integrity and aoverelgnty of India, against whioh Pakletan ha8 oommitted aggresolon. The muln preoooupatlon should be to make a oonetruotlve oontribution towards the settlement of this question. For this purpnae, nnd slnoo no oonstruotive nclvanoe is posslbla without the oooperation of both gldeo, it is neopsoary that India also should be represented by the Minister who hns beon epeoially deslgnnted by my aovernment to deal with this iesue. It lo relevant to point out that Palcistnn Is represented by ita Minister of Forolgn Affairs. In ease the Seourlty Counoil wishes to make n oonstruo- 16. En cutre, on ne peut eqdrer entamer de dlsourslon oonrtruotlve 6ur lo Caohemire ou sur l’un qusloonqua de6 autres problhmes en 6u6pen6 tant quo 10 Bsuvernement pakistanair n’aura par mis fin au6 parE6outlonE dont sent aotuellement vIotlme6 lem minorit Want 6ur ran terrltolre. Las membreo du Conreil de 66ourit6 ravent qu’il y a aujourd’hui enoor6 un exode masslf de6 minorlt66 du Pakistan oriental ver6 l’Ind6, C’ert seulement paroe que, oette fois, de6 mlnorit66 ohr6tiennos no Eont enfuiea du Paklotan oriental que lee pay6 oooldentaux ont prir oonroienoe de la tragkiie qui 66 d6roule danr oette rbgioe. Lea mlnorit66 du PaW6tan oriental vivent dans un olimat de terreur qua la Qouvernement paklstanals ne peut par ou ne veut pas dlseipsr. Leo aotes de vlolenoe, lee spollatione, Ies agreseions oontre 160 femme6 rant devenus monnaie oour6nte au Pakistan oriental. Chaque Jour arrivent plur de 8 000 r6fusi6r - fe din bienr ~1~6 de 9 000 i6fugi66 - qui fuieire 16 P&&tan pour ‘4ohappar aux psrsQoution6 d6liWr6es et P l’in66ourlt6 oonrtante $i menaoent leur vie et leurr bienr. Evidemment, 10 Consell n’ert par sairi de oette quertion. Nour 10 Eavan6, ma16 l%de dolt 6e pr6parer k aooueiIl1r 6u.r ron terrltolre de6 oentalner et de6 millier6 de r6fugi66 venant du PakiEtan oriental. D6jk, plus de 126 OUO r6fugi66 aont arriv6r en Inde. Prbs de 71000 personnes Ed Eont enfuler d’un dlstrlot voi6in du Paklkan oriental, et parmi elles on oompte environ 40 000 ohr6tienr. Le puvernement et le pup18 de 1’Iade mobiliE6nt leurr rw~ouroe6 et leurr 6nergisd pour faire faoe 1. oet immen6e problbme humain et prennent de6 merurer en we de reolrrssr et da r6inrtdler oe6 malhsureux qui fuisnt Is6 perE4- outionr dont ilr sont Itobjst au Paklrtan. Man gouvernement ertime qu’il faut parer au plus preE66, Co problbme prend de6 prcportlanr ohauue lour plur ‘ inqul6tdr rt oonrtiiua I pour mon g&ve& m&t une aouroe de prawn inqui6tuder. Le Qouvernemene palcirtanais ni ramble &bre aten rouoler et, avao un m6priE oynique pour 106 Eouffratloer dsr minorit6s qui vivsnt our non territolre, il pr6fbre maourir B la diverrlon et brandlr 10 problbme du Caohemire. PO notre o&6, nous avon6 B deux reprlEs6 prop066 au Gouv6rnEmEnt pakistanair dtsEEayar de rdroudre 06 problbme au moysn dtsntretienr bilat& rauv antre nor minirtrer de l’int6rirur, mair no6 properltionnr ont 6U rrjEt6e6, 67. Mon gouvernement 60 dolt, et ildoltR son peuple, de 68 faire repr6aentsr clans ler meilleur6r oonditlons au Consell de sdourW.3 pendant ies d6bnts oonsnorbs (1 oette Import&e question dent dQxx&xlt l’unlt&, l’int6grit6 territoriale et la souvernlnet6 de FInde, mises en dnngor par le PaIcI&ui. Nous devons avolr pour pr6oooupution essentlello de oontribuer de fagon oonstruotive nu rQgloment de ootte question. A oette fin, et oomme auoun progr8o v&itable n’est poseible Rana la ooopkation des deuxpnrties, 11 Importe qua 1’Indo soit, ellenu~sl, ropr6sont6e par le Ministre sp6oinlement dQaign6 par aon gouvornemont pour EI’OOOU~OP do ootte quo&Ion. I1 oonvlont de noter que le Palclstan eat reprt3sent6 par ~011 minletre des affalres extkieuree. Si le Conee!i de 68. Thlr 1s a very reasonable request, and I hope the couaoil will aooede to It. I also hope that thhs Forelen Mlnlrter of Paid&n will give roxie ooarlderrtlon~ our oonv8alenoe and will flnd It porrlblo to w-operate with ua In thlr rospeot, 68. Mr. HAJEK (Caeot.oslovakla) (tranrlated from Frenoh): My delegation ha6 ll~~ned OarOhlly to the rtakmeatr by the Minlrter of Fore@ Affalrr of Pakistan and by the Ambarrador of ladta. 