S/PV.1122 Security Council

The Seourity Cou~oil ha8 vory oftoa had to examina oomplaints oonooi~nii~ aots of aggresslon committed agniust ths torritory and populntion of ono oountry by another. Those situations sometimos nrise followlug a torritorinl oontrovorsy hotwcen noighbours, or ns a rosult of animoslty that might be stirred up by politioal antugonism. Although, ilïtho oaso now brought to our attention, the r6glmee of Camboclia and of the Republio of Viet-l\cam are different andalthough 26. Among SO many others, the inoidents at Chantrea and Mong, like those at Taey and Thlork, are the result of aotions taken bu the army of the Republlo of Viet-Nam, Of oousse, the Ooverntient of that oountry is foroed to wage a domestio war the foroign extensions of whioh ars obviws to all, Cambodia, whlle it may be lsgitimately preoooupled with psaoe in that area, is not conœrned with the oauses Of that war or with its ramifioations, If its neighbours are unfortunate enough to be plagued with a war on their territory, suoh a situation oan provlde them neither with the pretext nor, a fortiori, w&b the right of bring@gthat war &II Dam~4 26, Sinoe its independenoe, Cambodia has oeaselessly deplored this war and bas sought to avoid its politioal and mllitary reperoussions, It is not the least of the merits of lts Soversign that he has oourageously rssistsd blandishments and pressures and has defended, with vigour and deep sinœrity, the determination of his people ~2 remain outside a oonfliot whloh its nsutrallty oan oortalnly help to salve but whose already SsriOUs oomplioations oan only be multiplied bycam- 4Odian partioipation, 2% This polioy of poaœ haa been firmly and insistently maintained, rsgardless of the trendof events in the region itself and regardlese of the balanoe of the international forces whioh, in one oapaoity or another, have found reaaons for intervenlng, It has been refleoted just as muoh in Cambodia’s refusa1 to lnterfere in the affairs of its nelghbours as inite determination to oppose interferenoe in its own affairs by ita neighbours or by Powers whioh wére openly offering them their support, 28, The freauenov of the inoidentr whlohfor a numbsr of yearr now havë ooourred on Cambodian territory has in no way weakened this polioy or led Cambodia along a path whioh rome would like it to follow, Clearly, a gsneralisation of the oonfliot in the area would have heel~ of moi9 profit to a military stratogy whloh is favourod lw a broacl front, as ~011 ns to infiltration taotlos wh.~h oan only dsriv0 sdvantngo from nawbases Of opsrations, 20, Prlnoa Norodom Sihanouk bas shown inflexible dctormlnation in rojootIng a11 invitations to IutOrvOnO, WhOther dirootly or indireotly. No doubt ha husfinally Ootwlnoed somo of 111s noighbours, who havo rO0ognisod bot11 1111~ desiro for poaoci and 1~1s oag~noss to s~ouro 0ffootive lleutI’ality for hîs oountry. 31. Without wishing in this debate to dlgress on our evaluation of the polioy of neutrality or to pass judgement on the reasons whioh bave induoed oertainoountrtes to follow it, 1 would reoall one or two examples of oonfliot between the areat Powers where the statu8 of neutrality oonstitute& by gsneral consent, a solution whiob really safenuardsd mao% 1 think insartioular of the reoognliion ofthe neutrality of Austrià, whose prevlous situation appaared at oertain moments to be fraught with danger for the peaoe of Europe, The demand for neutrality and for a guarantee of territorial integrity made by the Austrian Clovernment and people found readler support among Powers whose mutual diatrust at that time was nevertheless muoh more intense. It ~111 not be denied that the settlement of the Austrian problem an thls basis had an extremelybsnefiolal effeot ou tbe evolution of post-war polioy in Eur(ope and on relations bstween the great Powers @epselv.es, + ~~~~~ --~ i , 38.’ For some tlme the oo&roversy about the.neufrallty of Caos pitted throe of the great Powers guqantaeing the aeneva Agreuments against the pni@d States, whioh finally, thanks to the luoid reallsm of ~President Ker&dy, reoognietrd the advantages of suoh neutrallty and admitted the need for it. In any anse, it had merits at a time when no other solution seemed likely to be worked out or to oommand the agreement of a11 the parties oonoerned, 1 shall mention later the oritioism now being levelled in oertain oiroles * against the noutrallty of Laos in connexion with new diffioulties whioh have arisen, But a11 statesmen reallae, today more than before, that dolayed solutiona allow the oonsequenoes of a situation to evolve, sinoe the olements of that situation are $$c+osarlly subjeot to ohange. c- Z>. 38. The a%OOanit Jn d Ca!%Wdîa'~ MtUtralîtY. and tht, guarantee %y wMoh the Royal Khmer Clovetiment wished it t0 be aooompanied, would undoubtedly have spared the Powers involved in Su.tth-East Asia many diplomatie and polîtioal diffioulties, In any 0888, it wcltld have spared the Royal Uovernment of Cambodia the necesslty of brlnging before the Seourity Counoil the 8ltuation ow ated by the painful inoidents whioh @ok plaoe on itr Lerritory uimply through the fault of Itr neighbourr. Finally-and thîr is not the leart important aopeot of thr question-lt woutd bave prevont&! the United States ûovernment from beooming involvod witb tho IIo~~ublio of Viet-Nam In these inoidanto nnd in ths dcvclopmonts to whloh they bave givon rllse. 84. Two kinds of arflments wore used to ot)Poae le Cambodian demand. Ïn the firat place, it ië?elt that tha initiation of talks on the neutrality of Cambodia would open the way to AZ discussion which would not be confined to tbîs problem, and thnt it mlrrht lead tu a general examination of ttie situation in South-ICaat Asia a8 a whole. In thls roflpeot, Cumbodln 11~ glvon oategorionl nfmw~llc~~ thnt it Manda to reetriot the Il due On invoque, d’autre part, la tion au A Ni, J’ai neutralît6 du d6s le des BvBnements dont la situation aotuelle n’est que la oons6quenoe lointaine mais pr6visîble, aursient 6t4 6vît6s, $6, 1 statsd a short while ago that, if tho neutrallty of Laos had enjoyed general support from the Mme when the need for lt appsared, many events, of whloh ths present situation 1s merely the ultimats but foreseeable oonseWenaec would bave bsen avolded, 86, Undoubtedly, the exfstsnoe in Laos of stroqly differentiated politioal trends oonstitutos a kind of Aohilles( heol fur ths neutrality solution as aoospted and rsoognised in lB6!