S/PV.1108 Security Council

We havo just bourd a ntatement whlch nctually containod ths effort nguinst whloh 1 previou~~ly warnerl tho CouncIl. l’ho ropresentative of tho IJnltotl States 1s trylng to clrown tho 74. Le P1IESII)l3NT: le reprbeentant du Ybmon a damandb la parole pour oxoroor aon droit de rbponse, Je la lui donne. ‘76. M. QEQHMAN (Ybmen) [traduit ds llanglnis]: Nous venons dtentsndre une dbolaration qui traite pr801- a6ment do la tentative oontro laquslle j’av%ia mie 1s Conseil en gnrcle. Le reprbsontant dee Etnta-Un18 16, If the Unlted States representative wishes to be fair, then he muet admit that he does not have the OhOiOei he must either oonsider the aggression by itself and oondemn it, or take up British imperialism in the area as the main and only aouroe of trouble. This Counoil oannot afford to have a double-standard polioy, one for big Powers end one for small oountries, 77, These are the brief commcnts on the statement we just heard and 1 would like to reaerve my right to reply to Mr. Stovenson in due time, 78, Mr, MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Sooialist Republios) (translated from Ruseian)t The Soviet delerration’s position on the question of the anaression oommlttcti by the Unlted tiingdom agaînst tfië Yemen Arab Republio was olearly set forth at the meetinrr held on yhursday, 8 Aprli 1984, Had certain eta& ment8 whioh we oan hardly pas8 over in silenoe not subsequently been made, ie‘should in faot have had nothing to add to the firm support expresssd bu the USSR iepresentative in his st&ement at the3eoÜrity CounoWs 1108th meeting, At that meeting, as you will reaall’ he firmly supported the eight pointa advanoed by the Yemeni representativo in the oonoludingpart of Ns speeoh. 70, The statements made thereafter by the representatives of the Unitad Arab ReDubllo, Stria and Iraa. and the statements made by ihe rëprésentativbs Ôf Moroooo and the Ivory Çoast a8 members of the Counofl’ have eupplemented that speeoh and made qutte olear to eve 71 one the real nature and aoope of theae events, whio have been oorreotly desoribed a8 aote of aggresaion oommltted by the United Kingdom against Yemen, and whfoh are 80 glaring that there fe nothi $ were presente to add to the faots of the oaae an they here, Evsn the United Kfngdom representative, however he appraîrer the reasons wbloh impelled bis Government to employ armed foroe aaainat the Yemen Arab RsPublio. oould not dent-he himself oonfessed as muoh-the-faots as deso&ed at the outret in the Yemen1 representative’r letter [F+/tNS] and later in hir statement before the Counoil, 80, Consequently, the efforts whioh oan only be derorikd as an atGmpt to plaoe the rggrarror and the viotfm of aggrerrion on the same love1 or footing rtrike a rtra $ e and inoomprehenslble note, a note whfoh, 1 woul say, is in oompletely unjustifiable ci~aoorcl with c3vorything that wo havo bcard in tho oour~e of throo Couaoil meotiugs. 19, Dans leurs expo868, les repr6rentante de la RBpubllque arabe unie, de la Syrlr, de llIrak, du Maroo et de la C6te-d’Ivolre ont montrb olatrement aux yeux du monde quelles (taient la nature et la portbe des BvBnemente qu’on oonrId&e, B juste titre, oomme de8 aotes d’agression du Royaume-uni oontre la R8publique arabe du Y(lmeni la situation ert ri olaire quI1 n’y a rien 4 ajouter aux faits dont le Conrell est saisi, D’ailleurs, le repr(lsen&t du Royaume-Uni lui-m&me, quelle8 que soient lea ralrotu quIîl avanoe pour justifier 1s reoours P laforoe arm6e oontre la R@ubliquo arabe du Ydmrn, n’a pas pu nier et, en somme, a reoonnu les faits tels qu’ils ont 6t8 exposdr dans la lettre (S/6685] du ~prbseatant du Wmrn et au oouf de nos d4bato. 60. Etant donn6 oa QUI nous avons entendu au aoura de trois 18anos1,ll rëmblo &range, inoompr8hrnrlblr et, jo dlrd m4me. absolument ddpla& aue l’on hdf6rœ de mettresur le morne pian l’ag?erseur et la viotime de l’agression. 