S/PV.1131 Security Council

In accordance with the decision taken earlier on this matter by the Council, 1 shall invite the representatives of Madagascar, Indonesia, India, ‘Sierra Leone, Liberia, Pakistan and Tunisia to take places at the Council table. A t the invitation of the President, Mr. L. Rakotomalala (Madagascar), Mr. L. N. Palar (Indonesia), Mi-. Narendra Singh (India), Mr. G. 0. Coleridge- Taylor (Sierra Leone), Mr. J. R. Grimes (Liberia), Mr. K A. Hamdani (Pakistan) and Mr. TaTeb Slim (Tunisia) tookplaces at the Counoil table.

The first speaker on my list is the representative of Indonesia, and 1 cal1 on him to address the Counoil.

On 9 June 1964, the Security Council adopted by 7 votes with 4abstentions a resolution [S/5761]‘/ urging the South African Government to end forthwith the tria1 in progress and to grant an amnesty to a11 political prisoners. Two days later, the judges at the Rivonia tria1 awarded sentences of life imprisonment to eight major leaders in the fight against apartheid. As my oolleague, Mr. Sidi Baba of Morocoo, said [1130th meeting], that was a tragic day for Africa. We cari only thank God that the irrevocable act of injustice was not metedoutto these men, whose courage and restraint have earned them world-wide admiration. 4. There cari be no doubt that before long they Will be set free, and the only question is whether it will .I/ Officia1 Records of the Securig Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplemé& for April, May and June 1964. 5, As 1 said in my statement last week, it might only require the Verwoerd Government to be rash enough to commit the single crime of executing Nelson Mandela to inflame the whole continent of Africa beyond the point of restraint. If the VerwoerdGovernment has not chosen to comply with the injunctions of the Security Council and the requests of the General Assembly with respect to the freeing of political prisoners, evidently the Court has not failed to note their import as a gauge of the strengthof world public opinion. 5. semaine Verwoerd crime d’executer le continent africain plus maftriser ne S’est pas r&olu Conseil gén6rale détenus politiques, n’a pas manque de les considérer cation de la force de l’opinion publique mondiale. 6. One cannot help wondering then how much more effective might the resolution of 9 June have been had it been adopted unanimously. The three western countries with the power of veto which abstained in the vote ail expressed fears as to the timing of the resolution and its possible adverse effects on the verdicts reached at the Rivonia trial. My delegation considers these fears misplaced in this respect, Moreover, we seriously question the consistency of the negative stand taken by those Powers with the forthright nature of their statements which clearly indicated that they regarded the laws’ under which the Rivonia tria1 was conducted as arbftrary and unjust. The representative of the United States admitted that the so-called security laws were designed primarily to maintain the system of apartheid, and then he went on to restate bis Government’s conviction that policies of apartheid are “inconsistent with the principles of the United Nations and are charged with potential danger not only for the people of South Africa but also for a11 peoples throughout the world who seek racial harmony” [1128th meeting, para. 361. Yet, because the triais were still in progress or, as the phrase is, @ rjudice, the three Powers felt that the resolution was a grave interference in the judicial processes of a country , 6, conditions, du 9 juin si elle avait ét6 adoptge 4. llunanimit6, trois qui se sont abstenues dans le vote, ont toutes exprime des craintes quant aux effets d’avoir pro&s craintes fondement. l’attitude temps tenaient pour injustes cation poursuivis. que ces “lois destinées ensuite r&ffirm6 la politique principes seulement mais encore pour tous les peuples qui, dans le monde entier, [1128Bme seanoe, par, 361. Pourtant, procès l’expression trois tuait une ingerence grave dans les affaires judiciaires d’un Etat. 7. In Nazi Germany thousands of heinous crimes were committed in the name of laws condemned by the rest of the world. These crimes led to a world conflagration which cost millions of lives, and after the conflagration was over, the world went to Nilrenberg to sit in judgement on the laws which had made the Nazi crimes possible. The powerful countries of that era had perhaps some excuse for not intervening before it was too late to forestall wholesalebloodshed and slaughter because the League of Nations had no power of effective action. But the Security Counoil bas that power and it is particularlywithin the powers Of ths countries holding the right of veto to take pre- ) ventive action, in the case of South Africa, SO that i, laws which have been unanimously condemned as uni just and as seriously disturbing international peace f 3 7. En Allemagne nazie, des milliers de crimes ignominieux ont Bt6 commis au nom de lois condamnées par le reste du monde. Ces crimes ont abouti à une conflagration mondiale dans laquelle des millions d’étres humains ont trouve la mort; puis, B l%sue de cette guerre, le monde s’est rendu a Nuremberg pour juger les lois qui avaient rendu possibles les crimes nazis. 11 se peut que les pays puissants de l%poque aient eu quelques excuses de ne pas intervenir avant qu’il fût trop tard pour arr&ter les torrents de sang et pr& venir les assassinats en masse, parce que la Société des Nations n’avait pas les moyens d’agir efficacement, mais, dans le cas de l’Afrique du Sud, il est au pouvoir du Conseil de &curité, et en particulier des pays ayant le droit de veto, d’agir pr8ventivement pour remedier a des lois qui ont Bt6 condamnees a l’una- 9. Al1 the delegations which have been invited to participate without vote in the debate here have appealed ta the Council to take enforcement action agamst South Africa in the form of economic sanctions. We have done SO in the belief that sanctions are the only peaceful means open to the world body of correcting South African laws which have been unanimously condemned and which could have such dire consequences for world security. 