& The oonstant ohallengs to the interna1 balanos derives just as muoh from a 96, Il est oertaln aufau Laos IWis’tsnoe danoes politiques fotiment une sorts lit6, en lB6& La remise en oause oonstanta de I~6cWibre interne pouvoir a normal struggle for power wfthin the country AS from the oonfliot between the two baslo influences that exerolse pressura on the two extrsme sides of the deux influsnoes fondamentales qui slexersent sur les deux ailes extr6mes de 1Oohiquier politique laotien, La seule tendanoe qui avait pujusqu%pr6sent autour d’elle les faotions oppoa6es, la seuls persannaUt politique du pays qui Btait au oentre de toutes les. oombinaisons la stabilit6, -6taient la tendanoe neutraliste et son leader, Aujourd’hui enoore et malgr6 les diffiouMs, le prlnoe Souvanna Phouma asp6rs auoords de Qsn6ve solution aux dlffioul tr s aotuelles, A oondition dtentourer sa nouvelle d6marshe des oondttions quVnsple une 16gitlme prudenoe. 97, Or, au Oambodge, la situation interne est diffdrente, risque pas dt6tre tirdllsments prolon nistes LacMan politioai. ohess-board The only tondenoy whloh has SO far bsen able to rally the oontsndlng faotions around it has bsen the neutralist polioy of lts leader, the one statesman in the oountrv who has been at the centre of ail politioal oombinatons likely to ensure stability, Even Tokay and desnite the diffioulties, Prinotr -Souvanna Phouma hupss that the valldity of the Oeneva Agreements may serve as a bas18 for the solution of existing problems, provided that his new apprsaoh is made in oiroumstanoes dlo- Med-by legitlmate prudence. 81, In Cambr&a, however, the domestio situation is different and reoognitlon of neutrality is not thrsatensd wlth destruotion from wlthin the oountry by the pull of forœs movî t in opposite dtasotions towards tpDreign poles of at raotion that are mutuallyantagonis- I 88, Finally, thers is a moral oonefderatlon involved in the example given by thls smsll oountry whioh. despits the -delioaoy of lts position, is appsaling despsratsly to the whole world for reoognltion of its psaœful vooation, for ooneolidation of ite eovereignty in peaœ and for the preservatlon of its territory from the oonsequenoes of a war whioh it dœs not want, tlther on its neighbour% tarritory or on its own, 88, trohe A l&emple d6pit de sa situation et ds la en appelle dbsesp6r6ment au monde entier pour faire sa souveroined dans ritoire @il que 80, La d616gation marooaine aurdt bien tuMur au l’objet ot sa population la vlotlmo, Cola nous aurait oondtit il partager avoo las mcmbras du Conseil la dbsapprobation do tols lnoldonts ot il rouhoroher aveo eux les moyens dt!.+.~o rbparatfon moral0 at mnt&Wlo npproprl60 h Aa dignlt6 ot uux lntbr&s 89, The Moroooan delegation would havs preferrsd to oonftne its attsntion to Cambsdia~a domplaint oonoernlng the aots of aggression agalnst its territory and population, Thie would bave lad us to join with othor members of the Counoll in roprobating euoh lnoldents nnd in saaklng with thsm the mears of saaurlng moral and materle regarntlon nppropriM b the dignlty and intersote of the Royal IChmor Covarnmont, wa would also bave oontributed to tha soaroh for ways and means of provontlng the roourrsnoo of suoh inoldants. If wo had oonflnetl tho study of the Wostlon beforo us wlthln tho strict limlts of tbc Rotlon 1 huvo juElt outlilled, our delognt~o11 would havo amply fulfillod ite rosponelbility and Its obligations. Ilowever, tha Prcsîdont and tho mombors of tho Counmont royn~ ld~n~~~. Nous aurions oontribu6 lu raol~erol~e dos voies ct mouures susoeptlbloe do prbvenlr ou dtempOoher le ronouvellomont do tels inoldonts. Si nous nous Qtions born6.s la quostlon yul nous est soumiso, dans 10s seulos llmltos dUl6gatlon SO serait 40, I oan assure you, Mr, PresidBnt, that outside the Counoil this discussion is bsing followed with the gxdatest Aerest, partioularly by that segment of world op!n!on wh!oh I have the honour ta represent, Al1 the arguments bave been oarefully analysedl for the real issue is not merelv the re-establishment of noodnltighbourly relations between Canrbodia and thënepublio of Viet-Nam or the improvement of relations between Cambsdia and the Wnited States, but also the passionate desire for peaoe in a part of the world where, si!!&-? 1047, war ha8 been going on under different flags but to the detriment of the psoples ooncerned who may, out of sheer weariness, aooept peaoe at any pr!oe a& they beoome aware that they are extsrminating eaoh other for interests whioh are not alwavs thelr own. For this reason, the araunrents whioh haie been put forword before thé Counc& warrant the part!oular attentian of Membsrs of the Unlted Nations and thelr respective mer!ts muet be assessed with equal objeotivity, espeoially where the views of the great Powers now direotly involved are oonoerned, 41, W haoe noted with espeoial satisfaotion that for the flrrt Hme in the Seourity Counoil, and in suoh a Oomplex oaoe PI this, the Frenoh delegation has endormi so olearly the position whioh the non-aligned oountrles for a long time and often alone, have had k, defend SO strenuously, If this meane anything for us in tha praeent world nituutlon, lt moans that tlio nonalignod Sto”res oan look forward wlth knoro hopu to inorsas!ng understanding, on tlio part of tho grent Powor0, for polioi13s of non-alignmont whioh in Elis past huve beon mlsunderstood und somcAimes, evon, oondomnod. 42, If, in disouseiag thls problen~. WQ oursolvoel~nva adolltQd 00 olour an attitude in 81 ‘)0X+ of Cambodln, it 1s out OI faithfulness to a polioy CO wliioh Morooo6 bas fully adhcrod from ml3 vory outeet. At a11 intornntional oonfei~onoes it bus worked unromittingly to k, peaae and war and with regard oho 08 by any glven oountry of Its international polioy, independently of the situation in a glven geographioal region. Theae oomments oannot be interureted AS a stand in favour of one eide or another fioin ths point of vies of ideologioal subetanoe, The ooexistenoe of dlfferent r&lmes and different oonoeptions of freedom le a dire+ oorollary of the posttion whloh 1 defined earlier, A speolflo problem 1s belng examined by this organ of the Unlted Nation& we have set forth, with einocrity, our view of its baslo aspeots, -- 44, However, we are not overlociklng the faot that neither the Ueneva Conferenoe of 19842/ nnr that of 19683/ was oonvened within the framework of United Nations aotion or under the Organisation% responsibility, The outoome of negotiations or oonoerted aotion, those Oonferenoes