S/PV.1129 Security Council

Pursuant to decisions previously taken ùy the Security Council in this matter, I shall invite the reprssentatives of the Malagasy Republic, Indonesia, India, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Pakistan and Tunisia to take places at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. L. Rakotomalala (Madagascar), MI-, L. N. Palar [Indonesia), Mrs. Lakshmi N. Menon (India), MI-. C. R. Rogers- Wright (Sierra Leone), Mr. J. R. Grimes (Liberia), Mr. V. A. Hamdani (P&is tan} and Mr. Taïeb Slim (Tunisia) took places at the Council table. 2. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The first speaker on my list is the representative of Endonesia, on whom 1 now call.

1 should like to begin by thanking the Council and you, Mr. President, for giving my Government the opportunity to be represented this important debate. Even if we had no common origins with those people suffering from the injustice of South Africa’s racial policies, we Asian and African nations are bound by the principles enunciated in the Declaration of the Bandung Conference in 1955-and only very recently restated by the Preparatory Meeting for a second Afro-Asian Conference-at which we pledged ourselves to do everything in our power to eradicate the system of apartheid, 4. Included in the one and a half million so-called coloured South Africans are some 50,000 persons primarily Indonesian descent, known as the Cape Malays. The first Cape Malays were sent by their colonial masters from Indonesia to South Africa 5. The Cape Malays have long been valiant Eighters against white domination. AS early as at the beginning of this Century, Dr. Abdurahman founded the African Peoples’ Organisation whose aim was to unite the non-white communities in their mutual struggle for equal rights. His work w as carried onby his daughter, Mrs. Zainuessa Gool, who was the first leader of the ail-race National Liberation League which played a prominent part in the anti-colour bar demonstrations of the late 1930’s. More recently, the Cape Malay group fias identified itself with the most militant voico of the Coloured South Africans, the Coloured Peoples Congress, headed by Mr. Dcsai, who is now in exile in London, and has produced such notable leaders as Toffie Bardien and Ebrahim Saterdien-both of whom have suffered imprisonment as a result of their political activities. 5. avec Dés 1’African communautbs pour par sa fille, chef toutes dans 1930-1940 gens Malais militante Peoples en exil It Londres éminents qui ont tous deux été punis leurs 6. B is worth recording that the 1.5 million coloured peoples of South Rfrica enjoy a slightly higher legal and social status under the system of apartheid than the native Bantu, and they could perhaps have concluded a special deal with the Verwoerd Government SO that their situation might be eased further. Instead they have committed themselves to securing the dignity of their birthright as South African citizens by standing firmly beside their African brothers in their struggle against apartheid in a11 its manifestations and for a government based upon the Will of the people. 6. régime du million dans indigbnes sans doute pu conclure avec le gouvernement un arrangement un peu cette situation. se consacrer que leur africains fr&res sous fondé sur la volonté du peuple. 7. a et& saisie la politique 14 ans, elle a demandé instamment de l’Afrique la mesure 7. The United Nations General Assembly first took. up the question of South Africa’s iniquitous racial policies in 1947. For fourteen years it has appealed to the Government of South Africa to reconsider these policies. As the Verwoerd regime heedlessly pressed on with its apartheid programme, the United Nations resolutions were couched in ever stronger terms and aclopted by ever increasing majorities. In 1961, the year of the Sharpeville massacres, the General As- Sembly in resolution 1598 (XV) unequivocally deprecated South Africa’s racial policies as “reprehensible and repugnant to human dignity”. That year the vote was unanimous-with the obvious and unimportant exception of Portugal. u aucun deplus enplus strictement les en termes & des majorités l’ann&e g6nerale 1598 (XV), en la qualifiant la dignite a été unanime, B l’exception voix sans importance, 8. The hardening of world opinion in the face of South Africa’s intransigence has likewise been reflected in 8. l’intransigeance u Sec OffiCial Kecords of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, u (Part If), Plenary Meetings, 981st meeting. session 9. And what has been the response of the Velwoerd Government to the unanimous injunctions of the Security Council? Total disregard. Instead of complying with the Council’s unequivocally worded requests, the Verwoerd Government has blandly stepped up its implementation of the apartheid system and imperturbably proceeded with its treason triais. Since December 1963, not only have new sentences Of life imprisonment or of death been passed, but, according to the March report of the Special Committee on the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Flepublic of South Africa [S/5621],3 political prisoners have actually heen executed. 10. Such a display of contempt for the UnitedNations on the part of a Member State cries out for action. The item we are considering here today is nothing less than the case of the United Nations against the Government of the Republic of South Africa, Even were there no other considerations at stake, South Rfrica’s crowning defiance of the resolution of 4 December 1963 would alone be sufficient to warrant the Council’s invoking coercive measures, 11. However, it is not jusl: because of the contempt which South Africa has shown for our Organization that my delegation is urging the Council to take this unprecedented step, The Council shoulcl above allgive its mosl; serious attention to the human implications contained in the Verwoercl Government’ s recalcitrance. First among these is the possible death of yet more political prisoners: while we ùebate, the life of a leader of the calibre of Ne&on Mandela hangs in precarious balance. Then there is the concern for the matter of respect for fundamental human rights: as long as the system of apartheid continues to exist, SO long Will one of the most noble principles of our Charter continue to be violated and outraged. And, finally, arising out of the other two, there is the danger of a bloody race conflict erupting within the Republic and of open hostilities between South Africa and I;he AErioan nations which have dedicated themselves tofreeing their brothers from the bonclage of a modem slave SOCiety-a fight in whioh Asian nations cari be expected to join. Each new measure that is taken by the Verwoerd Government to consolidate apartheid brings this danger closer to explosion point, 12. Developments in South Africa bave now reaohed a Crucial Stage. My delegation is oonvinced that, if decisive action is not taken by the Security Cono in a Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Eighceenrh Year, SU~+- ment for July, August and September 15>03. II 5 Ibid., Supplemenr for Octoher, Navember-and December 1963. 4/ Same text as A/5692 (see Officlal Records of the General Assemble, Nineteentlr Session, Annexes). 13. The coercive measures that are being sought are primarily the economic sanctions listed under Article 41-backed, if necessary, by a blockade, which is a measurefallingwithin the provisions of Article 42. The abject in view is to employ sanctions as a method of persuading the Verwoerd Government to abandon its nauseous system of apartheid before the situation explodes into a breach of the peace. 13. tiellement 1’Article comme d’amener a renoncer la situation 3 une rupture 14. This is not the first time that the use of sanctions against South Africa has been discussed in our Organizntion. Both in the Assembly and in the Council, the case for and against sanctions has frequently been argued out. And it is not my intention to go into these arguments again here. Members of the Council Will, 1 am sure, have read the report of the delegation of the Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of tha Government of the Republic of South Africa on the International Conference on Economie Sanctions against South Africa, held in London from 14 to 17 April 1964 [S/5717, annex II]. 2 This Conference, at which 1 was privileged to represent my country, was most thoroughgoing. Under the guidance of experts in the field, officia1 delegations from twenty-nine nations, plus representatives of organizations and lndivicluals irom many other countries, investigated a11 aspects of the problem of applying sanctions against South Africa: the practical requirements of an effective blockade, the impact on the international economy and on individual economies, the probable effects on the South African Government, and the legal nnd political implications. TO quote paragraph 74 of that report of the delegation of the Special Committee: “TheConference came to the conclusion that total economic sanctions were politicnlly timely, economically feasible and legnlly appropriate.” 