10. And now, to our plea, has been added the most pertinent voice of all, that of Chief Albert Luthuli, a great South African leader and auniversally acclaimed man of peace who has been awarded the Nobel Prize because of hls efforts for peace. In his statement of 12 June, which was read to the Council by the representative of Morocoo [113Oth meeting, para. 51, Chief Luthuli appealed to “a11 Governments throughout the world, to people everywhere, to organizations and institutions in every land and at every level, to act now to *impose such sanctions on South Africa that Will bring about the vital necessary change and avert what cari become the greatest Afrioan tragedy of our times”. Hia appeal was prompted directly by the verdicts reached at the Rivonia triai; for, as he said, those men condemned to life imprfsonment “believe profoundly in justice and reason; when they are looked away, justice and reason Will have departed frein the South’ African scenep. 1 believe that the Security Council cannot bear this responsibility. 11. When a groat leader, who is also an acknowledged man of peace, utters such a plain warning, we cari only ignore it at our peril. Chief Luthuli’s clear cal1 for action should not be unheeded by the countries which have the power of veto, the countries which have hitherto been reluctant to take positive steps, despite the undoubted sincerity of their condemnation of the poiicy of apartheid. We understand the nature of their reservations and we appreciate that they face genuine problems in enacting Iegislation whfch might cause inconvenience, though not hardship, to their own people; but at the same time we beg these three Governments to consider the strong possibility that their fears might be exaggerated. In a11 humility, we suggest to them that they may be guilty of misjudging the temper of their countries and that a decisive gesture on their part in conformity with the wishes of the vast majorily of nations might meet with much warmer response from their people than they have ever suspected. 12, In particular, we appeal to the United States, as the most powerful country in the western world, to 13. The imprisonment of Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and their six colleagues stands as a challenge to the Security Council. As 1 said at the outset of my intervention, there is no doubt that these men Will be freed. The only question ,is whether it Will be by violence or by peaceful means. Let us choosepeaceful means while there is time for us to make the choice.

In the six months whioh have elapsed since the question of the inhuman polioies of apartheid pursued by the racist régime of the Republic of South Africa was last considered in the Security Council, the position in that country has further deteriorated. This intolerable situation, which is fraught with serious consequences not merely for the African continent, is evidenced by the reports of the United Nations Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa which were submitted to the Council in documents S/!%I21 and S/57173-and by the statements of the Ministers and representatives ofthe Afro-Asian oountries taking part in the Security Council’s work. 15. The Minister for External Affairs of Sierra Leone, Mr. Rogers-Wright, speaking in the Council on 8 June last, stressed that “the practice of the policies of apartheid in Africa during the middle of the twentieth Century without question constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security” [1127th meeting’ para. 98]. un terme 1’Assemblee 16. This opinion is now shared by a11 sensiblepolitioians, The question of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa remains on the agenda of the Security Counoil and of the General Assembly. In 1963 alone, the General Assembly and the Security Council adopted four resolutions solemnly calling upon the rulers in Pretoria to abandon the criminal policies of apartheid and discrimination and to stop the orgy of lawlessness, violence and terror directed against the vast majority of the country’s population. Those resolutions stressed that the policies of the rulers of South Africa were abhorrent to the conscience of mankind and were inconsistent with the prinoiples contained in the Charter of the United Nations and with South Africa’s obligations as a Member of the United Nations. geants patible Unies, par oe pays en tant que Membre des Nations Unies. 17, 17. Nevertheless, the South African authorities have continued to oppose the decisions of the United Nations 2/ kne text as A/5692 and A/S707 respectively (see Officia1 Records of the General Aseembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexesl. 18. We know how provocative the reply of the Pretoria Government was to the last Security Council resolution [S/5’76l.], adopted only a few days ago. The South African patriots fighting for the rights of their people, for freedom and national independence, were sentenced by the racist régime to life imprisonment. The Seourity Council cari only regard this fresh act of arbitrary lawlessness, which has aroused generai indignation and has been resolutely condemned as an outrageous challenge to the United Nations. 19. It is difficult to pass over the statements of Verwoerd, who in his speech to Parliament on 8 May last said, during the discussion of the question of South West Africa: “1 have not given up hope that the world cari be persuaded to see the value of our policy . n 20. Ignoring the decisions of the world Organization, and mercilessly trampling upon the most elementary rights of the indigenous African people, the racists, as you see, still permit themselves to expatiate on some sort of possible Qnderstanding” of their monstrous cannibalistic policy. But is the meaning of the Verwoerd rbgime’s policy not known to all? Are the 13 million non-whites of South Africa not suffering its baneful consequences? 21. Reservations and hunger, slums and disease, mass forced resettlement, the cruellest exploitation, police raids and arbitrary decisions of the courts-is not that the true meaning of the policy of apartheid; is not that the sum of what this policy brings to the indigenous population of the Republic of South Africa? 22. The head of the Indian delegation, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of India, Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, was perfectly right wben she said: “TheGroup Areas Act, the Suppression of Communism Aot ancl the Bantu Education Act, to mention only three, have made South Africa worse than the Nazi concentration camps for 13 million non-white people in it. n [1127th meeting, para, 170.1 23. A new development in the extension of apartheid by the Verwoerd rbgime is the publication of the report of the Odendaal Commission,i/ whichproposes the establishment in the Territory of South West Africa of ten 11Bantustans81-infamous ghettos for the indigenous population of Africa. The report of the Odendaal Commission is designed to implant apartheid not only in the Republic of South Africa but in every sphere of life in South West Africa, and to strengthen and make permanent the annexation of that Territory. Significant in thfs connexion is the statement of Mr. de Wet, South African Ambassador to the UnitedKing- 3/ Republic of South Africa. Report of the Commission of Enquiq into South West Afrjca Affairs, 1962-1965, Pretoria, Government Printer, 1964. 