S/PV.1135 Security Council

In accordance with the decision previously taken by the Security Council on this question, 1 shall now invite the representatives of Madagascar, Indonesia, India, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Pakistan and Tunisia to take places at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mri L. Rakotomalala (Madagascar}, Mr. L. N. Palar (Indonesia), Mr. Narendra Singh (India), Mr. C., B. Rogers- Wright (Sierra Leone), MT, J. R. Grimes (Liberia), Mr. V. A. Hamdanî (Pakistan) and Mr. Taïeb Slim (Tunisia) took places at the Council table.

The Council wiZ1 now continue its discussion of.the draft resolution submitted by Bolivia and Norway [S/5769]. The first speaker on my Est is the representative of the IVORY COAST and, with your permission, 1 Will speak in that capacity. 3. First of all, 1 should like to thank the representative of Norway, and the representative of Bolivia, for the efforts they have made to enable the Council, should the draft resolution before us be adopted, to bring its debate on apartheid to an honourable conclusion, Having myself been involved in the negotiations, 1 know the difficulties which the sponsors OP this draft resolution have had to overcome in order to present us with this balanced text. 4. The draft resolution admittedly contains some positive elements. It once again condemns apartheid and seaffirms that apartheid ia oontrary t0 human rights, contrary to the Charter and contrary to South Africa’s obligations under the Charter. It CallS for the abolition of the iniquitous laws of apartheid; endorses the principle that the future of South Afrioa must be determined by the country’s entire PeoPle, 5. Il n’y figure, dans particulierement de prochder ce projet pas demandé dont il s’inspire que sa mise laquelle exprimés 5, There is no doubt that the term “measurest’ is fOund, as the sponsor of the draft resolution himself said, in specific Articles of the Charter, particularly in Chapter VII. Nevertheless, before proceeding to the vote, we wish t.0 state that this draft resolution is net ours. It does not express our views, and is far from representing what we have asked of the Council. Its principles and intentions are praiseworthy, but it seems to us that they are paralysed by the form in which they are to be expressed and put into practice. 6. Thus we repeat that we do not believe that the men of Pretoria are in a sufficient state of grace to be led by the Holy Spirit to modify, in the way we a11 desire, the situation they have created, by means of interna1 legislative and constitutional reforms, 6. Nous que les hommes grâce afin de modifier, tous, formes 7. It seems to us, then, that paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the draft resolution represent merely pious hopes. &IoreOver, that Government has already given anegative reply. 7. Ainsi, 6 et ‘7 du projet vœux. D’ailleurs, repondu par un non. 8. As for the expert committee, it is rendered ineffective by its composition, Not only is the position of three countries-not the least in importance-well known, but it has been impressed upon us that they will not be bound even by the committee’s findings. It 1s certain that either the committee Will break up of itself, or else it Will admit failure in submitting to us a report in the form of a statement recording the position of each member. We had already expressed reservations regarding the Group of Experts provided for in the resolution of 4 December 1963 [5/54?1],u and the fate of the report [S/5658, annex]Q of those experts and their conclusions has proved us to be right. Now, likewise, we make explicit reservations regarding the new committee contemplated, and we do SO in order to place our position on record at this juncture. For our part, we consider that the situation created by apartheid does not disturb the peace but does endanger international peace and security. We believe that a11 Articles of the Charter are applicable, and that there is no reason to study their applicability at this time. We consider that the studies required for the immediate application of sanctions are available to us ail. 8. Quant rend inopérant. - et non encore les conclusions Ce qui est desagrégera de carence de pro&s-verbal Nous Groupe cembre de ces experts sions des reserves nous les faisons pour theid et la securite les articles n’y a pas cabilite. disposition immediatement 9. Nevertheless, we shall vote in favour of the draft resolution. We shall vote for it because it contains, albeit in a purely nominal way, certain positive elements which we have mentioned. We shall vote for it, sbove all, because we need in our struggle a11 our Latin American friends, a11 our friends, the smaller OcMries Of Europe, the European neutrals and particularly the Scandinavian countries which have ranged themselves on our side and, with their peoples and their trade unions, are effectively combating apartheid, TheY need a supplementary study of this sort before gOiag further in the common struggle we have under- 9. Cependant resolution. contient, tains Nous voterons avons amis latino-americains, pays d’Europe, culi&rement de notre syndicats, ont besoin I/ OffloiaI Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Supplema for October, November and December 1963. I/ Documents Supploment u Ibid., Nineteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and Juae 1964. 2 Ibid., 12. Secondly, we consider that thespecial Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa which was to follow the development of those polioies and’whose vigilancehas enabled us to hold this meeting of the Council, should continue its work in accordance with the terms of reference originally laid down by the General Assembly. 1.3. Finally, we consider that the General Assembly, which already has the problem of apartheid inscribed on its provisional agenda, should continue, at the appropriate time, to discuss it. 14. It is therefore with these reservations that we shall vote in favour of the draft resolution before us.