14. envisage du Sud. A I’Assemblée des sanctions pas voqués du Conseil délégation politique blique des sanctions tenue annexe l’honneur question en la matiere, ainsi personnalités tous de sanctions pratiques l’économie pays, africain On cl&&gation conclu politiquement et juridiquement 15, The material contained in the report should ade- 15. devraient de ceux qui cherchent des sanctions de l’apartheid. CPtely rebut the main arguments of those who seek to cast doubt on the effectiveness of sanctions as a msans of trying to bring about an end to apartheid, Very often these doubters speak as if the method had been attempted before and had failed. But, in fact, there has never yet been an instance in which the great family of nations has collectively undertaken to apply economic sanctions against another country. comme échoue. grande famille des nations ait entrepris d’appliquer 16. d’imposer définitive, dans tous les autres cas, des sanctions ont été appliquées par quelques pays à titre unilatéral. D’autre part, il n’est pas besoin de grandes connaissances economiques pour comprendre qu’aucun pays industriel moderne ne peut conserver sa prospérité accoutumée s’il est entibrement coupé des 16. The League of Nations hnrl intendecl to invoke them against Pascist Italy, but in the end ii, never took ths actual step of carrying out its decision; in a11 other lases, sanctions have been appliecl by a few indivitlual Countrics acting on a unilatcral basis. On the other hilad, it does not require much cçonomic trnining to realize that no modem industrial nation could be ex- PeCted to continue to flourish in its accustomecl prosperity if its lifeline of foreign tïade were complctely s/ %ne text BS A,‘5707 (see Officlal Kecords of rhe General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes). générale, 17. A decision by the Council to tnvoke sanctions would, furthermore, almost certainly give heart to those liberal or frightened white elements in South Africa who are at present powerless to exercise an influence on their own Government. SO that, far from consolidating white South African opinion againstworld opinion-as the fear supposedly is-decisive Council action might on the contrary begin to crack the unity of the Verwoerd r6gime. It is only as long as the world goes on taking a hostile, condemnatory attitude but does nothing positive that a unified South African front is predictable. Unity of action, however, is very easily sundered where there is no genuine unity of purpose. There are white people in South Africa who are not committed to the polioy of apartheid, and who indeed deplore it and even live in dread of its consequences. But what is quite clear by now is that these people cannot by themselves bring about a change in the political order of their country. For this, Unlted Nations intervention is necessary. 18. 1 am sure that no member of the Security Council would tare to advocate the United Nations going to war with South Africa before first attemptingpeaceful methods of coercion. Hence, it seems pertinent to ask at this point: what other practical alternatives to economic sanctions are there? Seventeen years of combined persuasion, exhortation and condemnation have signally failed to have any effeot on the Verwoerd Government to date. Another resolution merely condemning South Africa and requesting it to reverse its policies would therefore be tantamount to inactionwhich is something the urgenoy of the situation will not permit. 19. 1 should like to emphasize that in deciding to invoke economic sanctions against South Africa, the Council would only be reflecting the wishes of the vast majority of Member States. General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII), recommending specific economic measures, was adopted by 67 votes to 16, with 23 abstentions. Since then a number of countries which abstained in the vote have indicated their belief that the time is now ripe for such a course. And we may also confidently expect that the developments in South Africa during recent months Will persuade still others to join with the majority opinion, 20. However, as the South African Government itself jubilantly noted, the sixteen countries voting against the resolution between them account for almost two thirds of South Africa’s foreign trade. Consequently, such sanctions as might be individually applied by the majority of nations responding to the recommendation of the General Assembly cari be anticipated to have little or no useful results. Moreover, studies by experts at the London Conference have since shown conclusively that sanctions would, in fa&, be unlikely to 22. As yet, the situation has not caused an actual hreach of the peace, nor is there as yet any act of aggression to be considered. Thus the peaceful solution to the problem of inducing the Government of South Africa to abandon its apartheid policy inescapably hinges upon the Council finding that the situation constitutes a “threat to the peace”. When thefour African Foreign Ministers brought the item before the Security Council in August and again in December 1963, they made strenuous representations along these lines, TO no avail. Three members with the power of veto -France, the United Kingdom and the United Statescategorically refused to concede that the situation in South Africa represented a threat to peace within the meaning of Article 39. As a result, because Chapter VII does not speak in terms of disturbances to the peace, the resolution of 7 August and that of 4 December 1963, instead of declaring the situation a threat that was ‘tseriously endangering international peace and security”, declared it to be a situation that was tvseriously disturbing international peace and security” , It is an unhappy irony indeed that the words chosen should denote an even graver situation than the words rejected, and yet be powerless to unlock the Council’s capacity for peace-keeping action under Articles 41 and 42. 23. With respect, such legalistic juggling of phrases in order to evade the unpleasant consequences of responsibility ought to be beneath the dignity of the Security Council. When States with the power of veto take au indefensible but unassailable stand on the letter of the law, one is forced toinfer that they do SO for reasons prompted, as they very often are, by strong motives of self-interest. In this instance we do not have far to look for those motives. Al1 these three Western States with the power of veto were among the sixteen countries which voted against General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII), And it is well known that the United Kingdom and the United States between them account for about 45 per cent of South Africa’s fore@ trade, and that both Powers maintain considerable investment in that countryinvestment which, incidentally, has risen appreciably during the last few years. 24. AS it happens, studies by economic authorities have since demonstrated that, provided the sanctions are universally applied and the necessary adjustments to the international economy are made, the adverse impact of sanctions on the individual economies of the nations applying them-including South Africa’ s main 25. Thus far, the Verwoerd Government has known that it cari flout the Security Council’s injunctions with impunity because it is protected from sanctions by the self-interest of the members with the power of veto who are its main trading partners. As a consequence, the situation has worsened alarminglywithin the past year. This is the third time that the item has been brought before the Council in under nine months, and on each occasion a11 the evidence has pointed to yet a further deterioration. The Western Powers themselves did not dispute the worsening the situation last December: the resolution of 4 December speaks of the Council being t’strengthenedll in its conviction that the situation was seriously disturbing international peace and security. Recent developments in South Africa cari only strengthen that conviction still further. But how far cari a situation that is already unanimously acknowledged as seriously disturbing the peace continue to deteriorate before constitutes a stificient threat to the peace, within the meaning of Article 39, to warrant Council action? 26. During the Council debates in August and again in December last year, the Western Powers went to considerable lengths to try to distinguish the threat to peace that they admitted was inherent in the situation in South Africa from the threat to peace that would, in their opinion, justify the Council’s invoking the measures provided for under Articles 41 and 42. It was maintained, for example, by one permanent member that the resolution’s phrase “disturbing the peace” referred to the underlying elements of a serious situation that, if continued, would be likely to endanger international peace and security. Yet in the next breath it was argued that this was quitedifferent from tca fully matured threat to or breach of the peace” . But what this would seem to mean is that coercive measures cari be invoked only when the threat is SO imminent as to require an emergency meeting of the Council in order to try to prevent bloodshed virtually the next day or even the next hour. In the case of South Africa, what possible effective peaceful action could be taken under such conditions? Moreover, the wording of Article 39 clearly indicates that the terms of the Charter envisage à definite time lag between a ‘lthreat” and a “breach”, or else both words would not have been included. This being SO, my delegation, at least, interprets Article 39 as indicating that the first duty of the Council is to safeguard the peace, to prevent the occurrence of an actual breach, rather than to restore the peace after a breach has taken place. 27. We would humbly submit that the acknowledged existence of a threat to peace should be looked upon as serving the same function as the presence of pain in the body-a warning of sickness, the cure for which 28. The members with the pawer of veto have unanimously condemned South Africa for the pursuit of its racial policies. The right to give effect to their condemnation was granted to them as one of their prfvileges as powerful nations in the world. But it is a right that is also a duty, and in refusing to exercise their right they are also refusing to fulfil their duty. The Charter made the permanent members of the Security Council the chief guardians of the peace and acoorded them veto powers in order to help them to carry out their responsibilities. Sometimes, as we know, the permanent members are prevented from fulfilling their task because they are at odds with each other. This is what happened in the Korean crisis, when the Security Council was paralysed by a power conflict between the permanent members and the General Assembly had to take over in adopting the “Uniting for Peace” resolution [377 (V)]. But in the case of South Africa, where there are no cold war issues at stake, there is no real dissension among them. Al1 are essentially agreed in whole-heartedly and sincerely condemning the Verwoerd Government for its inhuman system of apartheid, for failing to liberate political prisoners, for conductingexecutions. Hence, there being no conflicting power interests at work in this instance, there is thus nothing to prevent the permanent members from taking concerted action along the lines desired by the great majority of the Member States of this Organization, 28. damne unanimement du Sud. Le pouvoir leur a Bté accordé comme l’un des priviléges a la qualité est l’exercer, La Conseil de la paix, et leur a confer aider nous Ie savons, pas desaccord s’est Conseil entre generale résolution de la paix”. il ne se pose pas n’existe permanents, condamner ment Verwoexd, refus executions pas dans ce cas de conflit d’inter&ts