24, But does the indigenous population of South Africa not have the right to stand and battle for its vital interests acquired by birth in that very country, if the newcomers-the white conquerors-claim these rights? Furthermore, what kind of %ivilizationf~, may I ask, do we here have? It is a civilization that resorts to inquisitional methods, cannibalistic treatment of the indigenous population, a policy of fire and sword, a policy of repression and of the abasement of human dignity. 24. n’aurait int&r&ts alors P&endent mette ici? La civilisation, ce auxquels la repression tique d’oppression hommes, 25. Such statements fully reflect the virtual conversion of the country into a military and police camp. Suffice it to recall that South Africa’s military budget for 1964-1965 has reached proportions unprecedented in the country’s history-$294 million, that is, 25 per cent more than in the 1963-1964 financial year ending this month, 25. la transformation police. la RBpublique 1964-1965, soit 25 p. 100 de plus que celui de l’exercice clos ce mois-ci. 26. The racist regime of South Africa is arming feverishly. Data supplied by the Special Committee show that in the past four years the production of arms, military equipment and explosives in the Re- Public of South Africa increased by 80 per cent, and that the amount of arms and military equipment of all types in South Africa is now three times what it was during the Second World War. According to available data, the South African authorities plan to spend in the 1964-1965 financial year $46.2 million on the production of military equipment-in other words, more than 100 times the sum SO expended in 1960. 26. s’arme par le ComitB spgcial, la production tions a augment8 de 80 p. 100 pendant les quatre dernikres années; d’armements seconde dont on dispose, tention 1965, 46 200 000 dollars de guerre, l’anni%e 1960. 27. It should be stressed in this connexion that the Seourity Council, in its resolutions of 7 August [S/5386]gand 4 Deoember 1963 [S/5471],51 solemnly called upon a11 States to cesse forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of a11 types and military vehicles to South Africa, as well as the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa. 27. ses 4 decembre a demande fin imm8diatement de munitions a l’Afrique tien fabrication en Afrique 28. africaine navires 28. Meanwhile the racists of the Republic of South Africa continue, even now, to be supplied from abroad with powerful warships, aircraft and helicopters. 29. resolutions et, nisation? 29. Who is engaged in this traffic? For whom do the resolutions of the Security Council not exist? Who is violating them, and thus undermining the foundations Of our Organization? 30. Times trois chantiers nl’aocord 30. According to The New York Times of 26 March, for example, the United Kingdom has supplied a further three anti-submarine frigates, built in British yards, under the so-oalled Simonstown Agreement. o/ OffiCial Records of tbe Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Suppiement for July, August and September 1963. 4/ année, s/ I!A$Supplément 9 5, Supplement for October, November and December 1963. 32. It is no secret whom the Minister had in rnind in referring to “other well-disposed countries “, This means, in the first place, the Portuguese colonizers and the racist rggime in Southern Rhodesia, linked as they are with the rulers of South Afrioa by common designs against the national liberation movement of the African peoples. 33. It has been pointed out, in the reports of the Special Committee and in statements by the distinguished Mini&ers and representatives of African and Asian countries in the Security Council, that the racist regime of South Africa could not have persisted SO long in its policy had it not enjoyed the economiti, political and military .support of a number of Western countries. 34. lt is appropriate to recall the statement of Ambassador Dia110 Telli, Chairman of the Specisl Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of’ the Republic of South Africa, which as already rightly observed, has accomplished a great deal of positive work. At the end of last year, Ambassador Dia110 Telli, in the Special Political Committee, clearly pointed to the particular responsibility of States, which directly or indirectly encourage the South African Government’s policies of apartheid: n .,. The States are the United Kingdom of Great Britain in the lead, the United States of America, France, Italy, West Germany, Japan, Holland and Belgium. None of these countries having announced any concrete measures to put an end to their cooperation with South Africa in the diplomatie, economic and, especially, the trade fields, it is necessary again to pose the problem in clear-out terms to these States SO as to avoid deluding international opinion by simply adopting one more resolution without those States which have in their power the key to the solution of theproblem of apartheid having indicated unequivocally their position in this matter and having indicated their agreement-or, if the contrary, their refusa&to put an end to the policy of apartheid.“61 35. We should like to know whether the appeal by the Special Committee has been heard by a11 concerned. If it has, what is the attitude towards it of the States Members of the United Nations mentioned? Have they taken effective steps, or have they turned a deaf ear to the Committee’s well-founded appeal? 6/ For a summary of this statement, see Officia1 Records of the General Assembly, Eigbreenth Session, Special Political Committee, 396th meeting. 38. au trafic “business” civili&s, libertt5s de demander du Conseil puissances Royaume-Uni, tique est un crime 38.. Is it not time to end the shameful commerce of the slave-owners and criminal business elements gcdng forward in the so-called civilized countries, with their much-vaunted constitutions and democratic freedoms? Are we not entitled to ask how much longer permanent members of the Security Council, especially great Powers like the United States of America and the United Kingdom, Will continue to act as accessories in the policies of apartheid, which under our Charter constitute a crime against humanity? 