S/PV.1124 Security Council

In aooordanos wlth deolslons taken previously on thls agenda item, 1 shall invite the representatlves of Camhodla and the Republlo of Viet-Nam to tske plaoes at the Çounoll table, 1. Le PRESIDENT: Conformement aux deolslons prises ant0rleurement au sujet de la question inscrite B notre ordre du jour, je vals inviter les reps+- sentnnts du Cambodge et de la RBpubllque du Vlet:Nam B prendre plaoe B la table du Conseil. Sur I’invitst1on du Prkfdent, 1M. Huot Sambath (CamWge) et M. Vu Van iMau (RRBptrbfique du VfeC Nam) prennent place $ Sa table du Conoeil. 2. M. VU VAN MAU (RBpubHque du Viet-Nam): Pendant q,ua tout le peuple et le Qouvernement de l’Inde font nujourdfhul leurs derniers adieux k leur grand leader, le pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, la de16gatlon de la Rgpubllque du Viet-Nam se fait un devoir de s’assooler aux hommages qui ont 8t6 pr6sentBs par le Conseil de s8ourit4 B oette noble figure qui honore la famille afro-asiatique. La delggatlon de la Rgpubllque du Vlet- Nam se reouellle religieusement en eomm8moration de ce grand hgros do la nntion indienne et de lthumamt~ tout ontibre, en oomm&norntlon de sa vie toute do lutte, dtabnt3gntion, cio sacrifice, et qui constitue pour tous un symbole du triomphe finnl de l’esprit sur In matibre, de In non-violence (~nhlmsa~) QUI’ In force brutale, de la liberte, de In justice, do In cl6mocrntio et de la paix. 3. La d810gntion de :a Republique du Viet-Nam ae plaît h constater que le Min!&e clos affaires Btrnngeres du Cambodge, M. Huot Snmbath, a fait amende honorable en rgpnrnnt l’orrour de l~nppellatlot~ qu’il avait utllis&3 le 25 mal pour dbsigner mon pnys. Copendant, si, au debut de son dernier discours, il n amploy6 correctement l’expression W6publiquc du Viet-Nnm”, il n’on reste pas moins qu’nu cours cle sa db’clarntion l’expression “gouvernement de SnigonW continue dlbmniller ses propos. Jo me pürmots toute- At the invitation of the President, Mr. HuotSambeth (Cambodia) and kfr. Vu Vaa Mau (Republio of Vfet- Mm) Cook plaoes at the Counoil table. 2, Mr. VU VAN MAW (Republfo of Viet-Nam) (translated from Frenoh): At tbls tirne* when the entlre people of Indla snd lts Oovernment sre saying thelr 1aSt farewells to thelr grsat leader, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the clelegatlon of the Repubilo of Viet-Nam feels Pound e0 joln ln the tribute pald by the Seourlty Counoll to that noble atateeman who does honour to the Afrlosn-Asfan famlly of nations, The delegatlon of the Republlo of Viet-Nam pauses reverently in commemoratlon of that greut horo of tha h~tllnn nation nnd of a11 mankind, in commemorntlon of hls whole lifo of struggla, self-nbnegntion nnd snoriflce, whioh is n symbol for a11 of us of the ultimate trfumph of mind over mntter, of non-violence Qhlmsnn over brute force, the trlumph of froetlam, justice, domocrncy nnd ponoe. 3. The deiegntlon of the Republlc of Viet-Nam is plonsad to nota that Mr. Huot- Samba& ths Cnmlaochan Mlnister for Fore@ Affaire, lins duly mnde amen& by oorraotlng tho errer ho hnd mndo on 2.5 Mny m reforrlng to my oountry. However, nlthough he Oorrwtly uued thu exprossi~~~ ~R~publlo 01 Vlet-NamR at tbe beginning of bis lnst atntemont, ha continues to steak nbout tho Walgun C;ovarnmantW. 1 would novortboless hope thut 1 shali not have to revert to thl0 question of langunge. 1 ---- PrSsfdent: M. Roger SEYDOUX (Franoe). Adoption de l’ordre du tour ~‘otdre du jour est adopté. Plainte pour agrasslons contre le territoire et la population civile du Cambcdgs (S/‘5697) 6. At this advanoed stage of the disou8sion, I do not wfsh to take up the Counoil%i time with sterile polemios. May I therefore request the Counoil, in oonnexion with the frantier incidente it ie disoussing, to refer whenever neoeesary to thle objeotive dooumentatien. 8, In order to demonstrate to the Çounoil the biaeed nature of the oherges made by the representative of Cambodia, I shall merely oite by way of flluetration a few teohnioal faote whioh totally invalidate the allegations of the Çambodian delegation regarding our L-ID observation airoraft, ehot down by Cambodianfighters on 19 Maroh 1984, 7. In the firet plaae@ the downed airoraft had never led in the bombing of Çhantrea, ae the Gambodian repreeentative alle@s. Tho bomblng tOok plaoe at 8.30 a.m. and the T-28 fighter planes shot down our L-18 plane the same day at 11.68 a.m,,or 3 heurs and 28 minutes later, Sinoethe L-l& oanremain aloft without refuelling for Only four hOurs( it oan remain for only three houre at moet in the eone of oprations beoause it needs at least an heur to go to Chantrea from the neareet landing etrip this side of the Cambodian-Viet-Nameee frontier, and baok. Consequently, if there had aotually bsen an L-19 observation airoraft leading the bombing of Chantrea, it would never have been ehOt down by the Cambodian fighter foroe. 3. Moreover, it le untrue to say that the pllot of the L-1$ observation airoraft euooeededin bringinglt baok to Viet-Namese territory after being attaoked by thhe fightere in Cambodian air epaoe over Chantrea. Aotually, the Viet-Nameee observer of the L-I9 was Wlled instantly where he sacs while the pibt, who was oritioally wounded, died five days later. a. Furth0rmore, NI oxnmination of tt1e Wl’5OfCll(.$e of the airoraft mndo on 21 Maroh 1964 by a numbor of military attaol& and nswspnper oorraspondents nt thc soana of tha orash revanled thnt tho motor, riddled witb 12.7 mm. buliats, must linva stoppeci worlcing ns ~0011 as the ~1~10 vfm3 hlt by fire froln the CaInbOdiaII figliter. This 1s berne out irrefulnbly by the pliotogrnphs taken by the internntlonnl Press nnd me milltary nttaoh& OI: the 8;Fot. Thom photogrnphs hnve been rcgrorluoed in the momorandum ta wbioh I bave 1% ferrod. Consequently ) bhe niroraft ) quite npart from the condition of itfl crewI hnving beon tit nt n hcight of no more thnn 1W feet, wouldhnve crnshecl in the imn~oclintc viciaity of thc spotwhero itwns nttackod, projooted 19. Having said that, ws should like to spendour time in more oonstruotive efforts, AS I havs pointsd out in the counoil, ail we rire asking ii3 asystem of effestive international oontrol to prevent the orimes for whioh ws havs been unjustly blamed and whioh ars being nommitted by the communiste. Por our pP.rt, we ars prepared tu submit ~Rsoifis propos~ls if neosssary or to oonsider seriously any Oonstruative prol~~al irrespective of its souroe. 10. Cela dit8 nous voulons oonsaorer notre temps B un travail plus oonstruotif. II mIa 6t6 donn0 de souligner devant le Conseil que nous ns demandons rien d’autrs qu%n syst&me de contr8le intt+rnational effioaoe paur pr0vsnir les orlmss qu’on nous afaussement attribu&s et qui sont plut& Qommis par lss @ammunistss, Nous sommea prbtS, pour notre part, a soumettre des prxmositions oonOrMes, si besoin est, ou B oonsid6rer 80rieusament touts proposition cunstruotivee, d’oh qu%lle vionne. 11, The various statsments we bave hsard in the geourity Q~~oil indioats that opinion bas orystallieed around two passible solutions: the aonvening of another Qeneva oonferenoe to broaden the funotions of the International Control Commission, and tha establishment of an international poliOe fome under Unit& Nations auspioss. 11. Dec diverses interventions que nous avons enbndues au sein du Conseil de e6ourit6, il ressort que les id6es se sont polari&es autour de deux formules possibles. D’une part, la oonvooation d’une nouvelle ocnf6rencs de Qenbve pour 6largir les attributions de la Commission internationale de survsillanae et de oontrble; de Ilautre, la oonetitution d’un oorps de polioe international sous les auspioes des Nations mies. 12. With regard tu ths advisability of oonvening another Qeneva oonfersnoe, though our hopss were blighted by the bittsr experienoe of the Agrwments signed at the lQ64aand 1999~Conferenoe13, there is no more authoritativs opinion of the Unitsd Kingdom as Cc-Chairman of the Confsrenoe,thanthat sxpressed by Sir Yatriok Dsam 12. En 06 qui canaerne l~opp&unit8 de cornaquer une nouvelle ootirenoe de Qenbve, mal@% nos dbboires et l~exp6risnoe ambre que nous avons faits B la suits des aocords aonolus aux conf0renOss de 19642/ et de 19992f8 il n’y a pas d’avis plus autoris que celui exprim6 par la voix de sir Patrick D~an, puisque le Qouvsrnement britanniqus assure les fonotions de copr8sident de la ConfBrenoe: =Dans 08s <Ponditiona, il ne servirait manifestement R rien que mon gouvsrnement s~a5sooie BItenvol dlinvitations en vue d’une oonf6rsnce puiequs ces invitations, nous avons tout lieu de le ordre8 seraient dBolin4ss par plusiëurs des gouvernements avso lesquels le Cambodge a des dif%ultBs et aveo leequels la wnf&enoe aurait pr6ois6ment paur objet d%rivsr B un aooOrd,N [11918me sBanoe, par. 94.1 RIri these oiroumstanoes it would olearly serve no ussful purpuse for my Qovsrnment to join in issuing invitations to a oonforenoe wbioh would, as ws bave reaeon e0 believe, bs dealined by several of thoao Qovernmente with whioh Camhiia kas dlffersnaes snd with whioh it would be the purpose of suoh a oonfsrenoe to reash agreement.” [llalst