S/PV.111 Security Council

The Australian representative has put before the Council a proposal that a sub-committee be instructed to report to it on the facts of the case. Under rule 33 of the rules of procedure, motions referring a matter to a committee have precedence over all other motions. The Council should therefore take a decision, on the motion proposed by the Australian representative. Les faits que je viens de citeI' et plus particulihement le fait que le Gouvernement britannique a rejete les propositions albanaises alors que I'Albanie s'etait declaree prcte a etudier les possibilites de regler la question du deminage du detroit de Corfou par l'entremise d'une commission mixte, montrent que les accusations portees par le Gouvernement britannique contre l'Albanie sont sans fondement. La question de la securite de la navigation dans le detroit de Corfou et celle de savoir qui est responsable du deminage des eaux albanaises du detroit doivent ctre reglees par voie de negociations directes entre les pays interesses, avec le concours de l'Organisation internationale de deminage. La methode adoptee par le Gouvernement britannique ne pennet pas de resoudrc cette question. BIle complique plutot la situation, cc qui est contraire ala fois aux intercts des Nations Unies et a ceux des pays directement interesses. A la lumiere de tous les faits que je viens d'exposer il est evident que la reference a l'Article 35 de la Charte, contenue dans la plainte britannique, n'a aucun rapport avec la question. 11 n'y a pas lieu de se re£erer a l'Article 35, car il n'y a pas de faits qui tomberaient sous le coup de cet Article. L'affirmation selon laquelle I'at. titude de l'Albanie dans l'incident des contretorpilleurs britanniques qui ont ete endommages par des mines dans le cletroit de Codou, cons- . titue ou pourrait constituer une menace a la paix, est denuee de tout fondement. Le PRESIDENT: Le Conseil a ete saisi par le representant de l'Australie d'une motion tcndant a charger une sous-commission de lui fa!re rap,. port sur les faits de la ca~se., ~onformement .a l'article 33 du reglement mteneur, les propOSItions tendant a renvoyer une question a une commission ont priorite sur les propositions principales. Le Conseil devrait donc se prononcer sur la motion formulee par le representant de l'Australie. ally by the United States naval authontles, declaring the entrances to Durazzo and Valona unsafe. He observed that he understood that this broadcast was made in consequence of a United States ship's having observed floating mines in the swept channel to Durazzo. It is true that United States destroyers reported that they had sighted two floating mines on 14 November 1946, during the evacuation of . the informal United States mission to Albania. On the basis of that report, the Commander of the United States Naval Forces in Europe notified the Navy Department of his intention to advise the International Routing and Reporting Authority that he considered the Medri route 17/1 to Durazzo unsafe owing to mines, and, by inference the Medri route 17/2 entering Valona , . . was also considered doubtful. Followmg receIpt of this information, the United States Navy issued a warning in regard to these waters in the broadcast message or hydrolant referred to by Sir Alexander Cadogan. With respect to the case now before the Security Council, we strongly support the British contention that mine-laying in peacetime for any reason; without notification, is intolerable for humanitarian and security reasons. Such activities endanger all users of the high seas. The British case as presented seems to us convincing. We find it difficult to believe the professed Albanian ignorance regarding these mines and their laying. While it seems clear to us that Albania must at least have known of the existence of the mines, we feel that sound practice requires very careful examination of all the evidence pertinent to disputes before the Security Council. We would, therefore, favour further examination of the facts. The representative of the Soviet Union and the representative of Australia have both spoken this afternoon. The representative of Australia has proposed a simple solution, the formation of a sub-committee to inquire into all the facts and to report. After hearing the exposition of Mr. Hasluck and that of the representative of the Soviet Union-and I am taking these statements in conjunction with the original allegations of the repres~ntative of the United Kingdom-it 1 See Official RiJcords 0/ the SiJcurity Council, Second Year, No. 15, 107th meeting. 1 Voir Proces.verbaux officiels du Conseil de SBcurite, Deuxieme Anne~, No 15, lO7eme seance. The Council may recall that the resolution establishing the committee on Spain was couched in very similar terms; that is to say the actual operative part of the resolution, not the preamble. This sub-committee will have full freedom to sift the evidence,to bring the conflicting statements into sharp contrast with each other, and to call for a clarification from the members of the Council, at t,his table, who are parties to the dispute. The sub-committee can give the Council the benefit of its analysis of the facts and, we hope, of its recommendation as to a suitable course of action. Mr. MICHALOWSKI (Poland): The question which is being dealt with at present by the Security Council is of a different nature and character from all the problems of which the Security Council was seized during the first yea,r of its existence. In all the questions previously discussed by us here, we have been dealing with certain facts established beyond doubt, or charges based on specific proofs. The problems were always those of' political interpretation, and we had to determine their effect on the maintenance of the security and peace of the world. The aim of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council was always to establish in what relation the given facts stood to the Charter and what mea-' sures were to be taken in order to prevent threats to peace. In the dispute now under consideration the situation appears to be quite different. Only one fact exists beyond doubt, that is the loss which the British Navy has suffered. Our common attitude toward this fact is very simple: we deeply regret the loss of life of the seamen of the British Navy, a loss which occurred after the cessation of hostilities. I am certain that I am expressing the feeling of all members of this Council in conveying my deepest sympathy to the British Government, whose concern we can perfectly understand. However, apart from this one fact on which we all agree, we seem to hold contradictory opinions. Allow me to mention only the most important points here. Point one. The Government of the United Kingdom states that the mines were laid by the Albanian Government, or at least with its knowledge. The Government of Albania, on the other hand, categorically denies any connexion with the mine-laying. I should like to draw your attention to what was said by