80, We deeply regret that although&month ha6 parred tlnoe the Smurlty Counoll deolded on 17 Febxwrv lW4 to adjourn tlie oonrlderatlon of thlr question, nb prqrerr has been made towardr brlngingthe po~ltlonr of thore two great onuntrlor of Ada olorer together. 60. Nour regretton profond6tiont qua, alors qu’un mols #e&t 600~16 ciopulcl la d6airlon du Conrell de s6ourlt6 du 17 f6vrler 19134 d’ajourner l’examen do oette question, auoun progr6e n’alt 6t6 aooompli pour rapprooher lee porltloar do 008 deux grand6 pays d’ Aalo. 61. Pormettec-mol de rappelor que, danr lo d6bat qul a p&&6 sot ajournomont, tour ler mombror du Conreil do r6ourlt6 ont exprlm6 la podtion do lourr gouvernomontr rorpeotilr, porltlon qul parairralt 6tre lnrplr6o par lo d6rlr do volr lea gouvernemonk do oe& doux grandr payo d’Aolo trouvor un terrain d’entento. 61. Lo r&o du Conrell do aBourlt6, oomme ma d61& gatlon &o6t parml~ de lo faire observer A ootto oeoaaion, no peut otmolrtsr qu’A faollltar la reoheroho d%no telle vole d’antonto aux dew nartlor InUrea- &OS, rt O’olt d&m 00 aelm-U quY1‘ nous pBr8l-k quo touter 10s d6llbbarrttonr du Conroll wr la auovtlon du dlff6rond entre 1’Inde ot la Pakirtan d&Wart 6tre oandulkr. Or, uno dor oardltlonr lndirpanrablor d%ine telle oondulte dor d6llb6rrtlonr ort Ia partloipation der repr6rontmlr dor dour payn A ooller-01. Cela oorrorpand au paragraphe 1 do I~Artlolo 89 do la Charte, et dtalllours A l’eaprlt du Chapltre VI ks&srztii qul 8 trait au r6glomont paofflquo doa 81. M&y I point out that in the debate whloh preoeded that adjournment all the memberr of tho Seourity Ccuaoll &atadthqporltlonr o! their re~peotlva Oovernmanta, porltlonr whloh were apparently lnrplrsd by a wirh to gee tho Qov8rnmentr of thore two great Ad&a countrlor find some common ground 62 The role of the Security Counall, II my dolegatlon ventured Zo obrorve on that oooaslon, oan only be to faollltak the flndtng of ruoh a path ta undorrtandlng for both partion wnoemd, and It ir on thlr bar16 that WI feel that all the Counnli’r dllrourrlonr ontho quortlon of the dlepute betwoon Iadla and Paklatan should be oonduoted, Now, one of the orreatlal aondltlonr for oonduotlng the dlrourrlonr In thlr manner ir that nproronfitlwr of both oountrlor rhould partloipak In them. That LI In line with Artiolo 58, parapraph 1, of the Charter, and, furthermore, with ‘the ipl?lt oi Chapter VI aI a wholo, wbloh doalr with the paolfio rettloment of dlrputer. 89. It wer for that realon, Lo., ta fcoilitato the partlolpatlon of both partler b the #amo extent in tho Counoll’r dleouIstonlr that we agreed to the adjou!?nmrnt of the debato. on 17 Februarv 1864. rlnno the Mlnlrter oi P&&in eoarldekd itbdra~l~, th h th8 MM8ter of India ftrmly opped itr raylng that ‘Y 8 W&I ready to aontinue the dobate to the on& 63, C’ort pour oetto ralron, otert-A-dim pour faollltor la paitlolpatlon dor dot& prrtlor, dani la m6mo meauro, aux d6llWratlonr du Conroll QUO now avon8 aooopt6; lo 17 f6vrior 1984, l~ajounoinont du d6bat, 6tant donn6 quo lo Mlnlrtre du Pakirtan lo c%xWd6- rrit d6rtribIo, Wan qur lo MMsts% do PSndb ry fdt q&w6 rbrolummt, an se d6olrrtmt pr6t h pawrulvre lo d&t furqiYru ho&, c Today the poeltlon la different: it ia the Pakistan doiegnlicn whfoh deslros an immedlato resumption of the Counoll’s dlsouasion on the dispute between India and Pnklstan; on the other hand, it is the Indian delegntlon whloh ia not in n positlon to take port at preeent but whloh says that it is prepnred to do so at a later dato. 64. Aujourd’hui, la situntlon ost dIff6ronte: o’es! la d6lBKation du Pnkietnn qul d&Ire la reprlse lmm6- dinte aes dblibbratlons ciu Conaefl cur ie diff6rend qul sepnre llInde et la Paklstnn; pnr oontre, o’eet 8 la d616gatlon de 1’Inde qui n’est pas en position d’y prendre pnrt aotuollement, mais qui pq dbolare dispoe6e f~ le fnire n ulle date ult8rleure. 