pêche dbcision grande majorite 29. The Indonesian delegation does not believe that the lack of unanimity among the veto Powers displayed in yesterday’s vote on the resolution [S/5761]ushould be regarded as in anyw ay undermining their unanimity of general attitude on the question of South Africa’s racial policies. While we may lament the fact that the Western permanent members allowed legal considerations, albeit important ones, to overweighpolitical and humanitarian considerations of a desperately urgent nature, we nevertheless take note of the apologetic tone of their explanations of vote. For the statements made yesterday [1128th meeting] by the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States are indeed proof positive that, if anything, their Condemnatory attitude towards the Verwoerd Govern- 29. faille puissances sur ebranlant attitude de l’Afrique occidentaux permis portantes, et humanitaires toutefois avaient par les xepresentants et du Royaume-Uni 6/ OfsciaI Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and Jane 1964. u Supplément 31. My delegation is convinced that if the Security Council could only consent to consider the situation in South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter and to include in its resolution a provision on economic sanctions, we would have gone a long way toward finding a peaceful solution of a problem that has troubled the conscience of the world for many years. We are fully in favour of the proposa1 for a national convention put forward by the Group of Experts [S/5658, annex] u established by the Security Council last December. But we are not encouraged by the Verwoerd Governmentls refusa1 to afford the group any assistance in its work whatsoever, or indeed by its refusa1 to take part in the present debate. We feel that what is required is some prodding. Obviously Council’s provision on economic sanctions could not be put into effect immediately; the period needed for preparation, however short, should give theVerwoerd Government ample time for second thoughts. Oncethe white South Africans realize that the implementation provision would mean the economic collapse of their society, the Verwoerd Government might suddenlyfind itself disposed to attend the initial negotiations on the National Convention, or alternatively be compelled make w ay for another Government. 32. This is, of course, to invoke the threat of sanctions. But my delegation contends that the threat would not be a real one unless the Security Council and the veto Powers have publicly committed themselves to carrying out sanctions in an explicit provision. Then, and only then, in the opinion of my delegation, Will the South African Whites be persuaded see reason. 33. The humiliating and dangerous deadlock between impotent world condemnation on the one hand and the persistent defiance of the South African Government on the other must be resolved. It is within the power of the permanent members of the Security Council achieve it. And we pray that they Will do SO before is too late. 34, Mr. HAMDANI (Pakistan): On behalf of the Government of Pakistan, I wish first to thank you, Mr. President, and the members of the Security Council for your courtesy in allowing me to participate in this debate. 35. 1 must mention here that our request forparticipation in this debate is based not only on Pakistan being a member of the Asian-African family, but also 36. The specific question of apartheid came before the General Assembly in 1952 at the request of thirteen Member States, of which Pakistan was one. We are gratified that a large number of independent African States exist today to lead this fight to awaken the conscience of humanity, and to be in the vanguard in the campalgn for the extinction of apartheid. It is a cause which is besieged with difficulties at present but, as it is not only a cause for racial equality but also for human civilization itself, we have no doubt, that it is bound to triumph in the end. 37. It is against this background that my Government considered it a duty to join with fifty-seven other Asian and African Governments in requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council toresumeconsideration of the serious situation existing in South Africa and to take such positive and urgent action as may be appropriate to prevent a conflict in South Africa of incalculable consequences for Africa andfor the world. 1 do not wish to repeat what was SO lucidly stated before the Council by its members, the representatives of Morocco and the USSR, and by the representatives of Liberia, Sierra Leone, India and Indonesia. Their statements, as well as the records before the Security Council, consisting particularly of the resolution of 4 December 1963 [S/54713 the report of the Secretary-General [S/5658], containing the report submitted by the Group of Experts and the report of the Special Committee on the Policy of apartheid of the Gove.rnment of South Africa, contained in documents Si5621 and S/5717, deal comprehensively with the situation prevailing in South Africa today. They point out clearly the danger of a most sanguinary conflict which is inherent in this situation. And they dispel any ambiguity about the measures which need to be taken immediately in order to avert the threat to international peace and security that is caused by the policies of the South African Government. As a Member State greatly perturbed over this graveproblem, Pakistan hopes that these statements and reports, as well as the report of the International Conference on Economie Sanctions against South Africa, held in London recently, at which Pakistan had the honour to be represented, Will receive not a mere academic appreciation, but urgent and practical consideration by the Security Council. 39. We greatly regret that the South African Government has chosen to remain unrepresented here. Instead, its Permanent Representative in his letter to the Council IS/5723] a/ has given the comments bis Government on the report of the Group of Experts, which he wants to be accorded due recognition when the Group’s report is considered by the Security Council. In this connexion, it is but fair to expect that the observations of the representative of Morocco, Ambassador Sidi Baba [1127th meeting], who was member of the Group of Experts, in refutation of the charges made, Will be given full attention. Atthe same time, Mr. President, with your permission, 1 wish quote from the reply of Sir Hugh Foot, another member of the Group, which has appeared in The Times London of 5 June 1964: II 1 It is hardly reasonable of the South African ( 1 Government to accuse us of having ‘no first-hand knowledge of the situation in South Africa’ after refusing the request of the Secretary-General we should be enabled ta visit South Africa. n (2) The extensive evidence we have heard and read does not support the South African Government’ allegation that th.e African Nationalist Congress, Pan Africanist Congress, the South African Indian Congre% and the Coloured Peoples’ Congress ‘communist orientated’ or ‘under communist control’ ; and none of those from whom we quote in our report is a communist. ” (3) It is impossible for the South African Government to refute our statement that the Bantu Laws Amendment Bill carried 1 an important stage further measures to deny to millions of South Africans elementary rights of employment, residence movement in large areas (87 per cent of the whole) of the country’. “(4) The statement that ‘for obvious reasons South African Government cari see no usefulpurpose in commenting on the detailed proposals for a National Convention and its agenda’ is scarcely adequate response to our argument for bringing the majority of the people of South Africa consultation, “As to the persona1 charge that 1 did not approach my task free from ‘preconceived ideas’ 1 certainly admît that 1 held the preconceived idea that, as we said in our report, ‘a political, economic and social system built on the domination of one race another by force cannot survive’. 8/ Ibid k ilOur report and our principal recommendation for a National Convention are soon to be considered by the Security Council. It is still possible to hope that the main contention of our group that ‘the future of South Africa should be tiettled by the people of South Africa-a11 the people of South Africa-in free discussion’ Will gain world-wide support, including increasing support in South Africa itself amongst the people of a11 races.” 40. It is plain that since the previous resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council have been treated with contempt and disdain by the South African Government, the imperative now is not just condemnation or exhortation, but such tangible action as Will compel the South African Government to abandon this reprehensible policy o-f apartheid. 41, In SO far as the imminent danger arising from the arbitrary trails of the opponents of the policy of apartheid and the imposition of death sentences on some of them is concerned, my Govérnment is beholden ta the representatives of the Ivory Coast and Morocco for the initiative taken by them in submitting the draft resolution contained in document S/5752/ Rev.1 to the Council, It is heartening that the Council adopted this resolution by 7 votes to none, with 4 abstentions, although my delegation regrets that it did net muster a unanimous vote. It is necessary to warn the Government of South Africa not to seek any satisfaction in the temporary reprieve given by the abstention of certain Powers, because the philosophy of apartheid and arbitrary legislation based on such philosophy has been equally condemned by these members of the Security Council who also happened to abstsin. 42. We shall look forward at a later stage in the debate to more powerful and eloquent testimony of the continued attachment of the Governments of the abstaining permanent members to the Principles and Purposes of the Charter and the efficacious useof the Security Council as a primary organ for the maintenance of peace and security. 