meeting, para. 84,] And furthsr on: Sir Patrick Dean dit snooro: N ‘, 11. I should liks in addition to refertothe representative of t%mbocUa~e auggesticn that theIntsrnational Çontrol Gammission should exeiwiss odsgree of oontr01 over the border. n . . . SO voudrais en outrs r6pondre R la suggastion faits par le repr8rentant du Cambodge relative 8 ltexsroio8 d’un osrtain oontrble de 12 fronti&rs par la Commission internationale de SontMe, “In my dologation’a opinion, thsIntornutlona1 Control Commissions in Cambodia and Vist-Nnm are alraady suffioiontly oooupiod by tha tnsks aasigned ta thom by the QonovnAgrcemontsof P954,wbioh did not foresae tha present need for spscial msa6ure6 to prevent inoidents on the border betwaen Cambochn and the Republio of Viet-Nam.” [m., para. 95-M.] “De llavis do mn dblbgntion, les commissions internationalos de oontrble nu Cambodge St au Viet-Nam sont d6ja suffianmment oocup6as par los taches que leur ont oonfi&e las noaorda do GanLw~ do 1954, qui no pr8voynient pas la n&~~~aitb aotuallo de mssuros sp6oînlas pour ompQohar des inoidonts a lu fronti8i.e khm8ro-urlottlnmien~~s.a [I-td., par. 95 et 96.1 13. That viow oonstitutos tht, most deoisiva and authorltntivo rofutation of the Frenoh dolegationP3 argumant in faveur of tbo Intornntionnl Control Catnmiasion; anart from tho diffioulties mentionod, thnt nrgumant dlsrogards thu built-in parnlysîs whioh stoms from 13. @ot AVfa OOIIStihIo In r6fututfon In plus p& remptoire et la pluo autoris& de l~oplnion oxprimbo pnr la d616gntion française an fnvsur do la Commission internationalo de contr0lo, dont alla a pnssb sous .c~ilonce, Sn dehorS des cliffioult& prbddentos, 10 tico -~ 2/ Conlï?renco de Gandvo II”~’ le I~robldn~cdur8mbIl.son1ooIdo la @x on indochlnc. rkde du 10 Juin PU 21 Juillet 1954. IO, I shculd like to brcach a more sericus prcblem, The USSR representative expressad surprise that the Rapublîc of Viet-Nam should have R Permanent Observer at the United Nations, as if he had suddenly discovsred the mocn. I feel ccmpeied to infarm Nm that the Republio of Viet-Nam is also R member of a11 the Unitad Nations speoialieed agencies and even serves on the goveriiing bodies of several of thom. I likewise feel Pound to remind bim that time and time again the Qeneral Assembly and the Security Çouncil vcted on the question of admiasicn of the Republic of Viet-Nam to membership in the United Nations; only the veto of the &viet Union, which on a number of cccasions was the cnly negative vote in the Council, has blocked our admission to this great world crganieation. Wculd Mr, Fedorenko be willin& kfcre this Çouncil,to make ta solemn pledge never again to use the veto on the question of admission oi the Republic of Viet-Nam tc the United Nations? If the USSR representative daree 00 acceat that ohallenne, the Republic of Viet-Nam, at the eariieet opportuni~y~ wlll sübmit its application for admission to the United Nations and the USSR repreeentatfve will then bave R better ides of the oaneidëred opinion of the entire world aommunity with regard to the Republic of Viet-Nam. If the repreeentative of ehe Soviet Union fs not afraid tc face veality, 1 urgtt him ti accept my challenge withthe guodfaith and sportsmrtnship which befit a great nation. 16. The USSR rearesentative bas dwe& at len&h on the war whichis n&w takingplace in Viet-Nam. I &culd like to clarffy the issue. The pecple of the Republtc of Viet-Nam,- who have no othcr ambition than io live in peaoe and to devote ail their efforts to eoonomic and social davelopmont t hnve andured tbis wa.r for mony years in their own territory. If thay ai-e defending themselves heroicnlly, it is because they are determinet1 to live ns free men and not as slaves. In expressing ths impnrtinl opinion of t.he UFitecl Kingdem ns Ca-Chuirman of the Genevn Conference, no one cari spenlc with more authority thnn Sir Patrick Dean: *On the fnot of this aggrcssicn directed from abroad, my Govornment. is in no doubt whatsoevor. It in amply attestcd by sources rangingfrom thcobeervation of our own representativus to the reprts of the International Control CommIasion.n [~.,pnrn. 9Q.) 17. MI-. P’cdorenko, repreuentlng as he does the other Co-Chulrnitui of thc Gerievn Confcrence, cnnnot be “Mon gouvernement n’&prnuve aucun doute quflnt B lu r6nlit6 de cette ngression dirig6e de l’ext6riour; elle est amplement &ablfe par des sources divOrso% qui vont dos observations de ~OR propres reprbsontnnts jusqu’aux rapports de la Commission internationale de; contrBle.” [m., pnr. 90.1 17. M. Fedownlro, repr6sentant l’autre copr6e:dent de la Conf6renco de GP)nbve, ne doit pas non plus 18, Thia twofold &allen@ whioh we formally issue bofora the Seourity Çounoil also oonoerrrs otheroountriee in the great Afrioau-Asian ’ .miiy of nations. The delegation vf the Republia of Viet-Nam and no doubt the developing nations of Afrioa and Asia are impatiently, indeed feverishly, awaitlng the Soviet reply whiohwill provide a touohstone of the Communist bloo’s goodwill and sinoerity in their regard. 19, Haviug laid ta rest the vain hope of finding a salutien to our problem in another Qeueva oonferenoe, let us now examine the second formula. My delegation believes that, in order to have a really effeotive system of border oont~~l between Camb&ia and Viet-Nam, thus eliminatiug the rOot oause of friotion and assuring Cambodian neutrality, the best solution would be the establishment of an international polioe foroe. I should like to make it olear at onoe that the international polioe forüe we have in mindwould have neither exaotly the same role nor the same magnitude as the police foroes now in Qaza or in the Congo. The only thing these foroes would have in oommon-and 1 emphasize this basio poiunt-would be the task of keeping peaoe oonferred on them by the United Nations. Moreover, this international police foroel operating along the border between Cambodia and Viet-Nam, would not have to fight anyone, exoept of oourse in the oase of self-defeuoe. Its pollohg funoUon would be merely to keep watoh over the frontier andtake note of any violations of Chat frontier from any quarter, be they on the part of Viet-Cong Communists. Viet-Nameseor Cambodians. If a froiïtier inoident arose, the international polioe foroe would be empowered to make an investiaation and determine who *as responeible or the exfent of the responsibility of eaoh of the parties involved. 19. AprBs avoir fait ressortir oombien 11 e& illusoire de oheroher dans la oonvooation d%me nouvelle oonfarenoe de QenBve le rem8de au problbme qui nous pr&oooupe, examinons maintenant la seoonde formule. Pour oontr8ler d’une façon r0eSlement efficace la ligne de frontibre entre le Cambodge et le Viet-Nam, et par 18 môme supprimer B leur source les oauses de friotion entre les deux pays en garantissant en m&me temps la neutralita du Cambodge, la d618gatfon de la RBpublique du Viet-Nam estime que l%tabliesement d’une foroe de police internationale serait la for nule la plus indiquee. Je voudrais imm&iabment prbofser que oette foroe de polioe internationale, dans notre oonoeption, n’aura ni exactement le m&ne rble ni les marnes propc,rtions que les foroes du marne nom en aotivit6 B Qaea ou au Congo. Le seul trait commun entre oes forces - et otest IQ le point essentiel sur lequel je me permets d’attirer votre attention, - ofest la mission de paix dont les Nations Unies voudraient bien leur oonfier la responsabiîît6. En revanohe, oetee foroe de polioe internationale k Etablir le long de la frantibre khm&ro-vietnamienne n’aura pas k se battre oontre qui que oe soit, exoept6 bien entendu en oas de l$gitime d6fense. Son r81e de police sera seulement de surveiller la frontibre et de aonstater les violations de o&.te frontibre d’oh qu’elles viennent, que aea violations soient oommises nar les communistes viotcongs, les Vietnamiens ou les Cambodgiens, Si un inoident de fronti8re survieut, laforoo de police internationale sera comp&anta pour enqu&er et d&ermincr quels sont les responsables au ia part de responaabilit6 qui incombe A ohaoune des parties intbress6as. 20. Mor~ave~‘, and above ~111, the role aitltisintcrnatlanal poliac farce would be preveniiva. As regards invnluntury violations of the Cambdian frontier by Viat-Namasc eoldiers in pursuit of Communiata, the international polioe force, by fts varyprcsencc,wauld be abla to stop ouch incideots Lefore thay oocurred. In such circumstanoes I tho internntional police force wwld order the Viet-Nameso soltiiors la hnlt. at tho frontler and would natify the Cambodian authorities of the illegal presence of Vi&-Cong traops in their territory. The Royal Camhdian Govcrnmont would 20. M~is sette force de poli& internationale aura aussi et avant tout un r&le preventif. En ce qui concerne 11hypotb8sa de violations involontaires de la frontibre cambodgien~le par les soldats vietnamiens dans la poursuite des communistes, la force de police intarnationale, par sa pr6senco marne, pourra Bvitar la naissance de CQS inoidants. En effet, en de pnreillas circonstances, la force de police internationale, d’une part, notifiera aux soldats vlotnumiens de s’arr&er R la fronti8re et, d’autre part, signalera auxautorit& cambodgiennes la pr6sence ill0gals des Viatcongs sur a2. In oase the Viet-Namese Qovernment had reason to belleve, either from reports of Viet-Cong prisoners or from othar souraes of information, that Vi&-Gong supply bases or military installations had been set up in Cambodlan territory, the international polioe foroe would be empowered to make an on-the-spot investigation in order to olear up any possible misunderstanding. 