On 4 December 1963 the Security Council unanimously adopted [10?8th meeting] a resolution submitted by the Norwegian delegation. That resolution [S/5471] was regarded, at the time, as containing elements which, by their nature, would not suffice to compel the leaders at Pretoria to change their policy. However, the African States and the African delegations to the United Nations did not fail to pay sincere tribute to the efforts made by the Norwegian delegation and, more gcnerally, by the Scandinavian countries with regard to this problem of apartheid. 16. At the current series of meetings similar efforts have been made by the Norwegian delegation, but they have been reinforced by those of the Bolivian delegation-which gives to the prosent undertaking a much more comprehensive aspect. During the past few weeks we bave followed with interest, and often with sympathy, these efforts which have finally resulted in the draft resolution now before us. 17. Obviously the results secured by these efforts, these conversations and these contacts are far from reflecting the standpoint of Africa, the standpoint of the South African nationalists and the standpoint of the African delegations to the United Nations. But we mist not on that account underestimate their importance and the sacrifices made in order to achieve them. They are, we feel, the outcome of an effort to which we must once again pay tribute; forwe are well aware of the almost unshakable attitude, adopted in the’ Security Counoil by certain important delegations which opposè the Africans’ stand on sanctions, which, in our view, are the only measures that can be taken against the leaders at Pretoria in order to compel them to change their policy. peaceful and orderly change in their policy, in conformity with the United Nations Charter and with the feelings of the South Afrioan people as a whole. 19, We therefore oonsider that, at the stage whioh ths problem of apartheid has now reached, only eco- 19, Nous nomic sa&ions cari be sufficiently effective. We are lution of ths opinion that the only valid task of the committee sanctions efficaces, provided for in operative paragraph 8 of this draft rssolution Will be to study what measures cari be taken paragraphe along the lines of sanctions. n’aura sures 26, My delegation does not conceal the fact that it finds itself in a novel situation resulting from the statement made by Mr. Stevenson the day before yesterday when he said: “. . . and in particular [we] do not subscribe to the recommendation ‘of paragraph 121 of the report of the Group of Experts . . .ll [1133rd meeting, para. 261. 20. Ma delegation dans Une situation que M. mentionne graphe quelles nous ne souscrivonspas.. par. 261. 21. Thus a very important delegation which is voting in favour of this draft resolution already excludes, in downright fashion, any possibility of applying sanctions against South Africa. This situation arouses in us a desire not to vote in favour of the paragraphs concerning the establishment of this expert committee. My delegation would certainly have taken such a deoision, had we not already committed ourselves to our Norwegian friends, with whom we have collaborated closely in the preparation of this draft resolution. 21. Ainsi, en faveur façon categorique, sanctions laquelle nous nous trouvons de ne pas à la creation aurait si elle ne se trouvait amis de la Norvege; vaille, projet de resolution. 22. We consider that the committee provided for in this draft resolution will have to study the possibility of applying sanctions against the policy of apartheid. If it does not do SO, it Will not reflect the meaning of the vote we shall cast in favour of the draft resolution before us. We therefore think that the committee to be established under this draft resolution Will have to study ‘ail the recommendations, without exception, of the report of the Group of Experts, including those in paragraph 121 of that report. 22, Nous considérons que le comite prévu dans ce projet de resolution devra etudier la possibilité de prendre des sanctions contre la politique d’apartheid; s’il n’agit pas ainsi, il ne refletera pas le sens que nous donnons actuellement au vote positif en faveur du projet de rhsolution qui nous est soumis, Par conséquent, nous considérons que le comit0 qui sera créé en vertu de cette résolution devra étudier toutes les recommandations du rapport du Groupe d’experts, qui se trouvent au paragraphe 121 de ce rapport. 23. Having said this, 1 should like to stress some of the positive aspects of this draft resolution, First of all, it is in itself timely in view of present oiroumstances; and we consider that any draft resolution, even if not fully in line with our views, is better than nothing. 23. Cela dit, je voudrais mettre l’accent sur certains aspects positifs de ce projet de rholution. Tout d’abord, ce projet est, en lui-meme, opportun dans les circonstances actuelles; nous estimons qu’un projet de rholution, fisamment à ce quenous désirions, est mieux que rien. 24, D’autre part, ce projet de resolution comporte Un certain nombre d’é16ments nouveaux qui méritent notre attention. En premier lieu, c’est un projet qui rappelle et réaffirme toutes les positions antérieures prises par le Conseil de &curité dans ses resolutions p&cédentes, Politique d’apartheid ou l’appel pressant adresse au Gouvernement de la République sud-africaine pour qu’il renonce a l’execution de toutes les personnes :ondamnees a mort, pour qu’il accorde immediatenent llamnistie a toutes les personnes détenues, )our ‘qu’il abolisse la pratique de I’emprisonnement 3ans mise en accusation. 25. We aIs0 consider that this draft resolution incor- Porates certain of the recommendations contained in ths report of the Group of Experts-recommendations 24. Moreover, this draft ,resolution contains a number of new features which warrant our attention, In the first place, it is a draft that recalls and reaffirms a11 ths preViOUs ‘positions taken by the Seourity Council in its resOlUtiOns, whether it be the condemnation of ths PolicY of apartheid or the urgent appeal to the Governmsnt of the Republic of South Africa to renounce ths sx&cUtion of any persons sentenced to death, to grant immediate amnesty to a11 detained persons, and to aboli& the practice of imprisonment without charges, 25. Nous considerons également que ce projet de &olution fait siennes certaines des recommandations :ontenues dans le rapport du Groupe d’experts, et qui 26. Taking account of a11 this and of the fact that operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolutionprovides that the Security Council shall note the recommendations and conclusions in the report of the Group of Experts-the recommendations as a whole, without exception, including that in paragraph 121 of the report-my delegation Will vote in faveur of this draft resolution.