81. 11 o& impossible tl’aoooptor que l’os tante do 81. WQ OamOt P000~~0ilO OUI%0lVW t0 Chli~pts t0 oomplionte thc oompletely olonr dtuation of faot, tho fnolunl oiroum3tnuoe8, beforo ths Counoil. Wo onnnot oompliquor ce qui, on fait, est fort 019ir, Il oet impoe~ sible d’admottro quo 1’011 ne puisea r~btorminar qui, noospt assortions to tlie effwt thnt it 1s impossible du Roynuino-Uni ou du Y&nen, est rooponsabla des to determine wbioh of the two Btutos-the United Kingnotes dtngrer3sion, alors cluw ebqit d9u10 attaqua dom or tiie Yoman Arnb Rapublia-1s guilty of the branch of the pence, thc act of nggrossion wliioh took pnr 10s forocs armbos britnnniquoo oontre lu ~1110 tlio epeolfio forrn of iul nmed nttnolc by Ili~itisli mIliyh&iiEe Wlnrib, (hi 1~3 anurnit tlavnntngo sousoriro tary forcos upon tho Yamoni town of llurlb. Wo onnnot h l’ldbo qu’il no faut mBtne pas eseuyor tl’0valuer 1efJ fait6 qui Ont nm3nb h OO~lVOOAtiOtl du COWOil et 83, This !a the reason why we strongly Fdpport the same proposa1 that we supported in ouf firs i statement; as the whole of the cnsuingdisc -.ss!on has mol: olear, this proposa1 and the podtion that we took hera are fully in oonformity with the faots of the onse, v,h!oh have been established beyond the shadow of a ~~oubt: namely, that an aot of aggression in the form nf an attaok-the pu,& and present subjeot of the whole disoussion4.ouk plaoe and was oommittod by the Unlted Kingdom against a small oountry, the Yemen Arab Renublio. That is why we feel 80 strongly oompelled to ‘raiee our voioe a&inet assertions Biit it iii impossible to gain a correct understanding of the attair and that it is better to lay aside oonaideration of the faots of the oaee, We therefore adhere to the demande whioh we made here in our firet statement. 84. We believe that any attempt to present the oase in suoh a way as to make it appear that tho aggressor and the viotim of aggression are equally guilty would run oounter to the views and expeotations of world opinion, whioh is relying on the Seourity Counoil and awalting from it a just deoislon in aooordanoe with the faots, Suoh a deoision wouldunquestionably oonsist, prfmarily, in a finding that aggression had been oommitted by the United Kingdom against the Yemen Arab Republlo, in a oondemnatfon of the aggressor, and in the other expliolt measures whioh the Yemen! repreaantptive ha6 advooated and whtohbsve been supported here by the repreeentativee of a number of other Arab and Afrioan oountries represented in the Counoil, 30, We therefore support ooneideratton of this question exaotly as it has been presented here, and protest againrt any kind of attempt ta extenuate the aggressorcs rrsponr!b!l!ty for the aot he has oommitted and in so dolng to obrtruot the lay!ng down of that oorreot programme of aotlon whioh the Beourity Counotl must ndopt in ordar orme and for a11 to put an end ta, and prevent the reourmnds of, a Yemen Arab Republfo and inte Y resrion agafnst the erenae by the United Kingdom in the interna1 affairs of Yemen. 38. Mr, DNNIIIMA (Moroooo) (trnnslnted from B’ronoh): My delegntion hna listened wlth tho @‘ontest intorest to thc statomant just mndo by tho roprosontativo of ae Un!tocl statos. I haston to oxprose its sntlsfaotlon nt henr!ng him, OH behnlf of bis C4overnment, ontegorionlly oonclenin rotnlintion nncl sny thnt Ire oot~demnotl !Es us0 no mntter who its nuthor 01% !ts v10t1n1 nlight be. 87. ‘flre ropresentntive of the Unlted Stotes endenvourecl to onumerate the incidents wh!cl~ hnd 82. Par oons@uent, on ne peut &re d’aooord avao des propositions tendant B s’abstenir de d6finir la nature de la maladle et 8. se borner k prescrire quelques rembdes, simples palliatifs qui, en lcabsenoe de tout diagnostio, ne sauraient apporter de soulagement et risquent en revanohe de miner la notion da justioe, que le Coneeil se doit de faire reepeoter en vertu de la Charte. 