were oonvened in order to put an end to the war in Indo-China or to prevent another, I3ut neither the initiative, nor the negotiations, nor their result have in any way oommitted any organ of the United Nations, Of oourse, we were a11 pleased with the peaoeful oonoluslons in whioh those Conferenoes oulmlnated. But the applioation of the deoisions reaohed and ths trend of events slnoe the holdlng of the two Conferenoee have always been outside the nuthoritv of the United Nntions and have remainod withln tlïe exolusive oontrol of the Powers whioh agreed to those deolsions, It seems tous logiaal that the United Nations oan hardly take A deoislon on the substanoe of a problem about whioh it has for the most nart merslr bsën oourteously lnformed or with regad to whioh it has sometimes ken oalled unon touse its nood offices g order to avold an aoute orisis, - 46, It will k remembered that during the diooursionof the Uyprus question [lO86th and 1084th to 1108rd meetings] we told thooe frlends of ours who wanted the hurlty Counoil to denounoe the Agreements of Zurioh and London that in our view the Counoil had no rîght to determine the validity or non-validity of agreements reaohed outside the United Nations on the basis of international law andthat it was for the parties themselves to find the means of disengaging themselver freely from what they had frsely agmed to, 48, We have olearly expressed bllr opinion that the instruments establiehed by the Qenevn COnferf3nOM oould still, if usod with oqual good faîth, sorvo for tlro settlomont of tho probloms faolng CambodIa today, t0 tlloso u~mmento 2bmnin attaohad to thern, tlb Counoil ountiot froc tho othoru frein tlreir oommltmo~~t~ and ospouse thair vlews oonoernîng tho validlty or nona 00110vP Uollforonco ou lll0 I’robloltI of roororlng I’onco 111 Itldo-cllllin, hO’d I~OIII 16 Juno 10 21 July 1954, 48, Before oonoluding, 1 must state that at present my delegation oan take no dsfinite stand on oertaln proposa18 whioh havo been made to the Counoil for a oourse of aotion llkely to load to the establishment of a Bondy whose task would be to assist the two parties, inter alia through border oontrol, and thus avoid tho roourrswe of inoidonts suoh as those brought to our attention, The delegation of Cambodia has made uertain suggestionsi wo also llstened yesterday to tho statement by tho ropresontativo of the Republio of Viet-Nam, in whioh ho made othor suggestions, This dtornoon again, tho Unltsd Statos representativo sot forth at longth a further suggesti&, linkod to thoso already made during le initial statemont by the United States delegation [1118th meeting], We shall remaîn in alose oontaot with other delegations whose goodwill is apparent and whoso efforts are enoouraging, We hope we oan roaoh a formula that oan provldo the parties oonoernod with the friendly undorstandlng whioh thoy cjesiro with equal -s!pperitytoc@i@!!!@l! amongst thomselves, i 49, The PREiIDENT (tranelated from Frenoh)t 1 oall on tho representativo of CambodIa. 50, -Mr, HUOT SAMBATH (Cambodia) (translatsd from Frenoh)! This statement is in oontinuation of those made to tho Counoll by the Permanent Ropretentative of Gambodia and, at tho last meeting, by myself, It would not have been nooossury bnt for the faot 3hat at previous meetings certain delogations, partioularly that of tho Republio of Viet-Nam, took th8 opporturdty to try to dîsoredlt Cambodia(s polioy of independenoe and neutrality by means of slanderous allegations and hostile insinuations, 61, As I said yesterday, in every instanoe, whethor at Mong, Chantrea, Taey or Thlork-to mention only the mont reoent attaoka of whioh wo have bsen the viotlms-1 myself vieited the soene to f ether wîth the membere of the International Contro Commission, the military attaoh6s and prese attaohda of the embasries aooredited to Camhodia, and national and foroign journalirtr who were able to ostablirh the faot of the attaokr upon the people of Cambodia and the ext&t of thr damage oaured by the Unlted St&ar and Barth VLt-Namere fcwoeo, Thir, then, ir an oyewîtnerr aooount, not a vague philorophioal dirrertathon or a politioal statement marked by hdredor aome other objeotîvo feeling. 1 eay fleyewltnees aooountN advisscily, booAUs0 thel’e WerB 010Ar AttAOkfJ AgAillSt Cambotiian torritory by Unitad 8tAtet3 Ad %Ut11 Vi&- nAinoSe troope, ‘l’ho Attaoke were AooolnpA1lled by Or~lTlOEl, thOft8, pillAgillg Alld AOtB Of bAllditry. 62, ‘l’hitr ls, 1 think, I\ suffiolently sorfous UhArge that ehould bo ooi~sidorod by tlro Counoil, slnoe what has tAksl1 ]3lAOS is llothh~ hSS thall A l?e&$UlAl’ AttAOk lll,Oll the tor~~itorlal intogrlty of ~1 eovereign andlntlepeiident fit& Membor Of tho Unîted NAtlOtbs, aussi dietingut2 soit-il, H~&E sont bien 18, attendant que juet&ao leur soit A4, Il fut un tempe oh le Gouvernement du Sud ignorait nier IUvidenoe, des inoidents provoqu6s par aeu propres troupes1 il slobstinalt justifi6es du Gouvernement royal du- Oambodge, Aujourdlhui, irrMutablee, d8maaqu6 aux yeux du monde entier, le r4gime sud-vietnamien oherohe une nouvelle porte de sortie en reoonnaiasant 888 eelon lui, pour et ineuffieamment prot6g6esfl. La t&Bee de l’erreur iqvolobtaire des ftianohieaant la frontibre du Gambodge B-leurinau nez Eu I#&i lea-enqu9tee du oontrble et les oonstatationa &rangere- -mettsut Auoh gratuitoue statements on the part of a representative, no matter how distlngulahed, when the dead Md wounded are there, demandlng redress? 64. Time waa when the Government of South Viet-Nam olaimed to know aothing and denied everything, It even went 80 far 88 to deny the evidenoe, It refused to aoknowledge inoidents provoked b its own troopsi it persieted in rejeoting, @en bloon, J llhe jartified oomplaints of the Royal aovernment of Camlxdia, Today, when it 1s overwhelmed by a mass of irrefutable evidenoe and unmaaked before the entire world, the South Viet-Nameee r6glme is eearohing for tanother exit, b I admitting ite oadmee whil8 blaming them on Mill-de inad and inadequately guarded frontierefl, The argument that it was au unintentional mietake on the part of3he~South Viot-Nameee armed force8 and that they 'torossed the frontier into Cambodia without Wisin# it is unaooeptable to the Royal Glovernment, T@a I&rnational Oontrol Oommisrion~~ invaetigation and the findlnge of the foreign military attaohdr oonfirm that a miatake of this kind at pointa where the frontier is wry olearly defined by natural linee, ie quite impossible, But even assuming, dgspite the evidence, that euoh a mistake was made, it ie altogether unlikely that the United States and South viot- Namese troops deliheratily aanaarinated Khmar paaeaïïts and-pillaged tid deetroyed Cambodian vil- 1 if es1 a aok in ignoranoe, and in errer, In the oane of the on Uhantrea, for example, this village was the only one in a vaut expanse of plain, General Huynh Van 000, head of the South Viet-Namesa delegation whioh visited the uoene at the inviation of the Royal Oovernmant, himrelf admitted thir and deolared to tbe people .and the Preerr~ “1 oannot understand ruoh A mirtake belng made,, , 1 am sending aai demMdinf~that_ WR!3 Porponathle bo wf alto Sai@n r--- ---. . .u$A!