Sir Alexander in his statement-namely, that "If the Albanian Govervment were in good conscience innocent and Le Conseil se souviendra peut-etre que la resolution creant la sous-commission chargee de la question espagnole etait redigee en des termes presque identiques; je parle de la resolution proprement dite et non du preambule. Cette sous-commission aura toute latitude pour passeI' au crible tous les temoignages, faire ressortir les divergences qui existent entre les declarations contradictoires, demander des ec1airc1ssernents aux membres du Conseil qui sont parties au differend. Elle pourra fournir au Conseil le benefice de son analyse des faits et, esperons-Ie, recommander les mesures que l'on pourrait prendre par la suite. M. MICHALOWSKI (Pologne) (traduit de l'ang1ais): La question dont est saisi actuellement le Conseil de securite differe, par sa nature et son caractere, de tous lesproblemes qui lui ont ete soumis'pendant la premiere annee de son existence. Dans toutes les questions precedemment disc;utees ici, nous avions atraiter de certains faits etablis sans l'ombre d'un doute ou d'accusations reposant sur des preuves bien nettes. Les problemes etaient toujours des problemes d'interpretation politique et il s'agissait de determiner dans quelle mesure ils affectaient le maintien de la securite et de la paix internationales. Les resolutions adoptees par le Conseil de securite avaient toujours pour but de determiner quel rapport existait entre les faits donnes et la Charte et les mesures qu'il fallait prendre pour ecarter les menaces contre la paix. Dans le differend que nous examinons maintenant, la situation apparalt toute differente. Un seul fait est indiscutable, c'est la perte qu'a subie la marine britannique. Notre attitude a tous en cette matiere est tres simple: nous regrettons profondement la mort des marins britanniques, qui s'est produite apres la fin d:s hostilites. Je suis certain d'interpreter le sentIment de tous les membres du Conseil en exprimant ma profonde sympathie au Gouvemement britannique. Nous comprenons parfaitement 1'emotion qu'il a ressentie. Cependant, si 1'on met a part ce seul fait sur lequel nous soyons tous d'accord, il semble que sur les autres, nous ayons des opinions contradictoires. Permettez-moi de ne vous, citeI' que les points les plus importants. Premier' point. Le Gouvemement du Royaume-Uni affirme que les mines ont ete mouillees par le Gouvernement albanais ou que tout au moins ce Gouvernement etait au courant. Le GOllvernement albanais, de son cote, affirme categoriquement qu'il n'est pour rien dans cette operation. J'attire votre attention sur le passage suivant de la declaration de Sir Alexander: "Si le Gouvernement albanais ignorait en toute sin- In its note of 21 December 1946, the Albanian Government clearly stated: "With regard to the accusations that the Albanian Government itself placed the mines or was aware that others had placed them or again, knew of the presence of mines in the Corfu Channel, these accusations are completely without foundation and are profoundly wounding to the peaceful aspirations and feelings of the Albanian people and the Albanian Government." 2 In his statement Sir Alexander said: "The Greek denial has already been published. I will therefore say no more about it." 3 I do not wish to be' misunderstood; I am not trying even for a moment to accuse the Government of Greece of laying the mines; we have no proof to substantiate such an allegation; but if the Governments of the countries on the Straits of Corfu have denied the fact of mine-laying, I cannot understand why an accusation has been raised against Albania alone. It could only be justified if the Government of the United Kingdom possessed certain and definite proof to this effect. Personally, I fail to find such proof in the British statement. Point two. There is yet another contradiction. The Government of the United Kingdom stated that the mine-sweeping carried out on 12 and 13 November 1946 was the result of a unanimous decision of the Mediterranean Zone Board, confirmed by the Central Board in London on 1 December 1946. The Albanian Government has quoted a denial issued in that respect on 14 December. I understand that these facts are not the most essential for establishing the responsibility for the mine-laying. I am mentioning them only because they constitute a proof of the goodwill of the Albanian Government on the question of the mine-sweeping of the channel and contradict the facts contained in the British statement.. Point three. The third difference of opinion concerns the accusation made by the Government of Albania that on the day after the explosion of the mines in the channel British planes flew over Albanian territory, thus infringing its sovereignty. The British Government denied these facts and again neither side has presented satisfactory proof of its respective charges.4 3 Ibid., No. 15, 107th meeting, page 302. "On a accuse le Gouvemement albanais d'avoir lui-meme fait poser les mines ou eu connaissance du fait que d'autres les avaient posees, ou encore, d'etre au courant de la presence de ces mines dans le detroit de Corfou; ces accusations sont depourvues de tout fondement et blessent profondement les aspirations et les sentiments pacifiques du peuple et du Gouvernement albanais2." Sir Alexander a dit egalement: "Le dementi grec a deja ete publie. Par consequent, je n'en dirai pas davantage3 ." J e ne voudrais pas qu'on se meprenne sur mes paroles. Je ne songe pas un instant a accuser le Gouvernement grec d'avoir pose les mines. Nous ne possedons aucune preuve a l'appui d'une telle allegation, rnais si les Gouvernements des deux pays bordant le detroit de Corfou ont nie avoir pose les mines, je ne vois pas pourquoi, seule, l'Albanie a ete accusee. Cette accusation ne pourrait etre justifiee que si le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni avait une preuve certaine et precise. Personnellement, je n'ai pas trouve cette preuve dans la declaration britannique. Deuxieme point. I1 y a une autre contradiction. Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni declare que l'operation de dragage des 12 et 13 novembre 1946 a ete effectuee a la suite d'une decision unanime du Bureau de deminage rnediterraneen, confirmee le ler decembre 1946 par le Bureau central de Londres. Le Gouvernement albanais cite un dementi publie sur ce point le 14 decembre. Je veux bien admettre que ces faits n'aient pas une importance capitale quand il s'agit de determiner qui est responsable du mouillage des mines. J e les cite seulement parce qu'ils constituent une preuve de la bonne volonte du GOllvernement albanais en ce qui conceme le dragage des mines dans le chenal et, en outre, parce qu'ils sont en contradiction avec les faits enonces dans la declaration britannique. Troisieme point. La troisieme divergence d'opinions est la suivante: le Gouvernement albanais accuse des avions britanniques d'avoir, le lendemain de l'explosion des mines dans le detroit, survole le territoire albanais, portant ainsi atteinte a la souverainete de ce territoire. Le Gouvernement britannique nie ces faits et, la encore, aucune des parties n'a presente de preuves satisfaisantes a I'appui des accllsations qu'elles formulent<l. 1 Voir Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de stfcuritl, Deuxieme Annee, No 15, 107eme seance, page 302. 