83, C’est pourquoi noua appuyons vi propos!t!on que nous avons d4jg a oureusement la d fendue lors de notre prem!&re d$olarat!om oomme la suite des dbbats l’a mont!%, oette proposition et notre position rapondent entibrement LI I’Atat de fait dont nous sommes sa!s!s, tel qu’il a Bt9 Btabl! sans conteste, h savoir que le Royaume-Un! a oomm!s un aota d%gress!on oontre un pstlt pays, la RBpublique arabe du YBmen, Ause! estimons-nous indispensable de protester Bnorgfquement quand on nous d!t qu’il est impossible de voir olair dans oette affaire et qu’il est pr4Mrable de ne pas examiner les faits de la oause. Nous 8” rsistone dono dans lee demandes que nous avons ormul6es lors de notre premi6re intervention, 84. Cheroher A montrer que lcagresseur et ln v!ot!me sont Bgalement ooupableè serait trahir les espoirs de lconinion publique mondiale, qui a les yeux tourn6s vers ie ConËeil etqu! attend dé iu! une s&!t!on juste, en rapport aveo les faits! oette solution consisterait 6, oonstatsr l(agress!on br!tann!que dontra la R@Iblfque du YBmen, B oondamner l’agresseur et !l prendre les mesures radicales que le repr0sentantdu YBmen a proposges et qu! ont Qt4 appuy6es par de nombreux autree pa s arabes et par lea gouvernements afr!oa!ns reprdsent I s au Conseil, 86. Nous sommes en faveur de l’examen de la question telle qu’elle a BtB poule devant le Conseil et nous nous opporonr g toute tsntative de nature Aamenufrer la reoponrab!l!t4 de Vagresseur, oar oela nuirait A la Jurteese des d6oislonr que doit prendra le Conseil pour mettre fin, une foir pour toutem, aux agrerrions du Royaume-Un! oontrr la R&ubl!que arabe du Y6men et A se@ Ing6renoeu dans les affaires !nt6r!eures de 00 pay8. 80. M. WNIIIMA (Mnroo): Mn dblbgntion n 6ooutb nvoo le plus grand !ntbrOt l%tervent!on quo v!ent de fnlro le reprbsentnnt des Etats-Unis. Je m’emprosuo do lu! exprimer la sntisfnot!on qua nous nvona bprouvbo h l’ontondre oondntnner ont6gor!quement, nu nom do son gouvornoment, l’usage des repr6- snilles et mentionner qu’il oondnmnnit oet usnge, quel qufen soit l’nuteur et quelle qu’en soit In viotime. 87. Le repr6sentnnt des Etats-Unis n essnyb de ~BUE p&euter une 6wn8ration ohiffr6e deo inoi- 89, We have only a few oomments to make, and 1 am sure that the United States representative will give them the oonsideration they merit, The previous speaker quotes a few examples of a medîoal nature, For my part 1 will say that, when a wounded man oorne to a dootor for urgent afd, the dootor suggeets that he go into hospital for thorough examination and general review, We would requeet the Counoil, and this is what we expeot of it, to deoide firet witb regard to a speoifio inoident whose oauses and effeots have baen olearly desoribed by various delegations around this table, *. demander au Conseil, et olest oe que noue attendons de lui, qu’il 8e prononoe d’abord sur un inoident sfloifique dont le6 raisons et les oons8quenoes ont 8t4 nettement expos4es par difffkentes d414gationn devant le Conseil. 90. Nous sommea dcaooord aveo le repr$sentant des Etat$-Unis sur le fait que prendre une d8oieion A PBgard de cet inoident n4quîvaudrait pas A trouver une solution durable pour emp&oher 8 Vavenir la r6p0tition dtinoidents similairee, C%st dan6 ae aen8 que nous 8omme8 tr8s eeneiblee A Ileffort partioulier que repr6sente sa proposition. Mais le Qouvernement des Etats-Unia sait tr&e bien que la attuation au YBmen ne oomporte pae eeulement lcaepeot d’un inoident frontalier 1s long de la fronti&e du sud, Il y a au YBmen un probl0me de frontibree, maia il Y a Egalement un brobl&me politique qui le ConËeil de s6ourit6 a examin0 B deux ou troir reprlmr. Le Seor&&re gWral suit PBvolution de :A s-ituation et communique tirlodiquement a oe sujet un rapport au Coneetl. Peut-&re oette 8ugge&ton pourrait-elle Btre utile et rtlnMgrer dan8 le cadre de6 reoheroher entreprieer par le Seordtaire g4nbral pour errayer de trouver