43. But, as its sponsors have themselves pointed out, this resolution deals only with an imminent danger and not with the more basio issues involved in this question. As such, there is no reasonforus to believe that the passage of this resolution will mitigate the severity of the conflict in South Africa today. We are net being original in saying it, but it needs to be said again and again, that the conflict in South Africa, indeed the danger that confronts humanity there, does not arise from this or that specific measure of the Pretoria Government. It arises from its basic outlook and mentality which is now integrated into its entire governmental system and jurisprudence, It arises from the very foundation on which the South African Government bases its position in the world today. The policy of apartheid is not a mere excrescence on the 44, Looked at from this angle, theproblem confronting tl-e United Nations today is, 1 submit, of a far greater dimension than that of putting an end to a particular measure OF practice of the SouthAfrican Government. The issue, in the ultimate analysis, is of the freedom and self-determination of the peoples of South Africa. My Government shares the belief that a definitive solution of the South African problem cannot be evolved except by the establishment of a suitable national convention which Will fully representthe entirepopulation of South Afxica and decide the future shape and structure of that country. Apartheid is, of course, abomination, but even without the more degrading effects of this policy, a white South Africa functioning in essential opposition to the bulk of its population Will, we are afraid, continue to pose the gravest problem of international peace and security. 45. It is obvious that this problem cannot be overcorne by half-hearted or piecemeal measures. reasoning that demands resolute and comprehensive action on the part of the world community bas been articulated in the reports which 1 have mentioned earlier. It is time now for the Security Council, the primary organ of international peace and security and as a vehicle for the expression of humanity’s conscience, to register its acceptance of this reasoning and to decicle on effective action for making the South African Government desist from its present insane course. Such action should be guided by the conclusion reaohed by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at their meeting in February 1964, that “sanctions of every kind represent the only remaining means of peacefully resolvingthe explosive situation prevailing in South Africa”. 46, In this context, 1 must recall that it has been the consistent standpoint of my Government thal to meet the danger caused by the policy of the South African Government, the United Nations needs to adopt such measures as Will have a Swift and decisive effect in obtaining the compliance of tbat Government with the demands of humane public opinion throughout world. It might be relevant to mention here that at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, Pakistan delegation proposed an amendment [A/SPC/ L.751 to an eight-Power draft resolution [A/SPC/ L,72/Rev.l.], calling upon Member States to refrain from exporting petroleum to South Africa. amendment, based on a resolution adopted at the 47. In support of this view it is appropriate to draw the Counoilts attention to paragraph 107 of the report of the Group of Experts, whioh reads: II a.. as South Africa is specially dependent on imports of petroleum and rubber, there is a case for a ban on exporting these products to South Africa, on the ground that an embargo on these supplies could be more easily and quickly decided and enforced than a general ban on a11 imports into South Africa. The application of economic sanctions even if limited to petroleum-and possibly rubber-might act as a sufficient warning and deterrent.” 48. While expressing these thoughts before the Security Council, 1 cannot resist saying that we, the peoples of Asia and Africa and indeed of Europe and the Americas, who are outraged by the abominations of the South Afrioan Government, face today the deepest and most perilous issue of our times. We have made appeals; we have issued exhortations; we have uttered condemnations; we liave given ample expression to our sense of anger and outrage. SO far, a11 has been in vain. The spirit of the South African Government today does net represent a temporary aberration or insanity. It poses a challenge to a11 the principles which are at the basis of theunited Nations Charter, of me coexistence of different races and cultures in this single world and of civilizedrelations between different peoples. If we temporize, if we tinker with the problem, if we try to postpone the issue, we Will not be able to save the prinoiple of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 49, The South African Government takes refuge behind its so-called laws and judicial processes. In doing SO, it makes it manifest that its policy of apartheid is now anchored ancl bwilt into a system of jurisprudence which is the negation of a11 law and whioh represents, even more than the Nazis did, the cuit of racial superiority and the negation of human freedom. The question that we have to answer is whether the United Nations and, in fact, human civilizabon itself, has no resources to bring about the end of the savagery which has armed, shielded and fortified itself in the so-called laws and institutions of the Republic of South Africa.

Mr. President, on taking the Eloor for plénières, o/ S-X Officia1 Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, @WiaI Polirical Committee, 287th meeting; ibid., Plenary Meetings, 1067th meeting; and ibid., Annexes, agenda item 76, document A/4968. 51. I am here to replace the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Malagasy Republic wha is unable to be present; and it is in his name that 1 shali express views of my Head of State and of my Government the problem of apartheid which has once again been brought before the Security Council beoause the South African Government has not complied with previous resolutions, 52. It is a cause of reflection for a11 of us, as well as a sign of the times, that the debates on apartheid are taking place under the presidenoy of an Afrioan, who, had he had the misfortune to be born and to live in South Africa, would have been refused the most elementary of fundamental rights without which is really not worth living, 53. On the day after the performance of the last funeral rites in honour of Pandit Nehru, 1 cannot but evoke the memory of that man who throughout his life fought, with ski11 and courage, against a11 forms racial discrimination. His great shadow, 1 am sure, hovers above us while we work. 54. After the voting of the resolutiori [5/5’761] calling for the ending of the politioal trials and for the release of the convicted and accusedpersonswhose onlycrime is to have opposed the iniquitous ancl arbitrary laws on apartheid, we corne again tothe crux of the problem. The Malagasy Republic and the friendly States Liberia, Tunisia and Sierra Leone were asked by the Heads of African States who met thirteen months at Addis Ababa to speak on their behalf before the Security Council for the purposo of seeking means to obliterate from the face of the earth that shameful Soi~e, that form of Ieprosy constituted by the sytem of apartheid. The previous speakers have analysed this syst.em well and eloquently, and have indicated to you th’e solutions calculated to end it. 1 shall net revert to their arguments, but Will confine myself to certain considerations which my delegation would like stress. With a problem of such major concern, canfiot pass over even the least of its many aspects. 55. TQe attitude of the South African Government in the fi%+ place, a challenge to the world’s science. WhN+ the votes cast in this Council and in the General Ass’epbly have not always beenunanimous, at least no voice has been raised to defend apartheid, and no one during the past few years has dared to raise his hand in disapproval of the verdictswhich, eaoh instance, have reflected the revoit of world opinion, 56. Apartheid does away with every triumph barbarism secured by man throughout thc centuries. It is a throw-back to those eras in which might toolc precedence of right and the individua had to bow to the laws of detested but powerful masters. It is a ref;urn to those times, which we thought had gone for ever, when there were slaves over whom master had the right of life and death-to those so- 57. For centuries men have fought, lived and died, and bloody revolutions have taken place, in order that mankind might live in greater freedom and greater happiness, and enjoy its fundamental rights-freedom of thought and of expression, freedom to live with onds family wherever one desires, freedom of movement within the borders of one’s country. It was because these rights had been trampled upon that twice within the present Century the peoples arose to do battle. It was in order to destroy a regime based on racial supremacy, on the enslaving of its citizens to totalitarian ideology and policy, that from 1939 to 1945 millions of human being fought and suffered. It was in order to prevent this happening again that as the bloodiest of wars drew ta a close the nations devoted to peace and freedom founded the United Nations, and later drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . 58. But what do we see today in South Africa? Thirteen million Africans have blindly to obey the “Diktat” of 3 million Whites. They are deprived of a11 political rights, have no share in the administration of the country, cannot travel without authorization, and may not speak, Write or assemble freely. 59. No more cari be said of the arbitrary so-called If sabotagetf laws, under which any person cari be arrested and kept in solitary confinement, in a frightful cell, for an indefinitely renewable period of three months. None of the legal safeguards which are the pride of modern societies is enjoyed by such people. A mockery of legal organization, which would be comic if it were not tragic, prevails. Recently we have seen defendants acquitted by a Trimina court only to be nrrested, as they left the court-house, for tria1 once again. 60. Hundreds of thousands of patriots, who have committed no crime but to oppose tyranny, have been sentenced to very heavy penalties. Some forty executions have taken place within one year. An iniquitous tria1 which revolts the conscience of the world is now in progress, and the lives of great patriots are threatened. 