The delegation of the Soviet Union considers it necessary to explain its vote on the draft resolution IS/5769] submitted to the Security Council. 28, In their statements during the discussion in the Security Council of the problem of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa, the representatives of African and Asian countxies have clearly indicated what measures the Council should take in order to put an end to the explosive situation in the Republic of South Africa. The delegations of African and Asian countries have unanimously appealed to the Security Council to abandon the policy of fruitless admonition and persuasion and the practioe of delaying decisive action in respect of the racist policy of apartheid in the Republic of South Afrioa. 29. Both the reports of the Special Committee [S/5621 and S/5’717] 3/ and the statements of representatives of African and Asian countries have plaoed special emphasis on the role of those countries, first and foremost among them the United Kingdom, the United States and France, which maintain close economic and political ties with the Republic of South Africa and whose direct assistance enables that country cynically and with impunity to flout the decisions of the United Nations. 30. It was therefore primariIy to these countries that appeals were addxessed to help the world to restrain the fascist regime of Verwoerd. Bowever, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have not heeded the urgent appeal of the African-Asian countries and have takenno account of the wishes of the indigenous population of South Africa. On the contrary, they have shown utter indifference towards the legitimate clemands of ths African peoples. Worse still, the representatives of the great Western Powers stated in the Securitp 31 Same text as A/5692 and A/5707 respectively, (see Officia1 Records of the General Assemhly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes). 32. Thus we are witnessing yet another blunt refusa1 by the Western countries to support the reasonable and justified demands of the African-Asian States that the fascist slave-owners should be restrained and that the criminal lawlessness of the racist régime and the excesses of the executioners in Pretoria should be brought to an end. The Western Powers thus demonstrate that they side with the shameful policy of apartheid and share the responsibility for the crimes against mankind committed in the Republic of South Africa. 33. The USSR delegation has in its previous statements [112’7th, 1130th, 1131st and1134thmeetingsJ set forth in detail the positions of the Soviet Union regarding the policy of racial discrimination and apartheid pursued by the South African regime. We were and still are of the opinion that the Seourity Council should decisively and unconditionally demand the implementation by the Pretoria régime of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, which cal1 for the policy of racial discrimination and apartheid being brought to an end. 34. The delegation of the Soviet Union is convinced that the only effective form of pressure that cari be brought to bear on the racist Verwoerd régime is immediate and effective economic, political and other sanctions, as proposed in the recommendations of the Special Committee which has fully demonstrated its effectiveness and which must certainly continue its work. 35. As the Security Council has seen, the Western Powers-primarily the United Kingdom and theUnited States of America-by objeoting to the application of economic sanctions against the raoist regime of the Republic of South Africa have once again revealed their predatory colonialist nature, They have shown that their own selfish interests and the profits they derive from the victims of an inhuman racist policy -surely a monstrous form of enrichment-are much more important to them than any humanitarian or moral principles. 32. refus demandes et fascisants, nelles des bourreaux sances de la honteuse responsabilité pétres 33. tail, lLSOeme, de l’Union discrimination le regime demandons fermement de Pretoria, semblee politique 34. seul de Verwoerd sans autres, du Comite son ses travaux. 35. convaincre, le Royaume-Uni sanctions la Republique leur montré nita de lucre dépens humain. 36. For the reasons stated, the USSR delegation cannot support the draft resolution and will not vote for it. 36. gation lution et elle votera 37. votre cutive en anglais de ma cleclaration. 37. 1 should like to follow the Presidentls example and waive the consecutive interpretation of my speech into English.

Inow cal1 on the Secretary-General who has expressed the wish to make a statement. 38. au Secretaire faire une declaration.

In accordancewith financial regulation 13.1, 1 should like to inform the 39. Conformément 40. Under operative paragraph 9, the Secretary- General would be required “to provide to the Expert Committee the Secretariat’s material on the subjeots to be studied by the Committee, and to co-operate with the Committee as requested by it”, The cost of the servicing of the meetings of the Committee cari be met from within the budgetary resources already available. 41. Operative paragraph 11 calls upon “the Secretary-General in consultation with appropriate United Nations specialized agencies to establish an educational and training programme for the purpose of arranging for education and training abroad for South Africanslf . This may entai1 the need for addition.a funds, the size of which cari be determined only after a suitable programme has been drawn up in consultation with the specialized agencies concerned. 42, In the absence of any provision in the Organization’s budget for 1964, it Will be my intention to seek the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to meet the additional expenses referred to above, under the terms of paragraph 1 of the General Assembly resolution 1985 (XVIII) relating to unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for the financial year 1964.

There are no more speakers on my list for explanations of vote before the voting. 1 therefore assume that the Council is ready to vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/5769.$ A vote was taken by show of hands. 21 favour: Bolivia, Brazil, China, Ivory Coast. Morocco, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Against: None. Abs tentions: Czechoslovakia, France, Union of Soviet Sooialist Republics. The draft resolution was adopted by 8 votes to noce with 3 abs tentions.

The first speaker on the list for an explanation of vote after the voting is the sepresentative of the United States, on whom 1 now call.

wanted to intervene briefly to express once again the appreciation of the United States delegation both to the co-sponsors of the resolution which has just been adopted and to the several delegations which have worked SO hard and SO long to reach an agreement on its terms. As the representative of Norway said the day before yestsrday [1133rd meeting] in introducing the resolution, it represents a compromise, but we feel a valid coinpromise which may well provehelpful towards the solution of this stubborn problem which -/ For the text adopted see document S/5773 (Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1964). Gouvernement recommandons alors miques commande. “If no satisfactory reply is received from the South: African Government by the stipulated date, 0 . * ws recommend that the Security Council should then take the decision to apply economic sanctions in the light of the result of the examination recommended . . , . above.” 18/5658, Annex]. 47. l’id8e si elle aux recommandations convention, sanctions de fait, 47, What we cannot aubscribe to is the concept of an ultimatum to South Africa that unless it complies with the recommendations for a convention by a stipulated date, economic sanctions Will automatically be applied, regardless of the factual situation. 48, Secondly, 1 am sorry that the Soviet Union could 48. n’ait étudiées pourrait agir Sud. A notre guerre être de l’Union positives du Sud. not support a resolution calling for a study of rneasures whioh might be taken by this Council in acoordanoe with the Charter to influence the repugnant racial policies of South Africa. In our opinion, another rhetorical cold war attaok on the United States, which could have been copied from a hundred similar attacks by the Soviet Union, is not a substitutefor some positive action about the sad situation in South Africa. 49, As 1 said the other day [ 1133rd meeting, para. 311, the United States Will continue to search for practical means which Will assist in bringing about the changes that 1 am sure we a11 seek. We will not only use our best efforts to implement effectively this present resolution, but we Will continue to adhere to past resolutions. ,Paragraph 12 of the resolution that we have just adopted reaffirms provisions oontained in t.he resolutions adopted in August and December last. At those times my Government defined its position on these questions [1052nd, 1056th, and 1078th meetings] and affirmed its adherence to these provisions. Iwish t0 reaffirm the United States adherence to these provisions, with, of course, the same understanding that was set forth in August and Deoember by the representative of my Government. 49. par. moyens ments Nous ne ferons que la resolution continuerons Le paragraphe d’adopter dans les &Solutions derniers. d4fini 1056eme et 1078&me s&nces] de ces Etats-Unis bien entendu, sentées représentant 50. pinally, let me express the hope, which1am sure 1s Common to a11 the ,representatives here present, that when we next meet on this question we will he ahle to perceive more improvement in the racial situation in South Africa than we have heretofore. 50. j’en suis sentants consacr8e dans la situation lioration jusqu’a