86. In these olroumetnnoee, my delogatlon seee only one solution to the problem. It bnaes Its poeitlon on its desire to oontrlbute to the beat of ito ability to oreatlng condltlone oonduoive to bringing both aides closer together, Consequently. It foole that the Council abculd 06. Devant une telle situatlon, mn d6ldgation ne volt cpQune aolutlon nu problbme. Elle fondo en position SW aon d6sir de oontrihuer do oon mleux 11 order doe oondltfons fnvornblea nu rapprochement dea deux partlea. A 801: nvia, pnr oon&quent, le Consell 69. Of oo&se, the Seourlty Counoll will have to take a deolsion on the proposal made by the representative of C zeohorlovakla, and my delegation will be prepared to take a position on that proposal, But the Camoll~s deoislon should, I think, be arrived at after very sober and mature oonelderatlon, An adjournment for six weeks or more may have a bearing on the eltuatlon in Kashmir. I am sure that all the members of the Council will wish to do everything in their power to alleviate the serious state of affairs now prevailing in the area. 70. It is in that spirit that I am encouraged to appeal to the representatives of India and Czechoslovakia to oonsider aooeptlng at the moment a ourpension of the debate for two days, in order that the Council may oonrlder the proporal for a relatively long adjournment In the light of the present olroumstanoes and the developments in Karhmlr itself. 71. If my ruggeotion lo aooepted, I would propoee that the Council should reoonvene to deal with thlr problem on Friday, 20 Maroh, at 3 o’olook in the afternoon, 72. The PRESIDENT: The reprerentatlve of Brazil, if I understand him oorreotly, has not at thir stage formally moved to amend the proposal made prevlourly by the reprosentatlve of Czechoslovakia.

In the statement we have just heard by tha Ministar of Foreign Affair’s of Pakistan, Mr. Bhutto, wt~ have once again been given a detailed aooount ofhis Government’s views on the dispute between Psklatan and India. 74. The Council hos aleo heard the Tepresentatlve of India, Mr. Chukravarty, who asked tlint the dlscusslon of the question we nre considering c+hould he adjourned for some tlmo. 73. M. FEDORENKO (Union des R6pubIiqueb sociallstee sovl6tlquee) [tradult du russe]: En Bcoutant M. Bhutto, le mlnlstre des affulres Btrnn@res du Pakistan, nou8 avons de nouveau entendu un expos6 d&n1116 des VUBB de son gouvernement nu sujet du differend entre 1’Indc et le Paklstnn. 74. Le Cons011 a entendu bgnlement M. Chnkravnrty, le reprBse;itnnt de l’lnde, qul voudrnlt volr dlfferer quelque peu l’examen de cetb question. de I’bduoatlon nationale de PInde, M. Chagla, avalt alors soullgn6 la n6oesslte de tenlr oompte de oe qul oonvenait le mleux aux dew parties lnt6ress6es, et qu’ll avalt prls position oontre un ajournement de quelques Jours. 11 avalt deolar6 qu’en tant que repr& sentant de 1’Inde 11 etait pr& B poureulvre la dlsoueslon au Consell, afln d*en terminer aveo l’examen du dlff&rend exlstant entre 1’Inde et le Pakistan. 76. Aujourd’hul, o’est l’lnde qui, &I eontour,demande au Consell de dlfferer le debat sur la question du Caohemlre. Dana la lettre du reprbeentant permanent de 1’Inde (S/6662], 11 eat dlt notamment que, el Ie Consell dolt &re oonvoque t2 nouveau, 11 faut ddment reoheroher al oela oonvlent aux deux parties, et pas eeulement B l’une d’ellee, le Pakistan en l’ooourrenoe. En m8me tempa, on lndlque dane oette lettre que le Qouvarnement lndien ne pourra pa8 partlolper oomme il oonvient aux r&unions du Consell avant la fln de la session budg&alre du Parlement indlen, laquelle devralt @aohever au debut du mofs de mal. 17. Par oons6quent, II notre avle, le ConeelI ne sauralt faire autrement que de prendre en ooneldb ration Ia demande du Gouvernement lndlen et d’agir oomme 11 l’a fait p&o&demment en oe qul oonoerne lea souhalts exprlmbe par le Pakistan. 