une rolution durable de la rftuatîon politique RU Bmea, Cette question de frontibrer du sud ne reptdrenb qu%m arpeot de oe problbme polltfque important. BO, We agree with the United States representatlve that a deoision wîth regard to this inoident would not be tantamount to the finding of a lasting solution suoh a8 to prevent the reourrenoe of similar inoidente in future, That le why we muoh appreotate the epeolal effort whioh hi8 proposa1 represente. But the Qovernment of the United States le well aware that the eitua- Mon in Yemen ie not refleoted eolely by a border inoident on the eouthern frontier, There is a frontier problem in Yemen, but there is also a politioal problem wbloh the Seourity Couuoil hoa ooneîdered on two or three oooasions. The Seoretaru-General is followînn the situation and te periodioally-rdporting on it to thë Counoil, Perhape the United Ratas euggeetion mi ht be ureful and form a part of the Seoretary-Genera Li ‘6 efforta ta find a laating rolutionfor the politloal eituatien in Yemen, The question of the southern frontierr ir only one aepot of that mujor politioal problem. Dl, The represent,attve of Yemen referrcld a 1ittlQ whilo ngo to treatles nnd agrQQmont8, in foroo sinoa le lnst oentury, whioh nrQ not dirsotly relatcd to the inoidont that ooourrad nt tbe Qnd of Mnrch. If WQ rQI%lly want to al’l’iVQ at a lasting .9olution of the politionl problom in Yemen, it Will have to be soght in n goiteral oontoxt indopendent of this pnrtioulur inoldont, and will huve tooncoinpass a11 the torritory’s probloms, oome of whioh hnvs rocontly bQen ooneldered by the Soourity Counoil. In other Word& WQ slrould bo vary grateful if, in thi8 debute, tho COUI~C~~ lwfrained from turning its attention awny from a 91. Le repr6eentnnt du Ybmen 8tQ6t rBf6r6, tout a l’heure, a des trait6s et A das nooords, QII vlguour depuis 10 sibole dernier, qui n’ont pas de rapl>ort diraot nveo l’inoidsnt aurvellu h la fin du mois de mars. Dans le oas oa l’on voudrait d6finitivemont rQol~orohQr une UOlutiOtl dU problbmo politique nu Ybmon, il faudrait que oe ooib dans un oadre gbnbral, ind8pQndnnt do oet inoident et pouvant englober l’Qll8QmblQ des pl~Oblbln08 dU tGrritollv3 dont qUQlqUQSun6 ont 0t6 Qxamînbs r6oemment lJal* lu Conseil de s6ourIt6. C’o8t dire qulnu cours du dbbat que nous poursuivons nour3 sarions tri38 reoonnaissants au 98. We would very muoh like the Counoil to be able to aomplete, today,-its disousslon of the speoifioprobm lem before Lt. without prefudioe toits later oonsideratien of the future position; 94, 1 ehould not wish to oloee without paying tribute to the United States representative for the effort he has made, It was a oonstruotive effort, indloating on the part of hls oountry that oonstant intereet and oonoern whioh it was desired to refleot in this Counoil in order to put an end to what has beoome a somewhat ohronio situation in Yemen, That situation has however been ohronio for over a oentury; and my delegation does not olaim, in oonnexion with an lnoident provoked by the British Air Foroe, to be able to take part in an.lmmediate settlement of the politloal problem in Yemen, The United Statee euggestion olearly raises politioal oonsiderations whioh will have to be examined at another ttme and in other oiroumstanoes, 96, We have ventured to suggest that the Seoretary- Qeneral ahould take ooerniaanoe of that suggestion, oonsider it and if neoessary, in bis appr&ïoh to a solution of the sroblem of Yemen, find a formula for taking it into aioount in hîe efforts to bring about a laeting settlement of that problem, Q0, Mr, EL-ZAYYAT (United Arab Republf. rt WaE gratifying to my delegatlon to hear the &ateir! ,nts of the representative of the Ivory Coast, the representative of the Soviet Union and, of oourse, the representative of Moroooo, We heard with gréat attention the etatement of the reareeentative of the United Statea. We heard him expreèe hic dîeapproval of the ides of reprisale, and 1 thlnk 1 am right in eaying his disapprooal of the Britlsh aggreesion on the town of Harib on 28 Maroh 1964, Yet on another oooaeion when the alleged vlotima were not women, ohildren and old men from ; .,note and small Yemen, Mr, Steoenaon, for whom 1 have great admiration, mnde a rtatement whioh 1 wlrh 1 had now to put on reoord for the knefit of the memberr of this Counoil. 