My dele- .@ion would first wish to express its appreciation to the rePreSentatiVes of Norway and Bolivia and to other rePresentEhiVes for their work in producing successfullY the resolution which the Council has just adopted. 51. Sir l’anglais]: remerciements la Bolivie ont permis que le Conseil 53. First, the situation in South Africa is not such as to permit the decision by the Council, to cal1 for the imposition of coercive measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. 54. Second, we do not believe that ooercive measures are the right way to dealwiththisproblem. We intend, in the study to be undertaken by the Expert Committee to be established by the Council to make our views on this point explicit. It follows that in voting for this resolution and in participating in the work of the Expert Committee, we are in no sense committed, now or at any time in the future, t0 support measures of coercion against South Africa. Our position in this respect is the same as that stated by the United States representative on 16 June. 55. 1 would like to remind the Council of our statements in the debates of this Council in August [1054th and 1056th meetings] and December 11078th meeting] and at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly, bath in committee ancl in plenary.5/ 56. At the same time, we believe it essentialthat the Council should be in the position to weigh a11 the possible implications of the application of measures under Article 41 of the Charter sothatwhennext this matter is before us there cari be no doubt in the mind of anyone what is involved. 1 emphasize thesepoints because we owe it to this Council to ensure that our vote should not be misinterpreted, 57. 1 have one further point, The fourth preambular paragraph of the resolution recalls the resolutions of the Security Council of 7 August 1963, [S/5386], 4 December 1963, [S/5471], and 9 June 1964, [S/5761]. 1 wish to remind the Council that my delegation abstained on the resolutions of 7 August 1963 and 9 June 1964 and that, in voting in favour of the resolution of 4 December 1963, 1 stated the reservations which we felt bound to express on operative paragraphs 1 and 5 of that resolution [1078th meeting, paras. 18 and 201. 58. In relation to operative paragraph 12 oftheresolution which we have just adopted, 1 should therefore repeat that the position of my Government on the export of arms remains as stated in the Secretary- GeneraYs report [S/5438]61 of 11 October last and, on the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture of such arms, ns was stated in my speech of 4 December 1963 in this Council. 59. I also would like to regret the negativecharacter of the intervention of the representative of the Soviet Union. 5/ Sec Officia1 Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Special Political Committee, 386th meeting and Plenary Meetings, 1238th meeting. dl Sec Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1963. 61. montre, la discrimination En revanche, qu’il aussi Etat Membre.

As its actions show, the Freuch Government has always condemned racial discrimination in a11 its forms. On the other hand, now as in the paSt, it considers that the United Nations is not entitled to intervene SO directly in the domestic affairs of a Member State. 62, My Government hopes that there Will be changes in South Africa. But it does not think that the desired reforms cari be brought about by intervention of the type now proposed. On the contrary, the use of suoh a method could only harden positions and crystallize the present state of affairs. 62. des Mais telle que celle aux réformes méthode cristalliser 63. For this reason, while associating itself with reprobation of the policy of apartheid and with the appeals for clemency addressed to the South African Government, the French delegation was obliged to abstain from voting on the draft resolution just adopted by the Council. 63, C’est bation de la politique à africain, tenir adopte par le Conseil,

During the general debate [ 1130th meeting] my delegation expressed its views on the apartheid question and also on the measures to be taken by the Council in view of the present situation. 64. M. HAJEK general, [1130&me ainsi que sur Conseil, 65, In previous resolutions the Council has condemned the racist policy of apartheid as incompatible with the principles of the Charter and contrary to the obligations of the Republic of South Africa as a Member of the United Nations. The Council has also found that the situation oreated by this policy of racial discrimination and persecution seriously disturbs international peaoe and seourity. The Government of South Africa has rejected every appeal to reason. This being SO, there remains no solution other than to take appropriate measures, under Article 41 of the Charter, in order to ensure that the authority of the United Nations is respected and to tope with a situation whioh constitutes a threat to international peace and security. 65. Puisque rieures, comme Charte sud-africaine Nations crébe per&cution et la sécurité nement il mesures la Nations constitue internationales. 66. Such a conclusion, moreover, is in line with General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) adopted in 1962 and recalled by General Assembly resolution 1881 (XVIII), unanimously adopted. Similar action has also been called for as a matter of urgency by the representative of the African nations, in the course of our Couucills debate. In particular, 1 would recall the WO~~S used by the Secretary of State of Liberia en 8 June when our proceedings opened: 66. Une a la r&olution adoptee (XVIII), action par le représentant du debat au sein de notre conseil. de rappeler 8 juin par s’est “Under the circumstances, 1 think we are left with no alternative but to urge the Security Council to aPPlY economic sanctions as the only peaceful PeCOUrSe left open to resolve the issue and remove that threat to international peace and seourity.” [1127th meeting, para. 71.1 reste pas d’autre ment au Conseil tions reste menace [1127eme 67. It is on the basis of these facts, conclusions and justified claims that we deemed it necessary to con- 67. et de ces “We do not desire a resolution of a wish and not of a Will. The Security Counoil, above a11 else, cari provide the world with an instrument by which humanity cari defeat the despotism of the racist Government of Premier Verwoerd and support it with free and self-respecting men. In Africa you Will be measured not by your words but by your deeds.” [w., para. 89,l 68. My delegation fully endorses these words, whioh epitomized the situation SO eloquently and indicated the way in which the Council should have acted. The text of the resolution just adopted expresses certain desires, transmits them to the racist Government of South Africa and makes an appeal to this Government, inviting it to accept certain conclusions and to cooperate in a field in which it has already refused a11 co-operation. 69. On the other hand, where the situation demands that the Council take a decision on concrete measures, the resolution does nothing more than propose the establishment of a committee to study the possibility of adopting such measures. Yet informationis already available on the economic and technical possibilities and the probable effects of such measures. Nofurther studies are needed. What is lacking is willingness on the part of certain States to take specific measuresin this case, economic sanctions. We have indicated the reasons for this unwillingness to draw the appropriate conclusions from statements made by the representatives of the Governments affected to the United Nations, and even to the Security Council during the present discussion. We do not believe that further studies cari induce the reluctant Governments to draw the appropriate conclusions from the antiracist statements which bave been made, and to act accordingly. Qn the contrary, these studies may furnish a further pretext for postponing the essential measures, the urgent need for which has long been felt. 70. In this connexion the statement made by the representative of the United States on 16 June Iast [1133rd meeting] and further explained by him today, and the statements made by the representative of the United Ilingdom, are significant and, 1 may say, hardly encouraging to those who believe that, if additional studies on sanctions were undertaken by a committee of experts representing Governments, it would be possible to persuade the Governments ooncerned to abandon their policy, which gives practical support to the eoonomy and to the military preparations Of the apartheid régime. 71, The resolution which has just been adopted proposes nothing more than inadequate, ineffective measures and therefore does not correspond to the immediate needs of the oppressed and exploited non-white population of South Africa, to the justified desires and claims of the African and Asian nations, or to the well-defined position of world opinion.