39, Foreign monopolies and the fate of racism in South Africa are bound together by the same tord, by common material interests. This is in fact what determines the attitude of a number of Western countries, inoluding several permanent members of the Security Ceuncil, towards the policies of apartheid and racism in the Republic of South Africa. 39. dans la RBpublique par ce qui datermine dentaux, Conseil et de racisme 40. It is well known that according to officiai data, some 175 United States companies are operating in 3outh Africa, inoluding such major concerns as the “Big ‘l’hreen of the United States automobile industry- General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor CO. and Chrysler Corporation together withInternationa1 Har- Vester CO., Firestone Tire and Rubber CO. and many others. The investments of United States companiesoffioially amounting to some $500 million, but in fact, as the representatives of the companies themselves admit, approach $1,000 million-are increasing from year to year, For instance, in 1963 alone United States automobile companies announced further investments: General Motors, $30 million; Ford Motor, $11 million; Chrysler, an 80 per cent inorease in production; Firestone, $7 million, and SO on, and SO forth. 40. ci&& compris, automobile et Chrysler Harvester, d’autres americaines, se monteraient mais de ces soci&&, augmentent exemple, ont d&?lar8 General 11 millions tation lars; 41, Republique 1 milliard implantées britanniques 41. United Kingdom investment in the Republic of South Africa officially amounts to El,000 million sterling. Major British companies are firmly established there, as in the case of Rio Tinto Zinc and Imperial Chemical Industries: the latter’s subsidiary, 42. In March 1964 the well-known British newspaper The Observer described the profits made by foreign comuanies in South Africa. as follows: “The average diviiend in South Africa is 12.6 per cent, compar& with 6.6 per cent in Western Europe, and American companies doingbusiness in South Africa are averagiag profits of about 27 per cent on invested capital.” 43. No less indicative are the trade relations between South Africa and members of NATO. The United Kingdom and the United States of America for instance, account for almost 40 per cent of South Africa’s exports and about 50 per cent of its imports. 44. The United States newspaper Journal of Comm.erce gives figures, which show that in 1963 experts of goods from the United States to South Africa inoreased by 21 per cent over 1962. On 30 March 1964, the same newspaper, referring to a statement by Dr, Erich Lang, Head of the Central and Southern Africa Section in the Ministry of Economie Affairs at Bonn, gave figures showing that, in 1963, experts from the Federal Republic of Germany to the Republic of South Africa had risen by 25.4per cent and imports by 20 per cent, as compared with 1962. 45. The Soviet delegation feels it impossible to remain silent about one inexplicable matter. The report entitled “The Pattern of Foreign Trade of the Republic of South Africa” (A/AC.115/L.55) dated 5 March 1964, prepared by the United Nations Secretariat at the request of the Speoial Committee on the Poliaies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa quite arbitrarily states that the Soviet Union is using the services of the South Afrioan diamond-marketing cartel-we refer to pages 26 and 27-and the USSR is the only country mentioned in this connexion in the report, Such taking of liberties with the facts-to use no stronger expression-is, to say the least, surprising. 46. It is well known that theSoviet Union has no relations, in trade or anything else, with South Africa. Apparently the authors of that false statement needed it in order to detract attention from the true state of affairs and obscure the issue, We hope that this matter Will be duly investigated and that a clear explanation of the reasons for such lack of responsibility and accuracy in the preparation of documents Will be forthcoming. 47. We have touched on certain economio interests of foreign countries in South Africa, because they exert a determining influence not only on the behaviour of the racist Government of South Africa but also on the attitude of the oountries concerned towards the adoption of resolute measures against the Pretoria régime. 48. It is regrettable that, influenced by the trade policy of the Powers which 1 have mentioned, not a11 the African oountries have severed their economic relations with the slave-owning State of South Africa; 50. At the session of the Council of Mini&ers of the Organization of African Unity which was held at Lagos in February 1964, a resolution was adopted which envisaged that that Organization should: )l., , renew its appeal to a11 States to apply strictly the eoonomic, diplomatie, politioal and military sanctions already decided upon by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council; and that it should address a special appeal to the major trading partners of the Government of South Africa, to desist from the encouragement they are giving to apartheid through their investments and their trade relations with the Pretoria Government; Il. 51. It is also appropriate to recall the words used hy Ahmed Ben Bella, President of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, in a table to the President of the Security Council [S/5759],3 which appealed to a11 members of the Council n,. . to decide on effective measures, principally economic sanctions, to oombat odious racial practices.” 52. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana, in his turn made the following appeal to the Security Council: “It is, therefore, my fervent hope that strong measures including economic sanctions Will be adopted by the Council. At this critical moment, economic sanctions Will constitute the minimum measure which cari be employed against the Government of South Africa for its continued repression of 12 million Africans because of their colour and for its blatant rejection of a11 United Nations peaceful o-vertures embodied in past resolutions.” [S/5757] 7/ 53. In his statement to the Security Counoil, Mr. Grimes, the Foreign Minister of Liberia, noted that “we are left with no alternative but to urge the Security Council to apply economic sanctions as the only peaceful recourse left open to resolve the issue +. .” (1127th meeting, para. 711. 