23. The omation of suoh an international surveillanoe sysfsm under the auspioee of the UnitedNations would make it possible ta eliminate the oauses of friotion between Cambdia and Viet-Nam at their very source, and lay a solld groundwork for the development of oordial relations between the two oountries. Moreover, the system of an international plioe force would be oapable of guuaranteeing Gambodia its territorial integrity, its independenoe, and its neutrality muoh more definitely and effeotively tu1 would any international oonferenoe or agreement. 24. An international polioe force thus oonstituted oould, it would seem, make a great oontributionto the establishment of international peaoe and seourity in Soutb-East Asia. The supreme imprtanoe of tbis nieasure oertainl~ oannot esoape the members of the Counoil. The means neoessary to attain suoh a farreaohing objeotive are muoh more modest thon one might tbink at first, It is true that the boundary-line between Viet-Nam andCam&iiaextends for a distanoe of about 1,000 kilometzes, but sinoe, in thesystem we bave outlined, the role of theinternationalpolioeforoe is not to fight but to wateh sndobserve, we believe that a total foroe on the order of 1,600 would be suffioient, Chat number to inolude offioers, soldiers and supply servioes. 26. Tbo methods and means used will naturally be as flexible as wssible. The internationalpolioe force will be able to operate in both mobile and stationnry units. Xt will be able ta oononntrate on oertnin sore spots or spread out along the border, ns need be. At any rate, it should be equipped with rapid means of transwrtation, including halioopters, jeeps, and launches for patrolling on water. 26. In brief, the role whioh we envisage for tbis international polioe force will not differ substantlally from tbat of the International Co&ol Commission in Indo-China, exoept thnt a11 the weaknesses of tha International Contra1 Commission will havo been aliminated. Far from being pnralysed in ita aotlvities by tbo flnw inherent in the ?roika” system and the prooedural rule of unanimity, it will havo groater freodom of action; nbovo ail, itwillenjoy the immense 26. Les m6thodes et les moyens utilfs6s serontnaturellement des plus souples et des plus flexibles. La foroe de police internntionale pourra opbrar h In fois en Equipas mobiles et en bqnipes fixes. Elle pourra 90 concentrer sur certains points n8vralglques ou s’&aler la long de lafronti&re au besoin. Elle devra posseder, en tout oas, des moyens rapides de locomotion, y compris des h&icoptBres, des jeeps et des vedettes pour ex6outer des ps.trouilles sur aau. 26. l3n bref, le rOle que noua ezmcevons pour cet@ force de police internationale ne sera pas substnntiellement different de celui de la Commission internationale de contrala en Indochine, mais cctle fore@ sera ~>ur@?e de toutes !QS faiblesses qui affectent la Commission intornntîonale d3 contrale. Loind%tre puralys6e dans son action par le vlco orfginal de la WoikaW et de la rbglo procbdurala de l%n~animitS, ells disposc?ra de moyens d’action pluo etendus et surtout 28, Viet-Nam has every reascn to believe that the Royal Qcvernment of Cambodia will look with favour upon the establishment cf suoh an international poliae fcroe# oalled upcn to maintain the peaoe, safeguard Cambodian neutrality and eliminate the oauses of friction between our two oountries; for it would be surprising at the least, if, having plaosd its oomplaint befcre the Seourity Counoil, the Royal Qovernment of Cambodia were little inolined to aooept a solution set up under the auspioes of the United Nations and preferred instead the merely theoretiaal if not illusory proteotian whioh would reeult from a third Qeneva oonfereaae, espeoially after the disappointments of the Qeneva Conferenoes in 1964 and 1962. XI. Mr. USHER (Ivory Gcast) (translated from Frenoh) : The Seourity Ccunoil has been asked, in dooument S/SSS7, aof 13 May 1964 to oonsider the inoidents that took plaoe on 7 and 8 May at Taey and at Tblcrk, For the purposes of cur debate, therefore, ail we have before us is the memorsndum aooompanyingthat dcoument and the statements by the parties ta the dispute. These various statements, and espeoially tkose by the parties direotly oonoerned, have limited tke problem before us to the inoidents themselves, and in the interest of effioienoy we ought to oonfine OUrselVeS to this approaoh. 36. It is a veryrarethingin thehietory of tke Counoil fer pldntiffs and defendants to agree on the existence of the subjeot of the d.isputee or@ more exaofly, on the eXPlaWion of it, In the present oase B on the other hand, as is evident frcm the varicus stntamotits thut huve bQen mnda, ths actunl facts of the matter are net in disputa, Cambodia bas undoubtedly been ths victim of theS0 incidents, whloh bave umortunately led to the las8 of hummi lifa. 30, De m8moire du Conseil, bien rares sont les oooasiens oti plaignants et aoous6s sont tomb& d’aooord pour reoonnaftre l’exietenoe des faits qui font l’objet de la plainte ou* plus exaotement, pour en donner une explicnttct~, Au cctitraire, dans la oas pr6sent ot ainsi qu’il ressort de ltnnalysO des cliff6rent.s discours, la mnt6rialitb des faits ne prQte pas il contastation. Le Cambodge a bel et bian bt6 victime de 00s incidents, qui, malheureusement, ont entrnfn8 des pertes de vies humnines. 31, Bion s6r, ltint0rpr6taticn da ces inoidents qunnt h elle, cb6issnnt h une certaine logique de subjeotivlt6, laissa apparaftre plus CU moins de diff6renoe. Quoi qu’il an soit, les un6 et les autres, publiqu0mont, ont oxprim6 soit leur regret, soit leur non-pnrticipnticn, 31. Of o~ursc, tho interprotutions of these incidents vary sc lewhat in ncoordanoc with a cortnin subjective lcgic, Hcwever that may bc, bcth sidos hnve publicly 0ither oxpressed their regret or denied their participation nnd it is admittod in a11 the nrgumonts tiot only that those events ocourred but that they hnve been repented. ot tous le8 nrguments ccncouront h reconnnitre ~IOIX seulement l’cxistance da ces faits mais leur r&&- tition. -~ .Y VOk txxxnlallte afftclete du Conso dB dfcur1co, dla-llotiul~,“e $l&Ia, Supplorrlorlt cl’wrll, mn1 ot Jldr1 1%. -- 34. For some people, the faot that Vi&-Gong foroes find a refuge in Cambodiah territory means that others bave a right to pursue them evenbeyondthe frontiers, whioh, moreover, in ths absence of any physioal barrier, may easily 1~ orossed inadvertently. Against these two argumente, whioh tend to minimiss the gravity of the military aot reported to the Counoil or even to justify it, there is the position of those who believe that the military attaoks that have been made against Çambodian territory in the past and are still being repeated have been launohed deliberately beoause of a refusa1 to aooept and guarantee Çambodia’s neutrality. BE. Neither the refusa1 to reoogniee Ganabodia’s politioal status nor the desire to oapture rebels justfies the violation of the frontiers of an internationally raoogniaed State. 36, 1 repeat that Gambodia, like all other Members of the United Nations, is independent and sovereign. We are a11 in dutybound,underthe@harter, to respeot itu lntegrity and eovereignty, 37, I also wish to stress tbat the right of one State to pursue in the terrltory of another is untenable. It is fortunate that no one has explioitly invoked it as a fustifioation for the inoidents we me disoussing, 33. An international oommiseion to oontrol the frontier would be neoessary if infiltration by the Viet-Gong wa5 a faotor justifym military intervention on Cambodian soil. If suoh in! iltration was reoognieed to have ooourred, my oountry would oertainly Join others in appealing to Ca:- adia to preven.t its territory from seing used as a base for attaoks agsinst a neighbouring oountry. Furthermore, the role of a United Nations oommiesion of that kind would bave to k either one of survsillan~e I and in that oase its dynamio oharaoter might involve the United Nations prematurely in the war in Viet-Nam, 0r one of observation, and then the Unitad NAtiO1llT, the guardian of Reaoe, would be A Epectatm Aoqukuaohg in A %VAL’ wngud beforo its oyes WbiOh it WA8 ~OWCJ~h3SS t0 ilA&. 30. Thero remains thc anse of enby lnto Cambodian territory by mistake, Rere the Cou11oi1 should,Rending A permanent solution, ask the parties to axeroise modoration in their relations and requast thoae oon- Ommi to tAke e~0l’y pI%QAutbn iU tho future t0 AVOid ancroaohlng on Cambociian territory. 40. In titis connexion, my delegation is oanvinaad that the parties oan overcome any cliffioultias thora may be, Speaklng alx2mut thls problem, the reproaantativo of the Repu!