73. Nous pensons qu’ll eeralt logique et Bqultable de donner eatisfaotlon B la demande de llnde et de retarder l’examen du dlffdrend entre l’fnde et le Pakistan jusqu’au debut du mols de mal. 79. La d616gatlon sovl&ique eat oonvalnoue que lee membree du Consell de s6ourlt6 feront preuve de l’objeotivlt8 voulue, qullle prendront une attitude Bqultable B l’&gard dee dew partlee, l’lnde et Ie Pakistan, et qu’lle feront drolt au d&sir exprlmb par le representant de PInde, de m&me qu’llr aooep ieront la proposition qul vlent d’Btre d&por&e par M. HAjek, le reprbsentant de Ia R9publique roolallste toh6ooeIovaque. 80. M. HAJEK (‘L’oh&oorlovaqule): Comme mon ami ltambarsadeur du Brbsll, M. Bernardee, m’a adrem un appel, mn dbI6gatlon - prenant en oonrld&ratlon les bonnes intentions de la dblkatlon du BrOell en vu8 de faolllter aux autree membrer du Coneell ltexamen de oette quertlon - veut bien sootier P la ruggertlon brBslllenne, blen que noua ertlmlonr que, ayant &6 p &sent&e oonform9ment aux termer de l’alln9a 0 de l’artlole 33, notre proposition devrnlt Otre lmm&dlatement exam!n&3 et faire l’objet d’un vote. 81. En dormant man ncoord h In suggestion durepr&- , sentnnt du BrBsil, je crols oomprendre que, m&ne upr& oet ajournement, la discussion ne portern qua sur la proposition que vlent de faire ma d616gatlon et que le vote sur ootte derniOre nura lieu B la proohaine Oh~iC6. 16. Now, it is India’b turn to ask the Counoll to adjourn the discussion on the Kashmir question. In the letter from the representative of India [S/5662], it is stated inter alla that if it is neoessary tc reoonvene the Co~noll, this should be done with due regard to the oonvenlenoe of both parties and not of only one party, namely, Pakistan in this ease. At the same time the letter in question explains that the Government of India will be unable to partioipate in an appropriate way in any meetings of the Ccunoll before the end of the current budget session of the Indian Parliament, which is expeoted to end by the beglnnlngof May next, 17. Consequently, we feel that the Counoil must take Into aooount the request by the Qovernment of India just as it did before in the oase of Pakistan’s request, 13, In our view, lt would be logloal and fair to meet India’s request and postpone the oonslderatlon of the Indo-Pakistan dispute until the beginning of May. 19. The Soviet delegation is confident that the members of the Security Counoll ~111 he dulyobjeotlve and equally fair to both sldeo, India and Pakistan, that they will meet the Indian representative’s request and will also adopt the proposal whloh has just been made by the repreeentatlve of the Czeohoslovak Socialist Republlo, Mr. IiAjek.

Slnoe my friend, the Ambaerador of Brazil, Mr. Bernardee, has appealed to me, my delegation- Wng into aoocunt the good intentions of the Brazlllan delegation in reeking to faollltate for the other memkrr of tha Counoil the oonriderationof thlrr quemtlon- 1s wllLing to oomply with the Brazilian ruggertion, although we oonrider that our proposal, having been submitted In aooordanoe with rule 33, sub-paragraph 3 of the provlslonal rules of procedure, should be lmmedintely oonsldered and put to a vote. 81. It is my understanding, in agreeing to the Brnzll- Inn representative’s suggestion, that even after this adjournment the discussion wlll deal only with the proposal which my delegation has just mnde, and that the vote on it will take place at the next meeting.