& ” errëur est naturelles, D’autre part et oontre -toute -Lvîdënne, ortte erreur eQt-elle $emblable que les troupes am6rioano-bud-vie@raieiinee~elent~dBlibBrb~meqt=asLrureiJdes tiquement authentiquement & leur par exemple, fl s%girsait d’une plaine .r~6tandant perle de vue, n+nt pour Le dn6ral Huynh vietnamienne, qui -11~6tait l’invitation du gouvernement royal, l’a. oonrtati iU= mdme, et& presse8 %Te ne m@explique ogm-jnt QI wj,bJea,R 664 As w rdr Taey tho representativa ofthe ROI~&- lb of Vie -Nam, in iinr wîtb the joint oommurdqu6 &” Med by hir oountry’u Minirtder of ~&onoa a? F6r@iaa A%irs, ihade no mention whaknr of tha 66,‘ Mpublique du Viet-Nam, muniqu6 oommun der a#aim tëtiënt -~OUI silence le rud~virtnamiona, qui a oaurl la mort dUoo(ak piayaann khmOr9 et le pUge des latfon, Lh non plus il ne pouvait e%glr d’une orrour, la for& du o6t6 VIetnamion et par oAml>odgion, d+iutros les mtimbros oontr810, do pr6oieor que 10s foroos arm6&Î&&ioano-audvlatnamionnos dOfonso, de inoursion n&nos ~~~~~t rridw soutb Viet-Name rmnmmd whioler Whiob was nr noiblo for the dëath of innooent Khmrr pbasants and if e looting of the population18 property. That oould not havo been a mistako dthor, b~oause th0 frontior in thio looality iA markod by forost on UlQ Viot-Nnmoso sido and by an opon plaiu on tho CAmbodian eido, Tho Wttited Statea rvwtary Attnohb Atld Othor international 0~~1orvor~, inoluding tho mombera of tho International Control Commiseion, woro ablo t0 800 this with their own oyes. It muet be polnted out fflat the United Statos and South Vi&Namesa Armod fwos openod firo on tho dafonooloes Khmer population ~d thon illogally arroatod throo provinoial guards, bfOl+e oontlnufng tholr inourAfon furthor înto Cambodian territory, On tho naxt dny, 8 May 1064, the 57. The representative of the SaigonGovernment also referred to alleged violations of South Vi&t-Namese territory by the armed forces of Cambodia, and cited as examples the Vinh-Lac affair and the L-19 reconnaissar-ce aircraft shot down by our fighter planes. In the case of Vinh-Lac, the Royal Government issues the most categorical denial. This slanderous accusation levelled at the Royal Cambodian Army is part of the usual campa@ waged by the Saigon Press, and it is surpsising to hear it repeated by the representative of South Viet-Nam, As for the L-19 aircraft allegedly shot down over South Viet-Nam by Cambodian fighters, the facts are as follows: the aircraft in question was directing the attack on Chantrea and was in Cambodian air space; the Cambodian fighters, after issuing to it the usual summons, shot it down while it was still flying over Chantrea; and according to the Saigon Press, one of the two occupants of the aircraft was killed outright whilst the second was able to fly the machine back to South Viet-Namese territory before it crashed. The explanation given by the representative of South Viet-Nam to the effect that the aircraft’s engine was riddled with bullets, which caused it to stall and the machine to plummet vertically, reveals a somewhat ourious conception of ballistics. 58. As for the allegation that the frontier is ill-defined, 1 would recall that the Cambodianfrontiers have been delimited in documents and detailed maps. Although these frontiers were drawn in a mannes unfavourable to Cambodia, they have been stsictly observed by our country which expects, however, that the “minimum” thus left to us shall not be oalled in question by our neighbours. 59. Another favouxite argument advanced by the Saigon Government, and SO willingly repeated by its allies, is that Cambodia is used as a place of refuge and supply fox the Viet-Cong forces, Once again, the Royal Government most categorically rejects these false allegations. Anyone who paid any attention to the gratuitous assertions of the representative of the Government of South Viet-Nam would be led to believe that Viet-Cong dead and wounded had been left on the battlefield. But this is not SO. The victims are a11 peaceful Khmer villagers. 60. In the case of Chantrea, one of the targets of the South Vi&-Namese air force was obviously the pagoda, as ev-idenced by a line of bomb craters and thefr direction. This was noticed by General Cao when we flew over the site in a helicopter. The representaprOtious day, following the ma88aore of the Taey villagers by the United Statee and South Viet-Namese foraes, were keeping a partioularly .sharp look-outmade a11 the sasier by the nature of the terrain whioh, aa I mentloned before, 1s a vast and oompletely unint~r~pted plain, On this OCOaRiOn, as on othars, there was not a trace of a Viet-Con& let alone a battalion of thym. The members of the International Control Commission and the international observere, inoludingthe United States Military 4UtaohtI, aotially Witnes8sd the engagement taking plaoe, on Oambodian territory, between the forces of the Royal Government andthose of the Covernment of Saigon; 82, It was in order to put an end to aoousations that we were eheltering and supplying the Viet-Cong that Camboaia proposed a g8neral international oontrol of its frontiers, The Snuth-Viet-Namese proposal for a oommfssion of experts to delimit the Camtxxiian-Bouth Viet-Namese frontier 1s hardly aooeptable to the Royal Covernment of Cambodia, ainoe it would in faot mean oalling the frontier line in question, If by this expedient South Viet-Nam wlshes to oall thefrontier in question, Cambodia for its part would k oompelled to reolaim aertain Khmer territory whioh was wrongly awaredto South Viet-Nam by the Frenoh authorltlee at the time, 88, As for the South Viet-Namese propo8al for the forming of mixad patrols to oo-operate in joint euparvision of the frontier eone, we must point out once again that the aivil war in &uth Viet-Nam is an internal affair of that