Inow cal1 upon the representative of Liberia, 73. Le PRESIDENT: sentant du Liberia. 74, Mr. GRIMES (Liberia): As far back as 1960 the Security Council at its 856th meeting adopted a resolution [S/4300] ywhich, among other things, recognized that the situation in South Africa had led to international friction and if continued might endanger international peace and security. 1 believe that the Security Council at that time fully realized that the policy of apartheid practised by the Government of South Africa was sowing the seeds of interna1 disorder in South Africa and spawning racial conflict in Africa thatwould endanger the peace and stability of the rest of the world. 74. M. GRIMES 1960 dej&, sa 856eme seance une resolution naissant avait conduit si elle se danger la paix et la securite que le Conseil compris le Gouvernement désordre sance en Afrique danger la paix et la stabilit8 75. The Council recognized that no racial policy in the long or short run in South Africa would suceed unless it was made acceptable to the non-whites in that country, and theref0r.e this unhappy spectacle of human behaviour by South Africa would have to be abandoned in order to bring about racial harmony based upon equality, which is the demand of the 13 million non-whites. This has not happened. South Africa has shown not only contempt for the authority of the Security Council but also defiance, and it has persisted in its abominable and diabolic practice of apartheid, which restricts the development of one class of its citizens, and keeps in human bondage mis majority by repressive legislation. 75. Le Conseil à long ou a court du Sud si les non-blancs devra cesser tement raciale de non-blancs. ainsi. L’Afrique de mepris elle l’a abominable le développement qui, par une legislation majorite 76. It is because of this continued deterioration of the situation in South Africa that the African and Asian representatives in their statements in this debate have urged the Council to impose sanctions against South Afrioa. The situation in South Africa has worsened since 1960 and has definitely endangered international peace and security, as was foreseen by the Security Council at that lime. 76. C’est de la situation sentants dans ce débat de prendre La situation et, comme le Conseil de sécurite elle a incontestablement la sécurité 77. Whenwe urged the imposition of sanctions during this present debate, we were aware that economic sanctions are feasible and practical. Some African and Asian States have contributed to the financing of the recent International Conference on Economie Sanctions against South Africa and that Conference, .composed of first-class experts fsom many parts of the world, concluded that total economio Sanctions on Scuth Africa are feasible and practical and cari be effective. It concluded also that the adverse effeots of such a policy on world trade, finance and the economies of individual countries having a significant share in the South African economy would be small and marginal, 77. Lorsque, siste pour vions que des sanctions et applicables. avaient Conférence contre l’Afrique nissait rbgions economiques possibles efficaces. néfastes merce mondial, pays ayant des interêts sud-africaine 78. The Security Council has just adopted a resolution in which the Ccuncil for the first time condemns the apartheid policies of South Africa; appeals again for 78. Le Conseil lution dans laquelle il condamne la politique a iW* Fifteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1960. 2 Ibid., quinzième 79. For this mild resolution we had hoped that there would have been a unanimous vote of the Council, and we are disappointed that this did not materialize. 80. It is our understanding that a report of the Expert Committee created by this resolutionwill be submitted before the end of the nineteenth session of the General Assembly; that the Special Committee Will continue its valuable studies on the situation in South Afriea and that, should these be a further deterioration of the situation in South Africa, the African and other Member States Uri11 be entitled to raise this question again before this Council, 81. Furthermore, a Conference of the African Heads of States and Governments Will be convened next month in Cairo and, in our opinion, this action by the Security Council Will net in any way preclude them from initiating additional measures against South Africa if they SO wish or deoide. 82. 1 would be less than frank if 1 did not tel1 you that when one considers the number of appeaIs and resolutions which have been made and adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council and the fact that South Africa has not only contemptuously ignored them but is defiantly practicing more repressive and oppressive measures, the African and Asian States would bave preferred to see this Council, which has the important and primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, take more resolute action than this resolution provides. 83. There is no doubt that a11 of us would prefer to see peaceful change in South Africa, and this we have always urged because apartheid is abhorrent to a11 of us and is really a crime against humanity of monstrous proportions. There is also no doubt that South Africa has failed to respond favourably to the appeals for peaoeful change, has violated its obligations under the Charter and has refused a11 appeals to start a “dialogue” which seems to be the great obsession of some members of theCouncil.However, letmeremind suoh Council members that it takes at 1eaSt tWo to have a dialogue. 84. It is equally true that a11 members of the Cour&1 have agreed that the situation in South Africa iS seriously disturbing international peace and SecuritY and that the situation has deteriorated since that determination was made last year by this Comoil. 85. As Members of the United Nations we have the obligation to act in accordance with the principles 85. En tant contained in its Charter and when we persistently Nations violate these principles, the Organization has the mément power and the duty to take action to ensure respect violons for, and compliance with, these principles. Specious sation a le pouvoir et le devoird’agirpour arguments which have the result of preventing the le respect et l’application, Des arguments spbcieux Organization from taking effective action in such qui ont pour &sultat d’empêcher l’Organisation de prendre en pareil cas des mesures efficaces, surtout circumstances, especially when advanced bq permanent members of the Security Council, are a great quand ils sont avanc& par des membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité, desservent fâcheusement disservice to the United Nations. l’Organisation des Nations Unies, 86. Whilst we still prefer to see a peaceful solution of this grave problem, we do believe that a threat to the peaoe does exist and that coercive measures are indeed necessary to resolve it. 86. Tout en oonservant notre prgfkrence pour une solution pacifique du grave problame qui nous occupe, nous pensons qu’il existe effectivement une menace contre la paix et que des mesures de coercition sont vraiment nécessaires pour r&oudre la question. 87. For those who think to the contrary, who criticize every recommendation and are opposed to every proposai, we ask them here and now tosuggest a feasible alternative plan which will ensure the peaceful change we a11 desire and we Will gladly accept it. We shall, however, delude ourselves if we think this matter cari be settled by merely pious expressions of hope ancl protestations of concern, 87. Quant 8. ceux qui pensent le contraire, qui critiquent toutes les recommandations et s’opposent a tOUteS les propositions, nous leur demandons de proposer immBdiatement un autre plan qui soit applicable et assure l’évolution pacifique que nous désirons tous, et nous serons tr&s heureux de l’accepter. Nous nous bercerions d’illusions, cependant, si nous imaginions que cette question puisse se régler simplement par de platoniques expressions d’espoir et manifestations d%nqui&ude. 88. Further, let me say that no African State wants to violate the Charter, It is too meaningful a document, But we are somewhat perplexed by those countries which, in the case of apartheid, use legal pyrotechnies to lend implied support to South Africa under the guise of guardians of the Charter, while in some other instances they have themselves violated their own obligations under the Charter. My only additional comment on this would be: From such guardians, good Lord, deliver us. 88. Qu’il me soit permis de dire encore qu’aucun Etat africain ne veut violer la Charte, Ce document est trop important. Mais nous ne laissons pas d’être perplexes devant l’attitude de certains pays qui, dans l’affaire de l’apartheid, ont recours 3, des artifices juridiques pour jouer les gardiens de la Charte et prendre une position qui revient à soutenir l’Afrique du Sud, alors qu’en d’autres circonstances ils ont eux-mêmes violé les obligations que la Charte leur impose, A leur sujet, je n’ajouterai qu’un mot: que Dieu nous preserve de semblables gardiens! 89. In spite of OU~ disappointment and our reservatiens on the resolution, we have accepted it because it does move us slightly forward by the Security Council’s decision to study measures. There would, in our opinion, be no need for the Security Council t0 study measures if a threat to the peace did not exist, and, regardless of the verbiage some bave used, this step is a significant one. 89. Malgré notre di5ception et nos rgserves, nous avons accepté la résolution parce que la décision prise par le Conseil de s&urité d%tudier les mesures & prendre repri%ente un 18ger progr??s. Anotre avis, le Conseil n’aurait pas besoin d’étudier des mesures s’il n’existait pas de menace contre la paix et, quel qu’ait pu &tre le verbiage auquel certains ont eu recours, c’est l?i une d&ision importante. 90. We are indeed grateful to Ambassador Nielsen and the delegation of Norway, as well as the Bolivian delegation and to a11 the members of the Security Council who have voted in support of the resolution to enable us to make this advance. We hope that the Council Will set about its task with the urgency which this matter demands, for when that report is completed, we feel that the Security Council Will have to make a decision-a final decision on which feasible measure should be applied to resolve the situation resulting from apartheid. For if, as we are convinced will be the case because of the study presently available to us, measures are found by the Security Council’s Expert Committee to be feasible and practical, members of this Council Will undertake an awesome responsibility if they refuse to apply them. Al1 Africa, Asia and the world now await your final decision. 90. Nous sommes sin&rement reconnaissants a M. Nielsen et a la dé1Bgation norvégienne, ainsi qu% la délégation bolivienne et 2 tous les membres du Conseil de s&uril& qui ont vot8 pour la réSOlUtiOn et nous ont ainsi permis de rgaliser ce progr& Nous espérons que le Conseil se mettra au travail avec toute la diligence voulue car nous pensons que, lorsque le rapport sera achev8, le Conseil de &Ourit8 devra prendre une décision - et cette fOiS une d8cision definitive - sur le choix de la mesure realiste a appliquer pour résoudre le problbme cri% par l’apartheid. En effet, si le Comité d’experts du Conseil de sécuritk arrive, comme nous d’après l%tude dont nous disposons dkj8, & la conclusion que des mesures sont possibles et applicables, les membres du Conseil de sécurite aSSUmeraient une bien lourde responsabilité s’ils refusaient de les