2 Voir Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de slcurittl, Deuxieme Annee, Supplement No 3, Annexe 8, page 43. B Ibid., No 15, 107eme seance, page 302. . 4 Voir Proces-verbaux offieiels du Conseil de sicuritl, Deuxieme Annee, Supplement No 3, Annexe 8: note en date du 21 decembre 1946 adressee par le Gouvernement albariais au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique, page 4·2, et Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de Point fiVe. There are certain doubts whether the channel in question is the international channel mentioned here by the representative of the United Kingdom as route 18/32 and 18/34. We do not know whether this route is a recognized international route, and it rather surprises me that this international route passes only three hundred yards from the Port of Saranda. The Albanian Government claims that this channel is a part of the waters of the Port of Saranda. Point six. The Government of the United Kingdom claims that this channel had been swept of mines in 1944. On the other hand, according to the statement of the Albanian representative, the British note of 25 January 1945 sent to the Albanian Government by General Hodgson stated clearly that the navigational lines declared open were not safe and that vessels using them did so at their own risk.2 I am certain that the clearing up of this point is essential to a proper solution of the dispute. Point seven. As another proof of Albanian guilt, the British Government cites the fact that the Albanian Government maintains "vigilant defences . . . along their coast".a I believe it is customary for all countries whose frontiers lie along sea-coasts to maintain such defences. At the same time, the maintenance of such defences is not proof of mine-laying. The Polish delegation cannot accept the description of the mines as a proof, either. German mines, as well as many other weapons of German make, are common in Europe and can be found almost anywhere. The description of the mines and the fact stated here by Sir Alexander- "the· paint shone brightly in the sun"-do not throw any light on the essence of the question. I have mentioned here only a few points to prove that as regards the most essential question involved in this discussion, we know very Httle; also, that there are no proofs at all and that the charges contradict one another. There are, besides, certain questions of law which are in doubt, such as the question of innocent passage through territorial waters. The responsibility for incidents in such waters and the reason why Albania is not a member of the Mediterranean Minesweeping Board, must also be cleared up. ' In the opinion of our delegation, we cannot decide upon all these legal problems in this 2 Ibid., Supplement No. 3, Annex 8, page 44. See also Mr. Hysni Kapo's statement at the 109th meeting, re~ord. No. 16, page 398. Ibid., No. 15, 107th meeting, page 300. See also Supplement No. 6, Annex 15, Exhibit VIII. 1 Voir Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee, Supplement No 3, Annexe 8, paragraphe 8, page 37. . • Ibid., Supplement No 3, Annexe 8, page 44. VOll' aussi la declaration faite par M. Hysni Kapo ala 10geme seance Proc(:s-verbal No 16, page 398. 3 Ibid., No 15, lO7eme seance, page 300. Voir aussi Supplement No 6, Annexe 15, piece No VIII. ~ith the maintenance of international peace and security. For instance, we have before us the problem of disarmament, and we are now in the midst of the discussion on the control of atomic energy. This, of course, does not mean that the Security Council is helpless in the British-Albanian dispute, but it is not our task to solve puzzles. Article 34 of the Charter states clearly that "The Security Council may investigate any dispute ... in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the mai.ntenance of international peace and security." There is no danger to peace in this dispute. The Corfu Channel has been cleared, and there remains only the question of indemnities and not one of world war or peace. We do not believe that a threat to peace can result from that unfortunate incident, which took place many months ago. No definite proofs have been established. There are no facts which the Security Council could use as a basis for a decision. We are neither a court of justice nor a jury, and we cannot pass a verdict one way or the other on the basis of our convictions alone. Therefore the Polish delegation believes that the most appropriate course of action would be to proceed according to Article 33 of the Charter, where it is provided that: "The parties to any dispute ... shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means." Only the first of the possible means mentioned in Article 33 has been used in this dispute: negotiation. And if the members of the Security Council deem it necessary, we can still approach the parties to the dispute and call upon them to use some other. means of peaceful settlement of the controversy. There remains another way out, of course. We can use Article 36, paragraph 3, of the Charter and call upon the parties to direct their dispute to the International Court of Justice. May I remind you that paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute provides that it lies within the competence of the International Court of Justice to settle the "legal disputes concerning: . . . the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation"? The Polish delegation considers the first possibility as the more desirable, but if it is the wish of this Council to call upon the parties to direct Il reste encore evidemment une autre solution. Nous pouvons, en vertu du paragraphe 3 de l'Article 36 de la Charte, inviter les parties a. soumettre leur differend a la COUT internationale de Justice. Puis-je vous rappeler que le paragraphe 2 de l'Article 36 du Statut stipule qu'il entre dans la competence de la Cour de juger "tous les differends d'ordre juridique ayant pour objet: ... la realite de tout fait qui, s'il etait etabli, constituerait la violation d'un engagement international". La delegation polonaise estime que de ces deux methodes, la premiere est preferable. Si toutefois le Conseil desire inviter les parties a. Mr. ZULETA ANGEL (Colombia) (translated from French): I wish to raise a point of order. The Australian delegation has proposed the appoin~ment of a sub-committee. According to the rules of procedure, a motion of that sort has precedence over principal motions, as you have reminded us, Mr. President. That being so, I should like to know whether we could not discuss that motion only, and vote on it, rather than continue consideration of the whole question.