~& of Vlot-Nam axplainad that bis oountry’s troope only enter Cürnl&Ian territory inudvartently, 33. DB6 lors, une oommission internationale de surveiilanoe de la frontibre s’imposerait si l%ffltration des Vietoongs Btait un 018ment justifiant une intervention militaire sur le sol oamb&gien, Si une telle infiltration Btait reoonnue, mon pays se joindrait certainement B d’autres pour lanoer un appel au Cambodge pour qu’il veille B oe que son sol ne serve pas de base d’attaques oontre un territoire voisin, Bien plus, une telle oommiesion des Nations Unies aurait ou bien B jouer un rble de surveillance, et dans ae aas son oaraotbre dynamique risquerait d’impliquer prbmahlr&nont les Nations Unies dans la guerre du Vi&NAm, ou bien A jouer un rBle d’observatouri et alors les Nations Unies, gardiennes de la ynix, assisteraient, oomme si elles êtaient complices, A une guerre dont elles ne pourraient ordonner l’arr&. 30, Reste dono le cas de la p6nbtration en territoire oambodgien par inadvertance. Ici le Conseil devra& en attendant une solution d0finitiva, demander aux partiea d’user do moderation dans leurs relations et aux fnt0resses de prendre toutea les mesurés ponr bvlter A l’avenir de pen6trer sur le territoire oambodgien. 40. MA d018gation pense A ce sujet que les pnrtias peuvent sane aucun doute surmonter les dlfficultea a’11 8’6n trouvait, En effet, parlant de ce problbme, le roprb6ontant de la RBpublique du Viet-Nam a expllque que lea troupes de 8011 pays na pk3nbtrant on 44. But 8s f&r as this p&WioUlar problem le oonoerned, bearing in mind the tragio atrcoitiee oommitted in oertain other oountriee in South-East Asia QS a result of ideologioal struggles and regrouping nehind one side or another, my delegation thinks that it would bediffioult not to oomply with Cambodia’s request if, despite a11 the soeptioism there may be on this subjeot, international reoognition of its status as a neutral State 0~ give Camtxxiia the safeguads it seeks, an endeavour in whioh we support it, beoause, in point nf faot, its politioal nonoonformity has given it aoerkin stability, whose value should be reoognieed. 46. Gambodia bas a stable governmenta it is politioally tranquil; and there is no reason to expeot that the oonfueed situation whioh exlsted in other oountries rit the time when they were gusrnntsed neutrality by the Qeneva Conferenoa wculd reour before @ambodia% wishes were granted. 4G. A oloser loolc at this request reveals thnt it is relatod to ths inoid6nt.s we are disoussing and mny, together with demaroation of the frontiors, offer the mOst permanent solution. Those reslonsible, direotly or indireotly, for the incidents ure nll members of the Qenevn Conferenoe. If, thereforo, they undertoclc to rospeot the sovereignty, nautrality and lntcgrity of Cnmbcdin, thora is cvory rcnson tc boliove thnt sucb lnoidente would ba avoided. 47. Dut unfortunntoly the Counoil onnnot 001ivmm or requast the convocation of n bcdy thnt 1s net subcrdl- Unta tc it. Itonn oaly,h tho intorosts of penoo, express tbo hcpe that the members of the Genevn Conferexme will talcc Cnmbodlnts wlahus intooonsidorntion, orpay serious regard to its legitimate wisl~os. 41. Peutdtre aussi que le Conseil pourrait cr8er ou autoriser le SeorBtaire g0nBral A oonstituer, A la demande dos parties, une commission qui leur pr& terait ses bons offioes pour matirialiser les frcn- MAres si elles en avaient besoin et qui pourrait avoir une mission dbtermin8e et de oourte dur0e. 42. Le Cambcdge, par le biais de oette plainte, pose une question de fond en demurdant que In Conf&+enoe de QenAve se r$uniese pour garantir sa neutralit6 et son intI3grP.l territoriale. 43. Il pourrait sembler, A premibre vuo, que oette demande n’a pas de rapport aveo la question dont noue sommes saisis. Qui plus est, des objeotions nssee e8rieuses tir0es des pr8o8dents lui sont oppos8es. Cependant, quand on songe que la neutralit6 dont on Bvoque le prso$dent otait, dans l’esprit de oerhins, le dernier rem&de pour sauver un r6gime oroulant et que, dans l’esprit des autres, oe nWnit que pour donner A oolui-ci le OOUP de nrboe. dans la aui&ude et lYmpunit6, le moins que 1Gn puisse dire-est que o%tait la Qeutralitb de la oonfueionn. 44. Mals, abordant 08 problbme partioulier et nyant en m$moire le th&itre des atrooit88 commisse dans certains II~YS de 08 m$me Sud-Est asiatique au titre des luttes idgologiques et du regroupement derribre tel ou tel camp. ma d61fkation pense qu’il est diffioile de ne pas faire droit A-la demande du Cambodge si, grAoe A la reoonnaiesanoe internationale de son statut d%tat neutre, le Cnmhodge peut obtenir - malgr6 tout le soeptloisme que oela peut soulever - les garanties qulil reoherohe; nous le soutenons dans oette voie paroe que, pr0ois8ment, ltoriginalit8 politique de oe pays lui a oonf0r0 une oertaine stabilit8 A laquelle il oonvient sans doute de rendre hommage, 46. Le Cambodge, en effet, jouit d’un gouvernement solide, d’une situation politique sereine, et il ne faut pas attendre que 1s situation oonfuse qui 8 r&& dans d’autres pqs au moment OA la Conf0renos de UenBve accordait la neutralitb A oee pays se reproduise avant de faire droit aux vcoux du Cambodge. 46. Si l’on cxnminc la domanda du Cambodge de plus prAs, on s’npercoit qu’elle a des rapports nveo les incidents dont IIOUS sommes saisis et quWle peut constituer, aveo le trno6 des frontibres, 10 solution la plus permanente, En effet, si les auteurs proolies ou 61oignGs da 06s incidents, Qtnnt tous membres de la ConfBranoe de Genbve, prenaient l%ngngemont de respooter la scuverainetb, lu neulrulitb et lW& grit6 du Cambodge, on a tout lieu de croire que oes inoidents seraient 6vltfl,. 47. Mnis, hblns! 11 est exact que le Conseil ne peut pns oonvoquer ou demander In convacation d%m Orgnne qui ne d6pencl pas de lui, Il no peut, dans 1YntBrQt do la pnix, que souhaiter que les pays membres de In Confbronco de QenEvo prennent en conaid&irntion, ou tiennent fortement compte, des nspirntions logitimos du Cambodge. 4s. In referring thus to the bas14 problem of Indo- China, we ulso mise a11 the diffioulties it involves. St goee without saying that the problem of palitioal etnbility, whloh fa a problem faoed todny by Statee in oertaln parts of the Asian oontinentl oalls for certain eaoncmio oonditions Rnd aohievements, without whioh these r8glmes are lilcely to re-aaln unstable for R long time. 60, Subversion in newly independent oountries is olosely bound up with eoonomio faotors, Regardiug these probiems President Houphouet-Bo@y alw~ys uses a slogan that le worth remembering: @Hell;a us to help you.” Tbis appeal, extremely pithy ami moving, brings out the lnterdopendenoe between subversion and the poverty and hunger that prevall in the so-oalled under-devolopod oountries. Thue, the rumwer to subversion in the new oountrioe la 444n4mi4 rather tlmn tl1illtIWy 1 61. In 04n41usi4np let me add that my delegation would weloome a reeolutlon whiah deplored the inoidents in question an8 oalled upon the parties to settle the dismite on a frisndly baeie* inviting those responsible to offer Cambodia fair oompenenti~ni aresolution Ruthorieinn the Seoretary-General to eetablish, at the requeetof the partie& a oommission to heip them, if neoessary, with the physloal demaroation of their frontiere; and finally, a resolution expreesing the hop that the States membere of the Qeneva Conferenoe will take @ambodia% wishes into oonsideratfon and that ail Statee will resepeot its neutrality andihtegrity. 6% Mr, HUOT SAMBATH (Cambodia) (translatedfrom Frenoh) : Allow me first of RH to foinwith the membere of the Seourtty Counoil in paying atribute to the illustrioue memory of Psndit JawaharlalNehru. Kia eudden death has oaet a pal1 over the whole world, and partioularly my oountry,whiohhas so many ties with the great nation of India. In the late Jawaharlal Nehru, the Afriom-Asian world has lest one of itsfinest sons. Let me, therefore, on behalf of the Hoyd mvernment and peuple of Cambodia, offer my heartfelt oondolenoes and profound sympathy to the family of tbegraat Head of State aad to the G?vernment and psople of India. 63. 1 ahould lrave l~reforreci nat to taka tha floor R@I, but beonuse of the nllegntions made lnst TuesdRy [lLZ2nù meeting] by tha Unltud Statee reprcsontntive, 1 feel obliged tc mnlte tho following remnrks. 84, 8Kpprthg th4 &WitiQil t&eIl ùy L%uth Vi&-Nnm, thu Unitad Stntoa reprcsnntntive ngnin assortod thnt thc Viot-Cong were using Cam~dian territory. My delegntfon lns had cooneion sevornl timea in tho past to deny tkme shuidarous ansertions. Thore wua noevldenceof the prasence of Viet-Gong elaments during tho acts of nggression ngainat Cnmbcdin, mm, in the spe4ifio onse of the inoldcmts nt Chantraa, Tnoy and ‘lWcrk, 1 cxplainod nt length in my provicus stntementa why it WDE nbsurd to orocilt tho vorsion of thofacts presentod by the uggresscrs. 49. En faisant allusion Ru problome de fond de l~Yndoohfne, on touohe du doigt toutes les diffioult6s que soul8ve oe probl&ne; mais il reste presque naquis ~10 le probloma de la stabiliti politique, qui est oelui dee Etats dans certaines parties du oontinent asiatique, appelle un oertain nombre de donnaes et de satisfactions B44n4mlquas dont In oarenoe cautionnera pour longtemps ltinetabilit8 des rbglmes. 