oountry, in whioh neutral Cambodia oan in no way militarily lntervene, Consequently Cambodia will oontlnue, as kforo, to prevent aooess to its territory by Vi&-Namese, whether they balong to the Qovernment or to the Vlet-Cong aide, If any proof is required, 1 need only dte the oa8e of a Soutb Viet- Nameee general who sought refuge in Cambodia and together with MS troopa, waa disarmed by the fOW38 of the Royal Cambocllan Army, Another cloquent example is that of Mr. Nguyen Tou Hoan, now Deputy Head of tbe Saigon Qovernment, who while fighting against the Dlem rflgime oame in vain to eolloit Cambodla’s a88i&moa, 84. Moroovor, it 10 with a V!OW to oonflr!xlng and strengthanlng our absolutc nautrality that Cambodln urgee ganeral suparvisîon of its frontlors and tarritory by the International Control CommIseion, whioh alon is onpable of eneuring offeotivo and p01mln011t Oontrol of the frontiar. f% The Commission 1s olroady thare, on tho opot; and, a8 the rapresentative of Prance rîghtly observed in Itie statemeat yesterday, the estabMunont of oom- Pletely new organs would inovitably be a “slow, diffldult and eostly bucdne8sW. 67, The representative of Sath Viet-Nam in& oated yestsrday that Cambodia was enoouraging the ol&~destine IntWhOt!oU ht0 South Viet-Nam Of ohemioal !JrOduots used in the manufaoiure of exploslves,~In‘this oaso also, the Royal Covernment most oategorioally gives the lie to these slanderous assertions, whioh are olearly intended to sow oonfusion in worldopinion with a view to justifying the repeated setbaoks suffered by the United Statss and South Viet-Namese forœs, 68. This polioy of systsmatio hostility towards Cambodia is nothinn new. It ha8 been praotised bu a11 suooessivs CoveGmentS at Saigon, As early asFebr%iary 1960. the Suith Vietnamese r&ime. then ruled with a rod if iron by Ngo Dinh Diem, bas uaught red-handsd in a oonspiraoy to overthrow the national r6gime of Cambodia, The Khmer General Dap Chhuon, a traitor ta Ns oountry, reosived direct aid from the Saigon Uovernment in the form of arm8 andvarious subsidies, to plot agaiest Cambodia’s polioy of neutrality. In the preeenœ of the diplomatio corps and all foreign observera resident at Phnom Penh, it was establishsd that there waa alose oollusion between Dap Chhuon and Ngo Trong Hieu, the rspresentative of the Republîo of Viet-Nam lu Cambodia, The mont overwhelming evidenœ was displayed, showing that General Dap Chhuon~s trdtorous plan against our oountry, our indepsndsnœ and our neutrality hadbeen hatohed abroad, Nga Trong Hieu, who held euoœsrive poots of rus p” nribility in hi8 oountry and whom the representativs o Viet-Nam here prerent muet havs known qults well, waa not the onIy Ilnk in the ohain. Two radio experts from Soutb Viet-Nam and a member of the Unibd States Embarry, Viotor Matsui, were alro unmarked in their anti-Khmer aotlvitiee. 60. Today this attitude of eystomatio hostility towards Cainlxxha, far from diminishing, bas been aggravatud to the point whore it bordero on hysterla. Wo now 800 Unitsd States politloians followlug in the footstepe of the Saigon autlïorities, openly reooinmendiry au extonsi011 of tho war to Catnbodia. Whother it Ix, Lr olootiouoering or othor purposoe, tho faot romains that Mr. Nixon, Mr. Coldwuter sud Mr. Itookefeller have boon quiok to proparo Unitod Statos opinion for a possible oxteuslon of tho oonfliot in South Viet-Nam TO, If the Unlted States oonslders ltself not ta be responslble for the frontler lnoidents, that view oannot be shared by the Khmer psople-espaolally those living near the frontlers, who all too often sec the South ViebNamese troops, etlffened wlth Unîted States offloers, oome to ravage their villages and maasaopB their familles, 71, The United States has hltherb admltted only one lnstanoe of lts partlolpatlon-in the attaokon Chantrea -and thls booause lt was oaught red-handed, It oontlnues to deny the presenoe of Unlted States fladvlsers” at the attaoks on Taey and Thlork, desplte the testlmony of a south Vlet-Namese prlsoner namedNguyenOuang Tung, a private aged twënty-four, reglstra%&numbe~ 101646, bslonging to the fourth detaohment of theflrst Armcured Rerriment, SP4OG6. of the Sc&h Viet-Namese Army, 1 muef add tlïat thls grlsoner was interroga6d by the members of the International Control Commlsslon In the presenoe of international observer&, lnoluding the MiIitary AttaohB from the Unlted States Embassy. 18. As a Member of the Unlted Nations, Cambodla 1s entltled to ask thie Organisation that the necessary oondttlons be oreated to enable Cambodla to live in mas, 78, First, the olearly proven aots of aggrsssion agalnst Cambodla muet be formally oondemned. 74. Seoondly, we ask that measures be taken, by those In positions of responslblllty, to ensure that slmllar aob oannot roour, 7G. Thlrdly, tha viotlms of the aots of aggresslon by tlle Unlted Statea and South Vlot-Namose foroas must be oompeneatod, although no ropnratlons oan ever restera llfe to our dead, oblltcrate our wounds or 81’088 the memory of thoso odlous orlmes, 70, Fourthly, Cainbodla urges that tho Seourlty Co~nail tako a doolsion suoh that the aeneva Conforenoo 1s reoonvenod at ths earllost opportunlty for the purpose of solvlng the general problem effeotlvoly and 79, Mr, FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Sooialist Renublioe) (translated from Russianl: The Soviet deloiation bo‘nsiders it neoessary to niake some remarks with respeot to the statements we have just heard, and partioularly to the speeoh by Mr. Stevenson, the Unlted States representative, 80, The Uidted States representative has onoe more indulged in myth-maklng, It should be noted that mythe sometimes suooeed in living on terms with faots, but not for very long, Faots, by their very nature and psyohology, rebel or revolt against myths, They rovolt, beoause an attempt fs made not to take them into aooount. They revolt and take vengeanoe on anyone who loses bis feeling for the realistio approaoh and does not wish to look reality, truth, in the faoe. 81. In the statement that he just made, the United Rates repreeentatîve showed displeasure at I’. 