In introducing the draft resolution [3/5’769] on 16 June, the representative of Norway described it as “anegotiated compromise draft resolution”, He also rightly said that II... this draft resolution contains not what many would bave liked to sec” [1133rd meeting, para. 131. He was speaking, no doubt, against the background the difficult and prolonged consultations which preccded the production of the draft resolution, and in the light of how, even in his view , the resolution falls far short of what was expected on such a grave issue, 93. My delegation would certainly have liked to have seen this Council adopt a much stronger resolution, one which preferably would have involved a decision to impose economic sanctions against the Government of the Republic of South Africa for its continued violation of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights through the practice of the heinous doctrine of apartheid. Furthermore, by its resolution of 4 December 1963, this Council had admitted that the situation in South Africa resulting from the practice of the policy of apartheid was seriously disturbing international peace and security, As the situation has deteriorated seriously since the adoption of thatresolution, it was hoped that the Council would now feel able to consider tzhe situation a sufficient threat to the peace to require the application of coercivemeasures under Article 41. of the Charter. That the situation has worsened considerably since this Council’s adoption of the resolution of 4 December 1963 is without question. 94. In my earlier statement before this Council on 8 June [1127th meeting] 1 already macle reference the new repressive measures which have been used by the Government of South Africa and which have now culminated in the unjust ancl inhuman sentences imposed on the defendants at the Rivonia triais. And be it remembered that thesc sentences were passed shortly after this Council had, on 9 June 1964, adopted a resolution [S/5761] 8/ which in paragraph 1 of its operative part, urged the Government of SouthAfrica, II (lu) TO end forthwith the tria1 in progress, instituted within the framework of the arbitrary laws of apartheid; “(9 TO grant an amnesty to a11 persons already imprisoned, interned or subjeoted to other restrictions for having opposed the policy of apartheid, and particularly to the defendants in the Rivonia triaI”. 95. However, in spite of this latest disregard of its efforts for a peaceful solution of the problem apartheid; in spite of this latest outrage against racial equality; in spite of the fact that these sentences have inflamed a11 Africa and brought the prospect of a continental racial war in Africa perceptibly closer, seems that the Council is still not convinced that s/ Ibid., Nineteenth Year, Supplement for April. May and June 19G4. 96. Si c’était sanctions sa politique de comprendre oonsidgrer rence r6unie et d&idG a prendre avoir 6tudi8 du Conseil africaine, une décision contre Ensuite, des sanctions est parvenue, & la conclusion Btaient possibles nexe II, par. par le Secrétaire graphe clare catégoriquement: 96, If this were the first time that the application of sanctions against South Africa for its racial policiés was being considered, perhaps it would have been casier to understand the reluctance of the Council to consider the idea. However, theSummitConference of Independent African States in Addis Ababa as far back as May 1963, considered the problem and resolved: “Ta co-ordinate concerted measures of sanction against the Government of South Africa”. The Conference of African Foreign Ministers in Lagos, meeting in Febru&ry 1964, after considering the same problem, took a decision bestowing their blessing on the imposition of sanctions against South Africa for its racial policies. Again, in April 1964, the International Conference on Economie Sanctions against South Africa, after a most thorough examination of the problem, concluded “that total economic sanctions are politically timely, economically feasible and legally appropriate” [S/5717, Annex II, para. 741. Finally, the Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General in pursuance of paragraph 6 of the resolution of 4 December 1963, states categorically: “The Security Council in December 1963 expressed its strong conviction that ‘the situation in South Africa is seriously disturbing international peace and security’ . This situation has deteriorated further due to the actions of the South African Govornment. If no satisfactory reply is received from the South African Government by the stipulated date, the Security Council, in our view, would be left with no effective peaceful means for assisting to resolve the situation, except to apply economic sanctions, Consequently, we recommend that the Security Council should then take the decision to apply economic sanctions , . .” [S/5658, annex, para. 1211, “En décembre déclaré Afrique s6curité core sud-africain. parvient fixée, plus soudre sanctions 97. It is, therefore, a sad fact that the Council has not been able to arrive at a compromise resolution which responds to this almost universal cry for sanctions, However, we have every confidence in the wise judgement of the Council and we take oomfort in the fact that the Council is now undertaking its own study of the question of sanctions. It is our earnest hope that when the results of this further study are available to the Council, it Will find itself able to take the appropriate measures before it is too late. 9’7. Il parvenir r8ponde sanctions en la sagesse dans le fait Etude de la question fermement étude seront mesure ne soit trop tard. 98. My delegation wishes to emphasize, however, first, that this resolution should not in any way interfere with the work of the Special Committee; secondly, that at any time the situation warrants it, this matter should again be brought before the Council; and third, that the report of the Group of Experts to be appointed under operative paragraph 8 of this resolution should be submitted to the Council preferably before the end of the nineteenth session of the General Assembly. 98. Ma d’abord, les travaux devrait si la situation et enfin désign6 lution, avant la fin de la dix-neuvigme blée gén6rale. 99. In conclusion, let me say that insufficient as tbis resolUtiOn is, it Will emphasize enlightened world opinion as to how little the traditional tradingpartners of South Africa are prepared to give to the cause of liberty, equality and fraternity. 