60. En effet, l’implantation de la subversion dans les jeunes pays est Me & 1%oonomio, te pr8sident Houphou&-Boigny, trultnnt de oes problbmes, lance toujours 4eY.e formule lapidaire: 8Aides-nous h vous ddeP, Cet appel, pathetique dRns con extr6me oonoision, rend bien compte du oaraotgre d’interdspsndanoe des subversions et de l%oonomie de mf&re et de faim pr6valant daim les pays dits sous-dBvelopp6s. Ainsi, la solution A la subversion dans les jeunes pays est plus Boonomique que militaire, 61, J’ajoute, pour terminer, que ma d816gation serait orale g aooueilllr ~~04 faveur un0 r6eolution qui EfBplorerait les inoidents dont nous somme8 saisis, demanderait aux parties de les ragler B lfamlable et aux responsabbs dloffrir une compensation 6quitable au Cambodge; une r0solution qui autoriserait le SeorBtaire g&$ral h oreer, k la demande des parties, une commission pour les aider* si oela est n&essRire, B mtat&ialisar leurs frontf8ree; une r&olution, enfin, oui exprimerait le voeu que les Etats membres de la~C&fBr&oe de aen8ve prennent en aonsid&%tian les aspirations du Cambodge et que tous les Etats respeotent la neutralitb et iQ-&3grit0 du Cambodge. 62. M. HUOT SAMBATH (Cambodge): Permetteemoi tout d’abord de m~aseooier aux membres du Conseil de e84urit.8 pour rendre hommage B la m& moire de l’illustre dispas% le pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Cette disparition soudaine a endeuillé le monde entier et partioulit3rement mon pays, lie par tant dtsfKnit8e B la grande nation indienne. En Jawaharlal Nehnt, le monde Sara-asiatique perd l’un de ses meilleurs fils, QuW me soit dono permis, au nom du Qouvernement royal et du peuple khmers, de PS@- eenter nos oondolg~oes &mÜer-et notre sjmgàthie attriet8e B la famille du nrand ohef d’Eta& au couvernement et Ru peuple indilièna, - 63. J’nurois voulu ne pas avoir h reprendre la parcle, mnia, en raison des nll0gntions faites iol mardi [1122bme sdanco] pnr le repr&entant des Etats-Unia dfAm6rlquo, je ma vols oontraint h faire les rcmarques EmivRntea. 64. Appuymt In thoso du Vi&-Nnm du Sud, le raprbcontant cios Et&+Unis d’Am6rlqua R rbp6t6 une fois cl4 plus quo las vi4toonge utilfeorlt le territoire cnmbcdgfen. Sur ce point, mn d616gntion a ci6js eu J~ccoRsion, a plus d’une reprise, de r6futer cet tissertians calomnieuses. Auc~une pr0sence vletccng n’a 6tB euregletrbe au cours don aotos d’ogrcaaion dont le Cnmbcdgo a Bt6 victime et, tlnns le 0~8 l~r6ciR tlea ngrcaaiona do Chnntrbu, l’acy et Thlark, j’ai longuemont cxpllqub. dnns mes intarvonticna Rntbrfourec, pourquoi il Btnit nbnurda d~aocordor cr6dit h la voraian des faits prbsont6a pnr nos flgrcsseurs. 66, I should like to Cake thia opportunity ta thank the United States representative for oiting this oommunlqu8 by tbo Cambodian Qeneral Staff, wbioh shows onoe more that the frontiers betweon Cambodia %nd Viet-Nam are not ill-definod and indifferently defended as he olaimed. 57. Cambodia, 1 repoat yet again, maintains thepositian it has alwaya maintained, whioh is to refuse any Vi&-Namosa element aooess to ita territofy, whother they belosg to the çhzvernment Qr the Viet4onp. 68, The Unitod States representative also saw fit to quota a passage from ah artiolo by Prinoo Norodom Sihanouk, Iiead of State of Cambodia, whioh appeared in the weekly @alite% Cambodkfennes of 90 July 1962, and then stated that %Cambodian authoritiea , . , themaelvee admit Wt thc Vietoong lave uscd and oontinua to use Çambodian territory%. 89, If Mr, Stevenson had readthe whole of the artiole, he would not have thus distortad the true sense of Prince Norodom Sibanouk(e words. In order to 0nlighten the Seourity Counoil, I sball take the liberty of quoting a few exoerpts from the sama artiole: %As for our allegsd oomplaisanco towards the Victoong, whom we are said to be enoouraging te establish themselves in Cambodia, honest observers euoh as General Soherrer of the United States milia tary mission and the United States fournalist Robert Trumbull oan testify-and they bave done so-that these allcgationa are at varianoe with tbe fa&%, %I5 it not 80 that the Whit0 Paper, reoently purlished by our United States friands in order to demonstrate, witb supportingevidenoe, that the Demooratio Republio of Viet-Nam interferes in the affaira. of South Viet-Nam, informs the world that nine times out of tsn North Viet-Nam senda its agents, with arm% and aquipment, through Laos and South Annam, along the 17th parallel, and not through Cam&&a?% 80. It is reprettablo that Ch0 Unitod States representativQ thought it mxossary to us0 this artiolo iu support of hi5 varsion of the inoidonts of 7 and 8 Mny .lDG4 nt TnQy and Thlork, namaly, that tho U:litod Statas atld South Vlet-Nainosa foroos orossod th0 Cflmbodian fi’ontler by mlstaka, in tlm hoat of bpttlo, wblla pur- YUlng th0 Vlot-Gong. Aa I hnve already aald, ft aa0m0 fJuqwfsing, to say tha loast, if tha UnitadStatos rapras0litativ0’s olaim fa carroot, thnt no Vlet-Coiig dend 01 wouhded wero found in the aroa. As inprovious sots of ~~UXW~OII, tha d0sd and woundoci wero a11 Camlxxbans liV@ la tha barder villagoa. lIowover, 1 fully undorstand the roaaons whloh lod the unitad Statos ropra- ~Qhtiva b advauoo this nbsurd argument in ordor to hlstify tho rel~atatl dofonts suffored by tha Unltcd %Ch8 and South Vi&-Nameeo forces nnd prepnre tbe United Stutoe publia for OUI intensifiontion of its ckmr~lin moine ~wpwwwt, ~1 lQ3n ee ri$f&re 3 la tbbsc souto~~uo pnr 10 rapri&antnnt dos Etats-Unla d’An& rlqim, qua l’on n’nlt relovb nuaun oadnvre ni auou11 blnse6 vlatcongs 0ur la hxrain, Comme lors d’actes d’agression pr6obd0nt.0, 10s morts et 10% blossba sont tous Cambodgiens, habitant0 do 608 vtllagas frontali0ri3. ~opondrrnt, jo oompronda pnrfaitement les raisons qui ont poused 10 rapr8aontant dos Etats-Unie d’Ambrlcpe R swtel~ir cotte tllbso Ql,surdo; C’UEIC 011 VI10 d0 justifier las 001~0s ri3fitbs ~10% forcos nmQrionno-sud-vletnnmlonllos at do pr6parar Ifopinion mmtts WRP offort ii1 tht part of th0 worid. 62. Quoting figures taken, it seems, fromCambodian statistios, the representative of South Viet-Nam said that he had tried in vain to account for an increase in the consumption of these products. Perhaps his knowledge of industrial chemistry is as inadequate as his knowledge of ballistics . 1 might point out to him that potassium ohlorate is used in the preparation of fertilizers. Saltpetre is also used to make explosives for the Cambodian army and for the rock removal operations undertaken by the Cambodian Department of Public Works in connexion with the construction of new mountain roads and theKamchay andKiriron dams. As for red phosphorus, it is used to manufacture matches and is also an ingredient of certain insecticides. Cambodiahas considerably expandedits production of matches following an import ban on these goods. Similarly , because of the expansion of cotton and hevea growing, we have been using insecticides with a phosphorus base. Again, owing to the inorease in agxicultural output provided for in our five-year plan. the use of fertilizers is becoming more and more widespread. 63. Those are the reasons which the representative of the Republic of Viet-Nam vainly sought in order to explain the expansion in imports of goods which he peremptorily described as strategic, A more thorough study would have spared him the blunder of presenting the Council with a fallacious argument. But what arguments Will a man not use in pleading a lost cause? 64. There is another very important aspect of the question regarding which explanations arenecessary. 1 should like to speak about the frontier between Cambodia and South Viet-Nam. The Press has takennote of Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s statement and some United States newspapers have reported on thefrontpage that the Cambodian Head of State is in favour of a United Nations body to control the frontier. Naturally, they did not quote the whole passage in the Prince!s statement on this matter and 1 should like, with your permission, Mr. President, to read it out to the members of the Council. Ne said: “The representative of South Viet-Nam has proposed an international control system under the auspices of the United Nations for our common frontier. The South Vietnamese Press says, moreover, that if we refuse suchcontrol,it is because we have Vietcong elements in our territory. But we are net refusing anything. Of course, we firmly maintain OUr position, which is the same as that of the Soviet Union and France, in favour of strengthening theInternational Control Commission, a body already agreed to by a11 the Powers concerned and wbich eXiStS in both Cambodia and South Viet-Nam, For we remain faithful to the spirit of the 1954 Geneva 62. Citant des chiffres puisés, parafe-il, dans des statistiques khmeres, le repr8sentant du Viet-Nam du Sud a dit qu’il a essaye en vain de s’expliquer une augmentation de la consommation de ces produits. Peut-être ses connaissances sont-elles aussi insuffisantes en chimie industrielle qu’en balistique, Je pourrais en tout cas lui dire que le chlorate de potassium sert a la preparation des engrais. Le salpêtre est aussi employt5 à faire des explosifs pour l’armée cambodgienne et pour les travaux de derochement entrepris par les Travaux publics du Cambodge dans la construction de nouvelles routes en montagne et des barrages de Kamohay et de Kiriron. Quant au phosphore rouge, il sert a fabriquer des allumettes et il intervient aussi dans la composition de certains insecticides. Or, le Cambodge a accru consid&rablement la production des allumettes par suite de l’interdiction de l’importation de cette marchandise; egalement, en raison de l’extension de la culture du coton et de celle de l’h&éa, nous avons utilisé des insecticides a base de phosphore. Par ailleurs, dans le cadre de l’augmentation de la production agricole prevue dans notre plan quinquennal, l’usage des engrais est de plus en plus genéralis& 63. Voilà les justifications que le representant de la Republique du Viet-Nam a Cherch!