1 statements of the Minlsterfor Fore@ Affaira of Ca ‘-&ia, the representative of Franoe, the Soviet delegation, the Ceeohoslovak delegation and others who oonsider ft neoessary that an international oonferenoe shouldbe oalled with a view to guaranteeing the neutrality and sovereign inviolabllity of Cambodia, 82, Instead of aoknowledging guilt for the aggressive aotions taken by the United States armedforoes against Cambodia-a Member of the United Nations-and deolaring to the Seourity Counoil with dus responsibility and aourage that the United States Government, as beffts a great State, would take appropriate steps to prevent the reourrenoe of oriminal aots with respeot to violation of Cambodia’s sovereignty and territorial tntegrity, our United States oolleague has ueed every devioe to shield first himself and then bis Saigon PupPets. 83, Furthermore, the United Statcs rcpreaentativa, forgetting tt at this time bis oountry is not tha aooueer-ah havo alraudy pointed out-but lias been aoousna of tho moet gross and serioue vlolatîon of the United Nations Charter and ths Geneva Agrcement8, aseiuned tho role of a tutcr nncl looturscl the Government of Cambodia-a eovereign State-on whnt it should nnd should not do. what the Cambodian GOVernment needs for the defenOO M, Huot Sambath, qui sait of its State frontiers against agression and interque son gouvernement doit faire pour protgger ses frontibres vention in tho interna1 affaira of Cambodia, unequivooally stated his Qovernment’s position and addressed l’intervention a perfeotly plain apgeal to the Seourity Counoil, tion de son gouvernement et a adressg au Conseil de s6ouritO une demande extr6mement prOoise, 86, Wa understand the Cambodlan Government’s position in the following way. It asks that the reourring 88, Voioi oomment noua oomprenons la positiOn du nggressive aotions of the Unit& States-South Viet- Qouvernement cambodgien, Il s’agit de condamner les Namese fOrOOS against Cambodiab territOry and aotes dlagression r6pdt6s des troupos amdrioanooivilian population bs oondemned, It asks that the sud-vietnamiennes oontro le territoire responsibility of the United States Ciovernment and lation oivile du Cambodge, Il s’agit do of the Saigon r6gime for these aots be reoognieed, que la responsabilit6 de oes aotss inooml>e au aOu= vernement des Etats-Unis et au r&ime 81, In this oonnexion, it 1s obviously indioated that the aforemontioned Governments must be invited to 87, A oe propos, il oonvient d’inviter 088 gouvarpay oompensation on a just basis for the damage to nements h indemniser Equitablement les viotimes the viotims at Mong, Chantrea and Taey, and that those de Mong, responsiblo for these aggressive aotions must be rosablas de oes aotes agrossifs qu’ils prennent les quired to take steps to prevent any reourrenoe of mesures n63essairos pour emphoher violation of Cambadia’s sovsreignty and territorial violation de la souverainet integrity, Lastly, there should be support for the oonritoriale vening of the Ueneva Conferenoe on Indo-China, with nùnoer en faveur de la oonvooation de la Confbronoe a view to reoognising and guaranteeing Cambodials de aenbve neutrality and territorial integrfty in aooordance witb de garantir la neutralit6 et lYntOgrit6 territoriale the legitimato and olearly expressed desire of the Cambodge oonform6ment aux vœux ldgitimes et olai- Oambodian Government. rement 88, In view of the faot that the Unit& Statss repre- 88, sentative ha8 set forth at length his underetanding of the situation in the region of Cambadia and Soutb sentant des Etats-Unis nous a Viet-Nam, we venture to draw the attsntion of memtion au Cumbodge et au Viet-Nam du Sud, j’attirerai bsrs of the Seourity Counoil to a highly vital aspeot l’attention des membres un of the United States military intervention in South- East Asia, Etats-Unis dans l’Asie du Sud-Est, 89, We refer to those radioal and intempsrate bsllf- 0088 appeals, heard in reoent days in the United 80, States, for the expansion of the military aotivities liqueux qui ont Bt6 lano& oes Of the United Statss armed foroes in this regioa As Unie en vue dUtendre les op&ations militaires reoently as g4 May the notorious United States SOnator, rioaines dans oette r@ion, Le g4 mai enoore, le tristsment Mr, Goldwakr, who is seeking the Presidenoy of the United Statss, uttered a oannibalîetio oall for the du dgsir de devenlr 10 proohain PrBsident des Etatsuse of atomio weapons in the war whioh ie being wagsd Unis, a pr8oonis6 by ths Unikd States in Scurth Viet-Nam, This barbario de l’arme aPPsa1 by the leader of the so-oalled Qinatio fringefl Unis mbnent au Viet-Nam arouses in a11 peaoe-lovingpeoples ange& indignation, du meneur des ad6mentsn a provoqu6 la oolbre et and le SsOuri $ timate oonoern lest the interests of psaoe and l’indignation bs plaoed in ev8n graver danger, WO may slinquibtent B tdouritb lsgltlmakly ask how these oannibalfatio appsals, theae symPtOmS of atsmio madness, found today in the Unitsd menao&es, Comment peut-On oonoflier oes appels Statss, aooord with the Washington deolarations oonsanguinaires, oes signes de d6menoe atomique qui oerning tho doeire for pea,oe, tho maintonanoe of intorse manifsstent aujourd’hui aux Etats-Unis, aveo 10s national seourity, intorost in the lessening of t0nsion, d6olaratlons de Washington sur le ddslr de paix do and so forth. 08 pays, Sur 19tppUi qu’il apportcl h la s6ourit6 internationale, semblablas? 66, of OOWBO, there are people who will oontend that RQlator Uoldwater is a prlvate individual, a lona t)O, Il se trouvera Bvid0mment des gens pour affirmr ments, nnd thnt they nro not dangarous. We oannot oitoyen oomme les nutres, un0 voix isol60, Ot qu’il figure; chat no attention should b0 paid to suoh statene vaut gubro agrec. Tlreir danger and the vast lrarm that they do are obvious tu all. As the saying goes, only the blind blables d&olarations, yul no pr6sontent dtuillcurs are unafraid of snakos. Sonator aoldwabrls ennuoun danger. Il nous est impossible do partager OO point 91. We do not even mention the faot that oertain oiroles in the United States oherished plans for the &em’of atomio weapons on the IndoGhinèse peninsula as far baok as 1964-ten years ago, and approximately ten years after ths atomio nightmare of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Furthermore, as for instance 1s noted in Hanson Baldwin’s artiole publiahed in X&I New York Times of today, 26 May, the utilisation of atomio weapons in this region ahas long been under shdy in the Pentatzon~. In Baldwinls words, Senator aoldwatar simply nbrought some of these disousslons into the nolitioal forum”-brought them, that is, out of the bhase of seoret disouïX3ion inti the open-when he oame out withhisfrank, free-and-easy appeal. Baldwin continues! %uoh aotion has been advodated by some military men [in the UnIted States] as part of oontin@noy plans. ” ,9& In these oiroumstanoes, we oannot ignore thefaot that up ta now not one offioial representative of the United St&s Government ha8 denounoed the oannibalistio projeots publioly proolaimed by Senator Qoldwater, 1s tbis aooidental? The auswer to this question should, of oourse, hrrve been given preoisely gyoUn;LUnited States representative in the Seourity 93, Unfortunately, tbis has not happene& The Seourity Counoil bas heard no explanation from the United Statae repreeentative. And we ask, how should thts silence be interpreted-as 108s of the power of speeohbeoause of Lpdig$ion and oonosrnl or as seoret, taoit oonsent? 