In the spirit ·of rule 33, I think that for the time being the discussion should be confined to the Australian motion regarding the appointment of a sub-committee of the Council. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I doubt whether it is necessary to take an immediate decision on the Australian representative's proposal even thougp. some of us might wish to speak on the substance of the matter. It seems to me that this proposal is not of a nature to be interpreted as a proposal to close the discussion. However, I am making no formal proposal to that effect. So far as the substance of the Australian proposal is concerned, I cannot support it, as I consider it incorrect a,nd incompatible with the need for keeping the Security Council's authority at a high level. The accusations levelled at Albania by the United Kingdom Government are not proved, and it is impossible to prove them. They are therefore unfounded, in spite of the effort to make much of the question and create a stir in the Security Council, in the Press, etc. If one wishes, one can make a great deal of noise about the most absurd accusation; all that is required is the desire to do so. As the representative of the Soviet Union, I do not wish to join those who are ready to create a stir about this matter without any justification. The United States representative considers the appointment of a sub-committee necessary. He read a statement in which his position was already defined. He considers that there are grounds for the accusations against Albania and nevertheless considers it necessary to study the question further. I understand the position of those representatives on the Council who refrain from express- M. ZULETA ANGEL (Colombie): Je demande la parole sur une motion d'ordre. La delegation australienne a propose la creation d'une souscommission. SeIon le reglement interieur, une telle proposition a la primite sur les propositions principales, comme vous-meme I'avez rappeIe, Monsieur le President. Dans ces conditions, je voudrais savoir si nous ne pourrions pas discuter seulement cette proposition et la mettre aux voix, plutot que de poursuivre l'examen de l'ensemble de la question. Le PRESIDENT: Dans 1'esprit de l'article 33, je crois qu'i! conviendrait de limiter pour l'instant la discussion a la proposition australienne tendant acreel' une sous-commission du Conseil. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Je doute qu'il soit necessaire de prendre immediatement une decision sur la proposition du representant de l'Australie, alors que certains de nos com~gues desirent prendre la parole sur le fond de la question. I1 me semble que cette proposition n'est pas telle. qu'on puisse I'interpreter comme une demande de cloture des debats. Je ne soumets cependant, pour ma part, aucune proposition formeIle. En ce qui concerne le fond de la proposition australienne, je ne puis l'appuyer, car j'estime que cette proposition est incorrecte et qu'elle ne contribue pas a maintenir l'autorite du Conseil de securite a un niveau eleve. Les accusations portees par le Gouvernement du Royau·me-Uni contre l'Albanie ne sont pas prouvees et ne peuvent pas 1'etre. C'est pourquoi, en depit de toutes les tentatives faites pour grossir l'affaire et pour faire du bruit autour d'elle, au C0I?-seil de securite, dans la presse, etc., ces accusations sont sans fondement. Si on le veut, il est aise de faire beaucoup de bruit autour de I'accusation la plus absurde; il suffit pour ccIa d'en avoir le desir. En ma qualite de" representant de 1':Union sovietique, je ne veux pas m'associer a ceux qui sont prets, sans la moindre raison, a faire du bruit autour de cette affaire. Le representant des Etats.Unis juge indispensable de Creel' une sous-commission. I1 a donne lecture d'une declaration dans laquelle il exprimait a l'avance la position de son Gouverne..: ment. Tout en estimant qu'il y a des raisons pour accuser l'Albanie, il n'en eroit pas moins necessaire d'etudier encore la question. Je comprends la position de ceux des membres du Conseil de securite qui s'abstiennent d'emettre

I call upon the representative of the United States on a point of order. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America) : Mr. President, foUowing the reference made by the representative of the Soviet Union to my former statement, I only wish to make clear what the attitude of the United States is in this case. May I make that statement?

I should like first to settle a point of order. I did not propose that the general discussion should be closed, but merely that priority be given to the Australian representative's motion. My interpretation of rule 33 of the rules of procedure seems to me reasonable; it is such as to avoid repetitions and, consequently, loss of time. If we continue to discuss the main issue and the Australian motion is subsequently adopted, these discussions will be repeated in the sub-committee, and again when the Council discusses the latter's report. It is therefore desirable that the Council should take a decision on the Australian motion before deciding how the discussion should be continued. ' Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): It seems to me that it would not be quite logical to take a decision on a proposal without first hearing other representatives who may wish to speak, as another proposal differing from the Australian proposal may be submitted by other representatives. If another proposal is submitted, how will the Council act? Will a decision on the other proposal be taken or not, bearing in mind that a decision has been taken on the Australian proposal? If we take a decision on the Australian proposal, the possibility of voting on any other proposal will be automatically excluded. It seems to me, therefore, more logical to hear any other members who may wish to speak before we take a decision on the Australian proposal. . Le PRESIDENT: Je donne la parole au representant des Etats-Unis pour une motion d'ordre. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Monsieur le President, le representant de l'Union sovietique s'etant rHere ama declaration anterieure, je d6lirerais eclaircir l'attitude des Etats-Unis dans cette affaire. Puis-je faire cette declaration? Le PRESIDENT: Je voudrais, d'abord, regler une question d'ordre. Je n'ai pas propose la c](lture de la discussion generale, maLe; simplement que priorite soit accordee a la proposition du representant de l'Australie. L'interpretation de l'article 33 du reglement interieur me semble raisonnable; eIle est de nature a eviter des repetitions et, par consequent, des pertes de temps. Si nous poursuivons maintenant les discussions sur le fond et qu'ensuite la proposition de l'Australie soit adoptee, ces discussions reprendront devant la sous-commission, puis une troisieme fois quand le Conseil discutera le rapport de cette derniere. 11 serait done desirable que le Conseil se prononce d'abord sur la proposition australienne avant de decider de la suite a donner au debat. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Il me semble qu'il ne serait pas tout a fait logique de prendre une decision sur une proposition, sans avoir entendu les membres du Conseil de securite qui desireraient prendre la parole. 11 se peut en effet que d'autres representants veuillent presenter une proposition qui differe de la proposition australienne. Si 1'0n soumet au Conseil de securite une autre proposition, que doit-il faire? Devra-t-il prendre une decision sur cette nouvellc 'proposition ou devra-t-il s'abstenir, etant donne qu'une decision aura deja ete prise sur la proposition australienne? Si nous prenons une decision au sujet de la proposition australienne, nous exclurons ipso facto la possibilite de mettre aux voix toute autre proposition. Il me semble par consequent que, s'il y a des representants qui desirent faire une declaration, il serait plus logique de les entendre avant de prendre une decision sur la proposition australienne.