54, Ether representatives of African-Asian countries in the Council speak in the same vein, 55. The Seeurity Council, which bears primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace ancl security, cannot ignore these appeals. It is bound t0 make a proper response to these approaches and demands , n Offbal Records of the Security Council. Nineteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1964. 11 i 5’7. We urge that the Security Council decisively and unreservedly require the South African Government to comply with the Security Conncil and General Assembly resolutions providing for an end to the policies of apartheid and racial discrimination, 58. The Soviet Union maintains no relations whatever with the South African racist regime, since it regards such policy and practice as a crime against humanity. We would point out that the Soviet Union has neither diplomatlc nor consular relations withthe Government of South Africa. It has no trade relations with that country. The Soviet Union is contincedthat immediate and effective economic, political and other sanctions, recommended by the Security Council and the General Assembly, could constitute efficacious means of influencing the racist Government of the Republic of South AErica. 59. On the basis of this position, the Soviet delegation supports the demands of the African-Asian countries as expressed in the recommendations of the Special Committee [S/5621 and S/5717] with regard to the taking of the most effective and immediate measures against the racist regime of South Africa. 60. It is the duty of the United Nations to bring ta the speediest possible end the Republic of South Africa’s policies of apartheid-a monstrous evil, not only for the peoples of Africa-and to do away with this shameful phenomenon of our time.

The views of the Norwegian Government on the policies of apartheid pursued by the Government of the Republic of South Africa are well known. They have been stated repeatedly in the Security Council as well as in the General Assembly. These basic views remain unchanged. We find apartheid to be in Sharp and outright contradiction with the fundamental human rights and freedoms. The practising of apartheid stands out as an example of horror at a time when other States in the world, also having problems of racial differences and the accompanying phenomena of discrimination and prejudice, are making determined andfar-sighted efforts to overeome their problems. 62. The Government of the Republic of South Africa is resorting to increasingly harsh measures of repression. Nevertheless, the full utilization of the present means of the Government appears not to be sufficient The already large and heavily equipped policeforcei~ being further expanded. The military forces also are being expanded and modernized at a rapid rate. This to .us is yet another proof that the whole concept of apartheid is unworkable. 63, That the present Government of South Afrioa is persisting in pursuing the policies of apartheid, with 64. During the last General Assembly aconsiderable number of Member States expressed the view that the 64. de tri% nombreux que l’organisation seulement pas faire, mais ils ont jugé tout aussi important, davantage, le cours des Bvenements United Nations should not only tel1 South Africa what not to do; it was equally important-if not more sofor the United Nations to offer assistance inproviding a gradua1 and peaceful correction of the course away from catastrophe and towards respect for human rights regardless of race, colour and creed. fique, voie du respect des droits de l’homme de race, de couleur ou de croyance. 65. In furtherance of this concept the Security Council on 4 December of last year unanimously decided [S/5471], inter alia, to have established a group of experts charged with seeking an alternative positive course leading to the restoration of human rights 65. du 4 décembre décidait groupe moyen les liber% l’Afrique invite réaliser la sociét8 avoir suggestions africain Il cette occasion d’engager un dialogue l’Organisation sulte sigeance. rapport africain [S/57233/] m&hodes des membres. 66, Je me bornerai rale, nement avoir insuffisante gouvernement, & toute coopBration and freedoms for a11 the inhabitants of South Africa. The Government of South Africa was invited to avail itself of the assistance of the experts in order to bring about a peaceful and orderly transformation of the present society in South Africa. Without even having heard the views of the Group of Experts, or their suggestions or requests, the Government of South Africa refused to eo-operate in any form. It is indeed most regrettable that the South African Government did not accept this opportunity of initiating a confidential dialogue with the United Nations. Instead, insult was added to this attitude of intransigenoe. When the Group of Experts submitted its report; [S/5658],& the Government of South Africa in an officia1 communication [S/5723]y criticized the findings of the group as well as its method of work, even attacking the persona1 disposition of individual members of the group. 66. 1 shall limit myself to the general observation that it ill-behooves a Government: to criticize an international body for having based its findings on insuffitient or incorrect facts concerning that Government’s policies when that very Government has refused any and a11 co-operation with that body. 67. est qu’il lui-même et non & une fraotion eider de l’avenir lement fin des consultations 67. The main conclusion of the Group of Experts is that it is for the people of South Africa itself-but, of course, a11 of them, not only some of them-to decide the future of their country. The Group of Experts also pointed to the urgency of bringing the people into consultations at the national level for that purpose. 