%es en vain pour expliquer l’accroissement de l’importation de produits qu’il a qualifi&s péremptoirement de straté- giques. Une recherche plus approfondie lui aurait 8vite de commettre une b&ue en présentant au Conseil un argument fallacieux. Mais, pour plaider une cause perdue, que d’arguments n’emploierait-on pas? 64. Il y a un autre aspect txi% important de la question sur lequel je voudrais apporter ici les 8claircissements necessaires. Je veux parler de la frontibre khmero-sud-vietnamienne. La presse a fait &at de la déclaration du prince Norodom Sihanouk et certains journaux am&ioains ont mention& en Premiere page que le chef de IlEtat cambodgien est en faveur d’un organisme des Nations Unies pour assurer le contrôle de la frontiére. Ils n’ont Bvidemment pas cite la totalité du passage de la déclaration relative à cette question et je voudrais, avec votre permission, Monsieur le Président, en faire part aux membres du Conseil. Le prince a dit: “Le representant du Sud-Viet-Nam a propos8 un systbme international de contrôle sous les auspices des Nations Unies pour la frontière commune. La presse sud-vietnamienne bcrit, d’autre part, que si nous refusons ce contrôle c’est que nous entretenons des Vietcongs sur notre territoire. Mais nous ne refusons rien du tout. Certes, nous maintenons vigoureusement notre position, qui est la meme que celle de l’Union sovietique et de la France, en faveur du renforcement de la Commission internationale de contrale, organisme deja accepté par toutes les puissances int&ess&es et qui existe aussi bien au Cambodge qu’au Sud-Viet-Nam. Car “As regards demarcation of the frontier between South Viet-Nam and Cambodia, a responsibility wbich Mr. VU Van Mau would like to entrust to experts under the auspices of the United Nations, our position iS simple. Our frontier line is well known t0 bath parties. South Viet-Nam only needs to recognize it and we can then immediately undertake t0 mark it out aoourately. We are quite ready to resume relations with Saigon and Bangkok, the sole condition being that they undertake to respect our present frontiers. Only the refusa1 of such recognition by our neighbours prevents the restoration of normal relations, What country in the world, smallor large, would agree to live without frontiers?” “En ce qui concerne la délimitation de lafrontière entre le Sud-Viet-Nam et le Cambodge, que M. Vu Van Mau voudrait voir confier a des experts sous les auspices des Nations Unies, notre position est simple. Le trace de notre frontibre est bien connu des deux parties; il suffit que le Sud-Viet-Nam le reconnaisse et nous pourrons aussitat aprés pratiquer un bornage rigoureux. Nous précisons que nous sommes tout prêts !l reprendre les relations avec Saigon et Bangkok a la seule et unique condition qu’ils s’engagent B respecter nos fronti&res actuelles. C’est le refus de cette reconnaissance par nos voisins qui bloque seul le retour a des raPportS normaux. Quel pays au monde, petit ou grand, accepterait de vivre sans fronti&res?” 65. This, plnced in its proper context, is what was really in the mind of the Cambodian Head of State. 1s it not a patent demonstration of our good faith, of our sincere desire to live in peace andtoresume peaceful relations, on Oondition, naturally, that our neutrality is recognized and our territorial integrity respected? 65. Voila, Plac@e dans son contexte rhel, la pensée profonde du chef de IlEtat du Cambodge. N’est-ce pas là la lumineuse démonstration de notre bonne foi, de notre désir sinct?re de vivre en paix et de renouer des relations pacifiques, à condition &idemment qu’on reconnaisse notre neutralité et qu’on respecte notre intégritt! territoriale? 66. AS regards finding an appropriate way of achieving the objective we have set, however, we wish to make it clear that Cambodia’s position is unchanged as far as the International Control Commission and the Geneva Conference are oonoerned. We still insistthat the International Control Commission should control our frontiers and that the Geneva Conference should meet as quickly as possible in order to keep the peace in the region. 66. Dans le cadre de la recherche d’une solution appropriee en vue d’atteindre l’objectif que nous avons fix8, nous tenons cependant 2 prgoiser que la position du Cambodge est inchangee en ce gui concerne la Commission internationale de contrôle et la ConfBrenoe de GenBve. Nous insistons toujours poux que la Commission internationale de contrale contrôle nos frontiéres et pour que la Conférence de GenBve se réunisse le plus rapidement possible dans 1’intBrêt de la sauvegarde de la paix dans cette region. 67. Pour que tout soit clair, nous tenons adire aussi que les frais d’envoi d’un Eventuel groupe de contrôleurs des Nations Unies ne sauraient être supportés par le Cambodge. 67. SO that everything Will be quite clear, we also wish to state that the oost of any United Nations control team that may be sent oannot be borne by Cambodia. 68. M. BERNARDES (Brésil) [traduit de l’anglais]: Le Conseil de sécurit8 est saisi d’une plainte pour agressions contre le territoire et la population civile du Cambodge. Selon la lettre en date du 13 mai 1964 @/5697] qui vous a Ate adressee, Monsieur le P&ident, plusieurs violations de la fronti&re entre le Cambodge et la RCSpublique du Viet-Nam ont causé au Cambodge des pertes de vies humaines et des dommages matériels. Je me bornerai a parler de cette plainte en évitant autant que possible d’aborder le problème plus vaste et plus complexe de la situation en Asie du Sud-Est,

The Security Counoil is seized of a complaint concerning acts of aggression against the territory and civilian population of Cambodia. Acoording to the letter addressed to you. Mr. President, on 13 May 1964 [S/5697] ,anumber of violations of the frontier between Cambodia and the Republic of Viet-Nam took place resulting in loss of life and property in Cambodia. It is my intention to restrict myself to that complaint and to avoidin SO far as possible the wider and more complex issue of the situation prevailing in South-East Asia. 69. Although 1 am perfectly aware that the border inci- 69. Tout en me rendant parfaitement compte qu’il dents between Cambodia and the Republic of Viet-Nam est difficile d’isoler complêtement les incidents de cari hardly be disentagled entirely from the broader frontiéne entre le Cambodge et la République du framework of the political and military situation in the Viet-Nam du contexte plus vaste de la situation poli- Indo-Chinese peninsula, it is my considered belief that tique et militaire dans la peninsule indochinoise, je the way for the Council to improve that general situasuis convaincu que, si le Conseil veut améliorer cette tion at this stage is for it to limit itself t0 dealing with situation dans son ensemble, il doit se borner actuelthe specific complaint submitted by Cambodia. The lement a examiner la plainte pr8cise pr&sentge par le Security Council is not the properplaoe atthis time t0 Cambodge. Ce n’est pas au Conseil de SéCUrit6 qu’il disouss and pass judgement on the other problems appartient pour le moment d’examiner et d’appr6cier wbich affect the whole region, nor has it been called les autres probl8mes qui concernent l’ensemble de la upon to do SO. As to the complaints lodged by the Royal région, et il n’y a d’ailleurs pas BteconviB. Quant aux 70, We note that both the Government of theRepublic of Viet-Nam and that of the United States of Amerioa, acknowledging their involvement in the incidents that occurred earlier in the year, expressed their regrets tc the Gcvernment of Cambodia, and that the Gcvernment of the Republio of Viet-Nam bas cffered to PaY adequate compensation to the victims. We alsc teck ccgnizance of the statements made before this CCunCil by the representatives both of the United States and of the Republic of Viet-Nam concerning their sincere desire tc live in peace and maintain cordial relations with the Government of Cambodia. 