61. One must read and reread the noble statements made by Nelson Mandela at the Rivonia trial. Here is a man whose life hangs in the balance and who courageously, in moving words, declares his doctrine and his ideal. How his high moral stature towers above the odious and ridiculous pettiness of his accusers! One must also refer to the moving statement, SO well supported with facts ancl documents macle here last Monday [1127th meeting] by the Liberian Secretary of State, who incisively described the special laws enacted against the patriots and the revolting circumstances in which they are applied. 62. Can our Organization tolerate this tragic situation without exhausting a11 the resources provicled by the Charter? Can we let the Universal Declaration of 63, An objective examination of the events which have taken place in South Africa during thepast years is disturbing for otber reasons. No one cantell where the infernal cycle of repression is going to stop. The masterly work of the Special Committee, presided over by our eminent colleague Dia110 Telli, Ambassador of Guinea, has shown how from year to year the laws of repression and oppression become more meroiless, as the anger of the oppressed seethes dully but with a violence more and more difficult oontain. Where Will this monstrous spiral stop?Would it not be wiser to tut it off while there is yet time and while our Organization cari still, as 1 shall presently try to show, effectively intervene? 64. 1 now corne to what with your permission 1 Will call, too ambitiously perhaps, the constructive part of my exposition. 65. The question of apartheid has been on our Organization’s agenda for eighteen years, Numerous resolutions have been passed by a large majority, with no ooncrete result, Must we continue to pile resolution on resolution under the sarcastio gaze of the South African racists? My delegation cloes not think SO. Al1 roads to a peaceful-1 repeat, peaceful-solution have been explored. In 1963 the Counoil wisely decided to make one last attempt, and for this purpose a committee of highly qualified experts, with Mrs. Alva Myrdal as chairman, was formed; it duly submitted its report [S/5658, Annex]. The SouthAEricanGovernment refused, with haughty disdain, to participate this final attempt. In my delegationls opinion, it is necessary that the recommendations of the Myrdal report should be implemented, that a constitutional conference attended by the patriots in full freedom should be called, and that the preparatory measures advocated in the report should be taken without delay. 66. What should we do if the Government of South Africa persists in its completely negative attitude? Are we going to let a record of default finally register the Organization’s failure over a clear and simple problem, and aocept the position that the South African Government, having flouted a11 our resolutions sixteen years, ‘cari feel itself permanently immune from the unanimous verdict oftheworld’s conscience? 67. The thirty-four African nations on whose behalf my colleagues and 1 speak here do not believe it, and Will never agree to it. They are resolved to fix their teeth into the question of apartheid and not to loose hold of it, no matter what efforts and sacrifices they may have to make. 68. The champions of apartheid are faced, no longer by a mere 13 million of defenceless Africans, but by a good 200 million unanimous and resolute Africans, who Will corne to you as often and for as long as is necessary and Will never rest until apartheid with its hideous train of misery and hatred disappears, Hitlerism disappeared beneath the rubble of the Berlin Chanoellery in April 1945. Let us still hope, however, 79. The first step towards a constructive solution was General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) of 6 November 1962, which recommended that Member States should take a number of diplomatie and economic measures against SOU~~ Africa, 1 cari take legitimate pride in saying here that the Malagasy Republic, like a11 the African States, immediately implemented the recommendations made in that reeolution. 70. Le premier pas vers une solution constructive est la r&olution date du 6 novembre 1962, qui recommandait auxEtats Membres de prendre un certain nombre de mesures diplomatiques et économiques a l’encontre de l’Afrique du Sud. C’est pour moi un declarer ici que, comme tous les Etats d’Afrique, la RBpublique malgache a immediatement appliqué les recommandations de cette r&solution. 71. The Security Council, following the same policy, adopted resolutions in August and December 1963 inviting Member States to place an embargo on arms for South Africa. Many did this, but if the measure is to be really effective it must be fully applied by a11 the Member States. 71. S’inspirant sécurit8 a adopte en ao0t et en decembre 1963 des résolutions l’embargo sur les armes a destination de l’Afrique& Sud. Beaucoup l’ont fait, mais pour que cette mesure soit vraiment efficace, il faut que tous l’appliquent sans faiblesse, 72. The time has corne to convert these reoommendations into obligations for every Member State. We hope that the great nations which have unanimously condemned apartheid Will, realizing that a11 previous attempts have failed, join with us in finally adopting the economic sanctions which, without their participation, would have no practical effect. In this way they Will prove to the Asian and Afrioan States their determination to participate, otherwise than by oral declarations, in the solution of a problem which by common consent constitutes a permanent threat to peace and security in Africa. 72. Le moment est venu de transformer ces recommandations en obligations pour tous les Etats Membres. Nous esphrons que les grandes nations qui ont unanimement condamne 1 ‘apaxtheid, conscientes du fait que toutes les tentatives précedentes ont échou8, se joindront B nous pour decider enfin d’adopter les sanctions Bconomiques qui, sans leur participation, n’auraient pas d’effet concret. Elles prouveront ainsi aux Etats asiatiques et africains leur volante de participer, bales, B la solution d’un problbme qui, de l’avis géneral, est une menace permanente a la paix et a la sécurite en Afrique. 73. Je me tourne maintenant vers les dirigeants de l’Afrique d’aboutir 8. une solution Equitable du probl8me avant qu’il soit trop tard, 73. 1 now turn to the rulers of South Africa, to say tc them chat it is in their interest to arrive at an equitable solution of the problem before it is too Iate. 74. 1 say to them frankly: Can you hope for a few years more to maintain the apartheid regime by armed force? It is possible. For how long Will you be able to do it? Think of your children, of your little children. Spare them the harvest of this hatred which 74, Je leur dis avec franchise: pouvez-vous esperer, pendant quelques années encore, maintenir par la force armée le régime d’apartheid? C’est possible. Combien de temps pourrez-vous le faire? Songez a vos enfants, a vos petits-enfants. Epargnez-leur les moissons de cette haine que vous semez actuellement. Songez, nous vous en conjurons, a jeter les bases d’une société dans laquelle les droits de chacun seront respectes, dans la collaboration et l’harmonie raciale, travailler cette terre oeuvre jusqu’ici, YOU are now sowing, Think, we beseech you, of laying the foundations for a society in which the rights of everyone Will be respected, co-operation and racial harmony Will prevail, and your descendants cari live and work beside their African brothers, in this land where you snd your ancestors have laboured up ti1.l now, 75. Look about you and see what is happening in Africa and the rest of the world. Can your conscience endure forever the silent scorn and fierce hatred of the 13 million Africans whom you oppress? Do you not fear that these feelings in the face of persistent servitude will explode, and that this Will result in a ghaStly train of suffering and hatred? How long Will 75. Regardez autour de vous ce qui se passe en Afrique et dans le reste du monde. Votre conscience ,ourra-t-elle et la haine farouche des 13 millions d’Africains que vous opprimez? Ne craignez-vous pas que ces sentiments, levant la persistance de la servitude, n’explosent et lue ceci nIentratine un sinistre cortege desouffrances at de haine? Jusqu’a quand affronterez-vous ;ilite des 200 millions d’Africains qui vous linsi que la desapprobation de toutes les nations? yOU brave the hostility of the 200 million Africans surrounding you, and the reprobation of every nation? ‘6. C’est sur jartisans de l’apartheid en Afrique du Sud, que je mudrais terminer cette intervention. Notre devoir a 76. It is with this appeal to reason, addressed to the supporters of apartheid in South Africa, that 1 would hrlng my statement to a close. Our duty is clear to all: 77. Mr. Taieb SLIM (Tunisia) (translated from French): Mr. President, I should first like ta thank you and the members of the Councilfor allowing me to participate in the debate on the question of apartheid. 78. As you are uncloubtedly awaïe, the question of racial discrimination in South Africa is of paramount importance for my Government as weli as for a11 tho African States which have instructed the Foreign Ministers of Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone and Tunisia to represent them in the Council in order to defend the cause of our brothers in South Africa. Unfortunately, pressing commitments have SO far kept my Minister away from the Council, and he has asked me to beg you to excuse him. 79. The Security Council has met today at the request of fifty-eight African-Asian States in order to continue the consideration of the serious situation existing in South Africa. This is the first time that the Security Council has had before it a request originating from such a large number of Governments. This fact is especially important and significant, for it denotes the deep concern of world opinion and the anxiety of the majority of Governments represented in our Organization. This anxiety at the deterioration of the situation in South Africa stems from the obstinacy of the Pretoria authorities in pursuing their racialist policies of apartheid and their refusa1 to implement the numerous decisions of the United Nations. 