97, Yemea says that the viotima were twenty-flve womon. ohildren nnd men, und the Uritieh delegntion telle ui thnt they doubt tt;ere wf31.e that manyil’hey do not cloubt thnt there were vlotims, humus viotims. The Unlted “iltes dslegatlon prefers to look to tho future. Dl3. I3ut it is beoause of thu future thnt we oall for firm uotion by tlie Seourity Counoil. IIncl lt not been for the Soourity Counoil, hnd it not ben for tho IJnIted Nations, had it net been for the Chnrter, a roprisal would huve iuvlted nnother ropri~ul, and 80 on unohronique depuis plus d’un sii3ole et ma d616gation nia pas la pr&ention, h lloooasion d’un inoident prosoqu6 par l’aviation britanniqV.e, d3tre en mesure de r6gler tout de suite le problbme politique du YBmen, La suggestion amdrioaine soul8ve inoonteetablement des aspeots politiques qu’il faudrait, en d’autres tempe et d’autres oiroonstanoea, examiner, 96, Nous nous somme8 permis de suggdrer quo le BeorBtaire g$n$ral en prenne oonnaissanoe, ilexamine et pui888, au besoin, dans la fapon dont il poursuit la solution du probli3me du YBmen, trouver une formule pour int6grer cette suggestion aux reoherohes qu’il fait pour aboutir A un r6glement ddfinltif de oe probl&me, 013. M. EL-ZAYYAT (RBpublique arabe unie) [traduit de llanglais]r Ma d616gation a 6tB heureuse d’entendre les d8olaratione du repr6sentant de la C&e-dlIvo!re, du reprdeentant de l’Union sovi&ique et, bien entend, du repr&entant du Maroo, Nous aTon 8oouti aveo grande attention la df3olaration du repr6sentant des Etats-Unis, Noua l’avons entendu d6sapprouver l’id8e de repr6sailles et je ne croie pas me tromper en disant qu(il a d6sapprouv6 t3galement l’agression britannique oontre la vllle d’Harib, le Q8 mars 1964, Cependant, en une autre oooneion, lorsquo lee vlo- Mme8 en question n’btaient pas de6 femme& dea enfante et des vieillards de 08 petit paye lointain qu’eet le YBmen, M. Stevenson, pour qui j’8PraUVe une grande admiration, a fait une d6olaration que jtaimurofe avoir maintenant pour la faire figurer danr le oompte rendu pour l%iifioation der membre8 du Conseil. 97. Lo Ybmon bvalue le nombre des vlotimeo h 2G, hommes, femmes et enfants: la c1616gntiou Britnnnique met oe ohlffre en doute. Elle ne mat pus en doute le fait quY1 y a eu des vlotimes. dos Otres humains qui sont morte. La d616gntio~~ de8 Etute- Uni~, quant h elle, prbfbre regnrder vera l’nvonir. 08, C%.t h oawe de l~uvonir que nous demandons au Conseil do sbourltb do prendre des mosure8 ferme8. Snns le Conseil de sbourIt6, 1Tbgnnisution clefl N&ions Unies ot lu Charte, dos reprbsaillea aurnient attirb d’autres reprbeailles at cela nlaurnlt pnrr eu 90, The repressntative of Yemen has just put h!s oase very briefly, very simply. The Counoil is oalled upon to reply to the Britlsh aut by a resolution, Yemen, a small oountry, will find in this a satisfaution it does not wish to seek otherwise, Other politioal problems indeed oxist, other praotioal problems oan and should be negotiated, This 1s diotated by the Charter, Eut these problems are not before the Counoil now, although the representative of Yemen hae Just deolared he has no objeotion to bringing them before the SSourity Counoil or before any other body of the United Nations, 100. The Cuunoil is seieed with the oomplaint of Yemen, the aggrieved party and, to my delegation, the only aggrieved party, This party !s supgorted by 8 dooument, not of the making of the Yemen Uovernment, but of the making of the Rritlsh