In reply to the question which the United Kingdom representative has just raised, I should like to draw his attention to two points: first, as I said just now, it is not a question of closing the general discussion, but simply of giving priority to the Australian motion. If the latter is adopted, the Council will be free, if it wishes, to go on with the general discussion. Secondly, the representatives of the United States and of Poland dealt, in their remarks, with the Australian motion. They raised points which call for rectification by the United Kingdom representative; the latter is obviously entitled to participate in the discussion. As a matter of fact, I also intended to call on the United States representative, who asked to be allowed to correct a point in the statement made by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): Mr. President, I agree with your ruling on the priority of the proposal made by the representative of Australia. I shall therefore confine my remarks to that proposal itself. The representative of Australia proposed that the matter should be referred to a sub-committee composed of three members in order to investigate and make interrogations on certain ambiguities which exist in the case before us, before we proceed to formulate an opinion on the substance of the question. In fact, he has not specified the questions or the points which call for a sub-committee of investigation and interrogation, and which could Le PRESIDENT: En reponse ala question qu'il vient de poser, je voudrais attirer l'attention du representant du Royaume-Uni sur deux points: tout d'abord, comme je l'ai dit tout a l'heure, il ne s'agit pas de clore la discussion generale, mais simplement de donner la priorite a la proposition de l'Australie. Celle-ci adoptee, le Conseil est libre, s'il le desire, de poursuivre la discussion generale. D'autre part, les representants des Etats-Unis et de la Pologne ont vise, dans leurs interventions, la proposition de I'Australie. 11s ont souleve des points qui appellent une rectification de la part du representant du Royaume-Uni; celui-ci a evidemment la faculte d'intervenir dans le debat. Je comptais, du reste, donner aussi la parole au representant des Etats-Unis qui a demande a rectifier un point de l'intervention du representant de l'Union des Republiques so~ialistes sovietiques. M. EL-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais): Monsieur le President, j'accepte votre decision donnant priOl'ite a la proposition presentee par le representant de l'Australie. C'est pourquoi je me bornerai a quelques observations sur cette proposition elle-meme. Le representant de l'Australie a suggere de renvoyer la question a une sous-commission composee de trois membres charges d'etudier le cas et de questionner les parties au differend pour eliminer certaines ambiguites, avant meme qu'on puisse se faire une opinion sur le fond de la question. En fait, le representant de I'Australie n'a pas precise les questions ou les points qui devront faire l'objet d'une enquete par une sous-com- M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe) : Apparemment, ma declaration a deplu it Sir Alexander Cadogan et il voudrait qu'elle fut declaree nune et non avenue. Tout ce que je peux dire a ce propos, c'est que Sir Alexander Cadogan a Ull sens de l'humour tres developpe. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (t1'anslated from Russian): Apparently my statement did not please Sir Alexander Cadogan, and he would like it to be declared null and void. I can only say that Sir Alexander Cadogan has an extremely keen sense of humor.

I think we had better confine ourselves to the point of order which has been raised. As nobody has suggested amending the motion which I proposed to the Council, I shall take it as adopted. I would point out that the hour is now late, and the representatives of Albania and of the United States have asked to speak. I should like to ask the Albanian representative whether he feels he must speak today. I understand that the remarks of the United States representative will be short and will be limited to the rectification of a point raised by one of the members of the Security Council. Le PRESIDENT: Je croisqu'il vaudrait mieux que nous restions dans la limite de la question d'ordre qui a et'e posee tout a l'heure. A cet egard, puisque personne n'a propose de modifier la proposition que j'ai presentee tout a l'heure au Con~eil, je la considere comme etant adoptee. Je constate que l'heure est deja assez tardive. Les representants de l'Albanie et des Etats-Unis ont encore demande la parole. Je voudrais demander au representant de l'Albanie s'il tient a parler de nouveau aujourd'hui. J e crois que l'intervention du representant des Etats-Unis sera assez breve et tendra simplement a rectifier un point souleve dans une intervention d'un des membres du Conseil de securite. M. HYSNI KAPO (Albanie): Je veux a nouveau mettre en evidence devant le Conseil de securite le fait que 1'accusation portee par le Gouvernement britannique entre dans le cadre de la politique inamicale suivie par le Royaume- Dni a l'egard de I'Albanie. Les faits politiques que j'ai exposes devant vous montrent clairement cette tendance. Indiquer les causes reelIes ne signifie pas s'6loigner du probleme dont se preoccupe le Conseil de securite. Un expose le plus large possible des faits vous permettra de tirer des conclusions d'autant plus justes et completes. Ce qu'il ne faut pas perdre de vue, c'est que lorsque les' navires de guerre britanniques ont navigue dans les eaux albanaises a des fins de provocation et d'intimidation, la souverainete de l'Albanie a ete atteinte. Le Gouvernement britannique, en niant cet acte illegal, cherche a rejeter la responsabilite sur le Gouvernement albanais, qui ne respecterait pas les lois internationales. Je repete encore une fois que le Gouvernement albanais respecte les lois inter- Mr. HYSNI KAPo (Albania) (translated from French): I wish again to show the Security Council that the accusation made by the British Government is part of the hostile policy pursued by the United Kingdom with regard to Albania. The political facts which I brought to your notice clearly demonstrate this tendency. To indicate the real causes is not to deviate from the problem with which the Security Council is dealing. The fullest possible statement of the facts will help it to reach conclusions which are accurate and complete. What must not be forgotten, is that when the British warships proceeded through Albanian waters for purposes of provocation and intimidation, Albanian sovereignty was infringed. The British Government is attempting to throw back the responsibility on to the Albanian Government by denying that illegal act and saying that Albania did not respect international laws. I repeat once again that the Albanian Government does respect international laws. It respects The significant facts which the Security Council should bear in mind are: (1) the tone of the British notes, for example that of 2 August 1946, which ends with a threat;l and that of the other notes which attempt to confront Albania with a fait accompli; (2) the rejection of the Albanian proposals for sweeping the Channel; (3) the arbitrary way in which the mine-clearing operations were carried out. In this connexion, it must be pointed out that even before the problem of clearance had been discussed by the Mediterranean Board, and before a decision had been taken on the subject, the British Government, in its note of 26 October 1946, informed the Albanian Government that the Corfu Channel would be swept.2 This impatience, and 'this arbitrary procedure, were again in evidence when, during the mine-sweeping operations, the British commander invited an officer of the French Navy, who was not a competent representative of the