80. When the Security Council concluded its debate on apartheid on 4 December 1963, unanimity was achieved on the text proposed in the resolution adopted [8/54713, We had then welcomed the unanimity which, for the first time, had emerged on the question, because it gave added weight to the full moral force of the Security Council and lent a very special value and significance to its recommendations. In fact, that vote outweighed qur doubts about the goodwill of the South African Government and our reluotance to accept certain paragraphs in the resolution. We were of course convinced that the fate of the provisions of that resolution would be the same as that reserved for a11 the other resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly alike in the eighteen years that the question of apartheid has been considered by our Organization, 81. AS anyone might have expected, :he reaction of the Government of the Republic of Sout!l Africa to the recommendations contained in the resoluticn was in keeping with its systematic negative attitude towards the decisions of our Organization. But on this occasion, flouting the elementaryrules of propriety and courtesy, the Pretoria authorities did not hesitate to add insult 82. Furthermore, in the same document the Government of the Republic of South Africa had the audaci@ to question the objectivity and the integrity of the experts appointeà by the Secretary-General ta seek a solution to the problem of apartheid. 1 quote: 82. Enfin, dans le même document, de la Republique jusqu’à des experts trouver cite: “They are also well known individually as outspaken and partisan opponents of the South African policy which seeks to remove discrimination by a process of the separate evolution of the constituent peoples of the Republic. They cannot, therefore, reasonably be regarded as independent and impartial observers.lt “Elles la irréductibles a éliminer d%volution République. considerer impartiaux.” 83, Consequently, the reaction of the South African Government supports oUr conviction, already expressed a very long time ago, that any moderation and any desire for co-operationwith thewhite Government of South Africa is doomed to failure. 83. Ainsi africain déjà depnis très tout d&ir blancs 84. Since the most recent debate in the Security Council, the il1 Will and obstinacy of the Pretoria authorities towards our Organization, and their defiance and arrogance in pursuing the odious policies of apartheid, have continued to be manifested in amultitude of ways. 84. Depuis les derniers la mauvaise Pretoria et leur odieuse d’apartheid toutes les formes, 85. The interim reports of the Special Committee IS/5621 and S/5717], are most significant in this respect. The unco-operative statements of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, the Bantu Laws Amendment Bill and the implementation of the Transkei Constitution Act are amongthe matters which have been fully commented upon in those reports and which clearly show the determination of the South Afrioan Government to pursue its degrading policies of apartheid, The arbitrary detention, the repressive measures, the persecution and the torture to which the African leaders and the opponents of the policies of apartheid are subjected demonstrate the obstinacy and unreasoned determination of Pretoria to stifle and repress through coercion and terrer any movement for the restoration of the mast natural rights. 85. Les S/5717] d&larations la République Bantu Laws sur la constitution amplement festent sud-africain d’apartheid. de répression, sont soumis de la politique et la détermination et à réprimer, mouvement plus natUrels. 86. Le procés significatif. les tribunaux 3 la politique monde entier suffit M. Nelson rendre rendre culpés encourent la reconnaissance élbmentaires. des vagues 86. The Rivonia tria1 inparticular is most significant. The prisaners were a11 dragged before the courts for the Sole crime of having opposed the policies of apartheid and of having shared w ith the entire world respect for the human person. It is enough to read the pathetic statement of one of them, Mr. Nelson Mandela-to whose heroism 1 should like to psy a deserved tribute here in public-in order to realize the iniquity of this tria1 in which the accused are liable to the death penalty for having asked for recognition of their most elementary, inalienable rights. Waves of protests against the repression and terror instigated by the Government of Pretoria against the Africans have 87. My delegation, taking note of the resolution adopted at the previous meeting, wishes to thank those who unhesitatingly and uareservedly gave it their support. Although it had hoped chat this resolution would receive the unanimous support of the Counoil, my delegation is glad to note that, despite certain reservations, the adoption of the resolution adequately expresses the general disapproval of the policy of the Government r ’ South Africa and reveals the unanimous desire that the Pretoria authorities Will renounce their methods of subjugation and repression and ensure the release of the African leaders. 88. In this connexion, namely, the tria1 which is now in progress. 1 should like to quote from Mr. Nelson MandelaIs statement, which sums up in a few simple and very moving phrases the state of servitude in which 13 million Africans live and the denial of their most natural rights by the white Government of South Africa. 1 quote: “Africans want to be paid a living wage. Africans want to perform work which they are capable of doing, and not work which the Government declares them to be capable of. Africans want to be allowed to live where they obtain work, ancl not be endorsed out of an area because they were not born there. Africans want to be allowed to own land in places where they woxk, and not be obliged to live in rented houses which they cari never cal1 their own. Africans want to be part of the general population, and not confined to living in their own ghettos, African men want to have their wives and children to live with them where they work, and not be forced into an Unnatural existence in menls hostels, African women want to be with their men folk and not be left permanently widowed in the reserves. Africans want to be allow ed out after 11 o’clock at night and not to be confined to their rooms like little children. Africans want to be allowed to travel intheir own oountry and to seek work where they want to and not where the Labour Bureau tells them to. Africans want a just share in the whole of South Africa; theywant security and a stake in society.” m 89. This criminal attitude on the part of the white Government of SouthAfricais a flagrant and undeniable contradiction of the Universal Declaration of Human I/ Sec document A/AC.115/L.67, para. 79. 91. In t&e yourse of the previous discussion in the Security Council in July 1963 we referred to the size of the South African military budget, and 1 quote from our statement at that time: débats du Conseil de sécurit&, l’importance cite un passage t’l?urthermore, the Government of South Africa is continually strengthening its military potential. The budget estimates for 1963-1964 (under the chapter devoted to Army materiel, services and equipment) rose from 2,620,OOO rands in 1960-1961 to 11,945,OOO rands in 1962-1963, that is to say an increase of 450 per cent over the preceding budget. The strength of the standing army rose from 8,832 in 1960 to 12,700 in 1962-1963, not to mention the increase in the strength of the militia and commandos, The Government of the Republic of South Africa is steadily expanding production of modern weapons in the country: estimated expenditure on munitions manufacture increased about fortyfold between 1960-1961 and 1962-1963.t’ [1050th meeting, para. 59.1 92. dispositions africains. d’un article 1964 d’Afrique preparatifs 92, We stressed at that time the dangers which such budgetary provision presented for the African countries. In this connexion 1 should like to quote from an article published in The New York Times of 4 June 1964, which reported the South African Government’s intention to strengthen and intensify the military preparations. f The speaker continued in English.] “The South African Government disclosed today that it was building airfields for fighters and bombers in various parts of the country. The information was contained in a White Paper given to Parliament in Capetown by Minister of Defense Jacobus J. FouchB. The paper gave no indication of the number of fields under construction, the sites or their size, Theconstruction is regarded as another development in South Africa’s efforts to create the strongest military force on the African continent south of the Sahara, For the 1964-65 fiscal year, beginning next month, the Government has asked Parliament for the equivalent of $362.7 million for defense and security-more than it spent for military purposes at the height of World War II. ‘The White Paper reported that the Government was making ‘good prozress’ in manufacturingmunitiens. It put the number of whites under military training in various capacities at 82,940 and said arms and supplies were being stored in different parts of the country SO they could be issued without delay in an emergency. “South Africa’s defense policy, according to the paper, is to insure that her forces cari act ‘immediately, efficiently and uninterruptedlywhenever this IThe speaker continued in French.j 93. We are entitled to wonder what use the South African Government intends to make of these airfields and a11 this modern military equipment. It is difficult to believe that the white Government of South Africa is undertaking these military preparations for purely defensive purposes, for it would be hard to find among the neighbours of the Republic of South Africa a single country that has expansionist ambitions or the military wherewithal to achieve them. 94. The argument that the construction of these airfields and the purchases of aircraft are intended solely for interna1 securitywill not bear serious examination. Neither the importance or quantity of the equipment being manufactured, nor the operational range of the aircraft being purchased, cari substantiate such an argument. The only plausible theory which immediately cornes to mind is that the Government of South Africa is organizing and arming itself ta commit aggression against the neighbouring African countries. 95. The avowed intentions revealed by the article in The New York Times confirm that the policy of the white minority of South Africa is not only II seriously disturbing international peace and securityl’, as the Security Council resolution of 7 August 1963 [S/5386] put its, but is also endangering peace and security in Afrlca and throughout the world. 96. 1 offer these brief comments to those who continue to cherish fond hopes and who continually advocate moderation in regard to United Nations action against the racialist policy of the Whites in South Africa, We for our part long ago gave up a11 hope; the only hope we still have is to see those who advised us to be patient realize that for the white minority in South Africa moderation has always been regarded as a sign of weakness. 