71. ~b.is being the state of mind of the parties mCSt directly invclved, it should not prove impossible for them to arrive at an honourable understanding and clarification of the latest incidents, 72. 1 have no doubt, also, that the Council will feel it advisable to cal1 upon the parties to refrain in the future from actions that might cause friction between them and give rise to further incidents of a serious nature. 73. Difficult as it might be for the forces engaged in military operations in South Viet-Nam, given the nature of the terrain and the loosely demaroated borders, to strictly avoid incursions into cther oountries’ territories, the strongest possible reoommendation should be made to those in command of those forces to keep their aotivities well within their own territories. 74. The main point, andperhaps the most difficult one, upcn which this Council is called to act is the establishment of suitable machinery to prevent further incidents along the Cambcdian-Viet-Namese border. In this connexion a number of suggestions have been made, a11 of them having merit, in our view. My delegation will be prepared to consider any reasonable proposa1 for establishing effective machinery under the aegis of the United Nations to help stabilize the situation alcngthe Cambcdian-Viet-Namese frontier. We believe, hcwever, that to be fully effective and rapidly put intc cperation, this machinery should have the full endorsement of bath the parties concerned andthe whclehearted support of the Security Counoil. 75. These are the preliminary oomments Iwculdl&e tc make and, with your permission, Sir, I shall reserve my right to make further comments later, if necessary.

The Council is seized with a border situation that has arisen in a part of the wcrld where deep conflicts of interest exist, This makes it all the more important to refrainfrcm using la%‘uage or adopting attitudes which might impair the Present favourable international climate and lead back in the direction of the cold war. In addition to the @nQ’allY adverse consequences of such d development, this would seriously impede a solution of the speoific prcblem now being considered by the Ccuncil. Republique du Viet-Nam et des Etats-Unis d’Amé- rique, reconnaissant leurs responsabilit6s dans les incidents qui se sont produits Cette ann6e, ont exprim6 leurs regrets au Gouvernement cambodgien et que le Gouvernement vietnamien a offert de d6dommager les victimes 6quitablement. Nous avons 6galement Pris note des d6clarations faites devant le Conseil Par les repr6sentants des Etats-Unis et de la République du Viet-Nam quant à leur d6sir sinCère de vivre en paix et d’entretenir des relations cordiales avec le Gouvernement cambodgien. 71. Puisque tel est 1’6tat d’esprit des parties directement intéressées, il devrait leur Btre possible de parvenir & une entente honorable et de tirer au clair les r6cents incidents. 72, D’autre part, je ne doute pas que le Conseil estimera de son devoir d’inviter les deux parties a s’abstenir d6sormais de tout acte qui risque de Causer entre elles des frictions et de provoquer de nouveaux incidents s6rieux. 73. Bien qu’il puisse 6tre malais& pour les forces engag6es dans les op6rations militaires au Viet-Nam du Sud, Btant donné la nature du terrain et le fait que la frontière n’est pas marqube clairement, d’dviter completement toute incursion sur le territoire d’un autre pays, il faudrait recommander avec le maximum d’bnergie a ceux qui sont plac6s B la tete de ces forces de veiller Zi bien limiter leurs activit6s & leur propre territoire, 74. Le point principal, et peut-6tre le plus difficile sur lequel le Conseil soit appel6 Zi se prononcer, concerne la or6ation d’un mécanisme propre B emp6cher de nouveaux incidents le long de la frontière entre le Cambodge et le Viet-Nam. Certaines suggestions ont 6t6 faites & ce sujet et elles nous paraissent toutes pr6senter de ltint6rêt. Ma dbl6gation est pr&te à examiner toute proposition raisonnable en vue de cr6er, sous l’6gide des Nations Unies, un m6canisme efficace qui puisse contribuer a stabiliser la situation le long de la frontière entre le Cambodge et le Viet- Nam. Nous estimons toutefois que pour &tre pleinement efficace et pouvoir fonctionner rapidement, ce mécanisme devrait 6tre accept6 sans r6serve par les deux parties intéress6es et &tre approuve plelnement par le Conseil de s6curit6. 75. Telles sont les observations p&liminaires que je voulais pr6senter, tout en me r6servant le droit, si vous le Permettez, Monsieur le Président, de revenir ult6rieurement sur la question, le cas éch6ant. 7% M. NIELSEN (NorvBge) [traduit de l’anglais]: Le Conseil est saisi d’un problème de frontiere survenu dans une r6gion du monde oh existent de graves conflits d’int6rbts. Aussi importe-t-il particulièrement de se dispenser d’employer des termes OU dladopter des attitudes qui risqueraient de nuire àl’actuelle détente internationale et de nous faire revenir $t la guerre froide. Independamment des cons6quences g6n6rales d6plcrables d’une telle r6gression, la SOL~- tien du problème pr6cis que le Conseil examine en ce moment s’en trouverait entravée s6rieusement. 78. The Cambodian contentions regarding the specific violations of Cambodian territory have not been disputed. In this respect the matter under consideration seems somewhat less complicated than some of the other border incidents with which the Councilhas been seized. Hence it does not appear to beof primary importance to examine the cause of past events-events which my delegation sincerely deplores. 79. It is understandable that the recent incidents have cause great concern in Cambodia, particularly since the country is situated in an unstable area where a number of great Powers consider that essential interests are at stake. 80. Against this background the representative of Cambodia explained to the Council the importance which Cambodia attaches to its policy of neutrality. This policy has been recognized in the set of agreements which constitutes the political framework for that part of the world. Having in mindthe tense situation in the area, Norway would support a request by the Security Council to a11 the parties concerned to refrain from actions which might further aggravate the situation and to take suitable steps to reduce the present tension, This naturally would include respeoting Cambodia’s borders. Furthermore, it would seem reasonable that the loss of life and the material damage sustained in the incidents of 7 and 8May be fairly and justly compensated. 81. In some of the statements made before the Council it has been asserted that the tense situation in the border area may be due partly to insufficient border demarcation. Since the parties seem to agree as to the actual line of the border, they might consider the advisability of taking steps to improve the border demarcation. 82. We have noted with concern that the statements of the two parties have revealed howdeepandfar-reaching are the oonflicts of interests in that part of the world. In those statements, however, it has not been requested that the United Nations should take up this vast complexity of problems. Hence it would not seem suitable for the Council to go further into these matters. Also it appears likely that the consideration of the particular border incidents in question would only be complicated by the simultaneous consideration of these wider aspects of the problem. It might also be questioned whether the statements made before the Council in this regard have given aoomprehensive and balanced picture of the general situationin South-East Asia. 83. We have taken due note of the various proposals that have been advanced with a view topreventing new border incidents like those whichwe are now considering. 78. Les affirmations du Cambodge quant a cesviolatiOnS materielles du territoire cambodgien ne sont Pas contest6es. A cet egard, le probleme qui nous occupe semble un peu moins compliqué que ceux de certains autres incidents de frontière dont le Conseil a Bté saisi. Il neparai’t donc pas d’importance primordiale d’examiner les causes des BvBnements pas&, que ma d816gation n’en deplore pas moins sincè- rement. 79. Il est compr8hensible que les incidents recents aient sUSCit6 une vive inquiétude au Cambodge, d’autant plus que ce pays est situe dans une région instable oil plusieurs grandes puissanoes considbent que des int6rêts vitaux sont en jeu. 80. Ceest dans ce contexte que le representant du Cambodge a explique au Conseil l’importance que son pays attache B sa politique de neutralite. Cette politique a et6 reconnue dans l’ensemble des accords qui constituent le cadre politique de cette region du monde, Tenant compte de la situation tenduequiregne dans cette r&ion, la Norvège appuiera toute demande adress6e par le Conseil de s8curit6 aux parties en cause pour les inviter à s’abstenir de tout acte qui risquerait d’aggraver encore la situation et B prendre les mesures voulues pour r6duire la tension actuelle. Cela impliquerait, bien entendu, le respect des frontières cambodgiennes. De plus, il semblerait normal que les pertes en vies humaines et les dommages matériels r6sultant des incidents des 7 et 8 mai fassent l’objet d’indemnites équitables et justes. 