Qovernment, The dooument !s ths letter of Str Pntriok Dean tellfng us that they have indeed oarried out the reprisa1 and they have indeed asoertained that there were no s@ns of life after the attaok, We hope the Counoil will llmit itself now to this oomplaint, We are sure the United States delegation does not wish and will not ineist on a oourse that may dllute the issue of aggression. We hope the oomplafnt will IN jUdgSd on its msrfts and without heeitation heoause of the faot that it is direoted against a friend. des Etats-Unis ne veuf pas insister et nIin;;;X!? pas dans une direotlon qui pourrait faire vue le probl8ma de IQtgreeslon, Nous eep rons que F la plainte sera jug6e au fond, aans h8sItation du fait qu’elle est dirig6e oontre un ami, 101. Permettes-moi de oonolure par une oitation du proph8te Mahomet, On raconte quV1 a dit une fois! %angez=vous du 08t8 de votre fr8re, qu’il soit llagreseeur ou la olotime de ltagreesion.s Lorsqu’on lui demanda! aN~~s oomprenons aie l’on se CanuIpB de son obt6 s’il est la viotlmo, mais oomment pou& rait-on le faire s’il est llagresseur?fl. il rbuond!tt ~Ranges=~~~~ de son o6W ën lcemp8obant de’ oomi mettre une agreeelon, Rangea-voua de don 08t4 en le r8primandant,* Dans le langage de la Charte, cela signifie! ranges-vous de son obt8 en oondamnant sea aotee. lOa, M. PACHACHI (Irak) [traduit de l%nglairj~ Dans ma d6olaration B la IlOlQme ebanoe, /lai tnd!qu8 que oe que le Conseil devait 8tablir pour l’instant, ol6tait Que le raid du 28 mare 1864 n’avait par oonititu4 un Ëok rpontan4 de d6fenrr devant une provooation, oomme on l’a prbtendu. Noue avons d8olar6 que toutes Ier autres questionr, en grande partie btrang&res au propos, ne devraient en auoune mani8re masquer nu Co!ma!1 la gravit6 do l’attnqua outropriso pnr la Hoynl AIr Poron britannique, Dopuls mon dIs00ura, nous avons pu lira (33 quo oortnius 101. Allow me to end with R quotation from the Prophet Mohammed, He is quoted a8 having said once; “Be on the side of your brother, whether he le the aggreseor or the viotim of the aggressiomn When he was asked: “We understand being on h!e aide if he le the viotim of aggreesion, but how oan w9 ba on hi8 side if he is the aggre8sorPn H!E reply wasi flBe on h!s stde by preventing hinr from aggression. Beon his aide by reprimanding him.” In the language of the Charter, be on his aide by oondemning his aotion, 102. Mr, PACHACHI (Iraq): In my etatement at the 1107th meeting 1 said what the Counoilhaa to eetablieh for the preeent ir that the ratd of 28 Maroh 1984 was net a spontaneour aot of defenoe in the faoe of provooatien, as hae been alleged. We bave rtatrd that a11 other extraneous and largely trrelrvant quertionr rhould not in any way oloud the v!rion of the Counoil ns to the reriousness of the attaok undertaken by the British Royal Air Foroe, Slnoe K spoke we have read whRt so!!io of tha Urltisl! nawssnpors oaly yestorday publlslrod OI! this question. For example, l’ll’s !!!for!ns its rondors on 2ti Mnrch 1204 thut tho Uritish Cnbinst daoidod on retnlintio!!. \Vo afo informad bv ‘lb Observer of Lo!!do!!, o!! tho sn!ns day tlrnt th$ &~Znt first o»oosod bv tho I~oraim! S~orotnry, Mr, Ià!tler, but that he &!s over!‘ubad by tl!o Cnbinot, prlnoipnlly booause the Primo Ministor wne o!! tha side of tho Colonial Offîoo R!\d supportod the argu!na!!ts prosontad to tha Cnbiaot by tho ColonIul Ssorstnry, MP. IIUI!OUI! S~ndys. II! fnot, Mr, Wtlor joul~!laux blua!!l!!cYos oat IniblIb, MO! soulo!!!o!!t. sur ootto q!oi3tioll; Par axetï~pla, 10 ‘rimw il!forl!lo ~08 I~oteum, 1s 20 mars 1084, c1- Cnbliiot ln’ita!l!lic~uo -a dQoitl0 dtuoor ile - roprbsn!llee. VoJgx~~~ da Londres noua informe, 10 mbmo jour, que oetto dboislon u tout dtabord soulov6 ltopgos!tion du Soor&n!ra aux affairas 6trnnghraa, M, l~ullor, mnis qu6 le Cablnct n’en a pas tonu oompto, prliioipalement pnrae que 10 Premier Minlstro SO rangedt 103. New, it bas ben alleged that there was no infiltration of any kind, no interferenoe of uny kind, from the &uth Arabian Federation side in Yemen, But aaain 1 @uote from a British newspaper of 6 Aprii 1064, ‘and 1 think il waz stating something ‘&at is well known to all: “For the past eightaen months Beihan bas been the headquarters of the Yemeni royalists on the southern front in aotivities against the Yemen Arab Republio”. 