97. In this connexion 1 would refer to the latest initiative taken by the Council for the establishment, under paragraph 6 of the resolution of 4 December 1963 [S/5471], of a committee of recognized experts to examine methods of resolving the present situation in South Africa. 98. In doing this, 1 should first like to pay a tribute to our Secretary-General for the efforts which he has consistently made to discharge his task in the best possible way and for the diIigence he has shown in submitting his report [S/5658 and Add.l-41 a month before the prescribed date. 1 should also like to express the gratitude of my delegation for the praiseworthy efforts of the experts, who, in the discharge of their thankless task, have given proof of exemplary devotion and enthusiasm. Despite the obstruction, il1 Will and slander of the Pretoria authorities, our experts have been worthy of the confidence of our Organization. We know full well that the progress and “Nevertheless, the proposa1 that the Secretary- General should establish a small group of experts to examine methods of resolving the present problem peacefully and on the basis of the fundamental principles of human rights and respect for the territorial unity of South Africa arouses in us the same reservations as were expressed at the last meeting by the representatives of Ghana and Morocco. Other members of the Council, notably the representatives of the Soviet Union and France, have expressed reservations and doubts about the usefulness or effectiveness of such an examination, especially after the detailed and thorough studies that have already been made of the situation in South Africa.” He continued as follows: “The representative of Norway made it clear in his statement yesterday that the roleof sucha group of experts was to evolve in broad outline a solution which would make it possible to create the sort of saciety that is desired by the population of South fasciste travail création. pas de ma delBgation par le Comité Africa and not one established against its Will. In order to do that-although we cari a11 imagine what that will would be-the group of recognized experts would have to be able directly and freely to ascertain the will of the population as a wholeand, in the first place, that of the non-white population through its authentic leaders, free Prom a11 constraint or apprehension. Personally, 1 doubt that the Pretoria Government Will be willing to furnish a11 the necessary assistance for that purpose.” 11078th meeting, para. 106. ] 99. Consequently, after the refusa1 of the fascist Government of South Africa to receive the Group of Experts and to give it the assistance necessary to fulfil its task, it seems to us, in the light of what 1 have just quoted, that the main objective in the terms of reference of the Group of Experts could no longer be aohieved. The sound information and thorough studies contained in the report [S/5658, Annex] are undoubtedly very important and usefully supplement the work which the Special Committee has been carrying out since its establishment. 1 should be failing in my duty if 1 did not express here how much my delegation appreciates and is satisfied with the excellent work that bas been done by the Special Committee. du Groupe d’experts pour theid. nationale mandées dudit tionnée &bauche délégation, jour 100, The conclusions set out in the report of the Group of Experts undoubtedly contain positive elements for a tentative solution to the problem of apartheid. The holding of a national convention and the mariner of doing SO, as recommended in paragraphs 113, 115, and 117 to 120 of the report, constitute a proposa1 which, backed by our Organization, would serve as the basis for a solution. In the opinion Of my delegation, however, the explosive situationwhich from day to day is becoming worse and is apt at any time to turn into a bloody conflict whose extent 101. Unfortunately, such co-operation with South Africa, which according to the conclusions of the report itself is an indispensable condition for holding the convention, was refused by the Government of South Africa in its letter to the Security Council of 22 May 1964 [S/5723]. The Permanent Representative of South Africa did not hesitate in that letter to accuse our experts of tlsuppressio veri and suggestio falsi”, He would even have us believe that his oountrs is the _-- ., .- dreamed-of paradise for non-whites when hecleicribes his own version of the truth in the following manner: “The truth is that almost nowhere is there such internal peace and stability, such prosperity and such a high standard of living and education for non-whites and the extension to the Bantu masses of such new opportunities and privileges as there is in South Africa.1’ I shall not dwell on the value that can be set on such a statement. 102. In the circumstances and in view of the refusa1 of the Pretoria authorities to co-operate with the United Nations, the practioal value of the recommendation for the oonvening of the convention becomes problematical, since its implementation depends essentially on the goodwill of South Africa. We have always been ready to co-operatewiththeSouthAfrican authorities, and we have even asked for their cooperation. Unfortunately, the only response thus far bas been repeated refusais. We personally are not at a11 surprised at the terms of the letter of 22 May, the effect of which is to deprive the recommendation of the Group of Experts of much of its force and to reduce its chances of suecess, We only hope that this confirmation of a habituaily negative attitude Will dispel the illusions of those who still believe in the possibility of an easy solution with the South African racialists. 103. Furthermore, we accepted the proposalinparagraph 7 of Security Council resolution of 4 December 1963 only as a parallel course of action which, while the pressure on South Africa was being maintained, would enable preparations to be made for a reconciliation of whites and blacks in South Africaand open the way for establishing a new régimethere. The pursuit of this method would prepare the two elements of the South African population for a new concept of political life under which equal rights woulti be restored to a11 citizens and the country would b? saved from the chaos and violence to which the policies of apartheid must inevitably lead. If this is to be done, a marked improvement in the country’s political climate Will have to be brought about. Far from improving, however, the political situation has been steadily deteriorating since the Security Council’s debates of last November as is abundantly clear from 104, Despite our ardent desire to find a peaceful solution to the problem of apartheid and deapite the unceasing efforts of the United Nations to eliminate, through co-operation and persuasion, the danger involved in the continued purauit by the white Government of South Africa of its policy of racial diacrimination, we are bound to observe that a11 means have been exhausted without any progreas at a11 havingbeen achieved. A review of United Nations documents Will show that during the past elghteen yeara no effort bas been apared to convince the Government of South Africa that it ahould take a more reasonable view of its obligations as a Member State and to arrive at a peaceful solution of the problem of apartheid. 105. Despite the diplomatie activity and pressure of the closest partners of the South African Government, despite the repeated appeals of the General Assembly and the Security Council, despite the hostile reactions of world public opinion and the indignation expressed in a11 international institutions, the Government of South Africa continues to turn a deaf ear and doggedly pursues its criminal policies of apartheid. That is why the Heads of African States who met at Addis Ababa in May 1963 unanimously decicled as a last peaceful resort to contemplate applying economic sanctions in order to bring the Government of South Africa to accept a more humanely conceived policy. 106. The Council of Foreign Ministera, whioh met at Lagos from 24 to 29 February 1964, renewed ita appeal to a11 States for the strict application of the economic sanctions already decided upon by the General Assembly and the Security Council and itaelf decided that a11 steps would be taken to deny the right of overflight, landing and docking, and a11 other facilitics ta aircraft and ships coming from or bound for prevoit la paix et la s&urité pose des difficultés mais nismes South Afrioa. These, however, are only preliminary measures, and, in our opinion, it is high time they were supplemented with other measures that the Council oan take within tbe framework of the Charter of the United Nations. In view of the South African Government’s persistent refusa1 to discharge its obligations as a Member State, it is imperative for the Council to consider effective ways of inducing that Government to abandon ita policies of apartheid. The Charter of the United Nations embodies various mensurea and provisions to deal with a situation such as this which is a threat to international peace and security. Under Chapter VII (Article 41) economic measures should be recommendecl by the Security Council. 107. It ia certain that the application of this Article MiSes practical difficultiea which, though serious, are by no means insurmountable, and several interdiOnai bodies have been giving considerable attention to the problem of sanctions in order to determine the teohnical and prsctical means of applying them. sur modalit6s 108. dirigeants 108. Indeed, in view of the demands by the African leaders in South Africa, by the countries of Africa and 109, It was with this idea and aim that 200 representatives, a11 of them experts in different subjects, from forty-seven different countries met in London on 14 April 1964 at an International Conference on Economic Sanctions against South Africa with eleven international organizations participating. 