68. We believe that the recognition of the right of self-determination has been one of the most important 68. de libre dbtermination tants progrgs depuis de libre determination, pleinement prenons sud-africaine quant à l’avenir advances made in the international field in the last two decades. Through the peaceful application of the principles of self-determination a great number of States have gained full independence and sovereignty. We fail to see why the majority of the population of South Africa should not also be consulted about the future of their country. We further believe it to be a 69. It is not difficult to understand that the intransigence of the present Government of South Africa, in general, and the increasing severity of the oppressive measures employed, in particular, have led to a strong demand that the Security Council should now decide to apply economic sanctions against South Africa. At the same time, serious doubts have been raised as a matter of principle regarding the feasibility of employing measures of economic boycott in time of peace. It is the view of my Government that great tare and prudence should be exercisedboth with regard to political judgement or evaluation as well as with regard to the specific provisions which have been laid down in the Charter concerning such measures, We believe that it is the Security Council -and only the Council itself-which cari take the decision and the responsibility in regard to thepolitical and legal aspects of the question of sanctions. Needless to say, these are very serious questions involving our Organization’s relations to a Member State-South Africa-as well as the future direction of OUF Organization itself, In that respect 1 am referring to the faot that thenon-enforced and ineffective decision of Che League of Nations to institute sanctions against Italy proved to be the begianing of a rapid decline towards final collapse. 70. Notwithstanding the serious doubts which have been raised as a matter of principle, my Government is ready to support and co-operate in a technical and practical study of the feasibility, effectiveness and implications of measures which cari be taken under the Charter, We believe that it is only when the Council has a comprehensive report on the many technical and practical aspects of the feasibility, effectiveness and implications of these measures that it, the Council, in turn cari make its decision regarding the Charter or legal aspects and with regard to the policy to be pursued. 71. After due reflection and consultations it is our considered view that a task of this magnitude and importance to the Organization as a whole could only be entrusted to representatives of Governments. We further believe that the best cross section of opinions, as well as interests inour Organization in this regard, is to be found in the composition of the Security Council itself. We therefore believe that the technical and psactical study should becarriedout by experts representing a11 members of the Security Council, and appointed by them. 72. With reference to the consultations which my delegation has been having on this qUestion, permit me as an afterthought ta add that in a problem of this nature there is hardly any Member State that cari be considered neutral in the normal sense of that Word. ‘73. Sir Patrick DEAN (United Kingdom) : The Counoil has heard and Will take careful account ofthe speeches 75. 1 shall not today repeat what has been earlier said by my delegation in this Council, in the Assembly and in Assembly Committees regarding our general attitude towards the policies pursued by the South African Government, except where such repetition is direct@ relevant to our position on the report itself. 1 should like, however, to remind my colleagues that we voted in favour of the 4 December resolution primarily because we believed that the examination by the Experts then proposed would, to quote the words 1 then used, “give hope that some bridge cari be found over which the people of South Africa cari cross to a future, fair and just to a11 its inhabitants without discrimination” [ 1078th meeting, para. 141. 75. Je ne répeterai pas aujourd’hui ce que ma del& gation a deja dit devant le Conseil de S&urit& l’Assembl8e g&&ale l’Assembli3e en ce qui concerne notre attitude g&&ale & l%gard de la politique du Gouvernemenf sud-africain, sauf dans le cas oh une repétition pourrait Eclairer rapport. Je voudrais toutefois rappeler & mes col- 18gues que nous avons voté en faveur de la &Solution du 4 &cembre, avant tout parce que nous pensions que l’examen par les experts qui Btait alors propos8 donnerait - je cite mes propres paroles - “l’espoir qu’un pont pourra &tre jet6 qui permettra .% l’Afrique du Sud d’avancer vers un avenir juste et Equitable pour tous ses habitants sans distinction” [10788me seance, par. 141. 76. Under the terms of the resolution of 4 December, thhe Group of Experts had the task of examining “. ~ ~ methods of resolving the present situation in South Africa through full, peaceful and orderly application of human rights and fundamental freedoms to a11 inhabitants of the territory as a whole, regardless of race, colour or creed, and to consider what part the United Nations might play in the achievement of that end”. 76. Aux termes de la r&olution du 4 dbcembre, le Groupe d’experts etait charge “d’étudier les méthodes qui permettraient de regler la situation actuelle en Afrique du Sud par l’attribution integrale, pacifique et Ordonn&e des droits de l’homme et des libert& fondamentales B tous les habitants sur l’ensembleduterritoire, croyance, et d’examiner le r81e gue l’Organisation des Nations Unies pourrait jouer dans la r8alisation de cet objectif”. 77. The resolution also invited the Government of the Republic of South Africa to avail itself of the assistance of this group in order to bring about such peaceful and orderly transformation. Unfortunately, the Government of the Republic of South Africaproved unwilling to receive the Group of Experts, The group had, therefore, to proceed in its work without such advantages as might have been expected from consultation with that Government. This in itself must be a matter of regret to the Council; it is certainly a matter of regret to my delegation. We have always believed, and continue to believe, that there is no prospect of real progress in South Africa unless and until some form of dialogue with that country’s Government cari be set in train. 78, It cannot be disputed that the Group of Experts was set a task of great difficulty. 1 think that nevertheless a good many of the members of this Council had hoped that the study could have provided us with some more precise clues as to the manner in which developments in South Africa might be furthered to lead to freedom and justice for a11 in South Africa. 