81. Dans certaines d&larations faites devant le Conseil, on a affirmb que la situation tendue qui règne dans la region de la frontiere pourrait @tre due en partie à un marquage insuffisant de cettefrontière. Puisque les parties paraissent etre d’accord sur le trac8 actuel, elles pourraient envisager la possibilité de prendre des mesures pour ameliorer 08 marquage. 82. Nous avons noté avec inqui&ude que les declarations des deux parties ont fait ressortir la profondeur et l’étendue des conflits d’int&‘&ts dans Cette region du monde. Toutefois, les auteurs de ces déclarations n’ont pas demandé aux Nations Unies de s’attaquer 5L ce vaste complexe de problémes. Aussi ne semble-t-il pas opportun que le Conseil approfondisse ces questions. Il est d’ailleurs vraisemblable que l’examen des incidents de frontière pr8cis dont nous nous occupons ne pourrait qu’être compliquu8 par l’&ude simultan6e de ces aspects plus vastes du problème. On peut également se demander si les dgolarations faites B. cet Egard devant le Conseil donnent bien un tableau complet et BquilibrB de la situation g6nGrale en Asie du Sud-Est. 83. NOUS avons pris bonne note des diverses propositions qui ont Bté faites en vue d’emp@oher de nouveaux incidents de frontilre semblables h. ceux que nous examinons actuellement. les diverses SuggestioIlS qui ont été pr8sentees. 85. Le PRESIDENT: Je n’ai pas pour le moment d’autres orateurs inscrits pour la fin de la matin& ou pour cet apr&s-midi dans le debat genkal. Compte tenu du fait qu’il y aurait, je crois, intbrêt - c’est uu point sur lequel j’ai recueilli l’assentiment d’un certain nombre de mes collégues - d’en terminer avec la question inscrite à l’ordre du jour demain, ou a la rigueur samedi, je voudrais S.%VOir Si t@l OU tel de mes collegues a l’intention d'intervenir cet apres-midi ou demain matin. 86. M, CASTBIJ,LO JUSTINIANO (Bolivie) [traduit de l’espagnol]: Je me proposais, Monsieur le PU%~- dent, d’intervenir cet après-midi, mais je craindrais d’abuser de la patience de mes col@peS du Conseil de séourite et, en outre, de prOlOnger inutib3rMnt ce débat qui doit bientôt aboutir. Aussi exposerai-je db maintenant le point de vue de la délegation bolivienne, 86. Mr. cAsTRILLO JUSTIAN~N~ poliVia) (traslated from Spanish) : 1 had intended to SPeak this afternoon, but I feel that to do SO would tax the Patience of my oolleagues in the Security Council. Besides, it would needlessly prolong a debate whioh ought to be concluded as rapidly as possible, Therefore, 1 would rather state the views and the position of the Bolivian delegation at this time. 87. First of all, 1 should like to give expression to a feefing we ail share: to deplore the events which have occurred on the Cambodian-South Viet-Namese frontfer and express to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Royal Government of Cambodia our profound sorrow at the whole unhappy series of reports that have reached us. 88. In the second place, 1 should like to point out the danger of introducing oompletely irrelevant factors into the consideration of a problem, My delegation has listened with some concern to bitter words, words which constitute a real threat to the atmosphere of peaceful coexistence the world now enjoys. I should like to make it clear that there is a danger to the smaller nations when an attempt is made to transform a conflict into Yet another element in the cold war, The Bolivian delegation pleads for reason, especially on the part of the great Powers, which are responsible for, and bear the burden of, ensuring and maintaining world peace. 87. Je tiens d,‘abord a m’associera tous les orateurs, qui ont Bté unanimes 8. déplorer les incidents survenus le long de la frontière entre le Cambodge et la RépUblique du Viet-Nam, et k exprimer au Ministre des affaires Btrangkes du Gouvernement royal du Cambodge la profonde tristesse que nous ont causee ces tristes nouvelles. 88. Je voudrais souligner en second lieu le danger qu’il pourrait y avoir CI introduire dans l’examen d’un problème des 81éments qui lui sont completement &rangers. Ce n’est pas sans inquietnde que ma dB& gation a entendu des paroles de colare qui pourraient vraiment menacer l’atmosphke de coexistence pacifique qui r8gne actuellement dans les relations internationales. Je tiens h insister sans aucune équivoque sur le danger que pourraient présenter, pour les Petits pays, ces tentatives de faire d’un conflit un nouvel BlBment de la guerre froide. Za dEU3gation bolivienne tient a mettre en garde particuli&rement les grandes puissances, qui ont les plus grandes responsabilitks ?l cet Egard et qui ont la charge de faire régner et de maintenir la paix internationale. 8 8. In the view of the Bolivian delegation, it is essential to keep thk debate confined to the presentation of the case and the complaint submitted by Cambodia, 89. De l’avis de la dél&gation bolivienne, il est important de limiter le débat et l’examen de ce probleme 2~ la Plainte formulee par le Cambodge. 66. Our delegation also considers the existence of a neutral country and government important for the future Of tkis mm, which has known constant turmoil for manY YeCs. Preserving and recognizing this neutralitYt ad PromOting the same attitude on the part of others is, we believe, a basic duty of the Seourity Council. Nevertheless, my delegation considers the question Of neutrality to be purely political, not different but CertainlY Separate from thebasic OOmplaint lodged by Cambodk which is related toits territorial integritY+ NeutralitY cari be regarded as a long-term goal, but what is Ugently needednow is for the SeouritY Council to take measures to ensure the territorial integrity of Cambodia. 80. Ma d81Clgation estime en outre qu’il est important aussi, Pour l'avenir de cette region, dont la situation troublée constitue depuis des annt5es un État chronique, qu’il Y existe un pays et un gouvernement neutres. Nous sommes convaincus qu’en pr&servant, en reconnaissant et en favorisant cette neutralit4, le Conseil de sécurit6 fera son devoir, qui est de contribuer à oe qu’elle se rgalise. Ma d&égation juge cependant que la neutralite est un aspect nettement politique, qui n’est pas vraiment diffgrent mais se distingue de l’int%rit& territoriale, objet de laplainte fondamentale du Cambodge. La neutralite peut &tre l’objet d’un Processus de longue haleine. Ce qui est urgento c’est que le Conseil de skuritf$ prenne des mesures quant au respect de l’int&grite territoriale du Cambodge. gl* The Bolivian delegation believes , as do other delegations, that convening the Geneva Conference is g1* La dglegation bolivienne approuve le point de vue de ceux qui ont SOUlign& que le Conseil de &ourit& 16 9 3. 1 believe that 1 have stated the position of my country. 1 have found many points and suggestions ln the debate which lead me to say that providing it abandons the consideration of extraneous factors, the Security Council Will have before it a problem which c8n be resolved without difficully. My delegation is confident that this solution Will be reached.

Through the oourtesy of the representative of Bolivia, we bave been able to finish the general debate this morning, and 1 think that, in order that they may consuit each other to decide what conclusions they wish to emerge from this debate, my colleagues mayprefer to leave it to the President to convene the next meeting. 1 hope, of course, that 1 cari convene it tomorrow. If 1 hear no objections to thîs suggestion, 1 shall consider it adopted. Jt was SO decided. The meeting rose at 12.35’p.m. 93. Je crois avoir bien expose la position de ma d618gation. Etant don& les nombreux points communs entre les parties en cause et les suggestions qui ont été formul6es, je crois pouvoir dire que, si le Conseil de sécurit6 6carte l’examen d’616ments &rangers au problème qui lui est posé, il n’aura pas de diffioultgs à le r&oudre. La ddlegation bolivienne est convaincue qu’il y parviendra. 94. Le PRESIDENT: Grâce & la courtoisie du repr& sentant de la Bolivie, nous en avons termine ce matin avec le débat genéral, et je pense que, afin de se consulter en vue de savoir quelles conclusions ils souhaitent donner à ce débat, nos collègues voudront peut-8txe laisser à leur PrBsident le soin de les convoquer, Bien entendu, jtespgre que cette convocation pourra avoir lieu demain. Si je n’entends pas d’abjections ?i cette suggestion, je la considererai comme adoptee. Il en est ainsi dtkidé. La s&nce est levée a’ 12 h 55. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or Write ta: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva. COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre librairie ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève. COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas est& en venta en librerias y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o dirijase a: Naciones Unidas, Section de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra. Litho in U.N. Price: $US. 0.35 (or equivalent in other currencies) 27999-March 19654,975