Board, to be present. In accusing 'Albania of having prevented the Channel from being used when in reality no action was taken; in supposing, without any legal basis that the vigilance of Albania along the coast must imply the responsibility of the Albanian Government for everything which happens within its waters; in referring, without any justification in the case with which we are dealing, to the Convention of Barcelona,s which Albania signed, and which she respects; in qualifying as merely innocent the passage of the British r ships which committed an act of provocation and violated our territorial waters; in referring to certain articles of the Hague Convention which Albania respects, and of which she would in no way oppose the application to a State violating the said Convention, the representative of the United Kingdom, without any real evidence, is making false assumptions and deductions, and he concludes by suggesting that you adopt a resolution. . I do not wish to argue about a problem which has nothing to do with Albania; I would only remind you once again that the Albanian people, which made so many sacrifices for peace and democracy, still remains faithful to its principles, and is firm in its endeavour to ensure that its friendly relations with all peoples, and above all with the great Allies, shall be still further strengthened. The British Government's accusation has deeply wounded the peaceful feelings of the Albanian people towards all other peoples; that is why I refute it categorically. Je ne veux pas argumenter sur un probleme qui est etranger a I'Albanie; je vous rappelle seulement, une fois de plus, que le peuple albanais, qui fit tant de sacrifices pour la paix et la democratie, reste toujours fidele a ses principes et cherche fermement a renforcer ses relations . amicales avec tous les peuples et surtout avec les grands Allies. m~me que le probleme du nettoyage eut ete mis en discussion devant le Bureau mediterraneen, et avant qu'une decision eut ete prise a ce sujet, le Gouvernement britannique, par sa note du 26 octobre 1946, informait le Gouvernement albanais que le qetroit de Corfou serait nettoye 2. Cette hate et cette maniere de faire arbitraire se scnt a nouveau manifestees lorsque, au cours de l'operation de deminage, le commandant britannique invita a assister aux operations un officier de la marine franc;aise, qui n'etait pas un representant competent du Bureau. En accusant l'Albanie d'avoir empeche la navigation dans le detroit alors qu'en realite, aucune mesure n'etait prise; en affirmant, sans base legale, que la vigilance exercee par l'Albanie, le long de la c8te, doit entrainer la responsabilite du Gouvernement albanais pour tout ce qui se passe dans ses eaux; en rappelarit, sans raison dans le cas qui nous occupe, la Convention de Barcelone s, que l'Albanie a signee et qu'elle respecte; en qualifiant tout sirnplement d'inoffensif le passage des navires britanniques qui ont fait acte de provocation et viole nos eaux territoriales; en rappelallt certains articles de la Convention de La Haye que l'Albanie respecte, et qu'elle verrait sans objection appliquer a un Etat qui violerait ladite Convention, le representant du Royaume-Uni fait, sans aucune preuve serieuse, des suppositions et des deductions erronces, puis, en fin de compte, vous propose cl'adopter une resolution. L'accusation du Gouvernement britannique a profondement blesse les sentiments pacifiques que le peuple albanais nourrit envers tous les autres peuples; c,est la raison pour laquelle je la refute categoriquement. I Voir Proces-uerbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, De,llxieme Annee, Supplement No 3, Annexe' 8, paragraphe 11, page 38. • Ibid., paraghaphe 13. B Convention sur la libel'te du transit, ouverte a la signature des interesses a Barcelone, le 20 .avril 1921, et ratifiee par l'Albanie au leI' septembl'c 1931. . The representative of the United States expressed his. conviction that the Albani~n Government had knowledge of the existence of the mines found in the Corfu Channel. That conviction was based on the warning given over the wireless of the existence of floating mines in the sea routes to Durazzo and Valona. That does not constitute a serious argument, because as I have already pointed out, the head of the British Mission in Albania, General Hodgson, in his letter of 25 January 1946 to the Albanian General Staff, stated that shipping routes declared open were not safe, and that ships sailing in those waters must do so at their own risk. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : Mr. President, it seems to me that in the light of the ruling which you gave just now, every word of that speech was out of order, since the Albanian representative did not even mention the Australian proposal. Therefore I think it is absolutely out of order. I rather want to know what our situation is now. Are we to confine ourselves to the Australian proposal for the reference of this question to a sub-committee, or are we to go on discussing the substance of the question?

I must acknowledge that the United Kingdom representative's observation is correct. The Albanian representative's statement is not in conformity with the decision taken by the Council, and I would have stopped him if his remarks had not been relatively short. We have to abide by the decision we have just taken, and I must earnestly request members of the Council taking part in this discussion to observe it. As I said before, if members of the Council wish to speak in order to correct or to clarify statements or declarations made during this discussion, I shall, of course, have no objection. Le PRESIDENT: Je dais reconnahre que la rcmarque du representant du Royaume-Uni est fondee. L'expose du representant de l'Albanie ne correspond pas a la decision prise par le Conseil, et je l'aurais arrete si son intervention n'avait ete relativement courte. Nous devons nous en tenir ala decision adoptee tout al'heure, et je dais conjurer les membres du Conseil qui participent a ceUe discussion de s'y conformer. Comme je l'ai dit tout a l'heure, si les membres du Conseil desirent intervenir pour rectifier ou mettre au point les affirmations ou Ies declarations faites au cours de cette discussion, je ne m'y opposerai naturellement pas. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America) : I shall ask the indulgence of the Council for only a few moments to give a more accurate idea of the position of the United States than that suggested by the references. made by the representative of the Soviet Union. I am sorry that Mr. Gromyko missed what I think was the true intent of my former statement. There is no question that mines of recent M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (tmduit de fanglais): Je demande au Conseil de m'accorder quelques instants pour donner, de l'attitude des Etats-Unis, une idee plus exacte que celle suggeree par les allusions du representant de I'Union sovietique. Je regrette que M. Gromyko n'ait pas saisi la portee reeUe de ma declaration anterieure. Il est hors de doute que des mines de fabrica- Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de I'anglais): Monsieur le President, il me semble, a la lumiere de la decision que vous avez prise tout al'heure, que la declaration tout entiere du representant de l'Albanie est en dehors des regles, car dIe ne mentionne meme pas la proposition australienne. Elle n'est donc absolutnent pas conforme ala procedure etablie. Je voudrais savoir ou nous en sommes maintenant. Devons-nous nous borner a discuter la proposition australienne qui tend a renvoyer la question a la sous-commission, ou allons-nolls continuer a discuter du fonds de la question? SII' ~exander Cadogan, that mine-laying in pcacetune, without notification, is intolerable for h urnanitarian and security reasons. I further stated that the British case, as presented by Sir Alexander Cadogan, seems to the United States delegation convincing, and we find it difficult to believe in the ignorance professed by the AI~anian delegation with regard to the minelaYIng. \Vhile it seems clear to us that Albania must at least have known of the existence of the mines so close to her coast, we feel that sound pr?