0.P OWn experience in matters of constitutional development suggests to us that these goals are only to be achieved by an evolutionary process if change is to be accomplished peacefully, It seemed to my dele- 77. La r&solution invitait aussi le Gouvernement de la RBpublique sud-africaine à faire appel & l’assistance de ce groupe pour rgaliser cette transformation pacifique et ordonnee. Malheureusement, le Gouvernement de la RBpublique sud-africaine n’a pas Bte dispos8 a recevoir le Groupe d’experts. Le Groupe a. donc dl3 travailler aurait pu attendre de consultations avec ce gouvernement. C’est la une situation que le Conseil ne peut que regretter et que ma delégation deplore vivement. Nous avons toujours pense et nous Continuons ~3 croire qu’il n’y aura aucune chance de progres r8el en Afrique du Sud tant qu’un dialogue n’aura pu être engage sous une forme ou sous une autre avec le gouvernement de ce pays. 78. Il est incontestable que le Groupe d’experts s’est vu confier une tâche extr@mement difficile. demeure pas .moins qu’à mon avis, bon nombre de membres du Conseil esperaient que cette Etude aurait pu B la manii%e dont on pourrait agir sur la situation en justice pour tous dans ce pays. Notre propre expBrience dans le domaine du développement constitutionnel nous donne 2 penser que l’on ne peut atteindre ces buts que par un processus bVOlUtif, si l’on veut 79. TO my delegation, the vital problem, namely, is this: given the present circumstances in South Africa, what is the direction in which constitutional advance may be found? My delegation, at any rate, had hoped that an objective study of alternative posslbilities of evolution, which would give ail sections of the population in South Africa a reasonable hope for peacetil constitutional evolution, would provide us with at least the basis of a truly realistic programme for progress. 80. Now, the report before us makes only one proposai to this end: thîs is the establishment of a national convention fully representative ofthe wholepopulation. 1 would not for one moment wish to argue that this would not be an ideal way to proceed, especially if it could be coupled with the steps suggested by the experts in paragraphs 44 and 45 of their report, for an amnesty for political opponents of the South African Government. The various suggestions in paragraphs 50-59 of the report are a11 valuable and, in our view, deserving of oonsideration. But given the realities of the present position, it is to my delegation a matter of some regret that alternatives to this particular method of making progress were not considered and set out in the report, particularly as the recommendations contained in paragraphs 113 and 121 of the report appear to imply that if this proposal for a national convention is not accepted, this Council should then move to coercion, I am bound to say that this seems to me to be a somewhat extreme position. Means and ends cannot be divorced. 81. 1s there ground for any confidence that rapid changes in South Africa brought about by outside coercion would create an order of society in which the rights and aspirations of a11 communities are safeguarded? It is from within South Africa that changes must corne about, and they should be acceptable to the people of South Africa as a whole in accordance with their rights and aspirations, It must be a just society in which ail cari live and Prosper without fear. 82. Paragraph 114 of the report recommends suppost for the experts’ proposal regarding the establishment of a United Nations South African educational and training programme. We entirely agree that equal educational opportunities in South Africa are essential if the goals of constitutional progress are to be satisfactorily achieved, Present deficiences and discrimi- 83. How far useful planning, as suggested in paragraph 85 of the report, cari now proceed unless the South African Government is itself prepared to consult with the specialized agencies in the matter, we are more doubtful. 84. We endorse the appeal for an immediate amnesty for opponents of apartheid made in paragraph 116, although it would not presumably be the intention of the Council to seek to include in such an amnesty persons guilty of crimes such as murder which are punished in any ordered society. 86. We see more difficulty, however, in the invitations proposed in paragraph 118, as amplifiedbyparagraph 119, for a11 concerned to communicate their views on the agenda for a convention. The Government of South Africa is a Member of this Organization. We must still hope that progress on this matter cari be achieved by consultation with that Government, however unlikely this may appear. But it seems to us that to address ourselves to bodies outside the Government at the same time as we are endeavouring to persuade the Government itself to enter into a dialogue with the United Nations is to prejudice our attempts from the start. 86. In paragraph 120 the Group of Experts recommends that pending a reply to the proposed invitation by the Security Council, there should be set in hand an urgent examination of the logistics of sanctions. Before the Council endorses this recommendation, it should consider the purpose behind it. This is to be found in paragraph 121 of the report, The recommendation recalls the conviction of this Council that the situation in South Africa is seriously disturbing international peace and security. The experts go on to say that this situation has deteriorated further, due to the actions of the South African Government. This is a statement of opinion which it is for this Council to evaluate. un jugement, Nations bution integrale, l’homme habitants 87. 1 do not think that the Council, in framing paragraph 6 of the resolution of 4 December, had sought to do more than solicit the views of the experts as to the manner in which the United Nations could assist a full, peaceful and orderly application of human rights and fundamental freedoms to a11 inhabitants of South Africa. 88. With a11 respect to the group appointed by the Secretary-General, 1 do not think it was for them to recommend to this Council SO serious a step as the application of economic sanctions. We are a11 well aware that a step of this nature is only properly to be taken in accordance with Article 41 of Chapter VII 88. perts pas qu’il appartenait a ce groupe de recommander Conseil l’application tous parfaitement 90. There is no question here of abreachof the peace or of an act of aggression, and in our view no such threat to the peace exists at the present time. 91. The failure of the Government of South Africa to pay heed to the urgent requests of this Cou&l to desist from policies which are an affront to any civilized conscience is a matter of very deep concern to every Member. But a failure to take steps in accord with the request of this Council does not of itself create the situation in which a determination under Article 39 cari be made. TO determine this it is necessary to look at the situation within South Africa itself. Although the racial policies of the South African Government are, and rightly SO, the subject of world-wide condemnation, it cannot be said with any certalnty that such policies directly endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. There are no elements discernible to my delegation which could now cal1 for the kind of action appropriate in cases of threats to the peace or breaches of the peace under Chapter VII of the Charter. TO this extent the present situation does not seem to my delegation to differ from that which faced the Council in July and December of last year. 92. In addition to the report of the Group of Experts, we of course have also in front of us a further report from the Special Committee [S/5717]. The report has as one of its annexes a note on developments in South Africa since the Special Committee’s report of 23 March. 