1 am sure thie faot oannot be denied by the representative of the Unlted Kingdom, 104, Furthermore, it ha8 been stated, 1 read also from The Times, that the oa88 n a.* wa8 further oomplioated by the mot that tha Sultan of Beihan, ugross wbose border the or’fending Harib fort lay, ha8 been supporting the surviving royalists in the Yemen”. 106. If we were to disregard a11 these fJlear faOt8 and to deoide on aotion whioh oompletely ignores the enormity of the responsibility of the United Kingdom Qovernment and obliterates in a mass of words the aotion undertaken by the Royal Air Force on 28 Maroh 1084, we would be doing a great disserviue to the United Nations and to the prinoiples of the Charter. Beoause if. aa the representative of the United States advised usto do, wè were to forget the present and the past and oonoentrate on the future, what would this really amount to? It would umount to foroing the Yemen Arab Republlo to reoognize the South Arabian Federationt to oondone the belligerent and hostile wsition of the United Kingdom in not reoognizing the Yemen Arab Republio ai the legal govërnment of Yemeni and finallv, it would mean that the Yemen Arab Ftepublio woÜld implioitly reoognize and aooept the oooupation, in 1982 by foroee of the Sauth Arabian Federation of eight towne on the Yemeni side of the statue auo line determined by the 1934 treaty between the Unîted Kingdom and Yemen. 108. Any oonoentration on the future would, in faot, lead not only to the 10~s of the preeent 0888 whioh Yemen har prerented before thr Counoil, but alro to a oomplste surrrnder by the Yemen Arab Republio of the moet important podtion whioh it hae taken on the question of South Arabia; and this, in the faoe of tbe General Assambly dociuion on thc question of Soutb Arabia. 1.07. I oould undarstand tbat negotiations and talks would be of some use if tbe United Kingdom Govornment would now state that it is prepnrcid to reoogniee the Government of the Republto of Yemen: that It 1s “Au oourz des 13 derniers mois, Beihan a 6t6 le quartler g6n6ral des royalistes y6m6nites sur le front sud, dans leur aotion oontre la Republique du YBmen.” Je suis eOr que 08 fait ne peut 6tre ni6 par le repr6zentant du Royaume-Uni. 104, En outre, il a 6t6 d6olar6 - et je cite de nouveau le Times - que l’affaire n 6tait enoore oompliqu6e par le fait que le &JR% de Beihan, dont la frontibre traverse le fort .- __ -_-. d’Harib qui est -la oauBe des inoidente, a appuy6 les survivants royalistes du Y6mon”. 106, Si nous n6gligione tous oes faits pr6ois et que noua noua prononoions en faveur de mesures qui ne tiendraient auoun oompte de 1’6norme responsabilit6 du Qouvernement du Royaume-Uni et noieraient aou8 une mnsse de mate l’aotion entreprise le 26 mars 1964 par la Royal Air Foroe, noua rendrions un fort mauvais service ii llOrganieation des Nationo Unies et aux principes de la Charte, En effet, si, oomme le repr6sentant des Etats-Unis nous le oonzeille, nous oubliions le pr6sent et le pass6 pour noua oonoentrer sur l’avenir, B quoi oela reviendrait-il? Cela reviendrait h obliger la RBpublique arabe du Y6men A reoonnaftre la FBd6- ration de l’Arabie du Sud, h trouver des exouBeB B l’attitude bellig6rante et hostile du Royaume-Uni lorsque celui-o1 ne reoonnaft pas la RBpublique arabe du YBmon oomme gouvernement 16gal du YBmeni enfin, oela signifierait que la RBpublique arabe du Y6men reoonnaftrait implioitement et acoepterait l~oooupation, en 1962, par les foroee de la FBd6- ration de l’Arabie