94, Inetead of appelle for the exeroise of oommon seme and raetraint in oonnexion witb the existing situas tien in South-East Ada, we hear today, from highranking rapresentatives of the Unit& States Qovernment, etatements of an entirely different nature, 96. It is noteworthy that, as recently as 22 May, Mr. Dean RUE~, the Seoretary of State of the United States of Amerioa, deolared that the United States oould Wpand the warw whioh it was now wagi Y in South- Eaet Aeia, Does not the question inevitab y arise as to whether Senator Goldwater’e luet for the :ise of atomio warcpona doea net refleot offioial Uaited States polioy in that region? 96, Sinoe the United Statee reprerentative fcund it potisible to dwell at suoh length, in hi8 statements, on United States polioy in thia regian, members of the Counoil would. it ueems. be entit!ed to exX+ot that he should nowoome fo&‘ard with explauati&a on SO important a question, raised by life itself, Without a olear und preoiso anawer 011 this matter, the Unîted States repreeentutive’s protestntions to the effeot that the United States is pursuing peamful aims in this renion becorne even less tanrtible. In faot, the dispatoh to-South Viet-Nam of United-States hordës numi%ring msny thousands and the aggressive aotione taken by the United Statss soldiery against Cambodia are of themselves at open variante with the stntements made by the United Statos dsiegatlon to the Seourity Counoll. B ropriato to depiot the fighters of the National Front or the Libsration of South Viet-Nam As persans who laoked the support of the psople, we venture on tbis matter to quote aome more statements made by Dwight D, Eisenhower. On page 368 of his memoirs we rsad the followingr The enemyn-that is how Eisenhower desoribes the Viet-Namese partisane-Qad muoh popular sympathy, and many oivilians aided them by provlding both shelter and information,n On page 878 of the memoire we have Eieenhowerls admission that, sinoe the partisans aotually oontrolled all lines of oommuniaationl aThis meant that the mass of the population supported the enemy,” Laetly, on P ages ind 397 and 888 of Dwight Eieenhowerls memolre we a fmk etatement t0 the effeot that it had been nerally oonoeded that, had a general eleotion bsen hout Viet-Nam at that Mme, the people’s bave triumphsd in the entire oountry, 101, With theee hi former Prseidtrnt o hïy authoritative mmarke from tha 4 the United Statee, it beoomes quite olear what exaotly the Gffioial United Stabs propaganda ie today trying ti twist-namely, the faot that Uuited Stateu intervention in S&h Viet-Nam wa# undertaken in order to prevent the ViebNamese people from expreosing lts Will through an elootion as prasoribed by tho 1064 Glonava Agreement, nnd that the National Front for le Libsration of South VietGiom, todny ooinbating the Unitad Stntes intorvantion, oontinues t0 oxprese the wlll of the South Viet-Nameee, 102. If our United St&38 oolleague Eitill wisbos to diepute ull this, ho should now enter into an argument wIth Le former Prosident of tho Unitod Stnto.?, And, 08 thoy sny in English, goocl luok to llm. Dut bofore If Uvlght 0. Il~e~rl~owot~,~Wl~ltoIlollso Ycarat Ma~titofor CIlan o 1953.1956 (Ourdan Çlty, Now York, Lbti%ïb,ysndComyany, ha., 19 iv ). 104, Senator Morse% oomments on the Geneva Asreemente also deserve to be noted. On a1 May of this year, he also said: HWe have no rights under the aeneva aooords, beoause the aooords thomselves forbid the sending in of additlonal milltury aid above the 1964 levels.. . We did net even sign the aooords, and we have been vlolating them ever sinoe. We bave started to send in our boys and bave spent a total of $6,600 million in aid to South Viet-Nam.” 106, Lastly, Ssnator Morse sounded a sober note on the question d oonvenlng a oonferenoe on Cambodial “The situation in Asia demands, in my judgment, th;tz;mo to the oonferenoe table, and the sooner Il I It would havebaen logioal to expeot a eimilar statement t~od:,B United Stetes representativee in the Ssourity 106. Allow me to say a few words more. We 8~8 that the abeurdities whioh were revealed at the Seourity Counoil table at our lad meeting, and to whioh the ._. Soviet delegation drew attention, havo to uomo extont been eliminatdd. It le not our intention now to dwell on the oharaoter of the r8glme whioh exists in South Viet-Nam. Howevor it may dosoriùc iteelf, its puppet nature le not ohanged. SO far as the Soviet Union’8 attitude to tlio Saigon rbgime is oonodrnecl, the Soviet poeition was olearly set forth in the statenrents made by the Soviet delagation in tho Counoil on 10 and 21 May, u sas utllttxl sut00 OI Amorlca, $hlgrsoelonal Ik?cord, mxocd. .--.-- 1ngr a1!4 rmlm of tha 00th Collgrosar kG%iüI sosslon, vol, 110, ,,pa 1122741232. 10~. I should llke now e0 draw the Counoil’s attention to another absurdity-namely, the manner in whioh in- &&&a18 from the Saigon r0gime are inoluded within the institution of Permanent Observers to the United Nations, We say nothin# of the faot that there is no legal baals for this institution, We know that nelther the United Nations Charter npr the baslo Saourity counoil doouments governing the work of the United Nations provide for such an institution, On what grounds, then, and with what justifioation does the Qlue bookn mention, side by side with the regularly aooredlted representatives of Stateo Members of the United Nations, a “Permanent Observer of Viet-Nam”? We know that the strings attaohedto the Saigon puppets, and employed t0 make them perform, lead straight into the State Department of the United States, We know that this entire matter is settled on the basis of the visa proosdure for sojourns in the oountry where the United Nations Headquarters are situated, The State Department, whioh is in oharge of visas, deoides, in keeping wlth its own lnterests, who should and who should not bs admittsd, whoma not be thés kind of Observer, Slnoe t K and who may e question of aooreditlng “Permanent Observers” 1s thus deoided by the State Department, would it not bs more logioal for these puppet personages to appar in their real oapaoity, attaohed to the State Department of the United States of Amerioa? 