-ctice .requires careful examination of all mdence pertinent to all disputes before the Security Council. Our mind is not finally made lip. We have stated our position, as it can now be formulated, on the basis of the evidence so far presented. We favour a further and careful cxaluination of the facts, particularly after hearingthe conflicting statements of other members of the Council on this subject. I t '\Vas for that reason that I stressed the opinion that the sub-committee suggested by the representative of Australia might provide a convenient mechanism for bringing together the contradictions in the statements made at this table and for giving to the Council a precise statement of the facts as presented, together -with the differences of opinion based on the results of the interrogations which the subcOlurnittee might make. The Council should then have a basis for formulating a final decision to dispose of this case. Such a course would avoid an open debate in plenary session of the Council on highly controversial matters, and at the ~ame tiIlle obviate a situation in which each mCluber can make his declarations without having to conform to the pattern that might be set by a COIlllllittee in handling this case. I t is a nlatter of convenience rather than of mbstance, it seems to me. I do not think it indispensable to have the sub-committee; but I think it 'Would be highly useful. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): With regard to the Australian proposal, while I am not entirely convinced that it is useful or necessary, I should certainly not wish to oppose it, and if th~ Council decides in favour of setting up a cornrmttee, I shall, of course, place myself entirely at its disposal and give it any information it desires which may be in my possesion. I should like, however, to make one brief comment on a remark made by the Australian representative. I .think he said that there was before the council a question of fact and a question of Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume- Uni) : (traduit de I'anglais): Bien que je ne sois pas absolument convaincu de l'utilite ou de la necessite de la proposition australienne, 'je ~'ai nullement l'intention de m'y opposer et, SI le Conseil decide de Creel' une sous-commission, je me mettrai naturellement a la disposition de celle-ci et je lui fournirai, dans la mesure ou je les possede moi-meme, les renseignements qu'elle desire. Je tiens toutefois a faire une breve ,observation apropos d'une remarque du representant d~ l'Australie. Je crois qu'il a dit que le Consell avait a considerer une question de fait et une Now, Mr. President, as you said a moment ago, it would be in order for the representatives here to correct points of fact. Permit me, therefore, merely to refer to one or two things that have been said today which I think are inaccurate, reserving to myself the right, of course, to make further statements and provide further information, if the Council decides to refer the question to a sub-committee. Now, in the first place, the representative of the Soviet Union said again today that "the British Government acted without taking into consideration Article 33, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, which requires that the parties concerned should endeavour to settle their dispute, first of all, by means of negotiation, etc."2 He also referred to "the fact that the British Government had rejected the proposal of the Albanian Government for the establishment of a mixed commission for the settlement of questions concerning minesweeping in the Corfu Channel."2 He referred to that proposal for a commission, as if the latter had been intended to settle the whole dispute. But its proposed function was confined solely to the following: to determine what area of the sea should be considered to constitute the channel of navigation. That is what the Albanians asked. In my statement the other day, I said that my Government was wholly at a loss to understand this proposal. The limits of the Channel were perfectly well known, and have been so to every Government in Europe. Since October 1935, thirty copies of the Mediterranean Routing Instructions have been sent by the International Routing and Reporting Authority to the Minister of Public Works at Tirana. Therefore there really was no sense in establishing a commission to try to define a channel which was perfectly well known and clearly laid down. What I want to emphasize is that the rejection of that proposal, for that reason, does not show that we, in the words of the Soviet representative, • The United Kingdom representative was quoting the interpretation made at the time of the USSR representative's speech, the wording of which differs slightly from the official translation which appears in this recori:1. 1 Cette regie est citee dans le discours prononce par Sir Alexander Cadogan lors de la 107eme seance. Voir P,·oces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, Demdeme Annee, No 15. •Le representant du Royaume-Uni cite l'interpretation faite lors du discours du representant de l'URSS, et dont le texte est legerement different de la traduction officiclle figurant dans ce proces-verbal. The other statement that the USSR representative made in his speech today was the following: "In this connexion it is necessary to point out the important fact that the fairway in which the British destroyers were damaged by mines on 22 October 1946 does not coincide with the fairway which was swept in 1944-1945 and which is mentioned in the British note of 9 December 1946. Therefore the reference to the sweeping of 1944-1945 contained in the above British note is unfounded.m The statement, that the fairway where the destroyers were damaged does not coincide with the swept fairway, is untrue; and this can be proved to be so. Further, with regard to the mine-sweeping he declared: "The reference contained in the British note to the effect that the mine-sweeping would be carried out in accordance with 'the unanimous decision of the Central Mine Clearance Board' is refuted by the Board's resolution of 14 November 1946, in which it was stated that the mine-sweeping was carried out 'not on the instructions of the Board and without its sanction' )).1 I think both the Polish and the Albanian representative have also repeated that charge, that the mine-sweeping was carried out without any unanimous decision of the Board. I am afraid this is a rather complicated story, and it will take me a few minutes to explain it. Perhaps I had better read-I hope I am not being indiscreet for I do not know if it has ever been published-the actual text of the decision of the Central Board, of 1 November. Paragraph 1: "The Board considers that the North Corfu Channel should be re-swept at a favourable opportunity." Paragraph 2: "The Board is unable to express any further opinion in this matter, which is an issue outside the scope of this Board." That was the unanimous decision 'taken on 1 November. So far as I can understand it, the records are not extremely clear. Some reference to the decision of 1 November appeared in an organ of, I think, the British press, and attention was drawn to this fact at a meeting of the Central Board on 14 November. I think it was • I The U~ited Kingdom representative was quoting the mt~rpretatlOn made at the time of the USSR representatIve's speec~ the wording of which differs slightly from the nfficml translation