110. The purpose of this Conference was clearly defined in the’speech of welcome made by Mr. Segal, the Secretary of the Conference, to whom I should like to pay a tribute for the zeal and devotion which he displayed in organizing the Conference and in making it a success. With your permission 1 shall quate from hi@ speech, He saicl: ILet us dismiss from our discussions any argument over whether sanctions Will hurt the nonwhites of Sputh Africa. Of course they Will. It is a truth falsely stressed by just those people whose interest in South Africa never seems to extend beyond opposing a11 enforcement of change. “Let us ask ourselves instead-are economic sanctions a$ainst South Africa legs!? 1s thereproper provision fpr t$em in the Charter of the United Nations? , . , What Will they cost?Which of the sanctioning countries Will sacrifice most? And how may this sacrifice be reduced or virtually eliminated? What steps are necessary to avoid damaging the world’s monetary systems? What is the impact likely to be on Stiuth Africa itself? How speedily may sanctions be expected to prove successful and change be enforced?ll This brie% quotation enables us to see that the London Conference set out to examine evcry aspect of sanctions before deciding on whether they were appropriate. 111. It was thus able to make a scientific and objective assessment of a11 the consequences of economic sanctions on the racialist policies of South Africa and ta study and assess their repercussions on world trade. It demonstrated above a11 that the results of applying economic sanctions clepend cz the effective participation in such action of South Africa’s principal trading partners. 112. 1 would not wish to burden the Council with a reading of the full text of the Final Act of the London Conference; but 1 shall confine myself to the most important recommendations of that Conference. The following extraet is from the Special Comrnittee’s report of 25 May 1964: fI , , . the Conference reachecl the conclusi.>n that the situation in South Africa constitutes a grave threat to international peace and security. It considered that the Security Council should define this situation as a threat to the peace in terms of Ar- “The Conference came to the conclusion that total economic sanctions are politically timely, economically feasible and legally appropriate. TO be effective, economic sanctions should be total and universally applied, and must have the active participation of the main trading partners of South Africa.” [S/5717, annex II, paras. 72 to 74.1 113, Thus, both the aims and the conclusions of this Conference show that the participants set out to examine evcry aspect of sanctions. The extent and the results of their studies therefore fully covered what the Group of Experts had called “the logistics of sanctions”. 114. These recommendations are the results of researoh by university authorities, the thoroughness and soundness of which cannot be doubted. Mr. D. Jobnson, Professor of International Law at the University of London, former Assistant Legal Adviser in the British Foreign Office and formerly a staff member in the Office of Legal Affairs at the United Nations, gave particular attention to the legal aspect of sanctions. He spoke as Pollows: llEconomic sanctions are, however, unlikely to be effective without a decision by the Security Council, rendering the taking of such measures obligatory for a11 members, followed up, if necessary, by a blockade. The authority 01 the Security Council under Articles 25 and 48, together with the provisions of Article 2 (6) and Article 103 of the Charter, provide the necessary legal hacking for such measures-even to the extent of making them binding on non-members of the United Nations. The difficulty about taking them is likely to be political rather than legal.” -/ 115. A study of the implications, impact andpractical repercussions of sanctions in relation to international trade showed that no action could be effectively undertaken without the active participation and full cooperation of South Africa’s trading partners, which are permanent members of the Security Council and as such assume a very special responsibility toward the United Nations. 116. 1 do not wish to dwell too long on the work of the historic London Conference, but allow me simply to quote a few lines from the closing speech by the Chairman of the Conference: “The responsibility of the five permanent members of the Securily Council is quite clear, particularly that of the countries which have SO far re- I frained from taking a stand on the problem of j j -/ %Ctions against South Africa. edited by Ronald Segal, Penguin Books ttd. 1964, page 84. 118. Speaking of the consequences of economic sanctions on trade of the Republic of South Africa, Mr. A. Maizels, Senior Research Officer at the National Institute of Economie and Social Research, London, had this to say: Veveral main conclusions cari reasonably be drawn from this review of tbe character of South Africa’s foreign trade. First, the South African economy is a relatively ‘open’ one, in the sense that foreign tsade plays a major role in economic growth, both by providing growing markets for South African produce, and by providing the industria1 materials, fuel and capital equipment on which that growth has fed. Second, the concentration of South African foreign trade on a limited number of industrialized countries implies that no attempt by the United Nations to impose sanctions on South Africa could succeed without the full agreement and the participation of these countries, among which Britain and the United States are the most impsrtant. Third, sanctions limited to a few ‘key’ commodities . . . would have severe adverse repercussions onthe South African economy, without putting that economy under ‘siege’ conditions, Fourth, some form policing of trade with oountries not conforming with a general United Nations sanctions scheme would have to be instituted to prevent any substantial evasion by way of trade diversion.” [S/5717, annexI1, para. 42.1 119. Professor G. D. N. Worswick, Fellow Magdalen College, Oxford, dealing with the impact of economic sanctions on the United Kingdom economy, said: “Thus there is no simple answer to the questionwhat would be the effect of economic sanctions the U.K. economy itself? If Britain actedunilaterally, and then proceeded to tope with consequential balance of payments problems by the wrong means, the outcome might mean a sacrifice of 2-1/2 per cent of national product. But if an optimal policy were followed, a combined operation of a11 the natiens’ the overall loss would be imperceptible, especially in economies which are growing at a reasonable rate, Britain’s position with regard sanctions is a strategio one. On the one hand her trade constitutes about one third of the external trade of South Africa. Thus if Britain stayed out, the effectiveness of sanctions by other countries would be significantly diminished, the more SO if Britain allowed her own trade oonsequentially inorease. On the other hand, if Britain were to do it alone, and were obliged to tope with consequential balance of payments problems single-handed, she might run into rough water. Thus Britain, if she supports sanctions, has a strong case for asking that they should take the form of a combined U.N. operation, in which event the burden would be light. n [Ibid., para. 56.1 “The imposition of sanctions against the Republic of South Africa Will, on balance, have a very minor impact on the American ecpnomy. The cessation of exports will result in disemployment of 50,000 workers. The cessation of imports from the Republic Will not create any serious problems, although the cost of substitutes may rise nominally. The threat that sanctions Will result in the loss of foreign investment is more apparent thar, real, especially if the sanctions are universally applied and effectively policed. Finally, the reduction in the gold outflow from the Republic of South Africa should not be a source of difficulty and may even help bring awut some long overdue reforms in the international financial mechanism”. (Ibid., para. 57.1 121. Finally, one of the most recent issues of the Monthly Abstract of Trade Statistics, published by the Department of Customs and Excise of theGovernment of South Africa and covering the-period January to December 1963, enables us to observe a substantial increase in South Africa’s trade with its three principal trading partners. France inparticular increased its exports to the Republic of South Africa by $14 million, while the United Kingdom’s exports to South Africa rose by $80 million, representing an increase of 19 per cent by comparison with 1962. 122. The countries of Africa, international public opinion, the General Assembly of the United Nations, every Govesnment in the world and, above all, the highest international organ-the Security Councilhave, in various resolutions, condemned the criminel policies of the South African racialists. We recall in particular the statements made by the representatives of the United States, France and the United Kingdom in August 1963, in which they expressedtheirprofound disapproval of the policies of apartheid practised in South Africa. 123, It is time for the Security Council to assume its responsibilities as defined in the Charter and to consider effective means for the application of economic sanctions against the Government of South Afrioa. Such a decision would calm the anxiety of the States of Africa and Asia and satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the non-white population of South Africa, which regards this as the only means of liberation from the domination of the Nazi regime oppressingit. 124. This is the only way left open, and any temporizing Will only make the situation even moreinextritable and inevitably lead to violence and bloodshed. This form of action is a11 the more imperative as it offers the one possible chance of halting South Africa as it recklessly pursues the systematic extermination of the Africans. It is even pointless to spend much time in deliberating on the holding of a national convention, for the South African reply of 22 May shows

There are no more speakers on my list for this afternoon and none for tomorrow either. After consultation with the members of the Counoil, 1 believe that they are agreeable to meeting on Friday 10.30 a.m. If Ihear no objections, it Will be SO decided. The meeting rose at 5.45 p-m. HOW TO OBTAIN’ UNITED United,Nations publications may distributors throughout the Write to: United Nations, Sales COMMENT SE PROCURER LES Les publications des Nations Unies agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones casas distribuidoras en todas partes diriiase a: Naciones Unidas, Section I Litho in U.N. Price: $U.S. OSO (or equivalent