99. En terminant, bien qu’insuffisante, l’opinion naires commerciaux sont prêts 1’6galité 102. At the outset the Indian delegation would like to convey its appreciation for the labours of Mr. Nielsen and Mr, Castrillo Justiniano. The record of the Nordic countries in the field of decolonixation and the fight against apartheid is well known. What the delegation of Norway has to say on these matters we listen to with respect, We are also grateful to Mr. Castrillo Justiniano of Bolivia. Latin America represents, we know, a multiracial society. We have, of course, heard with interest and respect the views expressed on the resolution by the representatives of African States, 103. We are happy at the reaffirmation of the Council’s cal1 to a11 States to cesse forthwith sale and shipment of arms and ammunition, military equipment and material for manufacture of arms in South Africa. With the situation in South Africa ever worsening, is a11 the more necessary that a11 States now adhere to this cal1 of the Security Council, 104. We cari also draw satisfaction from the factthat the Council’s resolution recognizes that the future of South Africa cari be decided only by a11 the people of South Africa at the national level. Here the Council recognizes that South Afxica is not a fief of the few This means that it is for the ruling minority to corne to terms with the majority. The resolution also recognizes that the convention has to be at the national level, that is, that it is against any partition and is for the upholding of the territorial integrity of the country. 105. 1 should, however, like to express tothecouncil the disappointment of my delegation regarding that portion of the resolution that deals with the economic boycott of South Africa, 106, The Minister of State, Mrs. Lakshmi Singh, speaking to the Council la& week [1127th meeting] had made our position on the actionwewant the Council to take absolutely clear. Thirty African and other States including India are committed to General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII). Paragraph 4 of that resolution asks for a total trade embargo on South Africa. The Indian view is th&t a total economic boycott of South Africa should be enforced by the world to force the racist Government of South Africa change its policy of apartheid before the racial issue blows up in the face of a11 the world. We also feel that the main responsibility for success in applying the policy of economic sanctions lies with the major trading partners of South Africa. Conditions in South Africa have not improved since that resolution was passed, but they have grown much worse, as has indeed been clearly recognized by nine members of the Council including one of the two maintradingpartners of South Africa. 108. It has been argued that the Council should not apply economic sanctions to South Africa as this would be a policy of pressure or coercion and that instead, we should work for an alternate solution-a negotiated settlement with the Government of South Africa, This view fails to take into acoount the fact that the South African Government has defied the Uiited Nations for a11 these years. The letter of the permanent representative of South Africa to the Security Council, dated 22 May 1964, is the latest proof of South Africa’s refusa1 to co-operate with us. The representative of Norway went SO fax as to cal1 it an insult to the Group, who were appointed by this Coun- 108. quer parce de coercition, autre le Gouvernement pas compte bafoue années. l’Afrique Conseil l’Afrique Le représentant qualifier le Conseil. sont exactement, les solutions persuasion. C ‘est probablement mes dtaocord que les qui demeure d’apartheid cil. Furthermore, it is not clear to us what alternatives to the policy of sanctions the advocates of persuasion have in mind. None were given tothe Council. Presumably there are none. We agree with the Group of Experts that economic sanctions are the only hope left of bringing about a peaceful change in the policy of apartheid, 109. At Ieast one of the main trading partners of South Africa has placed the responaibility f or suffering and violence in South Africa on the repressive measures of the South African Government. The main trading partners of South Africa must bear a large share of responsibility for the consequences of the continuation of the policy 02 apartheid. 109. merciaux frances imputables ment merciaux de responsabilité de la politique 110. Ihdia remains committed to the full implementation by a11 the Member States of the United Nations of General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII). Further, Iadia bas fully supported the decisions of the Heads of African States taken in Addis Ababa in May 1963 and the resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at Lagos in February 1964. 110. application semblée l’Organisation apport8 les chefs en mai 1963 ainsi des ministres a adoptée a Lagos en février 111. Paragraph 8 in the resolution definitely falls short of our expeotations. The representative of Nor- Way bas explained that the Experts Committee of the 3eCuritY Council is not intended to get bogged down h legal squabbles-that is, on Article 2 (7)-or on the political advisability of sanctions. He says the intention iS to go into the consideration of the question SO that the Co-Üncil may have before it the nuts and I.11. Le paragraphe nement sentant d’experts sntraiher rente, Charte politique 112. But let net our disappointment on this issue of application of sanctions be interpreted as a victory for South Africa. The day of doom for apartheid is inexorably drawing near. First of ail, the resolution does not preclude any State from enforcing boycott of South Africa immediately. We who have boycotted South Africa sinoe 1946 indeed hope that further and total measures of boycott Will be ordered by other States wlthout delay. Secondly, there is a measure of a slightly greater involvement toward sanctions among the main trading partners of South Africa. Their position is something like that of the mari who says that ho has no intention of going to California but does not mind going to the railway station to find out the time of the train to California. 1 cari only repeat the words of my Minister of State here the other day: “May Providence give them a right judgement to enable them to uphold the dignity of man and the peace of the world ,II [1127th meeting, para. 185.1 113. Finally, 1 should like to make it clear that, SO far as we cari see, the resolution does not preclude the Security Council or the General Assembly or the Special Committee or any other body set up by the Uniteù Nations from continuing to discuss apartheid in the light of developments in the Republic and suggest or take action before the Expert Committee has given its Word. 114. May 1 thank the President and the members of the Security Côuncil for permitting my delegation to make these remarks in the present debate. 1 close with the hope that we will remain determined to take action here and everywhere to change the course of events in South Africa and abolish apartheid. We shall net get trippcd by small steps, but we shall use them as stepping-stones towards our goal of total economic boycott of South Africa and the smashing of apartheid.