I have made my Wcpest for an adjournment until May. I am most gl’ateftll., tot WY colleague from Czechoslovakia who has been good enough to make a formal proposal on 4?2: <OZ. WiAKFlAVARTY (Inde) [tmdult de l’anglnls]: J’ai demand6 que le Consell s’njourne aumolsde map. Je suis trbs reoonnnlssant 8. mon colNgue de In TohQcoslovaqule d’avol r blen voulu prBaenter une

The suggestionmadeby the representative of Brazil, as understood by my delegation, le that a ehort period is required for the Csunoll to ooneider whether, in ,viow of the rapidly deteriorating situation in the subcontinent and the uneasy cease-fire line, as well as the heavy exohange of fire that has taken place in the reoent past, it would be appropriate and oorreot for the Counoil to have a long adjournment or a short one. It is not aCLr understanding that a decision will be taken to have a long adjournment, but rather that time is requiredfor the members of the Counoil to hold oonsultations and, in the light of suoh oonsultations, to determine whether there should be a short adjournment or a long one.

I think that my suggestion was quite clear, A proposal has been made to adjourn until 6 May. The proposal wus made under rule 33, sub-paragraph 3, of the provisional rules of procedure. The last paragraph of that rule reads: “Any motion for the suspension or for the simple ad,. rnment of the meeting shall be decided wlthout deL n This paragraph relates to sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 bf the rule, Therefore, there should be a discussion In this instance, and a dlscussion is actually takiugplace now, 87. My euggestlon was that we should adjourn this dfsouesion for two days in order to ponder the sltuation in the llght of the considerations which I put forward, and to reoonvene on Friday, 20 Maroh, to disouss the matter and adopt a deoislon on the proposal to adjourn until 5 May. Thus, as I understand It, the first Item on our agenda on Friday, 20 March would be the oonolurlon of the Counollts oonsideration of the proporal made by the representative of Ceeehoalovakia.

As1 Just stntsd, the nppenl made by the representative of Brnzil has been accepted on the understanding thnt, at its next meeting, the Council will declcle the next step which it is to take. 89. If there ia no objection, 1 ohnll adjourn this meeting until * ‘?y, 20 March, nt 3 p.m., at which time the Count .lI proceed at once with IL dlscussion, if neccssnry, to decide whether to resume consideration of this item. ?%e meeting raw at 5.5 p.m. 86. M. BERNARDES (B&11) [traduit de l’anglais]: Je crois que ma suggestion etait parfaitement claire. Une proposition d’ajournement au 6 mai a et6 prbsent6e. Elle a et6 falte oonformement P. l’alinea o de l’artiole 33 du rbglement int6rleur provisoir6 Le dernier alinea de oet article est libelle oomme euit: “11 est statue sans debat sur bute proposition touohant la suspension ou le simple ajournemont de la seanoe.” Cet alinea no se refer-e qulaux paragraphes p et b de oet artiole. Par oons&quent, la motion dont nous aommea salsis dolt donner lieu a ‘in d&bat, et le Conseil est preoisoment en train d’en d6h;:tre en ce moment, 07. J’ai propose que nous suspendions le debat pendant deux joure afin de r6fMchir fi la situatton, compte tenu des oonsiderations que j’ai expcsees, et que nous nous rbuniosione le vendredl 20 mar6 pour disouter de la question et nous prononoer sur la propoeitior. tendant a ajourner la dieoueeion au 6 mai. Je vole dono lee ohoses de la facon sulvante: le premisr point A notre ordre du jour du vendredi 20 mars serait la fin de l’examen par le Conseil de la propositlon faite par le representant de la ToWooslovclquie. 88. Le PRESIDENT (trnduit de I~nnglnie): Comme je viens Lie le dire, la clemnntle du reprcsentnnt clu Br6sil r, 616 ngrcce, &nut enten& qu’& sn prochnine rounlon lo Conseil decidern de ce qu’il doit fnire. 89. En l’nhaence tl’objection, il sern entendu que la Consoil tlendrn le vendredi 20 mnrs n 15 heures sa proch~~ine reunion, ciul d&utera, le ens ccllR.ult, par ~11 cicbnt touchnnt In reprlse cventuelle de l’exnmen de ln questloti. La shnce est lev6e fi 17 h 5.