93. My delegation shares the ooncern of the Special Committee that, SO far from relaxing the repressive legislation which the Government of South Africa relies on to support its policies, that Government has in fact supplemented it. But, granted this, it seems to me difficult to argue from the events recorded in the Special Committee’s report that the situation has SO far deteriorated as to offer immediate danger to international peace. ask whether such measures woulcl, in fact, ensure a solution. 94, The report, of course, reflects the conviction -1 think 1 cari fairly say the passionate convictionof its authors, supported by the statements made here by the Mrican Foreign Ministers and their colleagues, that only coercion cari produce a solution of the South African problem. But those countries which would have to bear the main burden of the sort of measures which the Group of Experts and the Special Committee are now urging are entitled to 95. It may be that this Council at some future date Will be having to consider recommendations or decisions under another Article of the Charter, and nothing that 1 hav,e to say now is necessarily relevant to the position whioh my delegation might find it 97. Pr&i&ment sabilit&, plus B perdre sur le plan pratique si les dangers entrevus par de nombreux orateurs comme pouvant natire de la situation actuelle de l’Afrique devaient effectivement nous savons aussi que tout embargo Bconomiqueexige des mesures d’application, et nous rep&ons ici ce qui a dé@ et.6 déclare au nom de notre delégation devant la Commission politique spéciale: “On voit mal oomment concilier l’id&e d’une solution pacifique et celle de la coercition-1, n 97. Just because of those interests and responsibilities, there is probably no country which stands to lose more in real terms if the dangers which many speakers foresee arising from the present situation in South Africa should in fact corne about. But equally we know that any economic embargo requires enforcement, and we state again what was stated on behalf of our delegation in the Special Political Committee: “We are in danger of self-deception if we suppose that the concepts of a peaceful solution and of coercion cari be reconciled.” i/ 98. Of course, it would bs possible to study the logistics of a concerted imposition of sanctions on South Africa, But, however thorough the study, the fact remains that, to ensure the effectiveness of economic sanctions, the sanction of force would have to be at least in the background. No one cari guarantee, no study can demonstrate without peradventure of a doubt, that sanctions would be effective; no one cari deny that imposition would be an experiment of a most grave and dangerous nature. And then what? Would the Council then be prepared to take action under Article 42 and attempt by force to compel South Africa to change its policies? 98. Bien entendu, il serait possible d%tudier la logistique d’une action concertee visant & imposer des sanctions B l’Afrique approfondie que soit l’étude, le fait demeure que, si l’on veut que des sanctions Economiques soient efficaces, moins rester une éventualit8 toujours présente. Nul ne peut garantir, aucune étude ne peut dbmontrer en toute certitude que des sanctions seraient efficaces; nul ne peut nier qu’imposer des sanctions constituerait dangereuses. Et que se passerait-il Conseil serait-il prêt B agir en application de lfArticle 42 et à essayer par la force d’obliger l’Afrique du Sud à modifier sa politique? 99, Over and over again, we have been told in the Assembly and in this Council that it is the abject of the opponents of apartheid to bring about change by peaceful means. We Count ourselves among those opponents of apartheid. We are no less convinced than any Member of this Organization that change must corne about, but we are equally convinced that it must be through peaceful means, by changes in legislation, in attitudes of mind and heart fromamong South Africans of every race, and in a manner in which a11 people in South African cari acquiesce. 99. A maintes et maintes reprises, on nous a dit a l’Assembl&e g&!?.rale et au Conseil de sécurité que l’objectif était d’amener un changement par des moyens pacifiques. Nous nous rangeons nous-mêmes parmi les adversaires de l’apartheid. Nous sommes convaincus aussi, comme tout autre Membre de l’Organisation, qu’il faut qu’un changement se produise; mais nous sommes Bgalement convaincus que ce changement doit s’opérer pas des moyens pacifiques, par des modifications dans la legislatfon, par des transformations dans l%tat d’esprit et les sentiments de tous les Sud-Africains manii?re que tous les habitants de l’Afrique puissent y consentir. 100. In determining our position on such proposals as may flow from this general debate on the matter, the attitude of my delegation Will be governed by the requirement to uphold the Charter, by the considerations to which 1 have referred and by the need to further peaceful constitutional evolution in the Republic of South Africa. 100, En arr&tant sa position sur les propositions qui pourront &re faites 9 l’issue de cette discussion gBnérale, ma délégation s’inspirera de respecter viens d’évoquer et du besoin de favoriser une &?olution constitutionnelle africaine. The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m. 9 5% Officia1 Records of the General Assembiy, Eighteenth Session, Special Politics Commitcee, 386th meeting, para. 10 9/ Voir session, HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications moy be obtained distributors throughout the world. 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