du Sud, de huit villes situ6ea du _~...._ o6t6 y6m6nite, selon la ligne de statu uu~~“fi3 par le trait6 de 1034 entre le Royaumek6men. 103. Se oonoentrer sur oe qui #e paeeera dans l’avenir oonduiraft, en fait, non seulement B ne par traiter l’affaire soumise aotuellement par le Y6men au Conreil de rbcurit6, maie B l’abandon oomplet par la R6publique arabe du Ybmen de la porition trbs importante qu’elle a prise au sujet du pro- BlBmo de I~hrnbio du Sud, et oola en d6plt de la d6oidon de I’Assembl6e gbnbrnle 8ur le problbme do 1’Arabio du Sud, 107. JQ pourrais oomprendro l’utilitb do n6aooiutionu et -de pourparle& si le Gouverne&&-du Royaume-LJI11 etait pr& actuellemont h dbolnrer ___-..- quiil reoonnaft 10 O&%rnement de la IIBpublique arabe du %men, qutil est diepos6 h appliquer la r&olution 1040 (XVIII) de ltAssemb16e g&16rnlQ, adoptbe le 11 d&x%nbra 10G3 h une borasnnte mujorite - 77 voix contre 10 - et, 9ifii1, qu’il renonce 108. But to corne here and adviee the Yemen Arab Republio b surrender a11 its politioal demands, ta reoognlae in faot a11 the demanda that the Britlsh Covernment hae been making in the laet few years, and then to forget the inoldent that took place on 29 Maroh 1964, 18, to say the leaet, a very unfust demand; and neither the Republto of Yemen nor any other Qovernment oould ever be expeoted to aooede to suoh a demand. 109, What we have here 1s an aot admltted to have been oommttted by the Unitee Klngdom, an aot whioh had the sanction of the who:e British Cabinet many days before the laet alleged inoursion took plaoe on 27 Maroh 1984, an aot whioh has been desoribed by the British Covernment a8 a punitive oounter-attaok, 110. There oan be no esoape for the Counoil exoept to denounoe and oondemn this net as beinrr oontraru to the prinoiples of the Charter and inoonsrstent wî& the oblinatione of the United Kinrrdom under the Charter, An& as 1 soid, adequate o<mpeneation ehould be given to the viotims of thio aot, 111, For all these reasone the Counoll should oonoentrate its attention not on the future, whiohis a long and laborious prooess, whioh oannot be dsalt with in one resolution or in one meeting of the Seourity Coun- 011, a future that has ta be preceded by oertain aote, by certain measurea to be taken by the United Kingdom Qovernment, namely: first, reoognitlon of the Yemen Arab Remtbliol seoondly, aoce&noe of the General Aesembti resblution 1&49 (X+III) on Aden and the Proteotoratesl and finally, instruotions to the eheikhs of Beihan and noms otheri in the &uthArabian Federotion ~CI mase forthwith their aots of intervention in the interna1 affairs of Yemen, Only then oan we epeak about the future and about any aereement that oan be reaohed to settle the probltrins%etween Yemen and the United Kingdom, But for the preeent we have got to oonoentrate on thle reoent attaok by the Rritlrh Royal Air Faroe in the Iiarib area. It 18 for thia reason that my delegatlon fully supporte the vlewa expressed to the Counotl a little while ago by the representatlves of Yemen and Moroooo regarding the neoearlty of oonfinlng the iew before us to the attaok launohed by the Royal Air Force on 28 Maroh 1964, 112, Sir Patriak DEAN (Uuitod Kingdom): 1 shallhnve R gocd deul to say 1~ due oourso about soms of the stntomonts whloh huve been made here this uftsruoon. 1 huve only 0110 thlng to say tonight and thlt 1s to repent once n’ore that the notion taken on 28 Muroh was agdnst. a mllitary fort isoluted fronr Ilarlb town, u fort whiob, ns 1 shall show in due course, was a centre for subvorsh nnd aggresslve aotivitios aoross the border into tbe So&l~ Arablan Pederation; that this fort was not II polios post, but an urmy fort with artlllery atd urmuments, and thut no attnok whntevar WHB mudo on Ilarib town. l The meetina rixw at $50 p,m, 22 ~- <..-m---d LItho III UN, rwco: $US 0.35 (OF eq04v01011t 111 othor oorroilclos) 27068..Fobrua1y 1966~1,995 ,