108, Mr, STEVENSON (Unlted States of Amerioa)t Evidently Mr. Fedorenko, spsaking on behalf of the Soviet Union, io not very famillar with the polltloal system that exists in thls free oountry, Briefly, let me inform you, Mr. Ambassador, that our Qovsrnment is divided lnto three branohes-the legislatfve, the exeoutlve and ths judioial, It 1s the legislatlvs branoh that makes the lawsl it 1s the exeoutlve branoh that exeoutes theml it is the judioial branoh that lnterprets them, Subjeot to the laws, the forelgn polloy of the Unîted States is made and exsouted by the exeoutive branoh, and not by Ssnator Ooldwater or any other Ssnator, 109, If 1 understood bis sometimes obsoure and generally offensive language, tho Soviet representatlve has asked me for a olear and unamblguous answer t0 the question whether the polioy of the United States in South-eaet Aela le “more psaos” or “more warw, 1 am “7 rai (Ilad h anawer hls question by repeating what 1 hsra in the Counofl the other day, and perhape tt would save us tlme hereaftsr if my oolleague from the Sovlot Unlon llstonod to what I sdd. Or, 1 wonder if perhaps that would 13poi1 tbo offoot of hls rhetorioal mythology, A wioo mari on00 snid ln this oountry tbat’ thora 1s notldng more horrlblo to wltnoeu dan the lnurdor of A boautlful myth by a borriblo fuot. 110. ‘I%ls le what I sald. 1 batlnotoxpaotod to hava to ropeat lt, but 1 woloomo tho ohnnoo. Bpoaking bore on 21 May, I said: “First, tba United Stat~u hao no, and 1 ropoat ‘no’, national military objootive anywhora in South-IGast ‘%eoondly, the United States Oovernment 1s ou+ rently involved in the aflairs of the Republio of Viet-Nam for one reason, and for one reason on1 beoause the Republio of Viet-Nam requested the he p 3( of the United States and other Uovurnments to defend itself against armed attaok fomented, equipped and direoted from outslde,” [lllOth meetin& paras, SS- SO*I 111, Now let me, with apologies to representativesfor dotaining them at this late hour, say somethingelse to the Seourity Counoll, The Soviet representative has, in the worst tradition of the cold war, whioh he has revived here, laid before us alle ations oonoerning military measures whioh the Uni ed a States might in the futura take in South-East Asia. l-le has notextilainedand we oan hardly be surprised that he hasnot-the military measures whioh tbe Hanoi rsgime, with the assistanœ of its powerful oommunist allies, has for many years been taldng inslde the territories of lts neighbours, Laos and the Republlo of Viet-Nam, 11% It is the outrageous, the persistent, military aotion of the Hanoi rtlgime whioh oonstitutes thelongstand@ threat to the peaœ of 8outh-East Asia and to the territorial integrity of the other nations of that region, That and that only is the oause of the war in ScmthGast Asla, Let the oommunist Powers œase thelr aggressions and it ~111 no longer be neœssary for the United States to help those nations preserve tbbgrtsindependenoe and maintain the Qeneva Agreee 119, Unlese and until they do oease their aggression the United Statoe will indeed, aa 1 assuredthe Counoil laet week, help by whatever means are neœesary the free nations of South-East Asia to remain free, 114, 1 trust the position of the United Statesie olear, and olear enough to satisfy the representative of the Soviet Union, 116, Mr, FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet SooialistRepublioo) (tranrlated from Rusrian)r It would seem that we rhauld ba grateful to our oolle fur e, Mr, Stevenson, for ht8 effort-and a rather th 88s one at that-in undertsking to desoribe to ue in simple form the in- ;;;ons of the interna1 politioal ayetem of the Unit& I Ils. Thero is a dapancse saying that suggosts itsolf here: “Women are onohanting at a distance, in the dark and undor a narasol,” If suoh a statomant had boen made in a olass-room to .sol~oolohildron, it might bave had some offoot. But this 1s not a sol1001 assembly, and we a~0 not beginners in politioe and international affairs, 117. Thon 0ur Unit& States oolleague, wlth a metallio note acldocl to hi6 voice, went on tohis favourlte theme 118, As regards the organisation of $osiety in various oountries, thls is a question whioh, as we hnow, is entirely wlthin the domestio jurisdiotion of Statss, and we do not intend to intrude into thls area, But whatsver the system-in thls partloular oase, in the Unitsd States-there is, ‘and oan be, no justifioation for the overt and publio propagation of atomio madness, That is the raving of profoundly slok people-a form of madness whioh must bs suppressed, as a orime against humanity, in asy healthy soolety. And it would hardly be fittlng for our Unlted States oolleague tsextend Ns proteotion to those who should bs plaosd in strait jashets and brought to their ssnses, IgO, It is regrettable that the United Statss reprssentatiw bas found oourags only td use disoourteous expressions, instead of olearly and unambiguously mahing an objeotive assessment of the aots of United states sggressioa lai, We venture to hope that our Unit& Statss Sollsague Will adopta duly thoughtful and serious approaoh towards what has bsen said here by manymembers of the Seourity Counoll-inoluding the representatives of tbe Soviet Union, Cseohoslovalda, France andhlorooso -and by the Ministsr for Foreign Affairs of Cambodiar tbat ha wlll take a duly realistio attitude, and Will glve us an answer on tbe substance of ths question, laa, F0110wing the proosdure already established, 1 think thnt we should not mirusa our Mme-tbe hour ia already lats-but should ctontent ourtxelvos with the osnseoutlve înbsrpretation into Frenoh only, laa, The PRESIDENT (translated from Frsnohlt There are no more speakers on mylistfor thls afternom Havlng oonsultèd my oolleagues, 1 thinh that ws oould mset aPain tomorrow at 10.30 a,mrl 1 earaedly hope that ft a11 bs porslble to olose the pneral dei bate at ths rnd of tomorrow mornhg and 1 thsrefore Urge tbst thooe of you who havs not yst asksd for ths floor and wish ts do so will state your aovertllllents’ views tomorrow morning, if possible. 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