1 cal1 upon the representative of Pakistan.

1 wish to thank the President for allowing me to intervene once again in this debate. 117. On behalf of my Government, which, as 1 said in my earlier statement [1129th meeting] before the Council, is partioularly agitated over the situation of race conflict in South Africa, and has been intimately concerned with the issue for more than a decade, 1 seek permission to place on record the indignation of our people at the attitude the Government of South Africa continues to show. There is no doubt that the recent Rivonia tria1 has been another rebuff to the Security Council, to the United Nations, and indeed to public opinion throughout the world, and there is no qUSStiOn 118. The Council has just adopted the resolution which, as the representativeof Norway himselfpointed out, reflects the strength as well as the weakness of a negotiated compromise resolution, TO the sponsors of the resolution, and to thosewho actively worked toward its formulation, we cannot stint OUI‘ gratitude for its positive aspects, The endorsement of the principle that a11 the people of South Africa should be brought into consultation and should thus be enabled to deoide the future of their country at the national level is, in itself, a matter of great significance. It is an indication that the true dimensions of the problem with which the United Nations is faced in South Africa are now being realized. Its significance is further enhancedby the readiness shown in the resolution to consider the implementation of this principle. The establishment of an educational and training programme for South Africans abroad is also a measure whioh, if implemented in its appropriate scope and without undue constraint, is bound to unfold effects of great benefit in the future. 118. résolution l’a lui-même force négociée. ceux qui ont activement nous ne pouvons aspects cipe selon lequel des consultations tout dgcider est en soi que les l’organisation du Sud apparaissent tance de la résolution te Conseil dudit gramme nelle pour les Sud-Africains ment l’ampleur & avoir des cons6quences 119. But the fact cannot be concealed that there Will be a lot of dissatisfaction throughout the world that it has not yet been found possible to apply such measures as would effectively impress the influence of the United Nations on the situation in South Africa. With a11 due respect to the reasoning-both legal and political-against resort to economic sanctions, the truth is that, where a11 persuasive measures have failed, coercive measures alone cari bring about a solution. 119. des gens, m6contentement possible vraiment une influence Tout en respectant tiques je moyens de persuasion de coercition 120. The Pakistan delegation fully appreciates the concept of peaceful and constitutional development expounded by the representative of the United Kingdom in his statement on 15 June, when he said: 120. tement constitutionnel a expo&e “Our Own experience in matters of constitutions1 development suggests to us that these goals are only to be achieved by an evolutionary process if change is to be accomplished peacefully.” [1131st meeting, para. 78.1 développement que l’on processus se fasse par, 78.1 Constitutional development cari, however, take place OnlY in a democratic environment, and not in one burdened with apartheid. Le développement intervenir non dans un climat alourdi par l’apartheid. 121. In any case, the absence of coercive measures for the present only increases the responsibility of those Governments which still have meaningful relations and contacts with the South African Government. It 1s evident that, SO long as the United Nations as a whole is not able to take effective action, the moral obligation falls heavily on those Governments to make aIl efforts to ensure that the Government of South Africa desists from its present insane course. 121. :ives la responsabilité des relations nement sud-africain. L’Organisation ne peut pas agir efficacement, morale :OU~ les efforts lement % choisie de suivre.

On behalf of the Council 1 should like to thank the Ministers and representatives of States who have taken part in the debate on this problem. Their contribution has been effective and is greatly appreciated by the Council. 1 believe that 1 speak for a11 my colleagues when 1 repeat that the Council is extremely grateful ta them. 124. The decision which we have just taken concludes this debate on apartheid. The meeting rose at 1.40 p.m. Litho in UN. Price: $US. 0.35 (or equivalent