which appears in this record. Il est inexact que le chenal ou les contretorpilleurs ont ete endommages ne soit pas le meme que le chenal drague, et nous pourrions le prouver. Parlant ensuite du dragage des mines, il declare: "L'assertion contenue dans la note ·britannique, selon laquelle le dragage des mines serait entrepris conformement a la decision unanime du Bureau central de deminage, est refutee par la resolution adoptee par le Bureau le 14 novembre 1946, qui precisait que le dragage des mines a ete entrepris /sans instructions du Bureau et sans son approbation 1." Je crois que le representant de la Pologne et le representant de l'Albanie ont tous deux repete cette accusation, a savoir que le dragage des mines aete entrepris sans decision unanime du Conseil. Je crois qu'il s'agit la d'une histoire assez compliquee et il me faudra quelques minutes pour l'expliquer. Il vaudrait peut-etre mieux que je donne lecture-j'espere ne pas commettre d'indiscretions, car je ne sais pas si elle a ete rendue publique-du texte meme de la decision du Bureau central en date du 1er novembre. Le paragraphe premier est le suivant: "Le Bureau estime que la partie nord du detroit de Corfou devrait etre draguee a nouveau a la premiere occasion favorable". Paragraphe 2: "Le Bureau n'est pas en mesure de formuler d'autre opinion sur cette question qui ne releve pas de sa competence". Telle est la decision qui a ete prise a l'unanimite le 1er novembre. A ma connaissance, les proces-verbaux ne sont pas extremement clairs. Il est question de cette decision du 1er novembre dans un organe de la presse britannique, je crois, et on a attire l'atten- 1 Le representant du Royaume-Uni cite I'interpretation faite lors du discours du representant de l'URSS, et dont le textc est legerement different de la traduction officieIIe figurant dans ce proces-verbal. An agreement was reached at that meeting, to issue a press statement to the effect that the sweeping of Albanian territorial waters had not been carried out under the direction or auspices of the Central Board. That agreement, while representing the views of the members of the Board during the meeting, was suspended within an hour of the termination of the meeting by an objection raised by the United States member of the Board, and all members of the Board were immediately informed. A meeting to reconsider the decision of 14 November was summoned for the next day. At the request of the USSR representative, this meeting was not held actually for five days, and took place on 19 November. In so far as there was agreement on 14 November-that is, agreement to issue a press statement-it was to deny the emphatic words regarding the direction and auspices of the Central Board which were reported to have been used by the British press. It was definitely not a reversal of the decision of 1 November, that the channel should be swept. It had nothing to that effect at all, and the reversal decided upon on 19 November was justified by the fact that the proposed press statement would have given the imptession of being a repudiation of the decision of 1 November. The only operative decision was that of 1 November, which was communicated textually to the Allied Naval Commander-in- Chief, and that has never been reversed. It is therefore incorrect to say that there was no decision in favour of sweeping the channel because there was. Now the Polish representative made one or two other statements. He said in the' first place that there was only one fact which existed beyond doubt, and that was the loss which the British Navy had suffered. I maintain that there are certain other facts. He said that, for instance, with respect to aeroplane flights over Albania, there were simple denials on one side or the other, but no evidence. But there was evidence. The Albanians said flights had been made by British three-engined aircraft marked PK 4. I can prove-I can call witnesses, if necessarythat we have no three-engine aircraft there, and no aeroplanes marked PK 4. It seems to have been an invention of the Albanians. The Polish representative-and, I think, the Albanian representative-referred to an announcement by General Hodgson, and made great play with that. He said that General Hodgson had issued a warning that this Channel could not be guaranteed free of mines. Well, a warning of that kind after a sweep is normal and technical. You can sweep mines, but you cannot sweep up mines that may be on the sea Un accord est intervenu a cette seance pour publier un communique de presse precisant que le dragage des eaux territoriales albanaises n'avait pas ete entrepris sous la direction ou sous les auspices du Bureau central. Bien que cet accord representfi.t les vues des membres du Bureau presents a cette seance, son application fut suspendue une heure apres la cl6ture de la seance, en raison d'une objection soulevee par le representant des Etats-Unis au Conseil, et tous les membres du Conseil en ant ete immediatement informes. Vne reunion fut convoquee le lendemain pour remettre en question la decision du 14 novembre. Cette reunion n'a eu lieu, en fait, que cinq jours plus tard, le 19 novembre, a la demande du representant de l'URSS. On etait tombe d'accord, le 14 novembre, pour publier un communique de presse, dans le but de dementir les termes trop categoriques employes par la presse britannique en ce qui concerne les instructions et l'approbation du Bureau central. L'accord du 14 novembre n'avait nullement pour but de revenir sur la decision du ler novembre, qui prevoyait le dragage du chenal. Rien n'a ete fait en ce sens et le revirement decide le 19 novembre etait justifie par le fait que le communique de presse que l'on se proposait de publier aurait donne l'impression qu'on revenait sur la decision du 1er novembre. La seule decision pratique a ete ceIle du ler novembre qui a ete communiquee, textuellement au commandement en chef des forces navales alliees et n'a jamais ete infirmee. 11 est done inexact de dire que le dragage du chenal n' a jamais ete decide, car il l'a ete. Le representant de la Pologne a egalemem fait une ou deux declarations. 11 a dit en premier lieu qu'un seul fait a ete pfouve, a savoir que des contre-torpilleurs britanniques ont ete coules. Je soutiens qu'il ya certains autres faits. Il a dit, par exemple, qu'il n'y a, de part et d'autre, en ce qui concerne les survols du territoire albanais, que de simples affirmationssans preuves. 11 y a des preuves. Les Albanais ont dit que des survols ont ete effectues par des appareils britanniques trimoteurs, portant la marque PK4. Je peux prouver-avec temoins a l'appui, s'il le faut-que nous n'avons pas d'appareils trimoteurs dans cette region, et que nous n'avons pas d'avions portant la marque PK4. C'est la, semble-toil, une pure invention des Albanais. Le representant de la Pologne-et, sauf erreur, aussi le representant de l'Albanie-a fait etat d'une declaration du general Hodgson dont il tire un grand parti. 11 a declare que le general Hodgson avait publie un avis d'apres lequel on' ne pouvait garantir que le detroit etait entierement demine. Techniquement parlant, it est normal de publier un avis de ce genre apres un dragage. On peut draguer des mines mais on Those are an the remarks I have to make, and I apologize for taking up the time of the Council.

If the representatives of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who have asked to speak, do not insist on speaking today, we shall hear them at our next meeting dealing with this matter. The meeting rose at 7 p.m. Le PRESIDENT: Si les representants de la Chine et de rUnion des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, qui ont demande la parole, n'insistent pas pour parler aujourd'hui, nous les entendrons lors de la prochaine seance que nous consacrerons acette question. La seance est levee a1g, heures.